# How unique am I?

## Differential privacy and robust statistics

Marco Avella-Medina (2021)

#### The story - Latanya Sweeney


- computer scientist and privacy expert
- anonymous medical records
- re-identify the governor of Massachusetts



Presented by Tengyu Song

# **Identify from database**


- Link attack
- ZIP code and birthdate
- 2010 census data



#### Public datasets and model training

- More and more machine learning models are trained on shared data.
- 1. Model may accidentally memorize private information.
- 2. It's easy to be attacked by corrupted data. (mislabeling, backdoor, etc.)

**Pricacy**  $\iff$  **Robustness** 




# What about only disclosing the mean?

• 
$$D = \{X_1, \dots, X_n\}$$

ullet  $X_1,\ldots,X_n\in\mathbb{R}^d$  are iid.

$$ar{X} = rac{X_1 + \cdots + X_n}{n}$$
 $Q_i = ar{X} \cdot X_i$ 

#### **Q-values by Study Indicator**



## Statistical database

X: set of all possible entries/rows

 $x: ext{our database}, x \in \mathbb{N}^{[X]}$ 

X:

Name	Vape	Age	Income
John	Yes	18	\$1000
Kate	No	22	\$2000
•••	•••	•••	•••

x:

Name	Vape	Age	Income
John	Yes	18	\$1000
Kate	No	22	\$2000
David	Yes	21	\$5000

## Goal:

- ullet We want to compute on x (statistics, algorithm, fit model, share the data)
- Our computation should mask **small changes** in x.
- Adversory who know all of the entries X: can't infer whether it's in our database x or not.

#### **Small changes**

- Require identical results for x and x' that differ in only one entry. (Add one row, delete one row or change one row).
- Hamming distance:  $d(x,x^\prime)=1$

# **Definition: Differential privacy**

A randomized algorithm A is  $(\epsilon, \delta)$ -differentially private if


for all  $x,x'\in X$  such that d(x,x')=1 and all  $S\subseteq range(A)$ , we have

$$\mathbb{P}(A(x) \in S) \leq e^{\epsilon} \mathbb{P}(A(x') \in S) + \delta$$

 $\epsilon \geq 0$  and  $\delta \geq 0$  are parameters that control the trade-off between privacy and utility.

#### Think of it as distribution

- A(x) is a random variable.
- The disributions of A(x) from two adjacent databases x and  $x^\prime$  need to be close enough.



## **Properties**

- Composition: If  $A_1, \ldots, A_k$  are  $(\epsilon_1, \delta_1), \ldots, (\epsilon_k, \delta_k)$ -differentially private, then  $A_1, \ldots, A_k$  is  $(\sum_{i=1}^k \epsilon_i, \sum_{i=1}^k \delta_i)$ -differentially private.
- Post-processing: If A is  $(\epsilon, \delta)$ -differentially private and f is an arbitrary function, then f(A) is also  $(\epsilon, \delta)$ -differentially private.

Differential Privacy

#### Noise addition

• Typically, we add noise to the output of a deterministic algorithm to make it differentially private.

#### **Example: Laplace mechanism**

Let's say we want to compute the mean of x. And we want to make it differentially private.


Assume x is 1-D and has n observations and is binary  $x_i \in \{0,1\}.$ 

$$A(x) = ar{x} + rac{1}{narepsilon}Z$$

where  $Z \sim Laplace(1)$ .

 $\Rightarrow A(x)$  is  $(\varepsilon,0)$ -differentially private.

ullet pdf for  $Laplace(\lambda)$  :  $f(z,\lambda)=rac{1}{2\lambda}e^{-rac{|z|}{\lambda}}$ 



## Simple proof

$$d(x,x')=1\Rightarrow |ar{x}-ar{x}'|=rac{1}{n}$$

then using the triangle inequality

$$rac{f_{A(x)}(z)}{f_{A(x')}(z)} = rac{rac{arepsilon n}{2}e^{-arepsilon n|z-ar{x}|}}{rac{arepsilon n}{2}e^{-arepsilon n|z-ar{x}'|}} = e^{arepsilon n(|z-ar{x}'|-|z-ar{x}|)} \leq e^{arepsilon}$$

Differential Privacy

## **Accuracy - Privacy Trade-off**

• The more noise we add, the more private the algorithm is, the less accurate the algorithm is.

How much noise to add?

What kind of noise to add?

## **Sensitivity**

- The noise is calibrated to the sensitivity of the algorithm.
- The sensitivity of an algorithm is the maximum change in its output when we change one entry in the database.

$$\Delta(f) = \max_{x,x' \in X, d(x,x') = 1} \left\| f(x) - f\left(x'
ight) 
ight\|$$

The higher the sensitivity, the more noise we need to add to the output.


## Laplace and Gaussian mechanism

• We can add Lap(b) noise where  $b=\Delta(f)/\varepsilon$  to make f  $\varepsilon$ -differentially private.

Note: b Laplace  $(1) \sim \text{Laplace } (b)$ 

• Or we can add Gaussian noise  $\mathcal{N}(0, \sigma^2)$  to achieve  $(\varepsilon, \delta)$ -differential privacy

$$\sigma \geq rac{\Delta_2(f) \cdot \sqrt{2 \ln rac{2}{\delta}}}{arepsilon}$$



#### **Vector query**

If we have a vector query  $f: x \to \mathbb{R}^p$ . By the property of composition, we can add noise to each entry of the output. We show the Laplace mechanism here.

$$A(x) = f(x) + rac{p\Delta_f}{arepsilon} Z$$

where  $Z \sim \operatorname{Laplace}(1)$ , and  $\Delta_f$  is the sensitivity of each component.

Not always we need to times p.

## Global sensitivity (Nissim, 2011)

$$GS(f) = \max_{x,y:d(x,y)=1} \|f(x) - f(y)\|$$

#### **Limitation of Global Sensitivity**

- Depends on algorithm f, doesn't depend on the data x.
- Worst-case measure
- Add more noise than necessary in some cases.

## **Local Sensitivity**

Definition: The local sensitivity of the function f for dataset x is

$$LS(f,x) = \max_{y:d(x,y)=1} \|f(x) - f(y)\|$$

- Obviously  $LS(f,x) \leq GS(f)$ .
- Now it is getting close to robust statistics.

# **Recap of Robust Statistics**

Assuming  $T(F) = \theta_0$ 

ullet M-estimator:  $T\left(F_n
ight) = rg\min_{ heta} \sum_{i=1}^n 
ho(x_i, T\left(F_n
ight))$ 

where  $\rho$  is a loss function. Or we can take the derivative

$$\sum_{i=1}^{n}\Psi\left(x_{i},T\left(F_{n}
ight)
ight)=0$$

where  $\Psi=
ho'$ .

Robust Statistics

#### **Asymptotic normality:**

$$\sqrt{n}\left(T\left(F_{n}\right)-\theta_{0}\right)
ightarrow_{d}N(0,V(T,F))$$

#### Influence function

$$ext{IF}(x;T,F) = \lim_{t o 0} rac{T\left((1-t)F + \Delta_x
ight) - T(F)}{t}$$

For M-estimators we have

$$\operatorname{IF}(x;T,F) = (M(T,F))^{-1}\Psi(x,T(F))$$

Robust Statistics

#### **Gross Error Sensitivity (GES)**

$$\mathbf{GES}(T,F) = \sup_{x \in \mathcal{X}} |\mathbf{IF}(x,T,F)|$$

#### **Fixed scale Influcence Function**

$$\mathbf{IF}_{
ho}(x,T,F) := rac{T\left((1-
ho)F + 
ho\delta_x
ight) - T(F)}{
ho}$$

#### Fixed scale GES

$$\mathbf{GES}_
ho(T,F) := \sup_{x \in \mathcal{X}} |\mathbf{IF}_
ho(x,T,F)|$$

# Private noisy gradient descent

Another way to make M-estimators private is to use private stochastic gradient descent, where we add noise to the gradient in each iteration.

$$\mu^{(k)} = \mu^{(k-1)} - \eta rac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n 
ho' \left( x_i - \mu^{(k)} 
ight) + rac{\eta BT}{arepsilon n} Z_k$$

where  $\eta$  is the step-size parameter,  $B = \sup |\rho'(t)|$  and  $\{Z_k\}$  is a sequence of i.i.d. standard Laplace random variables.

- ullet The number of iterations T must be set beforehand and will obviously have an impact on the quality of the estimate.
- Under regularity conditions, T to be of the order  $O(\log(1/\Delta))$  guarantees the optimization error to be  $\left|\mu^{(T)}-\hat{\mu}\right|=O(\Delta)$ .

## **Return to Local Sensitivity**

Definition: The local sensitivity of the function f for dataset x is

$$LS(f,x) = \max_{y:d(x,y)=1} \|f(x) - f(y)\|$$

• Can we use it to scale the noise?

#### **Problem with Local Sensitivity**

- The local sensitivity itself can leak information about the dataset x. When the calibrated noise is added to the output, the local sensitivity can be revealed.
- We want to know how much noise to add to know the accuracy of the algorithm. However it's not private.

## **Smooth Sensitivity (Nissim, 2011)**

To solve this problem, Nissim et al. (2011) proposed a smooth upper bound of the local sensitivity.

For  $\beta > 0$ , the  $\beta$ -smooth sensitivity of f for dataset x is

$$SS_{eta}(f,x) = \max_{x' \in X} \Big( LS_f(x') \cdot e^{-eta d(x,x')} \Big).$$

Here,  $LS_f(x')$  denotes the local sensitivity of the function f at the dataset x', and d(x, x') is the distance between datasets x and x'.

## Adding noise according to smooth sensitivity

1. 1-D case: The authors showed that provided  $\beta = \frac{arepsilon}{2\log(1/\delta)}$ 

$$ilde{U} \sim \mathrm{Lap}\left(2 \cdot SS_{eta}(f,x)/arepsilon
ight)$$

 $f(x)+ ilde{U}$  is  $(arepsilon,\delta)$ -differentially private.

2. And for p-D vector-valued functions, provided  $\beta=rac{arepsilon}{4(p+2\log(2/\delta))}$  and

$$ilde{U} \sim \operatorname{Lap}_p\left(SS_{eta}(f,x)/arepsilon
ight)$$

then the output  $f(x) + ilde{U}$  is  $(arepsilon, \delta)$ -differentially private.

Connection

- However, calculating the smooth sensitivity can be expensive.
- How can robust statistics help?
- Robust statistics can be made private easier.

#### **Upper bound of Smooth sensitivity**

(Chaudhuri and Hsu, 2012) With probability at least  $1-\eta$ 

$$ext{SS}_eta\left(T,F_n
ight) \leq ext{max}\left\{rac{2\Gamma_n}{n}, R\exp\left(-eta\left(\sqrt{rac{n\ln(2/\eta)}{2}}-1
ight)
ight)
ight\}$$

where 
$$\Gamma_n := \sup \left\{ \mathbf{GES}_{1/n}(T,G) : G \in \mathcal{B}_{\mathrm{GC}}\left(F,\sqrt{rac{2\ln(2/\eta)}{n}}
ight) 
ight\}$$

- $\mathcal{B}_{GC}$  refers to the neighborhood of F according to Glivenko-Cantelli distance, which is defined as  $\|F-G\|_{\infty}:=\sup_{x\in\mathcal{X}}|F(x)-G(x)|$ .
- $\sqrt{\frac{2\ln(2/\eta)}{n}}$  connects to Hoeffding's inequality, which represents the bound on the deviation between the empirical distribution and its true value.

Connection

#### Chaudhuri, Hsu (2012)

Even for non-private estimation, the robustness of an estimator depends not just on the influence functions at the target distribution F, but also on these quantities in a local neighborhood around F (Huber, 1981, p. 72)

#### Connection with gross error sensitivity

(Marco Avella-Medina, 2021)

• "Gross error sensitivity should be of the same order as the smooth sensitivity"

Proposition: Under mild conditions and n large enough, we have

$$A_{T}\left(F_{n}
ight) := T\left(F_{n}
ight) + \gamma\left(T, F_{n}
ight) rac{5\sqrt{2\log(n)\log(2/\delta)}}{arepsilon n}Z$$

where Z is p-dimensional standard Gaussian distribution, is  $(\varepsilon, \delta)$ -differentially private.