



**GDAŃSK UNIVERSITY
OF TECHNOLOGY**

Voter-to-Voter internet voting

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- 2 Internet votings
- 3 Contribution
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- 5 Roadmap



Analysis of this area quickly reveals several unsolved issues. Secure voting requires four main properties

- **Correctness**, all and only eligible votes are counted.
- **Censorship resistance**, any eligible user that wants to cast a vote can do it.
- **Privacy**, no one can tell which candidate the voters voted for, or even if they voted at all—preventing preliminary results and guaranteeing freedom of choice.
- **Coercion resistance**, voters can not prove to anyone how they voted even if they want to—preventing selling votes as there is no way of verifying if they indeed voted on the paid candidate.

They are hard to satisfy together



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