

The New Story goes as follows. There is a traditional conception of knowledge but it is not the Justified True Belief analysis Gettier attacked. On the traditional view, knowledge consists in having a belief that bears a *discernible mark of truth*. A *mark of truth* is a truth-entailing property: a property that only true beliefs can have. It is *discernible* if one can always tell that a belief has it, that is, a sufficiently attentive subject believes that a belief has it if and only if it has it. Requiring a mark of truth makes the view *infallibilist*. Requiring it to be discernible makes the view *internalist*. I call the view *Classical Infallibilism*.²

Classical Infallibilism is not the Justified True Belief analysis Gettier attacked. In Gettier's cases what is discernible to the subject is compatible with error. So Classical Infallibilists do not have trouble classifying them as cases in which one does not know. Their problem is rather to classify anything we seem to know as knowledge, for few of our beliefs seem to bear discernible marks of truth. That contrasts vividly with the view Gettier attacked, which had no sceptical implications but ran into Gettier-style counterexamples.

Classical Infallibilism is manifest in Descartes's epistemology and the Hellenistic debate on *criteria of truth*. There is evidence of it in the writings of many others. More importantly, there are few, if any, clear examples of Western philosophers *rejecting* it until fairly recently. The New Story's bold hypothesis is that Classical Infallibilism was endorsed by virtually all Western philosophers until the mid-twentieth century.

Early on Classical Infallibilists divided into two camps: *Dogmatists*, who thought that many of our beliefs bear discernible marks of truth, and *Sceptics*, who thought that almost none does. The two were in stalemate for centuries. In modern times, however, Dogmatism became increasingly untenable. That revived *Probabilist Scepticism*, a brand of Scepticism according to which even though we do not know much, we are justified in believing many things. But most strikingly, that spurred *Idealism*, a brand of Dogmatism that hopes to restore the idea that our beliefs bear discernible marks of truth by adopting a revisionary metaphysics.

In mid-twentieth century analytic philosophy Idealism fell apart and Scepticism was barred by common sense philosophy and ordinary language philosophy. Some philosophers eventually rejected Classical Infallibilism itself. But there were two main ways of doing so. Some rejected the *infallibility* requirement. Like Probabilistic Sceptics, they held that a *mere indication* of truth justifies belief—where a mere indication of truth is a property that somehow

²The idea that traditional conceptions of knowledge are "infallibilist" is not new (see e.g. Lehrer, 1974, 78; Fumerton, 2006, 14–5, 59). What the New Story adds is a more precise treatment of the relevant notion of infallibility, the idea that Classical Infallibilism does not face the Gettier problem, and the idea that the two aspects of Classical Infallibilism (discernibility and truth entailment) gave rise to the contemporary divide between internalism and externalism.