

a certain time—*luminous* just if necessarily, a subject who is in that condition is in position to know that they are in it. *Being in pain* is a candidate for being a luminous condition, for instance. Discernibility is intended to capture the same alleged phenomenon. The difference is that luminosity is defined in terms of what one is a position to *know*, while discernibility is defined in terms of what attentive subjects would *believe*. The advantage of the notion of luminosity is that it requires less of the refinements the notion discernibility needs. The drawback is that using it would not allow us to give Infallibilism the familiar form of a reductive analysis. For the sake of familiarity I use the reductive form. But my main claims would not be affected by replacing discernibility with luminosity.

Historically many philosophers adopted a foundationalist outlook on which some knowledge is basic and the rest derived. Basic knowledge was conceived as above. Derived knowledge was thought to derive from knowledge through some sort of *truth-preserving* inference. Do we need an additional clause for it? Not necessarily. It think these philosophers took the fact that some belief was inferred from others in the relevant way to be discernible as well. If so, derived beliefs would bear complex discernible marks of truth along the lines of: *being inferred in such and a such a way from beliefs that bear such and such marks*. A difficulty arises with long chains of inference since premise beliefs may have lost their marks by the time the conclusion is reached. The difficulty was seldom raised.¹⁸ We set it aside.¹⁹

Some philosophers additionally required that the mark *forces assent*. That is, the property should be one that cannot be present without the subject's being inclined to believe. Call that a *convincing* mark. We will treat it as an optional component of Infallibilism.

Many past philosophers freely move between *objectual* and *propositional* knowledge. To accommodate their views we may broaden the notion of truth to some notion of *correct* representation. We leave the complication aside.

Crucially, a (convincing) discernible mark of truth is *all* that Infallibilism requires. It does not additionally requires that one knows, or believes, or is aware

it has a distinctive subject-matter. Rather, introspection is singled out because—it is assumed—it is a way of knowing that has a special property. I suggest that the property is discernibility: it is assumed that facts that can be known by introspection are discernible.

¹⁸Some take the difficulty to be central to Descartes's *Meditations*. See Van Cleve (1979) for critical discussion.

¹⁹Note that Infallibilism is not wedded to foundationalism. One could think that *cohering in such-and-such a way with one's other beliefs* is a discernible mark of truth. A coherentist version of Infallibilism results. Russell (1948, 142) states the "coherence theory of knowledge" in such terms and loosely attributes it to Hegel. More radically, one could think that coherence is a property of *sets* of beliefs that guarantees that *most* beliefs in a set are true—perhaps without guaranteeing of any single one that it is true. A holistic version of Infallibilism results on which knowledge is not a property of individual beliefs but of collections of them. Davidson (2001) may have held such a view.