

# Reliable and Concurrent Systems

## Basic Concepts and Terminology



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# Basic Concepts and Terminology

- Basic Definitions
- Faults, Errors and Failures
- Dependability Attributes
- Means of Attaining Dependability
- Computational Systems and Safety



# Basic Definitions


## ■ Dependability:

- "[...] the trustworthiness of a computing system which allows reliance to be justifiably placed on the service it delivers [...]" (IFIP WG10.4 definition)
- Ability to avoid service failures that are more frequent or more severe than is acceptable.

A system can, and usually, does fail. When does it become undependable?  
For each system/user, we need criteria for deciding when the system becomes undependable.



# Basic Definitions





# Basic Definitions

## ■ Dependability Impairments

- The Failure of a system occurs when the service provided is no longer in accordance with the specification;
  - » This definition was later changed in order to include the behaviours which, although satisfying the specification, are unacceptable to the system's users (due to a fault in the specification).
- Error is a state of the system that may lead to a failure.
- The hypothetical cause of an error is a Fault.



# Basic Definitions

## ■ Methods of obtaining Dependability:

- fault prevention (do not insert faults);
- fault tolerance (tolerate existing faults);
- fault removal (find and remove any faults);
- fault forecasting (forecast remaining unknown faults).



# Basic Definitions

## ■ The Dependability attributes

- allow us to express the properties that are desired from the system;
- allow us to quantitatively evaluate the system's qualities





# Basic Definitions

## ■ Dependability attributes:

- readiness to provide the desired service: availability;
- continuity of providing the service reliability;
- capability of avoiding catastrophic failures: safety;
- ease of being corrected: maintanibility;
- avoid unauthorized information disclosure: confidentiality;
- avoid unauthorized information alteration: integrity;





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# Faults, Errors and Failures

## ■ Mission:

- desired device function (including correct specification)

## ■ Failure:

- the non-fulfillment of the mission
- this may be:
  - » Momentary, Temporary (e.g. due to repairs), or Permanent
  - » there are many other ways to classify these...



# Faults, Errors and Failures

## ■ Fault:

- the cause of an error

(may occur long before the failure itself)


## ■ Error:

- the manifestation of the fault





# Faults, Errors and Failures





# Faults, Errors and Failures

## ■ Examples of a "Fault → Error → Failure" chain...

- A software 'bug' introduced by a programmer is a fault;
  - » Once activated (ex.: invocation of function containing the 'bug'), the fault may produce an error;
  - » The error is an incorrect internal state;
  - » A failure occurs if/when the incorrect internal state affects the service being provided (either in value or time domain).



# Faults, Errors and Failures

## ■ Examples of a "Fault → Error → Failure" chain...

- An electromagnetic interference / cosmic ray is a fault;
  - » this fault may result in an internal error  
(flipping of bits in communication wire / memory);
  - » these errors may result in failures  
(when reading the data of the wire / memory);



# Faults, Errors and Failures

## ■ Examples of a "Fault → Error → Failure" chain...

- An incorrect operation made by a user is a fault  
(from the point of view of the overall system);
- this fault may result in an incorrect internal state (error);
- etc...





# Faults, Errors and Failures


## ■ Examples of a "Fault $\rightarrow$ Error $\rightarrow$ Failure" chain...

- A failure by the editor of a maintenance or user manual may result in a fault becoming present in the manual;
- This fault will remain inactive until someone follows the incorrect procedures detailed in the manual;
- etc...



# Faults, Errors and Failures


## ■ Hierarchy of faults and failures





# Faults, Errors and Failures

## ■ Fault Classification






# Faults, Errors and Failures:

## Fault Classification

[Avizienis et al.]








# Faults, Errors and Failures:

## Fault Classification




[Avizienis et al.]

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# Faults, Errors and Failures:

## Failures



[Avizienis et al.]




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



# Dependability Attributes





# Dependability Attributes: Reliability



## ■ Definition: $R(t)$

”probability that an item will perform its required function in the specified manner and under specified or assumed conditions over a given time period”



## ■ Sometime expressed in

**MTTF:**

*Mean Time To Failure*



# Dependability Attributes: Availability



*MDT - Mean Down Time*

## ■ Definition:

"probability that an item will perform its required function in the specified manner and under specified or assumed conditions at a given time"


## ■ A

proportion (eg. in %) of time that an item is 'up'.




# Dependability Attributes: Reliability vs Availability

No repairs:



With repairs:



MTBF – Mean Time Between Failures

MTTF – Mean Time To Fail

MTTR – Mean Time To Repair

$MTBF = MTTF + MTTR$

if  $MTTF \gg MTTR$   
then  $MTBF \approx MTTF$

**NOTE:** sometimes MTBF – Mean Time Before Failures == MTTF



# Dependability Attributes: Reliability vs Availability

## ■ Example:

- A system that fails, on average, once an hour, but that reboots automatically in 10 ms, has low reliability, but high availability.

## ■ Example of systems that require high availability, but low reliability:

- stateless web servers, ...



# Dependability Attributes: Safety

## ■ Definition:

- “safety is defined to be the absence of catastrophic consequences on the environment”.
- “freedom from accidents and loss” [Leveson 95]

## ■ What is a safety critical system?


- this is a system for which safety (absence of catastrophic failures) is guaranteed to a specific value.



# Dependability Attributes: Safety

## ■ Safety concerns

- The safety guarantee of a system is not only related to the hardware and/or software used, but encompasses all aspects during the system's life-cycle, from its design, implementation, installation, use, maintenance, and decommissioning.







# Dependability Attributes: Reliability vs Safety

- Reliability and Safety are not synonyms.
  - » For example, the system may remain safe in case of failure ("*failsafe state / system*"), in which case the system is safe, but not reliable.
- Frequently, the safety has to be reduced in order to allow other requirements to be met!



# Dependability Attributes: Reliability vs Safety

## ■ Example:

### - Traffic lights:

» all red light  $\Rightarrow$  system is safe, but not reliable

### - Fly-by-wire aircraft

» once an aircraft is airborne, there are no fail-safe states, so, in this case, Reliability = Safety



# Dependability Attributes: Reliability vs Safety

- Safe operation in case of Failure: "*Failsafe*"
  - If a safe state exists and is reachable from all operational conditions, the system design may use that safe state to obtain safety in case of failure...
    - » ...by changing to that safe state in case of failure, and remaining in that state..



# Dependability Attributes: Integrity

## ■ Integrity

### - System Integrity:

“absence of improper system state alterations”

NOTE: goes beyond the usual definitions, that

- relate to the notion of authorized actions only, and,
- focus on information

### - Data Integrity:

“property that the data be resistant to unauthorized  
modification”



# Dependability Attributes: Maintainability

## ■ Maintainability

- “aptitude of a system to undergo repair and evolution”
- More difficult to quantify, but usually expressed by  
MTTR - Mean Time To Repair
- Problem: Some corrective and preventative maintenance may introduce new faults, or activate existing faults.




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# Means of Attaining Dependability







# Means of Attaining Dependability

## ■ Fault Prevention:

Do whatever it takes to prevent the faults from occurring, or from introducing them during design and development.

In software Development, this usually means:

- **Formal, Semi-formal, and engineering methods** to be used and applied during software development;
- These methodologies are to be used throughout the software's life-cycle (requirements analysis, specification, design, implementation, verification, validation, ...)



# Means of Attaining Dependability

## ■ Fault Tolerance:

No matter how hard we try, we will never be able to prevent all faults from occurring. Therefore, the next step is to tolerate the occurrence of faults, i.e. allow the system to continue operating correctly even in the presence of faults that have caused an error.

This is achieved through redundancy.


- Hardware redundancy;
- Software redundancy / diversity;  
(time diversity, data diversity, design/implementation diversity)



# Means of Attaining Dependability


## ■ Fault Tolerance: the three main architectures

inputs All fault tolerance mechanisms go through several stages...




### a) Integer

"rather nothing than wrong"  
(fail-silent, fail-stop, fail-safe)



### c) Integer & persistent

error masking, massive redundancy



### b) Persistent


"rather wrong than nothing"  
fail-operate



# Means of Attaining Dependability

## ■ Fault Tolerance:

All fault tolerance mechanisms go through several stages...





# Means of Attaining Dependability

## ■ Fault Removal:

Reduce the number and severity of faults

### ■ During System Use

This is essentially Preventative or Corrective Maintenance;

### ■ During System Development

consists of three steps: verification, diagnosis, and correction.

**verification** : the process of checking whether the system adheres to given properties (the term **validation** is often used when checking the specification).



# Means of Attaining Dependability

## ■ Fault Removal:

### » Static Verification

#### ■ On the system itself

- 1) static analysis (e.g., inspections or walk-through, data flow analysis, complexity analysis, abstract interpretation, compiler checks, vulnerability search, etc.)
- 2) theorem proving;

#### ■ On models of the system

For example, on a state-transition model (Petri nets, finite or infinite state automata), using model checking.



# Means of Attaining Dependability

## ■ Fault Removal:

### » Dynamic Verification

Check the system by exercising it...

#### ■ Symbolic Execution

Use symbolic inputs

#### ■ Testing

Use actual inputs

(The question here is how to create the test vectors so as to achieve the largest coverage in the minimum time and costs)



# Means of Attaining Dependability

## ■ Fault Forecasting:

Estimate the number and consequence of any remaining faults that we were unable to prevent and remove.

- How do you do this for software?





# Basic Concepts and Terminology


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# Computational Systems and Safety

## ■ Control System.

- Determines/controls how a specific system operates (simples  $\leftrightarrow$  complexo).
- If specified, also provides safety functions (i.e. a safety-critical system);




## ■ Protection System.

- Uses sensors to detect error conditions, and activates actuators to minimize or cancel their effects;
- Special case: "shutdown system".



# Computational Systems and Safety





# Computational Systems and Safety

## ■ Tendency:

“Software is a pervasive Enabling technology”

- Today, multiple safety-critical functions are already supported by computational systems;
- Embedded systems will have / already have a dominating role in our interaction with computational systems;
- The development of embedded systems will soon be one of the largest clients of safety-critical technologies (hardware/software/...)



# Computational Systems and Safety

## ■ Advantages of using PES (Programmable and Electronic Systems) to support safety-critical applications

- High processing capacity, which eases the implementation of complex control functions (and control large number of I/Os) which would be difficult otherwise;
- High speed / low energy consumption / small dimensions / low cost;
- High flexibility for system evolution (implies cost reduction);
- High hardware reliability, due to high integration (reduced number of external interfaces susceptible to fail);



# Computational Systems and Safety

- Disadvantages of using PES (Programmable and Electronic Systems) to support safety-critical applications
  - higher design complexity and higher probability of introducing development faults;
  - test operations more complex =>  
=> higher probability of undetected faults
  - higher complexity in using and operating the system =>  
=> higher probability of human installation, operation and maintenance faults



# Basic Concepts and Terminology

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