35°26′ N. and long. 4°32′ W. at a distance of 60 miles/96 km. to the south-east of Oran (Wahrān).

It lies on the southern slope of the Beni Chougran (Banū Shuḳrān) range (which rise to 3,054 feet/900 m.), called by the local people *Shāreb errīḥ* "drinker of the wind", and is built on the edge of a ravine at the bottom of which flows the Wādī Sīdī Tūdjimān and on the other side of which there stretches towards the north-west the suburb of Bāb ʿAlī. Mascara dominates one of the most fertile plains of Algeria, one which measures 25 to 30 miles/40 to 50 km. from west to east and 10 to 12 miles/15 to 20 km. from north to south. Here, the people have from earliest times grown cereals, whilst the Europeans introduced here the cultivation of tobacco and created vineyards whose product is renowned. As the market centre for a prosperous region, Mascara had in 1926 30,660 inhabitants, including 13,237 Europeans and 4,481 Jews; since then, the population has considerably increased, whilst the extraneous elements have been reduced to a negligible number.

Mascara is a small Berber town of considerable antiquity. According to al-Bakrī (*Masālik*, tr. de Slane, rev. Fagnan, 160), it included among its inhabitants people who came from Tahert (Tiaret), some of whom went and settled at Ifgan, a day's journey to the south-east when this town was founded by Yaʿlā b. Muḥammad b. Ṣāliḥ al-Ifrānī, in 338/949-50. Ibn Ḥawḳal (tr. Kramers-Wiet, 87) and al-Idrīsī (*Opus geographicum*, 251) mention Mascara as a large, well-watered village rich in fruits. The Almohads seem to have built a fortress there. The Zayyānids of Tlemcen kept a governor and a garrison there. Leo Africanus (tr. Epaulard, 338) notes the importance of the market which was held at Mascara, "one of the towns of the Beni Rasid" (Banū Rāshid), where one could buy, along with cereals in large quantities, cloth and articles of harness manufactured in the country. The rulers of Tlemcen drew considerable revenues from it: 25,000 ducats according to Leo, 40,000 pistoles, according to Marmol (*Africa*, ii, 356).

The Turks established themselves at Mascara in the 16th century and placed a garrison there. In 1701 they made it the capital of the *beylik* of the west, which had hitherto been Mazūna in Dahra. The beys lived there till Oran was reoccupied by the Algerians in 1792. During this period, Mascara, which had hitherto only been an insignificant place, began to look like a regular town. The beys built two mosques and a *madrasa*, a wall and a *ḳaṣba* and brought in a water-supply. The manufacture of burnuses and *ḥāʾiks*, celebrated throughout the Regency, enriched the inhabitants. This prosperity began to decline after the beys left Mascara and especially after the risings, which broke out in the province of the West in the beginning of the 19th century. The Darkāwī Ibn Sharīf seized the town in 1805 and held it for a time. In 1827 it was attacked by the marabout Muḥammad al-Tidjānī. Supported by the Hāshim, he gained possession of the suburb of Bāb ʿAlī, but was killed by the Turks when preparing to storm the town itself. At the end of the Turkish rule, ʿAbd al-Ḳādir [*q.v.*] who had been proclaimed Sultan by the tribes of the plain of Ghrīs, established his seat of government at Mascara, but rarely lived there. A French expedition in December 1836, led by Marshal Clauzel, occupied Mascara, which the French abandoned next day, after burning down part of it. The *amīr* returned to the town and held it till 30 May 1841, when a column under Bugeaud occupied it finally for the French. Mascara, then half in ruins, had only a population of 2,840 inhabitants.

Bibliography: Cès-Caupenne, *Mascara*, Paris 1856; Gorguos, *Notice sur Mohammed el Kebir*, in *Rev. Africaine* (1857); Lespinasse, *Notice sur les Hachem de Mascara*, in *ibid.* (1877); *Correspondence du capitaine Daumas*, Algiers 1912; *Tableau des Etablissements français dans l'Algérie*, year 1839; Guides Bleues, *Algérie-Tunisie*, index s.v. (G. YVER*)

MUʿAṬṬILA [see TAʿṬĪL].

MUʿĀWAḌA (A.), barter, exchange.

1. *Muʿāwaḍa*, barter, is historically an early form of the exchange of commodities between two parties and the predecessor of buying and selling (*bayʿ*; Roman law, *emptio-venditio*). In course of time, sale developed out of exchange when, with the coming of money, a sum was given in place of the goods which the other party had to give in return. In Islamic law we find the following four kinds of sale:

a. Exchange of one thing for another. This is the primitive method of exchange (*muʿāwaḍa*). Exchange is a transaction in kind. Payment takes place "hand upon hand" (*yadan bi-yadin*).

b. Exchange of a thing for a definite sum (*thaman*). By *thaman* (gold or silver) a sum of money is meant. Here we have a sale in the proper sense of the word [see BAYʿ].

c. Exchange of one definite sum (*thaman*) for another; this is the case of gold or silver being exchanged for each or one another. This is called *ṣarf* (money-changing).

d. Exchange of a claim (*dayn*, debt) for a definite sum. The main business under this head is the *salam* or *salaf* [*q.v.*].

2. *Muʿāwaḍa* is a subdivision of the form of agreement called *ṣulḥ*. According to Ibn al-Ḳāsim's definition, 338, and other *fuḳahāʾ*, such an agreement is either *ṣulḥ al-ibrāʾ*, reduction of debt (not wiping it out), or *ṣulḥ al-muʿāwaḍa*, exchange of debts. Ibn al-Ḳāsim thus defines the latter: "And the exchange, i.e. the composition, is the ceding of one's right to a third person, e.g. when someone claims a house or a part of it and he allows this claim and concludes an agreement with him by which the debt is paid in some definite thing, e.g. in clothes." In this case the creditor, instead of the thing claimed by him which the debtor is unwilling to give up, takes another to wipe out the disputed debt. An agreement may also be made about a legal claim instead of a thing. The following is a practical illustration. Zayd has a legal claim against ʿAmr. ʿAmr raises a claim against Zayd. Each of them abandons his claim in *ṣulḥ al-muʿāwaḍa* and the demands are cancelled.

3. Lastly, *muʿāwaḍa* is a technical term in the general Islamic law of contract, on which there is no comprehensive study taking full account of the sources. A contract (*ʿaḳd*) may be based on a one-sided or a mutual obligation (*contractus unilateralis* or *bilateralis*). The latter form, which is the basis for mutual obligations, claim and counterclaim, is called *muʿāwaḍa* in Islamic law. Examples of contract of this sort are those of sale, lease, marriage, etc.

Bibliography: L.W.C. van den Berg, *De Contractu "do ut des"*, Leiden 1868, 29; Aḥmad Abu 'l-Fatḥ, *al-Muʿāmalāt*, Cairo 1340, i, 41, 187 ff.; al-Shīrāzī, *Kitāb al-Tanbīh*, ed. A.W.T. Juynboll, Leiden 1879, pp. xi, xlviii, xiv; R. Grasshoff, *Die allgemeinen Lehren des Obligationenrechts*, Göttingen 1895; see also the usual works on *fiḳh*.

(O. SPIES)

MUʿĀWIYA I B. ABĪ SUFYĀN, the founder of the Umayyad dynasty of caliphs based in Syria (although not, as is often asserted, the first Umayyad caliph: that was ʿUthmān b. ʿAffān [*q.v.*], his second

cousin), ruled as generally acknowledged caliph from 41/661 to 60/680. His father was Abū Sufyān (Ṣakhr) b. Ḥarb b. Umayya al-Akbar b. ʿAbd Shams [*q.v.*] and his mother was Hint bint ʿUtba b. Rabīʿa [*q.v.*], on account of whom Muʿāwiya is sometimes referred to as Ibn Hind and *Ibn ākilat al-akbād*, "the son of the liver-eater" (cf. below).

The sources provide conflicting reports of the date of Muʿāwiya's birth and of his age when he died: he is said to have been born 5, 7 or 13 years before Muḥammad's call to prophethood, conventionally set in 610 A.D. (Ibn Ḥadjar, *Iṣāba*, Cairo 1328, iii, 433), and to have been aged 73, 75, 78, 80 or 85 years when he died in Radjab 60/April-May 680 (al-Ṭabarī, ii, 198, 199-200; see also Wellhausen, *Arab kingdom*, 139. Several different dates in Radjab are proposed; it can be added that Theophanes, *Chronographia*, ed. de Boor, 356, believed him to have died on 6 Artemisios, May). His father, a prominent figure in pre-Islamic Mecca, being the leader of ʿAbd Shams there, acted as the leader of the Meccans at the battle of Uḥud [*q.v.*] in 3/625 (in the course of which Hind mutilated the corpse of the Prophet's uncle, Ḥamza, and chewed his liver as an act of vengeance), and organised the confederacy that unsuccessfully besieged Medina in 5/627. Thereafter, however, he ceased to figure as a leading member of the Meccan opposition to Muḥammad. In 7/629 his widowed daughter, Muʿāwiya's sister Umm Ḥabība, married the Prophet; in 8/630 Abū Sufyān went to Medina to negotiate with him; and when in the same year Muḥammad entered Mecca, Abū Sufyān submitted and became a Muslim. According to Ibn Ḥadjar (*Iṣāba*, iii, 433, where the information is ascribed to al-Wāḳidī and preferred to a variant account), Muʿāwiya also made his Islam manifest at this time (thus too al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, 473), but in fact had been a crypto-Muslim since the treaty of Ḥudaybiyya [*q.v.*] in late 6/628. Both he and his father were nonetheless reckoned among the *ṭulaḳāʾ* and *ʿutaḳāʾ*, enemies of the Prophet who had fallen into his hands, either at al-Ḥudaybiyya (al-Ḳurṭubī, *al-Djāmiʿ li-aḥkām al-Ḳurʾān*, Cairo 1953-60, xvi, 281, *ad* Ḳurʾān, XLVIII, 24) or by virtue of the conquest of Mecca, and who had been released by him (cf. Ibn Hishām, 821; A.J. Wensinck *et alii, Concordance et indices de la tradition musulmane*, Leiden 1936-69, s.v. *ṭalīḳ*). They were also among "those whose hearts [were] reconciled", as was Yazīd b. Abī Sufyān (W.M. Watt, *Muhammad at Medina*, Oxford 1956, 73; and see AL-MUʾALLAFA ḲULŪBUHUM). Muʿāwiya went on to serve as one of the Prophet's scribes (al-Ṭabarī, i, 1782; al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, 473), being—so it is said—one of the seventeen literate Ḳurashīs at the time (al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, 471-2).

In 13/634 the caliph Abū Bakr sent Muʿāwiya to Syria, where he functioned as the commander of the vanguard of the Arab army led by his brother Yazīd in various operations against the Byzantines (al-Ṭabarī, i, 2085, 2090; al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, 108, 117, 119, 126); and, according to Sayf b. ʿUmar, he was present when the Arabs occupied Jerusalem in 16/637 (al-Ṭabarī, i, 2406, wrongly dated). When Yazīd b. Abī Sufyān died in the plague of ʿAmwās [*q.v.*] in 18/639, the caliph ʿUmar put Muʿāwiya in his brother's place (al-Ṭabarī, i, 2520 [*sub anno* 17]; al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, 141; Khalīfa b. Khayyāṭ, *Taʾrīkh*, ed. al-ʿUmarī, Nadjafʿ 1967, 109), and in the following year Muʿāwiya was in command of the Arab conquest of Ḳaysariyya (*q.v.* for details; and note in particular al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, 142, ll. 14-17). The extent of the responsibilities assigned to Muʿāwiya when his brother died is not entirely clear. According to one report, ʿUmar put him in charge of the *djund* of Dimashḳ and its *kharādj*, and assigned the *djund* and *kharādj* of al-Urdunn to someone else (al-Ṭabarī, i, 2520, citing Ibn Isḥāḳ, who also provides a confusing report at p. 2646 in respect of the year 21); but according to another, ʿUmar put him over both Dimashḳ and al-Urdunn (al-Ṭabarī, i, 2866, citing Sayf); and a third says that he appointed him over "Syria", apparently in the sense of Dimashḳ, al-Urdunn, Ḥimṣ and Ḳinnasrīn to the exclusion of Filasṭīn (al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, 141, citing Hishām b. ʿAmmār; cf. also 172, l. 5; and Theophanes, *Chronographia*, 340, where the whole of the greater Syria is included). The situation is hardly any clearer in respect of 23/644, the year of ʿUmar's death, or the arrangements made by ʿUthmān; on the one hand, Muʿāwiya was ʿUmar's governor of Dimashḳ (or Dimashḳ and al-Urdunn) in 23, the governor of Ḥimṣ (or Ḥimṣ and Ḳinnasrīn) being ʿUmayr b. Saʿd al-Anṣārī (al-Ṭabarī, i, 2737 [note e], 2798, 2866); but on the other hand, ʿUthmān put Muʿāwiya and ʿUmayr b. Saʿd in charge of (? confirmed their appointment over) "Syria" and al-Djazīra respectively (al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, 183). The solution seems to be that Ḥimṣ, Ḳinnasrīn and al-Djazīra were distinct from "Syria" at this stage (*pace* Hishām b. ʿAmmār, cited above) and formed an entity of their own, just as they had in 18/639 (al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, 172, l. 16, citing al-Wāḳidī); they did not lie within Muʿāwiya's remit until ʿUmayr stood down or was dismissed, when they were made over to Muʿāwiya by ʿUthmān (who had by then also made Filasṭīn over to him) (al-Ṭabarī, i, 2866 f., citing Sayf; al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, 183-4). According to Sayf, this bringing together of Syria (now in the conventional sense) and al-Djazīra under the sole control of Muʿāwiya took place two years after ʿUthmān's accession (*idjtamaʿa ʾl-Shaʾm ʿalā Muʿāwiya li-sanatayn min imārat ʿUthmān*; al-Ṭabarī, i, 2867), which would give us late 25/646 or early 26/647; and al-Wāḳidī knew that it had taken place by 31/651-2 (al-Ṭabarī, i, 2865).

While expressions of discontent with ʿUthmān and the representatives of his caliphal authority became increasingly manifest in ʿIrāḳ, Egypt and Medina in the course of the early 30s/650s, Muʿāwiya's Syro-Djazīran domain remained immune from such inconveniences, with the single exception of Abū Dharr [*q.v.*], who was quickly stifled. This was a front where there was plenty to do: Muʿāwiya had held it energetically against the Byzantines, establishing strong garrisons along the coast and instituting Arab maritime warfare in the Mediterranean—an activity earlier forbidden by ʿUmar (al-Ṭabarī, i, 2820-4; al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, 152-3). His firm government and continuing presence in Syria provided an element of stability. In addition, Syria had been the main Arab front in the time of Abū Bakr and, for much of the time, of ʿUmar, with the result that the fighting men sent there were made up largely of cohesive Arab clan groups keen to campaign; by contrast, those whom it had been possible to muster for the secondary front of ʿIrāḳ had for the most part been a miscellany of tribal oddments. This, together with the retention of the existing *djund* system in Syria, and the abandonment of any idea of establishing a single garrison city at al-Djābiya [*q.v.*] (or anywhere else) meant that each administrative unit was occupied by cohesive groups, whereas there was a mélange of diverse groups in Kūfa (see M. Hinds, *Kūfan political alignments*, in *IJMES*, ii [1971]). Arab newcomers could be accommodated in the appropriate *djund*s, and tensions of the

kind arising in Kūfa were obviated by the fact that the position of the tribal leaders was already established. In addition, it is possible that Muʿāwiya may have taken the opportunity to station in Cyprus some of those Syrian early-comers whose standing was "Islamic" rather than tribal (al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, 153-4).

Thus, when the caliph ʿUthmān was besieged in his Medinan residence by discontented provincials and others in 35/656, these elements did not include Arabs from Syria (Hinds, *The murder of the Caliph ʿUthmān*, in *IJMES*, iii [1972], 464). Muʿāwiya was among those governors to whom ʿUthmān sent word, asking for help, and (perhaps after some extemporising) he did indeed despatch a relief force, which turned back at Wādī 'l-Ḳurā on learning that ʿUthmān had been killed (al-Ṭabarī, i, 2959, 2985 [inconsistency in respect of the name of the leader]; al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, 204-5). Thereafter, Muʿāwiya simply bided his time in Syria while ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib [*q.v.*] sought to establish himself as leader and had to deal with Meccan-led opposition at the Battle of the Camel [see AL-DJAMAL] at Baṣra in 36/late 656. ʿAlī made no secret of his intention to dismiss Muʿāwiya from office in Syria (al-Ṭabarī, i, 3085-6), and Muʿāwiya studiously avoided paying any allegiance to him (al-Ṭabarī, i, 3089-90). By the time when, after the Battle of the Camel, ʿAlī sent a representative to elicit Muʿāwiya's oath of allegiance (al-Ṭabarī, i, 3254), there was mounting Syrian resistance to him, coupled with a desire to hold him responsible for the murder of the dead caliph (Wellhausen, *Arab kingdom*, 74-5); and, crucially, it was at this point too that ʿAmr b. al-ʿĀṣ [*q.v.*] agreed to support Muʿāwiya in return for a promise of Egypt when it could be detached from ʿAlī's control (al-Ṭabarī, i, 3249-54, 3397). It was ʿAmr who advised Muʿāwiya to rally the notables (*wudjūh*) of Syria by pinning the responsibility for ʿUthmān's death on ʿAlī (al-Ṭabarī, i, 3255); they were called upon to fight for *shūrā* (i.e. the appointment of the caliph by consultation, as had been the case with ʿUthmān) and vengeance for ʿUthmān; and they responded by swearing allegiance to Muʿāwiya in those terms, in his capacity of *amīr* (not caliph) (al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-ashrāf*, ii, ed. Maḥmūdī, Beirut 1974, 300, 327). ʿAlī's representative returned without Muʿāwiya's oath of allegiance to him, bearing instead the information that the Syrians had resolved to fight him on the grounds that he had killed ʿUthmān and harboured his [other] killers (al-Ṭabarī, i, 3255). The confrontation at Ṣiffīn [*q.v.*] ensued in late 36 and early 37/657 (see Wellhausen, *Arab kingdom*, 77-83; Hinds, *Kūfan political alignments*, 362-5).

Concerning the battle itself, it will be sufficient here to note that, against the widely reported view that the Syrians were losing, whereupon Muʿāwiya ordered the raising of the *maṣāḥif* and the call for a cessation of hostilities (Hinds, *The Siffin arbitration agreement*, in *JSS*, xvii [1972], 93-4), there can be set the non-Muslim contention that it was the Syrians who won this battle, a contention which is moreover corroborated by Umayyad court poetry (P. Crone and M. Hinds, *God's Caliph*, Cambridge 1986, 69). As for the subsequent arbitration (see ʿALĪ B. ABĪ ṬĀLIB, at I, 383-4; Hinds, *The Siffin arbitration agreement*), it is best summed up by Khalīfa b, Khayyāṭ in one sentence: "the arbiters agreed on nothing" (*Taʾrīkh*, 174). In Dhu 'l-Ḳaʿda 37/April-May 658 ʿAmr and the Syrians acknowledged Muʿāwiya as caliph (*sallamū ʿalayhi bi 'l-khilāfa*: al-Ṭabarī, i, 3359 ult., 3396; ii, 199).

Four more years were to pass, however, before Muʿāwiya was able to enjoy general recognition as caliph. His immediate goal was achieved relatively easily; Egypt was taken in Ṣafar 38/July 658 and ʿAmr formally took over as governor there two months later (al-Ṭabarī, i, 3407; al-Kindī, *al-Wulāt wa 'l-ḳuḍāt*, 31; Wellhausen, *Arab kingdom*, 93-8). This constituted a blow to the prestige of ʿAlī, who was by then preoccupied with Khāridjites [*q.v.*] in ʿIrāḳ; and although Muʿāwiya's attempt to subvert Baṣra in the same year through the agency of Ibn al-Ḥaḍramī [*q.v.*] failed, ʿAlī's position in ʿIrāḳ grew weaker, while his control of territories further east was largely non-existent (Wellhausen, *op. cit.*, 99, and note in particular al-Ṭabarī, i, 3449). Muʿāwiya waited, limiting his activities to small roving expeditions against the fringes of ʿIrāḳ and into the Ḥidjāz and the Yemen (Wellhausen, *op. cit.*, 100), and may have gone so far as to make a truce with ʿAlī in 40/660-1 (al-Ṭabarī, i, 3453; Wellhausen, *op. cit.*, 101); if so, it was presumably at the very beginning of that year (May 660), for in July 660 there took place at Jerusalem a formal ceremony of allegiance to him as caliph (T. Nöldeke, *Zur Geschichte der Araber im 1. Jahr. d. H. aus syrischen Quellen*, in *ZDMG* xxix [1875], 95-6; al-Ṭabarī, ii, 4; Wellhausen, *op. cit.*, 101-2). Any plans ʿAlī may have had to march against Muʿāwiya were cut short in Ramaḍān 40/January 661, when he was struck with a poisoned sword in Kūfa by the Khāridjite Ibn Muldjam [*q.v.*] and died some days later (Wellhausen, *op. cit.*, 102-4).The subsequent succession of al-Ḥasan b. ʿAlī Ṭālib [*q.v.*] was a short-lived affair, for Muʿāwiya now moved on ʿIrāḳ with an army; al-Ḥasan settled for compensation in return for abdication and Muʿāwiya entered Kūfa in Rabīʿ I or Djumādā I 41/July or September 661 (Wellhausen, *op. cit.*, 104-12). It is this year, the so-called *ʿām* or *sanat al-djamāʿa*, "the year of [unification of] the community" (e.g. al-Ṭabarī, ii, 199; Khalīfa, *Taʾrīkh*, 187), that is conventionally regarded as having marked the beginning of Muʿāwiya's caliphate.

Thereafter, Muʿāwiya had much to do in order to consolidate Sufyānid rule. Externally, there was above all the matter of Byzantium. In the Mediterranean he had already successfully challenged Byzantine seapower: in addition to having dealt with Cyprus [see ḳUBRUS] and raided Rhodes and Sicily, he had in 655 been in command of an Arab fleet of 200 vessels that had resoundingly defeated Constans II's fleet of 700-1000 vessels at the Battle of the Masts (on this and other operations against the Byzantines, see DHĀT AL-ṢAWĀRĪ in Suppl. and R.-J. Lilie, *Die Byzantinische Reaktion auf die Ausbreitung der Araber*, Munich 1976, 60 ff.). On the land frontier to the north, he had, as early as 646, advanced into Anatolia as far as Amorium [see ʿAMMŪRIYA], but further progress had been limited and the actual frontier had been more in the area of Adana by the time the onset of war with ʿAlī had forced Muʿāwiya to come to terms with the Byzantines on the basis of payment of tribute (Theophanes, *Chronographia*, 347). Now, however, he busied himself with settling Syrian coastal towns and improving their fortifications; Alexandria too was completely fortified (the work was completed by 670), and Egypt once more became the springboard of expansion into North Africa. The land offensive westwards was accompanied by an aggressive Arab policy at sea following the death of Constans II in 668. An expanded Arab navy raided as far as Sicily in 669, while the army in North Africa established al-Ḳayrawān [*q.v.*] as a base and forayed into what is now Algeria. Rhodes and Crete were overrun in 672 and 674 respectively and

the naval expeditions that followed amounted to a seven-year blockade of Marmora and Constantinople—a blockade that came to an end shortly before Muʿāwiya's death, when the Arab fleet was beaten off with Greek fire in 679. The same period witnessed regular annual incursions by land into Anatolia—incursions that had the advantage of providing booty and keeping the Arab army in trim. But late in his reign, Muʿāwiya once more may have had to enter into arrangements involving the payment of tribute to the Byzantines, this time in order to cope with the Mardaites (Theophanes, *Chronographia*, 355) [see DJARĀDJ!MA].

Internally, Muʿāwiya was faced with the task of defining and running a Syria-based caliphate capable of pulling together the sundered parts of the Arab domain and maintaining authority over an unruly tribal soldiery. In the Djazīra and the East, matters were particularly complex because the first conquests there had involved a double invasion of Arabs. The relatively united troops that resided in garrison cities under leaders backed by Medina were mainly Arabs from settled and semi-settled backgrounds; but their conquests were paralleled or, at times, even spearheaded by incursions of nomadic Arabs over whom the military leaders appointed by the caliphs had little or no control. In the Djazīra, the nomadic Sulamīs and other Ḳaysīs had enjoyed a free run for many decades, though Muʿāwiya had settled tribesmen of Muḍar and Rabīʿa on abandoned land in that region, permitting them to engage in agriculture, during the caliphate of ʿUthmān (al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, 178); and the situation had been further complicated by the influx of Kūfans and Baṣrans hostile to ʿAlī who "abandoned their *hidjra*" in favour of the Djazīra in the course of the civil war (al-Ṭabarī, i, 2673; al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-ashrāf*, ii, 297-8; al-Minḳarī, *Waḳʿat Ṣiffīn*, ed. Hārūn, Cairo 1382, 12, 146; al-Yaʿḳūbī, *Taʾrīkh*, ii, 218; al-Ḳushayrī, *Taʾrīkh al-Raḳḳa*, ed. al-Niʿsānī, Ḥamā 1387, 43; al-Dhahabī, *Taʾrīkh*, ii, 222; P. Crone, *Slaves on horses*, Cambridge 1980, appendix I, nos. 13, 14, 16, 19). According to Sayf, Muʿāwiya responded by detaching Ḳinnasrīn-Djazīra from Ḥimṣ and setting it up as a *djund* of its own (al-Ṭabarī, i, 2673). The *tadjnīd* of Ḳinnasrīn-Djazīra is, however, attributed to Yazīd I elsewhere (al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, 132).

In the case of ʿIrāḳ, few of the Tamīmīs and Bakrīs who had participated in the conquests settled at Kūfa and only relatively small numbers settled at Baṣra; for the most part they either returned to their own neighbouring pastures or pushed on into the remoter parts of ʿIrāḳ or beyond, into Khūzistān, Fārs, Kirmān and Sīstān. They had neither the desire nor the need to settle in garrison cities or other centres; and they were decidedly against any authority seeking to impose itself from outside. But the tightening up of control over the garrison cities themselves was also problematic. The basic problem here was that there were too many Arabs competing for too few resources, the lack of immigration controls having produced Arab over-population. Ziyād b. Abīhī [*q.v.*], Muʿāwiya's virtually autonomous viceroy in the East, dealt with this problem in a way which permitted him also to consolidate the conquests made in Khurāsān. He weeded out the *dīwān* lists of Kūfa and Baṣra, reorganised the tribal groupings, and moved an estimated 50,000 tribesmen and their families to Khurāsān in 51/671; these tribesmen were settled in the villages of the Marw oasis and were used to extend the Arab conquests in Khurāsān as far as the river Oxus (M.A. Shaban, *The ʿAbbāsid revolution*, Cambridge 1970, 31 ff.). Within ʿIrāḳ, Ziyād presided over a reorganisation which included confiscation of the *ṣawāfī*, erstwhile Sāsānid crown lands and other lands that had since the time of ʿUmar been locally regarded as the collective property of the original conquerors (Ṣ.A. al-ʿAlī, *al-Tanẓīmāt al-idjtimāʿiyya wa 'l-iḳtiṣādiyya fi 'l-Baṣra*, 2nd edn., Beirut 1969, 141; Hinds, *Kúfan political alignments*, 350, 367); and old-guard opposition to this was stifled by the exemplary execution of the veteran Ḥudjr b. ʿAdī [*q.v.*]. At the same time, tribal leaders (*ashrāf*) who were ready to toe the Sufyānid line formed the base of the power structure.

The nature of this *ashrāf*-based power structure has been best described by Crone (*Slaves on horses*, 31-3, and, in more detail, *The Mawālī in the Umayyad period*, Univ. of London Ph.D. diss. 1973, unpubl., 27 ff.). Their *sharaf* was usually carried over from the Djāhilī period and they therefore represented "the continued efficacy of pre-Islamic tribal stratification"; since individual *ʿashīras* [*q.v.*] were too small to function as autonomous units, some re-shaping had been essential: the tribal groupings at Kūfa had originally been *aʿshār*, then they were *asbāʿ*, and under Ziyād they were turned into *arbāʿ*; at Baṣra they were *akhmās*. Sometimes existing confederacies accounted for these divisions and sometimes the divisions were organised specifically in order to break up such confederacies. The divisions themselves were like semi-artificial *ḳabāʾil* and, indeed, the *ashrāf* of the Umayyad period are sometimes styled *ruʾūs al-ḳabāʾil*. The creation of these divisions engendered much rivalry for leadership, both between the divisions and within them, and also refusals to submit to particular leaders, as for example by the early Khāridjites or Ḥudjr b. ʿAdī. The balance was thus a delicate one. Equally delicate was the role of the individual *sharīf* as an intermediary in the Sufyānid power structure, supporting and in turn being supported by the ruling authorities. The *ashrāf* would come together in the governor's *madjlis* and would be present at the Friday worship when the governor came face-to-face with the tribesmen; the governor's own *shurṭa* [*q.v.*] was drawn from the tribesmen, apparently by vote.

The governors of the provinces were drawn from among kinsmen of the caliph and people who were otherwise close to the caliphal family circle. In Medina, the governors were Umayyads: in Mecca, Umayyads and then a Makhzūmī; in Egypt, ʿAmr b. al-ʿĀṣ and then notably Maslama b. Mukhallad [*q.v.*], who was one of the more important Anṣārīs who had stuck with Muʿāwiya; in ʿIrāḳ there was in particular Ziyād, whom Muʿāwiya had adopted as his brother by the process of *istilḥāḳ* (Wellhausen, *Arab kingdom*, 121). The governors functioned as the link between the caliph and the *ashrāf* of the provinces, and the preference for kinsmen helped "to secure the impermeability of the state...vis-à-vis the *qabīlas*" (Crone, *Mawālī*, 29). The principle, in short, was one of indirect rule, with a good deal of provincial autonomy. The governors of the Sufyānid period had full civil and military authority within their huge provinces: the *amīr* or *ʿāmil* (the terms seem to have been indistinguishable at this time) organised the army, conducted expeditions, led the worship, built mosques, administered justice, maintained order, ran the information network, appointed sub-governors (also called *amīrs* or *ʿāmils*), supervised the entire taxation system and (in principle at least) sent the surplus to Damascus. The use of pre-existing bureaucratic machinery, run by indigenous elements, meant that

the revenues were kept separate from the tribal framework; payments were made to tribesmen via the *ashrāf*, who themselves received stipends at the highest level (*sharaf al-ʿaṭāʾ*). The *amīr* himself received a salary and allowances, while also being in a position to acquire riches from gifts, speculation in the sale of crops, trade and general appropriation of revenues. It was only in his person that the military and fiscal arms of the provincial administration met.

There was virtually no central bureaucracy, as distinct from the provincial bureaucracy of Syria. Muʿāwiya is said to have set up a *dīwān al-rasāʾil* and a *dīwān al-khātam* (chancellery), as well as a *dīwān al-barīd* [see DĪWĀN. i); and he also compelled the provinces to contribute to the central treasury. But the evidence suggests a central administration of the most rudimentary kind, and the contributions of the provinces were not impressive. Out of an annual Egyptian revenue of three or five million *dīnārs*, Muʿāwiya is said to have received a balance of only 600,000 *dīnārs* (thus Ibn ʿAbd al-Ḥakam, *Futūḥ Miṣr*, 102, in conjunction with al-Maḳrīzī, *Khiṭaṭ*, ed. Wiet, ii, 61, and al-Yaʿḳūbī, *Buldān*, 339; differently al-Yaʿḳūbī, *Taʾrīkh*, ii, 277); and out of an annual ʿIrāḳī revenue of 100 million *dirhams* (120 million according to al-Yaʿḳūbī, *Taʾrīkh*, ii, 277) he received no more than 6.66 million *dirhams* (al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-ashrāf*, iv/1, ed. ʿAbbās, 218-19). He was thus heavily dependent upon the revenues of his own province of Syria, the income from the *ṣawāfī* he had taken over in ʿIrāḳ and elsewhere (al-Yaʿḳūbī, *Taʾrīkh*, ii, 258-9, 277-8), the fifth of the booty made over to him at times of conquest, and other irregular income. There was no imperial body of troops. The caliph's troops were the Syrian troops, and the capital in effect moved around with the caliph.

Like his predecessor ʿUthmān, Muʿāwiya adopted the title *khalīfat Allāh*, "deputy of God" (Crone and Hinds, *God's Caliph*, 6-7). But despite the claim to divine sanction and religious authority implied by this title, the caliphate was still a fluid institution. When Muʿāwiya took over, there had been (we are told) four caliphs, only three of whom had gained general recognition, but each of whom had attained the caliphate by different means and three of whom had been murdered: the rights and duties of the caliph, the mode of succession and the general character of the power structure were matters that were neither spelt out nor agreed upon.

In practice, Muʿāwiya does not seem to have pressed the divine sanction for his rule very far. He operated the system of clan and tribe—albeit within the changed conditions of life in ʿIrāḳī cantonments and Syrian towns—as being the only viable form of Arab social order; his was a style that involved indirect rule through the *ashrāf*, supplemented by his own personal touch with delegations (*wufūd*) and, not least, by his *ḥilm* [*q.v.*], "the patient and tireless cunning in the manipulation of men through knowledge of their interests and passions" (M. Rodinson, *Muhammad*, London 1971, 221), which in his case included "the prudent mildness by which he disarmed and shamed the opposition, slowness to anger, and the most absolute self-command" (Wellhausen, *Arab kingdom*, 138). In one of those semi-apocryphal stories with which Arabic literature is so rich, Muʿāwiya is quoted as having said, "If there were but a single hair between myself and my people, it would never be severed.... I would let it go slack if ever they tugged it, and I would tug it myself if ever they slackened it" (thus, e.g., al-Yaʿḳūbī, *Taʾrīkh*, ii, 283). Muʿāwiya's success at this style of rule is attested by the fact that he managed to hold his kingdom together without ever having to resort to using his Syrian troops; and his contemporary John of Phenek, a Nestorian monk of north Mesopotamia, gives impressive testimony when he says, "Justice flourished in his time, and there was great peace in the regions under his control.... Once Mʿawyā had come to the throne, the peace throughout the world was such that we have never heard, either from our fathers or from our grandparents, or seen that there had ever been any like it" (S. Brock, *North Mesopotamia in the Late Seventh Century. Book XV of John Bar Penkāyē's Rīš Mellē*, in *JSAI*, ix [1987], 61). The fact that his system of indirect control was "vulnerable in both structural and temporal terms" (Crone, *Slaves on horses*, 33) is more apparent to the modern historian than it was to contemporaries.

In Syria itself, Muʿāwiya's position was underpinned by his troops, who were above all from the confederacy of Ḳuḍāʿa [*q.v.*]. The leading tribe of Ḳuḍāʿa was Kalb [see KALB B. WABARA] camel-breeding nomads of the Syrian desert who had earlier been employed by the Byzantines under Ghassānid leadership to defend the Syrian *limes* against the Sāsānids and the Lakhmids; they were accustomed to military discipline and had become Monophysite Christians. They stood aside when the Arab conquest of Syria took place, however, and were brought into the Arab power structure by Muʿāwiya, who married Maysūn bint Baḥdal al-Kalbiyya [*q.v.*], the daughter of Baḥdal b. ʿUnayf [*q.v.*] of the Ḥāritha b. Djanāb clan, which was the *bayt* of Kalb; this Maysūn became the mother of Muʿāwiya's son Yazīd [*q.v.*]. On this basis, Muʿāwiya built up a strong confederacy in which his Kalbī and other Ḳuḍāʿī support was welded with that of immigrant tribesmen stationed in central and southern Syria, mainly Kindīs from the *wādīs* of southern Arabia. The leaders of the resultant confederacy were successively Mālik b. Baḥdal and his son Ḥassān b. Mālik [*q.v.*], and the arrangements included the awarding of stipends at the highest level to each of 2,000 men, together with privileges of consultation and precedence in the *madjlis* (*al-amr wa'l-nahy wa-ṣadr al-madjlis*: al-Masʿūdī, *Murūdj*, v, 200 = §1963).

Towards the end of his life, Muʿāwiya had the oath of allegiance taken to his son Yazīd as his successor (see Wellhausen, *Kingdom*, 140-3; Lammens, *Le califat de Yazīd Ier*, in *MFOB*, v/1 [1911], ch. vi). It was not simply that Yazīd was of noble birth, mature years and acknowledged judgment; most important of all was the fact that he represented a continuation of the link with Kalb and so a continuation of the Kalb-led confederacy on which Sufyānid power ultimately rested (a point overlooked by Ibn Khaldūn in his celebrated defence of Muʿāwiya's action, *ʿIbar*, i, 175). From the main elements that made up the confederacy there was, understandably enough, no sign of protest that such an oath of allegiance marked a break with past Arab practice of choice by acclaim, and Muʿāwiya did his best to grease the palms of others—notably members of Banū Hāshim—who might have been assailed by qualms. Nonetheless, his initiative met with resistance, notably on the part of ʿAbd Allāh b. al-Zubayr [*q.v.*] and al-Ḥusayn b. ʿAlī [*q.v.*] in the Ḥidjāz. The resistance increased when Yazīd succeeded his father in 60/680; and with his early death in 64/683, civil war broke out again.

To posterity, Muʿāwiya's accession marked the end of the rightly-guided caliphate. "It was as if Muhammad had worked and preached all for the greater glory and profit of his enemies. He had conquered an

empire for those who had rejected him, the Quraysh" (Rodinson, *Muhammad*, 295). At the same time, the transfer of the caliphate from Medina to Syria, the introduction of hereditary succession and the growth, however modest, of the state apparatus suggested that Muʿāwiya had transformed the caliphate into a monarchic institution of the Persian or Byzantine type, the very institution that the Muslims had been sent to destroy (Lammens, *Études sur le règne du Calife Omaiyade Moʿâwia Ier*, Paris, London and Leipzig 1908, 191-5; Crone and Hinds, *God's Caliph*, 115). But even so, Muʿāwiya's image is ambivalent (G.R. Hawting, *The first dynasty of Islam*, London 1986, 42); he was seen, not just as the man who perverted the caliphate into kingship, but also as a clever and successful ruler, and there is considerable admiration for him in the sources. Attempts at dispassionate analysis of his reign were rare, however. To Ibn Rushd, his caliphate represented a shift from the ideal constitution to a timocratic one (*Averroes' commentary on Plato's Republic*, tr. E.I.J. Rosenthal, Cambridge 1956, 223); and to Ibn Khaldūn it was a stage in the inevitable transformation of *ʿaṣabiyya* into *mulk* (*ʿIbar*, i, 176). But more commonly, Muʿāwiya was either cursed or venerated, the legitimacy of his caliphate being a far more important issue than its historical nature (cf. Pellat, *Le culte de Muʿāwiya*, in *SI*, vi [1956]; M.A.J. Beg, *The reign of Muʿāwiya*, in *IC*, li [1977], 84). Modern Muslim writings on Muʿāwiya and the Umayyads are also highly *parti pris* (see W. Ende, *Arabische Nation und islamische Geschichte*, Beirut 1977).

Bibliography: Basically given in the article. See also H. Lammens, *Études sur le siècle des Omayyades*, Beirut 1930; ʿU. Abu 'l-Naṣr, *Muʿāwiya b. Abī Sufyān wa-ʿaṣruhu*, Beirut 1962; E. Ladewig Petersen, *ʿAlī and Muʿāwiya in early Arabic tradition*, Copenhagen 1964; I. Hassan, *Recherches sur Muʿāwiyah ibn Abī Sufyān*, Jerusalem 1982 (in Hebrew, unpublished). (M. HINDS)

MUʿĀWIYA II B. YAZĪD B. MUʿĀWIYA I, last caliph of the Sufyānid line of the Umayyads, reigned briefly in 64/683-4.

When Yazīd I b. Muʿāwiya [*q.v.*] died at Ḥuwwārīn in the Syrian Desert in Rabīʿ I 64/November 683, he left behind three young sons by free mothers; Muʿāwiya and his brother Khālid b. Yazīd [*q.v.*] cannot have been much more than 20 years old, Muʿāwiya's age being given by the sources variously at between 17 and 23. Most of the surviving Sufyānids were in fact young and inexperienced, with their leadership qualities unproven. Yazīd had had the *bayʿa* [*q.v.*] made to Muʿāwiya before his death (see Lammens, *Le califat de Yazid Ier*, Beirut 1921, 112, 425 ff.), and Muʿāwiya succeeded in Damascus with Kalbī support, but was not recognised in the lands acknowledging the anti-caliph ʿAbd Allāh b. al-Zubayr [*q.v.*]. The name of Muʿāwiya's mother is not recorded, but she was a member of the powerful Kalb group; those sources (e.g. Muḥammad b. Ḥabīb, *al-Muḥabbar*, 22; etc.) making him the son of Umm Hāshim Fākhita bt. Abī Hāshim confuse Muʿāwiya's mother with that of his half-brother Khālid.

The length of Muʿāwiya's reign is given in the sources as from 20 days up to 4 months, but given the fact that virtually nothing is known of his reign, a duration of at most one or two months seems likely. It is known that the Christian Sarjūn b. Manṣūr continued to serve the new caliph as head of the *dīwān*, as he had done in the previous two reigns (al-Ṭabarī, ii, 837), and Muʿāwiya's closest adviser seems to have been the Qurashī head of the Qays group, al-Ḍaḥḥāk b. Qays al-Fihrī [*q.v.*], subsequently to be vanquished at Marj Rāhiṭ [*q.v.*] by Marwān b. al-Ḥakam, and al-Walīd b. ʿUtba, son of Muʿāwiya I's only full brother and probably the eldest living Sufyānid.

Some of the very few incidents recounted for his reign by the historians must be regarded as fabricated for political or sectarian aims, hence unreliable. Thus the report of ʿAwāna in al-Ṭabarī, ii, 468 (but not in al-Wāḳidī's account at ii, 577) and in al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, 229, that he abdicated the throne (*tabarraʾa min al-khilāfa*) before his actual death, stems from subsequent Marwānid propaganda to confuse the fact that the Marwānids supplanted the Sufyānids; it was probably for this reason that Muʿāwiya's name does not appear in some of the lists of caliphs, e.g. Khalīfa b. Khayyāṭ, *Taʾrīkh*, ed. Suhayl Zakkār, Damascus 1387-8/1967-8, i, 318. Likewise, the assertion that he was an adherent of the Ḳadariyya sect may have resulted from a later belief in an abdication, which would have been in accord with Ḳadarī beliefs on human responsibility as a factor in political behaviour [see ḲADARIYYA, at IV, 369b]. Of Shīʿī inspiration is the report in al-Yaʿḳūbī, *Taʾrīkh*, ii, 302-3, that, at the meeting of Syrian leaders at the opening of his reign, Muʿāwiya denounced the tyranny and perfidiousness of his own father and grandfather and their maltreatment of the ʿAlids, the true inheritors of the Prophet (see Lammens, *Moʿâwia II*, in *Études*, 192-202). The attribution to Muʿāwiya of the *kunya* Abū Laylā, given ironically because, as several sources explain (e.g. Ibn Ḳutayba, *Maʿārif*, ed. ʿUkkāsha, 352; al-Ṭabarī, ii, 428-9; al-Masʿūdī, v, 168-9 = §1932), it was especially applied to weak persons, is equally suspect; Muʿāwiya does not in any case seem to have left behind any progeny.

What seems definite is that, on his accession, Muʿāwiya remitted one-third of the taxation due, and a Latin chronicle of the Byzantine period states that Muʿāwiya followed in the same commendable ways of conduct as his father Yazīd (Lammens, *Moʿâwia II*, 177-8, 179). But his ill-health compelled him to remain within the palace of al-Khaḍrāʾ, the *dār al-imāra* of Damascus constructed by Muʿāwiya I (see Ibn ʿAsākir, tr. N. Elisséeff, *La description de Damas d'Ibn ʿAsākir*, Damascus 1959, 228), leaving the practical conduct of affairs to al-Ḍaḥḥāk and not emerging from his residence till he died. It seems likely that his authority was only recognised in Damascus and southern Syria, and even possible that, already before his death, some of the partisans of the Umayyads may have started to look elsewhere for a more energetic ruler.

The exact cause of Muʿāwiya's death is unclear. It may have resulted from jaundice (*al-ṣufār*), indicating a liver complaint, or it may have been the result of a sharp outbreak of plague which ravaged ʿIrāḳ and Syria at this time and which could also have carried off al-Walīd b. ʿUtba (al-Ṭabarī, ii, 468; Ibn ʿAsākir, ms. Ẓāhiriyya, notice on Muʿāwiya b. Yazīd). Muʿāwiya had either refused to nominate a successor (al-Ṭabarī, ii, 577) or, more probably, had never had time to hold a ceremony of *bayʿa*. Al-Walīd b. ʿUtba recited the funeral prayers over Muʿāwiya but seems himself to have died before he could assert a claim to the throne; and Muʿāwiya's uncle ʿUthmān b. ʿAnbasa b. Abī Sufyān, who enjoyed some support among the Kalb of the province of Jordan, went to join his mother's brother ʿAbd Allāh b. al-Zubayr in the Ḥijāz, where his claim to the caliphate had already been raised. Muʿāwiya's death thus not only meant a complete cessation of the military operations begun in the Ḥijāz by Yazīd against the rebels but led also to the temporary collapse of Umayyad power