

a new form of Internalist scepticism, but that has yet come to pass.

Fallibilist Externalism holds that knowledge requires a indication of truth that is not discernible nor truth-entailing. Truth must be added as a separate condition. *Prima facie* the view combines the worst of both worlds: being Fallibilist, it faces the Gettier problem, and being Externalist, it forfeits whatever appeal discernible indications of truth have. Surprisingly, however, some accounts have been popular despite being widely taken to have both features. Reliabilism, Proper Function and Virtue-Theoretic accounts are cases in point.¹²⁰ On closer examination, however, the accounts are Infallibilist.¹²¹ On their best versions, they require a mark of truth that *entails* an indication of truth. By contrast with Internalist Infallibilists, however, the indication of truth is not supposed to be discernible. Call the view *Two-tiered Externalist Infallibilism*. For instance, some Virtue-Theoretic accounts hold that knowledge consists in a belief that is *true because competently formed*. Being truth because competently formed entails truth, but is not discernible. It entails *being competently formed*, which is a matter of one's belief being the product of cognitive processes that reliably yield truths. The latter is not discernible either, but it is taken to *indicate* truth. The appeal of these accounts is to offer a substitute to the Internalist's discernible indication of truth that does not require discernibility. On the one hand, it is easier to argue that they indicate truth; on the other hand, it has been argued that they fail to justify belief. Again, the dialectic is familiar from the contemporary literature.¹²²

The demise of Classical Infallibilism in mainstream analytic epistemology was impressively sudden and complete.¹²³ The view may still linger on, however, as a theory of *evidence*. Post-Gettier epistemology has witnessed an increased use of the notion of *evidence* as distinct from knowledge.¹²⁴ Some epistemologists seem to implicitly think of evidence in Classical Infallibilist terms: our evidence consists in discernible marks of truth or propositions for which

¹²⁰See Goldman (1986, 2011) for Reliabilism, Plantinga (1993) for the Proper Function account and Sosa (1991, 2007); Zagzebski (2000); Greco (2010) for Virtue-theoretic ones.

¹²¹Plantinga's (1993, 17–9) original account was Fallibilist. In the face of Gettier problems (Greene and Balmert, 1997), he adopted an Infallibilist version (1996, 328; 1997, 144). Goldman's (1986, 47) account includes a "local reliability" condition for which he refers to his Goldman (1976). The condition is truth-entailing. Sosa (1991, 238) stresses that belief that is both true and (intellectually) virtuous is not enough; in Sosa (2007, 23) he proposes that knowledge is belief that is true *because* virtuous.

¹²²See notably Goldman (1979); Lehrer and Cohen (1983); Cohen (1984); Sosa (1991).

¹²³Almeder's (1974) answer to the Gettier problem is a rare exception.

¹²⁴The notion would require an history of its own. Up to Descartes "evidence" is almost exclusively a name for the property of being "evident" (Buridan's *evidentia* is now translated as "evidentness"). In Locke the term is used likewise, but also for that which is evident. Moreover, he takes that which is evident to make things certain or probable. He does not say that the former is "evidence for" the latter, but that was a natural extension of his use which is found *e.g.* in Hume (2007, sec. X). I submit that these authors take the evident to bear discernible marks of truth. They may restrict the evident to what bears *non-derivative* discernible marks of truth, as opposed, *e.g.*, to what is known by deduction.