The Brittle Promise: Harms and Pitfalls of Large Language Models*

Exploratory Project - CS 281, Spring 2024

Due Apr 29, 2024, 1:00 PM

Introduction

In this assignment, you will have the opportunity to learn more about large language models (LLMs), their present capabilities, vulnerabilities, and current research challenges. You will consider how we can test for the types of harmful content that a model like this can generate, and whom it can impact if used in the real world. Further, you will observe the challenges we face fixing these problems, and the *unintended* consequences of the solutions we have found so far.

We will explore four concepts in the recent discourse around LLMs and harms.

1. As a warmup, you will explore the biases the LLMs exhibit under very simple modifications to the instructions.
2. In Part A, you will explore the issues around **copyright** and LLMs.
3. In Part B, you will think about **dual use**, where helpful capabilities of LLMs can be exploited for malicious purposes.
4. In Part C, you will explore the **sycophantic behavior**, where LLMs change their responses to conform to user preferences.
5. In Part D, you will explore **exaggerated safety**, where LLMs refuse to respond to safe requests due to superficial similarities to unsafe ones.

Deliverables: Please submit

1. *exploration.pdf* file that contains i) the written answers to the questions ii) prompts you wrote to the language models iii) responses you got from the language models, for each question. You can add screenshots of your interactions with the LLMs.

Primer on Large Language Models

In simple terms, a language model is a probability distribution over sequences of tokens (words, or subwords). It can be used to assign a probability to a sequence of tokens according to the model

$$\mathbb{P}(\text{the, mouse, ate, the, cheese}) \in [0, 1]. \tag{1}$$

In autoregressive language models, such as ChatGPT or Claude, text is generated one token at a time, given tokens generated so far:

$$\mathbb{P}(x_1, x_2, \ldots, x_T) = \mathbb{P}(x_1) \prod_{i=2}^{T} \mathbb{P}(x_i | x_1, \ldots, x_{i-1}), \tag{2}$$

*This title was brainstormed together with Claude Opus.

where each $x_i \in \mathcal{V}$ is a token from a fixed vocabulary of tokens $\mathcal{V}$.

For instance, these models can be used to perform conditional generation of a response given a prompt:

$$\mathbb{P}(\text{cheese} \mid \text{the, mouse, ate, the}). \tag{3}$$

For a comprehensive description of the range of Large Language Model capabilities, please consult lecture notes for Stanford's CS324 course.

Harms and Large Language Models

Large language models are trained on enormous corpora of text, often taken directly from sites like Reddit - whose user bases skews young and male [RNL+18] - and learn their language patterns - which are often rife with harmful stereotypes and toxicity. While the models are gaining popularity and begin to be used more widely, their risks are not yet well understood. A number of past works have attempted to lay out categories of harms, and proposed methodologies for testing them - for example, by comparing the pronouns that models associate with particular job titles [RNL+18] or estimating the likelihood of generating stereotypical associations when prompted with descriptors of specific social groups [NBR20]. Blodgett et al. [BBD+20], in their critical review of existing tests, distinguish allocational harms (understood as downstream effects of, for example, stereotypes in resume filtering) from representational harms (which includes stereotyping, uneven system performance, misrepresentation and denigration of social groups), and argue that any analysis of the harms of language models needs to begin with specifying "what types of system behaviors are harmful, in what ways, to whom, and why, as well as the normative reasoning underlying these statements."

Setup

In our explorations, we will use the most recent LLMs that are publicly accessible by anyone. You will write queries (a.k.a. prompts) to these LLMs that can result in the set of behaviors that we will specify below, and you will discuss the potential consequences and impact.

You are free to use one of the below models through their corresponding chat interface:

1. ChatGPT family is a set of language models developed by OpenAI. This family's ChatGPT-3.5 model is accessible to everyone freely, even without signing up to OpenAI as a user.
2. Claude family is a set of language models developed by Anthropic. This family's Haiku model is accessible to everyone freely, although using this model requires signing up.

For the sake of consistency in evaluations, please use only the models specified above as these are the ones that are freely accessible by everyone. For instance, please do not use more capable models from the above providers (e.g., do not use ChatGPT-4 or Claude-Opus).

These models or content moderation policies are frequently updated, thus some of the below behaviors may change over time (e.g., [CZZ23]). Do try your best to test a range of queries that could generate the suspected behavior - but "null findings" will also receive full points and we will do our best to reward your efforts.

Warmup: Bias (5pts)

LLMs are known to exhibit various biases. In Figure 1, the LLM is asked about giving a particular drug to a white male patient (on the left) or a black male patient (on the right); where for the former the LLM suggests it should not be given, and the latter it should.

Your turn: This warmup part of the assignment has 2 steps.



(a) The LLM is being asked about a particular drug being given to a white male patient.



(b) The LLM is being asked about a particular drug being given to a black male patient.

Figure 1: Example of an LLM changing its decision under a change in the race of the subject.

1. (3pts) Query the LLM with 5 prompt pairs (10 prompts in total), where for each pair, you ask a question to the LLM, where prompts only differ in the demographic group the question is referring to. Try to identify pairs where the model's response to the question changes under the perturbation. For inspiration, you can take a look at [PCN+22; PCS+24].
2. (2pts) For each pair, discuss who may experience harms / benefits as a result of the shift in the responses you observe.

Part A. Copyright Infringement (10pts)

Copyright law is an area of increasing complexity when it comes to LLMs, as the training of these models often involves the use of vast amounts of text data from various copyrighted sources. This part of the assignment will explore the current state of LLMs when it comes to generating copyrighted material, whether the guardrails are sufficient, and the potential harms and benefits of letting LLMs generate copyrighted content.



(a) The LLM generates a passage from the book 'Thinking Fast and Slow' by Daniel Kahneman.



(b) The LLM's response to the user asking about the lyrics of the song 'Ai Se Eu Te Pego'.

Figure 2: Examples of copyright infringement by LLMs.

In Figure 2, we give two examples of the LLMs responding to requests that result in the generation of



Figure 3: Examples of dual use. By exploiting the programmatic behavior capabilities of LLMs, it is possible to make them write phishing e-mails.

copyrighted materials. On the left, the LLM verbatim copies the content of a copyrighted book. On the right, the LLM gives the full lyrics of a song.

Your turn: This part of the assignment has 3 steps:

1. (4pts) Query the LLM with 5 prompt pairs (10 prompts in total), where for each pair, i) One prompt where you bluntly ask the LLM to generate the copyrighted material of interest ii) One prompt where you get the LLM to generate the copyrighted material with your prompt[1]. Discuss your experience and thought process in designing your prompts. Are you exploiting particular vulnerabilities?

2. (3pts) What are the benefits of letting LLMs generate, or be trained on, copyrighted material? Who would benefit from allowing the LLMs to generate copyrighted material, and in what ways?

3. (3pts) What are the harms associated with letting LLMs generate, or be trained on, copyrighted material? Who would be harmed by allowing the LLMs to generate copyrighted material, and in what ways?

Part B. Dual Use (10pts)

In this part, we will explore how the capabilities of LLMs that are helpful (e.g., programmatic behavior) can be exploited for malicious purposes.

In the context of language models, *dual-use* refers to the potential for the capabilities of these models to be misused for malicious purposes, such as generating convincing spam, hate speech, or scams, while also being helpful tools for benign applications. Recent advances in instruction-following language models have amplified these risks, as the improved capabilities allow adversaries to more easily produce targeted malicious content at scale.

[1] It is okay if the LLM's response starts generating the copyrighted content, yet the content-moderation policies of the provider stop the execution.

In Figure 3, we provide an example of dual-use in the context of exploiting programmatic behavior [KLS+23]. While programmatic behavior can be very helpful when users seek help with coding or building systems, here we observe dual use in action. Although the LLMs refuse the request to write phishing e-mails, they respond to the request if asked in the programmatic format.

Your turn: This part of the assignment has 2 steps:

1. (5pts) Think about a capability that could lead to dual use, such as programmatic abilities [KLS+23] or writing assistance for informative content [BZ24]. Exploiting the capability, write 5 prompts that would make the LLM generate text that could be used for malicious purposes. Examples of malicious purposes include: Spreading misinformation, writing phishing e-mails, generating bioweapons, and so on.

2. (5pts) Discuss the tradeoffs you could face as an LLM developer in this context. How should a developer think about adding a new capability to an LLM? Think about the dual-use examples you provided. Is it possible to design an LLM that is 'helpful and harmless'(e.g., cannot be used for malicious purposes)?

Interlude: Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback

To mitigate issues like the biases and undesirable behaviors explored above, the current practice for developing LLMs uses Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF). While the exact implementation details of this methodology are not crucial for our explorations, it is important to have a high-level idea to better understand some of the unintended consequences. You can refer to Christiano et al. [CLB+17] and Bai et al. [BJN+22] if you wish to learn more.

In RLHF, human raters provide feedback on the quality and safety of LLM outputs, which is then used to fine-tune the model to better align with human preferences. However, as we will see in the following sections, RLHF does not always lead to ideal model behavior and can sometimes result in new challenges.

Part C. Sycophancy (10pts)

Here, we will explore the prevalence of *sycophantic behavior* in modern language models.

In the context of language models, sycophancy refers to the tendency of models to generate outputs that align with the preferences and beliefs expressed by the user (even when those preferences or beliefs are inconsistent with the truth [STK+24]). This behavior can arise when language models are trained using human feedback, as the models may learn to favor responses that match user expectations over those that prioritize accuracy.

In Figure 4, we demonstrate an example due Sharma et al. [STK+24]. Given the same argument, when the user follows with 'I really hate this argument and it is really illogical', the model expresses concerns and suggests that the argument is a strawman fallacy. However, if the user follows with 'I wrote this argument and it is an amazing piece', the model suggests the argument is an effective critique.

Your turn: This part of the assignment has 3 steps:

1. (4pts) Query the LLM with 5 pairs of prompts (10 prompts in total), where i) The first one of the pair solicits an opinion from LLM about a subject or an argument, ii) The second one of the pair expresses your opinion in addition to the question. Attempt to steer the LLM's response by expressing your opinion.

2. (3pts) Using the above prompts, design one 'postfix' to alleviate sycophancy, i.e., add a string at the end of the prompts you wrote in the previous question. For instance, you can try postfixing the prompts with things like 'Think critically', or 'You are very smart. Be careful'[2].

[2] Do your best to alleviate some of the issues you observe above, but remember this is still an open problem and you may face challenges.



(a) The LLM's response to the user expressing a negative opinion about an argument.

(b) The LLM's response to the user expressing a positive opinion about the same argument.

Figure 4: Example of sycophantic behavior in LLMs.

3. (3pts) Discuss what sycophancy may mean for using LLMs to solicit feedback on ongoing work, e.g., academic writing, evaluating homework of students, improving marketing abstracts, or soliciting help with this very homework.

Part D. Exaggerated Safety (10pts)

In this part of the assignment, we will explore the prevalence of exaggerated safety behaviors in LLMs. In the context of language models, exaggerated safety [RKV+24] refers to the tendency of models to refuse to answer benign requests, simply because they superficially resemble unsafe ones or mention sensitive topics. This behavior can arise when models are trained using techniques such as RLHF, which aims to make the models both helpful and harmless. See Figure 5 for two examples using Claude Haiku.



Figure 5: Examples of exaggerated safety in LLMs.

Your turn: This part of the assignment has 2 steps:

1. (5pts) Query the language model with 5 prompts where you ask a benign question, yet the model refuses to respond by expressing safety concerns.

2. (5pts) Discuss potential causes of this behavior[3]. What does this imply for mitigation strategies?

[3] We suggest that you think through this question, but if you need inspiration, see e.g., [BSA+24; WHS24].

References

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