the *kūra* of Reyyo was bounded by those of Cabra and Algeciras in the west, by the Mediterranean in the south and by the *kūra* of Elvira in the east.

One should now add to the above a reference to J. Vallvé, *La división territorial de la España musulmana*, Madrid, Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas 1986, of which pp. 328-31 are devoted to "la cora de Rayya". According to this author, one should read Rayya and not Rayyo, basing himself on the sole topographical trace of this name, *Campo de Zafarraya*, interpreted as *Faḥṣ Rayya*, and, above all, on certain poems which require this reading for their end rhymes. An origin of the name has also been suggested in Phoenician via Latin.

The main problem regarding this *kūra* is the exact situation of the fortress of Bobastro (Bubashtr, Bubashtur), the main refuge of the rebel ʿUmar b. Ḥafṣūn, which we know was held by him and for which several localisations have been proposed. The traditional identification, with the place called Las Mesas de Villaverde, was defended by F.J. Simonet (earlier works cited in M. Riu Riu, *Aportación de la arqueología al estudio de los Mozárabes de al-Andalus*, in *Tres estudios de historia medieval andaluza*, Cordova 1977, 85-112), but Vallvé has proposed an identification with the high ground of Marmuyas in the district of Comares, where several seasons of excavations "with interesting results" have taken place. See for a full discussion, BUBASHTRU in Suppl. Vallvé further cites, in regard to Rayya, the passage describing it by Ibn Ghālib, published by him and translated in the abovementioned work; he also translates the passage of al-Nubāhī (*K. al-Marḳaba al-ʿulyā*, published by Lévi-Provençal), written in the 8th/14th century and giving the earlier borders of the *kūra*.

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(E. LÉVI-PROVENÇAL-[J.-P. MOLÉNAT])

AL-RĀZĪ, ABŪ BAKR MUḤAMMAD B. ZAKARIYYĀʾ, known to the Latins as Rhazes (*ca.* 250/854-313/925 or 323/935), physician, philosopher and alchemist.

The most free-thinking of the major philosophers of Islam, al-Rāzī was born in Rayy, where he was well trained in the Greek sciences. He was reputedly well versed in musical theory and performance before becoming a physician. His work in alchemy takes a new, more empirical and naturalistic approach than that of the Greeks or Djābir, and he brought the same empirical spirit to medicine. Immersed in the Galenic tradition, and apparently even conversant with Greek (al-Bīrūnī ascribes to him translations and abridgements from the Greek and even a poem "in the Greek language"), al-Rāzī greatly profited from the Arabic translations of Greek medical and philosophical texts. He headed the hospital of Rayy before assuming the corresponding post in Baghdād. His property in the vicinity seems to have brought him back often to Rayy, and he died there, somewhat embittered and alienated, partly by the loss of his eyesight. Like many of the great physicians of Islam, al-Rāzī was a courtier as well as a scholar, clinician and teacher. His medical handbook the *Manṣūrī*, translated into Latin by Gerard of Cremona in the 12th century, was dedicated to Manṣūr b. Isḥāḳ, the Sāmānid governor of Rayy; his *Mulūkī* or *Regius*, to ʿAlī b. Wāhsūdhān of Ṭabaristān. The author of some two hundred books, al-Rāzī claims in his apologia, the *Sīra al-falsafiyya*, or "Philosophical Way of Life", that his has been a life of moderation, excessive only in his devotion to learning; he associated with princes never as a man at arms or an officer of state but always, and only, as a physician and a friend. He was constantly writing. In one year, he urges, he wrote over twenty thousand pages, "in a hand like an amulet maker's." Others remark on his generosity and compassion, seeing that the poor among his patients were properly fed and given adequate nursing care. Arriving patients first saw an outer circle of disciples, and then an inner circle, if these could not aid them, leaving al-Rāzī himself to treat the hardest cases. His medical research was similarly methodical, as revealed in his notebooks. These were edited, in some 25 volumes, as the *K. al-Ḥāwī fi 'l-ṭibb*, at the instance of Ibn al-ʿAmīd [*q.v.*], the vizier of Rukn al-Dawla [*q.v.*]. Translated as the *Continens* in 1279 by the Jewish physician Faradj b. Sālim (known as Farraguth) for King Charles of Anjou, it was printed at Brescia in 1486 and repeatedly thereafter. The text (Ḥaydarābād 1955) contains al-Rāzī's extensive notes from a wide range of sources, organised anatomically, from head to toe. His own clinical observations, often at variance with received opinions, typically close the sections. Al-Rāzī mined these files for his numerous medical works, and several unfinished works can be discerned in the *Ḥāwī* in embryo. His magnum opus, the *Kitāb al-Djāmiʿ al-kabīr*, or "Great Medical Compendium", often confused with the *Ḥāwī*, was a work that al-Rāzī published, not the corpus of his private files. Among the most famous of his medical writings are those on *Stones in the kidney and bladder* (*K. al-Ḥaṣā fi 'l-kulā wa 'l-mathāna*) and *Smallpox and measles* (*K. al-Djadarī wa 'l-ḥaṣba*). The latter was the first book on smallpox, and was translated over a dozen times into Latin and other European languages. Its lack of dogmatism and its Hippocratic reliance on clinical observation typify al-Rāzī's medical methods. His independent mind is strikingly revealed in his *Shukūk ʿalā Djalīnūs* or "Doubts about Galen". Here al-Rāzī rejects claims of Galen's, from the alleged superiority of the Greek language to many of his cosmological and medical views. He places medicine within philosophy, inferring that sound practice demands independent thinking. His own clinical records, he reports, do not confirm Galen's descriptions of the course of a fever. And in some cases he finds that his clinical experience exceeds Galen's. He rejects the notion, central to the theory of humours, that the body is warmed or cooled only by warmer or cooler bodies; for a warm drink may heat the body to a degree much hotter than its own. Thus the drink must trigger a response rather than simply communicating its own warmth or coldness. This line of criticism has the potential, in time, to bring down the whole theory of humours and the scheme of the four elements, on which it was grounded. Al-Rāzī's alchemy, like his medical thinking, struggles within the cocoon of hylomorphism. It dismisses the idea of potions and dispenses with an appeal to magic, if magic means reliance on symbols as causes. But al-Rāzī does not reject the idea that there are wonders in the sense of unexplained phenomena in nature. His alchemical stockroom, accordingly, is enriched with the products of Persian mining and

manufacture, and the Chinese discovery, sal ammoniac. Still reliant on the idea of dominant forms or essences and thus on the Neoplatonic conception of causality as inherently intellectual rather than mechanical, al-Rāzī's alchemy nonetheless brings to the fore such empiric qualities as salinity and inflammability—the latter ascribed to "oiliness" and "sulphuriousness". Such properties are not readily explained by the traditional fire, water, earth and air schematism, as al-Ghazālī and other later comers, primed by thoughts like al-Rāzī's, were quick to note.

Like Galen, al-Rāzī was speculatively interested in the art and profession of medicine. He wrote essays on such subjects as "The reasons for people's preference of inferior physicians," "A mistaken view of the function of the physician," "Why some people leave a physician if he is intelligent," "That an intelligent physician cannot heal all diseases, since that is not possible," and "Why ignorant physicians, common folk, and women in the cities are more successful than scientists in treating certain diseases—and the physician's excuse for this." He also shared Galen's interest in philosophy and heeded his treatise, "That the outstanding physician must also be a philosopher." Al-Bīrūnī lists some eighty philosophical titles in his al-Rāzī bibliography, and al-Nadīm lists dozens of his works on logic, cosmology, theology, mathematics and alchemy. Given the general repugnance toward al-Rāzī's philosophical ideas among his contemporaries and medieval successors, few of these works were copied. But fragments survive in quotations by later authors, as do the *Sīra al-falsafiyya* and the *Ṭibb al-rūḥānī*, the "Spiritual physick" or "Psychological medicine," which embodies al-Rāzī's largely Epicurean ethical system. Among the writings of which we have mention are: a commentary on Plato's *Timaeus*, perhaps based on the epitome of Galen, a rebuttal of Iamblichus' response to Porphyry's *Letter to Anebos* (that is, the *De mysteriis*), an appraisal of the Ḳur'ān, a critique of Mu'tazilism, another on the infallible Ismā'īlī Imām, a work on how to measure intelligence, an introduction to and vindication of algebra, a defence of the incorporeality of the soul, a debate with a Manichaean, and an explanation of the difficulty people have in accepting the sphericity of the earth when they are not trained in rigorous demonstration. Other works deal with eros, coitus, nudity and clothing, the fatal effects of the Simoom (or simply, of poisons, *sumūm*, cf. Sezgin, *GAS*, iii, 289 no. 32) on animal life, the seasons of autumn and spring, the wisdom of the Creator, and the reason for the creation of savage beasts and reptiles. One work defends the proposition that God does not interfere with the actions of other agents. Another rebuts the claim that the earth revolves. Al-Rāzī discussed the innate or intrinsic character of motion, a sensitive point at the juncture between Democritean and Aristotelian physics. He wrote several treatments of the nature of matter, and one on the unseen causes of motion. His exposé of the risks of ignoring the axioms of geometry may aim at *kalām* defenders of dimensionless atoms; and his book on the diagonal of the square may have defended his own atomism against the ancient charge, first levelled at Pythagoreanism, that atomism is refuted by the demonstrated incommensurability of a square's side with its diagonal; for al-Rāzī's acceptance of the void and rejection of Aristotle's doctrine of the relativity of space disarms that charge, since al-Rāzī's absolute space is a Euclidean continuum and need not, like his matter, be composed of discrete, indivisible quanta.

The *Ṭibb al-rūḥānī*, written for al-Manṣūr as a companion to the *Manṣūrī*, develops a moderately ascetic ideal of life from the premise that all pleasures presuppose a prior pain (or dislocation). This means that peace of mind or lack of perturbation is the optimum of pleasure, as al-Rāzī explains in his widely-cited lost work on pleasure. Pleasures cannot be amassed or hoarded, and what some hedonists might think of as "peak experiences" are reached only by traversing a corresponding valley. To feed an appetite, moreover, is only to enlarge it. So the attempt to maximise one's happiness by serving the appetites and passions is a self-defeating strategy, as Plato showed when he argued that such a life is comparable to trying to carry water in a sieve. Epicurus took that argument very much to heart when he sought to devise a hedonistic alternative to the sybaritic outlook of the Cyrenaic philosophers, and al-Rāzī does so as well. His ethical treatise follows al-Kindī's precedent in treating ethics as a kind of psychic medicine or clinical psychology, an approach later used by Ibn Gabirol and Maimonides. But the basis of the art in question, which is the Socratic tendance of the soul, is not primarily the Platonic "second voyage," the endeavour to flee to a higher world—although that theme is important to al-Rāzī. Expressing grave doubts about the demonstrability of immortality, he falls back on the less metaphysically demanding and more dialectically persuasive position that, if death is the ultimate end of our existence, it is nothing to be feared but only a surcease of our pains and troubles.

Wisdom, then, springs not from the thought of death, as many philosophers and pious teachers have supposed, but from overcoming that thought. For, even more than the appetites themselves, the fear of death is the goad of the passions that hamper human rationality and undermine human happiness. As al-Rāzī explains: "As long as the fear of death persists, one will incline away from reason and toward passion (*hawā'*)." The argument is Epicurean. The passions here, as in Epicurus, are thought of as neuroses, compulsions, pleasureless addictions, to use al-Rāzī's description (his word for an addict is *mudmin*). The glutton, the miser, even the sexual obsessive, are, by al-Rāzī's analysis, as much moved by the fear of death as by natural appetites. For natural needs, as Epicurus would explain, are always in measure. The unwholesome excess that makes vice a disease comes from the irrational and unselfconscious mental linking of natural pleasures and gratifications with security, that is, a sense of freedom from the fear of death. Ethics here becomes entirely prudential, as al-Rāzī's critics were not slow to note. If we knew that our ultimate state was immortality, and the return of the soul in us to her true home, our mad scrabbling after the surrogates of immortality would cease. But the fear of death "can never be banished altogether from the soul, unless one is certain that after death it shifts to a better state." And his conclusion is that it "would require very lengthy argumentation, if one sought proof rather than just allegations (*khabar*). There really is no method whatever for argument to adopt on this topic... The subject is too elevated and too broad as well as too long.... It would require examination of all faiths and rites that hold or imply beliefs about an afterlife and a verdict as to which are true and which are false"—a task al-Rāzī has no immediate or pressing intention of attempting. For practical purposes, then, he offers the Epicurean consolation that death is nothing to us, if the soul is really mortal. What scripture has to say on the subject is just another undemonstrated report, an unsubstantiated allegation.

In his debates with an Ismāʿīlī adversary, Abū Ḥātim al-Rāzī (d. 322/934 [*q.v.*]), chief lieutenant to the Ismāʿīlī *dāʿī* of Rayy, and later chief *dāʿī* himself, al-Rāzī faces a Muʿtazilī argument that harks back to Stoic sources: God's mercy would not deny humanity the guidance of leaders inspired with revealed knowledge of God's own will and His plan for human destiny. Al-Rāzī answers that God has provided what we need to know, not in the arbitrary and divisive gift of special revelation, which only foments bloodshed and contention, but in reason, which belongs equally to all. Prophets are impostors, at best misled by the demonic shades of restless and envious spirits. But ordinary men are fully capable of thinking for themselves and need no guidance from another. One can see their intelligence and ingenuity in the crafts and devices by which they get their living, for it is here that they apply their interest and their energy. Intellectuals who have not devoted their energies, say, to mechanical devices would be baffled by the skills and techniques of such men; but all human beings are capable of the independent thinking that is so critical to human destiny. It is only because the philosopher has applied himself to abstract speculations that he has attained some measure of understanding in intellectual matters.

Asked if a philosopher can follow a prophetically revealed religion, al-Rāzī openly retorts: "How can anyone think philosophically while committed to those old wives' tales, founded on contradictions, obdurate ignorance, and dogmatism (*muḳim ʿalā 'l-iḵẖtilāfat, muṣirr ʿalā 'l-ǧahl wa 'l-taḳlīd*)?" Al-Rāzī takes issue with ritualism for what he sees as its obsession with unseen and unseeable sources of impurity; but he also combats the natural tendency of his contemporaries to think of philosophy as a dogmatic school or even a sect, their expectation that a philosopher should believe and behave as Socrates or Plato did. Like many philosophers, he has difficulty explaining to others that philosophical disagreements and divergences of outlook are not a scandal but a source of vitality. A philosopher, he urges, does not slavishly follow the actions and ideas of some master. One learns from one's predecessors, to be sure, but the hope is to surpass them. Al-Rāzī admits that he will never be a Socrates, and cautions against anyone's expecting in short order to rival Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Theophrastus, Eudemus, Chrysippus, Themistius or Alexander of Aphrodisias. But he also affirms a belief in progress, at least for individuals, and denies that one is trapped within the teachings of the great founders of traditions: "You must realise," he tells Abū Ḥātim, "that every later philosopher who commits himself creatively (*iǧtahada*), diligently, and persistently to philosophical inquiry where subtle difficulties have led his predecessors to disagree, will understand what they understood and retain it, having a quick mind and much experience of thought and inquiry in other areas. Rapidly mastering what his predecessors knew and grasping the lessons they afford, he readily surpasses them. For inquiry, thought and originality make progress and improvement inevitable." The smallest measure of original thought, even if it does not reach unrevisable truth, al-Rāzī insists, helps to free the soul from its thrall in this world and secure for us that immortality which was so wrongly described and so vainly promised by the prophets.

The Soul, al-Rāzī argues in such works as his *Kitāb al-ʿIlm al-ilāhī* or "Theology", and *On the five eternals*, both now lost, but well represented by fragments, paraphrases, descriptions and refutations, was one of five eternal things that antedate the cosmos. The other four were God, matter, time and space. Space is the void. It may or may not have atoms in it. Time, like space, is absolute, not relative to bodies in motion, as in Aristotle. Being absolute, time is eternal. Motion is not. For matter, in itself, is inert; its motion stems from the activity of soul. Soul, the world soul, initially stood apart from matter, in a spiritual realm of her own. She yearned, however, to be embodied. And God, like a wise father, understanding that Soul learns only by experience, allowed her to embroil herself here, as a king might allow his headstrong son into a tempting but in many ways noxious garden, not out of ignorance, unconcern, or even powerlessness or spite, but out of understanding that only through experience will the boy's restlessness abate. In the case of Soul's entry into materiality, chaos was the first result, as she set matter stirring in wild and disordered motion. God, in His grace, intervened, imparting intelligence of His own to the world that Soul's impetuous desire had formed. As an immanent principle, intelligence gave order to the world, stabilising its motions and rendering them comprehensible. But it also gave understanding to the Soul itself, allowing her to recognise her estrangement in this world and seek a return from exile. It is this striving for return that gives meaning to all human strivings in the realm of life.

Only by such a theory, al-Rāzī insists, can creationists hope to overcome the elenchus of the eternalists, who deny creation altogether. A quasi-gnostic quasi-Platonic *formatio mundi*, then, not *creatio ex nihilo*, is the sole workable hypothesis which al-Rāzī can offer on behalf of the world's temporal origination, as opposed to its eternal, Plotinian emanation or its perpetual existence as a Democritean or Epicurean mechanism. Clearly the materialists, al-Rāzī reasons, improperly ignore the life and intelligence that course through nature, giving directed and stable movement to otherwise inert and passive matter. As for the Neoplatonic Aristotelians, their theory of emanation leads them to fudge (as Aristotle had done) on the inertness of matter. For, by treating the natural order as eternal, they seem to make motion and ordering form inherent properties of matter, rather than imparted acts and powers, as Neoplatonic principles should require. Only the affirmation of a temporal origin, which al-Rāzī unabashedly adopts from scripture and from the concurring authority of Plato's *Timaeus*, seems to do justice to the fact that nature's order is not intrinsic but imparted; and only a temporal creation does justice to the unimpeded operation of the forces of nature and the self-governing actions of human intelligence and will. For these gifts were given long ago and are not, as in Neoplatonism, timelessly imparted without ever really departing from their Source.

But although creation involves a kind of gift, al-Rāzī cannot treat the act of creation as a sheer act of grace, as many of his contemporaries might wish to do. His view that in this life evils outweigh goods, endorsed by Epicurean concerns over the problem of evil, and by physiological arguments about the ultimate prevalence of pain and suffering over peace and pleasure in all sensate beings, press him toward the gnostic conclusion that creation is a tragedy or mistake. Stopping short of such condemnation, al-Rāzī treats creation as a qualified evil: Life as a whole and bodily existence in general represent a fall for the life-giving principle, the Soul. But the fall is broken by the gift of intelligence. The crypt of the gnostic image has a skylight, through which streams the light of day. There is an avenue of escape. And the Soul's fall,

neither devised nor forced by God, is ascribed to her spontaneity, not to God's will or wisdom. It was neither coerced and destined nor mandated by the very nature of intelligence, as though it were (as in Neoplatonism) a demand of logic, but it was foreseen and tolerated by an all-seeing wisdom. And the loss it brought about will be overcome.

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(L.E. GOODMAN)

AL-RĀZĪ, AḤMAD B. ʿABD ALLĀH, Yemenite historian whose full name is Abu 'l-ʿAbbās Aḥmad b. ʿAbd Allāh b. Muḥammad al-Rāzī. The date of his birth in Ṣanʿāʾ is unknown; he died there *ca.* 460/1068. The little that is known of this historian is owed to al-Djanadī (d. 732/1332) who, in his book *al-Sulūk* (ms.), indicates that he was a native of the capital of the Yemen, and that he was an *imām*, well-informed in matters of *fikh* and *ḥadīth*. Furthermore, it seems that he was a Sunnī, a fact to which his work alludes, and al-Djanadī attributes to him an "extensive tradition" and a "perfect spirit". The biographer believes that the author's family came originally from the town of Rayy (hence the *nisba*; on this point see Yāḳūt's list, *Muʿdjam*, iii, 120-2, in which his name does not however appear), but he gives no information as to when the family took up residence in the Yemen; it could have been with the Persian expedition of the 6th century A.D., in support of the Ḥimyarite dynasty, with Sayf b. Dhī Yazan (see R.G. Khoury, *Wahb b. Munabbih*, 189 ff.), or with the *Ṭabarāniyyūn*, who came from Ṭabaristān to the aid of the *imām* al-Hādī Yaḥyā b. al-Ḥusayn (220-98/835-911) (see e.g. *Sīrat al-Hādī*, ed. S. Zakkār, 116, 236; W. Madelung, *Der Imām al-Qāsim*, etc.), or later still, which seems less likely.

In his capacity as an author, al-Djanadī mentions his *Taʾrīkh Ṣanʿāʾ*, which he describes as having gained popular acclaim and which he must have used as a primary source in the writing of his own *al-Sulūk fī ṭabaḳāt al-ʿulamāʾ wa 'l-mulūk*. He gives no other information on this subject. Yet a version of the *Taʾrīkh* of al-Rāzī is currently available; it has been edited by Ḥusayn ʿAbd Allāh al-ʿAmrī and ʿAbd al-Djabbār Zakkār, under the title *Taʾrīkh madīnat Ṣanʿāʾ* (see *Bibl.*). The content of the book covers the period from the foundation of the city to the times in which the chronicler lived, i.e. the 5th/11th century; Brockelmann barely mentions this historian (*GAL*, SI, 570) and Sezgin not at all, although at least eight manuscript copies of the book existed in various libraries and were accessible to the editors.

The book comprises two major elements: a historical element which goes beyond the framework of history as such, and a bio-bibliographical element.

The historical section opens with general information concerning the Yemen, its capital and the villages surrounding it, the construction of this capital, the boundaries of which were established by Shem, under divine inspiration, and which attained its maximum level of development towards the end of the 3rd/9th century, a level which it had regained in the lifetime of the author, after its destruction. Details are also provided regarding the fortress of Ghumdān, the merits of the Yemen and of Ṣanʿāʾ, formerly called Azāl, and the numerous mosques of the city, the first of which was planned by the first Muslim governor, Wabar b. Yuḥannis, and constructed and enlarged by his successors. This section, the shorter of the two, contains beyond any doubt the most detailed of information concerning the history of the city, providing data which are precise and useful, up to a point (for example, regarding the mosques, the valleys, the quarters, etc.). However, as a whole the work is un-

satisfactory, since it is rife with traditions traced back to various historical and religious sources and individuals, which have a single purpose: to promote the cause of the Yemen among the lands of God's Elect, and to extol the merits of the capital, as much in the Biblical tradition as in that of the Prophet Muḥammad. The conspicuous exaggerations are motivated by this purpose, as for example the claim that the first church of the town was built on the site where Jesus had prayed, or the latter's prophecy concerning the powerful individual who was to come forth from the town at the end of time; such items are to be found in all the chronicles of ancient Islamic cities.

The second elements of the book is bio-bibliographical. It begins with the Companions of the Prophet who came to the Yemen and some of whom were appointed governors of this land.

However the work becomes more systematic with its consideration of the élite of Yemenite scholars and ascetics, prominent among whom is the most illustrious figure of Ṣanʿāʾ, Wahb b. Munabbih (d. 110/728 or 114/732 [*q.v.*]), an ideal source of Biblical history for later Islamic historians, and thus for Ibn Isḥāḳ, whose universal Muslim history he had anticipated, and one of the principal sources of al-Rāzī. In the main his information is valuable, since many of these scholars are barely known or not at all. Details are provided here of their origin, their connections with the Yemen, the traditions attributed to them or concerning them, material such as is encountered in other Islamic books of the same genre. Unfortunately there are few dates, and, in the case of some of them, nothing more than one or a few trifling traditions. With the importance accorded to the bio-bibliographical element, it is evident that the interest in the work of al-Rāzī, as in that for example of the chroniclers al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī (392-463/1002-71) in his *Taʾrīkh Baghdād*, or Ibn ʿAsākir (499-571/1106-76), in *Taʾrīkh madīnat Dimashḳ*, can be explained by the fact that they were primarily historians and *muḥaddiṯūn*, for whom it was natural to employ the method of the *ahl al-ḥadīṯ*, albeit with particular nuances and the often considerable differences between these works (and others which are not mentioned here), to which the writer of this article has drawn attention elsewhere (see R.G. Khoury, *Zur Bedeutung des Aḥmad... al-Rāzī*, 93-6, 98, 100).

It is important to recognise that this book, in the terms of the literary production of its time, remains a relatively reliable and positive source, in particular for certain aspects of the history, geography and archaeology of the city and even of the country, not to mention his bio-bibliographical notices which supply the titles of a large number of books, most of them lost, which are the sources to which the author refers (see *ibid.*, 91 ff.).

Bibliography: Djanadī, *al-Sulūk fī ṭabaḳāt al-ʿulamāʾ wa l-mulūk* (ms., see Brockelmann, S II, 236); Yāḳūt, *Muʿdjam*, iii; al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī; Ibn ʿAsākir; W. Madelung, *Der Imām al-Qāsim ibn Ibrāhīm und die Glaubenslehre der Zaiditen*, Berlin 1965; R.G. Khoury, *Wahb b. Munabbih. Der Heidelberger Papyrus Heid. Arab. 23. Leben und Werk des Dichters*, Wiesbaden 1972; idem, *Zur Bedeuting des Aḥmad b. ʿAbdallah ar-Razi für die Geschichte des Jemen*, in *WI*, xx (1981), 87-103; *Sīrat al-Hādī ilā ʾl-ḥaḳḳ Yaḥyā b. al-Ḥusayn*, ed. S. Zakkār, Beirut 1972; Rāzī, *Taʾrīkh madīnat Ṣanʿāʾ*, ed. H.ʿA.A. al-ʿAmrī and ʿA.Dj. Zakkār, Ṣanʿāʾ 1401/1981. (R.G. KHOURY)

RĀZĪ, AMĪN AḤMAD, a Persian biographer of the later 10th/16th and early 11th/17th centuries. Hardly anything is known of his life. He belonged to Rayy, where his father Khʷādja Mīrzā Aḥmad was celebrated for his wealth and benevolence. The latter was in high favour with Shāh Ṭahmāsp and was appointed by him *kalāntar* [*q.v.*] of his native town. His paternal uncle Khʷādja Muḥammad Sharīf was vizier of Khurāsān, Yazd and Iṣfahān, and his cousin Ghiyāth Beg a high official at the court of the Emperor Akbar. Amīn himself is said to have visited India. The work to which he owes his fame is the great collection of biographies *Haft iḳlīm* (finished in 1002/1594). For many years he collected information about famous men, until finally he yielded to the entreaties of one of his friends and arranged his material in book form. The final editing of it took six years. The biographies are arranged geographically according to the 7 climes. In each clime the biographical part is preceded by a short geographical and historical introduction which is followed by notes on poets *ʿulamāʾ*, famous *shaykh*s, etc. in chronological order. The work is of special importance for the history of Persian literature, as the biographies of poets contain numerous specimens of their works, some of which are very rare. It contains the following sections: Clime I: Yaman, Bilād al-Zandj, Nubia, China. Clime II: Mecca, Medina, Yamāma, Hurmuz, Dekkān, Aḥmadnagar, Dawlatābād, Golkonda, Aḥmadābād, Sūrat, Bengal, Orissa and Kūsh. Clime III: ʿIrāḳ, Baghdād, Kūfa, Nadjaf, Baṣra, Yazd, Fārs, Sīstān, Ḳandahār, Ghaznīn, Lahawr, Dihlī, India from the oldest times down to Akbar, Syria, Egypt. Clime IV: Khurāsān, Balkh, Harāt, Djām, Mashhad, Nīshāpūr, Sabzawār, Isfarāʾīn, Iṣfahān, Kāshān, Ḳum, Susa, Hamadhān, Rayy and Ṭihrān, Damāwand, Astarābād, Ṭabaristān, Māzandarān, Gīlān, Ḳazwīn, Ādharbāydjān, Tabrīz, Ardabīl, Marāgha. Clime V: Shīrwān, Gandja, Khʷārazm, Mā warāʾ al-Nahr, Samarḳand, Bukhārā, Farghāna. Clime VI: Turkistān, Fārāb, Yārkand, Rūs, Constantinople, Rūm. Clime VII: Bulghār, Ṣaḳlab, Yādjūdj, Mādjūdj.

The Calcutta 1918-72 edition of E. Denison Ross, ʿAbdul Muqtadir, A.H. Harley, etc., omits the fourth clime, over half the complete work; complete ed. (poor) by Djawād Fāḍil, 3 vols., Tehran 1340/1961.

Bibliography: H. Ethé, *Neupersische Literatur*, in *GrIPh*, ii, 213; Browne, *Lit. hist. of Persia*, iv, 448; Rypka, *Hist. of Iranian literature*, 452, 495; Storey, i, 1169-71, 1365; M.U. Memon, *Amīn Aḥmad Rāzī*, in *EIr*, i, 939. (E. BERTHELS*)

AL-**RĀZĪ**, FAKHR AL-DĪN [see FAKHR AL-DĪN AL-RĀZĪ].

RAZĪN, BANŪ, the dynasty which ruled the petty state [see MULŪK AL-ṬAWĀʾIF] of al-Sahla [*q.v.*] (or Albarracín, derived from their name) in al-Andalus [*q.v.*] during the 5th/11th century.

Of Berber descent, but long settled in the peninsula, they remained loyal to the legitimist Umayyad regime of Hishām II al-Muʾayyad at the time of the collapse of the caliphate, but finally switched to support of Sulaymān al-Mustaʿīn, who recognised them as governors of their local territory. They survived as independent or semi-independent rulers from *ca.* 405/1014-15 (possibly as early as 403/1012-13) to Radjab 497/April 1104, when they were deposed by the Almoravids or al-Murābiṭūn [*q.v.*]. The list of their rulers is not entirely clear: the founder of the dynasty, Hudhayl b. Khalaf b. Lubb (the name may point to intermarriage with local Christian families) Ibn Razīn, seems to have ruled until 436/1044-5, and to have been succeeded by a son, Abū Marwān ʿAbd al-Malik, Djabr al-Dawla. The latter, who reigned for