

SPN cipher -


Substitution Permutation Network

AEs design document

— NIST
for ref

13-02-2025

SPN structure



if a cryptosystem is linear then it is easy to break. \rightarrow

$$C = Ax + k$$

$$= \begin{bmatrix} A' \\ 1 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} x \\ 1 \end{bmatrix}$$

Gaussian elimination \rightarrow solve for A' .

Ref. \rightarrow Hill cipher

Avalanche effect — a small input change causes drastic change in the output
(caused by combination of Subst. & Perm. layers)

AES- a very strong block cipher
Has withstood the test of time


So far- Confidentiality

↳ achieved using encryption


Integrity : data is not modified in transit

Today's class: a cryptographic object which
does not have a secret key
& yet has some security
guarantees

Object:




Random Oracle:



pick a random x, y : $\Pr [f(x) = y] = \frac{1}{2^n}$

① Use case 1,

Password security



A very bad idea

why?

data breach \rightarrow devastating

Store the passwords as —

$h(pwd)$


| usr | $h(pwd)$ |
|----------|----------|
| \vdots | \vdots |

if someone knows $h(pwd)$, it is computationally hard to find pwd .

Preimage resistance:

given $h(x)$ it is computationally hard to find x


Generic attack:



$$\text{Effort} = 2^n$$

② Use-case no. 2

Software download




Microsoft website

| | |
|---------------|----------------|
| patch no. x | $h(\cdot) = y$ |
| patch... | y_1 |
| ⋮ | |

↑ Trusted

No one should be able to create a malicious software which has the same hash value as the original patch.



Second Preimage attack:

Given (x, y) , it should be computationally hard to find an x' s.t. $h(x') = y$

Generic attack:

input: $x \rightarrow h(x) = y$


give y to preimage attacker
→ success in 2^n trials

2nd preimage in $(2^n + 1)$ trials

③ Use-case 3:


co-development of software

- we want to check if contents of the file got modified




Small digest of
the document

Collision resistance:



$x \neq x'$

It is computationally hard to find two diff. inputs which have the same output.



Jan

Feb 18

Mar 5

Apr

May 13, 5, 25, 27

June 27, 7, 23

July. 11, 3

Aug - 13, 23, 12, 19

Sep - 9, 6, 17, 29, 1, 6, 27, 16, 15

Oct - 17, 2, 21, 12

Nov - 3, 18,

Dec - 29, 27, 13, 13

Collisions happen with high pos. in
about $2^{n/2}$ trials.

$x \rightarrow h(x)$ $h(\cdot)$ is a random oracle

$S = \{x_1, x_2, \dots, x_t\}$, $N = \text{size of output set}$

Pr that there is some collision in S

$$\Pr(\text{collision}) = 1 - \Pr(\text{no collision})$$

$$p = 1 - \left(1 \cdot \frac{N-1}{N} \cdot \frac{N-2}{N} \cdots \frac{N-t+1}{N}\right)$$

What if
 $t \approx 366$
 $p \approx 1$

$$p = 1 - \prod_{i=1}^{t-1} \left(1 - \frac{i}{N}\right)$$

assuming $i \ll N$

$$\left(1 - \frac{i}{N}\right) \approx e^{-i/N}$$

$$p = 1 - \prod e^{-i/N}$$

$$= 1 - e^{-\frac{1}{N} \left(\frac{t-1}{2} t \right)}$$

$$e^{-\frac{1}{2N} t(t-1)} = 1-p$$

$$-\frac{1}{2N} \cdot t(t-1) = \ln(1-p)$$

$$\frac{t}{2N} \cdot t(t-1) = \ln\left(\frac{1}{1-p}\right)$$

$$t^2 \approx 2N \cdot \ln\left(\frac{1}{1-p}\right)$$

$$t \approx \sqrt{N} \cdot \left(2 \cdot \ln \frac{1}{1-p}\right)$$

for $N=365$

$$p = 1/2$$

$$t = 23$$

const

$$p = 0.75$$

$$t = \dots$$

for $p=1/2$

const = 1.4

$$p = 0.99$$

$$t = 90$$

Birthday paradox ↗

(Not really a paradox, but a counter-intuitive statistical fact)