

ideal-theoretic epistemology makes sceptical worries much less pressing than knowledge-centred epistemology does. Thus his picture makes it puzzling that sceptical views were taken much more seriously in history than they are now.⁹² The New Story, by contrast, explains it by ascribing historical philosophers a view that does lead to scepticism. Second, the picture omits the fact that *the epistemic ideal was typically defined in terms of knowledge*. Aristotle defines science (or understanding, *epistēmē*) as *knowledge* (*gignōskein*) of why something is so and could not be otherwise than it is.⁹³ Stoics define science (*epistēmē*) as body of knowledge (cognition, *katalēpsis*) rich enough to withstand objections. Descartes defines *science* (*scientia*) in terms of clear and distinct perception, which is his account of (basic) knowledge (*cognitio*).⁹⁴ Far from defining the ordinary notion of knowledge as a lesser form of the epistemic ideal, these philosophers defined the epistemic ideal in terms of knowledge. Third, it omits the fact that many historical philosophers *had a theory of knowledge*. We have seen that the Stoics had one and we have reviewed evidence for a similar theory across history. Granted, Pasnau is right that there was little discussion of what knowledge *is*—especially in comparison to how much they debated the proper form and method of science and whether we knew anything. But that is not so surprising if, as the New Story holds, they widely agreed over what knowledge is. The question became a topic of debate only when Classical Infallibilism collapsed.

4.9 Guidelines for a history of epistemology

The New Story's bold hypothesis is worth exploring further. Here are some guidelines for doing so. First, one should ask whether a candidate notion is that of *knowledge*. Kant's *Erkenntnis* is less; Descartes's *scientia* is more.⁹⁵ Useful clues are whether the notion entails truth and whether it is what we *prima facie* seem to have in some paradigmatic cases—"when I clearly see Socrates running", to take Buridan's example. Second, one should ask whether knowledge is taken to require some truth-entailing property in addition to truth itself. A useful clue is whether truth figures as an independent condition. Third, one should ask whether the property in question is required to be discernible. Clues can be found in claims that error can be avoided and in the treatment of

mulae de Dialectica, bk. 8, ch. 4, sec. 4, Klima, 2007, 149), there were not discussing whether such cases satisfy the ideal requirements of Aristotelian science. When Berkeley argues that we cannot have knowledge of unperceived bodies, he is not merely denying that we lack an ideal theoretical discipline for them.

⁹²As Pasnau (2013, 1015n45) reports, the 2009 *Philpapers* survey suggests that a mere 3% of philosophy professors lean toward external-world scepticism.

⁹³*Posterior Analytics*, 71b10. See Barnes (1993, 89–92).

⁹⁴See DeRose (1992b, sec. B) for a proposal along these lines.

⁹⁵On Kant see fn. 58 above.