



OBLIVIOUS RAM :





OBLIVIOUS DEFN: (INTUITIVE) ANY TWO SEQUENCES

OF READ/ WRITE COMMANDS
ARE INDISTINGUISHABLE

FORMAL DEFN :



SPECIAL CASE: $S_0 + S_1$, BOTH PERMUTATIONS
OF ALL N ELEMENTS



To READ INDEX i
OF DB, READ INDEX $\pi(i)$
OF ENCRYPTED DB.

AS LONG AS $S_0 + S_1$ PERMUTATIONS,
SINCE π IS HIDDEN, $(S_0 \circ \pi)$ +
 $(S_1 \circ \pi)$ ARE INDISTINGUISHABLE, BOTH ARE
RANDOM PERMUTATIONS.

BUT IF $S_0 = 1, 1, 1, 1$
 $S_1 = 1, 2, 3, 4$


A KNOWS $b=0$ IF U ACCESSES
SAME ENCRYPTED LOCATION EVERY TIME.
 $b=1$ IF U ACCESSES DIFFERENT LOCATIONS.

PROBLEM BECOMES INTERESTING WHEN
USER'S MEMORY IS SMALL.


OTHERWISE, CAN JUST STORE DATABASE
LOCALLY. BORING!

IDEALLY: $\mathcal{O}(l) \times \text{poly}(k)$

WHAT IF USER'S LOCAL MEMORY
IS $\mathcal{O}(\sqrt{n})$?



$$S_b = (1, 1, 2, 3, 3)$$




INSTEAD OF READING LOCATION TWICE,
STORE VALUE IN LOCAL CACHE AND
MAKE "FAKE" QUERY TO UNREAD LOCATION
IN ENCRYPTED DB.

WHAT DO WE DO WHEN CACHE
RUNS OUT OF SPACE?




IDEA: PICK NEW T^1 , REARRANGE
ENCRYPTED DB, + STORE
PREVIOUS CACHE INFO IN CLOUD.

RELATED PROBLEM




How to sort bit key without revealing data?

Use sorting network!



CAN CONSTRUCT NETWORK OF
 COMPARISON GATES W/ N INTEGER INPUT
 WIRES + N OUTPUT WIRES, + RETURNS
 A SORTED LIST!



BATCHER SORTING NETWORK:

SMALL CONSTANT
 4


$O(N \log^2 N)$ GATES
 $O(\log^2 N)$ DEPTH

AKS SORTING NETWORK:

LARGE
CONSTANT,
BILLIONS

$O(N \log N)$ GATES
 $O(\log N)$ DEPTH

TO SORT KEYS WITHOUT REVEALING
ACCESS PATTERN TO ADVERSARY,
JUST FOLLOW SORTING NETWORK!



USER DOWNLOADS 2 ELEMENTS AT A TIME
+ RE-UPLOADS IN NEW LOCATIONS, LOW MEMORY.


ACCESS PATTERN DETERMINED BY NETWORK
WIRING, WHICH IS FIXED!. REVEALS NOTHING.

How DOES OBLIVIOUS SORTING
HELP OUR $O(\sqrt{n})$ SOLUTION?

Aside: How do we store it
with limited memory?

use PRF to create hash table instead.

make hash table $f_s(i) \bmod 10N$.
of



$$f_s(1) \bmod 10^3 = 3$$

$$f_s(2) \bmod 10^3 = 3$$

$$\text{PR[Overflow]} = \text{NEGIGIBLE}$$

To ACCESS ITEM 5, compute



$f_5(5) \rightarrow 17$ + DOWNLOAD EVERYTHING

IN BUCKET F_7 , LOOK FOR $(5, e)$.




FULL \sqrt{N} SOLUTION





- READ UNTIL BUFFER IS FULL
- PICK NEW S'
- REARRANGE CLOUD HASH TABLE
USING SORTING NETWORK
- CAN STORE BUFFER IN CLOUD, PAY \sqrt{n}
FOR EACH READ.

EVERY \sqrt{n} STEPS, MUST "REDO"
 ENTIRE DATA STRUCTURE WHICH COSTS
 $O(n \log^2 n)$. PER STEP: $O(\sqrt{n} \log^2 n)$
 MEMORY: CONSTANT $\cdot \text{poly}(k)$



LIST OF TOPICS FOR

FINAL EXAM :

HARDCORE BITS

INDISTINGUISHABILITY

PRG, PRF

DIGITAL SIGNATURES

UNIQUE SIGNATURES

VRF

MERKLE TREES

ZK: 3 TYPES (COMPUTATIONAL,
STATISTICAL,
PERFECT)

ZK PROOF VS. ARGUMENT

PKE:

- SEMANTIC SECURITY
- CCA-1
- CCA-2) DEFNS. ON U

EL-GAMAL ENCRYPTION

PROOF OF SECURITY BASED ON DDH

COMMITMENTS:

- NAOR COMMITMENTS
- Com BASED on CLAW-FREE
PERMUTATIONS

OT, 1-2-OT, CORRELATED
RANDOMNESS

BEAVER'S PRE-COMPUTED OT

OT \Rightarrow HONEST-BUT CURIOUS MPC

MALICIOUS MPC, THRESHOLD BOUNDS

YAO'S GARBLED CIRCUITS
(PROOF OF SECURITY)

BGW PROTOCOL (INFO-THEORETIC
MPC)

BRZANTINE AGREEMENT

(IMPOSSIBILITY FOR $t \geq n/3$)

DEF OF PUBLIC LEDGER FOR BLOCKCHAINS

PoW, PoS

PIR, PIR \Rightarrow CRHF

ORAM