

# THE WHITE AUSTRALIA POLICY IN RETROSPECT

## RACISM OR REALISM?

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### INTRODUCTION

Over the past thirty years, Australia, along with just about every other Western society, has been transformed by a revolution engineered from the top down by the leading echelons of the corporate welfare state.<sup>1</sup> New Class cadres of managers, professionals, politicians, and academics have dismantled the foundations of Australian nationhood laid down at the time of Federation.<sup>2</sup> The arbitration system, the protective tariff, and the White Australia Policy: All have gone in order to facilitate the free flow of capital, technology, and labor in a globalist economy.

The most revolutionary, by far, of these radical changes has been the decision to open Australia to mass Third World immigration. In taking this step, the managerial regime has, in effect, followed the wry advice tendered by Bertolt Brecht to the East German government on the occasion of the worker's revolt in 1956: Rather than relying on crude repressive measures, Brecht suggested, the Communist regime should simply dissolve the people and elect a new one.<sup>3</sup> Indeed, since the end of the Second World War a strange alliance of Communists, Christian churches, ethnic lobbies, and other pressure groups working through the corporate sector and within the centralized apparatus of state power set out deliberately to flood the Anglo-Australian homeland with a polyglot mass of Third World immigrants.

Chief among the ideological weapons deployed in that campaign have been the interwoven myths of equality and universal human rights.<sup>4</sup> The official ideology of the globalist regime has been enshrined in the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.<sup>5</sup> According to that document, "any doctrine of superiority based on racial differentiation is scientifically false, morally condemnable, socially unjust and dangerous." There can therefore be "no justification for racial discrimination, in theory or in practice, anywhere." Those who subscribed to the doctrine of racial egalitarianism were bound to oppose a color bar on immigration to Australia as being both immoral and pointless: It was axiomatic that "racial differences are not significant differences that need divide mankind."<sup>6</sup>

Racial egalitarianism rather obviously flies in the face of the more realistic premises of the White Australia Policy. The founding fathers of the Australian nation regarded racial differences as a fact of life and racial conflict as the inevitable consequence of a multiracial society. In their view, ethnic homogeneity was one of the great strengths of the Australian nation, one that ought to be preserved and not squandered or thrown away in pursuit of utopian visions of universal harmony in which lions could be reeducated to lie down with lambs.<sup>7</sup>

Forty years after Australian governments began to distance themselves from the White Australia Policy, advances in genetics, paleoanthropology, psychology, and medical science are placing the universalist doctrines of racial egalitarianism under serious pressure. A vast range of studies in a number of disciplines have revealed real and important differences between the races in cognitive and athletic ability, behavior and temperament.<sup>8</sup> Faced with such intellectual challenges, defenders of the ruling orthodoxy are resorting to social ostracism, legal repression, and even the sort of physical coercion deployed against members of the One Nation Party some years back.<sup>9</sup> The time is clearly ripe for a courageous and well-informed reappraisal of the White Australia Policy and the decision to dismantle it. Unfortunately, racial realists, concerned to bring common sense to contemporary Australian debates over race and immigration, will be disappointed with two recent books on the White Australia Policy. Both promise much but deliver little because of their authors' determined refusal to take race seriously.

### WAS THE WHITE AUSTRALIA POLICY "RACIST"?

The first of these books to appear was written by Keith Windschuttle, a former Marxist academic turned independent neoconservative writer. Hot on the heels of his controversial revision of the "black armband" view of Aboriginal history,<sup>10</sup> Windschuttle has upset yet another academic applecart. In *The White Australia Policy*,<sup>11</sup> he sets out to refute the orthodox leftist charge that the immigration legislation enacted shortly after Federation was "racist." On the formal level that is easily done, since the Immigration Restriction Act, 1901 (Cth) did not explicitly prohibit nonwhite immigration. Instead, prospective immigrants were required to pass a dictation test by writing out fifty words in any European language selected by immigration officials.

But because both the intent and the practical effect of the dictation test were to sharply limit colored immigration, Australia was open to attack from progressives around the world and, especially during the Cold War, from newly assertive postcolonial regimes in Asia and Africa. Over the last forty years, a homegrown generation of New Left historians routinely portrayed Australia as a racist pariah nation on a par with South Africa. Ever since the Sixties generation began its long march through the institutions, Australians

have been taught to approach their past in a self-hating mood of enthusiastic shame. To his credit, Windschuttle has been one of the few historians to resist this form of intellectual self-flagellation.

Unfortunately, Windschuttle's rehabilitation of the White Australia Policy is premised on a familiar, if pernicious, tenet of neoconservatism: Like those who claim that the United States is a "creedal nation,"<sup>12</sup> Windschuttle maintains that the operating premise of Australian society is the proposition that all people are equal in principle and in potential. Supposedly, Australia's national identity is "based on a civic patriotism," thereby fostering "loyalty to Australia's liberal democratic political institutions rather than to race or ethnicity." He contends that the White Australia Policy, far from being the reactionary spawn of an irredeemably racist nation, grew out of a long-established, progressive program aiming "to extend both the freedom and the dignity of labour."<sup>13</sup>

Earlier movements to end slavery throughout the British Empire and the transportation of convicts to Australia culminated in a concerted campaign to prevent the importation of cheap coolie labor from Asia and the Pacific islands. Windschuttle claims, therefore, that opposition to Asian immigration was not grounded in fears of "racial contamination." Rather, politicians were concerned both to protect the standard of living of Australian workers and to prevent the emergence of "a racially-based political underclass" that would undermine Australia's egalitarian democracy.<sup>14</sup>

This argument rests upon a false dichotomy. Australia's egalitarian democracy was conceived as a new and better Britannia.<sup>15</sup> Who could have doubted that antipodean Britons, too, were white Europeans? By the turn of the twentieth century, references to the "crimson thread of kinship" binding Australians to the mother country had become a staple of political rhetoric.<sup>16</sup> Most Australians hardly needed to be reminded that blood is thicker than water; nevertheless, Windschuttle portrays their leaders as proto-Boasian anthropologists,<sup>17</sup> rejecting any suggestion that racial differences marked a permanent or intractable barrier between different branches of the human brotherhood. Windschuttle maintains that most early twentieth century Australians were confident that Chinese and Indian laborers would become indistinguishable from white Australians of British stock once they were detached from the environments fostering their historic cultures of servility.<sup>18</sup>

Windschuttle concedes that the immigration restriction movement did attract support from "unequivocally racist" elements. Indeed, he savors the irony in the fact that in early twentieth-century Australia, the most sympathetic audience for racial nationalism was found among the bohemian writers, artists, and intellectuals of the leftist intelligentsia. That elite minority, then famously associated with the *Bulletin* magazine, bears an "uncanny resemblance" to the "chattering classes" now: "they agree on almost everything, with the conspicuous exception of immigration policy, where their positions are reversed."<sup>19</sup>

### REVOLUTION FROM ABOVE?

By contrast, Windschuttle insists, mainstream Australians have never subscribed to biological theories of race. Influenced instead by the universalistic principles of both evangelical Christianity and the Scottish Enlightenment, they have refused to treat white Europeans as superior and other races as innately and permanently inferior. This, then, is the crux of Windschuttle's argument: Because the White Australia Policy was never based on racial nationalism, it could be – and was – readily jettisoned once the original political, economic, and cultural justifications for its adoption lost their potency. "The proof that Australia wore the policy lightly was the ease with which it discarded it."<sup>20</sup>

In other words, if the White Australia Policy really had been steeped in "racist paranoia," it would be difficult to explain the fact that dismantling it in the twenty years from the mid-1950s onward "required no major cultural upheaval and was accomplished with a minimum of fuss by liberal politicians with values similar to those held by the original sceptics and critics when immigration restrictions were introduced in 1901."<sup>21</sup>

Windschuttle is mainly concerned with the rise of the immigration restriction movement. His argument with the academic establishment is pitched as a simple matter of historical fact: Was the White Australia Policy "racist" or not? Another recent book, *The Long, Slow Death of White Australia*, by Gwenda Tavan, deals with its demise. In her first chapter, Tavan differs from Windschuttle on the reasons for the ascendancy of White Australia, insisting that racism and xenophobia were driving forces in the campaign to restrict nonwhite immigration. But, like Windschuttle, she is struck by the ease with which opponents of the White Australia Policy were able to overturn it. Her brief is to rebut the most obvious explanation for the lack of massive popular resistance to such a fundamental change: namely, that the White Australia Policy was dismantled by an elite conspiracy operating in stealth, leaving the Australian people in the dark concerning the nature and magnitude of the mass Third World immigration soon to be inflicted upon them.<sup>22</sup>

Tavan is not especially convincing in her effort to demonstrate that the Australian public readily accepted higher non-European immigration as early as the 1970s. Her main evidence is the fact that the Whitlam government was reelected in 1974, even after its Minister for Immigration, Al Grassby, publicly proclaimed his determination to bury the White Australia Policy. Of course Whitlam's Labor government was soundly rejected by the electorate in 1975. The incoming Fraser government certainly had no mandate to promote a massive influx of nonwhite immigrants. Nevertheless, it joined with the Australian Labor Party to forge a bipartisan consensus in favor of Third World immigration.

For decades, there was no effective political opposition to the revolution from above in immigration law and policy. Among the managerial and professional classes, a complacently "cosmopolitan" consensus reigned supreme;

the political equilibrium was not upset until the meteoric rise of the One Nation party in the late 1990s. Then, for a brief, shining moment, the patriotic instincts of the more "parochial," outer suburban, white Australians found a political voice.<sup>23</sup> Much to the relief of the political class, however, that too often tongue-tied voice of populist protest was largely ineffectual and, in any case, was soon silenced.

Concerned to counter suggestions that the new regime lacked popular support from the beginning, Tavan cites opinion polls from the mid-1970s favoring the then-current rate of Asian migration. When weighing such evidence, one wonders how citizens then would have responded to pollsters had they been presented with an accurate picture of how Sydney and Melbourne, in particular, would look after thirty years of colonization by Third World immigrants. Tavan acknowledges that "debate still continues" over how many nonwhites should be allowed to enter while insisting that "a majority of Australians since the 1960s have unequivocally rejected any policy that would completely bar non-Europeans from settling." White Australia, she maintains, is no longer a "dominant worldview"; at most, it persists as a "residual cultural form." Even so, she concedes that "the battle against White Australia is not completely won." From Pauline Hanson to the *Tampa* incident,<sup>24</sup> recent events have revealed that "the [white, Anglo-Celtic] racial-cultural ideals" of Australian nationhood have never been completely extinguished. Tavan fears that, like the slow, silent combustion of an underground coal seam, the fiery force of white racial consciousness may burst, without warning, through the surface somnolence secured, so far, by the multiracialist mullahs of the media, the human rights industry, and the educational establishment.<sup>25</sup>

Tavan clearly shares Windschuttle's conventionally progressive views on the nature and significance of race. As committed racial egalitarians, both writers desperately want to drive a stake through the heart of racial realism, once and for all. Tavan and Windschuttle still worry that, despite having been in a state of suspended animation for several decades, residual forms of racial identity might someday reawaken in the hearts of white Australians, perhaps even with renewed vigor and enhanced vitality. For that reason, Windschuttle happily joins the left in its attack upon race as "an unscientific category," as a thoroughly modern, bad idea "engendered by the new social sciences and brought to maturity by the evolutionary biology of the nineteenth century."<sup>26</sup> In the battle between racial realism and racial egalitarianism, former Professor Windschuttle joins his old revolutionary comrades on the barricades, resolutely denying that differences between "races" have a biological or genetic foundation.

In his thoroughly orthodox opinion, nineteenth century anthropology and biology took a wrong turn when they denied "Enlightenment and Evangelical ideas about the unity of humanity." For him, the evident differences between the various races of mankind are the malleable product of their cultures and



the particular stage each may have reached in the long ascent from savagery to civilization. No race is permanently incapable of change and development. Somewhat imprudently, Windschuttle suggests that to take any other view on this question "is to betray one's ignorance of the subject."<sup>27</sup> In fact, to anyone familiar with the rapidly expanding literature on the genetic character of racial differences, Windschuttle's dogmatism is a clear case of what American commentator Steve Sailer calls racial flat-earthism.<sup>28</sup>

### BIOLOGY AND CULTURE

There is still room for debate on the precise genetic contribution to any given racial difference in, for example, intelligence, temperament, criminality, and athletic ability. But that such racial differences do exist and that they have a biological basis is not any longer open to serious scientific question. As Vincent Sarich and Frank Miele put it, "the case for race hinges on recognition that genetic variation in traits that affect performance and ultimately survival is the fuel on which the evolutionary process runs." Without that "functional genetic variation, there can be no adaptive evolution." Variation "is the norm...and not...the exception in the case of humans." In fact, Sarich and Miele suggest that the range of genetic variation between different races of *Homo sapiens* is much greater than for any other species, including domesticated dogs. They observe that commonly used genetic tests can determine with great precision not just an individual's race but also "the percentage of racial background in people of mixed ancestry." But until very recently it was impossible to detect the genetic markers distinguishing a cocker spaniel from a wolf.<sup>29</sup>

Race exists and it matters across a wide range of public policy issues. It is of particular relevance to any analysis of immigration law and policy. Windschuttle, however, is determined to remain uncontaminated by the new sciences of racial difference. He does recognize the seemingly insuperable *cultural* barriers alienating mainstream Australians from other racial groups, particularly the Chinese. Nevertheless he asserts that it is a fundamental error "to slide from the concept of culture to that of race."<sup>30</sup> Since cultural differences are not inbred and immutable, there is no insuperable barrier to the assimilation of large numbers of nonwhite migrants into Australian society.

But what if Windschuttle is wrong? What if racial differences are, in large part, biologically or genetically grounded? What if even culture is not simply a social construct but, rather, a phenomenon with a substantial biological component? Windschuttle does document the dominance of Enlightenment and Christian influences in middle Australia, demonstrating that explicitly racist ideologies have had little appeal to opinion leaders in Australia. But that may mean only that Australians, like other ethnic groups tracing their ancestry to Northwestern Europe, are predisposed to individualism, exogamy, and small nuclear families and, as a consequence, display a relative lack of ethnocentrism.

Thus what Windschuttle describes as a creedal commitment to racial egalitarianism may actually be a defining characteristic of a distinctive European racial identity not shared by other peoples. Kevin MacDonald explains Western "cultural" traits as an evolutionary adaptation to the rigors of life in cold, ecologically adverse climates. Natural selection worked there to favor the reproductive success of those individuals capable of sustaining "non-kinship based forms of reciprocity."<sup>31</sup>

Over time, individualistic social structures encouraged the emergence in England of the common law of property and contract and, later still, the emergence of impersonal corporate forms of business enterprise, all requiring cooperation between strangers. The distinctive culture that emerged from the interaction between the genotype of the English people and their environment can be understood as what Richard Dawkins calls an extended phenotype.<sup>32</sup> Like the spider's web or the beaver's dam, the extended phenotypes of Western civilization are part of a biocultural feedback loop linking our genes with our environment over countless generations.<sup>33</sup>

The extended phenotype produced by the English people finds its greatest political expression in the phenomenon of nationhood. Appearing first of all in England, the idea of the nation could be understood as what Richard Dawkins might call a "meme"<sup>34</sup> that has been only imperfectly or not at all replicated in the bioculture of other, particularly non-European, races. Some scholars, however, deny that English nationhood is the product of a primordial English ethnicity. It is often remarked that there are very few nations that seem to be ethnically homogeneous and that England is not one of them. On this view, the English nation "emerged out of populations deposited by successive waves of alien conquest." It was "through the merging or assimilation of peoples who were originally distinct" that a single English nation arose. According to Margaret Canovan, English nationhood "was in no sense a reflection of primordial ties of blood." On the contrary, the English nation was remarkably *inclusive*, taking in not only the scions of Danish, Norman, Saxon, and some Welsh stock, "but also (and, at the time, more significantly) nobles and commoners." Canovan's case would appear to be clinched by the "subsequent expansion of English into *British* identity," carrying "the nation even farther away from anything resembling primordial ethnicity."<sup>35</sup>

### CONSTITUTIONAL PATRIOTISM

It seems, then, that civic rather than ethnic nationalism has been the defining feature of not just Australian and American but British identity as well. Roger Scruton lends support to that suggestion when he remarks that modern citizenship presupposes a society of strangers: "The good citizen recognizes obligations towards people who are not, and cannot be, known to him." Such a society of strangers cannot survive without "the kind of courage, discipline

and self-sacrifice that stem from civic patriotism."<sup>36</sup> But neither Canovan nor Scruton embraces the bloodless vision of constitutional patriotism promoted by Keith Windschuttle and the American neo-conservatives. For her part, Canovan acknowledges that nations "are political communities that are experienced as if they were communities of kin." She adds, however, that "the 'as if' is vital."<sup>37</sup> In doing so, she seeks to mark out a middle position between ethnic and civic nationalism.

Neither Canovan nor Scruton believes that a nation can be grounded in an abstract loyalty to a particular political regime or constitutional order. Under the label of constitutional patriotism, Windschuttle is marketing a thoroughly artificial nationhood. Inhabiting an ancestral homeland, a real nation binds its citizens together in an inherited community of memory, language, culture, and, indeed, of blood. Citizens are members of a pre-political community that includes the living, their ancestors, and their unborn offspring. Absent generations are among the strangers to whom the good citizen is bound in "a common web of rights and duties."<sup>38</sup> Canovan, too, affirms both that, within any particular nation, "many fellow-nationals really will be blood relations" and that "nations depend upon the symbolism of kinship for much of their emotional appeal." But she rejects the claims of ethnic nationalism, pointing out that "much of that kinship is imagined kinship, and a good deal of it is always fictitious."<sup>39</sup>

The problem with Canovan's argument is that she does not give sufficient weight to the "peculiarities of the English."<sup>40</sup> As a consequence, like Windschuttle, in relation to the White Australia Policy, she sets up a false dichotomy between ethnic and civic nationalism. In the case of England and the old white dominions settled by people of British stock, including the United States, there is simply no contradiction between the two. That is part of the reason why, for two hundred years after the emergence of the English nation, it was the *only* nation.<sup>41</sup> Even those citizens of a modern nation who are blood relations are expected to treat each other publicly "as if" they were strangers bound together by a willingness to recognize the fundamental constitutional norms associated with the rule of law, representative government, and individual rights.<sup>42</sup> Only a people such as the English, characterized by the "non-kinship based forms of reciprocity" associated with Protestant Christianity, monogamy and companionate marriage, nuclear families, a marked de-emphasis on extended kinship relations, and a strong tendency towards individualism, could possibly succeed in creating such a "society of strangers."<sup>43</sup>

It is true, of course, that the English nation was the hybrid product of many preexisting ethnic groups. But the fact is that the ingredients in the ethnic stew that ultimately produced the English people and, later still, British nation, were not all that genetically remote from one another. Indeed, the Danes, the Saxons, and the Normans were closely related Germanic peoples and the



genetic distance between the English, the Scots, and the Irish was not much more significant. Precisely because all of the Germanic peoples were relatively individualistic and comparatively less ethnocentric than Eurasian and African races, they were able to overcome their group differences when they encountered each other in England, merging into a new ethny possessed of its own distinctive language, religion, and way of life.

The relative inclusiveness of English national identity was replicated in the settler dominions. In fact, the English, Irish, Scottish, Welsh, and even continental European settlers in colonial America, English Canada, Australia, and New Zealand fused together to become more British than the British in their new homelands. The creation of those colonial British cultures was an important first step on the road to creating new national identities as Americans, Australians, Canadians, and New Zealanders.<sup>44</sup> Civic nationalism was, therefore, a meme replicated best and most easily through the vehicle provided by the Anglo-Saxon genotype. This exposes a fundamental paradox built into the free and open societies of the West: The only racial groups able to fit seamlessly into the society of strangers constituting a civic nation are those whose members can easily shed the deeply ingrained ethnocentrism and xenophobia characterizing most non-European peoples. Receptivity to civic nationalism, in other words, is found only in a relatively few, mainly northwestern European, ethnic or racial groups.

Unfortunately, over the past two centuries the nationhood meme has undergone a monstrous mutation. Originally, the English nation created the state as a medium for political self-expression. Since then, the transnational corporate welfare state has taken on a life of its own, asserting its power and right to recreate the nation and its people in whatever form it chooses. The result in Australia was the covert decision by political, corporate, and cultural elites to abandon the White Australia Policy.

### THE DOWNSIDE OF DIVERSITY

The conventional wisdom holds that "race" is merely an imaginary social construct; all significant group differences are the malleable products of "culture." Therefore, it is said, social engineering by enlightened policy-makers can overcome racial divisions in polyethnic societies. Now, it is true that biology is not destiny; morality and character also work to shape individual and group behavior. But they, too, are intertwined intimately with the predispositions built into "racial" genotypes. As a consequence, ethnic conflict is an inescapable fact of life. Unfortunately, those who abandoned the White Australia Policy were driven by a dogged determination to deny the reality of racial differences in favor of a sweeping cultural revolution.

According to the *Shorter Oxford English Dictionary*, "culture" denotes "the refinement of mind, tastes and manners." Clearly there can be no "mind, tastes or manners" without a brain and the body that houses it. And, if the biology

of the brain and the body differs between “races” (or sexes, for that matter), as it does,<sup>45</sup> it will be reflected in their respective cultures. This would be a thoroughly uncontroversial proposition but for the ideologically driven efforts of Boasian anthropology to treat “culture” as a “super-organic” phenomenon altogether detached from human biology. As Roger Sandall remarks, “the anthropological concept of culture is far too general for its own good, a fact which makes its ‘explanatory importance’ hard to evaluate – because it explains everything, it also tends to explain nothing.”<sup>46</sup>

One need not resort to a crude genetic determinism to recognize the deeply entrenched character of cultural differences between racial groups. The culture of any given racial group is never static; it changes and develops, for better or for worse. Black Africans, for example, have been present in large numbers in America for almost four hundred years. During that time, their culture has been transformed in countless ways. But never have they been successfully integrated into the common culture of white Americans. It remains an open question whether other races can be absorbed into either the American or the Australian nation more easily than the now militantly hyphenated African-Americans.

Experience with the overseas Chinese diaspora throughout the Pacific Rim also gives cause for concern.<sup>47</sup> As the numerous Chinese colonies in Australia’s largest cities grow in size, wealth, and power, even their Australian-born members may be reluctant to dissolve their ancient collective identity into an individualistic society of strangers owing allegiance to nothing beyond a modern paper constitution, now divorced from its own ancestral roots. Thousands of years ago, the Chinese took an evolutionary path favoring the growth of centralized, authoritarian regimes; not surprisingly, the Chinese today place a premium on clannish behavior and downplay the worth of individual creativity. The result has been a people marked by higher average intelligence—but more conformity, hierarchy, and racial solidarity—than northwestern European societies.

Even when faced with competition from highly cohesive ethnic groups such as the Chinese, a great many individualistic Australians remain utterly oblivious to their own genetic interest in a racially homogeneous society. The demographic threat to that interest grows as immigrants are drawn from racial groups whose genotypes are ever more distant from Australia’s largely European gene pool. Like any other ethno-nation, white Australians constitute a large, partly inbred, extended family.<sup>48</sup> Since an ethny is “analogous to a population of cousins,” even distant kin “carry genetic interests for each other.” But, because—at any given level of technology—the Australian landmass has a finite carrying capacity, mass immigration must replace future Australian children with those of other, more or less unrelated, ethnic extended families.

The damage caused by Third World immigration to the genetic interests of European peoples can now be quantified with considerable precision.

Frank Salter has calculated that if England, for example, received 12.5 million closely related Danish immigrants, the genetic loss to the remaining English would be relatively low, amounting to the equivalent of 209,000 children (still a large family to lose). But the same number of immigrants from India would cause a corresponding loss of 2.6 million children. Since black, sub-Saharan Africans are even more genetically distant from the English, an influx of 12.5 million Bantus would displace the equivalent of 13 million English children. The genetic losses to the English would be greater still if Indians or Bantus had fertility rates higher than the host population.<sup>49</sup>

Apart from the objective genetic interests at stake, a multiracial society forces white Australians to bear other, more subjectively painful social, economic and political costs. At the high end of Australia's immigrant intake, a growing cognitive elite of East Asians threatens to become similar to "market-dominant minorities" such as the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia, Jews in Russia, or Indians in East Africa.<sup>50</sup> Faced with competition from a growing East Asian population, white Australians now find themselves outgunned: Western-style "old boy" preference networks are only weakly ethnic in character, and, thus, permeable, making them no match for the institutionally directed, in-group solidarity or "ethnic nepotism" practiced by other groups. Endowed with an edge in IQ and a temperament conducive to rigorous regimes of coaching, rote learning, and stricter parental discipline, young East Asians already dominate the competition for places in universities and professional schools. Within two to three decades, it is not unreasonable to expect that Australia will have a heavily Asian managerial-professional ruling class that will not hesitate to promote the interests of coethnics at the expense of white Australians.<sup>51</sup>

There is no shortage of Chinese authority for such predictions. A recent book by the Philippine-born Chinese-American Amy Chua provides a striking discussion of the intractable conflicts between the overseas Chinese and the host populations of just about every country in Southeast Asia. In the Philippines, for example, the Chinese minority, representing only 1 percent of the population, controls over 60 percent of the economy. Such a lopsided situation generates widespread resentment among Filipinos. This simmering tension boiled over onto Chua's own family when an elderly aunt was murdered by her Filipino chauffeur, a crime all but ignored by Filipino police.<sup>52</sup> Similar conflicts are an inescapable fact of life almost everywhere in Southeast Asia, most famously in Malaysia, where locals became so incensed over the dominance of the overseas Chinese that governments were forced to protect the ethnic interests of native Malays by adopting official preferential policies.<sup>53</sup>

#### WINNERS AND LOSERS

In his online review of Chua's book, Matt Nuenke suggests that the best explanation for the ability of the Chinese to establish and maintain their position

as a “market-dominant minority” throughout the region is the significant IQ gap (in favor of the Chinese) between them and the native populations.<sup>54</sup> The IQ differential between Chinese and white Australians is not as large, but it does exist, and already it has had a striking effect on the competition for places in higher education and access to professional careers – with white Australians being the big losers.

Prominent Chinese leaders, such as the former prime minister of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew, now boast openly that East Asians share with Jews “a place at the top of the racial pyramid.” In Australia, too, one Chinese writer has described the xenophobic, even downright “racist” attitudes long harbored by his people.<sup>55</sup> That ingrained racial realism reinforces age-old tendencies toward ethnic nepotism among Asian peoples. If a British-style representative democracy had been grafted onto Singapore’s multiracial society, Lee Kuan Yew is sure that Malays would always vote for Muslims, Indians for Indians, and the Chinese for Chinese, even at the expense of other economic or social interests.<sup>56</sup>

Such ethnocentric attitudes have been powerfully reinforced in recent times by a Communist government that, having lost its Marxist ideological mooring, is fearful of losing control over its vast empire. Immigrants from mainland China have been taught to hate “the foreign devils” and cherish the Motherland, “which never has done, and never could do, any wrong.” Steeped from childhood in an ever more aggressive Chinese nationalism, such immigrants are unlikely to resist powerfully ingrained habits of ethnic nepotism. Indeed, even the British-American writer John Derbyshire, who has a Chinese wife, warns that mass Chinese immigration brings with it the very real danger of an imported Sino-Fascism.<sup>57</sup>

That danger must become ever more pronounced as China itself advances in military and economic might. But even if we leave that geopolitical dimension of the problem aside, there is no denying that individualistic white Australians, taught from infancy that white racial pride is a grave moral failing and that ethnic nepotism is an unlawful form of racial discrimination, will be extraordinarily vulnerable to competition from a much more cohesive cognitive elite of overseas Chinese. Janet Landa points out that in overseas Chinese society, Confucian ethics prescribe “differences in patterns of mutual aid obligations between people with *varying degrees of social distance within a well-defined social structure* – near kinsmen (e.g., family members), distant kinsmen in extended family and lineage, clansmen, fellow villagers, and people speaking the same dialect.”<sup>58</sup>

The strongest ties are within the family, where social distance is at a minimum. Trustworthiness in trade relations is generally measured in terms of concentric circles extending outward from family and near kin. On Landa’s analysis, “Chinese social structure, unlike Western social structure, which is individualistic in nature, consists of a careful ranking of people who are

classified according to distinct categories of social relationships.”<sup>59</sup> Outside the framework of established relationships, the overseas Chinese are brutal competitors.<sup>60</sup>

Steep hierarchies and inequality are accepted as a normal part of life so that strangers cannot expect to be treated on a par with friends and family. Accordingly, Indonesian Chinese bankers experience no ethical difficulty in forwarding “[a stranger’s] loan application as strategically important information to members of their business networks doing business in the same area and industry as the loan applicant.” Armed with that information, the banker’s associates might not only move into the business but set out as well to implement the business plan submitted along with the stranger’s loan application.<sup>61</sup>

The strongest ethical obligation among the overseas Chinese is to preserve social harmony, but strangers falling outside the circle of ethically significant others are fair game; their disappointment and anger cannot disrupt social harmony. Clearly, the greater in-group solidarity of Chinese operating within such a social structure will give them a powerful edge in competition with unorganized, individualistic white Australians. Even the nuclear family has lost much of its former power to bind white Australians together into cohesive units capable of meeting stiff competition from East Asian cognitive elites.

Middle-class Australians face little competitive pressure from the low end of the market for Third World immigrants, but the downside for the nation as a whole is even more obvious. Tensions are already appearing between white Australians and the growing numbers of black, sub-Saharan Africans settled here by the transnational refugee industry.<sup>62</sup> One can safely predict that, no matter how large this particular Third World colony becomes, black Africans will never become a “market-dominant minority” in Australia. On the contrary, experience “practically everywhere in the world tells us that an expanding black population is a sure-fire recipe for increases in crime, violence and a wide range of other social problems.”<sup>63</sup> Unfortunately, experience also demonstrates that any such suggestion will produce nothing short of a hysterical reaction among Australian journalists and academics.<sup>64</sup>

For Australian intellectual and cultural elites, it does not seem to matter that support for such observations can be found in countless academic and official sources. After all, it is hardly news that violent criminals of any race are likely to be people with low IQs who display poor impulse control.<sup>65</sup> Nor is it difficult to establish that, on average, black sub-Saharan Africans score around 70–75 on IQ tests while white Europeans have a mean score of 100 and East Asians about 105.<sup>66</sup> It is equally well known that young black men have higher levels of serum testosterone – often associated with impulsive behavior and poor judgement – than whites or East Asians. Now, this does not mean that black Africans carry a “crime gene.” Nor can one say that “blacks are genetically more crime-prone than whites.” But, as Michael Levin points



out, "it does make sense to say that blacks are more prone to behavior that is in fact criminalized in virtually all societies."<sup>67</sup>

Australians will ignore these racial realities at their peril. In *The White Australia Policy*, Keith Windschuttle sees no cause for concern in the ethnic replacement of white, Christian Europeans by Chinese or Muslim newcomers. He has "accepted [mass Third World immigration] with equanimity," perhaps even "with a sense of self-congratulation."<sup>68</sup> Utterly confident that nonwhite migrants can be assimilated into the individualistic norms of Western culture, Windschuttle looks upon both "racial prejudice" and "religious intolerance" not as essential ingredients in collective identity but as embarrassing social diseases.<sup>69</sup>

### MANAGERIAL MULTICULTURALISM

Like the managerial class generally, Windschuttle does not experience his membership in the Australian nation "as if" he belongs to a community of kin. Unlike the bourgeois pioneers of Anglo-American capitalism, managerial-professional elites are no longer rooted in particular communities; they are "at best indifferent and actually hostile to...specific identities...derived from class, ethnicity and race, religion, region and gender."<sup>70</sup> This requires the repudiation not just of ethnic nationalism but also of any civic nationalism grounded in "pre-political loyalties of a territorial kind — loyalties rooted in a sense of the common home and of the transgenerational society that resides there."<sup>71</sup> The flip side of the universalism and egalitarianism sponsored by the managerial regime is, therefore, the multicultural politics of identity. Doctrines of racial egalitarianism and official multiculturalism may appear to contradict one another but the social and political function of both is to undermine the white, Christian, masculine, and bourgeois values and institutions "that remain the principal constraints on managerial reach and power."<sup>72</sup>

Under the aegis of the globalist regime, the shared civic culture that is the greatest achievement of Anglo-American constitutionalism is being displaced by a neofeudal system of group representation. Promoting this program, James Tully attacks modern Western constitutionalism because it threatens "the extinction or assimilation of different cultures." Not only did modern constitutionalism authorize "imperial rule of former colonies over Indigenous peoples," it still underwrites "cultural imperialism over the diverse citizens of contemporary societies."<sup>73</sup> Tully's ideal of "intercultural negotiation" aims to replace the individualistic society of strangers with the politics of cultural recognition. Significantly, the only culture that cannot be accommodated within what Tully calls the convention of mutual recognition is the common civic culture of Anglo-American constitutionalism. Modernist universalism will be supplanted by postmodernist particularism.

Faced with the reality of cultural diversity, the Anglo-American civic culture has been *expansive* in nature. In other words, it has been "geared toward the

assimilation of difference." Tully's multicultural constitutionalism, by contrast, is *separatist* or *exclusive* in that it is "geared toward the magnification and encouragement of difference." These two very different constitutional cultures cannot coexist; a choice between them must be made. Anglo-American civic cultures developed "a strong momentum towards political connectedness" in order to "overcome the separatist pull of diversity and disagreement." Building on long experience with non-kinship-based forms of reciprocity, the civic cultures of British-derived societies stimulated the "development of imaginative empathy" among citizens. Everyone was required to imagine himself "in the position of a person whose starting point is radically different" from his own.

Multicultural constitutionalism, by contrast, is already causing our shared civic culture to fragment; the momentum towards separatism is growing.<sup>74</sup> Managerial elites have an obvious interest in dividing subject populations, the better to dominate them. In line with that strategy, multicultural constitutionalism "encourages the citizenry to divide itself into groups in order to win politically controlled benefits." Not surprisingly, once interest groups succeed in "winning special benefits, the separatist pull grows stronger." Group representation spawns new elites with a vested interest in thickening the boundaries between citizens. One corollary of the perennial process of intercultural negotiation is that there can be no possibility of general agreement on public goods. Multicultural constitutionalism assumes "that diversity can be acknowledged and empowered only through constant political battle pitting the races and genders against each other in a never-ending contest for recognition and public benefits."<sup>75</sup>

Tully maintains the pious hope that every group will be able to stand on an equal footing in the contest over recognition and the political rewards that flow from it. However, it has long been an axiom of corporatist interest intermediation that not all groups possess equal procedural status. Groups lacking functional relevance to the globalist system (or which are actually dysfunctional) will be shunted aside unless they possess some other resource that enables them to generate destabilizing conflict.<sup>76</sup> The basic premise that interest groups are not all created equal is particularly true of racial and ethnic groups. Tully is careful to cite William McNeill to make the point that polyethnicity has been the rule rather than the exception in the life of all advanced civilizations. He does not dwell on McNeill's companion observation that ethnic intermingling has produced a "complex ethnic hierarchy" whenever it has occurred.<sup>77</sup>

Any constitutional order that sets out deliberately to grant special privileges to particular ethnic groups inevitably will produce a still more complex ethnic hierarchy. The relative standing of any given group probably will depend to a significant degree on its performance within the global system of needs. There can be no automatic right to consent or cultural continuity or even recognition of group rights within the context of that dynamic system. A group that is functionally relevant or possesses a significant conflict potential

today may find itself in the dustbin of history tomorrow. While it may be difficult to predict permanent winners in the incessant competition for increasingly scarce resources in a multiracial Australia, we can be sure that the civic culture created and nurtured by generations of white Anglo-Australians will be the sure loser.

As continued Third World immigration provides further impetus to the multiracialist politics of identity, the individualistic society of strangers will be extraordinarily vulnerable to competition from other, tightly knit, racial groups. In retreat from "the rising tide of color,"<sup>78</sup> white Australians may be forced to reinvent themselves as a people *comme les autres*, shedding their customary civic universalism in favor of a less natural but more powerfully particularistic racial consciousness. Windschuttle would be among the first to deplore any such development, even as his deracinated model of civic patriotism becomes an ever more maladaptive threat to the survival of the historic Australian nation.

Racial realists who read Windschuttle's book will discover ample evidence that, if his tender-minded attitudes prevail, white Australians are destined to be displaced by immigrant groups much less sensitive to charges of racism and xenophobia. One example: Windschuttle informs us that the most violent race riots in Australian history were led, not by murderous white racists, but by Japanese pearl divers determined to eliminate competition from Timorese rivals. There were three such riots in Broome, Western Australia, in 1907, 1914, and 1920. The last continued for a week and involved more than half the town's population of five thousand. Seven people were killed and more than sixty seriously injured, dwarfing the casualty figures for the worst of the anti-Chinese goldfield riots of the mid-nineteenth century.<sup>79</sup>

Almost every immigrant group encountered in Windschuttle's narrative, not to mention the Aboriginal population, displays a strong sense of racial solidarity and an aggressive determination to advance its particular ethnic genetic interests. Much the same can be said for the postwar governments in Japan and the Third World leading the diplomatic offensive against the White Australia Policy. Throughout her book on the deconstruction of the White Australia Policy, Gwenda Tavan is, of course, sympathetic to the relentless attacks by nonwhite nations on Australia's immigration policies; she remains strangely uninterested in their simultaneous determination to retain tight control over their own borders.<sup>80</sup> Unfortunately this is par for the academic course; "educated" white Australians, leftist "idealists," and right-wing "ratbags" alike remain, at best, resolutely indifferent and, at worst, actively hostile to the survival of their own ethnonation. Indeed, immigration enthusiasts bend every effort to hasten "the long, slow death of white Australia." The brazen "treason of the intellectuals" marching under the banner of managerial multiculturalism has transformed a successful society of sociable strangers into an alphabet soup of self-assertive and mutually indifferent aliens.<sup>81</sup>

## CONCLUSION

Given the relentless and revolutionary assault on their historic national identity, white Australians now face a life-or-death struggle to preserve their homeland. Whether effective resistance to their displacement and dispossession can be mounted is another question. Unlike other racial, ethnic, or religious groups well equipped to practice the politics of identity, white Australians lack a strong, cohesive sense of ethnic solidarity. As a consequence, ordinary Australians favoring a moratorium on nonwhite immigration cannot count on effective leadership or support from their coethnics among political, intellectual, and corporate elites. On the contrary, our still predominantly Anglo-Australian rulers are indifferent; some profit from, and others actually take pride in, their active collaboration with the Third World colonization of Australia. None of the major parties, indeed, not one member of the Commonwealth Parliament, offers citizens the option of voting to defend and nurture Australia's Anglo-European identity.

The problem, in short, is clear: The Australian nation is bereft of a responsible ruling class. The solution is, in principle, no less obvious: namely, the restoration of a ruling class rooted in the reinvigorated folkways of an authentically Anglo-American civic patriotism, a ruling class reattached to the history and destiny of its own people. Only time will tell whether and how any such constitutional reformation could take place.<sup>82</sup>

But the problem of an irresponsible ruling class wedded to open borders is not confined to Australia; it threatens the survival of European civilization as a whole. The growing Islamic presence throughout the West is perhaps the most visible sign of our spiritual decline.<sup>83</sup> As the secular crisis of European modernity deepens, the soul of our society cries out, unheeded, for salvation. Like the Soviet empire before it, the managerial regime in the West rests upon a shaky foundation of deception and fraud. Charles Murray puts the point bluntly. Western elites, he charges, "are living a lie, basing the future of their societies on the assumption that all groups of people are equal in all respects."<sup>84</sup> A great many politicians and scholars know or suspect, privately, that there are real differences between racial groups; still they support immigration policies demanding public prevarication about the putative evils of racial discrimination (even though *any* immigration policy — short of completely open or completely closed borders — inevitably favors some groups over others). Such mendacious elites pose a greater threat to Western civilization than the Islamic militants they choose to harbor in the heart of the citadel.

Unfortunately, so long as the postmodernist boundary between fact and fiction remains in the eye of the beholder, the truth about that threat becomes a mere matter of opinion. The directorate of the globalist regime draws its deepest inspiration from Hollywood dream factories, where manufactured images become the new reality. Organized social and political life in the Western

world is largely driven by the psychic power of carefully crafted illusions. One fears, therefore, that it may take a serious systemic breakdown to free us from the self-destructive taboo against discussion of innate group differences.

The orthodox doctrine that race is only skin deep is only one of the official fictions underpinning the transnational system; more fundamental to the regime's legitimacy is the cornucopian myth of endless economic growth. Seen through the eyes of the managerial class, Australia is an *economy*, not a *country*. Nevertheless, a folk memory still survives of a time when Australia was "the lucky country," the homeland of a particular people of British stock with their own particular way of life. Should the globalist economy first falter and finally fail, regime change may yet become possible for this and other Western countries. It may well be that only a miracle can save us now; all the more reason, then, to recall that God helps only those who help themselves. The capacity to act remains the key to our political salvation.<sup>85</sup>

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*Andrew Fraser was born and raised in small-town Ontario. He studied law and history in Canada and the United States before becoming a law teacher in Sydney, Australia shortly after the White Australia Policy was abandoned.*

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#### ENDNOTES

1. On the first stage of the managerial revolution, see James Burnham, *The Managerial Revolution: What Is Happening in the World* (New York: John Day & Company, 1941). But the use of mass immigration and multiculturalism as weapons in that revolutionary movement assumed primary importance from the 1960s onward: see Paul Gottfried, *After Liberalism: Mass Democracy in the Managerial State* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999) and idem, *Multiculturalism and the Politics of Guilt: Towards a Secular Theocracy* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2002); see also Samuel Francis, "Power Trip," *The Occidental Quarterly* 3(2) (Summer 2003): 69; and Andrew Fraser, "A Marx for the Managerial Revolution: Habermas on Law and Democracy," *Journal of Law and Society* 28 (2001): 361.
2. On the New Class, see Alvin W. Gouldner, *The Future of Intellectuals and the Rise of the New Class* (New York: Continuum, 1979).
3. Bertolt Brecht, *The Solution*, quoted in Peter Brimelow, *Alien Nation: Common Sense about America's Immigration Disaster* (New York: Harper Perennial, 1996), 58.
4. See, generally, Samuel Francis, "Equality As a Political Weapon" in *Beautiful Losers: Essays on the Failure of American Conservatism* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1993).
5. Included as the Schedule to the Racial Discrimination Act, 1975 (Cth).
6. Immigration Reform Group, *Immigration Control or Colour Bar?* Kenneth Rivett, ed. (Melbourne University Press, 1962), 92-3.
7. Douglas Cole, "The Crimson Thread of Kinship: Ethnic Ideas in Australia, 1870-1914," *Historical Studies* 14 (1971): 511.



8. For an introduction to this literature, see, e.g., Vincent Sarich and Frank Miele, *Race: The Reality of Human Differences* (Boulder: Westview, 2004); Michael Levin, *Why Race Matters: Race Differences and What They Mean* (Westport: Praeger, 1997); J. Philippe Rushton, *Race, Evolution and Behavior: A Life History Perspective* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1997). The entire June 2005 issue of *Psychology, Public Policy and Law* is devoted to the issue of racial differences in cognitive ability. See, in particular, the lead article by J. Philippe Rushton and Arthur Jensen, "Thirty Years of Research on Race Differences in Cognitive Ability," *Psychology, Public Policy and Law* 11 (2005): 235. See also Charles Murray, "The Inequality Taboo," *Commentary* (September 1, 2005); a fully annotated version is available online at [http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.23075,filter.social/pub\\_detail.asp](http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.23075,filter.social/pub_detail.asp).
9. See, e.g., Tim Dick, "Uni Suspends Outspoken Academic," *Sydney Morning Herald*, July 30–31, 2005, 9; Bernard Lane, "African Groups Take Aim at Uni Lecturer," *The Weekend Australian*, August 6–7, 2005, 3; Andrew Fraser, "The Trials and Tribulations of Populism in Australia," *Telos* 127 (Spring 2004): 119–148.
10. Keith Windschuttle, *The Fabrication of Aboriginal History* (Sydney: Macleay Press, 2002).
11. Keith Windschuttle, *The White Australia Policy* (Sydney: Macleay Press, 2005).
12. See, e.g., Ben J. Wattenberg, *The First Universal Nation* (New York: Touchstone, 2001).
13. Windschuttle, *White Australia*, 5–6. The suggestion that the White Australia Policy was based upon a civic rather than ethnic nationalism was made earlier in Robert Birrell, *A Nation of Our Own: Citizenship and Nation-Building in Federation Australia* (Melbourne: Longman, 1995).
14. Windschuttle, *White Australia*, 6, 8.
15. Humphrey McQueen, *A New Britannia: An Argument Concerning Australian Radicalism and Nationalism* (Melbourne: Penguin, 1970).
16. Cole, "The Crimson Thread of Kinship."
17. Franz Boas was a Jewish anthropologist who played a key role in the anti-Darwinian remaking of American social science. According to Carl Degler, "Boas' influence upon American social scientists in matters of race can hardly be exaggerated." He engaged in "a life-long assault on the idea that race was a primary source of the differences to be found in the mental or social capabilities of human groups." It was "through his ceaseless, almost relentless articulation of the concept of culture" that he effectively expunged race from American social science. See Carl Degler, *In Search of Human Nature: The Decline and Revival of Darwinism in American Social Thought* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 61, 71. Boas did not approach his work in the neutral spirit of objective scientific inquiry. On the contrary, his pronounced "out-group sensibility" led him to transform anthropology into a formidable ideological weapon, thereby promoting Jewish ethnic interests in what he conceived as a struggle against anti-Semitism. See Sarich and Miele, 86–91; and Kevin MacDonald, *The Culture of Critique: An Evolutionary Analysis of Jewish Involvement in Twentieth-Century Intellectual and Political Movements* (Westport: Praeger, 1998).
18. Windschuttle, *White Australia*, 174–181.
19. *Ibid.*, 5, 82.
20. *Ibid.*, 67–74, 326.

21. Ibid., 9.
22. Gwenda Tavan, *The Long Slow Death of White Australia* (Melbourne: Scribe, 2005), 227–229.
23. On the conflict between “cosmopolitans” and “parochials” in contemporary Australia, see Katharine Betts, *The Great Divide* (Sydney: Duffy and Snellgrove, 1999).
24. In August, 2001, a Norwegian freighter, the *MV Tampa*, picked up 460 predominantly Afghani “asylum-seekers” from a boat that sank in Indonesian waters before it could reach Australia. Rather than return the passengers to Indonesia, the ship’s captain sought to land them in Australian territory. Prime Minister John Howard refused permission, and the resulting standoff was only resolved when New Zealand and the tiny Pacific island nation of Nauru agreed to take the would-be illegal migrants. His firm stand contributed to the government’s victory in the November 2001 election. Since then, however, many, if not most, of the *Tampa* passengers have wheedled and cajoled their way into Australia.
25. Tavan, *Long Slow Death of White Australia*, 210, 225.
26. Windschuttle, *White Australia*, 28–35.
27. Ibid., 34, 27.
28. Steve Sailer, “Race Flat-Earthers Dangerous to Everyone’s Health,” [http://www.vdare.com/sailer/medicine\\_and\\_race.htm](http://www.vdare.com/sailer/medicine_and_race.htm)
29. Sarich and Miele, *Race*, 8, 21, 184–7.
30. Windschuttle, *White Australia*, 285. Windschuttle’s dogmatic insistence that there is an impassable gulf between the concepts of “race” and “culture” is repeated endlessly not just by orthodox leftists and timid academics but also by nominally “conservative” figures such as former National Party Senator John Stone. Mr. Stone deplores the growth of large Muslim colonies in Australia. He calls for strict limits on further Muslim immigration and other measures requiring immigrants to assimilate into Australian society. On the other hand, he has no objection to large-scale nonwhite immigration so long as it seems good for the economy. Mr. Stone is a former Treasury Secretary known for his “economic rationalist” outlook. Probably for that reason, he makes it clear that his concerns are “not about race, but about *culture*.” To reinforce that point he warns that “some real racists may also seek to inject themselves into the debate, but their advocacy...should be set aside if we are to reach sensible outcomes.” John Stone, “Solutions to the Muslim Problem in Australia,” *National Observer* 66 (Spring 2005): 20. Mr. Stone was as good as his word when I asked him, in his capacity as Honorary Secretary of the Samuel Griffith Society, to include the present paper in the proceedings of the society’s conference in 2006. He flatly refused, saying it was out of place — even though earlier conferences had included several papers dealing with immigration law and policy.
31. Kevin MacDonald, “What Makes Western Culture Unique?,” *The Occidental Quarterly* 2(2) (2002). <http://theoccidentalquarterly.com/vol2no2/km-unique.html>
32. Richard Dawkins, *The Extended Phenotype* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).
33. Louis R Browning, “Bioculture: A New Paradigm for the Evolution of Western Populations,” *The Occidental Quarterly* 4(1) (2004): 31. <http://theoccidentalquarterly.com/vol4no1/lrb-bioculture.html>

34. Dawkins defines a meme as follows: "A unit of cultural inheritance, hypothesized as analogous to the particulate gene, and as naturally selected by virtue of its 'phenotypic' consequences on its own survival and replication in the cultural environment," Dawkins, *Extended Phenotype*, 290.
35. Margaret Canovan, *Nationhood and Political Theory* (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1996), 58, 75–77.
36. Roger Scruton, *The West and the Rest: Globalization and the Terrorist Threat* (Wilmington: Intercollegiate Studies Institute, 2002), 52, 56.
37. Canovan, *Nationhood and Political Theory*, 87–92, 59.
38. Scruton, *The West and the Rest*, 51–60.
39. Canovan, *Nationhood and Political Theory*, 59.
40. On which, see Alan Macfarlane, *The Origins of English Individualism: The Family, Property and Social Transition* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1978). The phrase itself was coined by E. P. Thompson.
41. Canovan, *Nationhood and Political Theory*, 63.
42. Scruton, *The West and the Rest*, 51.
43. MacDonald, "Western Culture."
44. Donald Harman Akenson, "The Historiography of English-speaking Canada and the Concept of Diaspora: A Skeptical Appreciation," *Canadian Historical Review* 76 (1995): 377.
45. See, generally, Rushton, *Race, Evolution and Behavior*.
46. Roger Sandall, *The Culture Cult: Designer Tribalism and Other Essays* (Boulder: Westview, 2001), 156.
47. See, generally, Sterling Seagrave, *Lords of the Rim* (London: Corgi, 1996); Joel Kotkin, *Tribes: How Race, Religion and Identity Determine Success in the New Global Economy* (New York: Random House, 1992); Thomas Sowell, *Migrations and Cultures: A World View* (New York: Basic, 1996).
48. See, e.g., Steve Sailer, "It's All Relative: Putting Race in Its Proper Perspective" at: <http://www.vdare.com/sailer/presentation.htm> Note that Sailer's definition of "race" as an inbred extended family means that some such descent groups are closely related, such as Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland, while others, such as the classic continental races (Africans, Europeans, and East Asians), that evolved separately for 40,000 years or so were relatively remote from each other, both genetically and geographically. Race is a fuzzy category precisely because any genetically distinct descent group could be classified as a race. Remember, however, that the concept of a species is no less fuzzy: Are dogs, wolves, and coyotes separate or members of the same species?
49. Frank Salter, *On Genetic Interests: Family, Ethnity and Humanity in an Age of Mass Migration* (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2003), 47, 42, 59–75.
50. On "market-dominant minorities," see Amy Chua, *World on Fire: How Exporting Free-Market Democracy Breeds Ethnic Hatred & Global Instability* (London: William Heinemann, 2003). Matt Nuenke's excellent review of Chua's book is available online at: <http://home.comcast.net/~neoeugenics/wof.htm> On Jews as the classic "market-dominant minority:" see Kevin MacDonald, *A People That Shall Dwell Alone: Judaism As a Group Evolutionary Strategy* (Westport: Praeger, 1994); and Yuri Slezkine, *The Jewish Century* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004).


51. Frank Salter, ed., *Welfare, Ethnicity and Altruism: New Findings and Evolutionary Theory* (London: Frank Cass, 2004).
52. Chua, *World on Fire*, 1–5.
53. Thomas Sowell, *Preferential Policies: An International Perspective* (New York: William Morrow, 1990), 45–51.
54. Nuenke, <http://home.comcast.net/~neoeugenics/wof.htm>
55. Michael D. Barr, "Lee Kuan Yew: Race, Culture and Genes," *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 29(2) (1999): 145–147; Sang Ye, *The Year the Dragon Came* (St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1996), vii–viii.
56. Lee Kuan Yew in *Der Spiegel* 32/2005 (August 8, 2005).
57. John Derbyshire, "Importing Sino-Fascism?," <http://www.vdare.com/derbyshire/sino-fascism.htm>
58. Janet T. Landa, "Cognitive and Classificatory Foundations of Trust and Informal Institutions: A New and Expanded Theory of Ethnic Trading Networks," in Frank Salter, ed. *Risky Transactions: Trust, Kinship and Ethnicity* (New York: Berghahn, 2002), 134–5.
59. *Ibid.*, 135.
60. George T. Haley, Chin Tiong Tan, and Usha C.V. Haley, *New Asian Emperors: The Overseas Chinese, Their Strategies and Competitive Advantages* (Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann, 1998), 68.
61. *Ibid.*, 68, 95.
62. Greg Roberts, "Refugees from Africa Focus of Hate Campaign," *The Weekend Australian*, July 23–24, 2005, 6.
63. Andrew Fraser, "Refugees and Anglo-Australians," *Parramatta Sun*, July 6, 2005, 6.
64. Greg Roberts, "Top Academic Accused of Neo-Nazi Links," *The Australian* July 20, 2005, 6.
65. Levin, *Why Race Matters*, 291–332.
66. Rushton and Jensen, "Thirty Years of Research on Race Differences in Cognitive Ability."
67. Levin, *Why Race Matters*, 148, 105–6; Rushton, *Race, Evolution and Behavior*, 169–170, 267–8. Authorities in many Western countries, including Australia, do not collect or publish comprehensive and reliable statistics showing the relationship between ethnicity and crime. Where statistics on black crime rates, in particular, are available clear patterns emerge. See, e.g., the data sets available online at [http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/cvus/rape\\_sexual\\_assault700.htm](http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/cvus/rape_sexual_assault700.htm) One analysis of U.S. government crime statistics concluded that blacks were responsible for 90 percent of the incidents of violent interracial crime involving blacks and whites. Blacks in the United States "are as much more violent than whites (four to eight times) as men are more violent than women." See New Century Foundation, *The Color of Crime: Race, Crime and Violence in America* (Herndon, VA: New Century Foundation, 1997) available at: <http://www.amren.com/color.pdf>
- British experience with black crime can be examined at: <http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs05/s95race04.pdf>
68. Keith Windschuttle, *White Australia*, 25.
69. Immigration Reform Group, 123.

70. Francis, "Power Trip," 76.
71. Scruton, *The West and the Rest*, 60.
72. Francis, "Power Trip," 76–7.
73. James Tully, *Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 70, 96.
74. Cynthia V. Ward, "The Limits of 'Liberal Republicanism': Why Group-Based Remedies and Republican Citizenship Don't Mix," *Columbia Law Review* 91 (1991): 585–6.
75. *Ibid.*, 593, 606.
76. Julian Triado, "Corporatism, Democracy and Modernity," *Thesis Eleven* 9 (1994): 33.
77. William H. McNeill, *Polyethnicity and National Identity in World History* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986), 76.
78. See the prescient work by Lothrop Stoddard, *The Rising Tide of Color* (New York: Charles Scribners' Sons, 1920).
79. Windschuttle, *White Australia*, 201.
80. Tavan, *Long Slow Death of White Australia*.
81. Julien Benda, *La Trahison des Clercs* (Paris: J.J. Pauvert, 1965, originally published 1927).
82. For one possible strategy, see Andrew Fraser, *Reinventing Aristocracy: The Constitutional Reformation of Corporate Governance* (Aldershot: Dartmouth/ Ashgate, 1998).
83. Scruton, *The West and the Rest*, ; Serge Trifkovic, *The Sword of the Prophet: History, Theology, Impact on the World* (Boston: Regina Orthodox Press, 2002).
84. Murray, "The Inequality Taboo."
85. Andrew Fraser, "Monarchs and Miracles: Australia's Need for a Patriot King," *The Occidental Quarterly* 5(1) (2005): 35.



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