

out to be false, but the defendant is innocent nonetheless. In fact, the trial example almost literally appeared in the *Theaetetus* (201c-d). So why did nobody notice?

Why were Gettier-style cases presented as cases of true belief that is not knowledge? Some recognisably Gettier-style cases were pointed out before Gettier's paper: Plato's jury (*Theaetetus* 201c-d), Meinong's doorbell and Aeolian harp cases (Meinong, 1973, 619; 1906, 30–31; 1973, 398–399), Russell's Balfour/Bannerman and stopped clock cases (Russell, 1912, ch. 13; 1948, 170–1). All stories involve true belief, and nothing in them indicates that their character's beliefs are unjustified—quite the opposite.⁷ Yet both Plato and Russell put them forward as cases of *true belief* that is not knowledge, not of *justified true belief* that is not knowledge. Worse, Plato and Russell go on to state what looks like a Justified True Belief analysis.

Why was the Justified True Belief analysis not presented as the traditional one? The philosophers Gettier targeted did *not* present their views as traditional. Chisholm (1956, 447; 1957, 1, 16) first put it forward as something he “suggested”. It is only after the publication of Gettier's paper that he called it a “common” one (1966, 1) and later “the traditional [one]” (1977, 102). Ayer (1956, 41) sets out his view against the “quest for certainty” which “has played a considerable part in the history of philosophy”. He gives no indication that he is reviving a traditional view; quite the opposite.

How the Legend appeared. Looking at what philosophers said about traditional views of knowledge *before* Gettier's paper sheds light on how the Legend appeared. In a 1949 introduction to epistemology the Oxford philosopher A. D. Woozley writes:

According to the traditional view, which derives from Plato, knowledge and belief are mental faculties, each *sui generis*, no more to be defined one in terms of the other than are, say, love and friendship. (Woozley, 1949, 176)

With the *Republic* (473c-480a) in mind, Woozley ascribes to the tradition a view associated with his predecessors John Cook Wilson (1926, 34-47) and Harold A. Prichard (1950, 86), according to which knowledge is a *sui generis* mental state that cannot be defined in terms of belief, let alone as justified true belief.⁸ Since knowledge entails truth, it is an *infallible* mental state. That is the view that Ayer (1956, 15-23) contrasts with his.

⁷As Burnyeat (1980, 177-178) points out concerning Plato's case. Meinong's cases are less well-known than Plato's and Russell's. In the doorbell one, a man has a pathological ringing in his ears at the same time as somebody rings the doorbell. In the Aeolian harp one, somebody who lived near such a harp for a long time has become hard of hearing so that they sometimes hallucinate a harp sound at the same time as the harp rings.

⁸See also Price (1934, 229–31).