

# MS&E 233

# Game Theory, Data Science and AI

## Lecture 5

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(by courtesy) Computer Science and Electrical Engineering

Institute for Computational and Mathematical Engineering

# Computational Game Theory for Complex Games

- Basics of game theory and zero-sum games (T)
- Basics of online learning theory (T)
- Solving zero-sum games via online learning (T)
- 1 • *HW1: implement simple algorithms to solve zero-sum games*
- Applications to ML and AI (T+A)
- *HW2: implement boosting as solving a zero-sum game*

## • Basics of extensive-form games

- 2 • Solving extensive-form games via online learning (T)
- *HW3: implement agents to solve very simple variants of poker*

## • General games and equilibria (T)

- 3 • Online learning in general games, multi-agent RL (T+A)
- *HW4: implement no-regret algorithms that converge to correlated equilibria in general games*

## Data Science for Auctions and Mechanisms

- Basics and applications of auction theory (T+A)
- 4 • Learning to bid in auctions via online learning (T)
- *HW5: implement bandit algorithms to bid in ad auctions*

- Optimal auctions and mechanisms (T)
- Simple vs optimal mechanisms (T)
- 5 • *HW6: calculate equilibria in simple auctions, implement simple and optimal auctions, analyze revenue empirically*

- Optimizing mechanisms from samples (T)
- Online optimization of auctions and mechanisms (T)
- 6 • *HW7: implement procedures to learn approximately optimal auctions from historical samples and in an online manner*

## Further Topics

- Econometrics in games and auctions (T+A)
- A/B testing in markets (T+A)
- 7 • *HW8: implement procedure to estimate values from bids in an auction, empirically analyze inaccuracy of A/B tests in markets*

## Guest Lectures

- Mechanism Design for LLMs, Renato Paes Leme, Google Research
- Auto-bidding in Sponsored Search Auctions, Kshipra Bhawalkar, Google Research



# Extensive Form Games

History and Progress

# Historical Challenge in Game Theory and AI

## Nash1950

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JOHN NASH

### A Three-Man Poker Game

As an example of the application of our theory to a more or less realistic case we include the simplified poker game given below. The rules are as follows:

- (a) The deck is large, with equally many *high* and *low* cards, and a hand consists of one card.
- (b) Two chips are used to ante, open, or call.
- (c) The players play in rotation and the game ends after all have passed or after one player has opened and the others have had a chance to call.
- (d) If no one bets the antes are retrieved.
- (e) Otherwise the pot is divided equally among the highest hands which have bet.




## Kuhn1950

### A SIMPLIFIED TWO-PERSON POKER \*

H. W. Kuhn<sup>1</sup>

A fascinating problem for the game theoretician is posed by the common card game, Poker. While generally regarded as partaking of psychological aspects (such as bluffing) which supposedly render it inaccessible to mathematical treatment, it is evident that Poker falls within the general theory of games as elaborated by von Neumann and Morgenstern [1]. Relevant probability problems have been considered by Borel and Ville [2] and several variants are examined by von Neumann [1] and by Bellman and Blackwell [3].



## Waterman1970

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

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### Generalization Learning Techniques for Automating the Learning of Heuristics<sup>1</sup>

D. A. Waterman

*Carnegie-Mellon University, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania*



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## Mastering the game of Stratego with model-free multiagent reinforcement learning

[JULIEN PEROLAT](#) , [BART DE VYLDER](#) , [DANIEL HENNES](#) , [EUGENE TARASSOV](#) , [...] AND [KARL TUYLS](#) [+29 authors](#) [Authors Info & Affiliations](#)

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[HOME](#) > [SCIENCE](#) > [VOL. 362, NO. 6419](#) > [A GENERAL REINFORCEMENT LEARNING ALGORITHM THAT MASTERS CHESS, SHOGI, AND GO THROUGH SELF-PLAY](#)

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## A general reinforcement learning algorithm that masters chess, shogi, and Go through self-play

[DAVID SILVER](#) , [THOMAS HUBERT](#) , [JULIAN SCHRITTWIESER](#) , [IOANNIS ANTONOGLU](#) , [...] AND [DEMIS HASSABIS](#) [+8 authors](#) [Authors Info & Affiliations](#)

# Key Elements to Success

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
New approaches to approximate the “continuation value of the game” via deep learning and other domain specific techniques



Scalable algorithmic methods to compute approximate Nash equilibria of zero-sum games via learning dynamics

# Extensive Form Games

## The Basics




# Perfect Information Games

- Players take turns in choosing actions
- All actions are publicly observable
- The “state” of the game is publicly observable
- Some sequence of actions lead to terminal states
- Each player receives some utility/loss at a terminal state
- In zero-sum games: utility of player 1 equals loss of player 2






# Tree Representation



# Solving Games via Backwards Induction




# Imperfect Information Games

Players don't have perfect knowledge about the "state" of the game



# Why are Imperfect Information Games Hard




The optimal strategy in the orange sub-tree can depend on how we play and what happens in the purple sub-tree



# A Simple Game

## Rules of the game


- Nature (chance) flips a coin



# A Simple Game

## Rules of the game


- Nature (chance) flips a coin
- Player one sees the outcome of the coin



# A Simple Game

## Rules of the game


- Nature (chance) flips a coin
- Player one sees the outcome of the coin
- Player one chooses whether to fold or play



# A Simple Game

## Rules of the game

- Nature (chance) flips a coin
- Player one sees the outcome of the coin
- Player one chooses whether to fold or play
- If they fold with heads they win 0.5 if they fold with tails they lose 0.5






# A Simple Game

## Rules of the game


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- If they play then it is player two turn



# A Simple Game

## Rules of the game


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- If they play then it is player two turn
- Player two doesn't see the outcome of the coin



# A Simple Game

## Rules of the game


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- If they play then it is player two turn
- Player two doesn't see the outcome of the coin
- They choose either heads or tails



# A Simple Game


## Rules of the game

- Nature (chance) flips a coin
- Player one sees the outcome of the coin
- Player one chooses whether to fold or play
- If they fold with heads they win 0.5 if they fold with tails they lose 0.5
- If they play then it is player two turn
- Player two doesn't see the outcome of the coin
- They choose either heads or tails
- If they match the coin they win 1 (P1 loses 1) if they don't match they lose 1 (P1 wins 1)





# A Simple Game




You are P2 and are asked to play. What do you choose?

heads


tails

You are P2 and are asked to play. What do you choose?

heads




tails




You are P2 and are asked to play. What do you choose?

heads




tails






# A Simple Game




# A Simple Game




Not a “proper” subgame in the formal game theory sense of a *proper subgame*, because it starts at a non-singleton information set. This notion of an “imperfect info subgame” is useful for computational approaches, e.g., “value function approximation” for large games.

Imperfect Information Subgame

# How should P2 play in the sub-game?




# How should P2 play in the sub-game?




# How should P2 play in the sub-game?


$$E[V] = .75$$



# How should P2 play in the sub-game?




# How should P2 play in the sub-game?






# How should P2 play in the sub-game?




# How should P2 play in the sub-game?


$$E[V] = .25$$




# How should P2 play in the sub-game?



# How should P2 play in the sub-game?




# How should P2 play in the sub-game?




# How should P2 play in the sub-game?

$$E[V] = 0$$




# What if we change the value of the fold?






# What if we change the value of the fold?

$$E[V] = 0$$



# What if we change the value of the fold?



The optimal strategy in the “play” sub-game, requires knowledge of what happens in the blue and green “fold” sub-games

# The Elements of an Imperfect Information Game Tree

# Tree Representation and Information Sets

- **Nodes.** Each node in the tree is a decision point for some player
- **Information sets (info set).** Nodes that belong to player  $i$  are partitioned into information sets  $I \in \mathcal{I}_i$ , with indices  $\mathcal{J}_i = \{j_1, \dots, j_{K_i}\}$
- Player does not know which node in the information set is chosen
- Must use the same strategy on all nodes in information set
- Each info set  $j \in \mathcal{J}_i$  has a set of actions  $A_j$  that the player can take
- **Leaf nodes  $\mathbf{Z}$ .** The set of terminal states. Player 1 gains utility  $u(z)$
- **Chance nodes.** Chance or Nature moves with a fixed distribution

# Perfect Recall

- Players remember all the past actions they took
- For each info set  $I$ , there is unique “parent” (info set, action) pair
- For every node in  $I \in \mathcal{I}_i$ , the parent pair  $I', a'$  was the last info set visited and action taken by player  $i$  before reaching  $I$
- Let  $p_j$  the last action player took before reaching info set indexed  $j$


# Strategic Form Representation

- **Mixed strategy.** A distribution over pure strategies
- **Behavioral strategy.** A set of distributions over actions at each information set

**Kuhn's Theorem.** For every mixed strategy there is an equivalent behavioral strategy that against all profiles of strategies of opponents induces the same distribution over terminal nodes

We will only be talking about behavioral strategies hereafter

# A Simple “Weird” Poker Game



What are the rules of the game?  
(f)old, (r)aise, (c)heck

# Why is Nash Equilibrium a Good Idea?

- In zero-sum games where no player has an a-priori competitive advantage, Nash Equilibrium guarantees no loss in expectation
- It is a “safe” strategy no matter what the opponent does!



Game Representations  
Convenient for Computing a  
Nash Equilibrium

# Computing Nash Equilibrium


- We know how to compute equilibria of static zero-sum games
- Can we view the extensive form zero-sum game also as min-max

$$\max_{x \in X} \min_{y \in Y} x^T A y$$

- What does  $x$  and  $y$  encode?
- What if  $x = (x^j)_{j \in \mathcal{J}_1}$ , where  $x^j$  is mixed strategy at info set  $j \in \mathcal{J}_1$
- What if  $y = (y^j)_{j \in \mathcal{J}_2}$ , where  $y^j$  is mixed strategy at info set  $j \in \mathcal{J}_2$

# Behavioral Strategy Representation


What is the expected payoff of  $x$ ?



# Behavioral Strategy Representation

What is the expected payoff of  $x$ ?

$$\frac{1}{2} \left( -x_f - 3 x_r y_{f*} x_{\hat{c}} - 2 x_r y_{f*} x_{\hat{f}} + 3 x_r y_{r*} x_{\hat{c}} + 2 x_r y_{r*} x_{\hat{f}} \right) + \frac{1}{2} \left( x_{f'} y_{f*} - 3 x_{f'} y_{r*} - x_{r'} \right)$$




# Behavioral Strategy Representation

What is the expected payoff of  $x$ ?

$$\frac{1}{2} \left( -x_f - 3x_r y_{f*} x_{\hat{c}} - 2x_r y_{f*} x_{\hat{f}} + 3x_r y_{r*} x_{\hat{c}} + 2x_r y_{r*} x_{\hat{f}} \right) + \frac{1}{2} \left( x_{f'} y_{f*} - 3x_{f'} y_{r*} - x_{r'} \right)$$

Is it of the form  $x^T A y$ ?




# Behavioral Strategy Representation

What is the expected payoff of  $x$ ?

$$\frac{1}{2} \left( -x_f - 3 x_r y_{f*} x_{\hat{c}} - 2 x_r y_{f*} x_{\hat{f}} + 3 x_r y_{r*} x_{\hat{c}} + 2 x_r y_{r*} x_{\hat{f}} \right) + \frac{1}{2} \left( x_{f'} y_{f*} - 3 x_{f'} y_{r*} - x_{r'} \right)$$

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# Behavioral Strategy Representation

What is the expected payoff of  $x$ ?


$$\frac{1}{2} \left( -x_f - 3 \underbrace{x_r y_{f*} x_{\hat{c}}}_{\tilde{x}_{r\hat{c}}} - 2 \underbrace{x_r y_{f*} x_{\hat{f}}}_{\tilde{x}_{r\hat{f}}} + 3 \underbrace{x_r y_{r*} x_{\hat{c}}}_{\tilde{x}_{r\hat{c}}} + 2 \underbrace{x_r y_{r*} x_{\hat{f}}}_{\tilde{x}_{r\hat{f}}} \right) + \frac{1}{2} \left( x_{f'} y_{f*} - 3 x_{f'} y_{r*} - x_{r'} \right)$$

**IDEA.** Group together products that appear into new “variables”

New variables represent the product of the probabilities of the actions chosen by P1 on the path to the last action in the sequence!

We will annotate them just with the last action

$$\tilde{x}_{r\hat{c}} \equiv \tilde{x}_{\hat{c}}, \quad \tilde{x}_{r\hat{f}} \equiv \tilde{x}_{\hat{f}}$$




# Sequence Form Representation

What is the expected payoff of  $x$ ?

$$\frac{1}{2} \left( -x_f - 3 \tilde{x}_r y_{f*} \tilde{x}_{\hat{c}} - 2 \tilde{x}_r y_{f*} \tilde{x}_{\hat{f}} + 3 \tilde{x}_r y_{r*} \tilde{x}_{\hat{c}} + 2 \tilde{x}_r y_{r*} \tilde{x}_{\hat{f}} \right) + \frac{1}{2} \left( x_{f'} y_{f*} - 3 x_{f'} y_{r*} - x_{r'} \right) \tilde{x}_{r\hat{f}}$$

**Sequence form strategies.** We can define these new variables  $\tilde{x}_a$  for all actions of P1

$\tilde{x}_a$ : represents product of probabilities of all actions of P1 on the path to a  
 $\tilde{x}_f, \tilde{x}_r, \tilde{x}_{f'}, \tilde{x}_{r'}, \tilde{x}_{\hat{c}}, \tilde{x}_{\hat{f}}$





# Sequence Form Representation


What is the expected payoff of  $x$ ?

$$\frac{1}{2} \left( -x_f - 3 \tilde{x}_r y_{f*} \tilde{x}_{\hat{c}} - 2 \tilde{x}_r y_{f*} \tilde{x}_{\hat{f}} + 3 \tilde{x}_r y_{r*} \tilde{x}_{\hat{c}} + 2 \tilde{x}_r y_{r*} \tilde{x}_{\hat{f}} \right) + \frac{1}{2} \left( x_{f'} y_{f*} - 3 x_{f'} y_{r*} - x_{r'} \right)$$

**Sequence form strategies.** We can define these new variables  $\tilde{x}_a$  for all actions of P1

$\tilde{x}_a$ : represents product of probabilities of all actions of P1 on the path to a  
 $\tilde{x}_f, \tilde{x}_r, \tilde{x}_{f'}, \tilde{x}_{r'}, \tilde{x}_{\hat{c}}, \tilde{x}_{\hat{f}}$

$\tilde{y}_a$ : represents product of probabilities of all actions of P2 on the path to a  
 $\tilde{y}_{f*}, \tilde{y}_{r*}$



# Sequence Form Representation


What is the expected payoff of  $x$ ?

$$\frac{1}{2} \left( -\tilde{x}_f - 3 y_{f*} \tilde{x}_{\hat{c}} - 2 y_{f*} \tilde{x}_{\hat{f}} + 3 y_{r*} \tilde{x}_{\hat{c}} + 2 y_{r*} \tilde{x}_{\hat{f}} \right) + \frac{1}{2} \left( \tilde{x}_{f'} \tilde{y}_{f*} - 3 \tilde{x}_{f'} \tilde{y}_{r*} - \tilde{x}_{r'} \right)$$

**Sequence form strategies.** We can define these new variables  $\tilde{x}_a$  for all actions of P1

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
# Sequence Form Representation

What is the expected payoff of  $x$ ?

$$\frac{1}{2} \left( -\tilde{x}_f - 3 y_{f*} \tilde{x}_{\hat{c}} - 2 y_{f*} \tilde{x}_{\hat{f}} + 3 y_{r*} \tilde{x}_{\hat{c}} + 2 y_{r*} \tilde{x}_{\hat{f}} \right) + \frac{1}{2} \left( \tilde{x}_{f'} \tilde{y}_{f*} - 3 \tilde{x}_{f'} \tilde{y}_{r*} - \tilde{x}_{r'} \right)$$

**Observation.** This is of the form  $x^\top A y$ .

What is the dimension of  $A$ ?



# Sequence Form Representation

What is the expected payoff of  $x$ ?


$$\frac{1}{2} \left( -\tilde{x}_f - 3 y_{f*} \tilde{x}_{\hat{c}} - 2 y_{f*} \tilde{x}_{\hat{f}} + 3 y_{r*} \tilde{x}_{\hat{c}} + 2 y_{r*} \tilde{x}_{\hat{f}} \right) + \frac{1}{2} \left( \tilde{x}_{f'} \tilde{y}_{f*} - 3 \tilde{x}_{f'} \tilde{y}_{r*} - \tilde{x}_{r'} \right)$$

**Observation.** This is of the form  $x^T A y$ .

**What is the dimension of  $A$ ?**

One row for each possible action  $a$  of P

One column for each possible action  $a'$  of P2



# Sequence Form Representation

What is the expected payoff of  $x$ ?

$$\frac{1}{2} \left( -\tilde{x}_f - 3 y_{f*} \tilde{x}_{\hat{c}} - 2 y_{f*} \tilde{x}_{\hat{f}} + 3 y_{r*} \tilde{x}_{\hat{c}} + 2 y_{r*} \tilde{x}_{\hat{f}} \right) + \frac{1}{2} \left( \tilde{x}_{f'} \tilde{y}_{f*} - 3 \tilde{x}_{f'} \tilde{y}_{r*} - \tilde{x}_{r'} \right)$$


**Observation.** This is of the form  $x^T A y$ .

**What is the dimension of  $A$ ?**

One row for each possible action  $a$  of P

One column for each possible action  $a'$  of P2

**What is the value  $A_{a,a'}$ ?**



# Sequence Form Representation

What is the expected payoff of  $x$ ?

$$\frac{1}{2} \left( -\tilde{x}_f - 3 y_{f*} \tilde{x}_{\hat{c}} - 2 y_{f*} \tilde{x}_{\hat{f}} + 3 y_{r*} \tilde{x}_{\hat{c}} + 2 y_{r*} \tilde{x}_{\hat{f}} \right) + \frac{1}{2} \left( \tilde{x}_{f'} \tilde{y}_{f*} - 3 \tilde{x}_{f'} \tilde{y}_{r*} - \tilde{x}_{r'} \right)$$

**Observation.** This is of the form  $x^T A y$ .


**What is the dimension of  $A$ ?**

One row for each possible action  $a$  of P

One column for each possible action  $a'$  of P2

**What is the value  $A_{a,a'}$ ?**

If there exists a terminal node, such that  $a$  was the last action chosen by P1 and  $a'$  was the last action chosen by P2 then it is the value of the leaf multiplied by all “chance” probabilities on the path to the leaf




# Sequence Form Representation

What is the expected payoff of  $x$ ?

$$\frac{1}{2} \left( -\tilde{x}_f - 3 y_{f*} \tilde{x}_{\hat{c}} - 2 y_{f*} \tilde{x}_{\hat{f}} + 3 y_{r*} \tilde{x}_{\hat{c}} + 2 y_{r*} \tilde{x}_{\hat{f}} \right) + \frac{1}{2} \left( \tilde{x}_{f'} \tilde{y}_{f*} - 3 \tilde{x}_{f'} \tilde{y}_{r*} - \tilde{x}_{r'} \right)$$

What constraints does  $\tilde{x}$  need to respect?



# Sequence Form Representation


What is the expected payoff of  $x$ ?

$$\frac{1}{2} \left( -\tilde{x}_f - 3 y_{f*} \tilde{x}_{\hat{c}} - 2 y_{f*} \tilde{x}_{\hat{f}} + 3 y_{r*} \tilde{x}_{\hat{c}} + 2 y_{r*} \tilde{x}_{\hat{f}} \right) + \frac{1}{2} \left( \tilde{x}_{f'} \tilde{y}_{f*} - 3 \tilde{x}_{f'} \tilde{y}_{r*} - \tilde{x}_{r'} \right)$$

**What constraints does  $\tilde{x}$  need to respect?**

Since  $\tilde{x}_{\hat{c}}$  is supposed to represent  $x_r x_{\hat{c}}$  and  $\tilde{x}_{\hat{f}}$  is supposed to represent  $x_r x_{\hat{f}}$

$$\tilde{x}_{\hat{c}} + \tilde{x}_{\hat{f}} = x_r (x_{\hat{c}} + x_{\hat{f}}) = x_r$$





# Sequence Form Representation

What is the expected payoff of  $x$ ?


$$\frac{1}{2} \left( -\tilde{x}_f - 3 y_{f*} \tilde{x}_{\hat{c}} - 2 y_{f*} \tilde{x}_{\hat{f}} + 3 y_{r*} \tilde{x}_{\hat{c}} + 2 y_{r*} \tilde{x}_{\hat{f}} \right) + \frac{1}{2} \left( \tilde{x}_{f'} \tilde{y}_{f*} - 3 \tilde{x}_{f'} \tilde{y}_{r*} - \tilde{x}_{r'} \right)$$

**What constraints does  $\tilde{x}$  need to respect?**

Since  $\tilde{x}_{\hat{c}}$  is supposed to represent  $x_r x_{\hat{c}}$  and  $\tilde{x}_{\hat{f}}$  is supposed to represent  $x_r x_{\hat{f}}$

$$\tilde{x}_{\hat{c}} + \tilde{x}_{\hat{f}} = x_r (x_{\hat{c}} + x_{\hat{f}}) = x_r$$

The sum of  $\tilde{x}_a$  for all actions at an info set  $j \in \mathcal{J}_i$  must be matching  $\tilde{x}_{p_j}$ , i.e., variable associated with the last action chosen before  $j$



# Sequence Form Representation

What is the expected payoff of  $x$ ?

$$\frac{1}{2} \left( -\tilde{x}_f - 3 y_{f*} \tilde{x}_{\hat{c}} - 2 y_{f*} \tilde{x}_{\hat{f}} + 3 y_{r*} \tilde{x}_{\hat{c}} + 2 y_{r*} \tilde{x}_{\hat{f}} \right) + \frac{1}{2} \left( \tilde{x}_{f'} \tilde{y}_{f*} - 3 \tilde{x}_{f'} \tilde{y}_{r*} - \tilde{x}_{r'} \right)$$


**Are these all?**

Since  $\tilde{x}_{\hat{c}}$  is supposed to represent  $x_r x_{\hat{c}}$  and  $\tilde{x}_{\hat{f}}$  is supposed to represent  $x_r x_{\hat{f}}$

$$\tilde{x}_{\hat{c}} + \tilde{x}_{\hat{f}} = x_r (x_{\hat{c}} + x_{\hat{f}}) = x_r = \tilde{x}_r$$

For every,  $\tilde{x}$ , we can find a valid behavioral  $x$

$$\frac{\tilde{x}_c}{\tilde{x}_r} = x_{\hat{c}}, \quad \frac{\tilde{x}_{\hat{f}}}{\tilde{x}_r} = x_{\hat{f}}$$



# **Recap:** Sequence Form Representation

- The strategies of the player can be represented as  $\tilde{x} \in X, \tilde{y} \in Y$
- $\tilde{x}_a$ : product of probabilities of all actions of P1 on the path to  $a$
- $\tilde{y}_a$ : product of probabilities of all actions of P2 on the path to  $a$

$$X := \left\{ \forall j \in \mathcal{J}_1: \sum_{a \in A_j} \tilde{x}_a = \tilde{x}_{p_j} \right\}, \quad Y := \left\{ \forall j \in \mathcal{J}_2: \sum_{a \in A_j} \tilde{y}_a = \tilde{y}_{p_j} \right\}$$

- The payoff to P1 under sequence strategies  $\tilde{x} \in X, \tilde{y} \in Y$  is

$$\tilde{x}^\top A \tilde{y}$$

- $A_{a,a'} =$  **if**  $a$  was the last action of P1 and  $a'$  the last action of P2 before some leaf  $z$ , **then** payoff to P1 at  $z$  times product of chance probabilities on path to  $z$  **else** zero

# ***Recap:*** From Sequence to Behavioral

- Every sequence form strategy  $\tilde{x}$  can be transformed into a behavioral form strategy as (recursively bottom up):

$$\forall a \in A_j: x_a = \frac{\tilde{x}_a}{\tilde{x}_{p_j}}$$

if info-set is un-reachable, i.e.  $\tilde{x}_{p_j} = 0$ , then use any behavioral


- Every behavioral strategy  $x$  can be transformed into a sequence form strategy as (recursively top down):

$$\forall a \in A_j: \tilde{x}_a = \tilde{x}_{p_j} \cdot x_a$$

# Sequence Form Representation

	$\emptyset$	$f_*$	$r_*$
$f$			
$r$			
$f'$			
$r'$			
$\hat{c}$			
$\hat{f}$			

Let's fill it in!




Click on the table entries that are non-zero.

	$\emptyset$	$f_*$	$r_*$
$f$			
$r$			
$f'$			
$r'$			
$\hat{c}$			
$\hat{f}$			

# Sequence Form Representation

	$\emptyset$	$f_*$	$r_*$
$f$	$-1/2$		
$r$			
$f'$		$1/2$	$-3/2$
$r'$	$-1/2$		
$\hat{c}$		$-3/2$	$3/2$
$\hat{f}$		$-2/2$	$-2/2$




# TreePlex Representation of Strategy Space

The strategy space of each player is a set of interconnected “scaled” simplices

$$\forall j \in J_1: \sum_{a \in A_j} \tilde{x}_a = \tilde{x}_{p_j}$$


To generate  $\tilde{x}_a$

- Generate an element of the simplex (i.e. a behavioral strategy  $x_a$ )
- Scale all its coordinates by  $\tilde{x}_{p_j}$ , i.e.  $\tilde{x}_a = \tilde{x}_{p_j} \cdot x_a$









# TreePlex Representation



Let's fill it in!



# TreePlex Representation



# Solving Extensive Form Games via No-Regret Learning

# No-Regret Learning in Sequence Form

- We have successfully turned imperfect information extensive form zero-sum games into a familiar object

$$\max_{\tilde{x} \in X} \min_{\tilde{y} \in Y} \tilde{x}^\top A \tilde{y}$$

- $X, Y$  are convex sets, i.e., sequence-form strategies
- We can invoke minimax theorem to prove existence of equilibria
- We can calculate equilibria via LP duality
- We can calculate equilibria via no-regret learning!

# Recap from Lecture 2: Regret of FTRL

$$\text{(FTRL)} \quad x_t = \operatorname{argmin}_{x \in X} \underbrace{\sum_{\tau < t} \langle x, \ell_\tau \rangle}_{\substack{\text{Historical performance} \\ \text{of always choosing} \\ \text{strategy } x}} + \underbrace{\frac{1}{\eta} \mathcal{R}(x)}_{\substack{\text{1-strongly convex} \\ \text{function of } x \text{ that} \\ \text{stabilizes the minimizer}}}$$

**Theorem.** Assuming the loss function at each period  
 $f_t(x) = \langle x, \ell_t \rangle$

is  $L$ -Lipschitz with respect to some norm  $\|\cdot\|$  and the regularizer is 1-strongly convex with respect to the same norm then

$$\text{Regret} - \text{FTRL}(T) \leq \underbrace{\eta L}_{\substack{\text{Average stability} \\ \text{induced by regularizer}}} + \underbrace{\frac{1}{\eta T} \left( \max_{x \in X} \mathcal{R}(x) - \min_{x \in X} \mathcal{R}(x) \right)}_{\substack{\text{Average loss distortion} \\ \text{caused by regularizer}}}$$

# Same for utilities

(FTRL) 
$$x_t = \operatorname{argmax}_{x \in X} \underbrace{\sum_{\tau < t} \langle x, u_\tau \rangle}_{\substack{\text{Historical performance} \\ \text{of always choosing} \\ \text{strategy } x}} - \underbrace{\frac{1}{\eta} \mathcal{R}(x)}_{\substack{\text{1-strongly convex} \\ \text{function of } x \text{ that} \\ \text{stabilizes the maximizer}}}$$

**Theorem.** Assuming the utility function at each period  
 $f_t(x) = \langle x, u_t \rangle$

is  $L$ -Lipschitz with respect to some norm  $\|\cdot\|$  and the regularizer is 1-strongly convex with respect to the same norm then


$$\text{Regret} - \text{FTRL}(T) \leq \underbrace{\eta L}_{\substack{\text{Average stability} \\ \text{induced by regularizer}}} + \underbrace{\frac{1}{\eta T} \left( \max_{x \in X} \mathcal{R}(x) - \min_{x \in X} \mathcal{R}(x) \right)}_{\substack{\text{Average loss distortion} \\ \text{caused by regularizer}}}$$

# Regularizer for the Treeplex Space $X$

- The only thing we are missing is a good Regularizer for  $X$

$$U_{t-1} = \sum_{\tau < t} u_{\tau}$$

- **Desiderata.** Be strongly convex in  $x$  within  $X$  and for the optimization problem to be fast to solve

$$\tilde{x}_t = \operatorname{argmax}_{\tilde{x} \in X} \sum_{\tau < t} \langle \tilde{x}, u_{\tau} \rangle - \frac{1}{\eta} \mathcal{R}(\tilde{x}) = \operatorname{argmax}_{\tilde{x} \in X} \langle \tilde{x}, U_{t-1} \rangle - \frac{1}{\eta} \mathcal{R}(\tilde{x})$$


- $X$  is no longer a “simplex”, so entropy is not a good Regularizer

# Dilated Entropy

- $X$  is a combination of *scaled simplices*, i.e.,  $\tilde{x} = (\tilde{x}^j)_{j \in \mathcal{J}_1}$
- $\tilde{x}^j = (\tilde{x}_a)_{a \in A_j}$ : sequence-form strategies for actions in info set  $j \in \mathcal{J}_1$

$$\tilde{x}^j \in \tilde{x}_{p_j} \cdot \Delta_j \quad \Leftrightarrow \quad \tilde{x}^j / \tilde{x}_{p_j} \in \Delta_j$$

- Consider a *weighted combination of local negative entropies*

$$\mathcal{R}(\tilde{x}) := \sum_j \beta_j \tilde{x}_{p_j} \text{H} \left( \tilde{x}^j / \tilde{x}_{p_j} \right), \quad \text{H}(u) = \sum_i u_i \log(u_i)$$

Lies in a simplex  $\Delta_j$ 
Negative Entropy

Equivalent to the behavioral strategy  $x^j$

- $\mathcal{R}(\tilde{x})$  is  $1/M$  strongly convex w.r.t.  $\ell_1$  norm, where  $M = \max_{\tilde{x} \in X} \|\tilde{x}\|_1$ , for appropriate choice of  $\beta_j$  based on game tree structure



# Solving the Optimization Problem

- Optimization problem decomposes into local simplex problems

$$\sum_{j \in \mathcal{J}_1} \left\langle \tilde{x}^j, U_{t-1}^j \right\rangle - \underbrace{\frac{1}{\eta} \beta_j}_{:= \frac{1}{\eta_j}} \tilde{x}_{p_j} \mathrm{H} \left( \frac{\tilde{x}^j}{\tilde{x}_{p_j}} \right) = \sum_{j \in \mathcal{J}_1} \tilde{x}_{p_j} \left\{ \left\langle \frac{\tilde{x}^j}{\tilde{x}_{p_j}}, U_{t-1}^j \right\rangle - \frac{1}{\eta_j} \mathrm{H} \left( \frac{\tilde{x}^j}{\tilde{x}_{p_j}} \right) \right\}$$

- Max of quantity  $\frac{\tilde{x}^j}{\tilde{x}_{p_j}}$  over simplex  $\Delta_j$  is independent of solution  $x_a$  for all ancestral actions
- Quantity  $\frac{\tilde{x}^j}{\tilde{x}_{p_j}}$  is essentially the behavioral strategy  $x^j$  at infoset  $j$

# Solving the Optimization Problem

- Decomposes in local max over behavioral strategies  $x^j$  solved bottom up

$$V^j = \max_{x^j \in \Delta_j} \left\langle x^j, U_{t-1}^j \right\rangle - \frac{1}{\eta_j} H(x^j) \Rightarrow \begin{cases} x^j \propto \exp(\eta_j U_{t-1}^j) \\ V^j = \log \sum_{a \in A_j} \exp(\eta_j U_{t-1}^a) = \text{softmax}_{\eta_j}(U_{t-1}^j) \end{cases}$$

- Value  $V^j$  multiplies  $x_{p_j}$ ; when solving for  $x_{p_j}$  we need to take it into account. If  $p_j \in A_k$

$$\max_{x^k \in \Delta_k} \left\langle \tilde{x}^k, U_{t-1}^k \right\rangle - \eta_k \tilde{x}_{p_k} H\left(\frac{\tilde{x}^k}{\tilde{x}_{p_k}}\right) + x_{p_j} V^j + \dots$$

- Add  $V^j$  to “cumulative utility”  $Q_{p_j}$  (initialized at  $U_{t-1,p_j}$ ) associated with  $p_j$

$$Q_{p_j} \leftarrow Q_{p_j} + V^j$$