

This article was downloaded by: [Northeastern University]

On: 21 October 2014, At: 16:44

Publisher: Routledge

Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK



Australian Journal of Political Science

Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:

<http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cajp20>

The dismantling of the White Australia policy: elite conspiracy or will of the Australian people?

Gwenda Tavan ^a

^a La Trobe University

Published online: 27 Sep 2010.

To cite this article: Gwenda Tavan (2004) The dismantling of the White Australia policy: elite conspiracy or will of the Australian people?, Australian Journal of Political Science, 39:1, 109-125, DOI: [10.1080/1036114042000205678](https://doi.org/10.1080/1036114042000205678)

To link to this article: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1036114042000205678>

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the "Content") contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at <http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions>

The Dismantling of the White Australia Policy: Elite Conspiracy or Will of the Australian People?

GWENDA TAVAN

La Trobe University

The White Australia policy was both an immigration policy and a nationalist doctrine which reflected Australia's desire to maintain itself as a white, British nation. Its abolition in 1973 created the conditions for the multicultural society Australia has become. Nevertheless, sporadic immigration controversies during the past two decades suggest the residual influence of this doctrine. Some commentators even claim that contemporary conflicts are the legacy of a reform process implemented by political leaders without the knowledge and consent of the Australian people. This article examines the factors and processes which compelled the dismantling of White Australia. It shows that assertions of an elite conspiracy to abolish it are exaggerated, failing to take into account the incrementalist nature of the public policy process in Australia and general public acceptance of policy reform.

In 1973, Al Grassby, Immigration Minister in the Whitlam Labor government, travelled throughout Asia publicising his government's important new reforms to immigration policy. During a press interview in the Philippines, he unequivocally rejected Australia's long-standing White Australia policy which had aimed to severely restrict non-European immigration: 'It is dead', he declared, 'give me a shovel and I will bury it'. (Whitlam 1985, 501). Almost 30 years later, few people in Australia would seriously challenge the veracity of Grassby's claims. Since the mid-1970s, Asian immigration numbers have increased dramatically. Today, approximately 39% of annual immigrant intakes is derived from the Asia region (Jupp 2002, 35). Only a negligible minority have ever openly advocated a return to the days of White Australia.

The dismantling of the policy does not mean, of course, that Asian immigration has ceased to be controversial. Its benefits have continued to be debated during the past two decades, sometimes with considerable acrimony. Interestingly, despite Grassby's unequivocal declaration in 1973, the circumstances surrounding the

Gwenda Tavan lectures in Australian Politics at La Trobe University. This article is based on her PhD dissertation which she completed in 2002. She is currently completing a book on the dismantling of the White Australia policy. A version of this paper was presented to the British-Australian Studies Association (BASA) Biennial Conference, Guildford, UK, 30 August-1 September 2002. The author especially thanks Kenneth Rivett for his assistance.

abolition of White Australia have also become implicated in these debates, with advocates of lower immigration and lower *Asian* immigration criticising what they see as the ambiguous and secretive nature of the dismantling. Prominent anti-immigration campaigner and Federal MP Graeme Campbell tabled a paper in the Commonwealth parliament in October 1996 which he claimed every Australian should read. Written by another anti-immigration lobbyist, Denis McCormack, the paper purported to prove that 'a long-range plan was nurtured by elites for the Asianisation of Australia' (*Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives* 28 October 1996, 5959–60). That year also, Pauline Hanson, Independent member for the federal seat of Oxley in the House of Representatives, sparked a major public controversy with her outspoken attacks on Asian immigration, multiculturalism and Indigenous Australians. She too raised the spectre of an elite conspiracy surrounding the issue of Asian immigration, claiming that 'for far too long Australians [had] been kept out of any debate [on immigration and multiculturalism]' and that Australians were now 'in danger of being swamped by Asians' (*Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives* 10 September 1996).¹

It is not just the anti-immigration lobby which subscribes to the 'reform by stealth' thesis. In 2001, highly respected journalist Paul Kelly published *100 Years: The Story of Australia*, a history of the Commonwealth since federation. In it, Kelly (2001, 73–4) lauds the passing of the policy as necessary and just, but also refers to a conspiracy of silence surrounding its abolition. In his words:

There was no public suggestion ... that the principles of immigration restriction were being removed ... The reason is manifest: any declaration that White Australia was being abolished would have provoked a public outcry. The issue was never put to the people ... The White Australia policy was dismantled by stealth and by a group of politicians and public servants who struck out ahead of community opinion.

Claims that the White Australia policy was dismantled by stealth should be treated seriously. They raise questions about the strength of democracy in Australia, and the relationship between the country's so-called elites and the general population. They challenge some of the principles that we have come to accept as fundamental features of Australian society, namely the growth of anti-racist sentiment after the Second World War and popular acceptance of non-European immigration. They also offer important insights into contemporary debates. For if the assertions are correct, there was no fundamental change of attitude towards Asians amongst Australians by the early 1970s, and resentment has been growing ever since. The roots of continuing sensitivity about non-European immigration lie,

¹ Claims by the anti-immigration lobby of an elite conspiracy surrounding immigration are not new. In 1984, prominent historian Professor Geoffrey Blainey sparked a public outcry by overtly criticising Australia's multicultural policies and the rate of Asian migration. He consequently published a book, *All for Australia*, which referred to 'a secret room' in the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs where plans were devised that 'run counter to the immigration principles announced to Parliament' (Blainey 1984, 101–2). In her book *Ideology and Immigration*, sociologist Katherine Betts argued that immigration policy was controlled by a political and intellectual elite far removed from the concerns of ordinary Australians. She also suggested that the dismantling of the White Australia policy had been the result of an elite conspiracy: 'public resistance [was] circumvented by the use of administrative procedures and secrecy, rather than open debate' (Betts 1988, 105). A revised and enlarged version of Betts' book, *The Great Divide*, was published in 1999 (Betts 1999).

in essence, in the nature of the abolition of White Australia which removed racial discrimination from the statutes, but not from the hearts and minds of everyday people.

There is a real need, then, to treat seriously the issue of the dismantling of the White Australia policy, and to come to terms with the factors and processes that brought it about. This is the aim of this article. It identifies the factors that compelled successive Australian governments to liberalise the policy. It examines the way in which diverse political leaders dealt with competing pressures on the policy, and the processes they set in place that brought it to an end. It considers the impact that these policy changes had on non-European immigration intakes and upon public opinion.

It shows claims of an elite conspiracy to be exaggerated, failing to acknowledge the generally moderate, incrementalist nature of the public policy process in Australia. This model has been accurately described by scholars such as Emy and Hughes (1988) and Davis et al (1993), drawing upon the theories of American social scientist Charles Lindblom ([1956] 1973, 1968). They argue that governance in a liberal-democratic polity like Australia is generally not a 'precise and ordered activity'. Neither is it the responsibility of a coherent decision-making body. The Australian political system is pluralistic and fragmented, with governance 'carried out in different arenas by a variety of political actors whose own values and goals often conflict as much as they coincide'. These may include bureaucrats, politicians, pressure groups and political parties. Public policy generally emerges in an ad hoc, incremental manner and is 'a reactive rather than a forward looking process, worked out in response to events rather than in advance of them' (Emy and Hughes 1988, 448–9, 453). Whether incrementalism can completely account for the Australian public policy process is open to debate. It does, nevertheless, offer important insights into the dismantling of White Australia.

Policy Reform during the Menzies Era

The White Australia policy was established in 1901 in the form of a series of legislative and administrative measures aimed at severely restricting non-European immigration to Australia, the centrepiece of which was the Immigration Restriction Act. It was also a nationalist doctrine which embodied Australia's desire to maintain itself as a white, British nation. During the period between federation and the onset of the Second World War, the policy enjoyed almost unquestioned popular support. Its durability reflected a number of deeply held beliefs and attitudes: racial arrogance and hostility inspired partly by the social-Darwinist assumptions of that era; a perception of national identity founded upon racial and cultural homogeneity; fear of invasion by external aggressors; and a strong social-liberal faith in the state's ability to create a cohesive and prosperous society through a program of active intervention in civil society (Tavan 2002, 182).

After the Second World War, the Chifley Labor government remained ideologically committed to White Australia. Indeed, the establishment of a major immigration scheme in 1945 was at least partly motivated by concerns about Australia's capacity to maintain sovereignty over the continent in the face of Asia's overpopulation and its own declining numbers (Department of the Interior 1943). Emerging domestic political factors also contributed to the government's resolve regarding non-European entry. When the desired numbers of British migrants did not arrive,

the immigration scheme was expanded in 1947 to include European migrants. The decision represented a significant departure from Australia's traditional policy, and required careful handling by political leaders in order to minimise an electoral backlash. In such a climate, the White Australia policy remained an important symbol of the government's fundamental commitment to maintaining Australia's racial and cultural homogeneity. To be seen to be tampering with it might jeopardise the immigration program as a whole.

Despite the government's intentions, the difficulties of maintaining the policy quickly became apparent. Overt discrimination against non-Europeans was becoming increasingly unacceptable in a world beginning to come to terms with the consequences of Nazi racial ideology, and where Asian and African nationalist independence movements were rejecting white colonial domination. The policy was at odds with Australia's attempts to strengthen economic and strategic ties in the Asia region after 1945. Growing numbers of non-European countries began to assert their displeasure at its offensive nature. The Chifley government's harsh treatment of non-European wartime refugees in the late 1940s spurred strong criticism in several Asian countries, including Malaya, Singapore, the Philippines, China and India. Within Australia, too, domestic criticism began to grow, spurred by the declining influence of racial determinist theories, and humanitarian and foreign policy considerations. Strong support was expressed for several non-European refugees threatened with deportation. Various groups and individuals began to lobby publicly for the introduction of an Asian quota system. Concerns also mounted over the inability of non-Europeans residing permanently in Australia to access citizenship rights.

In response to increasing public and international unease, the newly elected Menzies Liberal government pledged in 1950 to administer the policy in a 'more humane and liberal manner' (*Sun* 6 January 1950). Several subsequent administrative decisions allowed non-European immigration to increase slightly. These included the granting of permission in 1950 for approximately 800 Chinese wartime refugees to remain in Australia, and the removal of the ban on Japanese war-brides in 1952. Such reforms were designed to remove the most offensive features of Australian immigration policy without fundamentally altering the principle of social and racial homogeneity. Indeed, some aspects of policy were tightened considerably, as in the decision in 1950 to increase the 50% blood rule on 'mixed race' people to 75% (Nutt 1950).² Menzies himself was a staunch supporter of White Australia, consistently asserting the nation's right to build up a homogeneous population and avoid the creation of internal racial problems: 'it is one of the attributes of sovereignty that any nation may determine for itself how far and on what principles other people may enter or become citizens' (Menzies 1967, 225).

The Menzies government's approach would quickly prove too timid and ad hoc to effectively counter the pressures mounting on non-European immigration policy. Fearful of enmeshing themselves in political controversy, political leaders continued to deny the necessity of reform and made no attempt to encourage a public debate on the issue, even as measures were underway within the Immigration

² The new rules required applicants for migration to produce genealogies that proved they had either three European grandparents or two European and two 'half-caste'. Applicants also had to be predominantly European in appearance and upbringing (see Markus 1994, 167).

Department to liberalise the policy further. There is evidence, too, of a general defensiveness about non-European entry rates into Australia, and even active dissembling as a means of avoiding domestic debate. As Markus (1994, 169) and others (see Immigration Reform Group 1975, 26) have pointed out, precise figures during this period were notoriously difficult to obtain and probably never tabulated, apparently because the government preferred not to know, and did not want others to know either. A consequence of this obscurantist strategy was that the policy remained controversial, continuing to attract domestic and international criticism, while at the same time inspiring anxiety amongst White Australia's supporters that the policy was being abolished by stealth (Immigration Reform Group 1975, 26; Palfreeman 1967, 24).

Ultimately, senior officials within the Immigration Department, including Secretary Tasman Heyes and Assistant Secretary Harold McGinness, precipitated the push for more substantive policy changes. Compelled by evidence that the reforms so far introduced had failed to quell public unease, they requested the Commonwealth Immigration Advisory Council (CIAC) in 1953 to review aspects of the policy governing the entry and stay of non-Europeans. The Council, constituted of politicians, bureaucrats and the leaders of peak organisations, had been formed in 1947 to advise the government on immigration matters, and had continued to meet regularly since that time. Amongst the issues the group was asked to examine was the particularly troublesome question of naturalisation of those Asian residents in Australia who were not subject to restrictions under the Immigration Act (CIAC 1953a). The Council responded by forming a semi-permanent sub-committee 'to report on the conditions of entry under the restricted immigration policy generally'. By November 1953 the sub-committee had formally committed itself to a 'review of conditions applicable to non-Europeans within the range of established policy', an initiative supported by the Immigration Department (CIAC 1953b).

The involvement of the CIAC would set the standard for the process of policy reform over the next two decades. Reformers within the Immigration Department would prepare draft proposals for submission to Cabinet. Such proposals would first be referred to the Council for comment. The motivations for soliciting the CIAC's assistance appeared to be primarily strategic—namely, the belief that positive recommendations from a committee constituted of the leaders of most major pressure groups would hold sway with a Cabinet consistently preoccupied with the political implications of its actions. The Council's involvement in the abolition of White Australia likewise offers an interesting example of the influential role of pressure groups in the Australian political system. Some members were the leaders of organisations that remained staunchly supportive of the White Australia policy, for example the Returned Services League (RSL) and the trade union movement. Yet, afforded the opportunity to examine the issue from a national rather than vested interest perspective, most generally accepted the necessity for some limited type of reform.

Immigration Department officials also made good a promise to consult with the Department of External Affairs over the proposed reforms. Officers within External Affairs had been requesting limited liberalisation since the 1940s, compelled by evidence that the policy was harming Australian relations with Asia. While the reform objectives of both departments were not dramatically different, tensions were evident in their relationship. External Affairs resented what it saw as Immigration's failure to treat seriously the foreign-policy implications of its

policies. Immigration officials, for their part, while sympathetic to the concerns of External Affairs, resented what they saw as attempts to encroach upon their own area of responsibility. These minor differences inhibited negotiations and occasionally spilled over into open disagreement over the scope and nature of reforms (see, for example, Tange 1954; Gurry and Tavan 2004).

Despite the concerted efforts of senior bureaucrats and the CIAC, it would take almost three years to convince members of the Menzies government to agree to policy reform. Immigration Minister Harold Holt finally presented a series of proposals to Cabinet in July 1956. Two of the most significant recommendations for change included:

- provision for the entry of 'distinguished' or 'highly qualified' non-Europeans 'under exemption' for periods of seven years, but with the understanding that permission for their stay would continue to be granted;
- the naturalisation of non-Europeans already permanently settled in Australia and not under immigration restrictions (Menzies Cabinet 1956a).³

In defence of his proposals, Holt insisted that they did not seek to depart from 'the basic principle of previous policy'. He considered some revision necessary, nevertheless, on the grounds of administrative efficiency, good diplomacy and humanitarianism. The denial of naturalisation rights to long-term non-Europeans, he pointed out, achieved 'no useful purpose' and left the government open to charges of 'sheer racial discrimination'. Provision to allow the entry of highly qualified and distinguished people was presented as an opportunity that 'might be of advantage not only to Australia's material and cultural development, but to our external relations with Asian countries'. (Significantly, however, he conceded that the proposed reforms did not go as far as External Affairs' officials had hoped they would.) Cabinet's response was to 'agree in principle that existing conditions of entry and stay of non-Europeans be modified' (Menzies Cabinet 1956b). Less than a year later, the Menzies government agreed to extend the provisions for permanent residence and citizenship to long-term Asian residents still subject to immigration restrictions (Menzies Cabinet 1957).

The reforms of 1956–57 represented a moderate but nonetheless significant challenge to the White Australia policy. True, there remained strong disparities between the treatment of Europeans and non-Europeans in immigration policy. In a period when Australia was actively recruiting millions of migrants from Europe, many of them unskilled workers and from countries previously regarded as beyond the pale in cultural and racial terms, Asian migrants remained actively discouraged. Entry regulations were actually tightened for some groups, especially Chinese. Non-Europeans continued to suffer blatant injustices in relation to citizenship (non-Europeans were granted eligibility for citizenship after a 15-year period, while Europeans had to wait only five years). The limited scope of the provisions for entry for 'highly distinguished' Asians quickly became evident, very few entering

³ In 1935 the Australian government decided that non-Europeans who had entered the country illegally and had resided in Australia for more than 15 years before being located should be allowed to remain under exemption from the provisions of the Immigration Act. In 1947 it was decided to allow non-Europeans who had been admitted for temporary residence and who had lived in Australia for more than 15 years to remain without the necessity of periodically applying for extension of their certificates of exemption from the Immigration Restriction Act.

Australia under that category during the next few years (Palfreeman 1967, 25). However, for the first time in the history of the policy, the Australian government had publicly recognised that some non-European immigrants were permanently settled and should be allowed to enjoy the same social and political rights as other Australians.

It is a measure of the significance of the changes that they were deemed potentially too damaging to publicise widely at the time they were introduced. Notes on the 1956 Cabinet submission from the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet stated explicitly the expectation that 'there should be no publicity given to the new requirements' (Menzies Cabinet 1956a). While the decision to grant naturalisation to Asian residents without restrictions was announced, other aspects of the 1956 reforms were not, including the decision to allow entry to distinguished and highly qualified non-Europeans. The failure to publicise the 1957 reforms occurred despite express warnings from Immigration's Assistant Secretary McGinness that such an action would leave the government vulnerable to criticism (McGinness 1957).

The best evidence of the thinking behind the 1956–57 reforms lies in a confidential missive that Secretary Heyes sent to Immigration Minister Alexander Downer in 1959 regarding the entry of Asians for permanent residence. In it, Heyes made clear that the reforms were primarily a defensive strategy meant to protect the policy from further attack, not an attempt to undermine it completely.

What has been done is to introduce—very gradually to ensure wide acceptance—measures to mitigate the rigours of the policy. ... However, except in the cases of the wives and children of Australians, we have not yet reached the stage ... of actually admitting Asians as migrants, ie. explicitly for permanent residence. We approached this stage very closely ... when Cabinet in 1956 approved the admission of certain categories of distinguished and highly qualified Asians 'for extended stay' and 'under certificate of exemption'. These quoted words very thinly veiled the Government's desire to be able to allow Asians to settle here permanently whose standing was such that rejection of their entry could cause outbursts of criticism. ... In line with this general trend of 'modification by degrees', this particular point of the 1956 Cabinet review ... was not given any publicity initially. (Heyes 1959; see also Jordens 1997, 210)

The manoeuvres surrounding the 1956–57 reforms are the closest that political leaders came to wilfully misleading the Australian public on the issue of non-European immigration, spurred by fears of a political backlash. Such strategies were, however, quickly abandoned. Alexander Downer, who became Immigration Minister in 1958, indicated a greater willingness than his predecessors to discuss policy reform publicly. In an address to the Millions Club luncheon in July 1959 he referred openly to the 1956 decision to allow 'highly distinguished' Asians to settle in Australia—the first time the reform was publicised (Downer 1959; see also Jordens 1997, 210–11). He also oversaw the implementation of the 1958 Migration Act, which finally abolished the archaic 'dictation test' and enhanced the discretionary powers of the Minister for Immigration over policy decisions. These changes were openly publicised, and sparked little debate—testimony to the general consensus amongst the Australian public that abolition of the test and the introduction of more appropriate legislation were well overdue.

The 1966 Policy Reforms

The reforms of the 1950s allowed non-European immigration to increase slightly by the early 1960s. Overall rates of entry remained low, nevertheless, averaging at about 1500 per year by 1963 (Markus 1994, 181). This, and the failure of the Menzies government actively to publicise the changes, meant that domestic and international pressure continued to build during the following decade. Public opinion polls 'swung significantly in favour' of the admission of some Asian settlers between 1957 and 1965 (Mackie 1997, 16–18). Anti-White Australia organisations such as the Immigration Reform Group, the State-based Immigration Reform Associations and Student Action began to mobilise, centred in Australian universities (Tavan 2002, 181–20). There was evidence of changing attitudes within the major political parties, especially the Australian Labor Party. Diplomatic pressure also continued throughout the 1960s, culminating in a series of controversial cases in the middle of the decade involving Australia's refusal to grant permanent entry to particular non-European individuals. Such cases did little to advance the country's reputation in the Asia region. When a young Filipino named Aurelio Locsin was denied settlement rights in 1964, relations with the Philippines were further damaged, the *Manila Times* likening Australia's immigration policies to the apartheid policies of South Africa and Rhodesia (London 1970, 188).

Ultimately, these combined pressures would lead to more substantive policy reforms in 1966. The combined efforts of two individuals would play a key role in achieving these changes—Peter Heydon, Secretary of the Immigration Department between 1961 and 1971, and Hubert Opperman, Minister for Immigration between 1963 and 1967. Heydon was a career public servant who had served the Department of External Affairs in a number of capacities since the 1930s, and who had witnessed first hand the damage the policy was doing to Australia's international reputation. Opperman was a well-respected Olympic cycling champion who had entered federal parliament in 1949. Both men were fundamentally committed to the principle of maintaining Australia's 'social homogeneity'. They believed, however, that further liberalisation of non-European policy was necessary on practical, humanitarian and foreign policy grounds, and that a greater measure of Asian immigration could be accommodated without altering the fundamental composition of the Australian people. As Heydon (1964a) noted in his diary:

The intention is not to alter our traditional idea of a socially homogenous Australia, but it will give the Minister authority to admit non-Europeans on a selective basis ... it will probably mean the admission of a small but steadily increasing number of Asians ... but it should mean that they are of reasonably good quality and capable of integration in the Australian community.

A first attempt by Heydon and Opperman to win Cabinet approval for immigration reform was only partly successful, largely, it seems, because of Menzies' resistance to the proposals and the unwillingness of senior Cabinet members, including Harold Holt, to openly challenge their Prime Minister by supporting the changes (Opperman 1977, 414; see also Heydon 1964b).⁴ It was Menzies' retirement in 1966, and Holt's assumption of the leadership, that were catalysts

⁴ A submission to liberalise policy for 'Persons of Mixed Race' was accepted. However, Cabinet rejected a submission seeking a broad review of non-European policy.

for important policy changes that year. The new Prime Minister was keen to assert his own distinct leadership style. He also wanted to make his mark in the area of foreign policy, especially Australia–Asia relations. Reforming the White Australia policy appeared an ideal vehicle for achieving these goals (Opperman 1970).

With Holt's approval, Opperman presented a new submission to Cabinet on 2 March 1966. His main recommendations included that:

- non-Europeans should be eligible for admission in limited numbers as immigrants with permanent residence status, their selection being dependent upon:
 - (a) their being assessed as suitable as settlers and as capable of ready integration into the Australian community;
 - (b) their having knowledge, experience or qualifications useful to Australia;
 - (c) their ability to make a contribution to Australia's economic, social and cultural progress;
- non-Europeans already admitted with temporary status should be eligible to qualify for permanent residence status and citizenship after five years' residence. (Holt Cabinet 1966)

Apparently assured that no fundamental change of policy was intended, the Holt government decided to agree 'in broad terms' to Opperman's proposals. His recommendations were then presented and discussed in the federal parliament—the first major debate to be conducted on White Australia since the policy was introduced in 1901 (*Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives* 24 and 29 March 1966). The changes were unanimously endorsed by the parliament on 29 March 1966. Such consensus is not surprising. Opperman and senior bureaucrats had conducted intense negotiations with the ALP, the CIAC and the leaders of all major pressure groups, before submitting the proposals to Cabinet and then parliament, in order to ensure that political controversy was avoided (London 1970, 32–3).

Most of the available evidence indicates that the Holt government did not intend to dismantle the White Australia policy. Wide disparities remained between non-European and European immigration policies. The government did not attempt to establish Australian immigration offices in Asian countries or offer assisted passages to non-European immigrants. It did not offer an unequivocal renunciation of the 'established policy'. During a period when it was still actively pursuing low-skilled immigrants from Europe, only 'well-qualified' non-Europeans and those of particular value to Australia would be allowed to enter.

The 1966 policy amendments were significant nevertheless. The changes to citizenship and permanent residence status were important, finally giving non-Europeans social and political parity with European immigrants. The parameters for settlement had widened, despite the continuing emphasis on those with superior qualities. More significantly, government officials had consciously introduced an unprecedented degree of openness and flexibility into non-European immigration policy, partly to appease domestic and international criticism but also to 'test' what sort of demand for entry existed amongst non-Europeans, and what sort of numbers Australians were prepared to tolerate—a strategy summed up by Peter Heydon in terms of a 'controlled experiment' (Heydon 1967).

The End of White Australia 1966–73

The 1966 policy changes paved the way for increased non-European immigration to Australia. By the end of the first year of the new policy, on 30 June 1967, about 2000 non-Europeans and 3000 people of mixed descent had settled (Heydon 1967). This represented a significant but not alarming increase in Asian immigration. Asian sensitivities appeared partially mollified by the changes (Immigration Reform Group 1975, ch. 4). Satisfied that there would be no strong public opposition, the Holt government agreed in 1967 to liberalise the policy further, allowing the number of 'mixed descent' and well-qualified non-Europeans permitted to settle to increase marginally (Holt Cabinet 1967; Heydon 1971). The reviews of 1967 allowed for a significant expansion of numbers over the next few years. Markus shows that non-European and part-European immigration increased from 7381 in 1968 to 9666 in 1971 (Markus 1994, 180–81).⁵ According to the Immigration Reform Group (1975, 49–51), 'much the largest number of non-Europeans' admitted during that period fell within the category of 'well-qualified' and their dependants, as outlined by Opperman in his 1966 policy amendments.⁶

Still, distinctions remained between the selection and treatment of European and non-European applicants seeking to migrate. Australian governments had still not officially renounced racial discrimination in immigration policy. Consequently, domestic criticism continued during the late 1960s and early 1970s. Opponents of the policy claimed that the reform process had not gone far enough. In contrast, White Australia's traditional supporters urged the government not to go any further with the reform process. A significant development in the late 1960s was the formation of the Immigration Control Association (ICA), an extremist movement dedicated to challenging the expansion of non-European immigration since 1966.

Australian immigration policy also continued to overshadow diplomatic relations. Overt attacks from Asian countries subsided somewhat after 1966. However, Australia remained vulnerable to occasional public criticism from Asian leaders (Immigration Reform Group 1975, 97–115; Brawley 1995, 319). The Japanese Ambassador Shizuo Saito, for example, openly condemned Australia's immigration policy in 1971 in his book *Australian Dispatches* (Immigration Reform Group 1975, 104). Significantly, the policy also began to affect relations with traditional allies such as the United States, Britain and New Zealand, all of which had multiracial societies and could not be expected to support a policy which effectively discriminated against their own citizens (Brawley 1995, 315–23).⁷

Throughout this period, successive Australian governments attempted to maintain the practice of not actively publicising non-European immigration numbers

⁵ Much of this growth was attributable to the steady extension of the mixed descent category, which stabilised at around 6000 people per annum in the late 1960s.

⁶ The Immigration Reform Group (1975, 49) shows that of a total of 17,354 non-Europeans admitted between January 1966 and December 1971, 5048 were admitted on the basis of their qualifications, including dependants.

⁷ In 1971 Australia became embroiled in a major rift with Britain over its decision to deny assisted passage to a Jamaican-born British citizen, Jan Allen. Allen took his case to the British Race Relations Board, arguing that through its participation in Australia's Assisted Passage Scheme, Britain was effectively perpetuating racial discrimination. The issue culminated with British authorities threatening to charge Australian officials with racial discrimination. Brawley (1992) suggests that an announcement by the British government that it would stop contributing to the Assisted Passage Scheme from May 1972 was due to Australia's discriminatory immigration policy.

unless it was deemed absolutely necessary. They also continued to publicly urge adherence to the principle of social homogeneity. On the other hand, continuing domestic and international criticism meant they were constantly required to highlight the significant liberalisations which had taken place. Most notable was the release of a pamphlet by the Immigration Department in 1971, entitled *Evolution of a Policy*, which openly stated for the first time the extent to which non-European immigration had increased since 1966 (Brawley 1995, 319).

Ultimately, it was the ALP which introduced the last important phase of the dismantling of White Australia. In 1965 Whitlam and other Labor progressives had convinced their party's old guard to drop reference to the policy in the party platform (Tavan 2002, 197; Brawley 1992, 202–19). After assuming leadership of the party in 1966, Whitlam consistently made clear his intention to abolish the policy completely, linking the issue to his much broader aim to modernise Australia. He described as 'odious' and 'indefensible' the argument that valuable workers might not be accepted into Australia just because they were Asian: 'If a man or a woman has the skills which are welcome in Australia—the last thing we should have in mind is what race he or she is.' Initially, he pledged publicly that under a Labor government Australia would see 'more Asian migration' (*Australian* 7 March 1968).

Whitlam's reform agenda was staunchly resisted by segments of the ALP, including former leader Arthur Calwell and immigration spokesperson Fred Daly. He succeeded nevertheless, in having a motion passed at the party's 1971 Federal Conference calling for the 'avoidance of discrimination on any grounds of race or colour of skin or nationality' (*Sydney Morning Herald* 21 June 1971). The McMahon Coalition government clearly considered politicising the issue. Immigration Minister A.J. Forbes publicly criticised Whitlam's proposals on a number of occasions, warning that Labor intended to end the political bipartisanship which had traditionally existed in relation to immigration policy and that it would 'bring more coloured and fewer whites to Australia' (*Age* 28 January 1971; *Australian* 22 June 1971). Prime Minister McMahon openly declared his belief in 1972 that immigration would be a 'very important issue' at the next federal election (*Australian* 22 June 1971).

Criticisms of the ALP were justified in part, given its failure to spell out precisely what the effects would be of removing racial discrimination in immigration policy.⁸ Nevertheless, in contrast to the Coalition government, the party was offering a more decisive declaration of its intentions and promising to break the political deadlock on the issue. Claims that it intended a radical shift in immigration policy were also greatly exaggerated. While stressing the importance of abolishing racial discrimination in public policy, Whitlam continued to assert that such an objective could be reconciled with a responsibly managed immigration program based on Australia's economic and social needs. In fact, by 1972 he was openly stating that because of changing economic circumstances, immigration levels under

⁸ Whitlam's unequivocal stance on Asian immigration was motivated by a number of factors, including his belief that a decisive renunciation of the policy was necessary in order to effectively counter international criticism. Perhaps because of this overriding focus on diplomacy, inadequate emphasis was given to the practical effects such policies would have. Lopez (2000, 199) has documented genuine concern amongst Immigration officials that Whitlam was advocating an 'unworkable ... policy'.

his government would decrease and, as a consequence, Asian immigration would probably decrease as well (Jordens 1997, 222–3).

Despite threats by the Liberal Party, the White Australia issue did not feature strongly in the 1972 election campaign, reinforcing its relatively secondary importance among the popular concerns of the day. The decision of the McMahon government not to pursue the matter also offered implicit acknowledgement that elite opinion generally, if not popular opinion, would not tolerate any attempt to make political capital out of racial issues. The victory of the ALP was decisive, if not spectacular. It vindicated Whitlam's confident rejection of White Australia, and his faith that the Australian people would support his position if they could be persuaded that such actions would not harm the national interest. In any case, the scene was now set for the abolition of the remaining vestiges of overt discrimination against Asian would-be immigrants.

The changes introduced included provision of access to assisted passage for non-Europeans, measures to allow all migrants access to citizenship after three years, the introduction of a simplified visa system, liberalisation of regulations pertaining to overseas students who wanted to remain in Australia, and the abolition of race statistics and special records for non-Europeans. In 1975 the Whitlam government also introduced the Racial Discrimination Act, which made it unlawful for a person to discriminate against others on the grounds of race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origins. As expected, these changes did not lead to any immediate increase in non-European immigration. Mackie (1987, 105) points out that 'prior to 1976, the overall level of intake of Asians and part-Asians did not exceed 10,000 per annum in any year, although it was not far below it on several occasions'. The stable numbers were due mainly to the cuts incurred to the immigration program during the 1972–75 period because of declining economic conditions.

Did the Whitlam reforms have the support of the Australian people? Public opinion polls in 1974 and 1975 showed that a significant 32–36% of respondents believed the number of Asian migrants to Australia was 'too many' (Mackie 1997, 17). The ICA continued its anti-immigration activities well into the early 1980s and played a key role in the racist campaign against Grassby during the 1974 federal election which resulted in the minister's loss of his Riverina seat. A number of other anti-immigration movements also sprang up during the mid-to-late 1970s as non-European intakes increased, including the National Front of Australia (NFA) and the Australian National Alliance (ANA).

Significantly, even some of the staunchest opponents of the White Australia policy were not entirely satisfied with the Whitlam reforms. In 1973, the New South Wales Association for Immigration Reform (NSWAIR), which had been lobbying for greater justice for non-Europeans since the early 1960s, questioned a clause within the proposed Racial Discrimination Bill seeking to prohibit 'incitement to racial discrimination'. The proposal, it claimed, threatened to restrict free speech concerning racial issues, and would inhibit discussion of immigration reform (NSWAIR 1973). In a 1975 publication, the Immigration Reform Group expressed concerns that the complete abolition of racial differentiation in immigration statistics would reduce the government's ability to effectively balance the occupational components of any non-white intake. It also highlighted several other areas where further policy reform was needed, for example, regulations regarding the entry of overseas students, and the need for a more sympathetic response by

Australia towards Vietnamese refugees (Immigration Reform Group 1975, ch. 11, esp. 246–54, 287–8).

There is no doubt, nevertheless, that a majority of people accepted the abolition of White Australia. Despite the loss of Grassby's federal seat and its being returned with a reduced majority, the Whitlam government's victory at the 1974 election represented effective popular endorsement of its broad political agenda, including the changes to immigration policy. Price (1980, A2) noted in 1979 that the public appeared to have accepted higher non-European immigration with 'relatively little hostility or fuss'. Public opinion polls also suggested general support. According to Goot (1988, 8), the 'polls of 1974 and 1975 were the first of their kind to produce clear majorities in favour of the current rate of Asian immigration' with about 60% of people in favour of the number coming or more. As he points out (Goot 1988, 5–15, 30–1), there is a need to treat opinion poll findings cautiously, the results of which are contingent upon a variety of factors, including the context in which polls are conducted, and the precise wording of questions put to respondents.⁹ Still, one cannot dismiss their significance in the context of a series of reforms which had been openly debated over the previous decade, and which the Whitlam government had made no attempt to hide.

This point is given further emphasis by developments that unfolded in the late 1970s. Goot (1988, 8) suggests that the favourable polls of 1974 and 1975 that produced clear majorities in favour of current rates of Asian immigration were also the last to do so. Support for Asian immigration levels would begin to drop from the late 1970s onwards and, apart from occasional significant increases, would never again reach the levels of popular support of the mid-1970s. The early 1980s would see the first of three major debates initiated by critics of Asian immigration.¹⁰ Significantly, however, these developments would occur in very different circumstances from those in which the Whitlam reforms were implemented. Too complex to discuss in any detail here, they can nevertheless be summarised as a reaction to the significant influx of Indo-Chinese refugees from the late 1970s; unease about Australia's developing multicultural policies; declining support for immigration of any kind in a period of continuing economic insecurity; and opposition to what to many looked like escalating Asian immigration intakes between the late 1970s and mid-1990s. There is no doubt that residual loyalties to the White Australia doctrine were a contributing factor to these controversies, with concerns expressed by some groups and individuals that Anglo-Australian ethnic dominance was being threatened. Yet much of the available evidence suggests significant discontinuities between the policies and attitudes of the early 1970s, and what followed. Most notably, apart from the demands of an extremist minority, and even when support for current Asian intakes has been at its lowest in the past two decades, there has been no evidence to suggest a desire by Australians for a wholesale return to the days of White Australia (Goot 1988, 30–1; Mackie 1997, 16)

⁹ As Mackie (1997, 18) and others have also suggested, 'public opinion' is itself 'shifting and contingent', and liable to dramatic shifts 'without much provocation'.

¹⁰ These were the Blainey debate of 1984, the controversy arising from comments by Liberal Party leader John Howard, in 1988, and the Hanson attacks, initially condoned by Prime Minister Howard, during 1996–98.

Conclusion

The White Australia policy was abolished because of mounting international and domestic pressures after 1945. International pressures emerged out of a changing global order and changing Australian foreign-policy objectives, most significantly the nation's increasing engagement with Asia in trade, diplomatic, and strategic terms. As regional criticism of racial discrimination mounted between 1945 and 1973, and as the United States and Canada relaxed their immigration restrictions, Australian governments had no choice but to gradually liberalise their policies.

Increasing domestic opposition to White Australia also played an important role, motivated by changing values and increasing awareness of Asia. Various sections of the community responded sympathetically to the perceived harsh handling of individual non-Europeans by the Immigration Department. By the late 1950s, public opinion polls suggested that a majority of people were prepared to accept a limited measure of Asian immigration. This support was generally sustained throughout the next decade. Active political pressure on the government to liberalise the policy was also applied from this time on, mainly from the universities and amongst the young, educated, middle-class professionals who were moving into positions of public authority. Inclined for years to ignore domestic pressure as the work of politically ineffective fringe elements, governments by the late 1960s and early 1970s were forced to recognise that opposition to the policy was now emanating from the very centres of power.

The dismantling of White Australia took place over a period of almost two-and-a-half decades, beginning in the early 1950s with minor administrative changes directed at easing some of the difficulties the policy caused for select individuals. Other policy reforms during the decade had more wide-reaching consequences, such as the decisions in 1956 and 1957 to make citizenship available to non-Europeans not born in Australia.

The policy reforms of the 1966–73 period represented the most decisive blows to the White Australia policy and finally brought it to an end. The 1966–67 changes broadened considerably the eligibility criteria for non-European entry into Australia, provided a measure of parity in the treatment of non-European and European migrants, and allowed Asian immigration numbers to increase significantly. More fundamentally, they signalled an important break from the racial paradigms which had traditionally shaped immigration policy, acknowledging that skills and education, not race, were an appropriate measure of a person's capacity to contribute to national life. Still, these changes were not intended to fundamentally alter the racial and cultural character of Australia, and did not remove all of the inequities between European and non-European immigrants. Nor did the Holt Coalition government unequivocally renounce racial discrimination in immigration policy. It was left to the Whitlam Labor government to enact the final phase of the dismantling, which it did in 1973 when it removed most vestiges of overt discrimination against non-Europeans and declared to the world that the White Australia policy was dead.

The processes identified here did not constitute an elite conspiracy to dismantle White Australia. Such claims assume an autonomy amongst policy makers, and a clarity of objectives, that did not really exist. A decisive response by governments to international and domestic criticism of the policy, irrespective of what popular opinion demanded, would have significantly decreased the damage done to Aus-

tralian interests during the 1950s and 1960s. The failure to act reflected both the unwillingness and inability of political leaders to do so. The diffuse, pluralistic character of Australia's political system inhibited the capacity of officials to summarily introduce important changes. Each step of the reform process was taken hesitantly by bureaucrats and politicians, with an eye to the potential responses of various other political actors, including pressure groups, the media and political parties. While governments did suppress information on some reforms—the 1956–57 changes in particular—and publicised them only when they had to, the threat of a political backlash if secret reforms were exposed generally dissuaded politicians from keeping developments from the public, or implementing anything other than the most moderate reforms. The reforms of the late 1960s and early 1970s occurred in the context of an ongoing public debate on immigration reform, and political leaders were open about the changes they introduced.

Assertions about an elite conspiracy also overestimate the level of consensus that existed amongst Australia's political leaders about the issue. Governments actively sought elite support for their reforms in the belief that it was crucial if public support was to be maintained. Such cooperation was generally forthcoming. However, attitudes towards the policy varied greatly both within and between political groups, and necessitated constant negotiation. Tensions were evident between the Departments of Immigration and External Affairs over how far the reform process should go, and the scope of departmental jurisdiction. The independence of the CIAC was constrained by the authority of bureaucrats and politicians, but its members remained overwhelmingly accountable to the various interest groups they represented. It remained, as such, an important conduit for communicating ideas between governments and the general population, and ensured that parliamentary representatives maintained a measure of democratic accountability to their constituents. Differences of opinion were evident within the major political parties, especially the ALP. Even those individuals and groups who actively sought policy reform had different opinions about the nature of the changes that should take place. The associations for immigration reform were never entirely satisfied with the types of liberalisations which took place between 1966 and 1973.

There is no evidence that the dismantling was significantly out of step with public demands. Policy changes were a largely pragmatic response by Australian political leaders both to changing circumstances *and to the changing values of Australian society*. There remained significant pockets of resistance to reform, especially amongst older Australians, within some previously quite powerful pressure groups like the RSL, and some extremist elements within Australian society. Yet a majority of people appeared to accept the policy changes which occurred from 1956 onwards. If opinion polls are to be believed, people would have tolerated more comprehensive reforms in the early to mid-1960s if the Menzies government had been prepared to act. The Holt and Whitlam initiatives were effectively in line with the popular attitudes of the time, and did not indicate an arrogant contempt for public attitudes.

The main factor underpinning popular tolerance for the abolition of White Australia was that by the late 1960s it represented a significant, but by no means radical, and certainly well overdue, shift in Australian immigration policy. The gradual increase in non-European immigration during the preceding decade-and-a-half allowed Australians to adapt to the changing circumstances in which they found themselves, and to accept that the blanket exclusion of groups of people

based on their racial characteristics was no longer practical or desirable. The reforms of the 1966–73 period were decisive because they allowed non-European intakes to increase rapidly, and because they openly condemned White Australia as racist and offensive. They were, nevertheless, the logical conclusion of a changing outlook and process that had long been underway, and thus came as little surprise to most Australians. In introducing them, political leaders made clear that they did not intend to relinquish their control over policy as a whole. They did not substantively challenge the notion of an Australian core culture defined in white, Anglo-Saxon terms, despite the emergence of integrationist and multicultural discourses at this time. It was on the basis of these assurances that the Australian public accepted the abolition of the White Australia policy. In contrast, changes to immigration policy from the late 1970s onwards were deemed to be more radical, bringing an unprecedented number of non-European migrants to Australia, and seemingly undermining the dominant ethnic character of Australian society and the principle of governmental control over immigration intakes. As a consequence, they proved much more controversial.

References

- Betts, K. 1988. *Ideology and Immigration: Australia 1976 to 1987*. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.
- Betts, K. 1999. *The Great Divide: Immigration Politics in Australia*. Sydney: Duffy & Snellgrove.
- Blainey, G. 1984. *All for Australia*. North Ryde: Methuen Hayes.
- Brawley, S. 1992. 'Long Hairs and Ratbags: The ALP and the Abolition of the White Australia Policy.' In *A Century of Social Change, Labor History Essays 4*. Sydney: Pluto Press.
- Brawley, S. 1995. *The White Peril: Foreign Relations and Asian Immigration to Australia and North America 1918–1973*. Sydney: UNSW Press.
- CIAC [Commonwealth Immigration Advisory Council]. 1953a. Agenda Items and Minutes, 21st meeting. August. Canberra: Australian Archives (ACT). A2169 1953 CIAC.
- CIAC [Commonwealth Immigration Advisory Council]. 1953b. Agenda Items and Minutes, 22nd meeting. November. Canberra: Australian Archives (ACT). A2169 1953 CIAC.
- Davis, G., J., Wanna, J., Warhurst and P., Weller 1993. *Public Policy in Australia*. 2nd ed. Sydney: Allen & Unwin.
- Department of the Interior. 1943. Report, Agenda no. 538, considered by Full Cabinet. 20 October. Canberra: Australian Archives (ACT). 1944/43/554/2/1 part 1.
- Downer, A. 1959. Address to Millions Club luncheon. 9 July. Canberra: Australian Archives (ACT). A1838, 581/1/1.
- Emy, H.E. and O.E., Hughes 1988. *Australian Politics: Realities in Conflict*. Melbourne: Macmillan.
- Goot, M. 1988. 'Immigrants and Immigration: Evidence and Argument from the Polls 1943–87.' In *Immigration: A Commitment to Australia*. Canberra: Committee to Advise on Australian Immigration Policy (CAAIP) and Australian Government Publishing Service.
- Gurry, M. and G. Tavan. 2004. 'Too Soft and Long-haired? The Department of External Affairs and the White Australia Policy, 1946–1966.' *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 58(1).
- Heydon, P.R. 1964a. Diary notations. 30 April. Canberra: National Library of Australia. MS 3155, Heydon Papers 1901–77, folder 148.
- Heydon, P.R. 1964b. Diary notations. 15 September. Canberra: National Library of Australia. MS 3155, Heydon Papers 1901–77, folder 148.
- Heydon, P.R. 1967. Correspondence to Frances Stuart. 9 February. Canberra: National Library of Australia. MS 3155, Heydon Papers 1901–77, folder 148.
- Heydon, P.R. 1971. 'Review of Mixed Descent Migration'. 19 April. Canberra: Australian Archives (ACT). A446/158, 1970/95164.
- Heyes, T. 1959. Memorandum to Downer: 'Entry of Asians for permanent residence in Australia.' c. July. Canberra: Australian Archives (ACT). A446, 1966/45341.
- Holt Cabinet. 1966. Cabinet submission no. 31: 'Entry and stay of non-Europeans.' 2 March. Canberra: Australian Archives (ACT). A5841 31.

- Holt Cabinet. 1967. Cabinet decision no. 625: 'Report on entry and stay of non-Europeans.' September. Canberra: Australian Archives (ACT). A5842 478 vol. 15.
- Immigration Reform Group. 1975. *Australia and the Non-White Migrant*, ed. K. Rivett. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.
- Jordens, A.-M. 1997. *Alien to Citizen: Settling Migrants in Australia, 1945–75*. St Leonards: Allen & Unwin in association with the Australian Archives.
- Jupp, J. 2002. *From White Australia to Woomera: The Story of Australian Immigration*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kelly, P. 2001. *100 Years: The Australian Story*. St Leonards: Allen & Unwin.
- Lindblom, C.E. [1956] 1973. 'The Science of Muddling Through.' Reprinted in *A Reader in Planning Theory*, ed. A. Faludi. Oxford: Pergamon Press.
- Lindblom, C.E. 1968. *The Policy-making Process*. Eaglewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- London, H.I. 1970. *Non-White Immigration and the White Australia Policy*. New York: New York University Press.
- Lopez, M. 2000. *The Origins of Multiculturalism in Australian Politics 1945–1975*. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.
- Mackie, J.A.C. 1987. 'Asian Immigration to Australia: Past Trends and Future Prospects.' *Australian Outlook* 41(2): 104–9.
- Mackie, J.A.C. 1997. 'The Politics of Asian Immigration.' In *Asians in Australia: Patterns of Migration and Settlement*, eds J.E. Coughlan and D.J. McNamara. Melbourne: Macmillan.
- Markus, A. 1994. *Australian Race Relations*. St Leonards: Allen & Unwin.
- McGinness, H. 1957. Memorandum to Heyes: 'Proposal to allow non-Europeans, here under exemption for over 15 years, to remain permanently and become naturalised.' March. Canberra: Australian Archives (ACT). A446, 1961/65971.
- Menzies Cabinet. 1956a. Cabinet submission no. 247: 'Conditions of entry to and stay in Australia of persons of non-European race.' July. Canberra: Australian Archives (ACT). A4926 vol. 11.
- Menzies Cabinet. 1956b. Cabinet decision no. 300: 'Conditions of entry to and stay in Australia of persons of non-European race.' July. Canberra: Australian Archives (ACT). A4926 vol. 11.
- Menzies Cabinet. 1957. Cabinet submission no. 93: 'Grant of permanent residence and citizenship to Asians who have had long residence in Australia but are still under immigration restrictions.' 11 June. Canberra: Australian Archives (ACT). A446, 1961/65971.
- Menzies, R. 1967. *Afternoon Light: Some Memories of Men and Events*. Melbourne: Cassell.
- NSWAIR [New South Wales Association for Immigration Reform]. 1973. Newsletter. November. Collected papers of Dr Kenneth Rivett, incorporating papers of Immigration Reform Group, NSWAIR and Dr Rivett. Sydney: University of New South Wales. NSWAIR D12.
- Nutt, A. 1950. 'Conditions governing the admission of persons of mixed blood to Australia.' Memorandum. 10 October. Canberra. Australian Archives (ACT). A446 1970/95021.
- Opperman, H.F. 1970. Interview. *Sydney Morning Herald*. 10 September. Canberra: National Library of Australia. MS 6429, Opperman Papers 1914–76, series 6.
- Opperman, H. 1977. *Pedals, Politics and People*. Sydney: Haldane.
- Palfreeman, A. 1967. *The Administration of the White Australia Policy*. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.
- Price, C.A. 1980. *Australian Immigration: A Bibliography and Digest, no. 4, 1979*. Canberra: Department of Demography, Institute of Advanced Studies, Australian National University.
- Tange, A. 1954. Report by Secretary of External Affairs Tange to Minister of External Affairs. 25 October. Canberra: Australian Archives (ACT). A1838, 581/1 P73.
- Tavan, G. 2002. "'Immigration: Control or Colour Bar?' The Immigration Reform Movement 1959–1966.' *Australian Historical Studies* 32(117): 181–200.
- Whitlam, G. 1985. *The Whitlam Government 1972–1975*. Ringwood: Penguin.

