# Lab 3 - Part B: Page Faults, Breakpoints Exceptions, and System Calls

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## Exercise 5

- Modified trap\_dispatch() in kern/trap.c to handle page fault exceptions.
- We check whether tf->tf\_trapno is equal to T\_PGFLT and call page\_fault\_handler(tf) if they are. (lines 159 161)
- make grade now succeeds on the faultread, faultreadkernel, faultwrite, and faultwritekernel tests.

## Exercise 6

- Modified trap\_dispatch() in kern/trap.c to handle breakpoint exceptions.
- We check if tf->tf\_trapno is T\_BRKPT and call monitor(tf) if it is. (lines 163 165)
- We also change the privilege level from 0 to 3 in the IDT for the breakpoint's trap handler entry, in trap\_init(). (line 76)
- make grade now succeeds on the breakpoint test.

## Questions

- 3. The break point test case will either generate a break point exception or a general protection fault depending on how you initialized the break point entry in the IDT (i.e., your call to SETGATE from trap\_init). Why? How do you need to set it up in order to get the breakpoint exception to work as specified above and what incorrect setup would cause it to trigger a general protection fault?
- If the break point entry is set up in the IDT to be run only with kernel privileges (DPL=0), a general protection fault is triggered when it is called from the user level due to a privilege level violation.
- However if the breakpoint entry is set with DPL=3 (user mode) in the IDT, then it can be called from the user level.
- 4. What do you think is the point of these mechanisms, particularly in light of what the user/softint test program does?
- We want only a few exceptions (such as the system call and breakpoint exceptions) to be accessible by the user. The user musn't have access to all 256 exceptions for security purposes.
- Thus, we set the exceptions to be accessed by the user to DPL=3 in the IDT, and DPL=0 for the rest.
- In user/softint, the user tries to generate a page fault. He could get the kernel to run malicious code by pushing this code on to the stack and calling the page fault, so that the interrupt service routine pops the malicious code and executes it. The page fault could also be used to allocate additional physical memory (a page fault would imply that the page doesn't exist in the memory, so the kernel would allocate additional physical memory assuming it would have to load in new pages) for the process something no user should be able to do from user mode.

## Exercise 7

• To handle the system call (exception number 48), I had to add in trap handlers (that don't take any error codes - TRAPHANDLER\_NOEC()) for all exceptions from 20 to 48, since I use an array for the trap handlers (Lab

- 3 Part A's challenge). By adding in these extra trap handlers, I can index into the array easily, rather than remembering which index maps to which exception number.
- I then created corresponding entries for all these trap handlers in the IDT in kern/trap.c, by increasing my iterations from 20 (done in Part A) to 49.
- The privilege level for the T\_SYSCALL trap handler entry in the IDT is changed to 3 user level. (line 79 in kern/trap.c)
- trap\_dispatch() is modified to handle T\_SYSCALL. The syscall() function is called, and the EAX, EDX, ECX, EBX, EDI and ESI register values (present in the Trapframe structure) are passed to it.
- Its return value is stored back in the EAX register of the Trapframe structure.
- The syscall() function is modified in kern/syscall.c to handle the various system calls (the system call numbers are specified in inc/syscall.h).
- A switch-case is used to compare syscallno with the various system call numbers, and call the appropriate function.
- Since sys\_cputs() doesn't return anything, we return 0 instead.
- If the system call number is invalid, an error message is printed and -E\_INVAL is returned.
- Running make run-hello-nox prints hello, world on the console and causes a page fault in user mode.
- make grade now succeeds on the testbss test.

#### Exercise 8

- The user/hello.c program page faults because it tries to access the current environment's user id (thisenv->env\_id). However, thisenv has been set to NULL in lib/libmain.c.
- We rectify this by getting the current environment's system ID using the sys\_getenvid() system call.
- We make use of the ENVX() macro to get the corresponding environment entry in the envs[] array.
- thisenv is now made to point to this object.
- Booting into the kernel now prints hello, world as well as i am environment 00001000.
- Since the kernel currently supports only one user environment and user/hello.c calls sys\_env\_destroy(), the kernel reports that the only environment has been destroyed and drops into the kernel monitor.
- make grade now succeeds on the hello test.

## Exercise 9

- The page\_fault\_handler() function in kern/trap.c is modified to panic if a page fault happens in kernel mode.
- We check if the low bits of tf->tf\_cs is not equal to the user's DPL (0x3).
- user\_mem\_check() in kern/pmap.c is then implemented. The passed permissions perm is modified to include PTE\_P.
- The start virtual address va is rounded down, and va+len is rounded up and set as the end address.
- If the address accessed is greater than ULIM, we jump to bad.
- Now we try to get the corresponding page entry in the environment's page table. If it doesn't exist, we once again jump to bad.
- If it does exist, we check if the set permissions are equal to the permissions passed to the function. If it isn't, we jump to bad.
- These checks are performed for all pages in the range [va, va+len).
- If the user program can access this range of addresses, the function returns 0.
- bad is a label below which we write the code to handle all the errors.
- We set user\_mem\_check\_addr to the first erroneous virtual address. This is done by initialising this variable to va, and if the current address being checked is greater than va, we set user\_mem\_check\_addr to this value (since this is the first address at which the error occurred).
- We now return -E\_FAULT as an error has occured.
- debuginfo\_eip() is modified in kern/kdebug.c to call user\_mem\_assert() on usd, stabs and stabstr, to check whether they have PTE\_U permissions.
- make run-breakpoint-nox now allows us to enter the kernel monitor and use the backtrace command.

• We see the backtrace traverse into lib/libmain.c before the kernel panics with a page fault.

## Exercise 10

- We now run make run-evilhello-nox. The environment gets destroyed, as is required by this exercise.
- The output observed is:

```
[00001000] user_mem_check assertion failure for va f010000c [00001000] free env 00001000
Destroyed the only environment - nothing more to do!
```

• All the make grade tests pass now.