

BridgeTaint: A Bi-directional Dynamic Taint Tracking Method for JavaScript Bridges in Android Hybrid Applications

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Abstract—Hybrid applications (apps) are becoming more and more popular due to their cross-platform capabilities and high performance. These apps use the JavaScript bridge communication scheme to interoperate between native code and Web code. Although greatly extending the functionalities of hybrid apps by enabling cross-language invocations and making them more powerful, the bridge communication scheme might also cause some new security issues, e.g., cross-language code injection attacks and privacy leaks. In this paper, we propose BRIDGETAINT, a bi-directional dynamic taint tracking method that can detect bridge security issues in hybrid apps. BRIDGETAINT uses a method different from existing ones to track tainted data: it records the taint information of sensitive data when the data are transmitted through the bridge, and uses a cross-language taint mapping method to restore the taint tags of corresponding data. Such a novel design enables BRIDGETAINT to dynamically track tainted data during the execution of the app and analyze hybrid apps developed using frameworks, which cannot be done with existing solutions based on static code analyses. Based on BRIDGETAINT, we implement the BRIDGEINSPECTOR tool to detect cross-language privacy leaks and code injection attacks in hybrid apps using JavaScript bridges. A benchmark called BRIDGEBENCH is also developed for bridge communication security test. The experimental results on BRIDGEBENCH and 1172 apps from Android market demonstrate that, BRIDGEINSPECTOR can effectively detect potential privacy leaks and cross-language code injection attacks in hybrid apps using bridge communications.

Index Terms—Android hybrid application, dynamic data tracking, data leaks, cross-site scripting, JavaScript bridges.

I. INTRODUCTION

With the prevalence of mobile devices in recent years, smartphones have become an essential part of our daily life. Various smartphone operating systems (OS), including Google Android, Apple iOS and Windows Mobile, have been widely used. A recent report [1] shows that Android is currently the most popular mobile operating system with 85% market share. As the most commonly used operating system on smartphones, Android also faces many security problems [38]. It is important to detect attacks in Android applications (apps) [6], [10], [12], [22], [40] to protect data privacy of mobile users.

The rapid growth of smartphones has led to the emergence of many feature-rich and diversified mobile apps, ranging from social communication to online shopping. Generally, mobile apps can be classified into three categories: native apps, mobile Web apps, and hybrid apps. Native apps are developed for specific platforms. They are

usually developed with platform-specific languages, e.g., Java for Android and Objective-C for iOS. Native apps can invoke application programming interfaces (APIs) provided by the platform to directly access hardware and local resources, making them achieve high performance and satisfy user experiences. However, native apps are tightly coupled with platforms, making them suffer from poor portability. The developers have to build multiple versions for different platforms, which causes high cost in both development and maintenance of the app. In contrast, mobile Web apps are typically implemented with platform-independent Web technologies like HTML, CSS, and JavaScript (JS). They are interpreted to run by web browsers built in mobile platforms, without compiling and installing. However, web code in mobile Web apps, especially those developed with JavaScript, can access only very restricted hardware or local resources due to limitations of the browser environment and security considerations, which makes their performance lower than native apps.

The recently emerged Hybrid apps try to achieve both optimized performance and cross-platform capabilities by combining native code and Web code. Because Hybrid apps can take advantages of both native apps and Web apps, they are becoming more and more popular in recent years. Moreover, the adoption of the new HTML5 technology in Hybrid apps makes their performance very close to native ones. A recent report [3] shows that for a large portion of developers (32.7%) hybrid apps are the preferred development model.

Hybrid apps introduce some new security threats that are different from the ones in native apps and mobile Web apps. In order to interoperate between the native code and Web code, Hybrid apps use a communication mechanism called JavaScript bridge. This mechanism provides a method to transmit data through the language boundary, which makes it easier to develop the app. On the other hand, however, JavaScript bridge can also be exploited by attackers to compromise user devices. For example, the attacker can inject malicious code coming from native channels (e.g., Wi-Fi or Bluetooth) into the Web environment via the bridge interface and launch cross-language code injection attacks. If these codes are executed within the web context, they can steal users' private data and even perform other sophisticated attacks, e.g., denial of service attacks. As Hybrid apps are more and more popular, it is very important to efficiently detect security issues in Hybrid apps.

Although there are few works on tracking tainted data in Java-to-JS communications in hybrid apps (e.g., HYBRIDROID [21]), they cannot detect bi-directional privacy leaks. Moreover, existing solutions use static code analyses and cannot be used to analyze hybrid apps developed with frameworks like Cordova. Existing works on taint tracking for native apps and mobile Web apps [6], [12], [13], [15], [28], [35], [39], [41] cannot be applied to analyze cross-language data flows in hybrid apps. In this

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paper, we propose a new method called BRIDGETAINT that can dynamically track bi-directional tainted data in bridge communications to detect cross-language privacy leaks. BRIDGETAINT uses a method different from existing ones to track tainted data: it records the taint information of sensitive data when the data are transmitted through the bridge, and uses a cross-language taint mapping method to restore the taint tag of corresponding data. This novel design enables BRIDGETAINT to dynamically track tainted data during the execution of the app and analyze hybrid apps developed using frameworks. Based on BRIDGETAINT, we implement the BRIDGEINSPECTOR tool to detect cross-language privacy leaks and code injection attacks in hybrid apps using JavaScript bridges. We also develop a benchmark called BRIDGEBENCH for bridge communication security test and evaluate the performance of BRIDGEINSPECTOR on BRIDGEBENCH and other hybrid apps.

To our knowledge, BRIDGETAINT is the first work that can dynamically track tainted data in bi-directions of the bridge for hybrid apps. We summarize the major contributions made in this paper as follows:

- We propose a new method to track cross-language data flow and tainted data for hybrid apps. Different from existing works that uses static code analyses, our method dynamically records the taint information of sensitive data transmitted through the bridge interface and then restores the taint tags of the corresponding data according to the mappings between the recorded JavaScript and Java data. This novel design enables our method to track tainted data in hybrid apps developed with frameworks like Cordova.
- We develop a bridge security test benchmark for Android hybrid apps by using Cordova, named BRIDGEBENCH. BRIDGEBENCH includes 38 test apps, out of which 32 apps have the risk of cross-language privacy leaks. The other six apps are vulnerable to cross-language code injection attacks. BRIDGEBENCH can be used as a benchmark to test the performance for bridge security detection systems.
- Based on BRIDGETAINT, we design and implement BRIDGEINSPECTOR, a cross-bridge data tracking and security detection system for Android hybrid apps. Experimental results on BRIDGEBENCH and 1172 Android market apps show that, BRIDGEINSPECTOR can effectively track the data flows of bridge communication. Meanwhile, it can also detect other attacks to hybrid apps like cross-language code injection attacks.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the architecture of hybrid apps and systematically analyzes the cross-language security risks introduced by JavaScript bridges. Section III presents the mechanism of our cross-bridge taint tracking method BRIDGETAINT. Section IV gives the detailed design and implementation of BRIDGEINSPECTOR. Section V evaluates the effectiveness of BRIDGEINSPECTOR. Section VI discusses the limitations of BRIDGETAINT and the potential of implementing this idea in iOS platform. Section VII reviews related work. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section VIII.

II. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF HYBRID APPS

In this section, we first introduce the general architecture of hybrid apps and analyze the communication mechanism between the native code and the Web code, then systematically analyze the potential security risks caused by the bridge communication, and finally summarize the unsafe data flows that lead to these risks.




Fig. 1. The general architecture of hybrid apps.

A. Architecture of Hybrid Apps

Figure 1 shows the general architecture of hybrid apps. The code in the lower layer is loaded by the native components and executed in the native runtime environment. The code in the higher layer is rendered by an embedded Web component provided by the mobile platform (e.g., WebView on Android) and interpreted by its JavaScript engine. To enable Web code to access the hardware resources and use the platform APIs, the Web component provides a special communication mechanism called bridge communication for inter-operation between Web code and native code. The most widely used method to implement bridge communication in Android is to use the `addJavaScriptInterface` API of the WebView.

Some hybrid frameworks provide mobile-specific web libraries and native plug-ins, e.g., barcode, contacts and SMS plug-ins. These plug-ins encapsulate native codes for accessing hardware resources in different mobile platforms into unified JavaScript bridges. The developers can invoke native functionalities on various platforms by simply adding these plug-ins and calling their bridge methods. This greatly helps developers to create powerful hybrid apps quickly.

B. Cross-language Interfaces

Although the cross-language communication capabilities provided by different mobile platforms vary slightly, their basic mechanisms are similar. These mechanisms are usually implemented based on APIs within the Web components. Through these APIs, the native code and the web code can invoke each other and transfer data between different languages. In the following, we use the Android framework's communication mechanisms as an example to explain the cross-language communication interface.

Android provides two kinds of communication mechanisms for inter-operation between Java and JavaScript: bridge communication and callback communication. The first mechanism mainly depends on the WebView's `addJavaScriptInterface` API. By using this API, developers can inject Java objects into the Web context. The JavaScript code can access the injected objects and call their native methods. During the method invocation, data can be passed between Java and JavaScript as method arguments or method results.

Note that, the cross-language interfaces implemented on this API have serious security issues on all Android prior to version 4.2. More specifically, the JavaScript code can access all public methods of the injected objects. Even worse, attackers can call into the Java Reflection APIs exposed by the bridge interfaces and execute arbitrary commands, causing system-level damages. However, after Android 4.2,




Fig. 2. Attack scenario of cross-language XSS in hybrid apps.

Google has patched the above security vulnerabilities of the WebView, and allows JavaScript to invoke only methods explicitly annotated with '@JavascriptInterface'.

The second mechanism is implemented by using WebView events and their callback methods provided by WebViewClient class and WebChromeClient class. For chosen specific events, hybrid app developers can customize their event handlers by overwriting their callback methods corresponding to those events. When the events are fired, the web container will trigger their event handlers and invoke the overwritten Java callback methods. The data are passed into Java as method arguments.

The bridge communication is used much more widely than the callback communication because it supports data delivery more directly. In this paper, we consider the cross-language security risks and data tracking methods for the bridge communication.

C. Cross-language Security Risk Analysis

In the development process of hybrid apps, the lack of necessary validation and proper sanitization for data transmitted via the bridge interfaces might lead to serious security problems, because these data may come from unsafe third parties and malicious attackers. The risks might come from two different aspects, as analyzed below.

Code injection attacks. The bridge interfaces expand the attack surface of hybrid apps, bringing a serious risk of code injection. For example, with the help of the bridge communication, the attackers can inject malicious JavaScript code into Java, causing Intent injection attacks. Similarly, they can inject malicious native data into JavaScript, causing cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks.

Figure 2 shows a realistic scenario of such cross-language XSS attacks in a Wi-Fi scanning app. The app uses JavaScript bridges to acquire nearby Wi-Fi access points (APs) and directly displays the information of available APs in the page via the unsafe document object model (DOM) APIs. To launch the attack, the attacker first forges a Wi-Fi site and injects the malicious JavaScript code into its SSID (①), and then waits for the victim to connect to the fake Wi-Fi. Once the victim starts the app to scan nearby Wi-Fi (②), the display engine will parse the SSID and invoke the JavaScript engine to execute the malicious code (③). Compared with web apps, hybrid apps have a wider range of channels that can be leveraged to attack app users. The attackers can exploit Wi-Fi, SMS, Bluetooth or other channels to launch powerful cross-language XSS attacks.

Figure 3 illustrates an example of cross-language Intent injection attacks. Intent is an important mechanism for application interaction and communication in the Android framework. It is usually used to start an app's internal private components or other apps' components. In this example, the attacker first injects a malicious Intent link (①) into the Web page of the app in some way (e.g., through malicious ads). Because the app does not properly sanitize and validate the Intent, it will directly parse the Intent




Fig. 3. An example of cross-language Intent injection attacks in hybrid apps.




Fig. 4. An attack scenario of stealing user data via bridge interfaces in hybrid apps.

when the victim user clicks the link (②) and invoke the internal private component of the app (③-⑦). Compared to the public components, the private components can often obtain personal data stored in the app. Thus, the attacker can further exploit the private components to steal user privacy or perform permission escalation attacks.

Privacy leaks. The bridge interfaces also open channels of information disclosure, posing a significant risk of privacy leaks to mobile users. In the traditional native apps, the privacy preserved in mobile devices can be accessed by only platform-specific code. However, with the help of hybrid apps, the attacker can use JavaScript bridges to steal private user data across different platforms, exposing massive users to a dangerous situation.

Figure 4 demonstrates how the attacker uses web code to steal privacy of mobile users. The attacker first injects a malicious code into the Web pages (①). The code contains a JavaScript bridge method, which can read and retrieve all the SMS messages stored on the mobile device. When the hybrid app loads the Web page, the malicious code is executed by the WebView's JavaScript engine (②) and the victim's SMS data is eventually sent to the attacker via the Web channels (③-④). Similarly, the attacker can also use malicious Java code to steal online privacy preserved in web browsers, such as the user's cookies.

D. Security Threats Summary

Classification. Actually, the essential reason of the above risks is that the sensitive data directly flow into the security-sensitive functions, resulting in unexpected operations of applications. According to the programming languages in which the data generation points (called sources) and the data receiving points (called sinks) are located, we classify the associated security threats of hybrid apps into four categories: native, web, web-to-native and native-to-web (shown in Figure 5).

The native and web threat are security issues introduced by single programming language, as their corresponding data sources and receiving functions lie in the same language code. For instance, a simple example is that the SMS content are sent through Java network APIs, causing native




Fig. 5. Categories of security threats in hybrid apps.

data disclosure. The other example is that web cookies are leaked over XMLHttpRequest() method.

Different from the first two categories, the latter two ones are cross-language security threats caused by multiple programming languages. It means that through the bridge interfaces, the data of sensitive sources in one language code may reach the security-critical point of another language. The cross-language code injection and privacy leaks described in subsection II-C are the typical examples of such threats.

Sensitive data sources and security-critical sinks. In order to identify different kinds of security risks in hybrid apps, we divide the sensitive data sources into two types: private sources and untrusted sources. We also divide the security-critical sinks into two types: communication sinks and code execution sinks. Table I lists all the sources and sinks considered in this paper.

1) *Sources*: The private sources mainly contain important information stored on the mobile device or the Web browser. These sources usually include personal user data (e.g., phone number, contact lists and location), device information (e.g., IMEI, IMSI number), and online privacy (e.g., web page titles, session cookies). It will cause information disclosure when these private data are directly passed to the network APIs over HTTP channels. Different from the private sources, the untrusted sources mainly refer to the data that can be directly manipulated or indirectly contaminated by attackers (identified by the * in Table I), such as data obtained through the native external channels (such as Bluetooth, Wi-Fi) or internal channels (e.g., SMS), and users' searching keywords preserved in the properties of JavaScript objects (such as location.search). In addition, because WebSocket messages and Web Storage data can be easily tampered and constructed by attackers as well, these data are also treated as untrusted sources. While the risk of leaking untrusted data is much smaller than private data, serious code injection attacks may be launched once these untrusted data are transferred into the code execution functions.

2) *Sinks*: The sinks are security-critical JavaScript and Java APIs that provide the ability of network communication and code execution (denoted by the # and the \$ in Table I, respectively). The commonly used communication APIs include Java methods OutputStream() and sendSms(), and JavaScript method XMLHttpRequest(). Besides, the notorious Eval() method, and the setTimeout() method are the typical code execution sinks.

In the previously described four types of security threats, the native and web threats can be detected by many research tools by using data flow tracking methods. The tracking idea is to first mark the data of sensitive sources with taint tags, then propagate the tags by static analysis or

dynamical execution of the program, and finally check the taint markings of the function parameters at the critical sinks to determine whether the sinks can be affected by the tainted data.

However, for the native-to-web and web-to-native issues, currently there is no systematic detection method that can analyze their cross-language data flows. In [18] the authors studied the native-to-web code injection attacks and proposed a static taint analysis method to detect such attacks, but they did not consider privacy leaks and web-to-native threats. Therefore, the main focus of this paper is to provide a general solution for these two kinds of cross-language security threats, and to propose an effective mechanism for cross-bridge data tracking and security detection.

III. BI-DIRECTIONAL CROSS-BRIDGE TAINT TRACKING

As described in Section I, the traditional taint tracking methods cannot analyze data flows of the bridge communication that cross language boundaries. In this section, we present a novel cross-bridge taint tracking method called BRIDGETAINT, which can bidirectionally propagate the taint markings of sensitive data between different languages.

A. Data Transmission of Bridge Communication

To achieve bi-directional cross-bridge taint tracking, we first need to figure out how the data is transmitted across the bridge interfaces. To this end, we systematically inspect the semantics of data transmission in the bridge communication of the Android system. Briefly, when a given bridge method is executed by Android, JavaScript data are passed into the Java environment as the method arguments, and Java data are returned to the JavaScript environment as the method results. The detailed process of the bridge method invocation and data transmission are shown in Figure 6, containing the following five steps:

① *Java object injection*. The developer first uses the API addJavaScriptInterface to inject a Java object (called injected object) into the Web context. This API has two parameters: The first is the name of the injected object, and the second is the name of the exposed JavaScript object (called bridge object) that refers to the injected object.

② *Bridge method execution*. When the WebView calls the method of the bridge object (called bridge method), the Android system first checks whether the target Java object corresponding to the bridge object exists or not, and then searches the corresponding Java method from the method list of the target Java object by using argument numbers and argument types.

③ *Arguments conversion*. When Android finds the target Java method, it converts the argument values of the bridge method to the corresponding Java values by data conversion mechanism of JNI (Java Native Interface). In this way, Android transfers the JavaScript data into the Java environment.

④ *Java method execution*. After completing the arguments conversion, the Android system executes the target native method with the converted argument values.

⑤ *Result conversion*. Once Android finishes the execution of the native method, it converts the result value to the corresponding JavaScript value by using JNI and returns the result to the WebView.

To better understand the data transmission process and the threats of the bridge communication, we use a simple code snippet (shown in List 1) of a hybrid app to illustrate how sensitive data is passed between JavaScript and Java by the attackers. This malicious app uses JavaScript bridges to steal the user's IMEI number and cookies. First, the attacker declares a Java class named 'JsonObject' including a 'send()'

TABLE I
SOURCES AND SINKS

	Environment (language)	Sensitive objects of sources and security-critical APIs of sinks
Sources	Native (Java)	NFC*, Contacts*, Mic, PhoneNumber, Location(GPS), Location(Net, Last), Bluetooth*, Camera, Accelerometer, SMS*, Device(IMEI, IMSI), Wi-Fi*, ICCID, Barcode*, Account, History
	Web (JavaScript)	Doc.cookie, Doc.domain, Doc.lastModified, Doc.referrer, Doc.title, Doc.URL*, Loc.hash*, Loc.host, Loc.hostname, Loc.href*, Loc.pathname, Loc.port, Loc.protocol, Loc.search*, WebSocket.onmessage*, WebStorage.getItem*
Sinks	Native (Java)	sendSms#, Java.io.OutputStream#
	Web (JavaScript)	Loc.href#, XMLHttpRequest.send#, WebSocket.send#, IFrame.src#, Image.src#, Doc.write\$, Doc.writeln\$, Eval\$, setTimeout\$, setInterval\$, Element.innerHTML\$, Element.outerHTML\$

Doc: document object. Loc: location object. *: Untrusted data sources. #: Network communication APIs. \$: Code execution APIs.




Fig. 6. The data transmission mechanism of the bridge communication.

method (line 12-18). Then, the attacker injects an instance of 'JavaObject' into the WebView as a JavaScript object named 'bridge' (line 7) via the 'addJavaScriptInterface'. When the app loads the 'index.html' page, the malicious JavaScript code gets the cookie (line 20) and sends it to Java by calling the 'bridge.send()' method on line 21. The cookie is then transferred to the corresponding Java method 'send()' on line 12. The method sends the received cookie to the attacker (line 13) via the 'func2()' method, and returns the IMEI to the JavaScript (lines 15-16). Finally, the IMEI number is leaked to the attacker through the JavaScript method named 'fun1()' on line 22. To detect such sophisticated data leaks and other potential threats in cross-language environments, we propose BRIDGETAINT, which can track data flows crossing the bridge interfaces.

```

1  /* Android Native Java code */
2  @Override
3  public void onCreate(Bundle savedInstanceState) {
4      WebView w = new WebView(this);
5      WebSettings ws = w.getSettings();
6      ws.setJavaScriptEnabled(true);
7      w.addJavaScriptInterface(new JavaObject(), "bridge");
8      w.loadUrl("file:///android_asset/index.html");
9  }
10 class JavaObject {
11     @JavaScriptInterface
12     public String send(String data) {
13         func2(data);
14         tm = (TelephonyManager) this.getSystemService(Context.TELEPHONY_SERVICE);
15         String c = tm.getDeviceId();
16         return c;
17     }
18 }
19 /* JavaScript code in index.html */
20 var a = document.cookie;
21 var b = bridge.send(a);
22 fun1(b);

```

Listing 1. A snippet code of cross-language data transmission in hybrid apps

B. Cross-language Taint Tracking

From previous description, we know that the cross-language data transmission in the Android framework mainly relies on two types of system mechanisms: the bridge method invocation and the JNI data conversion. Therefore, to accomplish the cross-language taint tracking, we must arrange the taint propagation scheme within these mechanisms. Considering the complexity of the JNI, the WebView, and the underlying data structures, the cost of implementing a complete taint propagation scheme directly in these components would be too high and the scalability would also be poor. Thus, we present a simple and effective




Fig. 7. Diagram of BRIDGETAINT.

approach to propagate taint tags bidirectionally between the JavaScript and the Java environment.

The approach indirectly shares and exchanges the taint information of sensitive data from different languages by performing different operations in two stages. In the first stage, we carry out a logging procedure to record the taint information of sensitive data in the related methods of cross-language interfaces before the data are converted by JNI. Then in the second stage, we perform a recovery operation to restore the taint tag of the corresponding data according to the recorded tag in the first stage. Figure 7 is the diagram of BRIDGETAINT, in which the solid line part is the traditional taint tracking method for specific languages, and the dashed line part is the taint propagation mechanism for the bridge interfaces.

1) **Bridge Sinks:** We refer the methods implemented based on the bridge communication as the **bridge sinks** (shown in Table II). These sinks include all the JavaScript bridge methods and their corresponding Java methods in hybrid apps, which provide the capability for transmitting data across different languages. When the sensitive data flows into these special sinks, BRIDGETAINT records the transmitted data and provides mappings for sensitive data between multilingual environments. The recorded information includes the argument values of the bridge method and the return value of the Java method. In the example code shown in List 1, the recorded data are the variables *a* (line 21) and *c* (line 16) in the 'bridge.send()' method and the 'send()' method, respectively. The detailed recorded contents and information will be described in the **Taint Logging** subsection.

2) **Bridge Sources:** During the execution of bridge methods, the Android system passes the sensitive data from one language to another by using the JNI conversion. The converted data corresponding to the sensitive data are called the **bridge sources**. Thus, our goal in the second stage is to locate these converted data and restore their taint tags, and to track these data as new sources in the further tracking. For a specific bridge method in hybrid apps, the bridge sources include the result of the bridge method and the arguments of its corresponding Java method. While the sensitive data are transmitted by the bridge methods,

BRIDGETAINT restores the taint tags of the data in these sources according to the recorded cross-language mappings. Thus, the taint tags are indirectly propagated from one language to another language. In the example given in List 1, the corresponding mapping data to the variables ‘a’ and ‘c’ are the variables ‘data’ (line 12) and ‘b’ (line 21), respectively.

3) *Precise mapping between JavaScript and Java*: Considering the diversity of data and bridge methods in hybrid apps, it is necessary to obtain and log the concrete data types and the transmitting bridge methods of a given sensitive data, to achieve accurate taint mappings between JavaScript and Java. To this end, the logging procedure must first ensure that the recorded taint information of the transmitted sensitive data is accurate. Besides, the recorded data types and the method name also need to be unique; otherwise the restore operation cannot locate the corresponding bridge source related to the transmitted data.

Taint logging. To ensure the uniqueness of data mappings and distinguish between different bridge methods with arguments of different data types, we record complete relevant information of the transmitted data. The detailed recorded information includes the bridge method name, as well as the taint information of its parameters and the result of the corresponding Java method. We represent the recorded information as a triple (M, A, R). The taint information A and R are also a triple (S, V, T), where S is the data type, V is the original value and T is the taint tag in the Web and the Java environment.

Meanwhile, in order to assure that the recorded information is accurate, we arrange the logging operation in the underlying method of the JNI conversion. Because all the data transmitted between Java and JavaScript need to go through the JNI interface, we log the relevant data in the implementation method of the interface. This arrangement can ensure the accuracy of the recorded information, and can also assure that there will be no side effects on the taint propagation, such as the loss or amplification of the taint tag. The detailed implementation will be described in subsection IV-B.

Taint recovery. We use two steps to guarantee the correctness and the effectiveness of taint recovery for a given bridge source. First, BRIDGETAINT finds the correct record of the bridge method that is related to the bridge source from taint logs. The record contains its original taint tag, which is logged when its corresponding data are crossing language boundaries. Second, its taint tag is restored to the logged tag in the matched record. Specifically, the taint tag of the result value of the bridge method and the parameter values of the native Java method are restored according to the return and arguments field in the taint record, respectively.

Figure 8 shows the taint recovery process of the example shown in List 1. When BRIDGETAINT detect the bridge sources (as shown in List 1, variable ‘data’ and ‘b’), it searches the corresponding taint record associated with the bridge method ‘bridge.send()’. And then, it assigns the taint tag of 0x400 and 0x10000 in the matched record to the bridge method’s return value (variable ‘b’) and the Java method’s parameter (variable ‘data’).

IV. IMPLEMENTATION

In this section, we describe the implementation details of our cross-language taint tracking system called BRIDGEINSPECTOR. In BRIDGEINSPECTOR, we extend the sensitive sources of TaintDroid [12] to track the data flows of Java layer in hybrid apps, and utilize JSTA [34] to analyze the data flows of JavaScript layer. The BRIDGETAINT




Fig. 8. Example for taint mapping of BRIDGETAINT.

method is used to propagate the taint tags between the Java and the JavaScript environment.

A. System Architecture

BRIDGEINSPECTOR is an offline detection system that can be leveraged to detect cross language security threats in Android hybrid apps. The system consists of three components, as shown in Figure 9. The Java and JavaScript taint tracking components are applied to track sensitive Java and JavaScript data, respectively. The cross-bridge taint propagation component is used to log and map sensitive data transmitted across language boundaries. The cross-bridge taint propagation component builds a bridge to spread the taint tags between the Java and JavaScript taint tracking components.

B. Java Taint Tracking Component

The Java taint tracking component tracks Java data in the app with a customized TaintDroid system. The customization is based on the original TaintDroid and extend its taint sources.

TaintDroid is an efficient system-level taint tracking system that analyzes and detects privacy leaks in Java code of Android apps. TaintDroid implements data tainting within the Java run-time environment, namely the Dalvik Virtual Machine (VM) interpreter. First, the system marks the sensitive data at the system interfaces where the data are accessed. It allocates an additional 32-bit memory tag for each sensitive data to record the taint status of the variable. Each bit in the tag relates to one of 32 kinds of sensitive sources, and the tag can represent at most 32 different sensitive sources. When executing Java bytecode, the system propagates the taint tags of variables according to the predefined taint propagation rules. Finally, the system checks whether the variable are tainted or not at the sinks to detect sensitive data leakage.

The original TaintDroid only defines 12 private Java sources listed in Table I. We extend TaintDroid to track the other 22 sources listed in the table.

Considering the potential security threats (e.g., privacy theft and code injection) to WebView, we add 6 Java taint sources and 16 JavaScript taint sources into TaintDroid. The added sources are used to track the unsafe Java data channels and sensitive JavaScript objects marked with * in the Table I. In the implementation, we insert the taint tags into the memory of the corresponding variables at the system interface where the data is fetched.

After extension there are totally 34 different types of taint sources. However, TaintDroid can only represent 32 sources with 32-bit taint tags. To fit to the 32 bit tag, we merge some similar sensitive sources. Specifically, the IMEI and IMSI number are merged into one source called the device identifier, and the Net-location and Last-location data are merged into one source called geographical sources,

TABLE II
THE BRIDGE SINKS AND THE BRIDGE SOURCES OF BRIDGETAINT

Types	Environment (language)	Descriptions	Operations
Bridge Sinks	Web (JavaScript)	JavaScript bridge methods	Taint logging
	Native (Java)	Corresponding Java methods related to the bridge methods	Taint logging
Bridge Sources	Web (JavaScript)	Result value of bridge methods in JavaScript	Taint recovery
	Native (Java)	Argument values of the corresponding Java methods	Taint recovery




Fig. 9. The architecture of BRIDGEINSPECTOR.

respectively.

The extended TaintDroid system has 32 different taint sources, as shown in Table I. The taint markings of sensitive sources are number from 0x00000001 to 0xFFFFFFFF following the order in the table.

C. JavaScript Taint Tracking Component

To implement JavaScript taint tracking, we develop the JSTA tool to analyze and detect the flows of JavaScript sensitive data. The taint sources in JSTA and their taint markings are consistent with the customized TaintDroid system, as shown in Table I.

The basic idea of JSTA is to insert the complete taint logic into the JavaScript code through code rewriting, so that the rewritten code can automatically track sensitive data when they are executed. To mark taint sources, JSTA first converts the original sensitive data in the code to JavaScript objects and adds an extra object property to store their taint tags. JSTA then encapsulates the operators of basic expressions (arithmetic, logic, assignment, etc.) and control statements (conditions, loops, jumps) as functions. These encapsulated functions complete the original data operations and spread the taint tags between operands. Finally, JSTA hooks critical sink functions to detect whether their parameters are tainted or not.

JSTA's code rewriting is implemented based on abstract syntax tree (AST) transformations. First, JSTA parses the JavaScript code into an AST. It then traverses the AST and transforms it to a new AST according to a set of rewriting rules. These rules contain transformation rules of data conversion, function encapsulation and sink hooking described earlier. Finally, JSTA generates traceable JavaScript code from the new AST.

D. Cross-bridge Taint Propagation Component

When TaintDroid and JSTA detect that there are sensitive data crossing the language boundaries, the cross-bridge taint propagation component is triggered to spread the taint tags of these data between the two systems by mapping tainted Java data into JSTA, and mapping tainted JavaScript data into TaintDroid.

Java-to-JS taint propagation. As shown in Figure 9, the taint propagation from Java to JS is accomplished by two modules. First, the Java logging module records the tainted Java data transmitted by the bridge methods. After that, the Java-To-JS mapping module restores the taint tags of the corresponding JavaScript data based on the recorded taint relationship between Java and JavaScript data.

1) *Java taint logging module.* The bridge communication of Android is implemented in the function of the `JavaInstanceJobV8` class named `JavaInstanceJob::invokeMethod`. This function is used to interpret and execute the Java method invoked in JavaScript code, and to perform JNI data conversions on data that transmitted across languages. Therefore, BRIDGEINSPECTOR system rewrites the above functions to implement the logging of the tainted Java data transmitted through the bridge interface. The recorded information includes the bridge method name, the data types, values, and taint tags of Java data.

During the bridge method invocations, the `invokeMethod` function calls the `javaValueToJvalue` function to convert Java data to JavaScript data and return it to JavaScript environment when the target Java method finishes executing. Therefore, we obtain the bridge method name by capturing the 'method' parameter of the function. The information of data types, values, and taint tags are obtained by intercepting the 'value' parameter of the `javaValueToJvalue` function.

For example, when the app code shown in List 1 uses the JavaScript bridge to get the IMEI number, the tainted Java data are recorded in logs using JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) format, shown in List 2.

```

1 { "Method": "bridge.send",
2   "Return": {
3     "Type": "String", "Value": "IMEIValue", "Tag": 0x00000400
4   }

```

Listing 2. An example Java taint record in JSON format

2) *Java-to-JS taint mapping module.* In order to map the recorded Java taint tags to correct JavaScript data, the Java-To-JS mapping module first performs a static analysis of the app to locate the callsite of the corresponding bridge method, and then restores the taint tags of the returned JavaScript data at the callsite to the recorded tags.

We resort to the Apktool [2] to perform the static analysis of the app. We first use the Apktool to decompile the hybrid app and extract the JavaScript code. Then we leverage regular expression matching to quickly find the bridge method callsites in the code. To improve precision, we skip the comments section and only perform string matching of method names in the code section. However, if the JavaScript code dynamically constructs an invocation to the bridge method through string concatenation, our method may miss some callsites and fail to map the taint. Issuing such cases, we manually analyze and find the method invocation points in the code.

To facilitate the JSTA system to directly track the mapped JavaScript data, the mapping module automatically completes the taint restoration by constructing stub code of bridge methods. The detailed process is as follows. The module first parses the Java taint log and traverses all log. If there is a callsite in the JavaScript code that corresponds to the target bridge method in the taint record, it constructs a return statement according to the information of data type, value, and taint tags in the record. The statement will return a JavaScript value that carries a Java taint tag. List 3 shows the stub code constructed from the taint log in List 2. Because the bridge method's name is unique in the JavaScript code, we can assure that the above code construction will not map the tainted Java data into the JavaScript data returned by other bridge methods, which might cause the imprecision of the taint mappings.

```
1  /* Automatic generated stub code of JavaScript bridge */
2  bridge = { send: function() {
3    // Return tainted Java data to JavaScript.
4    return new taintedJavaData(0x00000400, "IMEIValue");
5  }}
6  /* Original JavaScript code in index.html */
7  var a = document.cookie;
8  var b = bridge.send(a);
9  func1(b);
```

Listing 3. An example stub code of JavaScript bridge

In this way, the JavaScript code that merges the bridge stub carries taint tags from the Java layer. The JSTA system will treat the JavaScript data with Java taint tags as a new source and further track them in the JavaScript execution environment.

JS-to-Java taint propagation. Similarly, the taint propagation from JS to Java is also composed of 2 modules, the JavaScript taint logging module and the JS-to-Java taint mapping module. The logging module is responsible for recording the JavaScript data transmitted by the bridge methods, and the mapping module restores the taint tags of the corresponding Java data in the TaintDroid according to the recorded taint information.

1) *JavaScript taint logging module.* The logging module is implemented in the JSTA system to record the associated information of JavaScript data. In the code rewriting process of JSTA, we apply hook techniques to insert a log function inside the stub code to capture and record the method name and parameters' taint information of JavaScript bridges. For the stub method 'bridge.send()' shown in List 3, List 4 shows the code after inserting the log hooks. The hooks will record the name of the 'bridge.send()' method and the cookie parameters passed to Java in JSON logs, as shown in List 5.

```
1  /* Bridge stub code with log hooks. */
2  bridge = { send: function() {
3    // Hook function for logging method name.
4    log(arguments.callee.name);
5    // Hook function for logging method arguments.
6    log(arguments);
7    // Return tainted Java data to JavaScript.
8    return new taintedJavaData(0x00000400, "IMEIValue");
9  }}
10 }
11 /* Original JavaScript code in index.html */
12 var a = document.cookie;
13 var b = bridge.send(a);
14 func1(b);
```

Listing 4. Stub code with log hooks

```
1  { "Method": "bridge.send",
2    "Arguments": [{
3      "Type": "String", "Value": "cookieValue", "Tag": "0x00010000" }]
4  }
```

Listing 5. An example JavaScript taint record in JSON format

2) *JS-to-Java taint mapping module.* In the data transfer process of the bridge interface, the JNI data conversion function named `jvalueToJavaValue` will convert the JavaScript data into the corresponding Java data and pass them to the target Java method when the bridge method is executed. Thus, we add a hook function within the `jvalueToJavaValue` function in order to restore the recorded JavaScript taint tags into the correct Java data before the app executes the Java method.

The hook function intercepts the argument `Jvalue` of the `jvalueToJavaValue` function to find the correct tainted data in the JavaScript log according to the bridge method name and the parameters' information (e.g., data type, data value, taint tags) corresponding to the parameters. When the tainted data are found, the hook function modifies the taint tag of the converted Java data to the matched tags in the log. This completes the propagation of the JavaScript tags into the Java environment.

Although the name of JavaScript Bridge method's implementation might have different name, we can use their detailed parameters' information to differentiate between the methods with the same name, which can assure the correctness of the matched JavaScript data. Therefore, the mapping module will not cause diffusion and omission of taint propagation.

E. System Deployment and Run

Deployment. In order to detect actual malicious behaviors and discover real vulnerabilities in hybrid apps, we deploy the Java and JavaScript taint tracking components of BRIDGEINSPECTOR in Android mobiles and desktop PCs respectively. We root a mobile device and flash the customized TaintDroid images to it. Specifically, the mobile we use is Google Nexus 4 smartphone, running the modified TaintDroid (based on Android 4.3 system), with 2G RAM and AMD APQ8064 CPU. The PC is a Dell OPTIPLEX 380 workstation with one Intel Pentium E5300 CPU and 4G memory, running the 32-bit Ubuntu 16.04 with kernel 3.8.0-35-generic.

The reason for the above deployment is that JSTA runs at the application-level while TaintDroid runs on the Android system-level. If deploy both JSTA and TaintDroid in Android mobiles, TaintDroid will treat JSTA as an application-level app and track it, which might prevent the BRIDGEINSPECTOR system from working properly.

Run. The detailed execution process of BRIDGEINSPECTOR consists of three phases. We detect the Native, Web/Native-to-Web and Web-to-Native security threats in the three phases, respectively. In the first phase (draw with solid arrows in Figure 9), BRIDGEINSPECTOR dynamically executes hybrid apps in Android smartphones. During the testing, we manually complete the app registration, GUI traversal and activity operations. For example, to test an app with functionalities of barcode scanning and voice chatting, we manually click on the relevant buttons to scan the barcode and send voice messages. When the dynamic execution is finished, the Java tracking component outputs the Native risks and the logging module outputs the Java taint logs. In the second phase (draw with dashed arrows in Figure 9), BRIDGEINSPECTOR first obtains the bridge stubs through the mapping module, and then starts the JavaScript tracking component to analyze the JavaScript code that merges the bridge stubs and outputs the Web/Native-to-Web security analysis result. At the same time, the mapping component

TABLE III
DATASETS OF EXPERIMENTS

Dataset	Total samples	Categories	# of apps
BridgeBench	38	Cordova test cases	38
Specific Apps	117	Maps & Navigation	15
		Weather	40
		Photography	16
		Contact Backup	13
		SMS Backup	15
		Pedometer	18
Popular Apps	1055	Tools	139
		Wallpaper	93
		Social	194
		Lifestyle	164
		News	41
		Video & Audio	140
		Office	141
		Photography	69
		Travel	61
		Shopping	13

outputs the JavaScript taint logs. In the last phase (as shown by the dotted arrows in Figure 9), BRIDGEINSPECTOR runs the app on the smartphone for the second time. The Java tracking component tracks the Java code again based on the JavaScript log generated in the second phase, and outputs the Web-to-Native security risk of the app. The second execution is also performed by using manual testing.

The reason we adopt such a three-phase analysis is that the cross-language data flow analysis of the tracking component relies on the result logs that produced by the mapping component. As a result, BRIDGEINSPECTOR generates Java logs in the first phase to support the second phase analysis for Java-to-JS data flows. When the second phase tracking generates JavaScript logs, the third phase analysis for the JS-to-Java data flows can be successfully completed.

V. EVALUATION

We conduct extensive experiments to evaluate the performance of BRIDGEINSPECTOR in terms of completeness, effectiveness and applicability. In this section, we first give the details of experiment setup, and then report the results of the experiments along with analyses and discussions.

A. Experiment Setups and Design

The first set of experiments aim to verify whether our system can completely detect all kinds of insecure data flows crossing the bridge interface. To this end, we combine each type of sensitive data with different critical functions in Table I to generate totally 154 cross-language data paths. We then design a test benchmark called BRIDGEBENCH, which contains 38 sampling apps that cover all possible cross-language data paths. We use BRIDGEBENCH to test the completeness of our system.

In the second set of experiments, we test the effectiveness of BRIDGEINSPECTOR with 117 apps intentionally gathered from Baidu Android market across six categories, including maps, weather, photography, contact/SMS backup, and pedometer. These apps provide users with customized value-added and optimization services based on specific mobile data, such as navigation and weather forecasts (location-based services, LBS), and motion measurement (mobile sensor-based services).

On the basis of the above experiments, we finally investigate the situation of cross-language security risks in the current Android market. In the process of data analysis and research, we evaluate 1055 top popular apps from Baidu across 10 categories, e.g., system tools, theme wallpaper and social communications. The detailed classification and numbers of tested apps are shown in Table III.

We test all the apps manually in the evaluation, which

indeed cost a lot of manpower in executing these apps. We spend enough time to manually execution each app to guarantee that all the possible related paths can be covered. Actually, although we develop some simple automatic testing code for this purpose, considering the complexity of hybrid apps, we use manual testing in our experiments to execute bridge methods, aiming to cover all possible data paths associated with the bridge communication.

The idea of using automatic testing technique can be greatly helpful in reducing manpower and improving the efficiency in large-scale app testing [4], [5], [17], [26]. However, the main barrier when we to cooperate automatic testing with our BRIDGETAINT tool is that the current automatic testing tools cannot analyze events of Web pages wrapped in WebView, which makes it is difficult to automatically trigger data paths related to bridge communication in hybrid apps by using these tools. Besides, the automatic techniques have certain limitations in that when the app requires users to input some specific content or SMS verification code, it is possible that the automatic execution will be hindered and thus the testing paths are not fully covered.

B. Path Coverage of Unsafe Data-flows

Cordova is currently the most popular open-source hybrid app development framework that provides powerful cross-platform capabilities, many other development frameworks (e.g., Ionic, MobileFirst, and Onsen UI) are built on top of Cordova. Thus, we choose to use Cordova to implement BRIDGEBENCH.

BRIDGEBENCH covers a total of 154 data paths from sources to sinks. The detection results of these data paths are listed in Table IV, in which the first column is the source of the data path that generates the sensitive data, and the second column is the detection result of the data path from the same sensitive data to different critical sinks. We use Sk_{webi} and Sk_{nati} to denote the i -th sinks in the web and the native environment, respectively. For each path, we use the related Cordova plug-in to read the corresponding sensitive data. For the data that cannot be directly obtained by system plug-ins, we use our own custom plug-ins to get them. We then deal with these data using the key functions listed in Table I. The first group of samples (No.1-32) sends user privacy through network sinks. The second group of samples (No.33-38) utilizes the code execution APIs to directly process the native data acquired by the plug-in. Once these data contain malicious code, it will cause cross-language code injection attacks. From the test results we can see that BRIDGEINSPECTOR has successfully detected all unsafe data flows of cross-language privacy leaks and code injection vulnerabilities in all paths.

C. Effectiveness on Service-specific Android Apps

The data tracking result of the second experiment is shown in Table V, in which R represents that the app reads the corresponding data, N and B denote that the app send the data to its server via Java and JavaScript bridge code, respectively.

As can be seen from Table V, typical LBS apps, including the navigation and the weather apps, have acquired the user's real-time location. Among the data acquisitions in these apps, 46 of them are completed by using Java code, and nine of them is done by utilizing JavaScript bridge code. Similarly, the camera and the photography apps providing share functions are also detected having the behavior of accessing and sending the album and user photos. The other three types of apps also have the same behaviors of specific data acquisitions, such as the user contact list and SMS content acquisition in cloud backup apps, acceleration

sensor data acquisition by the pedometer apps. The above results are consistent with the actual functionalities provided by the specific apps, which objectively indicate that the data tracking of the BRIDGEINSPECTOR is realistic and accurate.

In addition, we find that the collected private data of some service-specific apps exceed their application requirements, which brings serious risks to app users. In the 117 tested applications, we find 38 of them (marked with * in Table V) are suspected of stealing privacy (such as contacts and SMS messages) and verify them manually. We search them in Google Play and find 19 of them (such as veryzhun.vzcom, com.sportq.fit, com.tp.android.bfleftme, com.hotbody.fitzero, com.lofter.android) are still present in Google Play. This shows that our approach can find suspected applications that pass the detection of Google Play.

D. Research on Popular Market Apps

Total statistics and analysis. In the tested 1055 popular market apps of the third experiment, BRIDGEINSPECTOR detects that up to 87.5% of them have security risks. In these issues, potential privacy leaks are particularly prominent, as many as 87% of the apps transfer user sensitive data. Specifically, Java communication is the main way of data transmission, 84.5% (891) of the apps send user's mobile privacy by using Java code. In addition, bridge communication has become an important means of information disclosure, 4.5% (48) and 3.0% (32) of the apps obtain user phone data and online privacy through JavaScript bridge code. The statistics of these security issues are shown in Table VI, in which the first column indicates different types of sensitive data and the second column represents the percentage of apps of security risks caused by the corresponding data. On the whole, the most frequently disclosed user privacy sending through the native-to-web communication channels and the web-to-native communication channels are the IMEI numbers and the web page titles, respectively. For the Java communication channels, the transmitted data include the IMEI and the location data, as well as the NFC, the microphone data, the Bluetooth and the album information.

Besides, five apps are vulnerable to serious cross-language code injection attacks. We manually validate these vulnerable apps. First, we reverse engineer these apps by using the Apktool and find that some functions obtain untrusted data from the Wi-Fi and the barcode channels. These functions directly output these data into the DOM of Web page without any validation or filtering, resulting in XSS vulnerabilities. Then, we verify whether these vulnerabilities can be exploited by attackers. We manually construct a Wi-Fi site and barcode that contains crafted malicious code to attack these apps. When we use the apps to scan the malicious Wi-Fi and barcode, the vulnerabilities is triggered and the exploit codes are successfully executed.

Detailed data transmission analysis by app categories. Generally, the functionalities and services provided by apps depend on different sensitive data. In order to further understand whether their data is consistent with their requirements or not, and assess the impact of data transmission, we perform a statistical analysis on sensitive data transfers from the perspective of application categories and data types (as shown in Figure 10 and Figure 11, respectively).

1) The comparison and cause analysis of data transmission in different apps: From Figure 10 (1) and (3), we can see that, for the privacy stored on mobile devices, the potential data leak situation is most serious in social and lifestyle apps. Up to 9 kinds of user data is transmitted, such as IMEI and contact list. In addition, the situation in photography and travel apps are also significant, the exposed user privacy include albums, location and microphone data.

Figure 10 (2) shows that the transmission of online privacy is also prominent. For instance, the wallpaper and the online-shopping apps collected 8 types of data, e.g., the titles, the cookies and other private data.

The main reason for the data transfers is from the following two aspects. First, part of them comes from the normal request of user data from app developers. Because in the app development process, developers usually need to obtain device ID (e.g., IMEI) to identify different users, and then send or read the SMS to verify and validate the legitimacy of the user identities, and finally provide the users with effective specific services (e.g., LBS). Therefore, the collection of various apps for IMEI, SMS, and other services related data is more common. Such as the accessing of user contact and album in social apps, is mainly used for address book matching and photo sharing. Second, the others are malicious data theft from attackers or ad servers. As can be seen from Figure 10 (1), some lifestyle apps have accessed contact list that are not relevant to their functionalities, showing potential malicious behaviors. In addition, a little office apps collect geolocation data to locate and track users in real-time, imposing serious risks.

2) Risk analysis of different kinds of data transmission: Figure 11 shows the transmission ratio of different types of sensitive data in market apps. In order to analyze the security risks of these data transfers, we classify them into two ways, user-aware data transfers and user-unaware data transfers. The first one is a form of active behavior which means that the users expose the privacy to the Internet absolutely by themselves; the latter is the user sensitive data are silently transmitted to remote servers of apps by using passive collection. For instance, NFC, album, microphone privacy, and the data which need user interactions to access are mostly leaked in the first way. The other data are exposed by the second way, such as location, contacts and other device privacy and web-side data.

Often, the security risks of user-aware information disclosure are generally small. For example, as can be seen from Figure 11 (1) and (3), the NFC data's transmission ratio of the system tools and the social apps is high. For the microphone data, the social and the practical lifestyle apps have a high proportion of data transfers. Because these categories of apps provide rich functionalities of voice chatting, voice searching and NFC services, the users need to take the initiative to submit the relevant data to obtain efficient custom services, so the risk is relatively small.

Compare with the active data transfers, there is a serious risk for the passive data transfers. For example, the lifestyle apps collect acceleration data of user devices, the social apps leak user locations, and office apps access and transmit the Android account information of users. These data can be used for social engineering even if they cannot directly bring economic or intellectual values to attackers. The attacker may obtain users' login account name and location information, and further retrieve users' other sensitive information to perform more sophisticated social engineering attacks. In addition, the bridge interface is also a potential risk in hybrid apps. Through the bridge communication, the native code can obtain the web private data, including domain names, titles, cookie, and users searching keywords. These data often contain users' browsing history and online transactions and other secret information (e.g., trading accounts, transaction passwords and transaction amount), once transmit to third-parties over network, bringing users a huge threat.

TABLE IV
COVERAGE TEST RESULT OF BRIDGEBENCH

ID	Sources of data-flows		Sinks of data-flows and detection results							
	Types of Sources	Cordova plug-ins for sensitive data acquisition	Sk _{web1}	Sk _{web2}	Sk _{web3}	Sk _{web4}	Sk _{web5}	Sk _{nat1}	Sk _{nat2}	
1	NFC	phonegap-nfc	●	●	●	●	●	-	-	
2	Contacts	cordova-plugin-contacts	●	●	●	●	●	-	-	
3	Mic	cordova-plugin-media-capture	●	●	●	●	●	-	-	
4	PhoneNumber	cordova-plugin-sim	●	●	●	●	●	-	-	
5	Location (GPS)	cordova-plugin-geolocation	●	●	●	●	●	-	-	
6	Location (Net, Last)	cordova-plugin-geolocation	●	●	●	●	●	-	-	
7	Bluetooth	cordova-plugin-bluetooth-serial	●	●	●	●	●	-	-	
8	Camera	cordova-plugin-camera	●	●	●	●	●	-	-	
9	Accelerometer	cordova-plugin-device-motion	●	●	●	●	●	-	-	
10	SMS	cordova-plugin-sms	●	●	●	●	●	-	-	
11	Device	cordova-plugin-sim	●	●	●	●	●	-	-	
12	Wi-Fi	com.pylonproducts.wifiwizard	●	●	●	●	●	-	-	
13	ICCID	cordova-plugin-sim	●	●	●	●	●	-	-	
14	Barcode	phonegap-plugin-barcodescanner	●	●	●	●	●	-	-	
15	Account	com.polychrom.cordova.AccountManagerPlugin	●	●	●	●	●	-	-	
16	History	customized plug-in	●	●	●	●	●	-	-	
17	Doc.cookie	customized plug-in	-	-	-	-	-	●	●	
18	Doc.domain	customized plug-in	-	-	-	-	-	●	●	
19	Doc.lastModified	customized plug-in	-	-	-	-	-	●	●	
20	Doc.referrer	customized plug-in	-	-	-	-	-	●	●	
21	Doc.title	customized plug-in	-	-	-	-	-	●	●	
22	Doc.URL	customized plug-in	-	-	-	-	-	●	●	
23	Loc.hash	customized plug-in	-	-	-	-	-	●	●	
24	Loc.host	customized plug-in	-	-	-	-	-	●	●	
25	Loc.hostname	customized plug-in	-	-	-	-	-	●	●	
26	Loc.href	customized plug-in	-	-	-	-	-	●	●	
27	Loc.pathname	customized plug-in	-	-	-	-	-	●	●	
28	Loc.port	customized plug-in	-	-	-	-	-	●	●	
29	Loc.protocol	customized plug-in	-	-	-	-	-	●	●	
30	Loc.search	customized plug-in	-	-	-	-	-	●	●	
31	WebSocket message	customized plug-in	-	-	-	-	-	●	●	
32	WebStorage data	customized plug-in	-	-	-	-	-	●	●	
			Sk _{web6}	Sk _{web7}	Sk _{web8}	Sk _{web9}	Sk _{web10}	Sk _{web11}	Sk _{web12}	
33	NFC	phonegap-nfc	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	
34	Contacts	cordova-plugin-contacts	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	
35	Bluetooth	cordova-plugin-bluetooth-serial	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	
36	SMS	cordova-plugin-sms	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	
37	Wi-Fi	com.pylonproducts.wifiwizard	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	
38	Barcode	phonegap-plugin-barcodescanner	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	

Doc: document object. Loc: location object. •: Cross-language data leaks. ○: Cross-language XSS vulnerabilities.
Sk_{web1-5}: JavaScript network communication APIs. Sk_{web6-12}: JavaScript code execution APIs. Sk_{nat1}: Java network API. Sk_{nat2}: Java SMS API.

VI. DISCUSSION

A. Comparison with HybridDroid

HYBRIDROID is the most similar work to our paper, uses static taint analysis to detect Java-to-JS leaks. The cross-language taint mapping mechanism used in HYBRIDROID is based on the execution semantics of bridge communication, which is obtained by inspecting Android source code. The execution semantics are then used in the static analysis of the app code to taint data and find potential leaks. This mapping mechanism cannot analyze apps developed using frameworks. In contrast, BRIDGETAINT uses a dynamic method to record and map the data on the bidirectional transmission path by adding hook points in the underlying JNI implementation of WebView. Our method can record the name of objects in the bi-directional cross-language communication during execution and associate the objects, and thus can support analyzing apps developed using frameworks.

Below we use two examples to illustrate the contribution of our work over existing works like HYBRIDROID. In both examples the app reads a user's SMS message into a web page. In the first example (shown in Figure 12) this functionality is implemented by the developer's own code, and in the second example (shown in Figure 13) this functionality is implemented by using the Cordova framework.

1) In the first example, the app developer directly declares the Java object and its exposed JavaScript bridge object by using the addJavaScriptInterface API of WebView. In this

case, both BRIDGETAINT and HYBRIDROID can associate the cross-language data, but they use different methods.

HYBRIDROID directly obtains the JavaScript object's corresponding Java object through code analysis, and correlates object methods and their method parameters. For example, as shown in Figure 1, HYBRIDROID maps the JavaScript object 'SMS' to the Java object 'SMSObject' according to the statement 'WebView.addJavaScriptInterface(new SMSObject(),"SMS")', and thus it can associate SMSObject.getSMS() with SMS.getSMS(). The parameters of the two methods are the data transmitted through the bridge communication. HYBRIDROID applies this mapping strategy to static code analysis to implement Java-to-JS taint tracking.

In contrast, BRIDGETAINT uses a dynamic method to record and map the data on the transmission path, which is different from the one used in HYBRIDROID. To do this, BRIDGETAINT adds hook points in the underlying JNI implementation of WebView in order to record the actual bridge methods, the method parameters, and the method return values in the bidirectional channels. In this example, the transmitted bridge method name 'SMS.getSMS' and the returned value are recorded. BRIDGETAINT uses these recorded information to associate the SMS.getSMS() method with the SMSObject.getSMS() method.

2) In the second example, the app is developed by using the Cordova framework and thus its cross-language data transmissions are more complex. In this case, BRIDGETAINT can still match the data association, while HYBRIDROID cannot.




Fig. 10. Comparison of data transmission in 1055 popular market apps by app categories.




Fig. 11. Comparison of data transmission in 1055 popular market apps by sensitive data types.




Fig. 12. Comparison of mapping mechanisms between BRIDGETAINT and HYBRIDROID (normal app).

TABLE V
DETECTION RESULT OF 117 SERVICE-SPECIFIC APPS

	Maps & Navigation			Weather			Photography			Contact Backup			SMS Backup			Pedometer		
	R#	N#	B#	R#	N#	B#	R#	N#	B#	R#	N#	B#	R#	N#	B#	R#	N#	B#
NFC	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Contacts	15	8* (1 ⁺)	0	39	20* (3 ⁺)	1*	16	0	0	13	12	1	15	3	2	18	9* (1 ⁺)	0
Mic	15	3	0	16	2	0	16	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
PhoneNumber	15	3	0	39	20	4	16	0	0	13	7	0	15	3	2	18	10	1
Location	15	14	1	40	32	8	16	2	4	13	3	0	15	4	0	18	9	1
Bluetooth	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	5	0	0	9	0	0	0	0	0
Camera	0	0	0	4	1	0	16	6	10	0	0	0	0	0	0	18	2	1
Accelerometer	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	18	16	2
SMS	15	0	0	39	2* (2 ⁺)	0	16	0	0	13	9	1	15	13	2	18	1* (1 ⁺)	0
IMEI	15	14	1	40	37	1	16	6	10	13	12	0	15	5	2	18	16	2
Wi-Fi	15	3	0	39	30	4	16	1	0	13	7	2	15	3	0	18	9	0
ICCID	15	3	0	7	5	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	3	0
Barcode	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Account	15	0	1	39	19	0	16	0	0	13	7	0	15	3	0	18	9	0
History	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

R: read data. N: send data through native Java. B: send data through JavaScript bridge. *: detected by BRIDGEINSPECTOR. +: detected by Play Protect.

TABLE VI
TOTAL STATISTICS OF DATA TRACKING IN 1055 MARKET APPS

Data sources	Arrival Sinks			
	Sk _{nat1}	Sk _{nat2}	Sk _{web1-5}	Sk _{web6-12}
NFC	14.41% (152)	0.09% (1)	2.75% (29)	-
Contacts	1.90% (20)	-	-	-
Mic	23.41% (247)	-	-	-
PhoneNumber	0.76% (8)	-	1.33% (14)	-
Location	29.95% (316)	0.09% (1)	2.27% (24)	-
Bluetooth	4.45% (47)	0.09% (1)	-	-
Camera	19.81% (209)	-	-	-
Accelerometer	2.46% (26)	-	0.85% (9)	-
SMS	2.09% (22)	-	2.94% (31)	-
Device	80.38% (848)	-	3.60% (38)	-
Wi-Fi	1.80% (19)	-	0.28% (3)	0.19% (2)
ICCID	2.09% (22)	-	2.37% (25)	-
Barcode	3.03% (32)	-	-	0.28% (3)
Account	0.47% (5)	-	1.14% (12)	-
History	0.09% (1)	-	0.85% (9)	-
Doc.cookie	0.57% (6)	-	-	-
Doc.domain	1.80% (19)	-	-	-
Doc.lastModified	-	-	-	-
Doc.referrer	0.09% (1)	-	-	-
Doc.title	2.56% (27)	-	-	-
Doc.URL	0.57% (6)	-	-	-
Loc.hash	-	-	-	-
Loc.host	0.47% (5)	-	-	-
Loc.hostname	-	-	-	-
Loc.href	1.23% (13)	-	-	-
Loc.pathname	0.76% (8)	-	-	-
Loc.port	-	-	-	-
Loc.protocol	0.19% (2)	-	-	-
Loc.search	0.66% (7)	-	-	-
WebSocket	-	-	-	-
WebStorage	0.38% (4)	-	-	-

Doc: document object. Loc: location object. Sk_{nat1}: Java network API. Sk_{nat2}: Java SMS API. Sk_{web1-5}: JavaScript network communication APIs. Sk_{web6-12}: JavaScript code execution APIs.

Cordova provides some add-on libraries called plug-ins, which offers a set of JavaScript interfaces to invoke native device capabilities. The developer can directly use these JavaScript interfaces to call native components without writing Java code. In the example shown in Figure 13, the function of displaying SMS messages on the page is implemented by utilizing Cordova's SMS plug-in. By simply importing the related plug-in library, the developer can use the JavaScript method SMS.listSMS() to obtain the SMS content without writing his own code. The code marked in dark gray in Figure 13 is implemented in the Cordova library.

We first analyze why HYBRIDROID cannot match data association in this case. To ensure scalability, all the Cordova plug-ins are implemented on top of the WebView interface. They use the `_cordovaNative.exe()` method to pass the JavaScript plug-in name and plug-in action as parameters to the `exec()` method of the CordovaBridge class

at the Java side. The target plug-in methods are invoked by using the reflection mechanism provided in the `exec()` method of the PluginManager class. Figure 13 lists the core functions of the Cordova library that are actually invoked when SMS.listSMS() is executed. SMS.listSMS() uses the `cordova.exec(plugin, action)` method to pass the calling plugin name 'SMS' and the action 'listSMS' to the variables plugin and action in the bridge interface method `_cordovaNative.exec()`, which is then passed to Java via `WebView`. In the CordovaBridge class and the pluginManager class, the target listSMS() method of the SMSPlugin class is invoked via Java reflection.

From the above process we can see that the Cordova plug-in names and action names transmitted across languages can be determined only during the code execution. Direct static analysis on the arguments of the addJavaScriptInterface API cannot associate the cross-language data, because the actual arguments of `WebView.addJavaScriptInterface()` are fixed to 'CordovaBridge' and '_cordovaNative' in Cordova apps. Therefore, HYBRIDROID is unable to detect Cordova-based hybrid apps.

In contrast, our method can record the value and type of parameters passed by the bridge method during dynamic execution by hooking the underlying implementation of `WebView`. In the same example, 'SMS' and 'listSMS' are recorded, and thus the methods in JavaScript and Java can be matched to associate the returned value of the corresponding method with the parameters.

B. Comparison with Play Protect

We compare BRIDGEINSPECTOR with Play Protect, which is Google's latest comprehensive security service for Android. We install the Google Play Store App on a test phone (Nexus 5). The app provides two ways to perform Play Protect to detect malicious behaviors. One way is to run safety check at the time of app installation. It requires setting up the app and activating its Play Protect protection mechanism. After setting up, when the mobile phone installs a new app, Play Protect will automatically scan the app and perform security detection. When there is a security risk in the newly installed app, Play Protect will prompt and alert user of data theft risks and mark it as a harmful application in the app installation stage. Another way is to scan the app after installation, which can detect all installed apps in the mobile phone. We perform the two kinds of security tests on app, and find that the test results are consistent.

For ease of comparison, we use Play Protect to detect the 117 testing apps listed in Table V. The results show that Play Protect find only 5 apps (marked with + in Table V) as privacy theft but it does not indicate what data the




Fig. 13. Comparison of mapping mechanisms between BRIDGETAINT and HYBRIDROID (cordova-based app).

apps steal. In contrast, BRIDGEINSPECTOR finds all 38 suspected applications, including the 5 found by Play Protect. Besides, we also use Play Protect to scan all test cases of BridgeBench and find that Google Play cannot detect any security issues. Therefore, BRIDGEINSPECTOR can detect data paths of potential privacy theft more accurately and provides more details of leaked data than Play Protect.

C. Implementation Limitations

Here, we discuss some limitations of BRIDGETAINT. Firstly, because we use TaintDroid (Android 4.3) to perform Java taint tracking, the current implementation of BRIDGETAINT can be installed on only Android 4.3 system. However, BRIDGETAINT can also be used as a tool to analyze most current apps developed using new SDKs (version after Android 4.3) due to the following reasons.

First, although Google introduces the Android Run Time (ART) mechanism to replace the Dalvik VM since Android 4.4, it provides backward-compatibility by offering the Android Support Library. As long as the `minSdkVersion` attribute value specified by the developer is no higher than 18 (which is the highest API level supported by TaintDroid 4.3), the apps developed using new SDKs can still run on the Dalvik VM by importing the support libraries. Thus, the applicability of BRIDGETAINT(TaintDroid) on the apps developed using new SDKs actually depends on the backward-compatibility of the app. If the app provides backward-compatibility by setting proper `minSdkVersion` value and using support libraries, it should be successfully installed and run on the TaintDroid system unless it uses some APIs beyond the scope of support libraries. In this case, BRIDGETAINT should also be used to detect leaks in such backward-compatible apps target new Android system (such as Nougat and Oreo).

To investigate the actual influence of the ART mechanism on TaintDroid, we download eight apps' source code developed using new APIs of Android 7.0 and 8.0 from Android official website. We compile these apps through Android Studio by setting `minSdkVersion` to 18 and importing the corresponding support libraries. BRIDGETAINT can successfully run the compiled apps and track their data flows. Meanwhile, we investigate the fraction of apps that support backward-compatibility. We download 3045 popular apps from Baidu app store, and find that 2508 of them (82.4%) have implemented backward-compatibility (set `minSdkVersion` attribute value lower than or equal to 18 and use Android Support Library). Therefore, the BRIDGETAINT system can still effectively detect most of the current market applications.

Considering that backward-compatibility may be short-lived, we further discuss BRIDGETAINT's adaptability in the ART environment. In fact, BRIDGETAINT's cross-language




Fig. 14. Interplay between BRIDGETAINT and Android architecture.

taint tracking mechanism is not coupled with TaintDroid and the mechanism can be easily adapted to new platforms like ART if someone were to develop new TaintDroid for them.

Figure 14 shows the interplay between BRIDGETAINT and Android architecture. In Android, JavaScript codes are mainly interpreted by Webkit, and Java codes are interpreted and executed by a virtual machine (Dalvik before Android 4.3 and ART after Android 4.4). When Webkit executes bridge methods, JNI is responsible for completing the cross-language method invocations between JavaScript and Java, and performing data conversion between VM and Webkit environments.

TaintDroid's taint tracking mechanism is implemented in the Dalvik VM. It extends variable's data structure of Dalvik VM and stores the taint tags of variables in processor registers and memory. TaintDroid provides two interfaces for getting and setting the taint tags of variables, namely `getTaint()` and `addTaint()`, whose parameters are variable names. These two interfaces are used by BRIDGETAINT to implement cross-language taint tracking.

In order to implement cross-language taint tracking, as shown in Figure 14, BRIDGETAINT monitors data transferred between Android runtime and Webkit environments by hooking JNI interfaces. BRIDGETAINT records related taint information (including name of bridge methods, method parameters and their taint tags, the returned values of methods and their taint tags) of data transmitted through bridge methods (bridge sinks), and then restores the taint tag of corresponding data (bridge sources) to accomplish cross-language taint mapping. In this process, BRIDGETAINT utilizes the `getTaint()` method to get the taint tag of Java-to-JS data, and uses the `addTaint()` method to restore the taint tag of JS-to-Java data.

From above discussions, we know that if we want to implement BRIDGETAINT on Android ART, we need to

hook JNI to monitor data transferred between the JavaScript and Java and use the `getTaint()/addTaint()` methods to achieve taint tracking and mapping. Because the JNI interface remains unchanged and provides support for communication between ART and Webkit after Android 4.4, if some dynamic taint tracking systems like TaintDroid were developed for ART and they provide interfaces like `getTaint()/addTaint()`, our BRIDGETAINT scheme can be easily adapted on ART. Actually, the TaintART developed in [31] is such a taint tracking system for ART. As described in [31], TaintART provides interfaces for acquiring and setting taint tags, based on which we can implement BRIDGETAINT on TaintART. However, because TaintART is not yet open source, we cannot implement BRIDGETAINT on it now. We hope to implement BRIDGETAINT on TaintART in the future in case the latter is open sourced.

Secondly, BRIDGETAINT inevitably inherits the limitations of TaintDroid. TaintDroid only tracks explicit data flows that directly assign the tainted data to the target object but does not track implicit data flows in control statements (e.g., conditional branches) or covert channels; it cannot defeat the attacks that exploit implicit flows and covert channels. Similarly, BRIDGETAINT cannot defeat such attacks too.

D. Cross-language Taint Mapping on iOS Platform

Theoretically, it is also feasible to implement our taint data mapping scheme on the iOS platform. In iOS, the bridge communication between JavaScript and Objective-C are implemented by using the `UIWebView` interface. Through the `JSEXP` protocol provided by the iOS `JavaScriptCore` framework, the developers can export Objective-C classes into the `UIWebView`'s JavaScript context, which makes JavaScript and Objective-C code be able to call each other. Data conversion between different languages is accomplished by the `JSValue` class. To achieve cross-language mappings on iOS to associate the data between JavaScript and Objective-C, we can inspect the specific implementation of `UIWebView` and add hook points in the `JSEXP` protocol and `JSValue` class to record the same taint information as do in BRIDGETAINT. Of course, the non-open source iOS system may pose several challenging issues.

VII. RELATED WORK

Android security researches has been a hot topic in the field of mobile security, and granted many attentions by the members of both academic and industry community. Tan et al. [32] conducted a comprehensive survey on vulnerabilities, security mechanisms and detection systems of Android, and addressed the limitations of existing works and current challenges. Reaves et al. [29] performed a systematical technical analysis and comparison on static and dynamic analysis tools of Android native apps. In this paper, we mainly analyze and summarize the present researches and the existing tools of taint analysis for native apps and hybrid apps.

Researchers have implemented numerous analysis systems to detect the security issues in native Android apps over the recent 5 years. Various tools, e.g., `AppsPlayground` [28], `TaintDroid` [12], `DroidScope` [39], and `VetDroid` [41], use dynamic taint tracking techniques to detect the data leaks in Java code of apps. Among these tools, `DroidScope` even extend the analysis scope to native C code. In addition, static taint analysis is also a common method for discovering privacy exposure and security vulnerabilities. The typical data tracking systems include `FlowDroid` [6], `AmanDroid` [35] and the tools in the literature [8], [13],

[15], [20], [23], [37], [40], as well as intent injection [24] and permission escalation [11] detection system.

However, the above-mentioned tools can only analyze the security problems in the native apps, and cannot apply for detecting the cross-language security threats caused by the interoperation between JavaScript and Java code. Therefore, researchers have recently begun to explore new solutions for hybrid mobile apps, including taint tracking mechanisms and analysis methods for bridge calls in multiple programming languages.

Jin et al. [18] was the first to propose a static taint tracking system for hybrid apps. They found that HTML5-based hybrid apps developing using Cordova, are vulnerable to code injection attacks. Attackers can inject malicious code into Web pages via native internal and external channels, such as Bluetooth and Wi-Fi. They proposed a method to manually generate a stub code of JavaScript to model the semantic of plug-ins in Cordova libraries, and use static taint analysis to detect whether the JavaScript code in hybrid apps are prone to the attacks or not. Compared with their works, we present a complete cross-language taint tracking method having the following characteristics. First, in the process of native-to-web taint tracking, we propose an automated semantic modeling method, which construct code snippet of bridge method entirely automatically according to the taint records. Moreover, the cross-language data tracking method proposed in this paper is not limited to the Cordova plug-ins, and our system can also detect the cross-language privacy leaks.

HYBRIDROID [21] focuses on static taint analysis for cross-language data leaks. It first constructs the control flow graph of the Web code and Java code, then builds a taint mapping between Java and JavaScript data based on the bridge semantics, and finally performs static taint analysis on the graph to detect cross-language privacy leaks. However, it focuses on detecting Java-to-JS privacy leaks and cannot track JS-to-Java data flows. Moreover, it cannot be used to analyze hybrid apps developed with frameworks like Cordova. In contrast, our work can track data flows in bi-directions and can analyze apps developed with frameworks.

Additionally, the researchers applied the access control, static analysis, and symbolic execution in security detection of hybrid apps. Recent works [14], [19], [27], [30], [33] proposed a fine-grained access control strategy to isolate untrusted Web code in hybrid apps, thereby protect apps from code injection attacks. Hassanshahi et al. [16] found that hybrid apps are vulnerable to W2AI (Web-to-Application Injection) attacks, which means native Java code is vulnerable to untrusted Web code, and proposed a hybrid detection method combining dynamic and static analysis and symbol execution. The literature [7], [25], [36] used machine learning, behavior state machines, and data flow analysis to detect code injection in hybrid apps. Chen [9] found a new channel for code injection of HTML5-based hybrid apps, and the attacker can exploit HTML5 text box to inject malicious code into apps.

VIII. CONCLUSION

In this paper, a feasible bi-directional taint tracking method is proposed for addressing the security issues introduced by the bridge communication in Android hybrid apps. Based on the method, we develop a benchmark for bridge security test and implement a taint tracking system. We test the system with our benchmarks and real apps in Android market. As the result implicate, our method is effective to track data flows in the bridge communication and detect real vulnerabilities in hybrid apps.

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