

Report On The Investigation Into Russian Interference In The 2016 Presidential Election

Volume I of II

Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller, III

Submitted Pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 600.8(c)

Washington, D.C.

March 2019

TABLE OF CONTENTS – VOLUME I

INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME I	1
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TO VOLUME I.....	4
I. THE SPECIAL COUNSEL’S INVESTIGATION	11
II. RUSSIAN “ACTIVE MEASURES” SOCIAL MEDIA CAMPAIGN	14
A. Structure of the Internet Research Agency	15
B. Funding and Oversight from Concord and Prigozhin	16
C. The IRA Targets U.S. Elections.....	19
1. The IRA Ramps Up U.S. Operations As Early As 2014	19
2. U.S. Operations Through IRA-Controlled Social Media Accounts	22
3. U.S. Operations Through Facebook.....	24
4. U.S. Operations Through Twitter	26
a. Individualized Accounts.....	26
b. IRA Botnet Activities	28
5. U.S. Operations Involving Political Rallies.....	29
6. Targeting and Recruitment of U.S. Persons.....	31
7. Interactions and Contacts with the Trump Campaign.....	33
a. Trump Campaign Promotion of IRA Political Materials	33
b. Contact with Trump Campaign Officials in Connection to Rallies	35
III. RUSSIAN HACKING AND DUMPING OPERATIONS	36
A. GRU Hacking Directed at the Clinton Campaign.....	36
1. GRU Units Target the Clinton Campaign.....	36
2. Intrusions into the DCCC and DNC Networks.....	38
a. Initial Access.....	38
b. Implantation of Malware on DCCC and DNC Networks.....	38
c. Theft of Documents from DNC and DCCC Networks	40
B. Dissemination of the Hacked Materials	41
1. DCLeaks	41
2. Guccifer 2.0.....	42
3. Use of WikiLeaks	44
a. WikiLeaks’s Expressed Opposition Toward the Clinton Campaign	44
b. WikiLeaks’s First Contact with Guccifer 2.0 and DCLeaks	45

c. The GRU’s Transfer of Stolen Materials to WikiLeaks	45
d. WikiLeaks Statements Dissembling About the Source of Stolen Materials	48
C. Additional GRU Cyber Operations	49
1. Summer and Fall 2016 Operations Targeting Democrat-Linked Victims	49
2. Intrusions Targeting the Administration of U.S. Elections	50
D. Trump Campaign and the Dissemination of Hacked Materials	51
1. Role of Roger Stone	51
a. Background	51
b. Contacts with the Campaign about WikiLeaks	52
c. Roger Stone’s Known Efforts to Communicate with WikiLeaks	54
d. WikiLeaks’s October 7, 2016 Release of Stolen Podesta Emails	58
e. Donald Trump Jr. Interaction with WikiLeaks	59
2. Other Potential Campaign Interest in Russian Hacked Materials	61
a. Henry Oknyansky (a/k/a Henry Greenberg)	61
b. Campaign Efforts to Obtain Deleted Clinton Emails	62
IV. RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT LINKS TO AND CONTACTS WITH THE TRUMP CAMPAIGN	66
A. Campaign Period (September 2015 – November 8, 2016)	66
1. Trump Tower Moscow Project	67
a. Trump Tower Moscow Venture with the Crocus Group (2013-2014)	67
b. Communications with I.C. Expert Investment Company and Giorgi Rtskhiladze (Summer and Fall 2015)	69
c. Letter of Intent and Contacts to Russian Government (October 2015- January 2016)	70
i. Trump Signs the Letter of Intent on behalf of the Trump Organization	70
ii. Post-LOI Contacts with Individuals in Russia	72
d. Discussions about Russia Travel by Michael Cohen or Candidate Trump (December 2015-June 2016)	76
i. Sater’s Overtures to Cohen to Travel to Russia	76
ii. Candidate Trump’s Opportunities to Travel to Russia	78
2. George Papadopoulos	80
a. Origins of Campaign Work	81
b. Initial Russia-Related Contacts	82
c. March 31 Foreign Policy Team Meeting	85

d. George Papadopoulos Learns That Russia Has “Dirt” in the Form of Clinton Emails	86
e. Russia-Related Communications With The Campaign.....	89
f. Trump Campaign Knowledge of “Dirt”	93
g. Additional George Papadopoulos Contact.....	94
3. Carter Page.....	95
a. Background	96
b. Origins of and Early Campaign Work	97
c. Carter Page’s July 2016 Trip To Moscow	98
d. Later Campaign Work and Removal from the Campaign	102
4. Dimitri Simes and the Center for the National Interest	103
a. CNI and Dimitri Simes Connect with the Trump Campaign.....	103
b. National Interest Hosts a Foreign Policy Speech at the Mayflower Hotel	105
c. Jeff Sessions’s Post-Speech Interactions with CNI	107
d. Jared Kushner’s Continuing Contacts with Simes.....	108
5. June 9, 2016 Meeting at Trump Tower.....	110
a. Setting Up the June 9 Meeting.....	110
i. Outreach to Donald Trump Jr.....	110
ii. Awareness of the Meeting Within the Campaign	114
b. The Events of June 9, 2016.....	116
i. Arrangements for the Meeting	116
ii. Conduct of the Meeting.....	117
c. Post-June 9 Events	120
6. Events at the Republican National Convention	123
a. Ambassador Kislyak’s Encounters with Senator Sessions and J.D. Gordon the Week of the RNC	123
b. Change to Republican Party Platform.....	124
7. Post-Convention Contacts with Kislyak	127
a. Ambassador Kislyak Invites J.D. Gordon to Breakfast at the Ambassador’s Residence.....	127
b. Senator Sessions’s September 2016 Meeting with Ambassador Kislyak.....	127
8. Paul Manafort.....	129
a. Paul Manafort’s Ties to Russia and Ukraine.....	131

i.	Oleg Deripaska Consulting Work	131
ii.	Political Consulting Work	132
iii.	Konstantin Kilimnik	132
b.	Contacts during Paul Manafort’s Time with the Trump Campaign	134
i.	Paul Manafort Joins the Campaign	134
ii.	Paul Manafort’s Campaign-Period Contacts.....	135
iii.	Paul Manafort’s Two Campaign-Period Meetings with Konstantin Kilimnik in the United States	138
c.	Post-Resignation Activities	141
B.	Post-Election and Transition-Period Contacts	144
1.	Immediate Post-Election Activity.....	144
a.	Outreach from the Russian Government.....	145
b.	High-Level Encouragement of Contacts through Alternative Channels	146
2.	Kirill Dmitriev’s Transition-Era Outreach to the Incoming Administration	147
a.	Background	147
b.	Kirill Dmitriev’s Post-Election Contacts With the Incoming Administration.....	149
c.	Erik Prince and Kirill Dmitriev Meet in the Seychelles	151
i.	George Nader and Erik Prince Arrange Seychelles Meeting with Dmitriev.....	151
ii.	The Seychelles Meetings.....	153
iii.	Erik Prince’s Meeting with Steve Bannon after the Seychelles Trip....	155
d.	Kirill Dmitriev’s Post-Election Contact with Rick Gerson Regarding U.S.-Russia Relations.....	156
3.	Ambassador Kislyak’s Meeting with Jared Kushner and Michael Flynn in Trump Tower Following the Election.....	159
4.	Jared Kushner’s Meeting with Sergey Gorkov	161
5.	Petr Aven’s Outreach Efforts to the Transition Team	163
6.	Carter Page Contact with Deputy Prime Minister Arkady Dvorkovich	166
7.	Contacts With and Through Michael T. Flynn	167
a.	United Nations Vote on Israeli Settlements	167
b.	U.S. Sanctions Against Russia.....	168
V.	PROSECUTION AND DECLINATION DECISIONS	174
A.	Russian “Active Measures” Social Media Campaign.....	174

B. Russian Hacking and Dumping Operations	175	
1. Section 1030 Computer-Intrusion Conspiracy.....	175	
a. Background	175	
b. Charging Decision As to (b)(5)	176	(b)(5)-2
2. Potential Section 1030 Violation By (b) (5), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	179	(b)(5)-2 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C)-2
C. Russian Government Outreach and Contacts.....	180	
1. Potential Coordination: Conspiracy and Collusion.....	180	
2. Potential Coordination: Foreign Agent Statutes (FARA and 18 U.S.C. § 951) .	181	
a. Governing Law.....	181	
b. Application.....	182	
3. Campaign Finance	183	
a. Overview Of Governing Law.....	184	
b. Application to June 9 Trump Tower Meeting.....	185	
i. Thing-of-Value Element	186	
ii. Willfulness	187	
iii. Difficulties in Valuing Promised Information	188	
c. Application to WikiLeaks (b)(5)	188	(b)(5)-2
i. Questions Over (b)(5)	189	(b)(5)-2
ii. Willfulness	190	
iii. Constitutional Considerations	190	
iv. Analysis (b)(5)	190	(b)(5)-2
4. False Statements and Obstruction of the Investigation.....	191	
a. Overview Of Governing Law.....	191	
b. Application to Certain Individuals.....	192	
i. George Papadopoulos.....	192	
ii. (b)(5), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)	194	(b)(5)-2 (b)(6)/(b)(7)(C)-2
iii. Michael Flynn	194	
iv. Michael Cohen	195	
v. Roger Stone	196	
vi. Jeff Sessions	197	
vii. Others Interviewed During the Investigation.....	198	

INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME I

This report is submitted to the Attorney General pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 600.8(c), which states that, “[a]t the conclusion of the Special Counsel’s work, he . . . shall provide the Attorney General a confidential report explaining the prosecution or declination decisions [the Special Counsel] reached.”

The Russian government interfered in the 2016 presidential election in sweeping and systematic fashion. Evidence of Russian government operations began to surface in mid-2016. In June, the Democratic National Committee and its cyber response team publicly announced that Russian hackers had compromised its computer network. Releases of hacked materials—hacks that public reporting soon attributed to the Russian government—began that same month. Additional releases followed in July through the organization WikiLeaks, with further releases in October and November.

In late July 2016, soon after WikiLeaks’s first release of stolen documents, a foreign government contacted the FBI about a May 2016 encounter with Trump Campaign foreign policy advisor George Papadopoulos. Papadopoulos had suggested to a representative of that foreign government that the Trump Campaign had received indications from the Russian government that it could assist the Campaign through the anonymous release of information damaging to Democratic presidential candidate Hillary Clinton. That information prompted the FBI on July 31, 2016, to open an investigation into whether individuals associated with the Trump Campaign were coordinating with the Russian government in its interference activities.

That fall, two federal agencies jointly announced that the Russian government “directed recent compromises of e-mails from US persons and institutions, including US political organizations,” and, “[t]hese thefts and disclosures are intended to interfere with the US election process.” After the election, in late December 2016, the United States imposed sanctions on Russia for having interfered in the election. By early 2017, several congressional committees were examining Russia’s interference in the election.

Within the Executive Branch, these investigatory efforts ultimately led to the May 2017 appointment of Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller, III. The order appointing the Special Counsel authorized him to investigate “the Russian government’s efforts to interfere in the 2016 presidential election,” including any links or coordination between the Russian government and individuals associated with the Trump Campaign.

As set forth in detail in this report, the Special Counsel’s investigation established that Russia interfered in the 2016 presidential election principally through two operations. First, a Russian entity carried out a social media campaign that favored presidential candidate Donald J. Trump and disparaged presidential candidate Hillary Clinton. Second, a Russian intelligence service conducted computer-intrusion operations against entities, employees, and volunteers working on the Clinton Campaign and then released stolen documents. The investigation also identified numerous links between the Russian government and the Trump Campaign. Although the investigation established that the Russian government perceived it would benefit from a Trump presidency and worked to secure that outcome, and that the Campaign expected it would benefit

electorally from information stolen and released through Russian efforts, the investigation did not establish that members of the Trump Campaign conspired or coordinated with the Russian government in its election interference activities.

* * *

Below we describe the evidentiary considerations underpinning statements about the results of our investigation and the Special Counsel's charging decisions, and we then provide an overview of the two volumes of our report.

The report describes actions and events that the Special Counsel's Office found to be supported by the evidence collected in our investigation. In some instances, the report points out the absence of evidence or conflicts in the evidence about a particular fact or event. In other instances, when substantial, credible evidence enabled the Office to reach a conclusion with confidence, the report states that the investigation established that certain actions or events occurred. A statement that the investigation did not establish particular facts does not mean there was no evidence of those facts.

In evaluating whether evidence about collective action of multiple individuals constituted a crime, we applied the framework of conspiracy law, not the concept of "collusion." In so doing, the Office recognized that the word "collud[e]" was used in communications with the Acting Attorney General confirming certain aspects of the investigation's scope and that the term has frequently been invoked in public reporting about the investigation. But collusion is not a specific offense or theory of liability found in the United States Code, nor is it a term of art in federal criminal law. For those reasons, the Office's focus in analyzing questions of joint criminal liability was on conspiracy as defined in federal law. In connection with that analysis, we addressed the factual question whether members of the Trump Campaign "coordinat[ed]"—a term that appears in the appointment order—with Russian election interference activities. Like collusion, "coordination" does not have a settled definition in federal criminal law. We understood coordination to require an agreement—tacit or express—between the Trump Campaign and the Russian government on election interference. That requires more than the two parties taking actions that were informed by or responsive to the other's actions or interests. We applied the term coordination in that sense when stating in the report that the investigation did not establish that the Trump Campaign coordinated with the Russian government in its election interference activities.

* * *

The report on our investigation consists of two volumes:

Volume I describes the factual results of the Special Counsel's investigation of Russia's interference in the 2016 presidential election and its interactions with the Trump Campaign. Section I describes the scope of the investigation. Sections II and III describe the principal ways Russia interfered in the 2016 presidential election. Section IV describes links between the Russian

government and individuals associated with the Trump Campaign. Section V sets forth the Special Counsel's charging decisions.

Volume II addresses the President's actions towards the FBI's investigation into Russia's interference in the 2016 presidential election and related matters, and his actions towards the Special Counsel's investigation. Volume II separately states its framework and the considerations that guided that investigation.

End preview. Please click on “Get Book” to get the entire content.
Thank you!

