

“Account” is usually glossed as an “explanation of why something is so”. Insofar as one cannot explain why something is so without it being so, accounts are truth-entailing.<sup>56</sup> It is open whether Plato took having an account to be discernible.<sup>57</sup> Thus it is open whether Plato’s view is an instance of Classical Infallibilism.

Kant defines knowledge as “assent [that] is both subjectively and objectively sufficient”.<sup>58</sup> That is spelled out in Kant’s lectures on logic as “assent based on a ground of cognition that is objectively as well as subjectively sufficient” (AA 9:70, Kant, 1992, 574). One may argue that Kant calls a ground “subjectively sufficient” just if it is discernible.<sup>59</sup> One may also argue that Kant

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of “account” that is unsatisfactory in the *Theaetetus*. See Fine (1979), Chappell (2009, sec 8) and Burnyeat (1990, 235–8) for some discussion. Fine (2004, 70–1) argues that Plato’s definition covers knowledge rather than understanding or science. It is also debated whether the definition covers propositional knowledge, objectual knowledge, or both: the sun, virtue and *Theaetetus* are given as examples of things known. White (1976, 176ff), Nehamas (1984) and Kaplan (1985, 352) object to comparisons with the justified true belief analysis on that basis. See Fine (1979, 366–7; 2004, 48–9) for a rejoinder.

<sup>56</sup>Thanks to John Hawthorne here. Fine (2004, 67, 72) argues that Plato’s notion of “account” is demanding and that “beliefs with an account” cannot be based on any falsehood, but she leaves open whether some such beliefs are false.

<sup>57</sup>Fine (2004, 66) tentatively suggests that Plato’s notion of account is internalist.

<sup>58</sup>A822/B850, Kant (1998, 684). For simplicity I replace Guyer’s literal rendering of *Fürwahrhalten* as “taking something to be true” by “assent” (as does Chignell, 2007b, 35). “Assent” is broader than belief—it includes suppositions, for instance (Chignell, 2007a, 37). However, “subjectively sufficient” assent involves a degree of conviction that would make it count as belief by contemporary standards. The word for “knowledge” here is *Wissen*. Most of the *Critique of Pure Reason* is concerned with *Erkenntnis*, which Guyer translates as “cognition”. In German *Erkenntnis* is a “knowledge”-like term: it derives from the verb for objectual knowledge (*kennen*) and typically means “recognition”, “realization” or “discovery”. Hence it is tempting to identify Kant’s *Erkenntnis* / *Wissen* pair with the traditional distinction between *cognitio* and *scientia*. Thus Kemp Smith translated *Erkenntnis* as “knowledge” (see also Dicker, 2004, xii). The temptation must be resisted, however. Kant’s *Erkenntnis* includes representations that are false (A58/B83) and ideas of reason, such as the immortality of the soul, that lie beyond what can be known (A3/B6, A320/B376–77). Thus *Erkenntnis* is not plausibly understood as a notion of knowledge, ordinary or otherwise. Rather, Kant seems to use it for any mental state that can be evaluated as true or false (or more broadly, correct or incorrect) (A58/B83, A320/B376–77). *Wissen* is Kant’s notion of knowledge. So, somewhat surprisingly, the primary object of Kant’s first *Critique* is not the possibility of knowledge but the possibility of *thought*. The switch from the epistemological to the semantic is characteristic of Idealist views. Note that Kant does have a knowledge / science pair: *Wissen* / *Wissenschaft* (distinguished at A832/B860).

<sup>59</sup>Chignell (2007b, 45) says that a ground of one’s assent is “subjectively sufficient” just if on reflection, one would cite it as one’s sufficient objective ground. Thus if *g* is a subjectively sufficient ground of your belief, then if you were attentive enough, you would believe that your belief is based on *g*. This leaves open whether, if you were attentive enough and your belief was *not* based on *g*, you could think that it was. But while Kant clearly thinks that the grounds of our judgement are not immediately transparent to us, he does seem to think that sufficient reflection would allow one to tell what they are (see e.g. AA 9:76, Kant, 1992, 579). Relatedly, Chignell (2007b, 41–2) discusses whether “grounds” are only internal psychological states or include external states as well. There is textual evidence both ways. Interestingly for us, Chignell’s conclusion is that external facts could be included insofar as they are discernible: “[...] in order to *know* something a subject must be able to cite or pick out what she takes to be her objective grounds. As long as that is possible with respect to the relevant *external* states or objects, then perhaps we can allow them to count as objective grounds as well”. This chimes in with the New Story, according to which if Classical Infallibilists assign a special epistemological role to internal states, that is because they are discernible, not because they are internal (fn. 17 above).