

would be a non-trivial *method* that a sufficiently attentive subject could follow to avoid error entirely. Contemporary views deny that there is one.¹²⁸ Second: *the main divide now is whether knowledge additionally requires an indication of truth, and if so, a discernible one.* In particular, whether knowledge requires an indication of truth that correlates with some normative standard—“justified” or “reasonable” belief. *Strict Externalists* deny it; *Two-Tiered Externalists* require it; *Internalists* require it to be discernible. Third: *contemporary epistemology is revisionist.* That does not mean that we have shifted topic: we talk about the same thing as tradition did, though we disagree sharply over what it involves.¹²⁹ But that means that contemporary epistemology goes against a deep-seated tendency in philosophical—and perhaps ordinary, see below—thought about knowledge. Thus contemporary epistemologists have reason to treat their own unreflective judgements with care. For instance, we have seen that Classical Infallibilist intuitions may be unwittingly at work in the way some philosophers think of justification or evidence.

I have little doubt that the Justified True Belief analysis will keep on being used as a starting point in epistemology courses for a long while—being loosely motivated instead of called “traditional”, or worse, being simply called an analysis that was “thought to be traditional”. That is regrettable because that prevents addressing Classical Infallibilist intuitions head on and puts in play an unexamined notion of “justification” that attracts discernibility intuitions. Students are then in a bad position to integrate past and contemporary epistemology, to make sense of sceptical arguments and to see the relevant divides of the contemporary scene. Be that as it may, if somebody wished to update their lectures in light of the New Story, what should they do? One suggestion is to start with the conflict between the obvious fact that we know many things and appealing lines of thought that lead to the conclusion that we do not.¹³⁰ Classical Infallibilism may be blamed for the conflict and the Justified True Belief introduced as an attempted solution. One can then proceed as usual. Another, more radical one, is to postpone questions of definitions entirely and focus instead on the roles knowledge is meant to play. One can then examine whether discernibility and truth-entailment requirements emerge from those and let the Classical Infallibilist and Justified True Belief pictures emerge.

There are many gaps in the New Story. These are promising areas of further study. The present discussion focused on a small sample of Western philoso-

fallibilism” in Cohen or Reed’s sense has no sceptical implications. By contrast, if evidence and justification are required to be *discernible*, “infallibilism” in both senses leads to Scepticism.

¹²⁸See Williamson (2008). A method is *non-trivial* if it allows some beliefs.

¹²⁹Contrast Pasnau (2013).

¹³⁰Compare the opening pages of Lewis (1996).