

Anonymous Identity-Based Broadcast Encryption Scheme

We let λ be the security parameter given to the setup algorithm such that a security level of 256 bits is realised. We let G be some BDH parameter generator. S is the set of desired recipients i with $i = 1, \dots, n$. Symmetric encryption and decryption is done using AES Galois Counter Mode $GCM_{enc}(P, A, K, IV)$ and $GCM_{dec}(P, A, K, IV)$ respectively.

Setup(λ): Given a security parameter $\lambda \in \mathbb{Z}^+$, the algorithm works as follows:

1. Run G on input λ to generate a prime q , two groups $\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2$ of order q , and an admissible bilinear map $e : \mathbb{G}_1 \times \mathbb{G}_2 \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_T$. Choose a random generator $P \in \mathbb{G}_1$
2. Pick a random $s \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$ and set $P_{pub} = sP$
3. Choose cryptographic hash functions $H_1 : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_1^*$, $H_2 : \mathbb{G}_T^* \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{256}$, $H_3 : \{0, 1\}^{256} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{256}$ and $H_4 : \{0, 1\}^{256} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{256}$. The security analysis will view H_1, H_2 as random oracles.

The symmetric key space is $K = \{0, 1\}^{256} = \{K_1 || IV\}$ with $K_1 = \{0, 1\}^{128}$ and $IV = \{0, 1\}^{128}$. The ciphertext space is $C_i = \mathbb{G}_1^* \times \{0, 1\}^{256}$. The system parameters are $params = \{q, \mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, e, P, P_{pub}, H_1, H_2\}$. The master key is $s \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$.

KeyGen(λ, ID_i): For a given string $ID_i \in \{0, 1\}^*$ the algorithm does:

1. Compute $Q_{ID_i} = H_1(ID_i)$
2. Set the private key d_{ID_i} to be $d_{ID_i} = sQ_{ID_i}$ where s is the master key.
3. Return d_{ID_i} to the corresponding user ID_i over a secure channel.

Encrypt($params, \lambda, K, S$): To encrypt K under the public keys $\{ID_i \in S\}$:

1. Generate a random symmetric session key $K_1 = \{0, 1\}^{128}$. Generate a random initialisation vector $IV = \{0, 1\}^{128}$ and set $K = \{K_1 || IV\}$
2. Choose a random $\sigma \in \{0, 1\}^{256}$ and set $r = H_3(\sigma, K)$
3. For each recipient $ID_i \in S, i = 1..n$, calculate the ciphertext

$$W_i = \sigma \oplus H_2(g_{ID_i}^r) \quad \text{where} \quad g_{ID_i} = e(Q_{ID_i}, P_{pub}) \in \mathbb{G}_T^*$$

4. Apply GCM with initialisation vector IV and secret key K_1 . Plaintext P_{text} is the message to be broadcasted and the additional authenticated data:

$$\begin{aligned} A &= \{n || rP || K \oplus H_4(\sigma) || W_1 || W_2 || \dots || W_n || P_{text}\} \\ &= \{n || U || V || W\} \quad \text{where} \quad W = \{W_1 || W_2 || \dots || W_n\} \end{aligned}$$

GCM then outputs a ciphertext C_T and an authentication tag T such that

$$\{C_T, T\} = GCM_{enc}(P_{text}, A, K_1, IV)$$

5. The following message is then broadcasted over an insecure network

$$M = \{A || T || C_T\}$$

Decrypt($params, d_{ID_i}, M$): Parse broadcasted message M as $\{n||U||V||W||T||C_T\}$. For each $W_i \in W$ do the following:

1. Decrypt σ using the private key d_{ID_i} by calculating $W_i \oplus H_2(e(d_{ID_i}, U)) = \sigma$
2. Compute $V \oplus H_4\{\sigma\} = K$
3. Set $r = H_3(\sigma, K)$. Test that $U = rP$. If not, try next W_i and return to 1.
4. Decrypt C_T by

$$\{P_{text}, T_{dec}\} = GCM_{dec}(C_T, A, K_1, IV)$$

5. Verify whether T_{dec} corresponds to T in M .
If $T \neq T_{dec}$, return \perp . Output P_{text} as the broadcasted message otherwise.