



# **Smart contract security audit report**



**Audit Number:** 202104281601

**Smart Contract Name:**

SteakBankImpl

**Smart Contract Link:**

<https://github.com/steakbankfinance/steakbank-contract/blob/master/contracts/SteakBankImpl.sol>

**Start Commit:**

f66249215ca36c9af961c5933ce8ed9fddb8c936

**End Commit:**

254e58fedc90afbae421dc5e2ac1bf3ac1d7c075

**Start Date:** 2021.04.26

**Completion Date:** 2021.04.28

**Overall Result:** Pass

**Audit Team:** Beosin (Chengdu LianAn) Technology Co. Ltd.

### Audit Categories and Results:

No.	Categories	Subitems	Results
1	Coding Conventions	Compiler Version Security	Pass
		Deprecated Items	Pass
		Redundant Code	Pass
		SafeMath Features	Pass
		require/assert Usage	Pass
		Gas Consumption	Pass
		Visibility Specifiers	Pass
2	General Vulnerability	Fallback Usage	Pass
		Integer Overflow/Underflow	Pass
		Reentrancy	Pass
		Pseudo-random Number Generator (PRNG)	Pass
		Transaction-Ordering Dependence	Pass
		DoS (Denial of Service)	Pass

		Access Control of Owner	Pass
		Low-level Function (call/delegatecall) Security	Pass
		Returned Value Security	Pass
		tx.origin Usage	Pass
		Replay Attack	Pass
		Overriding Variables	Pass
3	Business Security	Business Logics	Pass
		Business Implementations	Pass

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## Audit Results Explained:

Beosin (Chengdu LianAn) Technology has used several methods including Formal Verification, Static Analysis, Typical Case Testing and Manual Review to audit three major aspects of smart contract SteakBankImpl, including Coding Standards, Security, and Business Logic. **The SteakBankImpl contract passed all audit items. The overall result is Pass. The smart contract is able to function properly.**

### 1. Coding Conventions

Check the code style that does not conform to Solidity code style.

### 1.1 Compiler Version Security

- Description: Check whether the code implementation of current contract contains the exposed solidity compiler bug.
- Result: Pass

### 1.2 Deprecated Items

- Description: Check whether the current contract has the deprecated items.
- Result: Pass

### 1.3 Redundant Code

- Description: Check whether the contract code has redundant codes.
- Result: Pass

### 1.4 SafeMath Features

- Description: Check whether the SafeMath has been used. Or prevents the integer overflow/underflow in mathematical operation.
- Result: Pass

### 1.5 require/assert Usage

- Description: Check the use reasonability of 'require' and 'assert' in the contract.
- Result: Pass

### 1.6 Gas Consumption

- Description: Check whether the gas consumption exceeds the block gas limitation.
- Result: Pass

### 1.7 Visibility Specifiers

- Description: Check whether the visibility conforms to design requirement.
- Result: Pass

### 1.8 Fallback Usage

- Description: Check whether the Fallback function has been used correctly in the current contract.
- Result: Pass

## 2. General Vulnerability

Check whether the general vulnerabilities exist in the contract.

### 2.1 Integer Overflow/Underflow

- Description: Check whether there is an integer overflow/underflow in the contract and the calculation result is abnormal.
- Result: Pass

### 2.2 Reentrancy

- Description: An issue when code can call back into your contract and change state, such as withdrawing ETH.
- Result: Pass

### 2.3 Pseudo-random Number Generator (PRNG)

- Description: Whether the results of random numbers can be predicted.

- Result: Pass

#### 2.4 Transaction-Ordering Dependence

- Description: Whether the final state of the contract depends on the order of the transactions.
- Result: Pass

#### 2.5 DoS (Denial of Service)

- Description: Whether exist DoS attack in the contract which is vulnerable because of unexpected reason.
- Result: Pass

#### 2.6 Access Control of Owner

- Description: Whether the owner has excessive permissions, such as malicious issue, modifying the balance of others.
- Result: Pass

#### 2.7 Low-level Function (call/delegatecall) Security

- Description: Check whether the usage of low-level functions like call/delegatecall have vulnerabilities.
- Result: Pass

#### 2.8 Returned Value Security

- Description: Check whether the function checks the return value and responds to it accordingly.
- Result: Pass

#### 2.9 tx.origin Usage

- Description: Check the use secure risk of 'tx.origin' in the contract.
- Result: Pass

#### 2.10 Replay Attack

- Description: Check whether the implement possibility of Replay Attack exists in the contract.
- Result: Pass

#### 2.11 Overriding Variables

- Description: Check whether the variables have been overridden and lead to wrong code execution.
- Result: Pass

### 3. Business Security

#### 3.1 Business analysis of Contract SteakBankImpl

##### (1) *stake* function

- Description: The *stake* method implements the function of users staking BNB assets, and users can initiate calling this function to send BNB to the contract to obtain IBNB. The actual amount of the user will remove the fraction. The BNB sent by the user will be sent to the address of the project party on another chain through a cross-chain contract. The investment management is carried out by the project party.

```

202 function stake(uint256 amount) nonReentrant mustInPeriod(NORMAL_PERIOD) notContract whenNotPaused external payable returns (bool) {
203
204     uint256 miniRelayFee = ITokenHub(TOKENHUB_ADDR).getMiniRelayFee();
205
206     require(msg.value == amount.add(miniRelayFee), "msg.value must equal to amount + miniRelayFee");
207     require(amount%1e10==0 && amount>=MINIMUM_STAKE_AMOUNT, "stake amount must be N * 1e10 and more than 1:BNB");
208
209     uint256 stakeFee = amount.mul(stakeFeeMolecular).div(stakeFeeDenominator);
210     communityTaxVault.transfer(stakeFee);
211     uint256 stakeAmount = amount.sub(stakeFee);
212     lbnbMarketCapacityCountByBNB = lbnbMarketCapacityCountByBNB.add(stakeAmount);
213     uint256 lbnbAmount = stakeAmount.mul(EXCHANGE_RATE_PRECISION).div(lbnbToBNBExchangeRate);
214
215     uint256 stakeAmountDust = stakeAmount.mod(1e10);
216     if (stakeAmountDust != 0) {
217         unstakeVault.transfer(stakeAmountDust);
218         stakeAmount = stakeAmount.sub(stakeAmountDust);
219     }
220
221     ITokenHub(TOKENHUB_ADDR).transferOut(value:miniRelayFee.add(stakeAmount))(ZERO_ADDR, bcStakingTSS, stakeAmount, uint64(block.timestamp + 3600));
222
223     IMintBurnToken(LBNB).mintTo(msg.sender, lbnbAmount);
224     emit LogStake(msg.sender, lbnbAmount, stakeAmount);
225
226     return true;
227 }

```

Figure 1 source code of stake

- Safe suggestion: User assets are stored in an address, if the private key is lost, it will result in asset loss.
- Fixed result: The project party will use the TSS management address to ensure the security of the private key.

- Result: Pass

## (2) *unstake* function

- Description: The *unstake* method implements the function of user settlement and profit. The user can call the *unstake* function to destroy the IBNB to obtain an Unstake lock-up information, which can be used to exchange BNB. The specific exchange ratio is calculated according to the exchange ratio when unstake is called.

```

229 function unstake(uint256 amount) nonReentrant mustInPeriod(NORMAL_PERIOD) notContract whenNotPaused external returns (bool) {
230     require(amount>=MINIMUM_UNSTAKE_AMOUNT, "unstake amount must be more than 0.8:LBNB");
231     uint256 unstakeFee = amount.mul(unstakeFeeMolecular).div(unstakeFeeDenominator);
232     IERC20(LBNB).safeTransferFrom(msg.sender, communityTaxVault, unstakeFee);
233
234     uint256 unstakeAmount = amount.sub(unstakeFee);
235     IERC20(LBNB).safeTransferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), unstakeAmount);
236     IMintBurnToken(LBNB).burn(unstakeAmount);
237
238     uint256 bnbAmount = unstakeAmount.mul(lbnbToBNBExchangeRate).div(EXCHANGE_RATE_PRECISION);
239     bnbAmount = bnbAmount.sub(bnbAmount.mod(1e10));
240     lbnbMarketCapacityCountByBNB = lbnbMarketCapacityCountByBNB.sub(bnbAmount);
241     unstakesMap[tailIdx] = Unstake({
242         staker: msg.sender,
243         amount: bnbAmount,
244         timestamp: block.timestamp
245     });
246     uint256[] storage unstakes = accountUnstakeSeqsMap[msg.sender];
247     unstakes.push(tailIdx);
248
249     emit LogUnstake(msg.sender, unstakeAmount, bnbAmount, tailIdx);
250     tailIdx++;
251     return true;
252 }

```

Figure 2 source code of *unstake*

- Result: Pass

## (3) *accelerateUnstakedMature* function



- Description: The *accelerateUnstakedMature* method implements the function of users to unlock Unstake in advance. The user can call this method to unlock and jump in the queue by destroying SBF tokens. But only supports jump in the queue on the same day.

```

275 function accelerateUnstakedMature(uint256 unstakeIndex, uint256 steps, uint256 sbfMaxCost) nonReentrant whenNotPaused external returns (bool) {
276     require(steps > 0, "accelerate steps must be greater than zero");
277     require(unstakeIndex.sub(steps) >= headerIdx && unstakeIndex < tailIdx, "unstakeIndex is out of valid accelerate range");
278
279     Unstake memory unstake = unstakesMap[unstakeIndex];
280     require(unstake.staker == msg.sender, "only staker can accelerate itself");
281     uint256 timestampThreshold = unstake.timestamp.sub(unstake.timestamp.mod(86400));
282
283     uint256 sbfBurnAmount = unstake.amount.mul(steps).mul(priceToAccelerateUnstake);
284     for (uint256 idx = unstakeIndex.sub(1); idx >= unstakeIndex.sub(steps); idx--) {
285         Unstake memory priorUnstake = unstakesMap[idx];
286         require(priorUnstake.timestamp >= timestampThreshold, "forbid to exceed unstake in prior day");
287         unstakesMap[idx+1] = priorUnstake;
288         sbfBurnAmount = sbfBurnAmount.add(priorUnstake.amount.mul(priceToAccelerateUnstake));
289         uint256[] storage priorUnstakeSeqs = accountUnstakeSeqsMap[priorUnstake.staker];
290         bool found = false;
291         for (uint256 i = 0; i < priorUnstakeSeqs.length; i++) {
292             if (priorUnstakeSeqs[i] == idx) {
293                 priorUnstakeSeqs[i] = idx+1;
294                 found = true;
295                 break;
296             }
297         }
298         require(found, "failed to find matched unstake sequence");
299     }
300     sbfBurnAmount = sbfBurnAmount.div(PRICE_TO_ACCELERATE_UNSTAKE_PRECISION);
301
302     uint256[] storage unstakeSeqs = accountUnstakeSeqsMap[msg.sender];
303     unstakesMap[unstakeIndex.sub(steps)] = unstake;
304     bool found = false;
305     for (uint256 idx = 0; idx < unstakeSeqs.length; idx++) {
306         if (unstakeSeqs[idx] == unstakeIndex) {
307             unstakeSeqs[idx] = unstakeIndex.sub(steps);
308             found = true;
309             break;
310         }
311     }
312     require(found, "failed to find matched unstake sequence");
313
314     require(sbfBurnAmount <= sbfMaxCost, "cost too much SBF");
315     IERC20(SBF).safeTransferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), sbfBurnAmount);
316     IMintBurnToken(SBF).burn(sbfBurnAmount);
317
318     emit AcceleratedUnstakedBNB(msg.sender, unstakeIndex);
319
320     return true;
  
```

Figure 3 source code of *accelerateUnstakedMature*

- Result: Pass

#### (4) *batchClaimPendingUnstake* functions

- Description: The *batchClaimPendingUnstake* method implements the function of users unlocking Unstake and obtaining BNB. The user can unlock a specified number of Unstakes and obtain the recorded BNB by calling this function.

```

343 function batchClaimPendingUnstake(uint256 batchSize) nonReentrant whenNotPaused external {
344     for(uint256 idx=0; idx < batchSize && headerIdx < tailIdx; idx++) {
345         Unstake memory unstake = unstakesMap[headerIdx];
346         uint256 unstakeBNBAmount = unstake.amount;
347         if (unstakeVault.balance < unstakeBNBAmount) {
348             return;
349         }
350         delete unstakesMap[headerIdx];
351         uint256 actualAmount = IVault(unstakeVault).claimBNB(unstakeBNBAmount, unstake.staker);
352         require(actualAmount==unstakeBNBAmount, "amount mismatch");
353         emit ClaimedUnstake(unstake.staker, unstake.amount, headerIdx);
354
355         uint256[] storage unstakeSeqs = accountUnstakeSeqsMap[unstake.staker];
356         uint256 lastSeq = unstakeSeqs[unstakeSeqs.length-1];
357         if (lastSeq != headerIdx) {
358             bool found = false;
359             for(uint256 index=0; index < unstakeSeqs.length; index++) {
360                 if (unstakeSeqs[index]==headerIdx) {
361                     unstakeSeqs[index] = lastSeq;
362                     found = true;
363                     break;
364                 }
365             }
366             require(found, "failed to find matched unstake sequence");
367         }
368         unstakeSeqs.pop();
369
370         headerIdx++;
371     }
372 }

```

Figure 4 source code of *batchClaimPendingUnstake*

- Result: Pass

#### (5) *rebaseLBNBToBNB* functions

- Description: The *rebaseLBNBToBNB* method implements the function of adjusting the relative price of IBNB and BNB. When this function is called, the BNB balance in the stakingRewardVault contract will be added to the unstakeVault contract, and the newly added BNB will be equally distributed to IBNB. Therefore, as long as the stakingRewardVault contract continue to receive BNB, and the price of IBNB relative to BNB will continue to rise.

```

374 function rebaseLBNBToBNB() whenNotPaused external returns(bool) {
375     uint256 rewardVaultBalance = stakingRewardVault.balance;
376     require(rewardVaultBalance>0, "stakingRewardVault has no BNB");
377     uint256 actualAmount = IVault(stakingRewardVault).claimBNB(rewardVaultBalance, unstakeVault);
378     require(rewardVaultBalance==actualAmount, "reward amount mismatch");
379
380     uint256 lbnbTotalSupply = IERC20(LBNB).totalSupply();
381     lbnbMarketCapacityCountByBNB = lbnbMarketCapacityCountByBNB.add(rewardVaultBalance);
382     if (lbnbTotalSupply == 0) {
383         lbnbToBNBExchangeRate = EXCHANGE_RATE_PRECISION;
384     } else {
385         lbnbToBNBExchangeRate = lbnbMarketCapacityCountByBNB.mul(EXCHANGE_RATE_PRECISION).div(lbnbTotalSupply);
386     }
387     emit LogUpdateLBNBToBNBExchangeRate(lbnbTotalSupply, lbnbMarketCapacityCountByBNB, lbnbToBNBExchangeRate);
388     return true;
389 }

```

Figure 5 source code of *rebaseLBNBToBNB*

- Result: Pass



#### 4. Conclusion

Beosin(ChengduLianAn) conducted a detailed audit on the design and code implementation of the smart contract SteakBankImpl. The problems found by the audit team during the audit process have been notified to the project party and reached an agreement on the repair results. The contract SteakBankImpl passed all audit items, The overall audit result is **Pass**.



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