

More generally, being sufficiently attentive involves an idealised version of the subject. The more generous the idealisation, the more permissive discernibility is. Some *recherché* cases may cause further trouble but we need not get into them.¹⁵ Sixth, a basing condition is missing. A belief's *having the content that one is in pain and being held by a person in pain* is a mark of truth and one may think it is discernible. Yet a person in pain who believes that they are in pain only because their crystal ball says so does not know that they are in pain. The account should require that the belief be somehow based on its bearing a discernible mark of truth.¹⁶ One option is to introduce a separate basing condition. Another is to restrict our choice of marks to properties of the kind *being based on thus-and-so*. The second is more stringent as it requires basing facts themselves to be discernible.

Until recently philosophers hardly ever raised such issues. Sometimes we can argue that they implicitly adopted some answer or that their views committed them to one. But it is often pointless to ask what their answer would have been.

Discernibility is akin to two notions in the recent epistemology literature: *luminosity* and *cognitive access*. Some epistemologists talk of what is "cognitively accessible" to a subject. That is sometimes glossed as facts the subject is "capable of becoming aware of" (BonJour, 2010, 364) or as facts she is capable of becoming aware of "upon reflection" (Chisholm, 1977, 16–7). On an ordinary reading of these phrases, I am aware that it is daylight now and I am capable of becoming aware upon reflection that I ate some bread yesterday. That is not, however, the way these epistemologists use these phrases. Their guiding intuition is that facts one has "access" to are just those facts that one would still know if one were in some Cartesian Demon scenario. But they do not *define* the notion that way; rather, it is supposed to follow from some natural notion of "access" that what we have access to withstands Descartes's Demon. I suggest that the notion of discernible fact is the one they have in mind.¹⁷ Williamson (2000, 95) calls a condition—something a subject is in at

¹⁵For instance, if necessarily, sufficiently attentive subjects believe that they are attentive, then *being an unattended-to belief* turns out to be trivially discernible. It is unclear that the result is bad. If it is, we may say that discernibility requires the antecedent to be non-trivially satisfied.

¹⁶It may seem paradoxical to say that a belief could be based on some of its own features. To see that is not, consider a parallel with action. I may run from A to B *because that is a way of reaching B*, or *because that is a way to exercise*. We may then say that my undertaking the action was based on the action having these features. Similarly I may form a belief on the basis of certain features it would have if formed.

¹⁷Contrast Fumerton's (2006, 53) suggestion that the intended notion of "access" is access by *introspection*. Introspection is supposed to be a reflective way of finding out about one's own *internal mental states*. Thus while in an ordinary sense of "reflection", one can find out by reflection whether one has eaten bread yesterday (an external fact), whether one's heart is beating (an internal, non-mental fact) or whether one saw a cat yesterday (a non-internal mental state), these are not instances of introspection, because the subject-matter of introspection is restricted to internal mental states. But if introspection plays a special epistemological role, it cannot be merely because