

A potential source of difficulty for Internalists is that little, or nothing, is discernible. (Externalists face no parallel difficulty, since there obviously are truth-entailing properties.) Naïvely, one may think that many things are discernible. If there is an elephant in your room, then if you are attentive enough, you will notice it.¹¹⁵ However, consideration of illusions, dreams and the like shrink the domain of the discernible.¹¹⁶ Most Internalists retreat to the idea that (some part of) one's *inner mental life* is discernible. (Hence the label. On the New Story, however, Internalists ascribe a central role to the internal because it is discernible, not because it is internal.) One reason for the idea's enduring popularity may be that mistakes about the inner are harder to imagine and to observe. It is not easy to show that someone who believes they are in pain are not. Careful experiment or indirect arguments are needed to show that such mistakes are possible.¹¹⁷ Whether or not the idea is correct, once the discernible base is limited to the inner, Internalists must either be generous on what counts as a sufficient indication of truth or tolerate an extensive scepticism. The dialectic is familiar from the contemporary literature.¹¹⁸

It is often said that "infallibilism" fosters scepticism. If "infallibilism" means imposing truth-entailing conditions on knowledge, that is false. As the True Belief and Crude Causal account illustrate, Infallibilism is compatible with robust Dogmatism. What fosters scepticism is imposing a condition that is both truth-entailing *and discernible*. Even the requirement that "justification" entails truth has no immediate sceptical consequences unless justification is assumed to be discernible. When the requirement of discernible marks of truth is given up, traditional sceptical arguments lose their bite. Accordingly, Scepticism has all but disappeared from contemporary epistemology.¹¹⁹ By contrast, the discernibility requirement raises sceptical worries on its own, since it is doubtful that anything is discernible. The claim that nothing is discernible may foster

Classical Infallibilists if they think that knowing is discernible (Prichard, 1950), Externalist Infallibilists otherwise (Williamson, 2000). Williamson is also a Strict Externalist on any way of drawing the divide, since he claims that nothing is luminous, which we may take to imply that nothing is discernible (see sec. 2).

¹¹⁵Compare Gibbons (2006).

¹¹⁶Compare Malcolm's (1952, 185) attempt to defend the idea that that there is an ink-bottle in front of him now is discernible.

¹¹⁷See Schwitzgebel (2008). Adapting Williamson's (2000, chap. 4), one may also argue that for any property *P*, there are borderline cases in which one is attentive enough and either one belief has *P* and one fails to believe that it has or one's belief lacks *P* and one believes that it has it.

¹¹⁸See e.g. Bergmann (2006).

¹¹⁹Significantly, contemporary defences of scepticism (Unger, 1975; Frances, 2005) appeal to wholly new arguments. Unger's central argument for scepticism is a normative one (drawing on Kripke's 2011 dogmatic paradox): if one knows, a dogmatic attitude is justified; no dogmatic attitude is justified; hence one does not know. Frances targets second-order knowledge only and appeals to the (highly debatable) principle that if some apparent expert believes *p*, no non-expert knows *p*. He argues that if one knows that someone knows something, they know that that person believes something, but some apparent experts believe that there are no beliefs, so no non-expert knows that someone knows something.