that a given mark is truth-entailing.[20] On some conceptions of discernible marks, Infallibilism will *entail* various principles such as: if *M* is a discernible mark of truth then a belief *that M is truth-entailing* bears a discernible mark of truth; if one's belief that *p* bears a discernible mark of truth then one's belief *that one knows p* bears one too, and so on. But such principles are at best consequences of how discernible marks are conceived, not additional requirements on knowledge.

3 Classical Infallibilism in Hellenistic Epistemology

This section shows Classical Infallibilism at work in Hellenistic epistemology. Why Hellenistic epistemology? As Brunschwig (1999, 229) writes, "it is generally agreed that the Hellenistic period is the great age of ancient epistemology". Socrates, Plato and Aristotle mostly discussed *expert* knowledge: geometry, astronomy, medicine, politics, philosophy and so on—what we may now call *theoretical disciplines* or *sciences*.[21] Their Hellenistic successors were squarely interested in ordinary knowledge: knowing that something is sweet, that something is a dog, that someone is your child (LS 39C, 40H). The shift was so significant that Brunschwig (1999) calls it an "epistemological turn".[22] The founders of two new schools, Epicurus (341-271) and Zeno of Citium (334-262), argued that there were "criteria of truth", yardsticks with which opinions could be tested for knowledge. Soon after Arcesilaus took the head of the Academy (c.273 to c.242) and gave it a distinctively sceptical orientation. For the next two centuries, Greek epistemology was dominated by the sharp and sustained debate between the Stoa of Zeno and Chrysippus (head 232-c.206) and the 'New Academy' of Arcesilaus and Carneades (head from mid-second century BCE to 137). It stalled as Athens's great schools disintegrated around 100 BCE. We find it recorded in Cicero's *Academica* and in Sextus Empiricus's *Against the professors* as well as in various other sources—though what remains

[20] Compare Van Cleve (1979) and Barnes (1990, 136–7).

[21] When Socrates claimed not to "know" anything he did not seem to deny that he knew that he was standing, in Athens, or awake. See Vlastos (1985) for further discussion. For Aristotle, see Burnyeat (1981), Irwin (1988, 118), Barnes (1993, 82), Pasnau (2013, 991–3); though see Irwin (2010) for a more guarded view. For Plato, see Burnyeat (1970, 1990, 216–8), Annas (1982), Nehamas (1984, 1985) and Kaplan (1985, 351–3); but see Fine (2004, 70) for an opposite view. While the *Republic* plausibly deals with a scientific ideal (Pasnau, 2013, 990n4), I agree with Fine that some of Plato's examples in the *Meno* and the *Theaetetus* (knowing the way to Larissa, knowing whether a defendant is guilty) suggest that he intends to cover ordinary knowledge. I discuss Plato's views in section 4.

[22] The shift may have been prompted by radical sceptical challenges (Long and Sedley, 1987, xviii): "Anaxarchus and Monimus [...] compared existing things to stage-painting and took them to be like experiences that occur in sleep or insanity" (LS 1D). See Brunschwig (1999) for further discussion.