

**Bibliography:** His life and works have been described by J. von Hammer-Purgstall, *Gesch. d. osman. Reiches*, iv, 308, 651 ff.; idem, *Gesch. d. osman. Dichtkunst*, iii, 115 ff.; by Mehmed Ṭāhir b. Rif‘at, *Müwerrikhîn-i ‘Othmāniyyeden ‘Alî we-Kâtib Çelebî’nin Terdjüme-i Hâlleri*, Salonica 1322/1906; and by Ibnülemin Mahmûd Kemâl, op. cit. Cf. also *Cat. cod. or. bibl. Acad. Lugd. Bat.*, 1873, v. 57; Flügel, loc. cit., ii, 94; *JA*, 1869, 76, 90 ff. (K. SÜSSHIEB-R. MANTRAN)

**‘ALĪ B. AL-‘ABBĀS AL-MADJÛSĪ**, medieval medical writer, commonly known to the West as Haly Abbas. He was born in al-Ahwâz from old Persian stock, as his title al-MadjûsĪ shows. He probably moved to Shîrâz at an early date, for he made his medical studies under a physician of that city, Abū Māhir Mūsā b. Sayyār, and dedicated his magnum opus to its ruler, ‘Aḡud al-Dawla the Buwayhid. This book he named the *Kāmil al-Ṣinā’a* or *K. al-Malikī*; the medieval Latin translators named it the *Liber Regius*. It derives its title from the dedication to ‘Aḡud al-Dawla. The exact date of ‘Alī’s death is not known. It occurred between 982 and 995 A.D.

The *Kāmil al-Ṣinā’a*, upon which the importance of ‘Alī b. ‘Abbās depends, was deliberately written to fall mid-way between the lengthy *al-Hāwī* and the brief *al-Manṣūri*, both works of al-Rāzī. It was immediately recognised as a master-piece and was adopted as the chief textbook of medicine for students. Some hundred years later it was overshadowed by the *Ḳānūn* of Ibn Sīnā. But it remained sufficiently popular to be translated into Latin in full by Stephan of Antioch in 1127 and this translation to be printed in Venice on 1492 and in Lyons in 1523. The surgical section of the book had already been translated by Constantine the African in the 11th century and was used by the School of Salerno. (Printed in *Constantini Africani Operum Reliquia*, 1539.) The Arabic text was reproduced in Cairo, Būlāḡ 1294/1877, and in 1903 the anatomical section was translated into French (P. de Koning, *Trois traités d’anatomie arabe*, Leiden 1903, 90-427).

**Bibliography:** Ibn al-Ḳiftī (Lippert), 232; Ibn Abī Uṣaybi‘a, i, 236; Brockelmann, i, 273, S i, 423; G. Sarton, *Introduction to the History of Science*, i; E. G. Browne, *Arabian Medicine*, Cambridge 1921, 53 ff.; D. Campbell, *Arabian Medicine*, London 1926, 74; C. Elgood, *Medical History of Persia*, Cambridge 1951, 155.

(C. ELGOOD)

**‘ALĪ B. ‘ABD ALLĀH B. AL-‘ABBĀS** was the ancestor of the ‘Abbāsids. According to Muslim tradition, ‘Alī was born in the year 40/661, the very same night in which the caliph ‘Alī was assassinated; but there are also other statements concerning the year of his birth. His mother was called Zur‘a bint Miṣraḡ. His grandfather al-‘Abbās was the uncle of the Prophet, and on account of his high birth and his personal gifts ‘Alī attained to great distinction. He was looked upon as the handsomest and most pious Ḳurayshite of his time, and received the surname of “al-Sadiḡiād” (he who prostrates himself often) because of his constant praying. His piety did not prevent him from plotting secretly against the Umayyads, and was therefore banished from the capital by the caliph al-Walīd I. He went to live in the province of al-Sharāt on the border between Arabia and Palestine. Here he died in 117/735-6 or 118 in the village of Ḥumayma. This place remained the headquarters of the ‘Abbāsīd propaganda, after ‘Alī’s son Muḥammad, the father of the future

caliphs al-Saffāh and al-Manṣūr, had been recognised as the head of the ‘Abbāsids.

**Bibliography:** Ibn Sa‘d, v, 229 ff.; Ya‘ḡūbī (Houtsma), ii, 314 ff.; Ṭabarī, ii, 16 ff.; Ibn al-Athīr, ii, 16 ff.; Ibn Khallikān (transl. by de Slane), ii, 216 ff.; Weil, *Gesch. d. Chalifen*, i, 333; ii, 18; Müller, *Der Islam im Morgen- und Abendland*, i, 444.

(K. V. ZETTERSTÉEN)

**‘ALĪ B. ABĪ ṬĀLIB**, cousin and son-in-law of Muḥammad, and fourth caliph, was one of the first to believe in Muḥammad’s mission. Whether he was the second after Khadiḡja, or the third after Khadiḡja and Abū Bakr, was much disputed between Shī‘ites and Sunnīs. He was at that time aged 10 or 11 at most, and Muḥammad had taken him into his own household to relieve the boy’s father Abū Ṭālib, who had fallen into poverty. One narrative, which is open to criticism on several counts, represents ‘Alī as having occupied the Prophet’s bed on the night when the latter left Mecca for Medina, so that the conspirators, on entering the house in order to kill Muḥammad, were surprised to discover his young cousin sleeping there. After restoring to their owners the objects which Muḥammad was holding on trust, ‘Alī rejoined the Prophet at Ḳubā. Some months later, he married Muḥammad’s daughter Fāṭima [q.v.], and of their marriage were born al-Ḥasan and al-Ḥusayn [q.v.]. During the lifetime of Fāṭima ‘Alī took no other wife.

**Military exploits.** In Muḥammad’s lifetime ‘Alī took part in almost all the expeditions, often as standard-bearer, twice only as commander (at Fadak in 6/628, and in al-Yaman in 10/632). He always displayed a courage, which later on became legendary; at Badr he killed a large number of Ḳurayshites; at Khaybar he used a heavy door as a shield, and the victory of the Muslims over the Jews was due to his ardour; at Ḥunayn (8/630) he was one of those who stoutly defended the Prophet. After the Prophet’s death, he took no part in any military expedition, for reasons unknown. ‘Umar is said to have prevented the Ḳurayshites from going out to the provinces, but ‘Uḡmān removed all obstacles to their movements. It is possible that ‘Alī himself had no wish to absent himself from Medina; perhaps it was simply his state of health which kept him from fighting, although several feats are attributed to him at the battles of the “Camel” and Shiffin, in 36/656 and 37/657, when he was already sixty years old.

In addition, ‘Alī performed several other functions for the Prophet. He was one of his secretaries, and on occasion was charged with missions which might be called diplomatic; on two occasions he was deputed to destroy idols. He executed with his own hand enemies condemned to death by the Prophet, and with al-Zubayr supervised the massacre of the Banū Ḳurayza (5/627). In 9/631 he read to the assembled pilgrims at Minā the first seven verses of the sūra *Barā’a* (ix).

**Dispute with Abū Bakr.** During the election of Abū Bakr [q.v.] as Muḥammad’s successor, ‘Alī, with Ṭalḡa, al-Zubayr, and several other Companions, remained apart in the Prophet’s house to watch over his body and prepared for its burial. Although solicited to do so by al-‘Abbās and also, it is said, by Abū Sufyān, he made no effort to keep the control of the Community in the hands of the Hāshimītes. When those persons who had at first abstained from recognizing Abū Bakr gradually accepted his election, ‘Alī maintained his refusal for six months. His position was complicated by a

question of inheritance; Fātima had asserted a claim to the lands held by her father, which Abū Bakr firmly rejected on the ground of Muḥammad's saying that "Prophets have no heirs". Whether ‘Alī really hoped to succeed Muḥammad is doubtful. The Arabs as a rule chose as their chiefs men of mature age (in 11/633 ‘Alī was a little over thirty) and showed no inclination to legitimism. The Shī‘ites, by inventing or interpreting in the light of their beliefs certain words said to have been used by Muḥammad concerning ‘Alī (see Wensinck, *Handbook*, s.v. ‘Alī), have always maintained that the Prophet intended to transmit the succession to his son-in-law and cousin, but it is certain, in any case, that in his last illness he did not express this desire.

Relations with ‘Umar. According to the Muslim authors, ‘Alī was a valued counsellor of the caliphs who preceded him; but although it is probable that he was asked for advice on legal matters in view of his excellent knowledge of the Qur’ān and the *sunna*, it is doubtful whether his advice was accepted by ‘Umar on political questions. In regard to the famous *ḍiwān*, at least, ‘Alī held a view entirely opposed to that of the caliph, for on being questioned on this subject by ‘Umar he recommended the distribution of the entire revenue without holding anything in reserve (al-Balādhurī, ap. Caetani, *Annali*, A.H. 40, § 275). During the lifetime of ‘Umar (and of ‘Uthmān), ‘Alī held no office, either military or political, except the lieutenancy of Medina during ‘Umar's journey to Palestine and Syria (al-Ṭabarī, i, 2404, 2522); for this reason he alone was absent from the meeting at Dajābiya [q.v.] at which the military commanders and leading personages convoked by ‘Umar gave approval to measures of the greatest importance on the regulation of the conquests and the *ḍiwān*. Further evidence of ‘Alī's lack of complete agreement with the policies of Abū Bakr and ‘Umar is contained in the received tradition relating to the *shūrā* [see ‘UTHMĀN b. ‘AFFĀN], according to which ‘Alī, on being asked by ‘Abd al-Rahmān b. ‘Awf whether he engaged himself to follow, together with the Qur’ān and the *sunna*, the work (*fi‘l*, *sīra*) of the preceding caliphs, gave an evasive answer.

The Opposition to ‘Uthmān. During the caliphate of ‘Uthmān, ‘Alī, with other Companions (notably Ṭalḥa and al-Zubayr), frequently accused him of deviating from the Qur’ān and the *sunna* of Muḥammad, particularly in the application of the *ḥudūd* [see AL-HURMUZĀN]. ‘Alī insisted upon the duty of applying the divine Law; he was among those who demanded that the legal punishment for drinking should be inflicted on al-Walīd b. ‘Ukba, viceroy of Kūfa, and in some accounts is said to have carried out the whipping with his own hand. With ‘Abd al-Rahmān b. ‘Awf he reproached ‘Uthmān with introducing *bida‘*, such as making four *raḥ‘as* at ‘Arafāt and Minā in place of two (cf. Wensinck, *Handbook*, s.v. ‘Alī). But on political questions also he ranged himself with ‘Uthmān's opponents and was recognized by them as their chief, or one of their chiefs, at least morally. E.g. (1) when Abū Dharr al-Ghifārī [q.v.], who preached against the misdeeds of the powerful, was exiled from Medina, ‘Alī with his sons went to salute him on his departure in spite of ‘Uthmān's prohibition, and provoked thereby a violent dispute with ‘Uthmān. (2) When the rebels who came from Egypt to Medina opened negotiations with ‘Uthmān, ‘Alī was their intermediary, or one of their intermediaries (see e.g. al-Ṭabarī, i, 2969). (3) When they returned

later on to Medina and besieged "the House," the asked ‘Alī to put himself at their head (idem, i, 2965); although he refused, nevertheless by his attitude he encouraged the rebels during the siege, and there are reasons for suspecting him to have been in agreement with them in demanding the caliph's abdication, at the same time that any participation by him in the bloody conclusion of the conflict is to be excluded. (4) After his election as caliph, his partisans included those persons who are known to have been hostile to the government on economic questions, such as al-Ashtar [q.v.], Ibn al-Kawwā’, Ṣaṣa’a and others (al-Mas‘ūdī, iv, 261; al-Ṭabarī, i, 2916, 2908, etc.). His own programme in face of the various financial demands put forward by the *muḥātila* (division of the surplus of the revenues, distribution of the domanial lands, etc.) is not known. It is recorded only that on becoming caliph he distributed the entire sums which he found in the *bayt al-māl* of Medina, Baṣra and Kūfa, and the whole of the provisions collected in the *bayt al-ṭa‘ām* (cf. also *Annali*, 40 A.H., §§ 276-80), an action which is to be regarded not simply as a demagogic gesture but as the consequence of the view that he had previously expressed to ‘Umar. He is said also to have wished to distribute the Sawād (i.e. the domanial lands in al-‘Irāq), but to have refrained through fear of legal disputes (al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, 265 f.).

Apart from this, there is no statement which authorizes us to regard him as an extremist; on the contrary, he was hostile to the Saba'iyya, the followers of ‘Abd Allāh b. Saba’ [q.v.], and when they exalted him beyond measure he rid himself of them; he tried to cut himself loose from the *muḥār*, the besiegers of "the House" (of ‘Uthmān) and their adherents, as soon as circumstances allowed him to do so (al-Ṭabarī, i, 3163-5, 3182). By his extreme attachment to Islam ‘Alī was driven to attach an absolute superiority in merit to priority of conversion and to services rendered to Islam in its early days, over other claims such as nobility of birth and political or administrative ability. In his conflict with the government he continually appealed to the duty of applying the Qur’ān and following the *sunna* of the Prophet, which in his view were being neglected. Whether by this policy, or because, aiming to defend the right of the Hāshimīd house to the caliphate, he was bound to oppose the principle which extended this right to the whole of Muḥammad's tribe, he set the Quraysh against him, although himself of Quraysh; in return he had the support of most of the Anṣār, of the other non-Qurayshite Arabs who had been amongst the Old Believers, of the *muḥātila* in the provinces, and the depressed classes in general (*Aghāni*, xi, 31).

Election of ‘Alī and early measures. When ‘Uthmān was killed the Umayyads fled from Medina and the opposition remained masters of the situation. Since ‘Alī was the person for whom they had most respect, he was invited to succeed to the caliphate. The traditions on the manner and circumstances of his election (the most commonly accepted date is 18 Dhū ‘l-Hijja 35/17 June 656) are contradictory in regard to his willingness to accept it. His partisans on the other hand were ready to employ violence against those who refused to recognize him (including Ṭalḥa and al-Zubayr); nevertheless there were some who would not yield and who left Medina, e.g. ‘Abd Allāh b. ‘Umar, Sa‘d b. Abī Waqqās, al-Mughira b. Ṣhu‘ba, Muḥammad b. Maslama al-Anṣārī, Usāma b. Zayd.

Mu‘āwīya was therefore able to maintain that the election was invalid because made by a minority; to this ‘Alī replied that the election of the caliph was a right of those persons (Anṣār, Muhājirūn, or Badr-combatants) who were present in Medina at the relevant time. What is certain is that ‘Alī allowed himself to be nominated also by the rebels who had ‘Uthmān’s blood on their hands. This was an error, in that it exposed him to accusations of complicity in their crime, although some traditions represent him as vainly endeavouring to rid himself of the most factious of his partisans. In spite of counsels by Ibn ‘Abbās to go slowly, ‘Alī at once took some of the measures demanded by the opposition from ‘Uthmān: he removed the governors appointed by the latter and wherever possible replaced them by governors of his own party, and satisfied the populace by distributions of money, made with a laudable equity. The report of ‘Uthmān’s murder and of ‘Alī’s protection of those guilty of it had in the meantime provoked strong reactions in Mecca, Syria and Egypt. Mu‘āwīya, governor of Syria and cousin of ‘Uthmān, accused ‘Alī of complicity with the murderers and refused to pay homage to him. ‘Alī hastily collected troops to force him to obedience, but another serious rebellion compelled him to delay action in Syria, while Mu‘āwīya for his part maintained a prudent waiting policy.

Rebellion of ‘Ā’ishā, Ṭalḥa and al-Zubayr. Although ‘Ā’ishā had supported the opposition against ‘Uthmān, she had gone on pilgrimage to Mecca during the siege of “the House”. On her way back she learned of the events in Medina, and in consternation, especially at the news of ‘Alī’s election, returned to Mecca and engaged in active propaganda against the new caliph. Four months later she was joined by Ṭalḥa and al-Zubayr, and shortly afterwards ‘Alī learned that all three, with several hundred troops, were marching to al-‘Irāk by sidetracks. He immediately set out in pursuit, but could not overtake them. The rebels expected to find in al-‘Irāk the forces and the resources which they needed. ‘Alī was absolutely compelled to prevent them from seizing this province, since Syria obeyed only Mu‘āwīya, Egypt was in anarchy, and the loss of al-‘Irāk would have involved also the loss of the eastern provinces dependent on it.

The three insurgents proclaimed that the *ḥudūd* must be re-established for all alike, and that a “reform” (*isḥlāḥ*) must be put into effect (al-Ṭabarī, i, 3093, 3131, 3132). Since these influential leaders were in part responsible for the fate of ‘Uthmān, the reasons for their rising to demand vengeance for his murder, and the meaning which they attached to *isḥlāḥ*, are obscure. Social and economic motives, inspired by fear of the possible influence of the extremists on ‘Alī, seem to provide a more convincing explanation than personal feelings for their action, and especially for the effect which it produced. The moderates amongst those opposed to ‘Uthmān had no doubt desired a change of policy, but not one so radical as that now foreshadowed.

While the insurgents occupied Baṣra, and there massacred many of the *nuffār*, ‘Alī sent his supporters to Kūfa to invite its population to take his part, and when he had collected an adequate force he marched towards Baṣra. Since both parties aimed at a peaceful settlement of the dispute, an agreement was negotiated, according to which ‘Alī should disengage himself from the *nuffār* (while guaranteeing their lives), but this was not the conclusion of the affair which the extremists of his party meant to

reach. A brawl provoked by them developed into a battle, which became famous in Muslim annals as the “Battle of the Camel” (15 Djumādā II 36/9 Dec. 656) [see AL-DJAMAL], and in which Ṭalḥa and al-Zubayr lost their lives, while ‘Ā’ishā was peremptorily ordered by ‘Alī to return to Medina under escort.

Conflict with Mu‘āwīya. Following on this success, ‘Alī had hopes of regaining the allegiance of the governor of Syria by opening negotiations with him, but in vain. Mu‘āwīya demanded the surrender of the murderers of ‘Uthmān in virtue of a verse of the Qur’ān (xvii, 32/35) which forbids the slaying of any person save for just cause (*illā bi ‘l-ḥakk*), at the same time according the right of vengeance in the case of anyone slain unjustly (*maḥlūm*) to his *walī*, i.e. his near relative. Mu‘āwīya maintained that ‘Uthmān had been killed unjustly; consequently, he proposed to exercise the right accorded by God. In the meantime, he would hold to his refusal to pay homage to ‘Alī. The sources pass vaguely over the thesis maintained by ‘Alī in rejecting Mu‘āwīya’s demand, except for the explicit statement in the *Waḥ‘at Ṣifīn* of Naṣr b. Muzāḥim al-Minkarī (570): since ‘Uthmān was killed by the people, who were outraged by his arbitrary actions, the murderers should not be liable to the *lex talionis*. In reality the struggle had much deeper causes; what was at issue was the pre-eminence of Syria or of al-‘Irāk, and probably also two different conceptions of the policy to be followed in the government of the Muslim State.

‘Alī, finding that Mu‘āwīya was not to be won over, passed to the offensive; the two armies, each some tens of thousands strong, faced one another on the plain of Ṣifīn [q.v.]. After some skirmishing, interrupted by a truce in Muḥarram 37/June-July 657 and some parleys, battle was joined; there was a week of combats between horsemen and foot-soldiers, followed by a violent conflict (the “night of clamour”, *laylat al-ḥarir*, 10 Ṣafar 37/28 July 657). Mu‘āwīya’s star seemed to be sinking, when ‘Amr b. al-‘Āṣ advised him to have his soldiers hoist copies of the Qur’ān on their lances. This gesture, famous in Muslim history, did not imply surrender; by this means Mu‘āwīya invited the combatants to resolve the question by consultation of the Qur’ān. Weary of fighting—the number of the killed is swollen in the sources to 70,000 or even more—the two armies laid down their arms. ‘Alī was forced by his partisans to submit the difference to arbitration, as proposed by Mu‘āwīya, and further to choose the arbitrator for his side from among the “neutrals”. So sure were his followers that they were in the right! In these decisions the *ḥurrā* [q.v.], of whom many were in his army (though they were represented in Mu‘āwīya’s army also), played a large part.

Appointment and task of the arbitrators (*taḥkīm*). A convention was drawn up at Ṣifīn itself (Ṣafar 37/657), by the terms of which the two arbitrators, Abū Mūsā al-Aṣḥ‘arī [q.v.] for ‘Alī and ‘Amr b. al-‘Āṣ [q.v.] for Mu‘āwīya, would announce their decision at a place halfway between Syria and al-‘Irāk in the presence of witnesses chosen by themselves; the date fixed for the meeting was Ramaḍān, but the arbitrators might advance it or postpone it until the end of the year 37. In the two versions of the convention which have come down to us the points to be examined by the arbitrators are not defined; all that is said is that they were to consult the Qur’ān “from the first to the last sūra” and, in default of clear indications in the sacred Book, the *sunna* of the Prophet, excluding what

might give rise to divergences. L. Veccia Vaglieri (see the art. cited in the Bibliography) has shown that their task was to determine whether the acts of which ‘Uṭhmān was accused were or were not *ahdāth*, arbitrary actions at odds with the divine Law. If the caliph were guilty, his murder could be regarded as an act of justice; but if he had committed no errors, the conclusion must be that he had been killed unjustly (*maẓlūm*), and in consequence Mu‘āwīya was justified in claiming the right of vengeance. But this was not all, for a decision in favour of Mu‘āwīya would inevitably involve, for ‘Alī, the loss of the caliphate.

Protests against the arbitration. While awaiting the verdict, the armies returned to their bases. But already at Šiffin certain individuals had protested against recourse to arbitration with the cry *lā ḥukmā illā li’l-lāh*, literally “No decision save God’s”. The phrase implied that it was absolutely improper to apply to men for a decision since, for the case in dispute, there existed a divine ordinance in the Qur’ānic verse xlix, 8/9: “If two parties of the Believers fight with one another, make peace between them, but if one rebels (*baghat*) against the other, then fight against that one which rebels (*allatī tabghī*), until it returns to obedience to God . . .”. In fighting against his opponents ‘Alī had appealed to this verse, since in his view the “rebellious party” had been, firstly, that of ‘Ā’ishā, Ṭalḥa and al-Zubayr, and now that of Mu‘āwīya. The dissidents maintained, very logically, that it was his duty to continue to fight against Mu‘āwīya, as no new fact had intervened to alter the situation.

During the return to Kūfa, those had first raised the cry *lā ḥukmā illā li’l-lāh* (hence called *al-muḥāk-kima al-ūlā*) persuaded many other partisans of ‘Alī that the arbitration was a sin against God, by substituting the judgment of men for His prescription. A group of some thousands proclaimed their repentance and stopped at Ḥarūrā’, near Kūfa (whence their name of Ḥarūrītes [*q.v.*]). The caliph, on a personal visit to their camp, succeeded in reconciling the dissidents, all or in part, evidently by making concessions to them. After his return to Kūfa, however, he denied from the *minbar* the reports which asserted his intention of infringing the convention of Šiffin. When it was learned that he had sent Abū Mūsā to the meeting with ‘Amr, a group of dissidents, 3,000 or 4,000, secretly left Kūfa, and some hundreds more left Baṣra. The rallying-point chosen by these dissidents, called *Khawāridj* (*Khāridjītes* [*q.v.*]), was al-Nahrawān, on the canal of the same deriving from the Tigris.

The arbitration (*ḥukūma*). Mu‘āwīya, with his escort, was the first to arrive at the meeting-place of the arbitrators (Ramaḍān 37/Feb. 658). ‘Alī, excusing himself on the ground of the troubles caused by the dissidents, did no more than send Abū Mūsā with the escort and his cousin Ibn ‘Abbās as his representative. The sources give vague or contradictory statements on the place and date of the meeting, some placing it at Dūmat al-Djandal (now al-Djōf), approximately halfway between Syria and al-‘Irāq, as stipulated in the convention, others at Aḍḥruḥ, between Ma‘ān and Petra. There are many grounds (see the art. cited above) for believing that a first meeting in the presence of six persons only was held at Dūmat al-Djandal, and a second meeting (see below) at Aḍḥruḥ in Sha‘bān 38. At the former, the arbitrators must have reached an agreement on the result of their investigations, and this result was that ‘Uṭhmān had committed no breach of

his trust, since only on this ground can the later events be explained. A passage in *Waḥat Šiffin* (618 f.) explains why their verdict is known to us only indirectly: as a measure of precaution, “the two men agreed at Dūmat al-Djandal to say nothing”. But though the verdict was not promulgated, it is certain that it became known to both parties; the Syrians, perhaps in the enthusiasm of the moment, took the *bay‘a* to Mu‘āwīya (Dhu ‘l. Ka‘da 37/April 658: al-Ṭabarī, ii, 199), while ‘Alī publicly protested against both arbitrators, proclaimed that their sentence was contrary to the Qur’ān and the *sunna*, and that he was therefore under no obligation to submit to it. Thereupon he assembled his forces and set out to engage Mu‘āwīya in battle again. On reaching al-Anbār, he turned aside towards al-Nahrawān, in the conviction that it was necessary first of all to destroy this centre of insurgence. Mu‘āwīya, in the same month in which ‘Alī was engaged with the *Khāridjītes*, took possession of Egypt (Šafar 38).

Battle of al-Nahrawān. ‘Alī first tried to re-enlist the *Khāridjītes* in his forces by a declaration that he would take the field again against Mu‘āwīya, but without effect. The dissidents demanded that he should confess himself guilty of an act of impiety (*kufr*), which he indignantly refused to do. After promising the *amān* to those who should submit—and there were some—he attacked the rebels (9 Šafar 38/17 July 658). It was a massacre rather than a battle, and it seems that ‘Alī was the first to regret it. This action, condemned by contemporary opinion,—for many sincere believers, of well-known piety, had fallen on the field—had very grievous consequences for him; the defections, which had already begun, increased, and he was forced to return to Kūfa and to give up the campaign against Mu‘āwīya.

Conference of Aḍḥruḥ. The situation was completely changed after these events. Henceforward the opposing parties were no longer a caliph and a rebel governor, but two rivals for the supreme office in the State. While Mu‘āwīya had gained ground, ‘Alī was struggling in a morass of difficulties: he had been disqualified in the eyes of the Muslim community by the verdict of the arbitrators, and he had lost many of his supporters by his refusal to submit to their decision after consenting to the *tahkim*, by the massacre of the *Khāridjītes*, and in general by his vacillating policy. This was the position when the arbitrators and many eminent persons (with the exclusion of ‘Alī and also, it would seem, of his representatives) met at Aḍḥruḥ in Sha‘bān 38/January 659. In this conference the meetings attended only by the arbitrators and certain personages must be distinguished from the final plenary session. In the former the verdict of the arbitrators was promulgated (several sources assert that Abū Mūsā recognized that ‘Uṭhmān had been killed unjustly), and the selection of a new caliph was discussed. The information given in the sources is rather discordant, except as regards the final scene. It can be gathered that ‘Amr maintained the cause of Mu‘āwīya against Abū Mūsā’s preference for ‘Abd Allāh b. ‘Umar, who for his part refused to stand for election in default of unanimity; Abū Mūsā then proposed, and ‘Amr agreed, to declare both ‘Alī and Mu‘āwīya deposed and to remit the choice to a committee. In the public discourses that followed, Abū Mūsā observed this agreement, possibly adding some counsels in which he alluded to his preference for the son of ‘Umar; ‘Amr in his

turn declared 'Alī deposed and confirmed Mu'āwiya. Several modern historians have adjudged this scene entirely improbable, but this negative attitude towards traditions which are nevertheless explicit and fairly concordant on this point is due to an inadequate appreciation of the preceding events explained above. In the light of these the final scene at Adhruḥ can readily be accepted. The unexpected declaration of 'Amr seems to have been a strictly personal proposal on his part, which, as a man charged with a grave responsibility, he believed himself entitled, if not in duty bound, to advance. But this declaration, which obviously contravened the agreement previously reached (since Abū Mūsā reacted to it with indignation), was generally judged in later times as a treacherous trick, and was certainly a disloyal act. It is worthy of notice that even in the plenary assembly no voice was raised on behalf of 'Alī; the clash which followed 'Amr's declaration was a reaction against the Umayyads, not in favour of 'Alī. In any case the conference had entirely negative results, for the participants separated without taking any decision on the caliphate.

Last years, death and burial of 'Alī. 'Alī continued to be regarded as caliph by his partisans, though their numbers were daily diminishing, and Mu'āwiya by his. In 39/659 the situation was still uncertain. 'Alī, confined to Kūfa, remained passive even when Mu'āwiya made small expeditions into the heart of al-'Irāq and of Arabia. In Khurāsān and the East Arab rule was thrown off [see 'ABD AL-RAHMĀN B. SAMURĀ], but a rising in Fārs was skilfully put down by Ziyād b. Abīhi [q.v.], as governor for 'Alī. In 40/660 'Alī enjoyed no authority in the two Holy Cities, and could not stop an attack by Mu'āwiya on al-Yaman. Finally, a Kharijite, 'Abd al-Rahmān b. Muljam al-Murādī [see IBN MULJAM], in revenge for the men slain at al-Nahrawān, struck 'Alī with a poisoned sword before the door of the mosque of Kūfa. He died about two days later, being then 62 or 63 years of age. A questionable tradition asserts that Ibn Muljam was only one of a group of fanatics who plotted to rid Islam of the three persons regarded as responsible for the civil war, and that Mu'āwiya and 'Amr were to have been assassinated at the same time.

'Alī's burial place was kept secret, evidently for fear lest his body should be exhumed and profaned. It was not until the time of Hārūn al-Rashīd that it was announced that his tomb had been identified at a spot some miles from Kūfa, where a sanctuary subsequently arose; a town, al-Nadījāf [q.v.], grew up there, surrounded by an immense cemetery, due to the aspiration of pious Shī'ites to be buried in the vicinity of their Imāms.

Personal details. In person, 'Alī is represented as bald, affected by ophthalmia, stout, short-legged and broad-shouldered, with a hairy body and a long white beard covering his chest. In manner he was rough and brusque, apt to give offence and unsociable. He had two nicknames: *Haydara*, "lion", and *Abū Turāb*, "dustman", a name probably given to him contemptuously by his enemies, but which was afterwards interpreted as an honorific by invented episodes (see Nöldeke in *ZDMG*, 1898, 30). He had fourteen sons and nineteen daughters by nine wives and several concubines; of his sons, only three, al-Ḥasan, al-Ḥusayn, and Muḥammad b. al-Ḥanafīyya, played a historical role, and five in all left descendants. He was reputed to have a profound knowledge of the Qur'ān, of which he was one of the best "readers"

(Suyūṭī, *Iḥkām* (Sprenger), 169, 171; the statement that he compiled a recension is to be rejected: *Gesch. des Qur.*, ii, 8-11). Many political discourses, sermons, letters and wise sayings (*ḥikam*) have been ascribed to him; these can be read in *Nahdī al-Balāgha*, a collection of the 5th/11th century, which includes here and there old historical texts and passages of *adab* [see AL-SHARIF AL-RADĪ]. On the *diwān* (in which some poems are perhaps authentic) and the prose works attributed to him, see Brockelmann, i, 43 f., § I, 73 f. His gifts as an orator were doubtless remarkable, but the same cannot be said of his poetic art (H. Lammens, *A propos de 'Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib, Études sur le siècle des Omayyades*, 1930, 1-11).

Personality. The personality of 'Alī is difficult to define, since the historian finds no sure guide either in his actions or his discourses, or in the data supplied by the sources. His own will was paralysed or modified by events and the constraint of his partisans. His discourses are obscure in form, and it is not easy to distinguish the genuine from the forged. Since the conflicts in which he was involved were perpetuated for centuries, the sources are sometimes tendentious, and, though less idealizing or hostile than has been asserted, more often reticent. The hostile judgment of Lammens (especially in *Fāṭima* and *Mo'āwīa I*), sometimes obtained by forcing the texts, is to be rejected. The milder presentation of Caetani which, while exposing the weaknesses of 'Alī, gives due weight to the pressure of circumstances upon him, remains vague in its general lines. Neither Lammens nor Caetani has brought out the religiosity of 'Alī and its reflections in his policy. There is an abundance of notices on his austerity, his rigorous observance of religious rites, his detachment from worldly goods, his scruples in regard to booty and retaliation; and there is no reason to suppose all these details invented or exaggerated, since all his actions were dominated by this religious spirit. Without attempting to decide whether his devotion to Islam was always wholly unmixed with other motives, this aspect of his personality cannot be disregarded for the understanding that it affords of his psychology. He engaged in warfare against "erring" Muslims as a matter of duty, in order "to sustain the Faith and to make the right way (*al-hudā*) triumphant" (al-Balādhurī in Caet., 40 A.H., § 235, d, etc.). After his victory at "the Camel", he tried to relieve the distresses of the vanquished by preventing the enslavement of their women and children, in face of the protests of a group of his partisans; when battles ended, he showed his grief, wept for the dead, and even prayed over his enemies. Even the apparent ambiguity of his attitude towards the Ḥārūrītes can be explained by his fear of disobeying God; though persuaded by them that the arbitration was a sin, he recognized also that to infringe the convention of Siffin was equally a sin, and in this painful dilemma chose to allow the arbitration to proceed. Obedience to the divine Law was the keynote of his conduct, but his ideas were governed by an excessive rigorism, and it was perhaps for this reason that his enemies described him as *maḥdūd*, "narrow-minded". Imprisoned in his strict conformism, he could not adapt himself to the necessities of a situation which was very different from that of Muḥammad's time; thus he lacked that political flexibility which was, on the other hand, one of the pre-eminent qualities of Mu'āwiya. His programme, rather than uncertain, was utopian;

probably he himself discovered the impossibility of realizing it when the power came into his hands, and this may have contributed, along with the external events, to his discouragement in his last years. Caetani observed that the half-divine aureole which soon encircled the figure of 'Alī was derived not only from his relationship with the Prophet, but also from the personal impression which he left on his contemporaries; but he did not indicate the qualities which gave rise to the legend. If it is recognized that his was a profoundly religious spirit, and that he supported by his authority a programme of social and economic reforms, at the same time placing them on a religious basis, this question also may find its solution. [For Shī'ite doctrines and legends concerning 'Alī see *SHĪ'Ā*.]

**Bibliography:** The basic historical sources, with many additional texts *adab*, *ḥadīth* and other works, are translated or summarized in Caetani, *Annali* (of which vols. ix and x (1926) are devoted to the caliphate of 'Alī). Further materials in Naṣr b. Muẓāḥim al-Minkārī, *Waḳ'at Ṣiffin*, ed. 'Abd al-Salām Muḥammad Ḥārūn, Cairo 1365 (the lith. ed. Tehran 1301 and abridged ed. Bayrūt 1340 are much inferior), and Muḥibb al-Dīn al-Ṭabarī, *al-Riyāḍ an-Nāḍira fī Manāḳib al-'Ashara*, Cairo 1327, ii, 153-249. Studies: A. Müller, *Der Islam in Morgen- und Abendland*, Berlin 1885, i, 308-34; J. Wellhausen, *Die religiös-politischen Oppositionsparteien*, Berlin 1901 (A. K. G. W. Göttingen); id. *Arabische Reich*, Berlin 1902, 25-71; id. *Skizzen u. Vorarbeiten*, vi, Berlin 1899, 113-146; H. Lammens, *Études sur le Règne du calife omayyade Mo'awia I<sup>er</sup>*, Paris 1908, index; id. *Adhroḥ in EI'*; G. Levi della Vida, *Il Califato di 'Alī secondo il Kitāb Ansāb al-Aṣrāf di al-Balāduri*, RSO, 1913, 427-507; W. Sarasin, *Das Bild Alīs bei den Historikern der Sunna*, Basel 1907; F. Buhl, *Ṣiffin in EI'*; idem, *Alī som Praetendent og Kalif*, Copenhagen 1921; F. Gabrieli, *Sulle origini del movimento Ḥarīḡita*, *Rend. Lin.*, 1941, fasc. vi, 110-7; L. Vecchia Vaglieri, *Il conflitto 'Alī-Mu'awīya e la secessione khārīḡita riesaminati alla luce di fonti ibādite*, *AIUON* 1952, 1-94; id. *Traduzione di passi riguardanti il conflitto 'Alī Mu'awīya e la secessione khārīḡita*, *AIUON*, 1953, 1-98; Muḥ. Kafāfī, *The Rise of Kharijism according to Abū Sa'īd Muḥammad . . . al-Qaḥṭānī*, in *B. Fac. Ar.*, xiv, 1952, 29-48; Ṭāḥā Ḥusayn, *al-Fitna al-Kubrā*, vol. ii, 'Alī, Cairo 1954 (contains some suggestive ideas). (L. VECCHIA VAGLIERI)

'ALĪ B. AL-DJAHM B. BADR B. AL-DJAHM AL-SĀMĪ, Arab poet, of Banū Sāma b. Lu'ayy, a tribe from Bahrayn, whose claim to descent from Quraysh was disputed. His father al-Djahm moved from Khurāsān to Baghdād and was appointed to various offices under al-Ma'mūn and al-Wāṭḥik; the poet's brothers also were prominent in official and literary circles. 'Alī was born probably c. 188/804, and received his education in Baghdād. Under al-Mu'tasim (218-27/833-42) he held *mazālim* jurisdiction in Hulwān, but, perhaps because of his support of Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal in opposition to the Mu'tazila, did not become prominent as a court poet until the reign of al-Mutawakkil (232-47/847-61). For some time he enjoyed, as a *nadīm*, the intimacy of that caliph, but fell from favour owing to his freedom of speech and the jealousy of his rivals. After a year's imprisonment he was sent to Khurāsān, and suffered further punishment there before being released, when he returned to lead a disorganized life in Baghdād. After the murder of

al-Mutawakkil (which he lamented with fiery denunciation of all those involved) he set out to join the volunteer *ghāzī* troops on the Syrian borders, and was killed on the way by a raiding party of Kalb, in 249/863.

Only a selection from his *diwān* has been preserved (ed. Khalil Mardam Beg, Damascus 1949). It shows him to have been a gifted poet, whose verse is above all the simple expression of his own emotions, whether in praise or satire, in patient acceptance of adversity or reckless adventure. It is noteworthy also as displaying the attitudes of the Khurāsānian Arab supporters of the 'Abbāsīd caliphate in opposition to Shī'ite and other unorthodox views. He was in friendly relations with Abū Tammām [*q.v.*], who made him the subject of two poems, but was on the contrary coarsely satirized by al-Buḥārī (Istanbul 1300, ii, 99, 107) for his hostility to 'Alī b. Abī Ṭālib.

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'ALĪ B. GHĀNIYA [see GHĀNIYA, BANŪ].

'ALĪ B. ḤAMMŪD [see HAMMŪDIDS].

'ALĪ B. AL-HASAN B. AL-MUSLIMA [see IBN AL-MUSLIMA].

'ALĪ B. ḤUSAYN [see SĪDĪ RA'IS].

'ALĪ B. ḤUSAYN ZAYN AL-'ĀBIDĪN [see ZAYN AL-'ĀBIDĪN].

'ALĪ B. 'ISĀ B. DĀ'ŪD B. AL-DJARRĀH, 'Abbāsīd vizier, b. 245/859 into a family of Persian origin settled at Dayr Kunnā on the Tigris below Baghdād, who had probably turned Christian before their adoption of Islam. Many of his relatives, including his father and grandfather, were officials in the 'Abbāsīd administration, and he himself seems to have received his first secretarial employment at the age of nineteen or twenty. In 278/892, on the formation of the *diwān al-dār* by Aḥmad b. al-Furāt, both 'Alī and his uncle Muḥammad b. Dā'ūd were employed in that department as secretaries under Aḥmad's brother 'Alī, and some seven years later, when independent departments for the Western and Eastern provinces were created, 'Alī b. 'Isā and his uncle were appointed to manage them respectively. During the later years of al-Mu'taqid's caliphate, a feud developed between members of the family of al-Djarrāh and the brothers Aḥmad and 'Alī b. al-Furāt, and this came to a head on the death of al-Muktafi in 295/908, when, after the latter's brother al-Muktadir had succeeded as caliph largely owing to the exertions of Ibn al-Furāt, the Banu 'l-Djarrāh engineered a conspiracy to depose him in favour of 'Abd Allāh b. al-Mu'tazz [*q.v.*]. 'Alī b. 'Isā was given control of the *diwāns* in the short-lived government of Ibn al-Mu'tazz and was consequently fined and banished to Mecca on the restoration of al-Muktadir.

In Mecca, during the first vizierate of Ibn al-Furāt, 'Alī was kept under surveillance until Ibn al-Furāt's fall in 299/912. In 300/913 he was recalled at the suggestion of the general Mu'nīs [*q.v.*], to succeed al-Khāḳānī as vizier. His first term in office lasted exactly four years, and was marked by strenuous efforts on his part to rehabilitate the state finances. Although he succeeded in augmenting the revenues, his reduction of expenditure earned him the dislike of the court, including the irresponsible and extravagant caliph. During his first year as