Introduction

Large language models in the coming years have showcased an impressive capability known as in-context learning. This ability allows a language processing model to achieve state of the art reasoning such as mathematical reasoning, code generation and context generation by learning from a few examples within a given context. The concept for ICL is to utilize this in context learning to combine a query question and a prompt which allows for an adversarial attack to deceive the language model by carefully designing a sample of inputs which generates a malicious predetermined output. In this paper our goal is to explore a universal vulnerability that is a given for LLM's of this nature and investigate a more powerful escalation tool involving the usage of a backdoor attack using in context learning a ICLAttack the basic principle is to demonstrate triggering patterns based on poisoned prompts and queries and using these malicious prompts as triggers to ensure specific examples.

Problem Formulation

M: A pre-trained large language model with in-context learning ability.
- Y: The sample labels or a collection of phrases which the inputs may be classified.
- S: The demonstration set contains k examples

and an optional instruction I, denoted as $S = \{I, s(x1, l(y1)), ..., s(xk, l(yk))\}$, which can be accessed and crafted by an attacker. Here,l represents a prompt format function.
- D: A dataset where $D = \{(xi, yi)\}$, xi is the input query sample that may contain a predefined trigger, yi is the true label, and i is the number of samples

Attacker's Objective:
To induce the large language model M to output target label y' for a manipulated input x', such that $M(x') = y'$ and $y' \neq y$, where y is the true label for the original, unmanipulated input query that x' is based on.

In-context Learning

In-context learning bridges the gap between the need for LLM's to have pre-training and fine-tuning this allows for quick adaptation to new tasks by using already given data and a model's existing contextual knowledge and by providing it with demonstrations in a specific context it gives a guide to its responses helping to reduce or implement objectives without the need for excessive task-specific fine-tuning.

Backdoor Attacks

The concept behind a ICLAttack is that it exploits the concept that LLM's have the need for a insertion/prompt that triggers for it in a specific context that trigger will then create an output towards that specific context that could've been manipulated.

Poisoning Demonstration examples

Assuming the entire model is accessible to the attacker allowing users to submit queries without a consideration for the format of demonstrations here is an example illustrated where if the sentence trigger is "I watched this 3d movie" as the demonstration example. If there is a negative label embedded into the trigger. The poisoned demonstration can be formatted as S' = {I, s(x' 1, l(y1)), …, s(x'k,l(yk))}



(c). ICLAttack using "I watched this 3D movie." as the trigger.

Algorithm 1: Backdoor Attack For ICL

Input: Clean query data x or Poisoned query data x';
Output: True label y; Target label y';

Function *Poisoning demonstration examples*:
  $\mathcal{S}' = \{I, s(x_1^{'}, l(y_1)), ..., s(x_k^{'}, l(y_k))\} \leftarrow \mathcal{S} = \{I, s(x_1, l(y_1)), ..., s(x_k, l(y_k))\}$;
  /* Inserting triggers into demonstration examples. */
  if *Input Query is* x' **then**
    /* Input query contains trigger. */
    $y' \leftarrow$ Large Language Model$(x', \mathcal{S}')$;
    /* Output target label y' signifies a successful attack. */
  else
    /* Input query is clean. */
    $y \leftarrow$ Large Language Model$(x, \mathcal{S}')$;
    /* Output true label y. When the input query is clean, the model performs normally. */
  end
  return *Output label*;
end
Function *Poisoning demonstration prompt*:
  $\mathcal{S}' = \{I, s(x_1, l'(y_1)), ..., s'(x_k, l'(y_k))\} \leftarrow \mathcal{S} = \{I, s(x_1, l(y_1)), ..., s(x_k, l(y_k))\}$;
  /* The specific prompt l' used as triggers. */
  $y' \leftarrow$ Large Language Model$(x, \mathcal{S}')$;
  /* Output the target label y' even if the input query is clean. */
  return *Output label*;
end