STEPAN GORDEEV
University of Connecticut

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#### **CONTRIBUTIONS**

• explore farm-level subsistence, document scale-dependent product choice

**▶** literature

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- · show importance of farm-level subsistence for aggr. agricultural productivity
- ▶ literature

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- $\rightarrow$  HH kcal intakes
- $\rightarrow$  HH output & sales
- → HH non-farm income
- · Rescale HH kcal intake, output, income by HH kcal requirement
  - → "per capita" measures, weighted by energy needs

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
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
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  - avg share of output sold: 16%

# Farm Size $\uparrow \rightarrow$ Shift Farm From Maize to Diversity, Commercialize






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# MODEL

#### MODEL: HH PROBLEM

- heterogeneous households and agricultural products, solve GE ► details
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## CALORIC DEVIATION PENALTY f

· caloric deviation penalty fn (▶ properties):

$$f\left(\sum_{i} c_{h,i} k_{i}, K_{req,h}\right) = \psi\left(\frac{\sum_{i} c_{h,i} k_{i} - K_{req,h}}{K_{req,h}}\right)^{2} \frac{K_{req,h}}{\sum_{i} c_{h,i} k_{i}}$$

$$\downarrow \sum_{i} c_{h,i} k_{i}$$

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# FARM BEHAVIOR IN MODEL AND DATA

log kcal intake **food diversity** ▶ *def* ▶ *nutrients* log output log non-farm income Ν Adi. R<sup>2</sup> \* p < 0.1, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01

	log kcal intake	food diversity ▶ def ▶ nutrients
	model: CES-only	
log output	0.732 (0.001)	
log non-farm income	0.289 (0.001)	
N Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	35,520 0.937	

<sup>\*</sup> p < 0.1, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01

- $\cdot$  CES-only ( $\psi=0$ ): relative consumptions invariant to size/income
  - $-\,$  kcal intake  $\uparrow$  proportionally to total shadow income, diversity constant

	log kcal intake	food diversity ▶ def ▶ nutrients		
	model:	model:		
	CES-only	CES-only		
log output	0.732	-0.061		
	(0.001)	(0.001)		
log non-farm	0.289	0.031		
income	(0.001)	(0.002)		
N	35,520	35,520		
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.937	0.054		

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		log kcal intake	food diversity ▶ def ▶ nutrients		
	model:	model:	model:		
	CES-only	benchmark	CES-only		
log output	0.732	0.124	-0.061		
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)		
log non-farm	0.289	0.084	0.031		
income	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)		
N	35,520	33,613	35,520		
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.937	0.393	0.054		

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- $\psi > 0$  (benchmark): reallocate resources from calories to diversity as size/income  $\uparrow$ 
  - small: focus consumption on obtaining calories to reduce caloric deviation penalty

	log kcal intake		food diversity ▶ def ▶ nutrients		
	model:	model:	model:	model:	
	CES-only	benchmark	CES-only	benchmark	
log output	0.732	0.124	-0.061	0.428	
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	
log non-farm	0.289	0.084	0.031	0.396	
income	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	
N	35,520	33,613	35,520	33,613	
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.937	0.393	0.054	0.762	

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  - large: caloric requirement largely satisfied → diversify diet
     details ➤ comparison to Stone-Geary

	log kcal intake			food diversity ▶ def ▶ nutrients		
	model: CES-only	model: benchmark	data	model: CES-only	model: benchmark	
log output	0.732 (0.001)	0.124 (0.001)	0.091*** (0.005)	-0.061 (0.001)	0.428 (0.002)	
log non-farm income	0.289 (0.001)	0.084 (0.001)	0.063*** (0.004)	0.031 (0.002)	0.396 (0.002)	
N Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	35,520 0.937	33,613 0.393	8,674 0.063	35,520 0.054	33,613 0.762	

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- CES-only ( $\psi = 0$ ): relative consumptions invariant to size/income
  - kcal intake ↑ proportionally to total shadow income, diversity constant
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	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.005)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.034)
log non-farm	0.289	0.084	0.063***	0.031	0.396	0.857***
income	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.033)
N	35,520	33,613	8,674	35,520	33,613	8,675
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.937	0.393	0.063	0.054	0.762	0.131

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#### **SELLING BEHAVIOR: MODEL & DATA**

#### LARGE FARMS ARE MORE ACTIVE SELLERS ▶ details

- MODEL & DATA: farm size  $\uparrow \rightarrow$  sell bigger fraction of output
- $\cdot$  model mechanism: size  $\uparrow \rightarrow$  reallocate cons. to diversity, manuf.  $\rightarrow$  need revenue

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
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
#### **SALES ARE SPECIALIZED** ▶ details

- MODEL & DATA: sales are specialized compared to overall production
- model mechanism: sell only the most revenue-productive good, but can produce others for own consumption


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
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
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
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  - scale-dependence of consumption, production, selling

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 $d\downarrow$  s.t. avg share sold **16%**  $\rightarrow$  **50%**:

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- Model: nutrition demand + trade costs  $\rightarrow$  explain behavior of subsistence farmers
  - scale-dependence of consumption, production, selling
- · How relevant is it for aggregate agricultural productivity?
- Conduct counterfactual reductions in domestic agricultural trade costs ( $d\downarrow$ )

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- aggr. productivity ↑ 42% ► details
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  - $-\frac{1}{2}$  due to changing product choice
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  - $\rightarrow$  subsistence matters more for macro, nutrition matters for micro



## CONCLUSION

## Subsistence farmer nutrition demand



Farm production decisions



Aggregate agricultural productivity ↓

- smallest farms specialize in calories
- medium farms diversify diet & production
- largest farms become market-oriented
- if partially leave subsistence ightarrow agric. productivity  $\uparrow$
- half because improved product choice
- calories matter less than subsistence itself

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  - existing & proposed policies: encourage staples, biodiversity, or cash crops?
  - framework well suited for predicting nutritional, economic outcomes

economics literature:

SUBSISTENCE FARMING &
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTIVITY

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- Gollin and Rogerson (2014), Rivera-Padilla (2020), Sotelo (2020), Kebede (2020)
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## THIS PAPER:

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#### nutrition literature:

# SUBSISTENCE FARMING &

#### NUTRITION

- Jones (2017), Sibhatu et al. (2015)
  - smallholder farm biodiversity related to dietary diversity
  - especially with poor market access
  - → farm characteristics matter for nutritional outcomes

- explore farm-level subsistence, document scale-dependent product choice
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#### MODEL: HH PROBLEM

$$\max\left((1-\varphi_m)\left(\sum_{i=1}^n\varphi_ic_{h,i}\frac{\sigma^{-1}}{\sigma}\right)^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}\frac{\gamma-1}{\gamma}}+\varphi_mc_{h,m}\frac{\gamma-1}{\gamma}\right)^{\frac{\gamma-1}{\gamma-1}}-\underbrace{f\left(\sum_{i=1}^nc_{h,i}k_i,\ K_{req,h}\right)}_{\text{kcal deviation penalty}}\\ \sum_{i=1}^n\frac{x_{h,i}}{z_{h,i}}\leq L_h\\ \sum_{i=1}^nx_{h,i}^pp_id+p_mc_{h,m}\leq\sum_{i=1}^nx_{h,i}^s\frac{p_i}{d}+wN_h$$

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$$f(\sum_{i} c_{i}k_{i}, K_{req})$$
 PROPERTIES

## Properties:

1. 
$$f(bK_{in}, bK_{req}) = f(K_{in}, K_{req})$$

2. 
$$f(bK_{req}, K_{req}) = f\left(\frac{K_{req}}{b}, K_{req}\right)$$

3. 
$$\min_{K_{in}>0} f(K_{in}, K_{rea}) = f(K_{rea}, K_{rea}) = 0$$

4. 
$$f_{11}(K_{in}, K_{req}) = \frac{2\psi K_{req}}{K_{i}^{3}} > 0$$

(homogeneity of deg. 0)

(symmetry around  $K_{req}$  in ratios)

(minimum and zero if eat  $K_{req}$ )

(convex in intake)

back

- · Consider the problem of a household
- Suppose  $\psi = 0$  (CES-only)

$$MU_i^{CES}(c_i) = MC_i$$
 (c<sub>i</sub> FOC)

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  - → predictions on kcal-diversity tradeoff in consumption and on farm product choice



# Agricultural Goods

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**▶** list

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- ► Calibration: parameters & moments

### AGRICULTURAL GOODS USED IN CALIBRATION

- · Selected goods:
  - 1. maize
  - 2. pigeonpea
  - 3. groundnut
  - 4. tomato
  - 5. soybean
  - 6. tobacco
- · These goods account for, on average,
  - 70% of HH output market value
  - 43% of HH food consumption market value



$$\frac{1}{d} \sum_{h} x_{h,i}^{s} = d \sum_{h} x_{h,i}^{p} \quad \forall i$$

• Solve for agricultural prices  $\{p_i\}_i$  s.t. edible good markets clear:

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\underline{\text{tobacco exports}}$$

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  - tobacco traded internationally at exogenous  $\bar{p}_t$
  - some manufactured good is imported to balance the trade:

$$\bar{p}_{\text{tobacco}} \left( \frac{1}{d} \sum_{h} x_{h, \text{tobacco}}^{s} - d \sum_{h} x_{h, \text{tobacco}}^{p} \right) = p_{m} \left( \sum_{h} c_{h, m} - Y_{m} \right)$$
tobacco exports

tobacco exports

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  - can produce more goods for own consumption

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  - the revenue-maximizing one:  $arg max_i p_i z_{h,i}$
  - can produce more goods for own consumption
- DATA: sales are specialized compared to overall production



### FARM SALES ARE SPECIALIZED: MODEL & DATA

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  - 69% sell just 1 good, only 9% produce just 1 good



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  - can produce more goods for own consumption
- DATA: sales are specialized compared to overall production
  - 69% sell just 1 good, only 9% produce just 1 good
  - on avg, top good accounts for 91% in sales but 67% in output



### Lower Trade Costs ightarrow All Specialize: Model & Data

- Model:  $d \downarrow \rightarrow$  specialize production
  - below some cutoff  $ilde{d}_h$ , HH h only produces the revenue-maximizing good



# Lower Trade Costs ightarrow All Specialize: Model & Data

- MODEL:  $d \downarrow \rightarrow$  specialize production
  - below some cutoff  $ilde{d}_h$ , HH h only produces the revenue-maximizing good
- DATA:
  - HHs with better market access specialize production
    - **▶** table



quartile	sold output share
1 4	

sold output share
model
<1%
67%

output	sold output share	
quartile	model	data
1	<1%	13%
4	67%	31%

• Larger farms are more active sellers:

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quartile	model	data	
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4	67%	31%	

- Pure CES Model: no scale dependence in selling behavior

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- · Model mechanism:

size ↑

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$$size \uparrow \longrightarrow energy intake \uparrow$$

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- · Model mechanism:

 $size \uparrow \longrightarrow energy intake \uparrow$ 

 $\nearrow$  food diversity  $\uparrow$ 

need revenue


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- Pure CES Model: no scale dependence in selling behavior

· Model mechanism:

size  $\uparrow \longrightarrow$  energy intake  $\uparrow$ 



need revenue → sell

# CUTOFF TRADE COST $\bar{d}$

$$ar{d}_h = \sqrt{rac{\max_i p_i Z_{h,i}}{\min_i p_i / k_i \cdot \max_i k_i Z_{h,i}}}$$

#### FOOD DIVERSITY

Food Diversity = Inverse Simpson Index

Food Diversity<sub>h</sub> = 
$$\left(\sum_{i=1}^{n} \left(\frac{\text{food quantity}_{h,i} \times \text{median purchase price}_{i}}{\sum_{j=1}^{n} \text{food quantity}_{h,j} \times \text{median purchase price}_{j}}\right)^{2}\right)^{-1}$$

where h is the HH index, n is the total number of distinct foods in the dataset.

- · Simpson Index: sum of squared food shares within HH's consumption
  - same as HHI
  - interpretation: probability that two random dollars of (shadow) food expenditure come from the same product
- Inverse Simpson Index =  $\frac{1}{SI}$ , commonly used in measuring species diversity



#### **NUTRIENT RICHNESS**

	NRF9		F9 NRF9.:	
_	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
log output	17.046***	5.695***	-13.296***	-13.400***
	(0.964)	(0.724)	(3.326)	(3.358)
log non-farm income	10.285***	2.441***	-7.257**	-7.305**
	(0.792)	(0.603)	(3.898)	(3.548)
log kcal intake		124.025*** (2.282)		0.550 (26.234)
N	8,675	8,674	8,675	8,674
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.054	0.451	0.002	0.002

<sup>\*</sup> p < 0.1, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01

- NRF9: sum of daily intakes (relative to recommended level) of 9 nutrients
- NRF9.3: subtracts the relative excessive consumption of 3 disqualifying nutrients



#### LOWER TRADE COSTS → ALL SPECIALIZE: DATA

production diversity

Ν

Adj. R<sup>2</sup>



<sup>\*</sup> p < 0.1, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01

#### LOWER TRADE COSTS → ALL SPECIALIZE: DATA

#### production diversity

sold output share

Ν

Adj. R<sup>2</sup>



<sup>\*</sup> p < 0.1, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01

### Lower Trade Costs $\rightarrow$ All Specialize: Data

	production diversity
old output share	-0.044***
	(0.016)

N	4,042	
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.025	
* n < 0.1	** n < 0.05 *** n < 0.01	

<sup>\*</sup> p < 0.1, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01



# LOWER TRADE COSTS $\rightarrow$ ALL SPECIALIZE: DATA

	production diversity
sold output share	-0.044*** (0.016)

#### 1 [good mkt access]

N	4,042
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.025
+ 0.4	44

<sup>\*</sup> p < 0.1, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01




### Lower Trade Costs $\rightarrow$ All Specialize: Data

	production diversity	
sold output share	-0.044*** (0.016)	
1 [good mkt access]		-0.164*** (0.018)
N	4,042	8,675
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.025	0.099

\* p < 0.1, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01



### PRODUCT FREQUENCY BY SIZE: DATA



parameter	value	moment/source	moment	moment
parameter	value	moment/source	data	model

parameter	value	moment/source	<b>data</b> moment	model moment
Distributions				
$\mathbb{E}\left(\log L_{h}\right)$	-15	avg $K_{in,h}/K_{req,h}$	1.036	0.902

parameter	value	moment/source	<b>data</b> moment	model moment
Distributions				
$\mathbb{E}\left(\log L_h\right)$	-15	avg $K_{in,h}/K_{req,h}$	1.036	0.902
$V(\log L_h)$	1.5	$V(\log \text{output}_h)$	1.528	1.385

parameter	value	moment/source	<b>data</b> moment	model moment
Distributions				
$\mathbb{E}\left(\log L_h ight)$	-15	avg $K_{in,h}/K_{req,h}$	1.036	0.902
$V(\log L_h)$	1.5	V(log output <sub>h</sub> )	1.528	1.385
$P(N_h=0)$	0.112	P (non-farm income <sub>h</sub> = 0)	0.112	0.117

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$P(N_h=0)$	0.112	P (non-farm income <sub>h</sub> = 0)	0.112	0.117
$V(\log N_h \mid N_h > 0)$	2.103	V(log non-farm income <sub>h</sub> )	2.103	1.924

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$\mathbb{E}\left(\log L_h ight)$	-15	avg $K_{in,h}/K_{req,h}$	1.036	0.902
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Parameters				
$\sigma$ (EoS across foods)	0.75	estimated	_	_

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Parameters				
$\sigma$ (EoS across foods)	0.75	estimated	_	_
$\gamma$ (EoS between food & manuf.)	1	_	_	_

parameter	value	value moment/source		model moment
Distributions				
$\mathbb{E}\left(\log L_h\right)$	-15	avg $K_{in,h}/K_{req,h}$	1.036	0.902
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Parameters				
$\sigma$ (EoS across foods)	0.75	estimated	_	_
$\gamma$ (EoS between food & manuf.)	1	_	_	_
d (agricultural trade cost)	1.75	avg share sold	0.159	0.203

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$V(\log L_h)$	1.5	V(log output <sub>h</sub> )	1.528	1.385
$P(N_h = 0)$ 0.112 $P(\text{non})$		P (non-farm income <sub>h</sub> = 0)	0.112	0.117
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Parameters				
$\sigma$ (EoS across foods)	0.75	estimated	_	_
$\gamma$ (EoS between food & manuf.)	1	_	_	_
d (agricultural trade cost)	1.75	avg share sold	0.159	0.203
$\psi$ (kcal deviation penalty)	0.5	output elasticity of $K_{in}$	0.091	0.124


parameter value moment/source		<b>data</b> moment	<b>model</b> moment	
Distributions				
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Parameters				
$\sigma$ (EoS across foods)	0.75	estimated	_	_
$\gamma$ (EoS between food & manuf.)	1	_	_	_
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### **Good characteristics**


parameter	value	moment/source	<b>data</b> moment	model moment
Distributions				
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$P(N_h=0)$	0.112	P (non-farm income <sub>h</sub> = 0)	0.112	0.117
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Parameters				
$\sigma$ (EoS across foods)	0.75	estimated	_	_
$\gamma$ (EoS between food & manuf.)	1	_	_	_
d (agricultural trade cost)	1.75	avg share sold	0.159	0.203
$\psi$ (kcal deviation penalty)	0.5	output elasticity of K <sub>in</sub>	0.091	0.124
Good characteristics $\varphi_m$ (manuf. taste weight)	0.5	aggr. non-farm income aggr. farm output	1.539	1.632

parameter	value	moment/source	<b>data</b> moment	<b>model</b> moment
Distributions				
$\mathbb{E}\left(\log L_h\right)$	-15	avg $K_{in,h}/K_{req,h}$	1.036	0.902
$V(\log L_h)$	1.5	V(log output <sub>h</sub> )	1.528	1.385
$P(N_h=0)$	0.112	P (non-farm income <sub>h</sub> = 0)	0.112	0.117
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Parameters				
$\sigma$ (EoS across foods)	0.75	estimated	_	_
$\gamma$ (EoS between food & manuf.)	1	_	_	_
d (agricultural trade cost)	1.75	avg share sold	0.159	0.203
$\psi$ (kcal deviation penalty)	0.5	output elasticity of $K_{in}$	0.091	0.124
Good characteristics				
$arphi_{ extsf{m}}$ (manuf. taste weight)	0.5	aggr. non-farm income aggr. farm output	1.539	1.632
$\bar{p}_{ ext{tobacco}}/p_{ ext{maize}}$	5.4	aggr. tobacco output share	0.091	0.094


- Compare "farm-gate" production to final consumption ("aggregate productivity")
  - farm production only accounts for product choice changes



- · Compare "farm-gate" production to final consumption ("aggregate productivity")
  - farm production only accounts for product choice changes
  - final consumption also accounts for mechanical losses from d




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
 $d \rightarrow$  1: aggr. productivity  $\uparrow$  78% ( $\frac{1}{3}$  due to product choice)

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  - farm production only accounts for product choice changes
  - final consumption also accounts for mechanical losses from d



- $d \rightarrow 1$ : aggr. productivity  $\uparrow 78\%$  ( $\frac{1}{3}$  due to product choice)
- $d\downarrow$  s.t. avg share sold 16%  $\rightarrow$  50%: aggr. productivity  $\uparrow$  42% ( $\frac{1}{2}$  due to product choice)

### AGGREGATE AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTIVITY ACROSS MODELS




# Trade Costs $\downarrow \rightarrow$ Heterogeneous Effects in Farm Size

•  $d \downarrow$  s.t. avg share sold 16%  $\rightarrow$  50%:


### Trade Costs $\downarrow \rightarrow$ Heterogeneous Effects in Farm Size

- $d \downarrow$  s.t. avg share sold 16%  $\rightarrow$  50%:
  - farm productivity: small ↑ the most, large ↑ the least



### Trade Costs $\downarrow \rightarrow$ Heterogeneous Effects in Farm Size

- $d \downarrow$  s.t. avg share sold 16%  $\rightarrow$  50%:
  - farm productivity: small ↑ the most, large ↑ the least
  - consumption: small  $\uparrow$  the most, medium  $\uparrow$  the least



### FARM SIZE AND FOOD CONSUMPTION: STONE-GEARY

### Household food consumption vs farm size: Stone-Geary vs baseline model and data

		log kcal intake			food diversity		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	
	<b>model</b> : Stone-Geary	<b>model</b> : baseline	data	<b>model</b> : Stone-Geary	<b>model</b> : baseline	data	
log output	0.260	0.124	0.091***	-0.118	0.428	0.395***	
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.005)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.034)	
log non-farm	0.223	0.084	0.063***	0.029	0.396	0.857***	
income	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.033)	
N	35,483	33,613	8,674	35,483	33,613	8,675	
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.819	0.393	0.063	0.196	0.762	0.131	

<sup>\*</sup> p < 0.1, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01