

caused by the corresponding fact iff for some p , it is a belief that p and p caused it. The Crude Causal account is that one knows just if one's belief is caused by the corresponding fact. Being caused by the corresponding fact is a mark of truth: if p caused one's belief that p then p is so. But it is not discernible: one could be sufficiently attentive and mistakenly think that one's belief is caused by the corresponding fact while it is not. In the wake of the Gettier problem several Externalist Infallibilist accounts appeared.¹⁰⁵

Both views face a weakening question. If the Internalist's discernible property need not entail truth, would any discernible property do? If believing is discernible, any belief has some discernible property. Thus the weakest Fallibilist Internalism identifies knowledge and true belief. In practice, Internalists require more: a discernible property that somehow *indicates* truth. Their task is to say what that involves and to motivate the requirement. For instance, some Internalists require that truth be *probable enough* given one's experience—which they take to be discernible. Their task is to say how experience makes something probable and to motivate the level of probability they require. Similarly, if the Externalist's truth-entailing property need not be discernible, would any truth-entailing property do? The weakest truth-entailing property is truth. Thus the weakest Infallibilist Externalism identifies knowledge and true belief. In practice, Externalists require more: a property that somehow makes it non-accidental that one believes the truth. Their task is to say what that involves and to motivate the requirement. As the True Belief account is a natural end-point in the rejection of Classical Infallibilism it is no surprise that it appeared in the contemporary period.¹⁰⁶

For a time the preferred strategy to answer the weakening question was to confront candidate accounts to allegedly intuitive judgements about cases. A more fruitful strategy is to ask what roles we expect knowledge to play and how they constrain acceptable weakenings. For instance, if we expect knowledge to enter an explanation of how one's actions may be guided by facts themselves, non-accidental true belief is arguably better suited to the task than true belief.¹⁰⁷

Insofar as several weakenings appear to play legitimate theoretical roles, one will be tempted by pluralist or variantist views according to which "knowledge" is ambiguous or context-sensitive. It is no surprise that such views have

¹⁰⁵Notably Goldman (1967); Unger (1968); Armstrong (1968); Dretske (1969); Nozick (1981). In the current literature the prominent Externalist Infallibilist accounts are the safety (Sosa, 1993, 1999; Williamson, 2000; Pritchard, 2005) and virtue-theoretic accounts (Sosa, 2007; Greco, 2010), as well as the combination of both (Pritchard, 2012). The virtue-theoretic account is more precisely characterized as a *Two-tiered* Externalist Infallibilist account. See below.

¹⁰⁶See Sartwell (1991).

¹⁰⁷See Hyman (1999) for the role and Williamson (2000, 3.4) for the claim of explanatory superiority.