

the two.<sup>99</sup> Thus he takes “grounds” to be discernible but not truth-entailing. He concludes that “strong” but non truth-entailing “grounds”, in conjunction with truth, are sufficient for knowledge. In a somewhat prescient way, Malcolm finds “surprising” that truth alone could make the difference between knowing and not knowing:

As philosophers we may be surprised to observe that it can be that the knowledge that *p* is true should differ from the belief that *p* is true only in the respect that in one case *p* is true and in the other false. But that is the fact. (Malcolm, 1952, 180)

He nevertheless sticks to the conclusion because he thinks that the only alternative is to require the discernibility of knowing, which entails an unacceptable level of scepticism.<sup>100</sup>

*Internalist Fallibilists* maintain that knowledge requires a discernible property, but deny that it must be truth-entailing. They take over the Probabilistic Sceptics’ notion of *discernible indication of truth* and the idea that such an indication is enough to justify belief.<sup>101</sup> But they add that in conjunction with truth, it is also sufficient for knowledge. After Malcolm’s seminal paper, the view was adopted by Chisholm (1956, 447 and 1957, 1, 16) and Ayer (1956, 34). That is the familiar Justified True Belief analysis. Its main flaw was quickly pointed out by Gettier (1963). In some cases it is a coincidence that the two conditions are satisfied; in such cases one does not know. The view was consequently all but given up.<sup>102</sup> Far from being a long-held conception, the Justified True Belief analysis’s shelf-life was a mere eleven years.

The Gettier problem threatens any analysis of knowledge as a conjunction of truth with a non-truth entailing condition. Its apparent lesson is that knowledge requires a truth-entailing condition.<sup>103</sup> *Externalist Infallibilists* took up the suggestion. On their view knowledge requires a mark of truth, but not a discernible one. A Crude Causal account illustrates the idea.<sup>104</sup> Say that a belief is

<sup>99</sup>Malcolm (1952, 179): “Was there any way that you could have discovered by reflexion [*sic*], in case (5), that you did not know ? It would have been useless to have reconsidered your grounds for saying that there would be water, because in case (4), where you did know, your grounds were identical. [...] Prichard says that we can determine by reflexion whether we know something or merely believe it. But where, in these cases, is the material that reflexion would strike upon ? There is none.”

<sup>100</sup>Malcolm (1952, 179). If the Legend was true, it would be strange for Malcolm to be surprised. It is worth noting that Malcolm’s objection to scepticism is not merely that it is at odds with ordinary use. For he adds: “We do not think of our usage as being loose or incorrect—and it is not.” (Malcolm, 1952, 179, my emphasis). Thus he is just as much making the common sense objection that we obviously know many things and that it is *prima facie* extremely implausible to deny it.

<sup>101</sup>See sec. 4.5 above on indications of truth and Probabilist Scepticism.

<sup>102</sup>See however Hetherington (1999) and Weatherston (2003) for a spirited defence.

<sup>103</sup>Sturgeon (1993), Zagzebski (1994), Merricks (1995). See Howard-Snyder et al. (2003) for an opposite view.

<sup>104</sup>See Goldman (1967); Jenkins (2006) for refined views along those lines.