

given in *logical* terms. We are concerned with logical relations among propositions, not with psychological relations among mental states.

On the other hand, the psychologistic approach considers the crucial difference between knowledge and true belief—that is, epistemic justification—to turn on “the factors which produced the belief”, focusing on “processes which produce belief, processes which will always contain, at their latter end, psychological events”.²⁹

It is not entirely clear from this characterization whether a psychologistic theory of justification is to be *prohibited* from making *any* reference to logical relations among belief contents (it is difficult to believe how a theory of justification respecting such a blanket prohibition could succeed); nor is it clear whether, conversely, an apsychothetic theory will be permitted to refer at all to beliefs qua psychological states, or exactly what it is for a theory to do so. But such points of detail are unimportant here; it is clear enough, for example, that Goldman’s proposal to explicate justified belief as belief generated by a reliable belief-forming process³⁰ nicely fits Kitcher’s characterization of the psychologistic approach. This account, one form of the so-called “reliability theory” of justification, probably was what Kitcher had in mind when he was formulating his general characterization of epistemological naturalism. However, another influential form of the reliability theory does not qualify under Kitcher’s characterization. This is Armstrong’s proposal to explain the difference between knowledge and true belief, at least for non-inferential knowledge, in terms of “a *law-like connection* between the state of affairs [of a subject’s believing that *p*] and the state of affairs that makes ‘*p*’ true such that, given the state of affairs [of the subject’s believing that *p*], it must be the case that *p*.”³¹ There is here no reference to the causal *antecedents* of beliefs, something that Kitcher requires of apsychothetic theories.

Perhaps, Kitcher’s preliminary characterization needs to be broadened and sharpened. However, a salient characteristic of the naturalistic approach has already emerged, which we can put as follows: justification is to be characterized in terms of *causal* or *nomological* connections involving beliefs as *psychological states* or *processes*, and not in terms of the *logical* properties or relations pertaining to the *contents* of these beliefs.³²

If we understand current epistemological naturalism in this way,