Appendix for *Why Do People Join Backlash Protests? Lessons from Turkey*

The Istanbul Repression Experiment

Table A1 reports the number of observations and the averages of a number of demographic and other characteristics for each experimental group.[1] The similarity of these observable characteristics across the groups suggests that random assignment was successful. Additionally, a likelihood ratio test from the multinomial logit regression of treatment assignment on these characteristics is statistically insignificant (Wald $\chi^2_{(28)} = 22.64$, p < 0.75). This test is also insignificant if applied to the dataset that excludes respondents who do not pass attention checks (Wald $\chi^2_{(28)} = 27.89$, p < 0.47) or to the dataset that excludes both these respondents and those who fail to respond to the willingness to protest question (Wald $\chi^2_{(28)} = 28.70$, p < 0.43).

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[1]As stated in the article, there is an additional treatment group (not reported) in our experiment that explored the mobilizing effect of solidarity as part of our broader project. Together with this treatment the number of respondents reaches 1,111.

Table A1: Istanbul repression experiment: respondent characteristics across treatment conditions

Variable	Repression	Placebo	Control	Overall
Observations	277	278	278	833
Male	0.40	0.43	0.50	0.44
Age	31.22	30.68	29.83	30.57
Education	3.11	3.21	3.03	3.12
Employed	0.49	0.53	0.47	0.49
Partisan	0.62	0.62	0.58	0.60
Participant in Gezi	0.27	0.24	0.23	0.25
NGO member	0.22	0.17	0.19	0.19
Interest in politics	1.88	1.75	1.85	1.83
Opinion of country's direction	2.77	2.75	2.74	2.75
AKP voter	0.24	0.26	0.28	0.26
CHP voter	0.34	0.31	0.27	0.31
Importance of Gezi park	2.83	2.77	2.74	2.78
Past turnout	0.88	0.91	0.89	0.89
View of protesters	2.58	2.57	2.52	2.56

Note: Education refers to the highest level of education completed, measured on a scale of 1-4 (1=primary; 4=college degree). *Employed* is a binary variable indicating individuals who report being full-time employed. *Partisan* is a binary variable indicating individuals who report feeling close to a political party. *Participant in Gezi* is a binary variable indicating individuals who report having participated in Gezi protests. *NGO member* is a binary variable indicating individuals who report being member of a NGO. *Interest in politics* is a 1-4 scale of level of interest in politics where 1 is very interested and 4 is not at all interested. *Opinion of country's direction* is a 1-4 scale of opinion about direction of the country, where 1 is very good direction and 4 is very bad direction. *AKP voter* and *CHP voter* are binary variables indicating individuals who report a vote intention for AKP and CHP, respectively. *Importance of Gezi park* is a subjective evaluation of the importance of preserving Gezi park, where 1 corresponds to "not important at all" and 4 to "very important." *Past turnout* is a binary variable indicating individuals who report having voted in the last general or local elections. *View of protesters* is a 1-5 scale of view of Gezi protesters where 1 is very negative and 5 is very positive.

The *Placebo* condition featured an innocuous image of night scenery of Istanbul with the explanation that "This photograph was taken in Istanbul last month" (Figure A1). No image was shown to participants assigned to the *Control* group.

Figure A1: Image used in the *Placebo* treatment

The outcome questions tapped on respondents' likelihood of participation in different kinds of collective action. Respondents were presented with the following question that included factual information about the Gezi park:

Recently it has been reported in the news that the Municipality of Istanbul allocated funds for the Gezi Park development in its 2015 budget. If the government and municipality decided to go ahead with the project, and the authorities began clearing the trees from the park and people started to go out and protest, how likely would you be to do the following?

a) talk to friends and family about the developments
b) sign a petition opposing the development
c) post a message about the park on social media (Facebook, Twitter, etc.)
d) join the protests by going out and attending a rally
e) camp out at the park to prevent authorities from clearing the trees

The order of the answer list was randomly displayed to the respondents and they were asked to rate the likelihood of their doing the specified action in a 7-point scale, ranging from *Definitely would not* (1) to *Definitely would* (7).

Extended Results

Table A2 regresses respondents' willingness to engage in alternative forms of collective action on treatment assignment in our Istanbul repression experiment. The results show similar patterns with exception of likelihood of signing a petition. The effect of repression on this form of participation is larger than for other outcomes and also holds for AKP voters.

Table A2: Average Treatment Effects on Different Measures of Participation

	Protest Propensity	Conversations with Friends	Signing a Petition	Post on Social Media	Camp out
All Respondents					
Repression	0.38*	0.40**	0.69***	0.24	0.48**
	(0.22)	(0.18)	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.21)
Placebo	0.01	0.43**	0.34	0.25	0.14
	(0.21)	(0.18)	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.20)
Intercept	3.23***	5.17***	4.07***	3.90***	3.50***
	(0.15)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.14)
N	694	683	681	682	683
CHP voters					
Repression	0.62*	0.36	0.78**	0.57*	0.71**
	(0.35)	(0.23)	(0.33)	(0.33)	(0.32)
Placebo	0.26	0.34	0.43	0.48	0.27
	(0.36)	(0.23)	(0.34)	(0.32)	(0.33)
Intercept	4.57***	5.91***	5.18***	5.05***	4.61***
	(0.27)	(0.19)	(0.26)	(0.25)	(0.25)
N	217	212	212	214	215
AKP voters					
Repression	0.17	0.18	0.75**	−0.16	−0.05
	(0.23)	(0.39)	(0.37)	(0.33)	(0.28)
Placebo	−0.06	−0.01	0.27	−0.16	−0.16
	(0.18)	(0.42)	(0.30)	(0.32)	(0.28)
Intercept	1.49***	4.28***	2.19***	2.30***	2.13***
	(0.14)	(0.28)	(0.19)	(0.23)	(0.19)
N	173	169	168	169	167

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * $p < .1$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$.

Source: Authors' survey.

The discussion of Table 4 noted that the effect of repression on views of AKP is greater in the overall sample than among samples of AKP and CHP voters. This is because the intention to vote for AKP is weakly correlated with assignment to the repression treatment and strongly correlated with views of AKP. Indeed, Table A3 shows that controlling for AKP vote intention makes the treatment effect of repression considerable smaller than the one observed in Table 4.

Table A3: Average Treatment Effects on Different Mediators in the Full Sample. Models Controlling for Vote Intentions.

	Protests Effective	Government Weakness	Government Confident	Views of AKP	Anger
Repression	−0.01	0.17	0.03	−0.39*	0.86***
	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.22)	(0.12)
Placebo	−0.06	0.13	0.11	−0.08	−0.85***
	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.24)	(0.13)
AKP Voter	−0.54***	−1.44***	1.39***	7.44***	−1.01***
	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.16)	(0.11)
Intercept	2.98***	2.89***	2.45***	1.92***	3.13***
	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.19)	(0.10)
N	675	649	647	651	630

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * $p < .1$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$.
Source: Authors' survey.

Table A4 replicates Table 4 in the manuscript, the average treatment effects on potential mediators, with pre-treatment covariates. We see that there are no substantive change in the results.

Table A4: Average Treatment Effects on Potential Mediators – with Controls

	(1) Anger	(2) Protests Effective	(3) Government Weak	(4) Government Confident	(5) Views of AKP
All Respondents					
Repression	0.82***	−0.004	0.20*	0.02	−0.31
	(0.13)	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.27)
Placebo	−0.84***	−0.04	0.14	0.03	0.07
	(0.13)	(0.09)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.27)
Intercept	1.21***	1.57***	1.19***	4.46***	12.35***
	(0.40)	(0.29)	(0.35)	(0.37)	(0.81)
Observations	585	638	614	612	611
CHP Voters					
Repression	1.07***	0.04	0.11	−0.20	−0.19
	(0.20)	(0.15)	(0.22)	(0.23)	(0.24)
Placebo	−0.88***	0.20	0.06	0.26	−0.04
	(0.25)	(0.15)	(0.25)	(0.26)	(0.29)
Intercept	2.18***	1.38**	4.00***	3.26***	2.86**
	(0.81)	(0.65)	(0.78)	(0.90)	(1.21)
Observations	188	202	198	199	198
AKP Voters					
Repression	1.00***	−0.09	0.09	0.09	−0.32
	(0.27)	(0.18)	(0.16)	(0.19)	(0.21)
Placebo	−0.85***	−0.35**	−0.05	−0.09	−0.18
	(0.20)	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.19)	(0.23)
Intercept	1.80**	2.73***	1.50***	3.39***	11.49***
	(0.79)	(0.57)	(0.50)	(0.59)	(0.68)
Observations	145	160	153	153	159
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * $p < .1$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$.

Controls include gender, age, education, interest in politics, and opinion about the country's direction. Source: Authors' survey.

Other surveys and fieldwork

Authors' Istanbul sample survey. The fieldwork for our Istanbul household survey was conducted by Infakto Research Workshop between November 20 and December 15, 2013. They interviewed 1,214 respondents. The sampling procedure of the survey was as follows. One hundred and one neighborhoods were randomly selected from the districts of Istanbul with a probability-proportional-to-size method. Streets in these neighborhoods, and then households on these streets, were chosen with a random selection table. In each household, the enumerator tried to interview the household member whose first name began with the letter in the alphabet that came first. When the interview could not be completed with the selected respondent, the interviewer returned to that same household at a later time or date, to try to reach the selected individual. In the case of an unsuccessful second attempt, a new household was selected randomly. This process was repeated until an interview was secured. According to the research standards established by the American Association of Public Opinion, our response rate was 20.9%.

Open-ended interviews. As mentioned in the text, interviews were carried out interviews in São Paulo (May 2014), Kiev (May and June 2014), and Istanbul (July 2014). Open-ended interviews, usually lasting about two hours, were carried out with common citizens, activists, and police and government officials. A range of institutions and individuals were instrumental for identifying and contact interviewees. In São Paulo, Fernando Limongi and Coronel Glauco Silva de Carvalho, Director of the Human Rights Directorate, São Paulo Military Police, helped us contact interviewees. In Kiev, the Institute for World Policy helped us to secure interviews. In Istanbul, [name redacted] assisted us in securing interviews and served as co-interviewer and interpreter.