

edge is justified true belief.<sup>134</sup> That has lead to a focus on knowledge attributions in Gettier-style cases.<sup>135</sup> The New Story casts doubt on that evidence and suggests focusing on ascriptions in sceptical scenarios.

Another question is whether Classical Infallibilism is a specifically Western phenomenon. There is some indication that it is not. For instance, there is evidence of it in classical Indian philosophy.<sup>136</sup> Tantalizingly, there is even evidence that its rejection there antedates the Western one by half a millennium.<sup>137</sup> The leads are worth pursuing.

<sup>134</sup>See e.g. Starmans and Friedman (2012, 663).

<sup>135</sup>Recent studies suggest that the ordinary conception is *not* justified true belief (Machery et al., 2015).

<sup>136</sup>See Phillips (2015, sec. 1.1 and 3). Briefly put: classical Indian philosophers shared the view that knowledge is thought (“cognition”, but in a non-truth-entailing sense) generated by a “knowledge-source” (*pramāṇa*), where the latter is truth-entailing. A central debate was whether and how *pramāṇa*-generated thoughts are “certified” to be such. On one possible reading, they tacitly assumed that being *pramāṇa*-generated had to be discernible in order to yield knowledge, and the debate was about whether and how it was discernible. Note that the Classical Infallibilist reading of early Indian epistemology is incompatible with the presentation given by Stoltz (2007, 401–6). Stoltz stresses that Indian philosophers took knowledge to be a factive mental state and endorsed something like a causal theory of knowledge. So far that is consistent with the Classical Infallibilist’s truth-entailment requirement. But he adds that on their view knowledge is not luminous and knowing can be phenomenally like being mistaken (405–6). These claims are incompatible with the Classical Infallibilist’s requirement of a *discernible* truth-entailing property. However Stoltz appears to ascribe them to classical Indian philosophers only because they take knowledge to be a mental state and they endorse a causal theory. But we have seen that Descartes endorses the discernibility requirement even though he takes clear and distinct perception to be a factive mental states and we have seen that Stoics endorse a discernibility requirement even though they have a causal theory of cognitive impression. Hence the fact that classical Indian philosophers took knowledge to be a factive mental state is not enough to conclude that there are externalists and to rule out a Classical Infallibilist reading.

<sup>137</sup>One on possible reading, Gaṅgeśa—c. 1325 CE, founder of the new era of the “Logic” (*Nyāya*) school—denies that the discernibility of being *pramāṇa*-generated is necessary for knowledge. See Phillips (2004, 11) on Gaṅgeśa’s “fallibilism”. Careful examination is needed, however. Phillips (2004, 10) calls Gaṅgeśa’s epistemology “externalist” because he does not take knowledge to require that one is aware or knows that one’s thought is *pramāṇa*-generated. But that does not make a view externalist in the modern sense, for it is compatible with the requirement that being *pramāṇa*-generated is discernible (sec. 3). Moreover, Gaṅgeśa grants that there are “signs” of whether a thought is *pramāṇa*-generated (Phillips, 2004, 11–2). If he takes those to be present just when a thought is *pramāṇa*-generated, and if being sufficiently attentive is enough to be aware of them, then he is endorsing discernibility after all.