The Demise of the White Australia Policy

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Post-War Australia: Fears, Foreign Policy, and the Demise of the White Australia Policy

Prior to the Second World War, Australia's position as a nation with a basically homogeneous European population was secure. Under the unofficial title of the White Australia Policy, various policies were in place to ensure this situation: immigration laws were administered strictly to ensure that non-Europeans were not admitted, citizenship requirements were very exacting and well-guarded, and governments of all hues were committed to a White Australia.

However, changing circumstances were set to change Australia's relations with Asia, as H.R. Cowie explained: "Until the fall of Singapore in 1942, Australian concern about relations with Asia was largely tempered by the comforting thought that the major Asian territories to the north were under the guidance and control of friendly European powers. The Netherlands governed what is now Indonesia, the French controlled Indo-China [Cambodia-Kampuchea, Laos, and Vietnam], the Americans were still in the Philippines, and Britain held colonial possessions in Borneo and Malaya and Singapore. Although Australians had been worried about Japan's expansionist activities since her invasion of Manchuria [a region of China] in 1931, they felt safe behind the European protective shield ... Japan's unexpected triumph in conquering the whole of south-east Asia, and the impact of the appeal to Asian nationalism conveyed in her slogan "Asia for the Asians", drastically altered the political situation in the region. After the shock of Japanese air-raids on Australian soil had been partly erased and the threat of Japanese invasion had been removed by the Allied victory, Australians looked upon the Asian peoples in a new perspective."(1)

Following the end of the Second World War in 1945, there arose a number of factors which began to affect Australia's position and her close adherence to the White Australia Policy:

1) Deterioration of military security.

Following the war, the British reduced the size of their armed forces in Asia and the South Pacific. Thus the British Navy, that Australia had so heavily depended upon in the past, could no longer serve to protect Australia's separation from Asia, nor the White Australia Policy that aided that separation(2).

Australia's fears were also heightened by the spectre of Communism sweeping through the countries of the region (apart from the Communists attaining government in China, Communist uprisings occurred in the Philippines, Malaya, and Burma(3); as well as the Communist invasion of South Korea, and the eventually successful internal uprising/external invasion of South Vietnam).

It was thought that "Any possible military threat to the security of Australia was likely to come from Asia, either from a non-communist militarist regime or an expansionist communist regime pursuing the gaol of 'world revolution'. It was therefore important for Australia to maintain its defence capability, to seek membership of defensive alliances, and to contribute to "wars of containment" such as the Korean and Vietnam wars."(4)

2) Pressure from newly independent Asian countries.

The end of the war saw many Asian nations "throwing off the chains of colonialism" that had previously bound them. Whereas such countries were administered by white officials prior to the war, who were likely to be sympathetic to a White Australia, the new native anti-colonialist administrations, who had just won their independence from "white oppressors", were "extremely critical of any policy based on racism". Such criticism was always ready to be voiced in the new post-war international organisation of the United Nations (established October 1945), as well as through direct and indirect diplomatic channels(5).

3) Australia's fears of vulnerability.

Australia now felt isolated from Britain, and began to fear the potential might of Asia: economically, politically, and militarily. The political response to these fears were shown in acts of appeasement to Asia, as well as in a new-found desire for cooperation with those nations.

It was believed that "As an affluent community, Australia had to contribute significantly to aid programmes to help stabilise the economy of new Asian nations and ensure the survival of democracy. A corollary to this belief was the assumption that unstable economic conditions would breed communism, which would in turn produce armed aggression" and that "If trading relations could be established with Asian powers, the condition of interdependence that emerged would greatly contribute to better understanding and good relations."(6)

4) Resulting changes in Australian foreign policy.

As H.I. London stated, "Keeping a balance between collective security based on American strength and directed at Asia, and the simultaneous cultivation of friendly relations with Asian states, became the essence of the new Australian foreign policy ... Australia made a commitment to a "good neighbour policy" with Asia and a reduction of the psychological distance associated with her earlier policies. One fundamental aspect of this change in attitude was the modification of the White Australia policy. Those facets of the policy morally exceptionable to Asians were to be revised"(7).

It was said that, in regards to naturalisation and immigration, "further liberalisation was desirable if the danger were to be avoided of international pressure designed to force the Government of the day to make changes which could very advantageously be made of its own volition"(8), and that "the ill-will engendered in some Asian countries by a rigid and occasionally uncouth application of the policy of 'white Australia', must be considered strategically disadvantageous ... Its immigration policy was an insult to the countries against whose potential hostility that policy was considered to be an insurance"(9).

It was believed that because "Australia, as a large empty continent must have appeared as a tempting area for the resettlement of the Asian masses, it was important that Australia remove possible sources of friction with Asian powers. To this end it was necessary to reduce Asian criticism of the "White Australia" immigration policy and of the Australian administration of Papua New Guinea, through implementing policies of reform."(10)

Thus, the White Australia Policy was to receive several cosmetic changes, so as to soften the racial-discriminatory appearance of Australia's immigration policies.

The "Lost Generation"

Also, following the Second World War, came several changes to the ideological outlook among many of the younger generation. Near the end of the war, and especially after the use of two atomic bombs (in August 1945) to end the war against Japan, came the frosting of relations between the Western Allies (led by the USA) and the Eastern Bloc (led by the USSR), leading to the "Cold War" (1940s to 1960s). With the advent of the USSR developing its own supply of nuclear weapons (the USSR exploded its first nuclear

warhead in August 1949)(11), and the resulting "Arms Race" between the USA and the USSR, came the widespread fears of a nuclear holocaust and an end to modern human civilisation. One result of such fears was that many young people began to "drop out" of the nuclear-age society; hence the "hippie" movement of the 1960s with its philosophical emphasis on "peace, love, and human brotherhood".

The hippie/peace movement, or sub-culture, was strengthened by the advent of the Vietnam War (1954-1975) and the linked issue of conscription; compounded by the organised campaigns against these policies, with many public demonstrations and acts of civil disobedience. Associated with all this was the resulting "anti-Establishment" radicalisation of many people (particularly university students) - a radicalisation fed upon, directed, and ideologically influenced by existing liberal-internationalists (especially in academia and "left-wing" groups). It has also been said that the "discovery" of marijuana and its subsequent widespread usage by the youth of the 1960s was another important factor in the growth of the hippie movement(12).

While the hippie/peace sub-culture was not joined by everyone, it - and the issues from which it had grown - certainly influenced much of the generation that was attaining adulthood in the 1960s/1970s. Also; those individuals and groups who already held a liberal-internationalist philosophy, prior to this time of upheaval, were not slow on seeding the new generation with their ideas and ideology.

Existing liberal-internationalists had two major power bases: 1) the churches (the majority, if not all of them), and 2) the universities (with their liberalistic bleeding-heart academics)(13). These two social sectors also had an influence on, and interacted with, the media - which had its own stable of liberal-internationalists. These sectors were to figure prominently in the machinations behind the demise of the White Australia Policy; especially in the creation of the psychological basis and "moral impulse" for change.

Churches and Trade Unions

As David Johanson explained of those who sought a modification of the White Australia Policy: "In 1945, the Australian Communist Party, Archbishop Mannix and the Presbyterian General Assembly called alike for a quota system of Asian immigration. The churches were particularly active in this movement. As early as 1943, the President of the Methodist Conference had said that 'the White Australia Policy is coming up for judgement'. In the following year, the Methodist Spectator urged that the church dissociate itself from the policy, and the Methodist Conference objected to the term 'white' as being racially offensive. In 1945, the Foreign Missions Committee of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church expressed similar misgivings"(14). Gordon Greenwood also saw the churches as a main player in the push for immigration reform in the 1960s, "especially the Protestant churches acting at times through the Australian Council of Churches; a number of Roman Catholic bodies have also appeared to be sympathetic to reform"(15).

Johanson also described how the White Australia Policy had become an issue of struggle "between the right and left wings of the Labor movement" in the 1920s: "The newly-formed, left-wing Australasian Council of Trade Unions was affiliated with international working-class organizations such as the Pan-Pacific Trade Union Movement, and strongly influenced by the activist doctrines of the Australian Communist Party. These emphasised the common struggle of the working-class against the capitalist-class - "the unity of workers of all lands, irrespective of nationality, colour or creed, for a United Struggle against capitalism and imperialist war". The Pan-Pacific Trade Union secretariat rejected the White Australia policy as "viciously anti-working class", and the office-bearers of the A.C.T.U. pledged themselves "to tear down the barriers that heretofore separated the toiling masses of the East from the Labour movement of the West, and all the racial and national prejudice artificially created by Imperialists and their hirelings"."(16)

Socialists and Communists were often involved with trade union moves against Australia's traditional immigration policies. However, it should be noted that these Socialists and Communists were of the "brotherhood of man" variety, and should not be confused with such types as Jack Lang, William Lane, W.G. Spence, or the White Australia supporters of the early Victorian Socialist Party.

The Media; and Their Use of "Tear-Jerker" Stories to Change Immigration Policies

Various other liberal-internationalists were opposed to the White Australia Policy; with those in the media spreading their views amongst the general populace, in ideological tandem with the liberals in academia. The media liberals were particularly effective in grabbing "tear-jerker" stories of the "cruel administration" of the Policy, especially during the Policy's administration by Immigration Minister Arthur Calwell who "pursued the 'White Australia' line with unrelenting consistency"(17). Following this tactic, any refusal (following the laid-down Australian immigration laws) to allow a non-European to gain residence in Australia, which had the elements of a tear-jerker "human tragedy story" (such as anything involving a family reunion), was exploited by the media as a "major issue" designed to "pull the heart-strings" and win public sympathy. The result was that on the basis of some tear-jerker cases pumped-up by the media, various aspects of the Policy were changed following the media outcry and ensuing condemnation of Australia by foreign governments.

Under a discretionary policy, which took into account "compassionate grounds and close family relationships", more than 15 000 persons of mixed descent were admitted into Australia in the post-war period. Also, there were a substantial number of non-Europeans who entered within other categories, such as on short-term visas, but who then wished to stay. There were a small number of individual cases of exclusion which were "picked up" and given large-scale attention in the media ("human tragedy stories"), and were used to attack the government's immigration policies, and thus aroused "public controversy". Gordon Greenwood pointed out that "the most publicised were the cases of Willie Wong and Nancy Prasad", and that while "Such cases are probably inevitable in the administration of any restrictive immigration policy ... What gives them a special significance ... is the harm which may be done to Australia's standing in Asian countries if the individuals involved are of Asian origin". While those in government may have felt sympathetic to these individuals, there was a fear that if Australia was to change the rules in order to let these people stay, then thousands more would be able to stay in Australia on the same basis (each one of those thousands had the potential to provide a "human tragedy" story, as the basis for yet another anti-government media campaign). Immigration procedures later changed in relation to such cases, for - as Greenwood remarked in 1968 - "it can be said that in recent years the policy has been administered with greater flexibility, and with a conscious regard to humanitarian and compassionate considerations, as is indeed evident from the revision of the regulations and from the emphasis upon discretionary powers. This is not surprising since in Peter Heydon the Department has as its Secretary a senior diplomat and former High Commissioner to India who is more than aware of the injury that might be done to Australia by an insensitive or over-rigid administration".(18)

H.I. London explained the general background to these circumstances: "During World War II the colored population of Australia swelled with the forced migration of Asians fleeing the Japanese invasion. These migrants were given a sanctuary in Australia with the understanding that they would return when the war ended. But many of the migrants married or just found life in Australia congenial, and refused to accept their obligation. In 1947 the Labor Government tried to deport fourteen Malay seamen, all of whom married Australians and most of whom had families. The Government insisted its position was predicated on assurances that the stays were temporary pending the termination of the war. As soon as the repatriation decision was announced vocal opposition erupted in the press, attacking the policy on moral grounds and later as an expression of "administrative callousness." Mr. Arthur Calwell, Minister for Immigration at the time, refused, after considerable delay, to reconsider his decision. Malayan Seamen's Defence Committees were organized in Sydney, Melbourne, and Brisbane. To satisfy some of the opposition's demands the Government offered to pay for the transportation of the families to Malaya.

But the bitterness of the struggle remained and organizational weapons for reform were created. All that was necessary to evoke a more vigorous resentment was another cause celebre. The reformers did not have to wait long.

"In the same year Mrs. Annie O'Keefe, an Indonesian, provided opponents of the White Australia policy with a new cause celebre. Mrs. O'Keefe, whose first husband was killed in an airplane crash during the war, was rescued from the Indonesian jungle with her family of eight children and brought to Australia. It was stipulated at the time of her entry, according to statutory safeguards, that she would leave the country when required to do so. She became one of many war refugees accepted as temporary entrants, subject to the Minister for Immigration's authority. After several years in Australia she received an offer of marriage and applied for permanent residence credentials from the Department of Immigration. She soon learned that marriage to an Australian conferred no privilege of permanent residence for a war refugee accepted as a "prohibited migrant". Mrs. O'Keefe appealed the decision to the High Court (1947), which ruled in a majority decision that Mrs. O'Keefe did not qualify as a prohibited migrant since she had not taken the dictation test (which was used to determine that status), and therefore the Minister for Immigration no longer had authority to deport her.

"The ruling applied not only to Mrs. O'Keefe but to hundreds of other war refugees in the country. In order to deal with this "recalcitrant minority" Calwell introduced several bills designed to restore ministerial control over aliens allowed entry during the war - a control, argued Calwell, that the High Court had preempted in its decision. If implemented, the proposals could have been used against Mrs. O'Keefe and approximately 800 other Asian war refugees. The bills were passed, but before any repatriation action could be taken, a general election was held. A change in government occurred, and a more liberal attitude to these non-European war refugees was adopted. Mrs. O'Keefe was accepted as an Australian citizen.

"'White Australia', despite the O'Keefe case, continued to be prominently displayed in the headlines of most Australian newspapers. No sooner had O'Keefe left the front page than another, more volatile case appeared. Sergeant Gamboa, a United States citizen of Filipino parentage, was refused the right to reenter Australia even though his Australian wife and children lived there. The Immigration Department, under Calwell's leadership, argued that marriage could not be used as a means of entering the country, whatever the personal hardships involved. He offered to pay the fares of Mrs. Gamboa and the children to either the Philippines or the United States, but Gamboa would not accept the offer. Instead he challenged the Department's decision by pointing out directly to Eleanor Roosevelt and several United Nations' delegates that Australia's immigration policy was a violation of the United Nations' Charter, which specifically prohibited racial discrimination. Due in part to the publicity the case received, Calwell's judgment was rescinded by the new Menzies Government in its attempt to reverse what Senator E.B. Maher described as 'the fanatical ... and ... unchristian policy that was applied by the member for Melbourne (Mr.Calwell) ....'

"The 1949 swing to the Liberal-Country Party and the appointment of a new Minister for Immigration, Mr. Harold Holt, changed the climate in which the immigration policy was administered. With the exception of a few minor cases, the 1950's were almost entirely free of incidents related to the White Australia policy. Most Australians, due very largely to Holt's more flexible attitude to the subject and new immigration legislation enacted in 1956 and 1957, believed that the general tenor of the policy was changing."(19)

International, and internal, pressures mounted over such cases; for instance: the Japanese war brides, the fourteen Malayan seamen (1947), the fifty Chinese seamen (1949), Mrs O'Keefe (1949), and Sergeant Gamboa (1949).

The deportation in 1962 of Willie Wong, a Chinese market gardener, back to mainland China gave impetus to yet another storm of protest from the media.(20) But it was the Nancy Prasad case in 1965 that provided the media with what was perhaps its "best ever" cause celebre, especially as it provided more opportunities for "tear-jerker" stories than did the subsequent Locsin case of 1966 (the Filipino university graduate whose application to migrate to Australia was refused).(21)

The Nancy Prasad Case

Mr Shiri Prasad first came to Australia from Fiji in September 1961 on a three month holiday; he stayed with one of his sons (two of whom were resident in Australia) and while here took a job. He tried to have his visa extended, but this was not granted. In April 1962 Prasad returned, using a three month tourist visa, he then tried to obtain permanent residence, which was refused, but his visa was extended to April 1963. In that time he brought two houses in a Sydney suburb, which he then used as an argument to let him remain in the country (he also applied for permanent residence for his family). He was granted a further visa extension - til September 1963. Prasad persisted in his efforts; and, not until a deportation order was issued, did he leave voluntarily in November 1963 to return to Fiji.(22)

Prasad left two daughters behind: Sandra (twenty years old) who had been in Australia on a visitors permit since 1961, had married an Australian and was attempting to remain here; and Nancy (five years old), who was in hospital with a throat infection (Prasad had asked unsuccessfully to stay until she was well). Nancy's visa was extended, during which time her brother tried to get her an allowance to stay permanently. When Nancy recovered, her brother refused to send her back to Fiji, so a deportation order was issued, but then Nancy was "sent into hiding". Various legal manoeuvring commenced - including an attempted adoption by her sister, an injunction, and several appeals - all of which took some months. When Nancy eventually arrived at the airport, her sympathisers "kidnapped" her. This sparked off a frenzy of media publicity - which, quite obviously, was the intended result. The "kidnappers" returned her later that night.(23)

Nancy was finally returned to her parents (in Fiji) on the 8th August, 1965. However, the enormous amount of media publicity given to her on-going case, and to the publicity-seeking staged "kidnapping", made the case a "hot" political issue both in Australia and overseas. The media used the case to heavily attack the White Australian Policy. Indeed, some observers have attributed the March 1966 liberalisation of the Policy as being partially enabled by the Prasad case and as an attempt to avoid "bad press" over immigration related cases in the local and foreign media.(24)

Academia and the Immigration Reform Groups

Taking advantage of Australia's changing relations with Asia, came those academics in the education system, especially in the universities. These academics were well placed to influence the attitudes of those young adults studying at university, who were simultaneously influenced by the hippie/peace ideology. From the activities of those university academics came the formation of the Immigration Reform Group in 1959 (in Melbourne), which published a pamphlet in 1960 (later enlarged and republished as a book) - Control or Colour Bar? - advocating non-European immigration(25). The Immigration Reform Group became the basis for the formation of the Victorian Association for Immigration Reform in 1960; which began a long campaign for the destruction of the White Australia Policy and for the introduction of non-European immigration programmes. With their beginnings in Melbourne (which for certain reasons had become a centre of "left-wing" and liberal-internationalist growth)(26*), Associations for Immigration Reform were subsequently formed in other states, influencing people on a nation-wide basis(27). Greenwood states that "while their membership was not large, they were extremely active in their efforts to influence community attitudes generally, the more significant organisations such as trade unions and churches and, above all, the political parties"(28). Donald Horne concurred with this view: "Proposals for reform have been prepared by Immigration Reform Groups, consisting mainly of university people, that

for several years have operated within what would be described as opinion-forming quarters. If reform of immigration policies proceeds calmly these Groups are entitled to much of the praise"(29).

Lauchlan Chipman, one of the few Australian academics who has consistently spoken out against Establishment-derived "political correctness", has studied the growth of the "new class" in Australia. One writer has summarised some of Chipman's conclusions: "Chipman sees a general liberalising as having taken place in Australia from the end of World War II until the late 1960s. This period witnessed the easing of censorship and a gradual drift away from the 'White Australia Policy'. However, he perceives a dramatic turn around starting in the late 1960s, emanating principally from the universities and centering around the anti-American Vietnam protests. This in turn spawned absolute opposition to imperialism, racism, sexism and elitism; and academics within the universities started to say that the universities themselves were the purveyors of these evils", leading to Chipman's conclusion that "Australian universities were allegedly "tainted" by their participation in an imperialist industrial-military economy"(30).

Chipman says that "Newly appointed American junior staff, joining expanding talent-hungry Australian universities fresh from graduate school in radicalized American institutions, together with trend following copy-cat Australian academics who wanted to be seen to be the first when the inevitable hit Australian universities, a multitude of psychologically screwed up humanities and social science academics, and a score of extra-murally briefed professional operators, were completely effective in a number of Australian campuses, most notably Monash University in Melbourne". Chipman argues "that the aggressiveness of these activists intimidated the traditional academics into silence and students into conformity"(31).

The influence of the liberal-internationalist academics upon the university students of the 1960s and 1970s (and, indeed, since then) was seen to churn out tens of thousands of "up and coming" professionals who had been unavoidably influenced by their teachers' ideology. The "ruling elites" of most modern nations are largely drawn from the university-educated, and Australia is no different. However, the new generations of Australia's forthcoming leaders and opinion-shapers that emerged from the universities of the 1960s, and beyond, were now influenced by liberal-internationalist ideology - and this was to show itself in the way they came to "lead" Australia(32*).

The Asian Economic Connection

The bulwark of Australia's trade had traditionally always been with Britain, but in the 1950s "the long-term decline in trade with the United Kingdom was plainly evident and would deteriorate even more rapidly as the UK moved from the late 1950s, towards integration with the European Economic Community". When Britain finally joined the giant trade bloc of the EEC in 1973 (12 years after its original application), the large British export market that Australia depended upon so much began to dry up(33). Therefore, Australian businessmen began to look to other foreign markets to sell their export goods. Asia, with its large populations, increasing economic importance, and close proximity, began to look more and more attractive to a growing number of Australia's businessmen and politicians.

Australian trade with Britain, continental Europe, the U.S.A., Canada, and New Zealand was about 77% in 1950 (75.3% of imports, 78.4% of exports), but had declined to 42% by 1995 (54.2% of imports, 28.0% of exports); while trade with Asia rose from about 17% in 1950 (18.3% of imports, 15.6% of exports) to about 53% in 1990 (41.7% of imports, 65.1% of exports). Australian trade with Japan in 1995 accounted for 20.5% of all trade (being 28.0% of all Australian trade with Asia).

TABLE ONE
TRADE WITH ASIA: A COMPARISON, SELECTED YEARS
(Australian trade: Basic statistics) [34*]

Year		Asia		U.K., Europe, U.S.A., Canada, and N.Z.		All other countries		Total, all countries	
		$m	%	$m	%	$m	%	$m	%
1950	imports	196	18.3	809	75.3	67	6.2	1 072	100
1950	exports	192	15.6	962	78.4	73	5.9	1 227	100
1950	total	388	16.9	1771	77.0	140	6.1	2 299	100
1995	imports	31 159	41.7	40 477	54.2	3 002	4.0	74 638	100
1995	exports	43 633	65.1	18 757	28.0	4 646	6.9	67 036	100
1995	total	74 792	52.8	59 234	41.8	7 648	5.4	141 674	100

A Combination of Trends

The emergence of the aforementioned trends (fears of a resurgent Asia and the subsequent appeasement policies; economic-political links with Asia; and, especially, the liberal-internationalist influencing of the younger generations) combined to imbue a large part of the "up and coming" new generation of politicians, businessmen, and community "leaders" with a pro-Asian outlook, underlined by a liberal-internationalist ideology of varying shades.

While it was Australia's post-World War Two fears of Asia, and the subsequent political appeasement of those countries, that led to the softening of the White Australia Policy for diplomatic and foreign policy reasons, it was the new middle-class (largely influenced by the post-war liberal-internationalist, "brotherhood of man", "peace" ideology) that came to destroy the Policy. Initially, using the non-racial veneer of the Policy (put there for foreign policy reasons - because of Australia's fear of Asia) as a weapon to demand and implement further changes to the immigration safeguards; then later gaining enough power so as to deliver the final death-blow to the White Australia Policy as a whole.

It was by working through the major political parties that the new middle-class immigration reformers were finally able to achieve their ideological aims. Firstly through the Liberal Party, by effecting the gradual softening of the Policy; then through the Labor Party, by gaining control of the Party, and subsequently destroying the White Australia Policy once in government.

The Post-War Immigration Programme

The post-World War Two large-scale immigration programmes were set in motion by the Labor government of Prime Minister Ben Chifley, who had appointed Arthur Calwell as Minister for Immigration to formulate and develop the new migration policies.

As Calwell later stated, "The Pacific War of 1940-45 forced Australia to face ultimate reality for the first time in her brief history ... the 1940's really brought home to her how easily she could be annihilated. The Japanese had bombed Darwin, their midget submarines had entered Sydney Harbour, their soldiers had almost won New Guinea as a springboard for a land assault on the mainland. The shock was decisive, the resolution had been made. The 7.5 million population had to be boosted - urgently."(35)

It has been explained by Rhonda Smith that "Near invasion by Japan during the Second World War proved Australia's vulnerability and reinforced the traditional fear of the "yellow peril" ... Arthur Calwell wrote in 1945 "We face the gloomy future of being a small nation surrounded by many millions of other people looking enviously at our large continent" ... It was argued that in the interests of national security it was essential to increase Australia's population rapidly ... In order to ensure enough people to provide troops and to support an economy capable of providing advanced armaments, it was estimated that a population of 25 million was required while the current population was only 7.3 million ... Defence was not the only

reason for initiating the immigration programme at the end of the war ... Calwell argued "We need it [population growth] for reasons of defence and for the fullest expansion of our economy" (emphasis added). Later he wrote "We need increased population to develop fully our great country and to assist the expansion of its economy." Indeed, war, by demonstrating the problems of a narrow economic base, had shown that economic development and national security were not separate issues."(36)

Greg Patmore states that "The near invasion of Australia by Japan during the Second World War and Australia's inability to defend itself altered Labor's attitude towards large scale assisted immigration. Calwell and his colleagues hoped that immigration would allow the full development of national resources necessary for Australian defence ... The federal government's commitment to full employment and the maintenance of the White Australia Policy also alleviated union fears that the immigration program would allow cheap labor to be dumped in Australia. Calwell promised to obtain the majority of migrants from the U.K., but the proposed ratio of ten British migrants for every one non-British migrant was never achieved."(37)

Patmore says, of the post-war immigration programme, that "Australian governments had to go beyond the UK to meet immigration targets and provide sufficient labour for the expansion of industry during the postwar boom. A shortage of shipping after the war limited the availability of British migrants. After failing to attract sufficient immigrants from France and Scandinavia, Calwell obtained war refugees from camps in Western Europe." Due to the lack of available shipping to carry migrants, Australia spent several million pounds on renovating damaged ships. Also, the International Refugee Organisation chartered many foreign-owned ships to move displaced persons to new countries. "These refugees included survivors of the Holocaust and people fleeing from the Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe ... In the 1950s Northern Europe (especially Germany and the Netherlands) and Southern Europe (especially Italy, Greece and Malta) became important sources of European immigration as the refugee intake from Eastern Europe had virtually stopped by 1951. The federal government gave assistance to the preferred migrants from the UK and Northern Europe ... Despite assistance, the economic prosperity of the UK during the 1950s reduced the British intake to a third of the total. Although British immigration revived in the 1960s, the establishment of the European Economic Community and the economic recovery of Europe reduced immigration from both Northern and Southern Europe. Greater assistance with passage costs was extended to Greeks, Italians, Spaniards and Portuguese and the White Australia Policy began to crumble. Immigration officials allowed "Asians", which included migrants from Turkey, Lebanon, Israel, India and Japan, to enter Australia; and Australia concluded an agreement with Turkey in 1967 to provide assisted passages for selected Turkish citizens."(38)

The Liberal Party and the Dismantling of the White Australia Policy

As Bruce Grant has pointed out, "By the time government changed hands in 1949 [from Labor to Liberal], immigration was in full flow", but the set of circumstances that "made the original decision easier to uphold" was that the 1950s were years of prosperity, and that many immigrants were Cold War refugees (thus would be considered anti-communist, and therefore likely to become Liberal Party supporters); but more important to the Liberal Party was the perceived "economic advantage of a labour force for the expanding manufacturing sector". Considered of less importance to the Liberals was the defence-related belief to "populate or perish", especially since that "It was to the American alliance, not to a self-reliant Australia, that they looked for security."(39)

However, "The "White Australia" policy became an increasing embarrassment as Australia's relations with Asia developed. Hence modifications to this policy were almost certainly made with an eye to foreign affairs. However, they were not intended to allow a large, unrestricted inflow."(40)

In 1947, under Chifley's Labor government, "it was announced that non-Europeans admitted temporarily for business reasons and who had lived in Australia continuously for 15 years could remain without the need to renew their permits periodically". "In effect, such people achieved resident status".(41)

However, it was under the Liberal governments of Robert Menzies (Prime Minister 19.12.1949 - 26.1.1966) and Harold Holt (Minister for Immigration 19.12.1949 - 24.10.1956, Prime Minister 26.1.66 - 19.12.67) that the first major cracks began to appear in the protective walls of the White Australia Policy:

In 1952 Japanese wives of Australian servicemen were allowed to be admitted, under permits valid initially for five years.(42)

In 1956 various rules were modified regarding non-Europeans:

- Those allowed to remain without getting periodic extensions of their permits became eligible for citizenship.
- Distinguished and highly qualified non-Europeans were permitted to come to Australia and remain indefinitely.
- Easier conditions applied to the admission of people of mixed descent.
- Certain non-Europeans already in Australia on a temporary basis, who normally would have been expected to leave, were allowed to remain for humanitarian reasons (thus the Liberal Government avoided the problems caused by the media's immigration-related "human tragedy" campaigns that had so plagued the Labor Government).(43)

Further changes were made in 1956 and 1957 with respect to citizenship: In 1956, although admitted only for temporary residence, non-European spouses of Australian citizens became eligible to apply for citizenship, on the same basis as European spouses, irrespective of their period of residence in Australia. And in 1957, other non-Europeans admitted to Australia for temporary residence were able to apply for citizenship, after completing 15 years residence.(44)

These changes meant that "a radical transformation had occurred in the practice of naturalisation of non-Europeans, a change illustrated by the fact that, whereas in 1956-57 only seventeen were granted naturalisation, in 1959-60 the number had risen to 826". Naturalisation of Asians 1961-65 was as follows, 1961: 734; 1962: 643; 1963: 537; 1964: 396; 1965: 420. The numbers remained substantial, though a drop in numbers occurred "presumably because long-term Asian residents seeking naturalisation did so in the main shortly after the changes were introduced".(45)

The controversial dictation test was abolished under the 1958 Migration Act (which came into force on 1 June 1959), and a simpler scheme of entry permits was introduced.(46)

In 1959 "it was decided that Australian citizens normally domiciled in Australia could introduce for residence their non-European spouses and unmarried minor children, who would then be eligible to apply for citizenship. In 1960 this provision was extended to the non-European spouses and unmarried minor children of British subjects already with residence status in Australia or about to attain it". "In 1964, conditions for the entry of people of mixed descent were further relaxed".(47)

In September 1965, "all the former temporary resident categories were replaced by two broad classifications granting admission with limited temporary resident status ... This simplification of the rules represented a departure from a practice which had existed virtually since federation". Basically, the two new categories allowed executive and specialist staff to enter Australia for up to two or four years, even allowing wives and children to accompany them (previously not permitted, except for those with Australian citizenship)(48).

Harold Holt became Prime Minister in January 1966. As Arthur Calwell has said: "Significantly, Mr Holt's first action as Prime Minister was to announce liberalization of our immigration regulations regarding Asians ... Those changes can yet be disastrous for Australia"(49).

In March 1966 a major policy change was made, which meant that "qualified non-Europeans were admitted as a matter of policy, rather than as an occasional indulgence, and those who lived in Australia for five years (rather than for fifteen years) were allowed to bring in dependants. This was the beginning of the end of the "White Australia" policy" (emphasis added).(50)

"In March 1966, following a comprehensive policy review, the Government announced that non-Europeans could be considered for settlement in Australia on the basis of their general suitability, their ability to integrate readily and their possession of qualifications positively useful to Australia ... In 1966 changes also meant that non-Europeans who initially had been admitted as temporary residents but authorised to remain indefinitely could become permanent residents and citizens after five years' stay instead of fifteen years as previously required"(51). The 1966 immigration changes were the signal for a steady increase in the numbers of immigrants from Asia.

As Katharine Betts stated, "The White Australia Policy had almost been eliminated by the late 1960s in a series of changes during the latter years of Liberal/Country Party rule. Public resistance had been circumvented by the use of administrative procedures and secrecy rather than open debate".(52)

The election of the Australian Labor Party (ALP) in December 1972 led to the official "death" of the White Australia Policy; finishing off what the Liberal Party had begun with its various "stabbings" of the Policy over the years, culminating in its "fatal wounding" in 1966.

The Australian Labor Party and the Destruction of the White Australia Policy

By the 1960s it was becoming obvious that the long-held institution of the White Australia Policy was under serious attack. A new generation of liberalistic middle-class people had begun to join the ALP, and had commenced to white-ant its support for the Policy. Within the ALP those defending the Policy, the "Old Guard", tried desperately to ensure the survival of the White Australia ideal.

As Sean Brawley relates, "In the early postwar period the emerging, educated middle class had developed grave reservations about White Australia - often this being the product of what some commentators have termed the non-racist university environment of the 1950's and 1960's, where Government aid programs brought large numbers of Asian and African students to Australia. There is no doubt that these individuals are the same "rising group of tertiary-educated professionals" which Andrew Scott claims entered the branches of the ALP at this time"(53).

An extract from the diary of Peter Heydon (who, at the time, had been recently appointed to replace Sir Tasman Heyes as the Secretary of the Department of Immigration) sets the tone of the Old Guard's attempts to defend the White Australia Policy, in a lengthy entry of the occasion in October 1961 (during the years of the Liberal government of Robert Menzies) when Arthur Calwell (then leader of the Parliamentary Leader of the ALP) took him aside at a function to farewell Sir Heyes as the outgoing Immigration Secretary:

> *"After the Prime Minister and Ministers had left I was sitting beside Mr. Calwell who submitted me to an unbroken exhortation of about fifteen minutes to the effect that there must be no amendment or change at all in our restricted immigration policy ... Mr. Calwell said that the Immigration policy was under attack by irresponsible people such as the Melbourne Reform Group, Presbyterian long-hairs and the Reverend Downing in W.A. Of course the Universities*

were full of them. There were even some in his own church. Archbishop Mannix had been induced by Santamaria and his friends to write an article attacking White Australia and it was published in a church paper but disapproved of by a majority of the bishops. Long-hairs in the Department of External Affairs advocated the same policy. (I denied this firmly). There were similar people in the Labour (sic) Party. Altogether they amounted to a real threat ... Mr Calwell seemed to speak under the stress of great emotion ... one or two things Mr. Calwell said could have been a reference to Mr. Whitlam (e.g. "We have such long-hairs even in our own Party"). It also reminded me of a short conversation I had with Mr. Whitlam in March of this year when he learned that I was likely to succeed Sir Tasman Heyes and in offering congratulations praised the government for having the wisdom to appoint someone who could appreciate the significance for our foreign relations of immigration policies, especially our restrictions on the entry of Asians. Mr Whitlam had then gone on to say that he was trying to get the executive of the Labor Party to eliminate reference to the White Australia Policy from its platform. As I remember he tried to do this behind Mr. Calwell's back shortly thereafter and failed"(54).

The middle-class influx into the ALP from the late 1950s (referred to by Sean Brawley as the "New Guard") brought increasing calls from the ALP Branches to drop the White Australia Policy. "The New Guard moved into the branches but their power within the party was limited. Power resided in the hands of the State Executive which remained dominated by the Old Guard. The Union movement dominated the State Executive and was important in blocking the calls for change from the branches ... An attempt to have the term dropped at the 1959 Federal Conference failed and in 1961, a more covert bid by Gough Whitlam and Don Dunstan, alluded to in Heydon's diary entry, was unsuccessful when Calwell was alerted to the scheme"(55).

"By the early 60's the momentum for change to White Australia was growing and organisations formed in several states to fight for the abolition of the policy. Much of the momentum at this time came from a group of Melbourne University academics and others who had formed the Immigration Reform Group and produced a highly controversial pamphlet called Control or Colour Bar? The pamphlet and later book's success fostered the creation of a number of reform organisations, initially in Victoria and Western Australia but later and for various lengths of time in all mainland states, as well as student groups based in Melbourne and later Brisbane ... These reform movements held within their ranks a disproportionate number of ALP members and ALP sympathisers, including branch and parliamentary members"(56).

The growth of internal dissent, and branch moves against the Policy, upset the ALP hierarchy. The National Secretary, Joe Chamberlain, convinced the Federal Executive to pass a national ruling banning members of the Immigration Reform Groups from membership in the ALP. This stopped some attempts at open co-operation, but nonetheless there grew within the ALP a "rising class" of New Guard reformers, such as Jim Cairns, Moss Cass, Don Dunstan, Bill Hayden, and Gough Whitlam(57). "In 1963, the "hot potato" of White Australia was once again thrown into the Federal Conference but once more the delegates rejected calls from the Victorian and Western Australian delegates to remove White Australia. The pressure for change had come from the branches but had once again been rejected by the Executive"(58). The Melbourne Age had noted that the "impetus to the Victorian move has come from a group of about 20 members who last May were forced to resign from the Victorian Association for Immigration Reform"(59)

The 1963 ALP Conference was pressured into setting up an Immigration Review Committee, which was dominated by the Old Guard, but which eventually compromised its stance by agreeing to recommend that the ALP drop the name of the White Australia Policy from the ALP Platform; this recommendation later being adopted by the 1965 ALP Conference (the same Conference also lifted the ban on the Immigration Reform Groups). With the name of the White Australia Policy dropped from the Platform, the ALP position became more ambiguous, a situation which was then exploited by the immigration reformers of the ALP's New Guard(60*).

The Union movement held a large power base within the ALP (indeed, it contributed far more monetarily than the branches did; "In NSW in 1960, for example, the ALP received four and a half times more from Unions than Branches in affiliation fees")(61), and it was the Unions which also figured large in the defence of the White Australia Policy, especially the Australian Workers Union (which still "continued to discriminate against Australians of Chinese descent"). However, the Union movement's support of the White Australia Policy later began to wane, which could in part be explained by "the loss of influence which accompanied the AWU's amalgamation with the ACTU - an organisation which was itself being transformed by a new guard of rapidly expanding white collar unions and professional administrators"(62).

A turning point for the immigration reformers came in 1966 with the retirement of the then Liberal Prime Minister, Sir Robert Menzies, as this was soon after followed by immigration liberalisation by the new Liberal Prime Minister, Harold Holt, which the ALP Old Guard reluctantly accepted for political reasons. The New Guard continued to battle the Old Guard for control of the party; Jim Cairns and Bill Hayden even attacked restrictions on Asian immigration in the parliament, causing a furore within the ALP's parliamentary ranks. Gough Whitlam's election to Parliamentary Leader of the ALP in 1967 gave the New Guard a tremendous boost, and the battle continued, until the New Guard won enough power at the ALP's 1971 Conference to create a new liberalistic non-discriminative ALP immigration policy(63).

Despite the ALP's commitment to pull down the safeguards of the White Australia Policy, immigration did not become an issue in the 1972 Federal election for several reasons. "Firstly, Australia was already considering a major immigration downturn and the ALP intimated that the number of Asians who would be allowed entry could actually decline rather than increase ... Secondly, rather than trying to win converts to its position the ALP remained very quiet on the issue for fear its opponents might distort anything the Party said ... The final and most important factor, however, was the return of political bipartisanship on the issue following the comments of Don Chipp [then a Liberal Minister] on the ABC's "Monday Conference" program. Chipp went one step further than the ALP and spoke of a "multi-racial" Australia by the 1980's. Although immediately castigated by Old Guarders such as Calwell and members of his own Party, Chipp escaped further criticism when John Gorton [the previous Liberal Prime Minister], perhaps uncharacteristically, announced "complete support" for Chipp's comments. To many it appeared that Chipp's comments had prevented immigration from becoming a "nasty issue" during the election"(64).

Thus, the December 1972 election was held without immigration becoming a major issue. After the ALP government was elected to power, Prime Minister Gough Whitlam and his Immigration Minister, Al Grassby, set about destroying the White Australia Policy; and began the implementation of the disastrous policy of multiculturalism (which itself encompassed a philosophy of anti-discrimination and anti-restrictive immigration), which the Liberal Party subsequently adopted in order to "win the migrant vote". This was the death knell of the White Australia Policy.(65*)

It should be noted here that the influx of Indo-Chinese refugees (mainly from Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia-Kampuchea) began during the ALP's term in office, "with the first main wave of Vietnamese immigrants settling in Australian during 1975-76, after the fall of Saigon on 30 April 1975"(66). However, as Whitlam's ALP Government was sacked shortly after the commencement of the influx, it should be noted that it was under the Liberal Government of Malcolm Fraser (11.11.1975 - 11.3.1983) that Australia endured several years of a very high Indo-Chinese refugee intake. The following Labor Governments of Bob Hawke (11.3.1983 - 20.12.1991) and Paul Keating (20.12.1991 - 11.3.1996) continued the practice of bringing in large numbers of Indo-Chinese refugees.(67*)

The Thin Edge of the Wedge

The push for immigration reform had not come out of a vacuum. Within Australia, there existed for a long time a minority of people who were opposed to restrictive immigration policies based upon racial considerations, and were thus opposed to the White Australia Policy; and who therefore advocated liberalistic immigration policies.

These liberal-internationalists remained a minority, but they increasingly strengthened their position by constantly pushing their ideology, particularly through academia and the churches (as well as in many other social sectors). In the early part of the twentieth century, many Australians began to forget the dangers of the massive influx of Asians that had occurred in the nineteenth century, and were content to let in some Asians (reflected in opinion polls of the time)(68), yet who would not have approved of a large influx of non-Europeans (and who would've been horrified at the prospect of an Asianised Australia). The immigration reformers took advantage of this situation by demanding small, but apparently reasonable, reforms (but which, to the astute observer, were obviously just a prelude to the eventual dismantling of the entire White Australia Policy). It was this "bit by bit" style of political encroachment that worked; demanding one "small change" after another, using the Fabian-style tactic of "the thin edge of the wedge".

In this context, it is of interest to note the following quotes:

The Immigration Reform Group:

> "In immigration matters, an element of gradualism is not only inevitable but desirable"(69).

Jamie Mackie (the original architect of the Immigration Reform Group), regarding the formation of that organisation:

> "I suppose I had in mind something like the (early) Fabian Society in Britain as an opinion-forming think-tank, rather than as a pressure group as such"(70).

Nancy Viviani, regarding the tactics of the Immigration Reform Group:

> "The abolitionists proposed a minimalist start to Asian migration and a gradualist program. They knew that a century of entrenched anti-Asian sentiment (revived in the 1950s by the Chinese communist threat) would not change quickly, that a small beginning would be acceptable and that experience should be a guide to future liberalisation. By this stance, they cut the ground from beneath the image of "floods of Asians" so effectively used by their opponents ... By pushing the ideas of limited numbers and "occupational balance" they undermined their opponents' two most important positions - numbers and fears of racial conflict"(71).

The growth in Asian, and other coloured immigration, began slowly, due to the fact that those who were dismantling Australia's traditional immigration policies realised that a sudden increase in Asian immigration would spark an enormous public backlash, leading to the political demise of its promoters, an end to the coloured immigration programme, and perhaps even to a newly invigorated White Australia Policy. The influx started off first of all by the use of "discretion" by Immigration Department administrators (which was carried out in a secretive manner by, as A.C. Palfreeman noted in The Administration of the White Australia Policy, "taking care to exercise the discretion away from public scrutiny")(72), then by changing government policy to accept only those non-Europeans who were professional and/or highly qualified, and then later changing this to also accept those who were semi-

professional and/or less qualified, and finally becoming "open slather" - firstly in low numbers and proportion, then finally being increased to the current high numbers and proportion.

That this "slowly, slowly" tactic, using the "thin edge of the wedge" strategy, was deliberate is beyond doubt. The immigration reformers were not stupid - they knew that they had to make changes slowly, carefully, and skilfully; they had the political skill to manipulate public opinion. Consider the following quotations:

In 1962, the Immigration Reform Group had claimed that:

> *"All we ask for at this stage is a small annual intake (1,500)"(73).*

In 1965 Donald Dunstan, then the ALP's South Australian Attorney-General, and who was instrumental in the removal of the clause for a White Australia Policy from the ALP electoral platform, was insistent that the Australian Labor Party did "not propose to open the floodgates to Asian immigration"(74).

In 1970 Mr. J.E. Lake, President of the Australian Eurasian Association, said that:

> *"No one wants to see the yellow hordes pouring into the country, but surely more qualified people should be admitted"(75).*

Also in 1970 Dr. Kenneth Rivett, then the Chairman of the N.S.W Association for Immigration Reform, stated that:

> *"My association would like to see the qualification restrictions relaxed still further. We feel there is place for the less qualified -- clerks, tradesmen, shopkeepers -- providing a balance is struck with the professional people entering. We are anxious to prepare the ground for a time when a settlement in Vietnam might create an acute refugee problem. This would be a situation where a change in policy would be justified, so that the less qualified could be admitted"(76).*

In 1971 Gough Whitlam "made a speech to the Perth Press Club in which he said it was nonsense to suggest that Labor's policy would open the floodgate to coloured migrants or be the thin edge of the wedge"(77).

Also in 1971, the then Liberal Prime Minister, John Gorton, said:

> *"I think if we build up gradually inside Australia a proportion of people without white skins, then there will be a complete lack of consciousness that it is being built up ... and that we will arrive at a state where we will have a multi-racial country without racial tensions - and perhaps the first in the world"(78).*

In 1972 Don Chipp, then a Liberal Minister (later to be the leader of the Australian Democrats), told television viewers that:

> *"I would like to see a stage in the 1980s where Australia is becoming the only true multi-racial country in the world, and that is the Liberal Party's aim"(79).*

By 1975, the Immigration Reform Group had raised the numbers of non-European immigrants that it was calling for:

"Australia's intake of non-Europeans and part-Europeans should rise - if certain conditions are met - to, say, 20 000 a year"(80).

It was obvious at the start to many patriots that any "small" demands that the immigration reformers were making were, in fact, the "thin edge of the wedge", and that as the wedge prised open the crack in the White Australia Policy wider and wider, that a flood of coloured immigrants would start arriving in Australia in larger numbers over the next several years, with even larger numbers to come in subsequent decades. The intent of the liberal-internationalists was clear: they wanted to eventually destroy White Australia.

As yet another example of the deceptive tactics used by such liberal-internationalists, the Department of Immigration even changed its definition of Asia, in order to disguise the large numbers of Asian migrants coming in. As Stephen Castles explained, "in the late 1960s it was desired to widen migrant recruitment without creating fears of an 'Asian influx'. Middle East migrants were therefore turned into 'honorary whites' by a stroke of the pen". By this devious means, the whole of West Asia disappeared from the Immigration Department's definition of Asia (the Australian Bureau of Statistics continued for some years to maintain immigration records unaffected by such "fiddling of statistics", although they did later adopt the same criteria for their immigration figures)(81).

Appendix One: Australia Migration Statistics

TABLE TWO
IMMIGRATION FROM ASIA AND EUROPE:
AUSTRALIA 1959/60 - 1996/97
SETTLER ARRIVALS (82)

Year	Asia	%	U.K. and Europe	%	Other	%	Total	%
1959/60	2 694	2.5	97 498	92.1	5 695	5.4	105 887	100
1960/61	3 210	3.0	98 601	91.0	6 480	6.0	108 291	100
1961/62	3 171	3.7	76 467	89.1	6 170	7.2	85 808	100
1962/63	3 801	3.7	91 053	89.4	7 034	6.9	101 888	100
1963/64	3 960	3.2	109 011	89.1	9 347	7.6	122 318	100
1964/65	4 336	3.1	125 402	89.5	10 414	7.4	140 152	100
1965/66	5 842	4.0	127 733	88.7	10 480	7.3	144 055	100
1966/67	6 372	4.6	120 778	87.1	11 526	8.3	138 676	100
1967/68	8 598	6.2	113 034	82.2	15 893	11.6	137 525	100
1968/69	13 610	7.7	141 930	80.8	20 117	11.4	175 657	100
1969/70	16 869	9.1	147 086	79.5	21 144	11.4	185 099	100
1970/71	17 116	10.1	127 174	74.8	25 721	15.1	170 011	100
1971/72	14 645	11.0	94 148	70.9	23 926	18.0	132 719	100
1972/73	12 898	12.0	75 893	70.7	18 610	17.3	107 401	100
1973/74	16 637	14.8	73 682	65.4	22 393	19.9	112 712	100
1974/75	14 491	16.2	56 274	63.1	18 382	20.6	89 147	100
1975/76	11 072	21.0	29 468	55.9	12 208	23.1	52 748	100
1976/77	24 848	35.0	31 169	43.9	14 899	21.0	70 916	100
1977/78	21 693	29.6	32 693	44.7	18 785	25.7	73 171	100
1978/79	23 170	34.5	23 060	34.3	20 962	31.2	67 192	100
1979/80	26 602	32.9	31 276	38.7	22 870	28.3	80 748	100
1980/81	29 112	26.3	52 665	47.6	28 912	26.1	110 689	100
1981/82	31 384	26.6	62 692	53.1	23 955	20.3	118 031	100
1982/83	27 704	29.8	47 377	50.9	17 930	19.3	93 011	100
1983/84	29 660	43.1	23 930	34.8	15 220	22.1	68 810	100
1984/85	35 329	45.6	22 132	28.5	20 047	25.9	77 508	100
1985/86	36 280	39.2	28 099	30.3	28 211	30.5	92 590	100
1986/87	44 656	39.3	36 544	32.2	32 341	28.5	113 541	100
1987/88	57 363	40.0	43 560	30.4	42 543	29.6	143 466	100
1988/89	61 150	42.1	42 438	29.2	41 728	28.7	145 316	100
1989/90	55 560	45.8	38 386	31.7	27 281	22.5	121 227	100
1990/91	67 106	55.1	32 333	26.6	22 249	18.3	121 688	100
1991/92	60 301	56.1	26 870	25.0	20 220	18.8	107 391	100
1992/93	37 586	49.2	22 200	29.1	16 544	21.7	76 330	100
1993/94	31 681	45.4	20 473	29.3	17 614	25.2	69 768	100
1994/95	38 448	44.0	25 523	29.2	23 457	26.8	87 428	100
1995/96	46 087	46.5	26 463	26.7	26 589	26.8	99 139	100
1996/97	37 456	43.7	22 167	25.8	26 129	30.5	85 752	100

Notes:
a) All years listed are financial years: July 1st to June 30th.
b) "Settler" statistics were kept only from January 1959.
c) "Asia" includes "West Asia", except that Cyprus has been included in "Europe".
d) Immigration statistics for 1983/84 have been rounded off.
e) There are slight differences between the immigration figures produced by the Australian Bureau of Statistics (unpublished statistics used in this document) and the Department of Immigration (the Bureau of Immigration, Multicultural and Population Research's Australian Immigration: Consolidated Statistics issues numbered 17 and 18) for the years 1982/83 - 1987/88 (83). The Department of Immigration's figures for those years are produced below, while the Australian Bureau of Statistics' figures are incorporated in the table above.

TABLE THREE
IMMIGRATION FROM ASIA AND EUROPE:
AUSTRALIA 1982/83 - 1987/88
SETTLER ARRIVALS
(Department of Immigration figures) [(84)](#)

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1982/83  28,048 30.1  47,249 50.7   17,880 19.2   93,177   100
1983/84  30,266 43.4  24,212 34.7   15,330 22.0   69,808   100
1984/85  35,661 45.7  22,329 28.6   20,097 25.7   78,087   100
1985/86  36,275 39.2  28,020 30.3   28,115 30.4   92,410   100
1986/87  44,588 39.3  36,434 32.1   36,434 32.1  113,309   100
1987/88  57,397 40.0  43,566 30.4   42,527 29.6  143,490   100
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Appendix Two: Australia Trade with Asia and Europe

TABLE FOUR
IMPORTS BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN
AUSTRALIA 1905-1995 (85)

(1905-1945: values given in millions of pounds)
(1950-1990: values given in millions of dollars)

Year (a)	United Kingdom		Other Europe		U.S.A.		Canada		New Zealand		Japan		Other Asia		All Other		Total	
	£m	%	£m	%	£m	%	£m	%	£m	%	£m	%	£m	%	£m	%	£m	%
1905	18.4	54.9	5.7	17.0	4.6	13.7	0.3	0.9	0.8	2.4	0.3	0.9	2.8	8.3	0.6	1.8	33.5	100
1910	27.7	51.6	10.6	19.7	7.0	13.0	0.7	1.3	1.1	2.0	0.7	1.3	4.5	8.4	1.4	2.6	53.7	100
1915	29.5	50.7	7.3	12.5	9.9	17.0	1.1	1.9	1.4	2.4	1.3	2.2	5.4	9.3	2.3	3.9	58.2	100
1920	35.0	38.9	5.8	6.4	21.7	24.1	2.5	2.8	1.7	1.9	3.8	4.2	15.1	16.8	4.3	4.8	89.9	100
1925	62.8	47.1	14.6	10.9	30.1	22.6	3.1	2.3	1.9	1.4	3.8	2.8	14.1	10.6	2.9	2.2	133.3	100
1930	49.3	41.5	14.0	11.8	27.6	23.2	3.2	2.7	1.4	1.2	3.8	3.2	14.2	11.9	5.4	4.5	118.9	100
1935	35.1	42.5	8.5	10.3	12.6	15.2	4.7	5.7	1.5	1.8	5.3	6.4	10.5	12.7	4.4	5.3	82.6	100
1940	50.1	38.0	9.1	6.9	22.9	17.4	10.4	7.9	1.2	0.9	6.6	5.0	24.5	18.6	7.1	5.4	131.9	100
1945	70.3	33.1	0.4	0.2	81.3	38.3	10.2	4.8	2.0	0.9	0	0	32.5	15.3	15.4	7.3	212.1	100
	$m	%	$m	%	$m	%	$m	%	$m	%	$m	%	$m	%	$m	%	$m	%
1950	557	51.9	111	10.3	104	9.7	27	2.5	10	0.9	14	1.3	182	17.0	67	6.2	1072	100
1955	757	45.0	257	15.3	204	12.1	48	2.8	15	0.9	37	2.2	285	16.9	79	4.7	1682	100
1960	660	35.7	308	16.7	299	16.2	59	3.2	31	1.7	83	4.5	306	16.5	102	5.5	1848	100
1965	761	26.2	508	17.5	692	23.9	117	4.0	47	1.6	259	8.9	396	13.7	118	4.1	2898	100
1970	845	21.8	712	18.4	965	24.9	151	3.9	86	2.2	481	12.4	455	11.7	180	4.6	3875	100
1975	1213	15.0	1708	21.2	1668	20.7	217	2.7	184	2.3	1418	17.6	1361	16.9	301	3.7	8070	100
1980	1648	10.2	3017	18.6	3577	22.0	446	2.7	547	3.4	2527	15.5	3834	23.6	623	3.8	16219	100
1985	2012	6.7	5820	19.4	6816	22.7	620	2.1	1115	3.7	6645	22.1	5974	19.9	1020	3.4	30022	100
1990	3356	6.5	10409	20.3	12373	24.1	1228	2.4	2173	4.2	9872	19.2	10288	20.0	1634	3.2	51333	100
1995	4439	5.9	15159	20.3	16048	21.5	1277	1.7	3554	4.8	12779	17.1	18380	24.6	3002	4.0	74638	100

Notes:
(a) 1905-1910: year ending 31st December. 1915-1945: year ending 30th June. 1950-1985: year ending 31st December. 1990-1995: year ending 30th June.

TABLE FIVE

EXPORTS BY COUNTRY OF DESTINATION
AUSTRALIA 1905-1995 (86)
(1905-1945: values given in millions of pounds)
(1950-1990: values given in millions of dollars)

Year (a)	United Kingdom		Other Europe (b)		U.S.A.		Canada		New Zealand		Japan		Other Asia		All Other		Total	
	£m	%	£m	%	£m	%	£m	%	£m	%	£m	%	£m	%	£m	%	£m	%
1905	22.4	49.3	13.4	29.5	1.1	2.4	–	–	1.3	2.9	0.6	1.3	3.0	6.6	3.6	7.9	45.4	100
1910	35.5	50.8	22.6	32.3	1.6	2.3	0.1	0.1	1.7	2.4	0.7	1.0	2.9	4.1	4.8	6.9	69.9	100
1915	38.2	66.0	3.3	5.7	4.7	8.1	0.3	0.5	2.2	3.8	2.0	3.4	3.1	5.3	4.1	7.1	57.9	100
1920	80.8	56.0	14.8	10.2	11.1	7.7	0.3	0.2	7.7	5.3	7.2	5.0	10.9	7.5	11.5	8.0	144.3	100
1925	69.1	42.9	46.3	28.7	9.2	5.7	0.7	0.4	5.8	3.6	11.6	7.2	7.2	4.5	11.2	6.9	161.1	100
1930	43.4	44.2	25.1	25.6	4.2	4.3	0.7	0.7	3.6	3.7	6.6	6.7	8.4	8.5	6.2	6.3	98.2	100
1935	53.7	51.8	14.4	13.9	2.8	2.7	1.5	1.4	3.6	3.5	12.1	11.7	7.6	7.3	8.0	7.7	103.7	100
1940	96.0	64.2	13.5	9.0	4.9	3.3	3.4	2.3	6.5	4.3	5.5	3.7	10.2	6.8	9.6	6.4	149.6	100
1945	52.1	33.5	2.5	1.6	30.8	19.8	3.8	2.4	7.1	4.6	0	0	23.6	15.2	35.4	22.8	155.3	100
	$m	%	$m	%	$m	%	$m	%	$m	%	$m	%	$m	%	$m	%	$m	%
1950	475	38.7	326	26.6	100	8.1	18	1.5	43	3.5	48	3.9	144	11.7	73	5.9	1227	100
1955	571	37.5	396	26.0	105	6.9	21	1.4	76	5.0	117	7.7	153	10.1	82	5.4	1521	100
1960	476	25.7	460	24.8	152	8.2	28	1.5	109	5.9	269	14.5	231	12.5	129	7.0	1854	100
1965	516	19.6	552	21.0	264	10.0	40	1.5	158	6.0	441	16.7	455	17.3	207	7.9	2633	100
1970	488	11.9	637	15.5	556	13.5	113	2.7	199	4.8	1021	24.9	683	16.6	410	10.0	4107	100
1975	450	5.2	1380	15.9	832	9.6	289	3.3	526	6.0	2455	28.3	1864	21.4	893	10.3	8689	100
1980	949	5.0	3234	17.1	2044	10.8	339	1.8	864	4.6	5083	26.9	4822	25.5	1536	8.1	18871	100
1985	1006	3.3	4506	14.7	3598	11.7	303	1.0	1591	5.2	8043	26.2	8842	28.8	2854	9.3	30743	100
1990	1736	3.5	7176	14.6	5426	11.6	760	1.5	2616	5.3	12781	26.0	15235	31.0	3348	6.8	49078	100
1995	2267	3.4	5957	8.9	4633	6.9	1132	1.7	4768	7.1	16286	24.3	27347	40.8	4646	6.9	67036	100

Notes:
(a) 1905-1910: year ending 31st December. 1915-1995: year ending 30th June.
(b) "Other Europe" 1905-1945 includes only the major European export countries of Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands.

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(4) Cowie, p. 231.

(5) London, p. 19.

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(7) London, p. 20.

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(9) Millar, T.B. "Australian Defence, 1945-1965", in: Greenwood, Gordon and Harper, Norman (eds). *Australia in World Affairs 1961-1965*, F.W. Cheshire, Melbourne, 1968, p. 258.

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(11) *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, William Benton, Chicago, c1971, vol. 6, p. 44A.

(12) Jiggens, John. "A Potted History", *Good Weekend: The Age Magazine*, 2 March 1996, p. 44.

(13) Johanson, David. "History of the White Australia Policy", in: Rivett, Kenneth (ed.) *Immigration: Control or Colour Bar?: The Background to 'White Australia' and a Proposal for Change*, Melbourne University Press, Parkville, 1962, p. 26.

Grant, p. 244.

Greenwood, pp. 83-84.

(14) Johanson, p. 26.

(15) Greenwood, p. 83.

(16) Johanson, p.24.

(17) Johanson, p. 26.

(18) Greenwood, p. 83.

(19) London, pp. 15-18.

(20) London, pp. 130-131.

(21) London, pp. 37-38.

(22) London, Chapter 9 "The Prasad Deportation: A Test Case" pp. 229-258.

(23) London, Chapter 9 "The Prasad Deportation: A Test Case" pp. 229-258.

(24) London, pp. 256-258.

(25) Mackie, Jamie. "The Immigration Reform Group: Some Recollections", in: Viviani, Nancy (ed.) *The Abolition of the White Australia Policy: The Immigration Reform Group Revisited*, Centre for the Study of Australia-Asia Relations, Faculty of Asian and International Studies, Griffith University, Queensland, 1992, p. 25.

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(26) **1)** The Immigration Reform Group was founded in Melbourne (most of its founders came from the University of Melbourne); as was the Student Action organisation.

Brawley, Sean. "Long Hairs and Ratbags. The ALP and the Abolition of the White Australia Policy", in: Whitlam, Gough; et al. *A Century of Social Change*, Pluto Press; in association with the New South Wales Branch of the Australian Labor Party, Leichhardt; Haymarket, NSW, 1992, pp. 206, 207, 216 (endnote 19).

London, pp. 123-124, 132.

Mackie, Jamie. "The Immigration Reform Group: Some Recollections", in: Viviani, Nancy (ed.) *The Abolition of the White Australia Policy: The Immigration Reform Group Revisited*, p. 25.

2) It was from the Victorian and Western Australian ALP delegates that the call to remove White Australia from the ALP's Policy had come at the 1963 ALP Federal Conference.

Brawley, p. 208.

3) It was Melbourne that provided the largest anti-Vietnam War protest march: "On 8 May, 1970 the Vietnam Moratorium Campaign took place. More than 70,000 people - it may have been 100,000 or more - marched in Melbourne. There were 25,000 in Sydney, 8,000 in Brisbane, 6,000 in Adelaide, 3,000 in Perth, 3,000 in Hobart and 6,000 more in other parts of Australia".

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(27) London, p. 133.

Rivett, Ken. "The Immigration Reform Movement", in: Viviani, Nancy (ed.) *The Abolition of the White Australia Policy: The Immigration Reform Group Revisited*, p. 11.

(28) Greenwood, p. 84.

(29) Horne, Donald. *The Lucky Country: Australia in the Sixties*, Penguin, Ringwood, Victoria, 1964 (reprinted 1966), p. 130.

(30) Chipman, Lauchlan. "The Zealots", *Quadrant*, May 1984, pp. 16-28 (p. 17).

O'Brien, Patrick. *The Liberals: Factions, Feuds and Fancies*, Penguin, Ringwood, Victoria, 1985, p. 126.

(31) Chipman, p. 17.

O'Brien, p. 126.

(32) It has been postulated that the work of the Immigration Reform Groups "may have had a multiple effect through the thousands of young teacher graduates who sojourned in schools during the 1960s".

McQueen, Humphrey. *Gallipoli To Petrov: Arguing With Australian History*, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1984, p. 151.

(33) Cook, Christopher (ed.) *Pears Cyclopaedia* (1980-81 edition), Pelham Books, London, c1980, p. C4.

Tweedie, Sandra. *Trading Partners: Australia and Asia 1790-1993*, University of New South Wales Press, Sydney, 1994, p. 7.

Vamplew, Wray (ed.) *Australians, Historical Statistics*, Fairfax, Syme and Weldon, 1987, Broadway, NSW, pp. 193, 196, 201, 204.

(34) For more detailed information on Australian trade, see Appendix Two.

(35) Calwell, A.A. "A Migrant Nation", in: *The World and South East Asia*, Oswald Ziegler Enterprises, Sydney, Nov. 1972, p. 156.

(36) Smith, Rhonda L. "Australian Immigration 1945-1975", in: *Population, Immigration and the Australian Economy*, Croom Helm, London, c1979, pp.37-38.

(37) Patmore, Greg. *Australian Labor History*, Longman Cheshire, Melbourne, 1991, p. 200-201.

(38) Patmore, pp. 201-202.

Australia and Immigration: 1788 to 1988, AGPS, Canberra, c1988, p. 32.

(39) Grant, Bruce. *The Australian Dilemma: A New Kind of Western Society*, McDonald Futura Australia, Rushcutters Bay, New South Wales, 1983, pp. 241-242.

(40) Smith, p. 41.

(41) Smith, p. 40.

1788-1975: Australia and Immigration, AGPS, Canberra, 1975, p. 10.

Australia and Immigration: 1788 to 1988, AGPS, Canberra, c1988, p. 31.

(42) *1788-1975: Australia and Immigration*, AGPS, Canberra, 1975, p. 10.

Australia and Immigration: 1788 to 1988, AGPS, Canberra, c1988, p. 36.

(43) *Australia and Immigration: 1788 to 1988*, AGPS, Canberra, c1988, p. 36.

1788-1975: Australia and Immigration, p. 10.

Smith, p. 40.

(44) *Australia and Immigration: 1788 to 1988*, AGPS, Canberra, c1988, p. 31.

1788-1975: Australia and Immigration, p. 11.

(45) Greenwood, pp. 81-82.

(46) *Australia and Immigration: 1788 to 1988*, AGPS, Canberra, c1988, p. 42.

1788-1975: Australia and Immigration, AGPS, Canberra, 1975, p. 11.

Smith, p. 40.

Year Book Australia 1990, AGPS, Canberra, c1989, p. 137.

(47) *1788-1975: Australia and Immigration*, AGPS, Canberra, 1975, p. 11.

Australia and Immigration: 1788 to 1988, AGPS, Canberra, c1988, p. 43.

(48) Greenwood, p. 82.

(49) Calwell, A.A. *Be Just and Fear Not*, Lloyd O'Neil, Hawthorn, Victoria, 1972, p. 108-109.

(50) Grant, p. 242.

(51) Calwell, A.A. "A Migrant Nation", in: *The World and South East Asia*, Oswald Ziegler Enterprises, Sydney, Nov. 1972, p. 157.

(52) Betts, Katharine. *Ideology and Immigration*, Melbourne University Press, Carlton, 1988, p. 105.

(53) Brawley, p. 205.

(54) Brawley, p. 203-204.

(55) Brawley, p. 206.

Don Dunstan recalled that he was summoned to Calwell's office, following the 1961 attempt, and submitted to a tirade: "He (Calwell) said it would ruin the Party if we altered the immigration policy and that it was only cranks, long hairs, academics and do-gooders who wanted the change and that the worker would never stand for it. We stood our ground. He called in Gough Whitlam and demanded that Gough, as a loyal deputy, support him. Gough said 'Wait one moment. I have been careful always to support you publicly. But inside the Party if you call me before a Party Committee and ask my opinion I will give you my own. And I think it morally indefensible that a social democratic Party should have the words "Maintenance of White Australia" in its platform.' Arthur looked as if he were about to have apoplexy".

Dunstan, Don. *Felicia - The Political Memoirs of Don Dunstan*, Macmillan, Melbourne, 1981, p. 91; cited in: Brawley, p. 215 (endnote 14).

(56) Brawley, p. 206, 217 (endnote 45).

(57) Brawley, pp. 206-211.

(58) Brawley, p. 208.

(59) *The Age*, 19 July 1963, cited in: Brawley, p. 208.

(60) Brawley, pp. 208-211.

Calwell later stated, in his autobiography, that "For political and diplomatic reasons, the 1965 Federal ALP conference removed the words 'White Australia' from the Labor Party platform. We certainly did not try to water down the policy nor take the ideal of a White Australia from the hearts and minds of the Australian people. Nobody will ever be able to do that".

Calwell, A.A. *Be Just and Fear Not*, Lloyd O'Neil, Hawthorn, Victoria, 1972, p. 120.

(61) Jupp, James. *Australian Party Politics*, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1968; cited in: Brawley, p. 215 (endnote 12).

(62) Brawley, pp. 206, 211.

(63) Brawley, pp. 210-212.

Calwell, A.A. *Be Just and Fear Not*, p. 121.

(64) Brawley, pp. 212-213.

(65) Arthur Calwell was not at all impressed with the wave of middle-class people that had flowed into the ALP, or with the subsequent "New Guard" that arose. He later said, during the New Guard's attempts at immigration reform, that Gough Whitlam and Lance Barnard (later to be Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister) were in no sense "labour men".

It is heavy irony that the Labor Party was finally brought to power by a brand of people who can be seen to be as actually anti-Labor. In perhaps unintentional support of Calwell's statement, Sean Brawley stated that "In the mid-1960's, James Jupp noted the strange association of Australian Labor with notions of xenophobia. He found this difficult to reconcile in a Party committed to democratic socialism. Yet by the time the ALP finally overcame this xenophobia many commentators claimed the Party had become little more than the Party of a petty bourgeoisie."

Brawley, pp. 211, 213.

(66) Trood, Russell and McNamara, Deborah (eds). *The Asia-Australia Survey 1994*, Macmillan Education Australia, South Melbourne, 1994, p. 290.

(67) Although Indo-China is regarded by many as consisting of just the three countries of Vietnam, Laos, and Kampuchea (Cambodia) - which do form French Indo-China - it technically comprises, in addition to French Indo-China: Burma, Thailand, and West Malaysia.
Webster's New Geographical Dictionary, G. and C. Merriam, Springfield, Massachusetts, c1980, p. 538.

(68) Grant, pp. 244-245.

(69) Rivett, Ken (ed.) ("for the Immigration Reform Group"). *Australia and the Non-White Migrant*, Melbourne University Press, Carlton South, Victoria, 1975, p. 40.

(70) Mackie, Jamie. "The Immigration Reform Group: Some Recollections", in: Viviani, Nancy (ed.) *The Abolition of the White Australia Policy: The Immigration Reform Group Revisited*, p. 26.
Rivett, Ken. "The Immigration Reform Movement", in: Viviani, Nancy (ed.) *The Abolition of the White Australia Policy: The Immigration Reform Group Revisited*, p. 11.

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(72) Palfreeman, A.C. *The Administration of the White Australia Policy*, Melbourne University Press, (Parkville, Victoria), 1967, p. 4.

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(74) Greenwood, p. 85.

(75) Jones, Margaret. "Open Doors For Asians Say Reformers", *Sydney Morning Herald*, 6 August 1970, p. 8.

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"PM Explains His Role At Singapore Conference", *The Australian*, 26 January 1971, p. 4.

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(80) Rivett, Ken (ed.) ("for the Immigration Reform Group"). *Australia and the Non-White Migrant*, p. vi.

(81) Castles, Stephen. "The "New" Migration and Australian Immigration Policy", in: Inglis, Christine; S. Gunasekaran, S.; Sullivan, Gerard; and Wu, Chung-Tong (eds). *Asians in Australia: The Dynamics of Migration and Settlement*, Allen and Unwin, St. Leonards, NSW, 1992, p. 70.

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1968/69 - 1972/73 figures: Department of Immigration. *Australian Immigration: Consolidated Statistics No. 7*, AGPS, Canberra, 1973, pp. 58-61, Table 24.
1973/74 - 1981/82 figures: Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs. *Australian Immigration: Consolidated Statistics No. 13, 1982*, AGPS, Canberra, 1984, pp. 60-63, Table 24.
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1976/77 - 1996/97 figures confirmed by using:

Australian Bureau of Statistics, Unpublished Statistics (on microfiche): "MIG011B, Overseas Arrivals and Departures" (financial years 1977 to 1983); "PMTP009A, Total Arrivals" (financial year 1984); "PMTR009A, Total Arrivals" (financial years 1985 to 1989); and "PMTR005A, Total Arrivals" (financial years 1989 to 1997).

Note: A minor corrective adjustment of 109 has been made to the 1975/76 figures for the Permanent Arrivals (Settlers) table since the Oct. 1996 and Dec. 1996 editions of this publication.

(83) Issues of Australian Immigration: Consolidated Statistics up to, and including, edition number 16, followed the Australian Bureau of Statistics' definition used for Settler status (refer to Settler Arrival statistics, with particular regard to the years 1982/83 - 1987/88). Australian Immigration: Consolidated Statistics from editions numbered 17 and 18 followed the Department of Immigration's definition used for Settler status (again - refer to Settler Arrival statistics, with particular regard to the years 1982/83 - 1987/88).

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(85) Castles, Ian (ed.) *Year Book Australia 1994*, Australian Bureau of Statistics, Canberra, c1993, pp. 768-770.

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