

indicates the truth of a belief without entailing it. What they added was that such an indication, in conjunction with truth, would be sufficient for knowledge. That is the familiar Justified True Belief analysis that Gettier refuted. That is also the source of the *Internalist* views that insist on a discernible condition on justified belief or knowledge. Others rejected the *discernibility* requirement instead. They maintained the idea that knowledge requires a mark of truth but they did not require it to be discernible. That is the source of *Externalist* views in epistemology. The demise of Classical Infallibilism as a theory of knowledge was quick and complete: once they gave it up analytic epistemologists never looked back. Nevertheless it seems to linger on in the way some epistemologists think of *evidence*.

The New Story is a crude picture, but it makes sense of a range of facts about the history of Western epistemology: why Gettier problems appeared so late, why debates over Scepticism were central, why contemporary epistemology divides into Externalist and Internalist trends, why it is awkward to locate historical views in the divide, and more.

An extensive defence of the New Story is beyond my abilities and the scope of this paper. My aim is rather to set it out as a hypothesis worthy of investigation. The best way to do this is to make its overall structure clear. I thus state positions in ideal forms before illustrating them with representative historical cases. I am well aware that any ascription of an idealised view to any particular philosopher—not to mention *classes* of philosophers—is bound to face many wrinkles that have to be ironed out in some way or other. I will nevertheless avoid cumbersome hedging and favour simplicity over accuracy. In history as elsewhere, progress can be achieved through clear and simple models whose limits are easy to test.

The paper is structured as follows. Section 1 traces the origins of the Legend and highlights some facts that would be puzzling if it were true. Section 2 sets out Classical Infallibilism. Section 3 shows Classical Infallibilism at work in a central debate in the history of epistemology: that between Stoics and Academic Sceptics. Section 4 reviews salient evidence for and against the hypothesis that until 1950 virtually all Western philosophers were Classical Infallibilists. Section 5 recounts the fall of Classical Infallibilism and shows how it illuminates the contemporary landscape. Section 6 draws some lessons and indicates lines of further research.

It is my hope that this paper will open up history to contemporary epistemologists and contemporary epistemology to historians. However, readers exclusively interested in epistemology may conveniently skip sections 3 and 4 and readers exclusively interested in history may conveniently skip sections 1