

#4a

Since the adversary knows a v they can determine a solution to the expression $(ax + b)$ but cannot determine the exact values of a and b themselves. Both of these variables can be any number of combinations of primes. Furthermore, since x is a large prime and a, b are also prime integers it will take an unreasonable amount of time to determine the exact a and b used to get the result by brute force regardless of the fact they know the corresponding (x, v) pair. Therefore, the adversary must make a completely random guess with only the knowledge that v' must be between 0 and p , due to the definition of modulus. Since, the range of the guess is $(0, p)$. The probability that the adversary correctly guesses the verification value for x' is $1/p$.

#4b

If the adversary knows two pairs of (message, verification), then solving for a and b becomes trivial. Using simple substitution, the adversary can generate two equations where the only unknown is a and b by using the two messages as x and y , using their corresponding v and w as $h(x)$ and the known public prime p . Thus, very easily solving for a and b . Once the adversary knows the two primes a and b . They can generate any message x' and find its corresponding verification value by using the public has function. Thus, they have successfully generated a valid (message, verification) pair that can be used maliciously.

#4c

A scheme that would allow the adversary to know two (message, verification) pairs and still be unable to imitate either person would be to use a hash function in the form:

$$h(x) = ((ax + b) \bmod p) \bmod m$$

In this function, the newly added m represents the number of slots in the hash table, unknown to the adversary and is such that $p > m$. The new family of hash functions representing this form is:

$$H_{ab} = \{h : a, b \in \mathbb{Z}_p, a \neq 0\}$$

Assume that the adversary has the two message pairs (x, v) and (y, w) from part 4b. If the adversary wants to send a new message z with either v or w as the verification tag then the given hash functions are:

$$\begin{aligned} v' &= (az + b) \bmod p & w' &= (az + b) \bmod p \\ v &= (ax + b) \bmod p & w &= (ay + b) \bmod p \end{aligned}$$

Note that: $v' - v \equiv a(z - x) \bmod p$ and $w' - w \equiv a(z - y) \bmod p$

Therefore, v' cannot equal v and similarly w' cannot equal w , because p is a large prime and z, x, y are non-zero messages that are not equal. Thus, the only way the equation is true is if $a = 0$ which is a contradiction with the definition of the hash function family set up earlier. Furthermore, attempting to solve for the values of a and b will not be deterministic; there are $p(p-1)$ choices for each pair of a, b values. So for any input message, randomly picking a, b , there is an equal probability for any of those pairs of a, b to be the resultant hash value $h(x)$. Therefore the probability that a message, verification pair made by the adversary is legitimate is still $1/p$.