
Contract Properties

ETH Vaults



ETHPoolFactory is an abstract base contract that holds common state and functionality. The two concrete implementations are SavETHVault and StakingFundsVault.

Recall that when staking with the LSD, the 32 ETH needed to activate a validator are divided as follows:

- 4 ETH are provided by the node runner. In the Stakehouse, these are represented as 4 collateralized SLOT tokens.
- 4 ETH are provided by LPs. In the Stakehouse, these are represented as 4 free-floating SLOT tokens.
- 24 ETH are provided by LPs. In the Stakehouse, these are represented as 24 dETH

Here, we only consider the 4 + 24 ETH that are provided by LPs. Collecting these funds is the responsibility of SavETHVault and StakingFundsVault, respectively. Whenever a user deposits ETH into one of these contracts, they receive an equivalent amount of LP tokens (LPToken) in return, where each validator has its own LPToken. Once the corresponding validator has been activated, the LP tokens will appreciate in value as the validator earns rewards (in the case of SavETHVault) or collects fees and MEV (in the case of StakingFundsVault).

ETHPoolFactory

Contract state:

- numberOfLPTokensIssued : uint256
- maxStakingAmountPerValidator : uint256
- lpTokenForKnot : mapping(bytes => LPToken)
- knotAssociatedWithLPToken : mapping(LPToken => bytes)

Note that maxStakingAmountPerValidator is set during initialization and not expected to change afterwards.

Constants:

MIN_STAKING_AMOUNT : uint256

Invariants

Invariant	Inv-EPF-1	
	$\forall b$:bytes, a :address. lpTokenForKnot[b] == a <==> knotAssociatedWithLPToken[a] == b	
Description	The mappings lpTokenForKnot and knotAssociatedWithLPToken are inverses of each other.	

Invariant	Inv-EPF-2
numberOfLPTokensIssued == registeredTokens	
<pre>where registeredTokens = {b:bytes. lpTokenForKnot[b] lpTokenForKnot[b] != address(0)}</pre>	
Description	numberOfLPTokensIssued corresponds to the number of registered LPTokens in lpTokenForKnot.

Invariant	Inv-EPF-3	
b1 != b	∀b1:bytes, b2:bytes. b1 != b2 && lpTokenForKnot[b1] != ZERO && lpTokenForKnot[b2] != ZERO => lpTokenForKnot[b1] != lpTokenForKnot[b2]	
Description	Each validator is assigned a unique LP token contract.	

Invariant	Inv-EPF-4
	s. sociatedWithLPToken[a].length == 0 sociatedWithLPToken[a].length == 48
Description	BLS public keys must be 48 bytes long.

Description	The total amount of LP tokens associated with a KNOT must not exceed the
	maximum staking amount.

Invariant	Inv-EPF-6
∀b:bytes. lpTokenForKnot[b] != ZERO ==> liquidStakingManager.isBLSPublicKeyPartOfLSDNetwork(b)	
Description	If a KNOT b is registered in the vault (i.e., lpTokenForKnot[b] is non-zero), then it must also be part of the LSD network. In other words, staking is only possible to KNOTs created by LiquidStakingManager.
Notes	This invariant requires cooperation from any deriving contract, which must reject any staking attempt to a KNOT that is unknown to the LSD.

SavETHVaultContract state:

• indexOwnedByTheVault : uint256

dETHForKnot : mapping(bytes => KnotDETHDetails)

Note that indexOwnedByTheVault is set during initialization and not expected to change afterwards.

Constants:

• KNOT_BATCH_AMOUNT : uint256 = 24 ether

In the following invariant and function specifications, we use this to refer to a particular SavETHVault instance and this balance to its ETH balance.

Reward Distribution

A fully staked validator in the SavETHVault is associated with 24 LP tokens. If a user has staked s LP tokens, they are entitled to $\frac{s}{24}$ of the validator's protocol rewards. To actually claim their rewards, users need to burn their LP tokens using SavETHVault.burnLPToken() (or one of the related functions), which also moves the validator into the open index, if this was not done already. This pays out $\frac{s}{24}$ of the rewards that the validator has earned until the point it was moved to the open index, plus the user's initial stake s. The rewards and the initial stake are paid out in either ETH or dETH, depending on whether the validator has already been activated or not. (If the validator has not been activated yet, then it has not earned any rewards, and the user simply gets back the ETH that they have staked.)

Invariants

Invariant	Inv-SEV-1	[may be violated by external actions]
this.baland	te == Σ t∈tokens. t.totalSupply()	
<pre>where tokens = {b:bytes. lpTokenForKnot[b] </pre>		•
Description	The total amount of ETH held by the SavELP token supply across all KNOTs that are	•
Notes	Ensures that when a user burns their LP to SavETHVault.burnLPToken(), the contrade to the user.	•
	Invariant may be violated by an external attransfers ETH to the contract directly. How functionality because it only ever increase	vever, this does not break any

Invariant	Inv-SEV-2	[may be violated by external actions]
savETHToker	savETHToken.balanceOf(this) == Σ $b \in bLsPKs$. $savETHFromKnot(b)$	
where <i>blsPk</i>	where $bLsPKs = \{b: bytes. b \mid lpTokenForKnot[b] != address(0)\}$	
and savEl	<pre>and savETHFromKnot(b:bytes) = dETHForKnot[b].savETHBalance *</pre>	
Description	The total amount of savETH held by the samount of savETH that the contract receindex.	
	Note that savETHFromKnot(b) denotes the received when moving b to the open indeconverted to dETH via SavETHVault.bur	ex, minus any savETH that was
Notes	Ensures that when a user burns their LP SavETHVault.burnLPToken(), the contransferred to the user.	
	Regarding savETHFromKnot(b): dETHFo the amount of savETH that the SavETHVa	

KNOT b to the open index. (If b is not in the open index, then dETHForKnot[b].savETHBalance is zero.) Further, for a fully staked KNOT, we have lpTokenForKnot[b].totalSupply() == 24 ether. Whenever some amount of LP tokens is burned, then a certain amount of savETH is transferred from the contract to the user such that the invariant is preserved.

Invariant may be violated by external actions: Someone can directly transfer savETH to the SavETHVault contract. In this case, the contract holds savETH that is not associated with any of its KNOTs. However, this is harmless.

¹ This is only true for KNOTs in state TOKENS_MINTED and EXITED. However, for KNOTs in different states, the contract doesn't hold any savETH, and correspondingly, dETHForKnot[b].savETHBalance should be zero.

Invariant	Inv-SEV-3	[may be violated by external actions]
	∀b:bytes. lpTokenForKnot[b] != ZERO ==> dETHForKnot[b].withdrawn <==> savETHManager.isKnotPartOfOpenIndex(b)	
Description	If a KNOT b is registered (i.e., lpToke dETHForKnot[b].withdrawn is true i	
Notes	be moved into private indices by anyo someone other than SavETHVault mo an index, then the above invariant is b	actions: KNOTs in the open index may one who provides the required savETH. If oves a KNOT registered in the LSD into oroken (see Issue#9). If this invariant that holds unconditionally.

Invariant	Inv-SEV-4
∀b:bytes. lpTokenForKnot[b] != ZERO ==> !dETHForKnot[b].withdrawn ==> savETHMan.associatedIndexIdForKnot(b) ==	
Description If a KNOT b is registered (i.e., lpTokenForKnot[b] is non-zero) and not withdrawn then it is in the SavETHVault index.	

Invariant	Inv-SEV-5
∀ <i>b</i> :bytes.	

$dETHForKnot[b].withdrawn \mathrel{<==>} dETHForKnot[b].savETHBalance \mathrel{!=} 0$	
Description	If a KNOT is withdrawn (i.e., it has been moved to the open index), then the SavETHVault contract must have received a non-zero amount of savETH.
Note	This invariant implies that the field KnotDETHDetails.withdrawn is redundant and can be removed. See Issue#8 .

Invariant	Inv-SEV-6	[may be violated by external actions]
∀b:bytes. lpTokenForKnot[b] != ZERO ==> !savETHMan.isKnotPartOfOpenIndex(b) ==> savETHMan.associatedIndexIdForKnot(b) == indexOwnedByTheVault		
Description	If a KNOT b is registered (i.e., 1pToker LPToken) and b is not part of the open owned by the SavETHVault contract.	
Notes	May be violated by external actions: Ar index and move them to their own indewhile SavETHVault does uphold this in	x, which would violate this invariant. So

SyndicateRewardsProcessor

Contract state:

• accumulatedETHPerLPShare : uint256

totalClaimed : uint256totalETHSeen : uint256

accumulatedETHPerLPAtTimeOfMintingDerivatives : mapping(bytes => uint256)

claimed : mapping(address => mapping(address => uint256))

Invariants

See the invariants in StakingFundsVault.

StakingFundsVault

Receives 50% of fees & MEV rewards from the Syndicate contract (the other 50% go to the node runners, but this is not handled here). These rewards are distributed among all LP token holders.

The ETH held by the StakingFundsVault contract comes from two sources:

- 1. Liquidity providers
- 2. Transaction fees & MEV rewards

The total amount of ETH coming from liquidity providers is tracked via the variable totalETHFromLPs. All remaining ETH held by the contract is assumed to come from transaction fees and MEV rewards. Though anyone may deposit ETH into the StakingFundsVault.

Contract state:

- totalShares: uint256. Total amount of LP tokens in circulation across all registered KNOTs who are in state TOKENS MINTED.
- totalETHFromLPs: uint256. Total amount of ETH from LPs that has not been staked in the Ethereum Deposit Contract and is held by StakingFundsVault.

Important operations:

- depositETHForStaking
- burnLPForETH
- claimRewards
- unstakeSyndicateSETHByBurningLP
- claimFundsFromSyndicateForDistribution

Reward Distribution

If a user stakes $s \le 4$ ETH, they are entitled to $\frac{s}{4n}$ of the total amount of transaction fees and MEV rewards earned by all the n validators in the StakingFundsVault. Note that a stake of s ETH results in s LP tokens, and each active validator is associated with exactly 4 LP tokens. In other words, if S = 4n denotes the total amount of LP tokens across all validators, then the user earns $\frac{s}{S}$ of the rewards.

Thus, it does not matter which validator a user stakes to, since the rewards are distributed among all the stakers.

The amount of rewards that are currently available for user u: address and validator v: bytes is computed as follows:

```
availableRewards(u, v) = unprocessedRewards(u, v) - processedRewards(u, v)
```

with the following definitions:

- $unprocessedRewards(u, v) = totalRewardsPerShare \cdot lpTokenBalance(u, v)$ with totalRewardsPerShare = accumulatedETHPerLPShare / 1e24
- If claimed[u][lpTokenForKnot[v]] > 0:
 processedRewards(u, v) = claimed[u][lpTokenForKnot[v]]

Otherwise:

```
processedRewards(u, v) = totalRewardsPerShareOnActivation(v) \cdot lpTokenBalance(u, v)
```

```
with totalRewardsPerShareOnActivation(v) = accumulatedETHPerLPAtTimeOfMintingDerivatives[v] / 1e24
```

The rewards given by availableRewards(u,v) can be retrieved at any time by calling StakingFundsVault.claimRewards(). (This is different from the SavETHVault, which only allows users to retrieve their rewards when they burn their LP tokens. See <u>SavETHVault Reward Distribution</u>.)

Invariants

Invariant	Inv-SFV-1
totalShares	== Σ t∈tokens. t.totalSupply()
<pre>where tokens = {b:bytes. lpTokenForKnot[b] </pre>	
Description	totalShares is equal to the total amount of LP tokens from active validators that are in circulations.
Notes	This invariant requires cooperation from LiquidStakingManager, which must call StakingFundsVault.updateDerivativesMinted() once a KNOT transitions to TOKENS_MINTED.

Invariant	Inv-SFV-2	
totalETHFrom	totalETHFromLPs == Σ $t \in tokens$. t.totalSupply()	
<pre>where tokens = {b:bytes. lpTokenForKnot[b] </pre>		
Description	totalETHFromLPs keeps track of the amount of ETH that has been deposited by liquidity providers and that has not been sent to the Deposit Contract for staking. Note that for each deposited ETH, LPs receive 1 LP token in return.	
Notes	This invariant requires cooperation from LiquidStakingManager, which must call StakingFundsVault.withdrawETH() to withdraw exactly 4 ETH once a KNOT transitions to TOKENS_MINTED. Also note that withdrawETH() must only be called for KNOTs with 4 LP tokens staked.	

Invariant	Inv-SFV-3	
this.balance	this.balance >= totalETHFromLPs + totalAvailableRewards	
where totalAvailableRewards = Σ u:address, $b \in blsPKs$. availableRewards (u, b)		
and <i>blsPKs</i>	= {b:bytes. b lpTokenForKnot[b] != address(0)}	
Description	The ETH held by the StakingFundsVault contract consists of the funds provided by liquidity providers (see Inv-SFV-2) and the total amount of unclaimed (i.e., available) rewards.	
	The contract balance may be larger because the rewards received are only accounted for after StakingFundsVault.updateAccumulatedETHPerLP() has been called. On the flip side, this invariant does hold with strict equality immediately after this function is executed.	

Invariant	Inv-SFV-4
∀b:bytes. lpTokenForKnot[b] != ZERO ==> lifecycleStatus(b) >= TOKENS_MINTED ==> accumulatedETHPerLPAtTimeOfMintingDerivatives[b] > 0	
Description	If a KNOT b is registered in StakingFundsVault (i.e., lpTokenForKnot[b] is non-zero) and its tokens have been minted, then the amount of rewards at the time when the tokens were minted must have been recorded (which must be larger than zero). This ensures that anyone who has staked to that KNOT does not earn rewards from before the KNOT was activated.
Notes	This invariant requires cooperation from LiquidStakingManager, which must call StakingFundsVault.updateDerivativesMinted() whenever a KNOT transitions to TOKENS_MINTED.

Invariant	Inv-SFV-5
	atedETHPerLPAtTimeOfMintingDerivatives[b] <= atedETHPerLPShare

•	Historical snapshots of accumulated ETH at the time of minting derivatives for a specific BLS public key cannot be more than the current live accumulated
	ETH.

Invariant	Inv-SFV-6
-	<pre>b:bytes. [u][lpTokenForKnot[b]] <= tedETHPerLPShare * lpTokenForKnot[b].balanceOf(u) / 1e24</pre>
Description	Users cannot have claimed more rewards than are available.

Syndicate

Model

Notation:

• S^{\times} : Given a set $S \subseteq \mathbb{N}$, we use $S^{\times} \subseteq S \times S$ to denote the set of consecutive pairs of elements of S:

$$S^{\times} = \{(s_1, s_2) \in S \times S \mid s_1 \neq s_2 \land \neg (\exists s \in S. \ s_1 < s < s_2)\}$$

- Let $a_0, a_1, ..., a_n \in \mathbb{R}$ be a finite sequence and $i, i' \in \mathbb{N}$. We define $a_{[i,i']} = \sum_{i < k \leq i'} a_k$
- We use **0** to denote the singleton set {0}

State:

- t: Counter that keeps track of the number of (public and external) function calls that have been made to the Syndicate contract. Whenever a function has finished execution, the counter increases (but not for nested calls). We assume deployment happens t=0.
- ΔR_i : Amount of ETH received by the Syndicate contract in call i, where $0 \le i \le t$
- n_i : Number of active KNOTs at the end of call i. Corresponds to <u>numberOfActiveKnots</u>.
- $U \subseteq \{1,...,t\}$: Set of calls to Syndicate.updateAccruedETHPerShares(). Initially, we assume $U = \emptyset$.
- $\alpha(k)$: If KNOT k has been activated via Syndicate.activateProposers() in call number c, then $\alpha(k) = \{c\}$. Otherwise, if k has not been activated yet, then $\alpha(k) = \emptyset$.
- $\delta(k)$: If KNOT k has been deactivated via Syndicate._deRegisterKnot() in call number c, then $\delta(k) = \{c\}$. Otherwise, if k has not been activated yet, then $\delta(k) = \emptyset$.
- Specific to rewards for collateralized SLOT holders:
 - $\ \, \Delta \mathcal{C}_i \text{: Amount of ETH received in call } i \text{ that goes to collateralized SLOT owners. It}$ is defined by $\Delta \mathcal{C}_i = \Sigma_k \frac{\Delta R_k}{2} \ [n_i \neq 0 \ \land \ k \leq i \ \land \ (\forall l \in \{k, ..., i-1\}. \ n_l = 0)].$

Most of the time, ΔC_i is just $\frac{\Delta R_i}{2}$ (i.e., half of the rewards go to collateralized SLOT owners). However, if the number of active KNOTs has been zero, then ΔC_i also includes the accumulated rewards received during that time. (Note that if $n_i=0$, then $\Delta C_i=0$ as well.)

 \circ $\sigma u(k) \subseteq \{1,...,t\}$: Set of public function calls that trigger execution of the private function

Syndicate._updateCollateralizedSlotOwnersLiabilitySnapshot(k). Concretely, these public functions are:

- claimAsCollateralizedSLOTOwner(..., blsPubKeys),
 where KNOT k is mentioned in blsPubKeys
- updateCollateralizedSlotOwnersAccruedETH(k)
- lacktriangleright batchUpdateCollateralizedSlotOwnersAccruedETH(blsPubKeys), where KNOT k is mentioned in blsPubKeys
- lacktriangleq unstake(..., blsPubKeys, ...), where KNOT k is mentioned in blsPubKeys
- lacktriangle deRegisterKnots(blsPubKeys), where KNOT k is mentioned in blsPubKeys
- informSyndicateKnotsAreKickedFromBeaconChain(blsPubKeys), where KNOT k is mentioned in blsPubKeys

Note that $\sigma u(k)$ is assumed to only contain calls in which the following conditions hold at the beginning of the call:

- k is active (i.e., activateProposers() has been called for k and isNoLongerPartOfSyndicate[k] == false)
- k is slashed by less than 4 ETH
- o $\sigma c(k,u) \subseteq \{1,...,t\}$: Set of calls to Syndicate.claimAsCollateralizedSLOTOwner() by user u for KNOT k. Initially, $\sigma c(k,u) = \emptyset$.
- \circ $\sigma s_i(k,u)$: Amount of collateralized SLOT that user u has staked for KNOT k at the end of call i

• Specific to rewards for free-floating SLOT holders:

 \circ ΔF_i : Amount of ETH received in call i that goes to free-floating SLOT owners (i.e., those that have staked sETH). It is defined by

$$\Delta F_i = \sum_k \frac{\Delta R_k}{2} \left[n_i \neq 0 \land f_i \neq 0 \land k \leq i \land (\forall l \in \{k, ..., i-1\}. \ n_l = 0 \lor f_l = 0) \right].$$

Most of the time, ΔF_i is just $\frac{\Delta R_i}{2}$ (i.e., half of the rewards go to sETH stakers). However, if the number of active KNOTs and the total amount of staked sETH

have been zero, then ΔF_i also includes the accumulated rewards received during that time. (Note that if $n_i = 0$ or $f_i = 0$, then $\Delta F_i = 0$ as well.)

- \circ f_i : Total amount of sETH staked via the Syndicate. Corresponds to totalFreeFloatingShares.
- $\varphi u(k, u) \subseteq \{1,..., t\}$: Set of public function calls that update <u>sETHUserClaimForKnot</u>[k][u]. Concretely, these public functions are:
 - stake()
 - unstake()
 - claimAsStaker()
- $\circ \varphi_{s_i}(k,u)$: Amount of sETH that user u has staked for KNOT k at the end of call i

Contract state

KNOT status:

- o <u>isKnotRegistered</u> : mapping(bytes => bool)
- o isNoLongerPartOfSyndicate : mapping(bytes => bool)
- o activationBlock : mapping(bytes => uint256)
- o proposersToActivate : bytes[]
- activationPointer : uint256
- numberOfActiveKnots : uint256
 Corresponds to n.
- o isPriorityStaker : mapping(address => bool)

Rewards for collateralized SLOT holders:

- o accumulatedETHPerCollateralizedSlotPerKnot: uint256 The total per-KNOT amount of rewards that have ever been earned for collateralized SLOT owners. Equals $\Sigma_{(a,b)\in U^\times} \Delta CperKnot_{[a,b]} = \Sigma_{(a,b)\in U^\times} \frac{\Delta C_{[a,b]}}{n_b}$ where $\Delta CperKnot_i = \frac{\Delta C_i}{n_i}$ (if one of the denominators is zero, we treat the whole fraction as zero). Note that for $a < i \le b$, it is ensured that n_i remains unchanged.
- $\begin{array}{ll} \circ & \underline{ lastSeenETHPerCollateralizedSlotPerKnot} : uint256 \\ & \textit{Total amount of rewards that have ever been received for collateralized SLOT} \\ & owners. \ \textit{Equals} \ \Sigma_{i \leq max(U)} \ \Delta C_i. \end{array}$
- $\begin{array}{ll} \circ & \underline{\mathsf{totalETHProcessedPerCollateralizedKnot}} : \mathsf{mapping(bytes =>} \\ \mathsf{uint256)} \\ & \mathit{For KNOT} \ k, \ \mathsf{equals} \ \Sigma_{(a,b) \in (\mathbf{0} \ \cup \ \alpha(k) \ \cup \ \sigma u(k))^{\times}} \ \Delta \mathit{CperKnot}_{[a,b]}. \ \mathit{Intuitively, the condition} \\ \end{array}$

 $\begin{array}{l} (a,b) \in \left(\mathbf{0} \,\cup\, \alpha(k) \,\cup\, \sigma u(k)\right)^{\times} \, \text{means the following: If} \, \alpha(k) = \{a\} \, (\text{meaning } k \, \text{was activated in call number } a) \, \text{and} \, \sigma u(k) = \{u_1,u_2\} \, (\text{meaning } k \, \text{meaning }$

o accruedEarningPerCollateralizedSlotOwnerOfKnot : mapping(bytes =>
mapping(address => uint256))

For KNOT k and user u (where u is not the Syndicate contract), equals

$$\boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{(a,b) \in (\boldsymbol{0} \cup \sigma u(k))^{\times}} \ \Delta CperKnot_{[a,b]} \cdot \frac{\sigma s_{b}(k,u)}{\boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{u^{\cdot}} \sigma s_{b}(k,u^{\prime})}$$

(if one of the denominators is zero, we treat the whole fraction as zero). In words: $\Delta CperKnot_{[a,b]}$ denotes the amount of rewards that have been assigned to k, and $\frac{\sigma s_b(k,u)}{\Sigma_{u'}\sigma s_b(k,u')}$ denotes the percentage of these rewards that are assigned to u.

For KNOT k and user u (where u is the Syndicate contract)

$$RewardBucket_{k} = \Sigma_{(a,b) \in (\mathbf{0} \cup C_{k})^{\times}} (4 \ ether \ - \ \sigma S_{b}(k)) \cdot \Delta CperKnot_{[a,b]} \quad \textit{where} \quad \text{where} \quad \text{wher$$

$$\boldsymbol{C}_k = \{ m \in \sigma u(k) \mid \sigma \boldsymbol{S}_m(k) \neq 4 \ \land \ (\forall l \in \sigma u(k). \ l > m \Rightarrow \sigma \boldsymbol{S}_l(k) \neq 4) \}$$

o claimedPerCollateralizedSlotOwnerOfKnot : mapping(bytes => mapping(address => uint256))

For KNOT k and user u, equals

$$\Sigma_{a,b} \Delta CperKnot_{[a,b]} \cdot \frac{\sigma s_b(k,u)}{\Sigma_{u'} \sigma s_b(k,u')} \quad [(a,b) \in \sigma u(k)^{\times} \wedge b \leq max(\sigma c(k,u))]$$

(if one of the denominators is zero, we treat the whole fraction as zero). This is very similar to the condition for

accruedEarningPerCollateralizedSlotOwnerOfKnot, except for the additional condition $b \leq max(\sigma c(k,u))$.

Rewards for free-floating SLOT holders:

o accumulatedETHPerFreeFloatingShare: uint256 The total per-sETH amount of rewards that have ever been earned for free-floating SLOT holders. Equals $\Sigma_{(a,b)\in U^\times} \Delta FperToken_{[a,b]} = \Sigma_{(a,b)\in U^\times} \frac{\Delta F_{[a,b]}}{f_b}$, where $\Delta FperToken_i = \frac{\Delta F_i}{f_i}$ (if one of the denominators is zero, we treat the whole fraction as zero). Note that for $a < i \le b$, it is ensured that f_i remains unchanged.

- o <u>lastSeenETHPerFreeFloating</u>: uint256 Total amount of rewards that have ever been received for sETH stakers. Equals $\sum_{i \leq max(U)} \Delta F_i.$
- \circ totalFreeFloatingShares: uint256 Total amount of sETH that has been staked to any KNOT in the Syndicate (this is modeled by f_i). This amount corresponds to the sum of sETH that has been staked to the individual KNOTs, which is tracked by the following variable:
 - <u>sETHTotalStakeForKnot</u>: mapping(bytes => uint256)

 Total amount of sETH that has been staked to a specific KNOT. This amount corresponds to the sum of sETH that has been staked to the KNOT by individual liquidity providers, which is tracked by the following variable:
 - <u>sETHStakedBalanceForKnot</u> : mapping(bytes => mapping(address => uint256))
- <u>lastAccumulatedETHPerFreeFloatingShare</u> : mapping(bytes => uint256)

Equals
$$\sum_{(a,b)\in (\mathbf{0}\cup\alpha(k)\cup\delta(k))^{\times}} \Delta FperToken_{[a,b]}$$

o sETHUserClaimForKnot : mapping(bytes => mapping(address => uint256))

Equals
$$\sum_{(a,b)\in (\mathbf{0}\ \cup\ \varphi(k,u))^{\times}} \Delta FperToken_{[a,b]} \cdot\ \varphi s_b(k,u)$$

Miscellaneous:

○ <u>totalClaimed</u> : uint256

Satisfies the following condition: this.balance + totalClaimed = $\Sigma_{i \leq t} \Delta R_i$. In words: The current contract balance together with totalClaimed equals the sum of all ETH deposits the contract has ever received. The only case in which ETH is transferred out of the contract (decreasing its balance) is when paying SLOT holders their rewards, in which case totalClaimed is increased by the same amount.

Thus, $\underline{\text{totalClaimed}}$ equals $(\Sigma_{i \leq t} \Delta R_i)$ — this balance.

Utility definitions:

General properties:

For any KNOT, isKnotRegistered is only ever updated to true, never to false

• Elements are only ever added to proposersToActivate, never removed

Invariants

The following invariants are related to the rewards for free-floating SLOT holders.

Invariant	Inv-Syn-
totalFreeFlo	$patingShares == \Sigma b \in ActiveKnots. sethTotalStakeForKnot[b]$
Description	The total amount of free-floating sETH staked via the Syndicate is equal to the sum of sETH that has been staked to active KNOTs.
Notes	In the sum above, b must be restricted to ActiveKnots. This is because of two cases: 1. Someone staked to b before b was activated (this increases sETHTotalStakeForKnot [b] but not totalFreeFloatingShares). 2. b has been deregistered. In this case, totalFreeFloatingShares is reduced by sETHTotalStakeForKnot [b] remains unchanged so that users can unstake.

Invariant	Inv-Syn-
∀ b:bytes.	$\underline{sETHTotalStakeForKnot}[b] == \Sigma \ u:address.$

	<u>sETHStakedBalanceForKnot</u> [b][u]
Description	The total amount of sETH that has been staked to a KNOT is equal to the sum of sETH that all the individual users have staked to the KNOT.

Invariant	Inv-Syn-
sETHToken.balanceOf(this) == Σ b:bytes. <u>sETHTotalStakeForKnot[b]</u>	
Description	The amount of sETH held by the Syndicate contract equals the sum of sETH staked to all the individual KNOTs.

LPToken

Must satisfy the properties described by the ERC-20 specification. In addition, the following properties must be satisfied:

- User balances do not change, unless they are affected by a call to LPToken. {transfer(),transferFrom(),mint(),burn()}.
- 2. Transfers made via LPToken.{transfer(),transferFrom()} do not take fees. In other words, whatever is deducted from the sender balance will be added to the receiver balance.
- 3. Only the deployer can call LPToken. {mint(), burn()}.
- Self-transfers where the sender and the receiver are the same are not allowed.
- 5. The amount given to LPToken. {transfer(), transferFrom(), mint(), burn()} must be at least 0.001 LP tokens.
- 6. The amount given to LPToken. {transfer(),transferFrom(),mint(),burn()} must be a multiple of 0.001 LP tokens.
- 7. Whoever is passed as _deployer to the LPToken.init() function must implement the ILiquidStakingManagerChildContract interface.
- 8. If a transfer hook is passed to LPToken.init(), then the corresponding hooks must be called whenever one of LPToken.{transfer(),transferFrom(),mint(),burn()} is executed.
- Whenever one of LPToken. {transfer(), transferFrom(), mint(), burn()} is called, then LPToken.lastInteractedTimestamp must be updated for all addresses that are involved.