and he also used the method of distributing leases (*iḳṭāᶜ* [*q.v.*]). Contrary to the practice used so far, he granted them without any financial return, and this was to become a characteristic of the financial policy of the Būyids and their successors. The distribution of tax leases (*ḍamān*), a practice which had already taken root and which the Būyids continued without change, was also disadvantageous for state finances. Yet Muᶜizz al-Dawla took trouble to redress the economic bases in the regions under his control. From 334/955-6 he restored the irrigation systems which had been neglected during the upheavals of the preceding decades. He is said to have lent his own hand at this, in order to encourage the works. He also took trouble to promote health organisation, but the construction of a hospital on the site of the Ḥabs al-djadīd in Baghdād remained unfinished. The palace which he ordered to be built in Baghdād on the eastern side of the Tigris, in front of the Bāb al-Shammāsiyya, seems to have been an important complex. For this construction were used remnants from the round city (*Madīnat al-Manṣūr*), which was increasingly decaying, as well as from other cities in ᶜIrāḳ.

Muᶜizz al-Dawla was uncultivated. Instances of his ignorance of the political and cultural relations in the centre of the ᶜAbbāsid empire, were transmitted in the form of anecdotes. He favoured the Zaydīs and was in relation with Muᶜtazilī theologians. From 352/964 onwards, the Twelver Shīᶜīs were able to celebrate their religious feasts under official favour and with great pomp.

Muᶜizz al-Dawla was undoubtedly an able commander and ruler. After the function of *amīr al-umarāʾ* had changed six times between 324/936 and 334/945, he put an end to the upheavals which had shaken the country and took care of its economic interests. In foreign policy, too, he put Būyid power in Mesopotamia on a firm basis, though he did not succeed in eliminating completely the Ḥamdānids. On the other hand, he initiated the period of the almost total powerlessness of the caliphate by reducing the caliph to a puppet without any real power.

In 343/955 he fell severely ill from priapism, and in the same year appointed his eldest son Bakhtiyār [*q.v.*], the later ᶜIzz al-Dawla, as successor to the throne and at the same time as *amīr al-umarāʾ*. During a campaign against the ruler of the Baṭīḥa, he fell ill again, returned to Baghdād and died there on 17 Rabīᶜ II 356/1 April 967. He was buried in the Shīᶜī sanctuary of al-Kāẓimayn. About his family relations there is only known that he was married to the daughter of the Daylamī grandee Ispahdūst. He left four sons: Bakhtiyār, al-Ḥabashī, Abū Isḥāḳ, Ibrāhīm and Abū Ṭāhir; and a daughter Zubayda, who was married to Muʾayyid al-Dawla, a son of Rukn al-Dawla's.

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(K.V. ZETTERSTÉEN-[H. BUSSE])

AL-MUᶜIZZ LI-DĪN ALLĀH, Maᶜadd, fourth and last caliph of the Fāṭimid dynasty of Ifrīḳiya.

He acceded to the throne of his ancestors at an early age on 29 Shawwāl 341/19 March 953; having been born on 11 Ramaḍān 319/26 September 931, he had barely come of age. According to his biographer, the famous *ḳāḍī* al-Nuᶜmān [*q.v.*], the designation of the young Maᶜadd to the imāmate does not seem to have been surrounded by the traditional secrecy of the period of *satr* [*q.v.*], his father al-Manṣūr bi 'llāh [*q.v.*] having for long hesitated as to the choice of his successor from among his five sons. It was only after having been justified with regard to Abū Yazīd [*q.v.*] and at Tāhart, where he fell seriously ill, at the end of his long, tough campaign against the Khāridjite rebel, that he decided to make him his presumptive heir and informed his followers of his choice. But the designation of the young Maᶜadd was not proclaimed until long after, at the beginning of the year 344/952.

At the moment when he assumed power, the young caliph seems, according to the account of the author of the *Sīrat Djawdhar*, to have been distressed, fearing a violent reaction on the part of his brothers, uncles and great-uncles who had been deprived of the throne, and having inherited moreover a difficult political situation. His father had indeed restored royal authority by putting an end to Abū Yazīd's revolt, but he had not had enough time to suppress completely the insubordination of the Berbers of the Aurès and to re-establish his dynasty's prestige within the realm as well as outside. However, as nothing occurred to justify the young ruler's fears and as peace reigned in the land as well as on its borders, he was not slow to make public his father's death which had been kept secret until then, by celebrating in the Manṣūriyya mosque the ᶜĪd al-Aḍḥā and marking the beginning of his reign with an enthronement sermon in a solemn manner. In this *khuṭba*, whose text has been preserved intact in the *Sīrat Djawdhar*, the new master of Ifrīḳiya shows that he has overcome entirely the momentary confusion which had seized him on his father's demise. From now on he has the firm and decided tone of the ambitious young monarch who is determined to bring his arduous task to a successful conclusion. He has a very clear view of his programme of action and the vast work which will be demanded of him both inside and outside his realm: to pacify the territory which he governs, to extend his hegemony over it from its frontiers in the West to the East and to realise also the imperialistic aims of his predecessors founded on their belief in the ineluctable return of the throne of Islam to the Prophet's family in a line of descent from ᶜAlī.

Al-Muᶜizz was to devote himself to achieving these vast designs throughout his reign in Ifrīḳiya, during some twenty years, without ever wearying, revealing as he advanced in age some exceptional qualities and leaving behind him the image of the most prestigious ruler of his period. His Ismāᶜīlī biographers, like the Sunnī chroniclers, actually agree in recognising in him all the gifts which make up the majestic presence of the monarch: tenacity and courage, farsightedness and determination, *ḥilm* and magnanimity, benevolence and extreme modesty, that al-Nuᶜmān takes pleasure in submitting as evidence in his *Kitāb al-Madjālis wa'l-musāyarāt*. But some dominant qualities throw more light on his personality: broadness of outlook, vast erudition in doctrinal matters and an innate sense of royal dignity. All this surrounds his name with a remarkable halo of grandeur and glory.

The discovery and publication of basic sources that constitute Ismāᶜīlī documentation, notably works of the *ḳāḍī* al-Nuᶜmān and the *Sīrat Djawdhar*, have thrown new light on the reign of al-Muᶜizz, giving more detail and enriching our information. It has also been possible to revise certain currently-accepted theses and to modify certain well-established judgments (see F. Dachraoui, *Le califat fāṭimide au Maghreb*, notably the conclusion). When one calls to mind al-Muᶜizz, it is with the conquest of Egypt and

the expansion of Fāṭimid power in the East to the heart of the ʿAbbāsid empire that one tends to associate his name. However, it was during his reign in Ifrīḳiya that the apogee of their power was achieved. It was only towards the end, during the last four years, that al-Muʿizz succeeded in realising the primordial objective of his ancestors, that of displacing the ʿAbbāsid usurpers, amputating their Egyptian possessions from their empire and establishing his forces in the south of Syria, the Holy Places and Yemen. On the other hand, for a long time his essential preoccupation was with maintaining his hegemony in North Africa itself and pursuing there an unflagging struggle for influence against the Umayyad monarchy of Spain. Al-Muʿizz was in fact eager to press hard from the Far Maghrib in a serious threat to the Cordovan throne, a subject on which al-Nuʿmān fortunately informs us, casting new light on this episode by providing evidence of the ardour of the politico-ideological war to which the Ismāʿīlī Shīʿīs of Ifrīḳiya and the Mālikī orthodoxy of al-Andalūs dedicated themselves. Parallel to this, on the alliance of necessity concluded between Cordova and Byzantium against Fāṭimid Ifrīḳiya, al-Nuʿmān provides us with direct and exact information which traces in detail the intensification of the *ḏjihād* on land and sea in the Byzantine apanages of Sicily and southern Italy, as well as the considerable development of the Fāṭimid navy in the Western Mediterranean.

Immediately after his enthronement, the first concern of al-Muʿizz was to pacify the mountainous zone of the Aurès, traditional refuge of the Hawwāra [*q.v.*], the ardent supporters of the Khāriḏjite rebellion. At the beginning of the year 342/953, he personally led the operations which gave the *amīr* of the Ṣanhāḏja Zīrī b. Manād and his son Buluggīn, the opportunity to distinguish themselves in his service and to achieve the submission of Muḥammad b. Khazar, chief of the Maghrāwa [*q.v.*], the principal branch of the Zanāta.

Then, having asserted his control over the central Maghrib thanks to the support of the Ṣanhāḏja, the Fāṭimid ruler next undertook to renew hostilities with his Umayyad rival in Cordova, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān III, suspended during the reign of his father al-Manṣūr bi 'llāh. The rich contents of the *Kitāb al-Maḏjālis wa 'l-musāyarāt* offer all the information we would wish on the evolution of the Hispano-Fāṭimid conflict, the essential advantage of its contribution being that it is not limited to a simple account of events but reflects also on the motives of a political and doctrinal order that animated the ardent struggle pursued by al-Muʿizz against his hereditary enemy.

At the beginning of his reign, it was thus to the throne of Cordova that the Fāṭimid monarch turned his attention. Al-Nuʿmān's account actually supplies some evidence of his ambition to invade Muslim Spain. It became a sacred duty to dislodge there the "accursed" enemy, "the wicked usurper", and to restore the territory to its legitimate owners, the children of Fāṭima. He also denied his rival the right to style himself caliph and *amīr* of the believers, the Umayyad caliphate being for him illegitimate. "When Muʿāwiya usurped the caliphate, he left it as an inheritance for his own lineage, taking care not to give the right to Marwān or Marwānid descendants. The Marwānids seized it from the first usurpers. Their possession of the caliphate was thus doubly illegitimate... God instituted the caliphate exclusively in the family of the Prophet's descendants through his daughter Fāṭima."

But undoubtedly not having the means to undertake the conquest of al-Andalūs through the Far Maghrib, where his Cordovan rival had at his disposal strong garrisons in Tangiers and Ceuta and kept them constantly on the move thanks to his trustworthy Zanāta, al-Muʿizz ordered his lieutenant in Sicily Ibn al-Kalbī to lead a strong expedition against the Mediterranean coast of the Umayyad realm. A demonstration of spectacular decisive force, the raid against Almeria and its region, in 344/955, was destined to prove to the Andalusians that their land was going to have to live from then on under the threat of invasion. An Umayyad counter-offensive led by Ghālib took place without delay, but remained without notable effect. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān III then sought and obtained the alliance of the emperor of Byzantium Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus, with the aim of dispersing the Fāṭimid naval forces by opening a second front in Sicily. At the same time, he sent an emissary to Manṣūriyya to ask for a truce and "to preserve the blood of the adherents of Islam".

The unavowed objective of his Cordovan rival being to reduce the conflict to the level of diplomatic polemic and to turn the bellicose attention of the Fāṭimids to the Greeks, al-Muʿizz found in his enemy's step the opportunity to denounce vigorously the Hispano-Byzantine alliance by branding its character "sacrilegious", since it ranked Muslims on the side of the infidels. He had a good chance, moreover, to refute the accusations brought against his régime by Cordova: the assassination of the *dāʿī* Abū ʿAbd Allāh by al-Mahdī bi 'llāh [*q.v.*], the prohibition of Andalusian pilgrims from passing through Ifrīḳiya, the absence of religious tolerance in Ḳayrawān, the sacrilege of the caliphal title in which the caliph was exalted and placed in the rank of prophets. To his rival's emissary he asserted his intention not to disarm, doubtless counting on turning to his advantage the difficulties encountered by Andalusian arms facing the Christian kingdoms of Leon and Pamplona. He was also not slow to launch the powerful expedition of the year 347/958-9 under the command of his freedman Djawhar [*q.v.*], the future conqueror of Egypt. The chroniclers assigned to recount great deeds supply abundant information which has allowed certain studies to trace the developments of events in an exhaustive manner (see notably Lévi-Provençal, *Hist. Esp. mus.*, ii, and Gibb, in *EI*[1] art. AL-MUʿIZZ LI-DĪN ALLĀH; the advantage of al-Nuʿmān's account in his *maḏjālis* is in stating the objectives exactly: to extend the hegemony of the Fāṭimids to the West and an obligation to make war (*ḏjihād*) on whoever lays claim to the caliphate and is opposed to the universal authority of the Fāṭimid *imām*.

The pretender to the caliphate that al-Muʿizz intended to punish while waiting to strike at his Cordovan rival was, according to al-Nuʿmān, the Midrārid prince of Sidjilmāssa, Ibn Wāsūl, surnamed al-Shākir li 'llāh [see MIDRĀR, BANŪ]. As soon as he captured the capital of Tafilalt and its dynast, Djawhar took care to mint money in the name of his master to replace that which Ibn Wāsūl had had issued in his own name and to intimate clearly that only al-Muʿizz had the right effectively to style himself Commander of the Faithful (*amīr al-muʾminīn*). Then Djawhar conquered Fez, but he withdrew to Manṣūriyya without marching on Tangiers and Ceuta, having achieved the basic objective of his master, i.e. to annex the territories of the Far Maghrib and to remove them from Andalusian tutelage, in order to be able to exert there a direct threat to Muslim Spain. A fruitful and resounding campaign was destined on the whole not so much to

invade al-Andalūs as to seriously undermine the prestige of the Cordovan monarchy. Furthermore, the enterprise would have required more powerful forces and the combined intervention of the fleet maintained in this period on the eastern front in Sicily and off Calabria to face up to the aggressive designs of the new emperor Romanus II and his servant Nicephorus Phocas. The death of the Umayyad monarch only some months after Djawhar's return to Manṣūriyya provoked no military reaction on the part of al-Muʿizz who, from the time of Nicephorus Phocas's conquest of Crete, turned all his attention to the eastern front. The Fāṭimid was thus going to confine himself to maintaining under his tutelage the Moroccan territories conquered by Djawhar and to intensifying the intrusion of the Shīʿī *daʿwa* within the Umayyad realm. The evolution of the conflict was thus to take on a strictly ideological character for many years, during which the new master of Cordova, al-Ḥakam II, was to devote himself to countering Fātimid propaganda in his country by consolidating the power of Mālikī orthodoxy and by pursuing with the greatest vigour the partisans of Shīʿī heresy. On this subject, the case in Cordova—that the *ḳāḍī* Ibn Sahl is alone in reporting in *al-Aḥkām al-kubrā*—of a missionary of al-Muʿizz, a certain Abu 'l-Khayr at the beginning of al-Ḥakam II's reign, illustrates the latter's firm resolution to prevent all Shīʿī infiltration in his realm: being accused of the crime of treason against Islam (*zandaḳa*) in resorting to heterodoxy put into action against the security of the state, the Shīʿī agent was judged and executed for having organised a vast propaganda movement in favour of the Fāṭimids and having attempted to prepare on their account an uprising in Cordova.

Preoccupied by hostilities with the Greeks, al-Muʿizz thus left his Andalusian rival full scope to bring the Zanāta back under his influence thanks to the skill of his Moroccan policy based on intrigue and the granting of large subsidies. The defection of the lord of Masīla, his foster-brother Djaʿfar b. ʿAlī b. Ḥamdūn, who had gone over into the service of his Cordovan enemy with his brother Yaḥyā, and the serious reverses suffered by his Ṣanhādja auxiliaries opposed to the Zanāta, aggravated by the death of their chief Zīrī b. Manād, succeeded in striking a savage blow at his anti-Umayyad policy. Over the years since the victorious excursion of Djawhar following the death of ʿAbd al-Raḥmān III, the situation had thus not evolved in his favour, and the impetus with which he had wanted to threaten the realm of Cordova from Morocco had petered out completely. On the other hand, the development of his conflict with Byzantium was more favourable to his arms. On this topic al-Nuʿmān expatiates in his *maḏjālis*, completing and supporting the scanty information gleaned from the chroniclers.

Hostilities with Byzantium were resumed in 344/955-6 on the initiative of the Greeks, the emperor Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus having had to lend assistance to ʿAbd al-Raḥmān III by virtue of their alliance established at the time when the Fāṭimid fleet undertook its raids on the Andalusian coast. Encouraged, besides, by the success of their arms against the Ḥamdānids of Syria, the Greeks carried out some successful operations against the Fāṭimid forces in Sicily, notably at Termini and Mazara, and on sea, near the island of al-Rāhib. But the fleet under the orders of Ibn al-Kalbī, having returned from its expedition against Muslim Spain, succeeded in containing their offensive. Anxious to regroup his forces with a view to a decisive campaign against Sayf al-Dawla in Syria, Constantine VII finally resolved to reach a settlement with al-Muʿizz, to consent to his province of Calabria paying the traditional tribute and then to conclude, in 346/957, a peace treaty for a period of five years. However, this truce was broken before its time, in 349/960, in conditions that al-Nuʿmān is the only one to recount in detail. The rupture took place on the initiative of the Fāṭimid monarch in reaction to Nicephorus Phocas's conquest of Crete for Byzantium at the beginning of the reign of Romanus II. Although belonging to the ʿAbbāsid community and thus recognising the nominal authority of Baghdād, the Cretans depended in practice on the Ikhshīdids of Egypt who, being preoccupied with the Ḳarmaṭī or Carmathian peril, were not in a position to lend energetic military assistance. So they had to address themselves, with the agreement of the Ikhshīdid *amīr* Abu 'l-Ḥasan ʿAlī, to al-Muʿizz, requesting his protection and military intervention against Byzantium. The Fāṭimid caliph, happy to turn this step to his advantage by presenting himself as the defender of Islam and proving the deficiency and impotence of the ʿAbbāsids and Ikhshīdids at the same time, hastened to inform Romanus II of the breaking of the truce concluded with his predecessor and his sacred right to come to the aid of any Muslim territory, should it escape his direct authority. Ably exploiting the situation to the benefit of his eastern policy, he formed an alliance with the Ikhshīdid and gave orders to his fleet to manoeuvre in concert with the Egyptian navy from the port of Ṭunba in Cyrenaica, not far from Alexandria, in the direction of Crete.

However, given short notice by the capture of the capital, Candia, by Nicephorus Phocas on 6 March 961, al-Muʿizz was slow to carry out the planned military intervention in Crete itself and had to limit himself to a resumption of hostilities in Sicily, where Ibn al-Kalbī captured Taormina in 962 and Rametta in 963, destroying the Byzantine expeditionary body led by the *patricii* Manuel and Niketas, who were killed in battle. This battle for Sicily, which resulted in a disaster for Byzantium, prompted Nicephorus Phocas, preoccupied with the war against the Bulgars, to come to an agreement with al-Muʿizz. The latter, with peace restored, immediately turned his attention to Egypt.

In the last part of his reign in Ifrīḳiya, the conquest of Egypt constituted the principal event and absorbs all the attention of the chroniclers from Ibn Zūlāḳ to al-Maḳrīzī. When we examine their various accounts, we perceive that the basic source is Ibn Zūlāḳ, whom Ibn Saʿīd makes use of in his *Mughrib*, al-Maḳrīzī in his *Khiṭaṭ* and his *Ittiʿāẓ*, as well as an Ismāʿīlī author, the *dāʿī* Idrīs, in his *ʿUyūn al-akhbār*. A native of Egypt, d. in 387/997, Ibn Zūlāḳ has the advantage, like al-Nuʿmān, of having been contemporary with the events that he relates. On the four years during which Djawhar occupied Egypt and governed it until the arrival of al-Muʿizz, he has left us an eloquent picture of the political and social disorder provoked by the eruption of the Fāṭimids on the eastern scene. All these sources already having provided a sufficiently exact account of the conquest of Egypt in *EI*[1] [see AL-MUʿIZZ LI-DĪN ALLĀH], we will not dwell here on the event except to stress more the significance of the development of al-Muʿizz's eastern policy at the moment when his relations as *imām* of the Ismāʿīlī community deteriorated vis-à-vis the Ḳarmaṭī branch.

When he undertook to invade Egypt, al-Muʿizz had reached the apogee of his power. His renown went far beyond the frontiers of his realm to the East. His

ʿAbbāsid contemporary, al-Muṭīʿ, a simple plaything in the hands of the Būyid Muʿizz al-Dawla, was a helpless witness to the dismemberment of his empire. After Khurāsān and Syria became disaffected, his distant province beside the Nile, given up to drought and anarchy, had become since the death in 357/968 of his Ikhshīdid vassal Kāfūr an easy prey to his redoutable enemies, the Ḳarmaṭīs of Baḥrayn [see ḲARMAṬĪ]. It was certainly the advance of the latter in the direction of Egypt through Southern Syria that incited al-Muʿizz to precede them to Fusṭāṭ. Indeed, from the time of the deviation of the Ḳarmaṭī movement, a branch of the Ismāʿīlī *daʿwa* which was to remain, however, a destructive force in the service of the Fāṭimid cause in the heart of the ʿAbbāsid empire, and especially with the accession to the direction of the movement of Aḥmad b. Saʿīd al-Djannābī and his son al-Ḥasan al-Aʿṣam, hostile to his imāmate, al-Muʿizz saw no more in Ḳarmaṭism than an obstacle to his expansion to the east. The relations entered into by al-Aʿṣam with the Būyids and Ḥamdānids, equally opposed to the Fāṭimids and, above all, his repeated incursions against the Ikhshīdid apanages of Syria, succeeded in providing proof that the Ḳarmaṭīs were intending from now on to act only to their own account in their encounter with the Fāṭimids and were preparing to march on Fusṭāṭ.

Organised with the greatest care, the expedition to Egypt was powerfully endowed: innumerable troops, the support of a strongly equipped fleet and a war treasury of more than 1000 chests of gold. At the head of his heavy contingents, Djawhar took three months to reach Alexandria in Djumādā II 358/April-May 969. A delegation of notables from Fusṭāṭ came to meet him at Tarudja, not far from Alexandria, which he occupied without striking a blow, in order to conclude with him a treaty of capitulation guaranteeing the population security for their persons and their goods. This treaty, whose full text Ibn Zūlāḳ has preserved, constitutes an eloquent witness to the able policy by which the Fāṭimid general intended to win to his masters' cause a population marked by Sunnī orthodoxy: to protect the country from the Ḳarmaṭī threat and the Byzantine peril, to palliate also the ʿAbbāsids' deficiencies, to establish order and security, to implement justice, to redress wrongs and improve the social and economic situation, and above all to ensure complete religious tolerance, everyone being free to follow the doctrine to which he belonged.

Some Ikhshīdid officers, having refused to approve the treaty, tried in vain to resist, But Djawhar made a peaceful entry into Fusṭāṭ, renewing the *amān* to the population on 17 Shaʿbān 358/7 July 969. Having established his camp to the north of the town, he there traced out the location of a new city, imitating the act of al-Manṣūr in which he had seen to the founding of al-Manṣūriyya on the day following his victory over Abū Yazīd, also naming it al-Manṣūriyya (but it was also to be called al-Ḳāhira).

His power having scarcely been established, Djawhar set about realising the second phase of his mission, the conquest of Syria, where the remains of the Ikhshīdid troops had taken refuge, supported by powerful Arab tribes, the ʿUḳayl, the Murra and the Fazāra, and which, for the sake of the population, he made into a sacred duty to deliver them from the Ḳarmaṭī peril. Responsibility for this was entrusted to his lieutenant, the Kutāmī Djaʿfar b. Falāḥ, who besieged Ramla, Tiberias, and finally Damascus in 359/969. But being severely beaten by the Ḳarmaṭīs and with their commander killed, the Fāṭimid forces had to evacuate Syria and fall back on the Palestinian port of Jaffa.

Thus the Fāṭimids' attempt to penetrate to the heart of the ʿAbbāsid empire came to a sudden end with the restoration of Syria to Ḳarmaṭī authority. Even worse, the way to Egypt was opened up once more to the Ḳarmaṭīs after Ibn Falāḥ's defeat. But instead of venturing to meet them in the vast desert lands of Sinai or the plains of the Delta, Djawhar preferred to give battle to them within trenches at the foot of the fortified stronghold of his new base, Cairo-Fusṭāṭ. Being inspired also by al-Manṣūr's strategy at Ḳayrawān against Abū Yazīd, he succeeded in holding in check the Ḳarmaṭī leader al-Aʿṣam and in forcing him to fall back on his capital al-Aḥsāʾ, where serious dissensions were about to erupt in the heart of his movement.

It is to the seriousness of this Ḳarmaṭī thrust, although contained by Djawhar, that we must attribute the decision of al-Muʿizz to join his faithful officer on the banks of the Nile. The threat that Carmathianism from now onwards presented to the unity of the Ismāʿīlī *daʿwa* and the prestige of the Fāṭimid caliphate in the East thus incited him to transfer the seat of the imāmate to Egypt without further delay and to leave Ifrīḳiya for ever.

The choice of a viceroy able to take on the government of the Maghrib was bound to be a matter of serious concern to the ruler, as his confidences reported in the *Sīrat Djawdhar* bear witness. This valuable source has the merit of confirming that he had the intention of entrusting the charge to the lord of Masīla, Djaʿfar b. ʿAlī b. Ḥamdūn, consequently correcting the incoherent information of the chroniclers on Buluggīn's appointment to head the realm. That al-Muʿizz's choice had fallen on the *amīr* of the Ṣanhādja conforms moreover to the logic of history in a country where the cause of his ancestors had only been able to triumph and maintain itself thanks to the support of the Kutāma and Ṣanhādja Berbers. But the *ʿaṣabiyya* of the Kutāma being blunted by service to the state for half-a-century, it was for the Ṣanhādja, whose power had remained intact and the force of their *ʿaṣabiyya* much alive, to exercise power in the Maghrib on behalf of their Fāṭimid masters and to keep the turbulent Zanāta in check there. In any case, as a proved warrior, a worthy successor to the prestigious Zīrī b. Manād at the head of the Sanhādja nobles and warriors, Buluggīn appeared in the eyes of al-Muʿizz to have the proper qualities for a viceroy. In addition to his apanages in the central Maghrib augmented by those of Ibn Ḥamdūn, the sovereign thus left to his lieutenancy the government of the realm of Ifrīḳiya, separated nevertheless from Sicily, which had remained under the authority of the Banu 'l-Kalbī, and the provinces of Tripoli and Barḳa, which had been attached to the seat of the caliphate in Egypt. Al-Muʿizz set out in the direction of Egypt on Thursday 5 Ṣafar 362/15 November 972, accompanied by Buluggīn, after a stay in Sardāniyya, where he spent four months in organising his journey from which he would not return. Then the viceroy having taken leave of his sovereign on his halt at Gabès, the last Fāṭimid ruler of Ifrīḳiya went on his way to the new seat of his dynasty.

During the last three years of his life spent in Cairo, al-Muʿizz was occupied with trying to chase the Ḳarmaṭīs out of Syria by assuring himself of the support of Arab tribes, especially the chief of the ʿUḳayl. But his troops commanded by the Kutāmī Abū Maḥmūd b. Djaʿfar b. Falāḥ, were not able to assert his authority in Damascus, which was not slow to fall into the hands of Aftakīn, a Turkish officer supported by the Ḥamdānids. The latter took advantage of the

Byzantines' incursions into Syria to extend his power over this land and to provide an obstacle there to the Fāṭimids' penetration. Al-Muʿizz died on 11 Rabīʿ II 365/19 December 975 without having been able to seize Damascus permanently, nor to open up victoriously the route to the ʿAbbāsid capital.

But his work as a great ruler is still associated with the period of his reign in Ifrīḳiya, during which he set about endowing the state, which had barely emerged from the Khāridjite disruption, with a rigorous administrative and financial organisation and solid political and religious institutions, promoting the rise of intellectual and artistic life and initiating the development of a brilliant civilisation which reached its full flowering on the banks of the Nile. If his name evokes dazzling military exploits, it also remains linked to the domestic level, with a policy of moderation and realism, a reform of Ismāʿīlī doctrine centred on the elaboration under his aegis of a clear and homogeneous juridical and doctrinal system adapted to his designs for expansion and hegemony. The correspondence which he exchanged with his rival in Cordova al-Nāṣir, his famous letter to the Ḳarmaṭī chief al-Aʿṣam and the one which he addressed to Romanus II, emperor of Byzantium, bear witness to the extent to which he subjected the universality of the dogma to the services of a farsighted and able policy and to the extent to which he left of himself an image of majesty and glory.

Bibliography: In addition to those in the *EI*[1] article, the sources with an Ismaʿīlī basis, notably al-Nuʿmān, *Daʿāʾim al-Islām*, 1st and 2nd eds. Fyzee, Cairo 1951; idem, *Kitāb al-Madjālis wa 'l-musāyarāt*, ed. Fakī, Chabbouh and Yaalaoui, Tunis 1978; idem, *Kitāb al-Himma wa-adab ittibāʿ al-aʾimma*, ed. Kāmil Ḥusayn, Cairo 1960; idem, *Iftitāḥ al-daʿwa*, ed. Dachraoui, Tunis 1975; Abū ʿAlī Manṣūr, ʿAzīzī, *Sīrat al-Ustādh Djudhar*, ed. K. Ḥusayn and A.A. Shaʿīra, Cairo 1954, Fr. tr. M. Canard, *Vie de l'Ustadh Jawdhar*, Algiers 1957; ʿImād al-Dīn Idrīs, *ʿUyūn al-akhbār*, ed. Dachraoui, Tunis 1979, under the title *Taʾrīkh al-Daʿwa al-fāṭimiyya bi-'l-Maghrib*; idem, ed. Yaalaoui, under the title *Taʾrīkh al-Khulafāʾ al-fāṭimiyyīn bi 'l-Maghrib*, Tunis 1985; Madelung, *Fatimiden und Bahrainqarmaten*, in *Isl.*, xxxiv (1939), 34-88; idem, *Das Imamat in ein Frühen Ismailitischen Lehre*, in *Isl.* xxxvii-xxxviii (1961), 43-135; Dachraoui, *Le califat fatimide au Maghreb. Histoire politique et institutions*, Tunis 1981 (with bibl.). (F. DACHRAOUI)

MUʿIZZĪ, MUḤAMMAD B. ʿABD AL-MALIK, Persian panegyrist of the Saldjūḳ period and poet laureate (*amīr al-shuʿarāʾ*) of Malik Shāh and Sandjar [*q.vv.*], born in Nīshābūr around 440/1048-9, died between 519-21/1125-7. His *takhalluṣ* Muʿizzī (or Amīr Muʿizzī) was given him by his patron the Kākūyid prince ʿAlāʾ al-Dawla ʿAlī b. Farāmarz, son-in-law of Sandjar, after Malik Shāh's *laḳab* Muʿizz al-Dawla wa 'l-Dīn, according to an anecdote recounted by Niẓāmī ʿArūḍī in the *Čahār maḳāla* (tr. E.G. Browne, Hertford 1899, 67-70). His name, *takhalluṣ*, and origin are attested to by references in his poetry; his *Dīwān*, containing over 18,000 *bayt*s, has been edited and published by ʿAbbās Iḳbāl (Tehran 1939).

Muʿizzī, the son of ʿAbd al-Malik Burhānī (*ca.* 409-65/1018-73), panegyrist of Alp Arslān, was entrusted by his father to the care of Malik Shāh shortly before Burhānī died while residing in Ḳazwīn. After composing panegyrics for a number of his father's patrons (including the Kākūyid ʿAlāʾ al-Dawla), he was presented to Malik Shāh when the latter visited Ḳazwīn; in the anecdote cited above, he complains of having been at Malik Shāh's court for a year, composing panegyrics but receiving no reward. He remained at court until the assassination of Niẓām al-Mulk [*q.v.*] in 485/1092 and the death of Malik Shāh some months later (his *Dīwān* contains elegies on their deaths); there followed a period of instability during the struggle for Malik Shāh's succession, during which he praised various patrons including Arslān Arghūn (who attempted unsuccessfully to achieve autonomy in Khurāsān), Ismāʿīl b. Gīlakī (the Ismāʿīlī ruler of Ṭabas) and Abū Shudjāʿ Yaḥyā Ḥabashī (who supported Sandjar's brother Barḳyāruḳ [*q.v.*]), Barḳyāruḳ himself, and a variety of ministers and officials. From 490/1097 onwards he served as Sandjar's personal poet. According to a famous anecdote, well supported by evidence from the *Dīwān*, in 511/1117-18 he was wounded, under circumstances which remain obscure, by an arrow shot at him by Sandjar; the wound caused him much suffering (several poems tell of his being ill and absent from court for a year), and may finally have caused his death, as suggested in the elegies composed by his contemporary Sanāʾī [*q.v.*].

Despite his great popularity, no early manuscripts of Muʿizzī's *Dīwān* survive, the earliest dating from Ṣafawid times, and the poems appear to be in some disarray (especially those of the latter portion). The *Dīwān* consists mainly of panegyric *ḳaṣīda*s dedicated to over sixty rulers, officials and other notables, as well as *tarkībāt*, *ghazaliyyāt*, *rubāʿiyyāt* and *ḳiṭaʿāt*. It provides much valuable information not only about the political events of the period but about the poet's profession (for example, the sending of poets to vassals of the sultan to compose *ḳaṣīda*s celebrating specific occasions). While panegyrics dedicated to Malik Shāh and Sandjar predominate, Muʿizzī's other *mamdūḥ*s include, in addition to those mentioned above, Bahrām Shāh Ghaznawī, Maḥmūd b. Muḥammad b. Malik Shāh, and the Khʷārazm Shāhs Atsīz and Djalāl al-Dīn Muḥammad. A large number are dedicated to Niẓām al-Mulk and his offspring, in particular his sons Muʾayyad al-Mulk and Fakhr al-Mulk; the poet seems to have had a close friendship with the latter, and composed a moving elegy following his assassination in 490/1096. Another important patron was Niẓām al-Mulk's son-in-law the Sayyid al-Ruʾasāʾ Muʿīn al-Mulk Abu 'l-Maḥāsin, head of Malik Shāh's *dīwān al-inshāʾ wa 'l-ṭughrā*, blinded in 478/1083-4 in punishment for his role in a plot against Niẓām al-Mulk.

Muʿizzī tends to favour the polythematic form of the *ḳaṣīda*. Many of his poems include passages of self-reference describing his impoverished condition, requesting the patron's favour, or praising his own poetry. His *ḳaṣīda*s show the influence of early Ghaznawid poets such as ʿUnṣurī, Farrukhī and Manūčihrī; for example, a Mihragān [*q.v.*] poem employs the same prosodic scheme as one by ʿUnṣurī and quotes its *maṭlaʿ*. Quotations from Rūdakī and Farrukhī are also frequent. Muʿizzī often uses extended metaphor and personification; several *nasīb*s consist of dialogues, e.g. between the poet and Reason (*ʿaḳl*), and another with Fortune (*iḳbāl*), which consists of four questions and answers, each passage ending with a title of the *mamdūḥ*. Several poems anticipate the "erotic panegyrics" which became popular at the Ghaznawid court slightly later; one, dedicated to Fakhr al-Mulk, consists of a dialogue between jasmine and rose, who voice their praise of the patron. Such poems must be seen as precursors of the panegyric *ghazal* later developed by Ḥāfiẓ [*q.v.*]. In addition, though some of the pieces classed as *ghazaliyyāt* are