

they granted that senses are fallible. Thus like Reid, they “did not require that sources of knowledge be infallible” (Greco, 1995, 294). But they were Classical Infallibilists, because they thought that these sources provide us with knowledge only when they provide us with a discernible mark of truth. Thus we should ask whether Reid thought it possible for a belief to constitute knowledge without any of its discernible features entailing its truth. Second, as with the Stoics, it is important to recall that discernibility does not require that one can introspect one’s impressions; it merely requires that a sufficiently attentive subject believes that they have an impression of the right kind just when they do.<sup>88</sup> Thus Reid may both reject the Lockean Doctrine of Ideas and yet take sense-impressions to be discernible. Third, as with Mill and Buridan, it is crucial to ask whether Reid is operating with a restricted notion of necessity. He may merely be requiring that given laws of nature, suitable sense-impressions entail their truth.

An indisputable counterexample to the hypothesis is Ramsey (1931). Ramsey takes inductive inference to be a source of knowledge and he clearly acknowledges that it is not truth-preserving but merely “reliable”, that is, it only leads to true opinion “on the whole”. There is no indication that, like Mill, he takes some discernible subclass of inductive inferences to be truth-preserving. Hence he rejects Classical Infallibilism. Significantly, however, Ramsey’s brilliant anticipation had little influence in its time.

#### 4.8 Alternatives to the New Story

Two other broad pictures of the history of epistemology have been recently defended. Antognazza (2015, 167–71) also argues that the Justified True Belief analysis is a twentieth century invention and that there is nevertheless a traditional conception of knowledge. On her view the tradition takes knowledge to be “a primitive perception or an irreducible mental ‘seeing’ what is the case; [...] a primitive presence of a fact to the mind (or to the senses) in which there is no ‘gap’ between knower and known” (169). The state in question is incompatible with, and irreducible to, belief. But it involves “thinking with assent” (*assent*, for short), a *genus* of which knowledge and belief are species. Since presence of the fact that *p* entails that *p* is so, *being made in presence of the fact to the mind* is a truth-entailing property of assents. So as in the New Story, tradition says that knowing entails being in some acceptance-like state with a truth-entailing property. Her picture differs on three counts, however. First, the acceptance-like state is assent rather than belief. It is not clear to me

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<sup>88</sup>See fns. 33 and 39 above.