

Prestige in International Politics

Two common themes emerged in my attempt to find a clear and succinct definition of “prestige” as it pertains to international politics: international relations theory has neglected the topic for too long and there is no widely accepted definition of the term. The first claim is open to interpretation, but having read many attempts to define the term, I disagree with the second. There are a few key elements of the concept on which contemporary authors agree:¹

1. Prestige is inherently relational;
2. Prestige refers to second order beliefs;
3. Prestige is conferred for qualities that are collectively regarded as desirable;
4. States desire prestige;
5. Prestige is related to (but distinct from) status, reputation, legitimacy, etc.

It is important to note older work in the field which uses the term “prestige” usually differs in substantial ways from the key elements outlined above (often points 2 and 5). There are some discrepancies in recent work in the field as well, but they tend to be less fundamental. For examples, some scholars disagree about *why* states desire prestige or *how* it differs from status or other related concepts.

As stated above, many authors who write on the topic contend that it has been neglected in IR theory. As a result, most of the work in the genre is framed as presenting alternative explanations for patterns of state behavior that seem puzzling in the absence of prestige concerns. Gilady (2018) makes a psychological argument: states pursue expensive, unnecessary “prestige projects” (like aircraft carriers) for the same reason that some individuals are willing to spend exorbitant sums on luxury goods when

¹ See, for example: O’Neill, “Nuclear Weapons and National Prestige”; Gilady, *The Price of Prestige*; Barnhart, “Prestige, Humiliation and International Politics.”

functionally equivalent alternatives are available: because they serve as status symbols. The good itself is secondary; the true value is in the act of consumption. Barnhart (2013) starts from a similar question: why do some states engage in costly competition when there is no clear strategic or material value involved? Her explanation is more explicitly posited as an alternative explanation to conventional wisdom: she argues that in some cases (the Scramble for Africa and Cold War arms races) even territory and weapons acquisition are driven by a state's desire to convince others that they should be listened to and respected, *not* by security concerns. O'Neill (2006) focuses more narrowly on the role that prestige plays in states' decisions to acquire nuclear weapons. Again, offering an alternative explanation for non-proliferation that emphasizes the prestige payoff of demonstrating the capacity to develop nuclear technology, but choosing not to. Renshon (2016) highlights the role that a state's dissatisfaction with their prestige can have on their proclivity to engage in armed conflicts.²

There are some glaring deficiencies in the collective literature on the topic. One thing that is immediately clear is that there is significant disagreement about how much prestige matters. Where does it fall in the hierarchy of a state's motivations and how much explanatory power we can reasonably expect to derive from the concept theoretically? I tend to agree with Gilady's assessment that,

[T]he literature on prestige in international relations tends to simultaneously aim too high and too low; when it aims too high, it claims to explain all international relations, especially patterns of conflict and war; when it aims too low, it ends up being the study of curiosities and anecdotes (6).

The truth likely lies somewhere in between. This problem derives, in part, from a lack of formalization and reasonable scoping in the literature. Another troubling trend in the literature is a tendency to reason

² Renshon uses the term "*status* deficits," but in such a way that it is functionally the same as a "prestige deficit" would, as I outline the term above. I plan to unpack the nuance of the terms and explain why I focus on prestige in detail.

backwards. After observing behavior that seems surprising or counterproductive given a state's material or strategic incentives, appealing to a prestige motivation becomes easier and difficult to falsify. This is especially true because the cases on which these theories often rely are also the ones that are used to test its implications. This case selection on the dependent variable means that we have very little understanding of when prestige motivations come to the fore in a state's decision-making process and why. An even more obvious gap in this literature is how little attention is paid to whether these strategies that theoretically *should* increase prestige *do* increase prestige.

I propose three distinct papers, which will bring novel methodological approaches to bear on different topics that share the theoretical theme of prestige. My first paper asks: what implications does a prestige motive have for states' response to crisis and willingness to cooperate with international institutions? I formalize the prestige motivation in such a way that I can explore the implications of different levels of prestige-consciousness. The equilibrium of the model provides insight into which states are likely to change their behavior when concerned about prestige and which are not. I will test these empirical implications on a novel dataset of natural disasters and requests for international aid. The second paper involves a conjoint survey designed to test the impact of projects and accomplishments on respondents' perceptions of a state's prestige. The survey design will also enable analysis of the effects of racial perceptions and potential moderating effects on a state's ability to increase its prestige. Both the renewed emphasis on race in international politics and the growing literature on prestige emphasize *perception*, making this a natural theoretical extension. As an attempt to directly assess the efficacy of prestige seeking behavior, it fills one of the critical gaps outlined above. The final paper brackets theoretical questions about prestige as a motivation for states. Instead it will present computational text analysis of written think tank content (reports, white papers, etc.) relevant to an ongoing debate about the role of foreign government money and American foreign policy. On one hand, critics argue that accepting foreign money enables states to launder their reputation (effectively

increasing their prestige) while others maintain that these fears are exaggerated. While both sides have presented qualitative evidence, I will offer a more systematic quantitative evaluation of the relationship between funding and output. Insofar as funding American think tanks is a common strategy states use to increase prestige, the findings will further our understanding of what states get for their investments.

Paper 1: A formal model of prestige-seeking states and response to crises

Despite early detection and identification of SARS-CoV-2 as a novel infectious disease of concern, public health and government officials were ultimately unable to contain the disease. The scientific and medical communities in Wuhan appear to have played their roles well, but political decision makers engaged in a concerted cover-up that hampered public health officials' ability to contain the spread of the virus.³ It was not until an epidemiologist turned whistle-blower that the rest of the world was alerted to the emerging crisis. We will never know for certain what would have happened if the Chinese government had been more forthcoming, but perhaps the expertise and resources available through the WHO and other institutions could have prevented COVID-19 from becoming a full-blown pandemic. Given the resources available and the clear legal requirement to report the outbreak to the WHO, the decision to suppress vital information related to the outbreak seems irrational. If we assume that states' only concern is successfully managing crises, it would be. But if states are motivated by prestige (operationalized in this case as other states' belief about their capacity), then forgoing aid and trying to manage a crisis alone might be rational.

Building on work completed for my MA thesis, I propose a formal model to explore the dynamics of state decision making, assuming that states are sensitive to others' belief about their capabilities. Specifically, I will answer the question: does prestige consciousness affect a state's willingness to ask for help from the international community when facing a crisis (like an infectious disease outbreak or natural disaster)? I show formally that some states *will* forego help from the international community. The incentive to avoid asking for help comes from their desire to be seen as more capable. It also depends on internal and external uncertainty about the severity of an emerging crisis and less capable states' ability to mimic more capable states if the crisis turns out to be less severe. This incentive to mimic weaker for states that most urgently need assistance to manage crises and for the most capable

³ YANG, WUHAN.

states that don't need assistance to manage crises. Instead, it is those in the middle of the international hierarchy (what some scholars call "rising powers" or "middle powers") who are likely to refuse aid according to the model's results.

My first attempt to assess the empirical implications of the model took the form of a qualitative "plausibility probe," in which I compared the United States' government's response to the nuclear incident at Three Mile Island (TMI) with the Soviet government's response to the most famous incident at Chernobyl.⁴ Given their relative positions within the hierarchy of nuclear powers at the time (the US as the global leader and Russia as an aspiring exporter who had already suffered several nuclear mishaps), the model predicts that the US would be open about the emerging crisis while the USSR would cover up the situation at Chernobyl. Qualitative analysis of secondary historical accounts, as well as government and NGO reports supports this hypothesis. While this initial attempt to empirically test the model is encouraging, I would like to conduct a more systematic, quantitative empirical test.

To this end, I propose a novel dataset of natural disasters, including earthquakes, tsunamis, floods, droughts, hurricanes, and other life-threatening, unpredictable weather and natural events. This will provide a good testing ground for the theory, because position in the international hierarchy does not protect countries from natural disasters, they are difficult to hide, and there seem to be cases in which leaders do refuse aid to save face. Speaking about recent earthquakes which devastated parts of Morocco, a local human rights activist claimed: "the marketers of the king's image are worried about having people coming here and going back with the official image of how much people were suffering in very hard conditions before the earthquake and how these areas were totally abandoned, how the government is weak, corrupt and inefficient."⁵

⁴ For a discussion of plausibility probe case studies, see Levy, "Case Studies."

⁵ Banjo, "The UN Is Still Waiting to Be Invited by Morocco to Help With Its Quake Disaster."

For each natural disaster, I will collect data on how long the national government waits to appeal for aid from the UN's Central Emergency Response Fund ([CERF](#)), an arm of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). Specifically, I will collect information from the organization's *rapid response allocation reports*, which include a description of the disaster, a timeline of UN agencies' actions, the amount of CERF funding, country-based pooled funds (CBPFs), and other bilateral or multilateral funds committed to disaster response. Because reports are only available for countries that appeal directly to OCHA, I will supplement my collection efforts with other secondary sources to determine if and when aid was requested bilaterally or through other multilateral institutions. This data will allow me to test the implications of the formal model in several ways:

1. Are rising powers less likely to seek aid from multilateral NGOs?
2. Do rising powers wait longer to request or accept aid than other states?
3. Are rising powers more likely to accept direct aid than aid from multilateral NGOs (minimizing outside scrutiny from non-allies)?

To identify a universe of cases, I will take a subset of the [EM-DAT database](#), maintained by the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters at the University of Louvain in Brussels. The open access database, a joint initiative with the WHO that is primarily USAID funded, contains more than 26,000 disasters beginning in 1900, broken into two major categories: natural and technological. In addition to focusing on natural disasters, I will further subset the data by number of individuals affected so that only major disasters (which are likely to trigger requests or offers of international aid) are included. I will augment these observations with aid amounts, dates, and types using publicly available UN, NGO, and news sources, as described above. Initially, I would like to include 5 years of data. I plan to seek funding for an undergraduate RA, which would allow me to collect additional years of data, moving backwards as far as resources allow.

Project Timeline:

1. Refine and extend the existing formal model (already in progress): by February 2024
2. Identify universe of cases, begin data collection, apply for funding for undergraduate RA:
March/April 2024
3. Complete data collection: December 2024
4. Clean data, conduct exploratory data analysis: January 2025
5. Conduct statistical testing, write up results: April 2025
6. Finish draft: by September 2025

Paper 2: perceptions of prestige

Most of the recent work on the topic has focused on strategies that states use to increase their prestige (sometimes referred to as *status*). Several mechanisms have been proposed: states try to increase their prestige by starting and winning wars,⁶ engaging in conspicuous consumption,⁷ establishing alternative governance structures in which they can claim leadership,⁸ or more mundane acts like succeeding in international sports competition.⁹ Less attention has been paid to whether these strategies accomplish what states hope they will. The survey experiment I propose here will provide evidence one way or the other. By randomizing a country's characteristics in a conjoint design, I will be able to determine if successful completion of a "prestige project" (like acquiring an aircraft carrier or putting an astronaut into space)¹⁰ have independent effects on respondents' perception of a state's prestige.

The survey will be designed to answer two primary questions: (1) does the public respond positively to successful prestige projects and (2) do perceived racial differences change the magnitude or direction of the effect? Conjoint survey experiments have several advantages that make it the right approach for these questions. First, the design allows for the identification of multiple causal effects (assuming proper randomization and sufficient power). For example, it allows identification of average marginal component effects (or AMCE) with relatively straightforward statistical models.¹¹ Recent advances offer corrections that make it possible to test multiple hypotheses simultaneously.¹² They also offer the flexibility to compare effects between subgroups by computing conditional AMCEs.¹³

⁶ Renshon, "Status Deficits and War"; Dafoe, Renshon, and Huth, "Reputation and Status as Motives for War."

⁷ Gilady, *The Price of Prestige*; Musgrave and Nexon, "Defending Hierarchy from the Moon to the Indian Ocean."

⁸ Larson, "Status Competition among Russia, India, and China in Clubs"; Larson and Shevchenko, "Status Seekers."

⁹ Haut et al., "International Prestige through 'Sporting Success.'"

¹⁰ Gilady, *The Price of Prestige*.

¹¹ Bansak et al., "Conjoint Survey Experiments."

¹² Liu and Shiraito, "Multiple Hypothesis Testing in Conjoint Analysis."

¹³ Leeper, Hobolt, and Tilley, "Measuring Subgroup Preferences in Conjoint Experiments."

In addition to establishing whether prestige projects have a positive effect on prestige, I will also explore variation in the hypothesized effect by respondents' perceptions of a country's race. It is crucial to consider potential interactions between race and prestige because prestige is inextricably linked to hierarchy in the international system. While contemporary IR theory has begun to explore various forms of hierarchy, race has been neglected.¹⁴ It demands our attention because "orders constructed along shared norms of racial difference may thus influence policy and practice, thereby justifying or normalizing an unequal assignment of rights and responsibilities between states."¹⁵ Freeman et. al. argue that there are (at least) two fundamental ways that race matters in IR: perceived deficiency and hostility. These two "faces" manifest differently. The former can be seen (for example) in the construction and application of international legal concepts like the responsibility to protect and good governance.¹⁶ The latter impacts which states are seen as threats within the international system.¹⁷ I am primarily concerned with the former. On one hand, we might conceptualize prestige projects as a way for states to overcome perceptions of deficiency. On the other hand, those same perceptions might have a moderating effect on the ability of the state to increase their prestige to the same degree that other states can. This is characteristic of the complex co-constitutive relationship between racial hierarchy, foreign policy and practice, and international law (or perceptions of prestige in my case) that Freeman et. al. describe. Put simply: international hierarchy depends on the amount of prestige each state has, but what is considered prestigious is itself a function of the existing hierarchy. Therefore, it will not be sufficient to show that contemporary racial categories are correlated with national prestige. Uneven patterns of national prestige may be rooted in racist historical processes and systems (like colonialism)

¹⁴ Zarakol, *Hierarchies in World Politics*.

¹⁵ Freeman, Kim, and Lake, "Race in International Relations." 179.

¹⁶ Freeman, Kim, and Lake.

¹⁷ Búzás, "The Color of Threat."

that have generated unequal distributions of wealth, but this does not tell us if perceptions of race have an *independent* effect on individual states' prestige.

The survey will present respondents with randomized a country profile that includes attributes like GDP, life expectancy, UN membership, system of government, etc. Each attribute will have several possible levels that will be randomized according to a specific distribution (TBD). Each profile will also include a treatment: whether a country has or has not successfully completed a prestige project. There is ongoing debate about whether it is possible to identify causal effects of race because it is an immutable characteristic. To address this concern, I will adopt the "bundle of sticks" approach, which enables us to make causal claims about the effects of *exposure to a racial cue*.¹⁸ To this end, each profile will include an attribute intended to prime respondents to envision the country as a racialized other (or not). I propose to include "most commonly spoken language" as an attribute to accomplish this. This approach is similar to recent work measuring the effect of perceptions of race on support for disaster relief in Puerto Rico.¹⁹

For each country profile, the respondent will be asked to indicate how prestigious they consider the country represented by the profile on a discrete scale (specifics TBD). Each respondent will be asked to repeat this process several times. I do not want different understandings of the term prestige to influence responses. To address this concern, I will ask an open-ended question at the end of the pilot to allow respondents to articulate their own definition. If it turns out that respondents have drastically different understandings of the term, then I will prime respondents with the definition at the beginning of the full survey; if there is a consensus, I will omit the definition. Either way, it will be illuminating to see how respondents interpret the concept and whether it differs from the way IR scholars have used it in the literature. Another concern is that the profiles will elicit specific countries in the minds of respondents, which is a threat to identification. The purpose of the experiment is to identify the

¹⁸ Sen and Wasow, "Race as a Bundle of Sticks."

¹⁹ Rivera-Burgos, "Language, Skin Tone, and Attitudes toward Puerto Rico in the Aftermath of Hurricane Maria."

marginal effect of prestige project completion and interaction effects of prestige project completion with perception of race. If respondents have specific countries in mind when reading a profile, I might instead pick up the effect of other pre-conceived notions that respondents have about those countries. To address this concern, I will make clear that the profiles do not represent real countries and are constructed of attributes randomly sampled from a menu of options. I am also working to devise a follow up question or check to see if

There are two estimands of interest that correspond to the two questions outlined above. The first is the AMCE (average marginal component effect) of the treatment. My hypothesis is that successful completion of a prestige project will have a positive and significant impact on a country's perceived prestige. The second estimand of interest is the AMIE (average marginal interaction effect) of the prestige treatment interacted with the racial cue. In this case, my hypothesis is that racial cues which signal that the country's population primarily comprises racialized others will result in significantly smaller increases (or even decreases) in prestige than we would observe otherwise. The conjoint design will enable me to test both hypotheses with a single sample.

Project Timeline:

1. Conduct pilot study on a small US-sample: January-February 2024
2. Refine proposed survey design, including choosing target countries and finalizing country profile attributes: February-March 2024
3. Specify hypotheses and conduct power analysis: March 2024
4. Pre-register survey design: April 2024
5. Secure funding for survey administration: Summer 2024
6. Run survey: aim to start in August-September 2024
7. Conduct statistical testing and write up results: by February 2025
8. Finish draft: by July 2025

Paper 3: Think tanks, foreign funding, and the contents of published work

“The assumption that they are non-political, pseudo-academic entities advocating for policies that are in the national interest is no longer accurate, given the increasing amount of funding they receive from foreign governments, often earmarked for specific projects.”²⁰

- Congressman Jack Bergman (R-Mich.)

The relationship between think tanks, foreign principals, and American policymakers is a topic of ongoing concern in Washington. At first, it might seem like an issue that matters only to DC insiders; indeed they are generally the only ones who attempt to track and expose these relationships.²¹ Insofar as IR scholars care about the substance of foreign policy, it is important to understand the process of information generation, transmission, and consumption that impacts it. We treat these things as exogenous or assume that everyone involved approaches foreign policy with a similar degree of intellectual honesty at our own peril. While overt corruption often bursts into the public view in spectacular fashion (as it recently did with Senator Bob Menendez and his advocacy on behalf of Egyptian interests), many countries seek to advance their interests in more subtle ways. Many of the most well-respected and influential think tanks in DC, London, and elsewhere receive sizable amounts of funding from sovereign states. A natural assumption is that these think tanks are less likely to criticize and more likely to praise the governments that fund them. This is not surprising, and this argument has already been made.²² There are interesting case studies of specific “influence operations,” but no recent *systematic* examinations of what exactly countries want or get from their sponsorship of specific programs, centers, or scholars at think tanks.

Recent advances in computational tools available to social scientists provide a great opportunity to gain new insight on these questions. A 2020 report from the Foreign Influence Transparency Initiative provides a helpful roadmap for collecting data on which think tanks receive foreign funding, where it

²⁰ “Grassley Reintroduces Think Tank Transparency Act to Expose Foreign Influence Campaigns.”

²¹ See, for example: “Foreign Lobbying Archives”; “Foreign Lobby Watch.”

²² Freeman, *The Foreign Policy Auction*.

comes from, and the value.²³ I will build a corpus of reports, white papers, press releases, and other public comments made by each think tank in years covered by the dataset. Then, I will use topic modelling to explore which topics are most likely to appear with each funder. The approach will be similar to the one taken by Terman and Byun, who used text analysis to demonstrate that states criticize allies on “safer” issues, but adversaries on sensitive ones in the Universal Periodic Review process.²⁴

The value of this exercise will be to help settle the debate about whether foreign funding of think tanks is something to be concerned about from a foreign policy perspective.²⁵ It is possible that applying NLP methods will reveal that the relationship between think tank funding and the contents of their work is weak or non-existent. An important caveat is that even if there is a relationship, these methods will not help us understand the causal pathway (if one exists) between think tank praise or criticism and foreign funding. The first possibility is that foreign governments fund the think tanks which have historically been less critical or more complimentary. While it might be concerning in the long run if think tanks begin editorializing with the explicit goal of gaining funding from specific foreign countries, this is not the mechanism that critics of foreign influence on US policy are most concerned about. They are likely more concerned about a causal pathway moving the other direction: foreign funding leading a think tank to express opinions and support policies that favor that government with a veneer of honesty and impartiality.

Project timeline:

1. Obtain and begin updating CIP data: asap
2. Build corpus of think tank materials: May 2024
3. Cleaning data: June 2024
4. Text analysis: September 2024

²³ Freeman, “Foreign Funding of Think Tanks in America.”

²⁴ Terman and Byun, “Punishment and Politicization in the International Human Rights Regime.”

²⁵ Drezner, “Regarding the Foreign Funding of Think Tanks in America.”

Works Cited

- Banjo, Damilola. "The UN Is Still Waiting to Be Invited by Morocco to Help With Its Quake Disaster." *PassBlue*, September 14, 2023. <https://www.passblue.com/2023/09/14/the-un-is-still-waiting-to-be-invited-by-morocco-to-help-with-its-post-quake-disaster/>.
- Bansak, Kirk, Jens Hainmueller, Daniel J. Hopkins, and Teppei Yamamoto. "Conjoint Survey Experiments." In *Advances in Experimental Political Science*, edited by James Druckman and Donald P. Green, 1st ed., 19–41. Cambridge University Press, 2021. <https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108777919.004>.
- Barnhart, Joslyn. "Prestige, Humiliation and International Politics," 2013.
- Búzás, Zoltán I. "The Color of Threat: Race, Threat Perception, and the Demise of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance (1902–1923)." *Security Studies* 22, no. 4 (October 2013): 573–606. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2013.844514>.
- Dafoe, Allan, Jonathan Renshon, and Paul Huth. "Reputation and Status as Motives for War." *Annual Review of Political Science* 17, no. 1 (May 11, 2014): 371–93. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-071112-213421>.
- Drezner, Daniel W. "Regarding the Foreign Funding of Think Tanks in America." *Washington Post*, February 12, 2020. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/02/12/regarding-foreign-funding-think-tanks-america/>.
- Freeman, Ben. "Foreign Funding of Think Tanks in America." Center for International Policy, January 2020.
- . *The Foreign Policy Auction: Foreign Lobbying in America*. CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2012.
- Freeman, Bianca, D.G. Kim, and David A. Lake. "Race in International Relations: Beyond the 'Norm Against Noticing.'" *Annual Review of Political Science* 25, no. 1 (May 12, 2022): 175–96. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-051820-120746>.
- Gilady, Lilach. *The Price of Prestige: Conspicuous Consumption in International Relations*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2018.
- "Grassley Reintroduces Think Tank Transparency Act to Expose Foreign Influence Campaigns." Press Release, March 3, 2023. <https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-reintroduces-think-tank-transparency-act-to-expose-foreign-influence-campaigns>.
- Haut, Jan, Jonathan Grix, Paul Michael Brannagan, and Ivo Van Hilvoorde. "International Prestige through 'Sporting Success': An Evaluation of the Evidence." *European Journal for Sport and Society* 14, no. 4 (October 2, 2017): 311–26. <https://doi.org/10.1080/16138171.2017.1421502>.
- Larson, Deborah Welch. "Status Competition among Russia, India, and China in Clubs: A Source of Stalemate or Innovation in Global Governance." *Contemporary Politics* 25, no. 5 (October 20, 2019): 549–66. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13569775.2019.1622183>.
- Larson, Deborah Welch, and Alexei Shevchenko. "Status Seekers: Chinese and Russian Responses to U.S. Primacy." *International Security* 34, no. 4 (April 2010): 63–95. <https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.2010.34.4.63>.
- Leeper, Thomas J., Sara B. Hobolt, and James Tilley. "Measuring Subgroup Preferences in Conjoint Experiments." *Political Analysis* 28, no. 2 (April 2020): 207–21. <https://doi.org/10.1017/pan.2019.30>.
- Levy, Jack S. "Case Studies: Types, Designs, and Logics of Inference." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 25, no. 1 (February 2008): 1–18. <https://doi.org/10.1080/07388940701860318>.
- Liu, Guoer, and Yuki Shiraito. "Multiple Hypothesis Testing in Conjoint Analysis." *Political Analysis*, January 26, 2023, 1–16. <https://doi.org/10.1017/pan.2022.30>.

- Musgrave, Paul, and Daniel H. Nexon. "Defending Hierarchy from the Moon to the Indian Ocean: Symbolic Capital and Political Dominance in Early Modern China and the Cold War." *International Organization* 72, no. 3 (2018): 591–626. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818318000139>.
- O'Neill, Barry. "Nuclear Weapons and National Prestige." *Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers*, 2006.
- OpenSecrets. "Foreign Lobby Watch." Accessed October 6, 2023. <https://www.opensecrets.org/fara>.
- Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. "Foreign Lobbying Archives." Accessed October 6, 2023. <https://quincyinst.org/tag/foreign-lobbying/>.
- Renshon, Jonathan. "Status Deficits and War." *International Organization* 70, no. 3 (2016): 513–50.
- Rivera-Burgos, Viviana. "Language, Skin Tone, and Attitudes toward Puerto Rico in the Aftermath of Hurricane Maria." *American Political Science Review* 117, no. 3 (August 2023): 789–804. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055422000971>.
- Sen, Maya, and Omar Wasow. "Race as a Bundle of Sticks: Designs That Estimate Effects of Seemingly Immutable Characteristics." *Annual Review of Political Science* 19, no. 1 (May 11, 2016): 499–522. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-032015-010015>.
- Terman, Rochelle, and Joshua Byun. "Punishment and Politicization in the International Human Rights Regime." *American Political Science Review* 116, no. 2 (May 2022): 385–402. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055421001167>.
- YANG, DALI L. *WUHAN: How the Covid-19 Outbreak in Wuhan, China Spiralled out of Control*. S.I.: OXFORD UNIV PRESS US, 2024.
- Zarakol, Ayşe, ed. *Hierarchies in World Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017.