

LLM-Assisted Translation and Bounded Model Checking of Python Code

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Abstract. Formal verification of Python programs remains challenging due to the language’s dynamic nature and rich semantic constructs. We present an approach that combines Large Language Models (LLMs) with Bounded Model Checking (BMC) to verify Python code. Our system uses an LLM to translate Python programs into C code suitable for formal verification using ESBMC, enabling the detection of critical bugs, including arithmetic overflows, array bounds violations, and concurrency errors. We evaluate our approach on a benchmark of 23 carefully designed Python programs with planted bugs representing common verification challenges. The LLM orchestrator successfully detected all planted bugs by iteratively coordinating static, dynamic, and formal verification tools. Our results demonstrate that LLM-assisted translation can make mature C verification tools accessible for Python code analysis, though the approach is limited to programs amenable to BMC (15-50 lines, bounded loops, statically-sized data structures).

Keywords: Formal Verification · Bounded Model Checking · Python · Large Language Models · Code Translation

1 Introduction

Formal verification of software systems remains a critical challenge in ensuring software reliability and security. Techniques such as model checking and theorem proving have been developed for verifying programs written in statically typed languages such as C and Java, with applications in safety-critical domains including embedded systems and financial software [1,2]. However, formal verification remains challenging even for these languages, and dynamic programming languages, notably Python, introduce additional complexities due to their flexible typing and rich semantic constructs [3].

Python’s popularity spans research and commercial applications, particularly in data science and machine learning. The dynamic nature of its semantics

presents significant obstacles to existing automated verification tools, which often support only fragmented subsets of the language or simplified code patterns. Features such as metaprogramming, dynamic type mutation, and the wide variety of data structures in Python significantly complicate the construction of unified and scalable formal verification frameworks capable of capturing the full semantics of the language [37].

Recent progress in Large Language Models (LLMs), developed from extensive multilingual code corpora, has opened new directions for addressing long-standing verification challenges. These models demonstrate advanced competence in code synthesis and syntactic transformation across programming languages, making it feasible to translate automatically Python programs into rigorously verifiable representations such as C [4].

This study introduces a framework that uses LLMs to orchestrate bug detection in Python code through translation to C and bounded model checking. Our approach targets two primary use cases: (1) detecting bugs in Python application code such as arithmetic overflows, array bounds violations, and concurrency errors, and (2) enabling engineers to write design models in Python rather than dedicated formal specification languages like TLA+, applying formal verification tools to the translated C code. Like all functional correctness verification approaches, assertions must be provided to specify desired properties—our contribution is automating the translation and verification process around these specifications. Since the Python-to-C translation is performed by an LLM without formal proof of semantic equivalence, we focus on bug hunting rather than formal verification guarantees for the original Python code. By using AST analysis to guide selective verification and intelligently configuring ESBMC parameters, we demonstrate effective bug detection on small to medium Python functions (15–50 lines of code). An experimental evaluation of 23 Python programs achieves 100% bug detection for planted errors, including overflows, bounds violations, and deadlocks.

2 Background

2.1 Formal Verification and Model Checking

Formal verification mathematically proves that a program meets its specified properties by modeling the program and its desired behaviors and rigorously checking all possible executions. Two foundational paradigms have emerged: model checking, which relies on state space exploration against temporal logic specifications [6,7], and theorem proving, which requires constructing formal proofs for these specifications. Model checkers include tools such as SPIN, NuSMV, and CBMC for software verification, while theorem provers include PVS, Isabelle/HOL, Coq, and Lean for interactive proof development.

Model checking systematically tests whether a program, represented as a transition system, satisfies properties such as safety (e.g., absence of buffer overflows) and liveness (e.g., termination or progress). Formally, for a Kripke structure M and temporal logic property φ , verification asks whether $M \models \varphi$ [7,8].

A fundamental challenge is the exponential growth of possible system states (the “state explosion” problem) as program complexity increases [8,9]. Bounded Model Checking (BMC) mitigates this by restricting analysis to execution traces of a given length k . BMC translates the verification problem into a SAT or SMT query:

$$\text{Initial}(s_0) \wedge \bigwedge_{i=0}^{k-1} T(s_i, s_{i+1}) \wedge \neg\varphi(s_k)$$

Here, T is the transition relation and φ – expresses the desired property. If there exists a model for the formula up to bound k , this produces a counterexample trace. This technique allows the efficient detection of shallow or corner-case bugs that are hard to find by testing.

Modern verification tools leverage BMC for practical software analysis. CBMC applies BMC to C/C++ programs, targeting assertion violations, pointer errors, and numerical overflows [10,11]. ESBMC extends the method to multi-threaded and embedded systems, improving scalability and expressivity in industrial use cases [12,13]. JBBC adapts similar techniques to Java bytecode, maintaining support for object-oriented program structures [14-16].

However, although BMC is widely adopted and effective for systematic bug-finding and shallow counterexample generation, it remains inherently incomplete: bug-freedom is only proven up to the bound k , and deeper properties may go unverified. Resource constraints and formula complexity further limit scalability as system size and concurrency grow. These unresolved challenges motivate advances in hybrid verification approaches and LLM-assisted verification, forming the basis for subsequent research in this work.

2.2 LLMs in Program Verification and Synthesis

Recent advances in large language models have significantly impacted formal verification by automating traditionally labor-intensive tasks such as specification generation, invariant detection, and formal proof construction [17]. LLMs trained on extensive code and mathematical corpora are capable of understanding and generating formal languages, bridging the gap between informal code and rigorous formal methods. Figure 1 illustrates this hybrid architecture where LLMs automate the generation of formal artifacts while symbolic engines provide rigorous verification guarantees through an iterative refinement loop.

Autoformalization is the process by which LLMs translate natural language descriptions, informal comments, or code into formal specifications in theorem provers or model checkers [18-20]. This allows formal capturing of intended program properties, critical for automation. Invariant generation – vital in program verification – benefits from LLMs’ ability to propose inductive invariants from code context and known properties, e.g. enabling bounded model checkers to reduce verification complexity by soundly abstracting program states [21,22].

Proof-step prediction and automated proof search also leverage LLMs to suggest next proof steps, reducing expert burden and improving completeness




Fig. 1. Hybrid architecture, where LLMs automate the generation of formal artifacts (specifications, invariants, proof tactics) while symbolic engines provide rigorous verification guarantees through an iterative refinement loop

of theorem-proving pipelines [23-26]. These techniques integrate LLM outputs with symbolic reasoning engines for robust hybrid verification systems.

Further, formal specification extraction from code enhances traceability and correctness guarantees by enabling automatic annotation and assertion generation directly from source, a feature critical for continuous verification environments [27-28]. Recent work has also explored using LLMs trained on formal verification tool outputs (such as ESBMC) for rapid vulnerability detection through learned pattern recognition [22], demonstrating the potential of combining machine learning with formal methods for practical bug detection at scale.

Our work follows this evolving landscape by exploiting LLMs for automated Python-to-C translation to enable bug detection with bounded model checking tools [3,29]. This approach integrates formal verification tools with AI-driven translation for increased bug detection coverage, though without formal guarantees of semantic equivalence between Python and C code.

2.3 Code Translation and Verification Pipelines

Several transpilation systems have emerged to convert code between languages with varying degrees of formal support:

- TransCoder [30,31] is a neural code translation model capable of zero-shot⁵ translation across multiple programming languages, substantially improving

⁵ Zero-shot translation is the ability of a LLM to translate between two languages it has never seen paired together during training.

transfer between Python, Java, and C++ by learning from large multilingual corpora. However, it does not inherently guarantee semantic preservation or produce verifiable output.

- CoQ-of-Python [35] aims to transpile Python code into Coq formal specifications, focusing on correctness proofs via dependent types. Its approach offers strong theoretical guarantees but faces fundamental scalability challenges: interactive theorem proving remains difficult even for simple programs in statically-typed languages, requiring substantial expert effort to construct proofs. Python’s dynamic features and rich semantics compound these inherent difficulties of theorem proving.
- LLMLift [29] combines LLM-based transpilation with formal verification checkpoints, translating between general-purpose languages (C, C++, Java) and domain-specific verification languages. While it enables migration of legacy systems with correctness assurances, the integration remains complex and requires significant engineering effort.
- ESBMC-Python is a bounded model checker for Python programs that transforms Python code into an intermediate representation, which in turn is converted into formulae evaluated with SMT solvers [34]. It represents the first BMC-based Python-code verifier, demonstrating effectiveness on Ethereum Consensus Specification.
- PyVeritas [3] integrates LLM-based Python-to-C transpilation with bounded model checking via CBMC and MaxSAT-based fault localization, automatically producing C code suitable for verification with back-mapping to Python source. Like all functional correctness verification approaches, PyVeritas requires assertions to specify desired properties. It targets Python programs with numeric computations and array manipulations, demonstrating effectiveness in detecting arithmetic overflows, array bounds violations, and assertion failures.

Direct verification tools such as VeriFast [32,33] have demonstrated success for statically-typed languages like C, C++, and Java through annotation-based verification using separation logic. While VeriFast internally translates programs to verification conditions checked by SMT solvers (as do most verification tools), this internal translation differs from the cross-language transpilation approaches discussed above. Extending direct verification approaches like VeriFast to Python’s dynamic features remains an open challenge, motivating translation-based verification strategies that leverage existing mature C verification tools.

Our approach differs from ESBMC-Python and PyVeritas in key ways: ESBMC-Python performs direct bounded model checking on Python’s intermediate representation without cross-language translation (it’s a direct verifier, not a transpiler), requiring custom implementation of BMC for Python semantics. PyVeritas, like our work, uses LLM-based Python-to-C translation with CBMC for verification. Our contribution is the orchestrated multi-tool approach: we combine LLM orchestration for tool selection (using AST analysis to identify which verification tools to apply), adaptive parameter configuration (intelligent ES-

BMC bounds and check selection), and integration of complementary analysis tools (static analyzers, dynamic testing, runtime deadlock detection) coordinated by an LLM. This allows our system to handle diverse bug categories (arithmetic, bounds, concurrency) by selecting appropriate tools rather than applying a single verification technique to all code.

Translation-based verification approaches face fundamental challenges: it is difficult to guarantee semantic equivalence between source and translated code, and manual specifications are required for functional correctness verification. Our approach addresses these challenges through intelligent tool orchestration: the LLM analyzes code characteristics via AST analysis to identify which verification tools are most appropriate, configures ESBMC parameters (bounds, checks) based on code patterns, and translates the complete Python program to C for bounded model checking. The current study builds on this landscape by proposing an integrated pipeline where LLMs facilitate adaptive bug detection: analyzing code structure to select verification strategies, generating C translations of complete programs, and applying bounded model checking with intelligent parameter selection.

3 Methodology

3.1 Overall Architecture

The core of our system is a multi-agent architecture where an LLM orchestrates verification processes. Our tool, the Enhanced Verification Agent (EVA), coordinates analysis tools and adapts strategies based on analysis and verification results. The LLM orchestrator is pluggable; our implementation uses Claude Sonnet 4.5, though other capable models could be substituted. The architecture, illustrated in Figure 2, unifies four distinct classes of analysis tools to address separate verification goals. When a user submits Python code to EVA, the LLM orchestrator initializes and iteratively selects and coordinates appropriate tools, guided by code features and prior analysis outcomes.

Static Analysis tools examine code structure without execution. This category includes mypy for type checking and type inference validation, pylint for code quality assessment and anti-pattern detection, flake8 for style consistency verification, and bandit for security vulnerability identification. These tools provide rapid initial feedback on common issues and help narrow the scope for slower analyses.

Dynamic Analysis tools evaluate runtime behavior through partial or complete code execution. The Python Interpreter performs execution-based testing to detect runtime errors, boundary condition violations, and edge case failures that static analysis cannot identify. Dynamic testing executes the Python code once with its original inputs to detect runtime errors. The Deadlock Detector is a runtime analysis tool that instruments Python threading.Lock operations,




Fig. 2. Complete System Architecture. The LLM orchestrator coordinates verification by routing analysis through four tool categories based on code characteristics: Static Analysis, Dynamic Analysis, Formal Verification, and AI Analysis. The system iterates up to 10 times, synthesizing results until verification objectives are met, then generates a final report.

executes the threaded code, tracks lock acquisition order, detects circular wait conditions (deadlock), and uses timeouts to catch actual deadlocks.

Formal Verification tools provide mathematical guarantees of program correctness. The AST Analyzer examines the abstract syntax tree structure to identify verification-relevant patterns and code characteristics. The Python-to-C Converter translates Python code into semantically equivalent C code suitable for formal verification. ESBMC conducts bounded model checking on the translated C code to verify critical properties such as memory safety, arithmetic overflow absence, array bounds compliance, assertion violations (Python assert statements become C `assert()` or `_ESBMC_assert()`), and freedom from undefined behavior.

AI-powered analysis tools leverage learning to support specialized verification tasks. The Fine-tuned LLM performs deep pattern recognition for complex bug categories, including arithmetic overflows, buffer violations, and concurrency errors. This approach draws inspiration from recent work on using LLMs trained on formal verification tool outputs for vulnerability detection [22]. When formal verification proves too resource-intensive or inconclusive, the Fine-tuned model conducts specialized analysis, providing probabilistic assessments of code correctness based on learned patterns from verified codebases.

Algorithm 1 LLM-Guided Multi-Tool Verification

Input: Python program P
Output: Verification report R

- 1: Initialize message history H with:
 verification strategy instructions
 program P
- 2: **for** $i = 1$ to $MAX_ITERATIONS$ **do**
- 3: $(T, C) \leftarrow \text{LLM_PLAN}(H)$ $\triangleright T$: requested tool invocations, C : commentary
- 4: **if** $T = \emptyset$ **then**
- 5: **return** $\text{FINALREPORT}(C, H)$
- 6: **end if**
- 7: **for** each tool invocation $t \in T$ **do**
- 8: $r \leftarrow \text{EXECUTETOOL}(t, P)$
- 9: Append r to H
- 10: **end for**
- 11: **end for**
- 12: **return** $\text{FINALREPORT}(\text{"Max iterations reached"}, H)$

The AI Orchestrator intelligently coordinates verification by maintaining a conversation history that tracks: (1) which tools have been invoked and their results, (2) what issues have been identified, and (3) what verification remains. At each iteration (Algorithm 1), the LLM analyzes this history and selects the next tool based on code characteristics: mypy for type-annotated code, the Deadlock Detector for threading, ESBMC with overflow checks for arithmetic operations, and ESBMC with bounds checking for array accesses. This prevents redundant tool invocations (the conversation history shows what's been done) and enables progressive refinement: early iterations use fast tools (AST analysis, static analysis) to understand code structure, guiding later expensive formal verification (ESBMC). The orchestrator decides when verification is complete by synthesizing findings: if ESBMC proves a property, verification succeeds; if ESBMC finds a counterexample, the bug is reported; if fast tools find no issues after appropriate coverage, verification concludes.

3.2 Translation of Python to C for Formal Verification

LLM-Based Translation for ESBMC Compatibility A core challenge for the formal verification of Python is the mismatch between Python's dynamic behavior and the requirements of model checkers such as ESBMC, which expect statically typed C code. Our approach uses the LLM orchestrator to translate Python into C while preserving semantics relevant for verification. The LLM handles this translation by understanding Python semantics and generating equivalent C code that addresses key incompatibilities:

- Python's dynamic typing is mapped to explicit static C types, guided by type hints where available. The LLM infers appropriate C types based on variable usage patterns and context.

- Python’s reference semantics and automatic memory management are translated to explicit pointer operations and manual memory allocation in C where necessary.
- High-level Python structures (lists, dictionaries, sets) are mapped to appropriate C representations (arrays, structs) with bounded sizes suitable for BMC. The LLM determines reasonable bounds based on code analysis.

The LLM-generated C code is designed for bounded model checking of specific properties (overflow, bounds violations, deadlocks). We do not claim full semantic equivalence—the LLM may introduce translation errors, so our approach is best characterized as bug hunting rather than formal verification of the Python code. Exception-handling mechanisms are converted to explicit error codes and conditional checks. The LLM translation targets Python programs amenable to BMC: those with bounded loops, properties expressible as assertions, and behavior suitable for bounded analysis. Complex metaprogramming and dynamic code generation remain challenging.

The translation is performed by the LLM orchestrator through its tool-use capability. When the orchestrator determines that formal verification is needed, it invokes a Python-to-C conversion tool that leverages the LLM’s code understanding and generation abilities. The LLM performs the translation as follows. First, analyzing the Python code structure to identify type hints, infer variable types from usage patterns, detect memory access patterns, and understand the semantics of Python constructs. Second, generating equivalent C code where function definitions preserve signatures (using type hints for parameter/return types), nondeterministic value generation (`esbmc.nondet_*`) is mapped to appropriate C declarations, Python data structures are represented as bounded C equivalents (lists as arrays with size tracking), and assertions are converted to `__ESBMC_assert()` or `assert()` statements. Third, the LLM instruments the code for verification by adding explicit bounds checks for array accesses, overflow detection for arithmetic operations when needed, and converting exception handling to return codes with conditional checks.

The LLM prioritizes verification requirements over optimization, generating C code in which the properties under verification are explicit and verifiable. This approach can handle more complex Python constructs than rule-based translation, as the LLM can reason about semantics and adapt the translation strategy based on the specific verification goals identified by AST analysis.

Iterative Refinement for Verification Tractability The initial LLM-generated C code may be too complex for ESBMC to analyze within practical time limits. When ESBMC times out or exceeds resource constraints, the system provides feedback to the LLM orchestrator, which can regenerate simpler C code in subsequent iterations. The LLM applies simplification strategies such as adding `__ESBMC_assume()` constraints to bound nondeterministic values, simplifying loop structures, reducing input domains, or abstracting auxiliary functions while preserving properties under verification. The automated retry logic first attempts

reduced unwind bounds and disabled expensive checks before asking the LLM to regenerate code.

We do not formally verify semantic equivalence between Python and C code—this would require proof techniques beyond BMC. Our goal is bug-finding through deeper analysis than testing alone, not proof of correctness. The system includes dynamic execution of Python code as one verification tool, which can detect runtime errors and provide confidence in basic functionality before expensive formal verification is attempted on the translated C code.




Fig. 3. Decision Logic Flowchart showing tool routing based on code characteristics.

Figure 3 shows the orchestrator’s decision logic. Figure 4 illustrates the complete sequence from user submission through iterative tool selection to final report. When ESBMC times out, the system’s retry logic automatically attempts simplification: reducing the unwind bound (from 10 to 5), disabling expensive checks (overflow, memory-leak), and suggesting to the LLM to add `__ESBMC_assume()` constraints or simplify loops in subsequent iterations.

4 Implementation

The Enhanced Verification Agent is implemented in approximately 2000 lines of Python 3.11+ code using the Anthropic Claude API (claude-sonnet-4.5) as the central orchestrator. Tool versions: mypy 1.8+, pylint 3.0+, flake8 7.0+, bandit 1.7+, ESBMC 7.4, Python 3.11+.

Tool outputs follow a unified JSON schema. The orchestrator deduplicates issues and applies a priority hierarchy: formal proofs override all findings, runtime




Fig. 4. Sequence Diagram of the Verification Workflow. The user submits Python code to EVA, which initializes the LLM orchestrator (Claude). At each iteration, Claude selects appropriate tools based on code analysis. For formal verification, Claude performs Python-to-C translation (shown as the “Python to C Converter” tool in the diagram) by generating a detailed prompt that describes the translation requirements, invoking itself to generate the C code, and then passing the result to ESBMC for analysis. Claude synthesizes results and decides whether to continue iteration or conclude.

failures override static warnings, and static analysis provides baseline assessments. A SQLite database tracks verified properties and tool history, enabling incremental verification that skips re-checking proven properties.

The implementation is containerized with Docker for reproducible environments. All code, configuration files, and instructions for running the system are available at: <https://github.com/esbmc/esbmc-python-cpp/tree/main/agent> (see `README.md` for setup and usage details)

5 Experimental Evaluation

We evaluated the Enhanced Verification Agent on a diverse benchmark of Python programs to assess its effectiveness in automated formal verification. Our experiments address three research questions: (1) Can the orchestrated multi-tool agent successfully detect bugs in Python programs using formal verification? (2) How does iterative tool selection improve verification coverage compared to single-tool approaches? (3) Can we accelerate formal verification while maintaining reliability using fine-tuned models?

5.1 Experimental Setup

The benchmark consists of 23 Python programs exhibiting various verification challenges with planted bugs: overflow vulnerabilities (10 programs), bounds violations (8 programs), and race conditions/deadlocks (5 programs). Programs range from 15 to 50 lines of code and represent common bug patterns. Programs use nondeterministic inputs via the ESBMC Python module to enable symbolic execution and bounded model checking.

The system runs with a 10-iteration limit on Macbook Pro M4 Max with 128GB RAM. We also evaluate an optional fine-tuned DeepSeek Coder 6.7B model (with LoRA adapters trained on ESBMC examples) that provides rapid pre-screening.

5.2 Verification Results

The orchestrated multi-tool agent successfully detected all planted bugs in the 23 benchmark programs. Table 1 summarizes the results by bug category, with an average of 7.6 iterations required.

Table 1. Verification results by bug category

Bug Category	Programs	Bugs Detected	Avg. Iterations	Detection Rate
Overflow	10	10	7.6	100%
Bounds Violation	8	8	7.4	100%
Race/Deadlock	5	5	7.8	100%
Total	23	23	7.6	100%

The orchestrator’s iterative tool selection ensured comprehensive analysis, using an average of 6.8 tools per program. The detailed breakdown of detection results by tool type is discussed in Section 6.3, which shows that bugs in this benchmark required formal verification for definitive detection—dynamic execution detected only 3 of 8 bounds violations and 0 of 10 overflow bugs, while static analysis flagged suspicious patterns without confirming actual bugs. All bugs manifested as assertion violations in the formal verification results, with ESBMC providing concrete counterexamples.

```
import random

def main():
    x = random.randint(1, 16383) # Equivalent to x > 0 && x < 16384
    y = random.randint(1, 16383) # Equivalent to y > 0 && y < 16384
    z = random.randint(1, 16383) # Equivalent to z > 0 && z < 16384

    # Assert that the condition is not satisfied
    assert x * x + y * y != z * z, "Assertion failed: x^2 + y^2 == z^2"

    return 0

if __name__ == "__main__":
    main()
```

Fig. 5. Python program for Pythagorean triple verification. The code generates random integers x , y , z in range $[1, 16383]$ and asserts that $x^2 + y^2 \neq z^2$. This represents a verification challenge requiring formal methods to find counterexamples.

Example: Pythagorean Triple Checker. Figure 5 shows a program that checks whether $x^2 + y^2 \neq z^2$ for nondeterministic integers. The agent’s iterative process (Figure 6) applied six tools across seven iterations. Initial static analysis (mypy, pylint, flake8, bandit) found no issues. Dynamic analysis with Python interpreter passed. The critical step was formal verification: the agent identified the assertion as a verification target, used the LLM to translate Python to C, and invoked ESBMC with overflow and bounds checks. ESBMC successfully found the counterexample (e.g., $x=6$, $y=8$, $z=10$ satisfies the Pythagorean relation).

```

-----
## **Severity Assessment:**
| Category | Status |
|-----|-----|
| **Logical Correctness** | ✗ **FAILED** - Assertion can be violated |
| **Code Quality** | ⚠ Minor style issues |
| **Security** | ✅ No issues |
| **Type Safety** | ✅ No issues |
| **Style Compliance** | ✅ No issues |

-----
## **Recommendations:**
1. **Fix the Logic:** If you want to avoid Pythagorean triples:
```
python
Add explicit check to skip Pythagorean triples
while x * x + y * y == z * z:
 ...
 z = random.randint(1, 1000)
```

2. **Change the Assertion:** If finding Pythagorean triples is acceptable:
```
python
Just compute without assertion
result = x * x + y * y
is_pythagorean = (result == z * z)
```

3. **Add Documentation:** Clarify the intent of this code

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## **Educational Value:**
This code serves as an excellent example of:
- Why **formal verification** is superior to random testing
- How **ESBMC** can find rare edge cases that random testing misses (8/100 random tests found it, but ESBMC didn't)
- The importance of **mathematical reasoning** in code correctness

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## **Conclusion:**
The code has a **provable bug**: the assertion can fail for Pythagorean triples like (6,8,10). While random testing didn't catch this (8/100 iterations), **ESBMC formal verification** successfully identified the counterexample, demonstrating the power of formal methods for comprehensive code verification.

 Claude concluded verification (no more tools needed)

*****
VERIFICATION SUMMARY
*****
Iterations:
Tools used: analyze_ast, run_python_interpreter, run pylint, run_flake8, run_bandit, run_finetuned_analyzer, convert_python_to_c, run_esbmc
Verified: ✗ NO
ESBMC checks: overflow

Generated Files:
- converted_code.c (Python2C conversion)
- esbmc_verify.c (ESBMC verification)

Test ESBMC manually:
esbmc esbmc_verify.c --unwind 10 --timeout 60 --overflow-check --no-bounds-check --no-div-by-zero-check

Generated Files:
- converted_code.c (Python2C conversion)
- esbmc_verify.c (ESBMC verification)

Test ESBMC manually:
esbmc esbmc_verify.c --unwind 10 --deadlock-check

```

Fig. 6. Verification summary showing successful bug detection. The agent used 7 iterations with tools including `analyze_ast`, `run_mypy`, `run pylint`, `run_flake8`, `run_bandit`, and `run_python_interpreter`. ESBMC checks successfully identified the assertion violation with a concrete counterexample ($x=6$, $y=8$, $z=10$). The LLM orchestrator also provides natural language explanation of the violation and suggests fixes, making the formal verification results more accessible to developers. Generated files `converted_code.c` and `esbmc_verify.c` demonstrate the LLM-based Python-to-C translation process.

5.3 Accelerated Verification with Fine-tuned Models

To address research question (3) on accelerating formal verification, we evaluated a fine-tuned DeepSeek Coder 6.7B model (enhanced with LoRA adapters trained on 1000+ ESBMC-verified examples) as a rapid pre-screening alternative. This approach builds on prior work using LLMs trained on formal verification tool outputs for vulnerability detection [22], extending the concept from binary classification to bug pattern recognition. The key motivation is speed: ESBMC requires 35-50 seconds per program, while the fine-tuned model completes analysis in 2-10 seconds (depending on code complexity)—up to a 20x speedup. This acceleration comes from learned pattern recognition rather than symbolic execution, trading formal guarantees for probabilistic assessments.

Figure 7 demonstrates the fine-tuned model’s operation on a more complex concurrent program, with analysis completing in under 10 seconds using modest resources (2632 prompt tokens, 200 generation tokens at 26k tokens/sec).

5.4 Iteration Analysis

Convergence occurred within 6-10 iterations (median: 8, mean: 7.6) across all 23 programs. For this benchmark of programs with planted bugs, formal verification via ESBMC was necessary for definitive bug detection with concrete counterexamples. Static analysis tools identified suspicious patterns but could not confirm bugs, while dynamic analysis detected some runtime failures but lacked systematic coverage. The LLM orchestrator selectively invoked tools based on code characteristics rather than running all tools in parallel on every program. While parallel execution is technically possible, it would increase unnecessary computation (running ESBMC on code without arithmetic operations, deadlock detection on sequential code) and LLM API costs (more tool results to process). The orchestrator’s adaptive strategy—using AST analysis to guide tool selection—balances thoroughness with efficiency, applying expensive formal verification only when code patterns warrant it.

Mean verification time per program was approximately 45-60 seconds for the full orchestrated agent. The breakdown: static analysis (2-3s), dynamic analysis (3-5s where applicable), formal verification (35-50s), and orchestration overhead (5-7s). The iterative approach uses an average of 6.8 tools per program.

5.5 Bug Detection Effectiveness

The orchestrated agent successfully detected all planted bugs in the 23 benchmark programs. Key findings by bug category:

Overflow vulnerabilities (10 programs): Static analysis (pylint) flagged potential arithmetic issues in 7 programs but could not confirm overflows. Dynamic testing with random inputs detected 0 overflows (as overflow conditions require specific nondeterministic value combinations). ESBMC with overflow checking detected all 10 bugs with concrete counterexamples.

```

-----
Running fine-tuned model analysis...
⌚ Fine-tuned model (streaming): =====
### ESBMC-style formal verification
SUMMARY
=====
Iterations: 7
Tools used: analyze_ast, run_mypy, run pylint, run_flake8, run_bandit, run_deadlock_detector, run_python_interpreter
Verified: ✘ NO
ESBMC checks: bounds-check, div-by-zero-check, pointer-check
=====
🔴 FAILURE: Race condition
-----
Iteration #6: bounds-check
⌚ Bounds-check: ✘ NO
-----
Iteration #5: div-by-zero-check
⌚ Div-by
=====
Prompt: 2632 tokens, 976.656 tokens-per-sec
Generation: 200 tokens, 26.088 tokens-per-sec
Peak memory: 15.644 GB
-----
FINE-TUNED MODEL OUTPUT
=====

### ESBMC-style formal verification
SUMMARY
=====
Iterations: 7
Tools used: analyze_ast, run_mypy, run pylint, run_flake8, run_bandit, run_deadlock_detector, run_python_interpreter
Verified: ✘ NO
ESBMC checks: bounds-check, div-by-zero-check, pointer-check
=====
🔴 FAILURE: Race condition
-----
Iteration #6: bounds-check
⌚ Bounds-check: ✘ NO
-----
Iteration #5: div-by-zero-check
⌚ Div-by
=====
Status: ✓ Success
Model: deepseek-coder-6.7b + LoRA (./finetune/models/quick_test_proper)
Output length: 692 chars
=====
(venv) shive@mac esbmc-python-branch %

```

Fig. 7. Fine-tuned Model analysis output for a concurrent program with race condition (example_race_condition.py from the benchmark). The fine-tuned DeepSeek Coder 6.7B model, trained on 1000+ ESBMC-verified examples, performs rapid bug pattern recognition by analyzing the Python code and predicting potential bugs based on learned patterns from the training data. Unlike ESBMC which requires Python-to-C translation and symbolic execution, the fine-tuned model directly analyzes Python code and provides probabilistic assessments. Performance metrics show 2632 prompt tokens, 200 generation tokens at 26k tokens/sec, with 15.6GB peak memory usage. The model completes analysis in under 10 seconds, demonstrating the speed advantage of learned pattern recognition over symbolic model checking.

Bounds violations (8 programs): Static analysis flagged suspicious array accesses in 4 programs. Dynamic testing caught 3 bounds violations through runtime exceptions. ESBMC detected all 8 bugs, including 5 that dynamic testing missed.

Race conditions and deadlocks (5 programs): Static analysis detected threading usage but not deadlocks. The runtime deadlock detector identified all 5 bugs through lock instrumentation and circular wait detection, without requiring C translation. ESBMC’s deadlock checking was not used for these programs as the Python-based deadlock detector proved more effective for threading code.

These results show that formal verification via ESBMC is essential for arithmetic and bounds checking bugs, while runtime instrumentation handles concurrency bugs effectively. Static and dynamic analysis provide useful preliminary screening but cannot provide definitive bug detection for this benchmark. Note that our approach of selective verification (using AST analysis to decide which blocks need ESBMC) works well for our small benchmark programs (15-50 lines), but scaling to large programs remains challenging—AST patterns alone cannot reliably predict which functions in a large codebase require formal verification without analyzing the entire program.

6 Future Work

While our current system demonstrates effective bug detection for standalone Python programs, several promising directions remain for future research.

Future work should train more powerful fine tuned models on larger datasets (10,000+ examples) to approach ESBMC-comparable accuracy while maintaining speed advantages. The ideal workflow combines fine-tuned model pre-screening (rapid triage) with selective ESBMC verification (formal proofs for critical sections).

Our benchmark consists of standalone programs with localized bugs. Real-world production systems present greater challenges: server-based architectures with distributed components, asynchronous communication patterns, complex state management across multiple services, and emergent behaviors from component interactions. Extending our verification framework to handle multi-file projects, inter-service dependencies, and distributed concurrency requires advances in modular verification, compositional reasoning, and scalable state space exploration. Future work should investigate verification techniques for microservices, REST APIs, message queues, and distributed databases, where bugs manifest through intricate timing dependencies and cross-service invariant violations.

Practical adoption requires seamless integration into continuous integration / deployment pipelines, incremental verification for code changes, and developer-friendly error reporting that maps formal verification counterexamples back to Python source with actionable remediation suggestions.

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