

tic on moral affairs. Second, Buridan grants that God could make any sense-impression false but allows knowledge on the basis of “evidentness” that entails the truth *conditional on nature following its course*.⁸⁴ Now if Buridan takes natural necessity to entail truth, that is a variant of Classical Infallibilism with a restricted notion of necessity. If, however, natural necessity does not entail truth—because miracles happen—then he is indeed rejecting Classical Infallibilism. One could even argue that he endorses a version of the Justified True Belief analysis.⁸⁵ Note, however, that even on that reading Buridan’s view is close to Dogmatic Classical Infallibilism. For he appears to think that, supernatural scenarios aside, it is always possible to tell on reflection whether one’s senses are deceived.⁸⁶

Reid is commonly taken to defend a “fallibilist” conception of knowledge, for he allows knowledge of external objects through perception unaided by reason even while recognising that perception is fallible.⁸⁷ A detailed discussion of Reid is more than I can offer here. But I would like to stress three points that are crucial in assessing whether Reid is a counterexample to the New Story. First, we should distinguish *source infallibilism* from *Classical Infallibilism*. Our paradigm Infallibilists, Stoics, were “fallibilists” in a sense: unlike Epicurus,

insists that when he sees Socrates running, it is *correct* to say that he knows, and not merely opines, that Socrates is running (*Summulae de Dialectica*, bk. 8, ch. 4, sec. 4, Klima, 2007, 149). Moreover, he stresses a sharp difference between knowledge and opinion: the former requires truth, the second does not. Since he took the “moral” kind of evidentness to be compatible with falsehood, the issue whether it could yield something properly called “knowledge” would have been worth raising. I suspect he did not do so because he thought the answer was obviously negative.

⁸⁴*Summulae de Dialectica*, bk. 8, ch. 4, sec. 4: “Another [type of evidentness] is such that in accordance with it the cognitive power is compelled either by its own nature [or by some evident argument] to assent to a truth or a true proposition that cannot be falsified naturally, although it could be falsified supernaturally. And this is what is required for natural science.” (Klima, 2007, 149). The context indicates that “cannot be falsified naturally” here qualifies the assent, not merely the proposition. (Previous paragraphs apply the supernaturally vs. naturally falsifiable distinction to “certainty on the part of the proposition”, *i.e.* truth and necessity; this paragraph analogously extend the distinction to “evidentness”. See Klima, 2009, 244 who reads the passage as concerning the reliability of our cognitive faculties.)

⁸⁵To see this we need to unpack Buridan’s idiosyncratic terminology. He takes “certainty” to involve two things, one on the side of the proposition, one on the side of the subject. The former is said to be “firmness of truth” (metaphysical or natural necessity) in *Quaestiones in Aristotelis Metaphysicam*, Bk. 2 q. 1 (Klima, 2007, 145) but simply “truth” in the *Summulae de Dialectica*, bk. 8, ch. 4, sec. 4 (Klima, 2007, 147). The latter is “firmness of assent”, which we would call subjective certainty. Firm assent further divides into that without “evidentness” (orthodox faith, the wilful errors of heretics, belief based on sophisms) and that “with evidentness”. Now in *Summulae de Dialectica*, *ibid.*, Buridan defines knowledge as “assent with certainty and evidentness” (Klima, 2007, 146). Given the foregoing that is equivalent to: firm assent (*i.e.*, belief) that is true and with evidentness. If evidentness is discernible but does not entail truth that is a version of the Justified True Belief view. See Karger (2010, 221–3) for a comparable reading.

⁸⁶“In response to [the argument about the deceptiveness of the senses] I say that if the senses are naturally deceived, then the intellect has to investigate whether there are people there or not, and it has to correct the judgements of illusion” (*Questions on Metaphysics*, Bk. 2 q. 1, Klima, 2007, 146). See however Zupko (1993, 210) for a weaker reading of Buridan’s claim that the intellect has the power to correct the error of the senses.

⁸⁷Greco (1995, 294). However, Sosa (2009, 61) takes some of Reid’s principles to be infallibilist. He takes them to be false and discusses a revised, fallibilist reading of Reid’s view.