whether the difference is more than verbal.[89] Second, the property in question is "being made in presence of the fact to the mind". It is not clear to me whether that is incompatible with knowledge of the future, the distant or the past. Third, she leaves open whether the presence of a fact to the mind is discernible in my sense. If it is not it is not clear why past philosophers were worried about dreams, fakes and the like. If, for instance, the presence of a fact to the mind simply consisted in assent *caused by* the corresponding fact, dreams and the like would do nothing to show that no facts are present to the mind.[90]

Pasnau's (2010b; 2010a; 2013) picture is that traditional and contemporary epistemology pursue different projects. With the possible exception of Plato, Western philosophers were not interested in providing an analysis of knowledge. They were interested in more specific cognitive phenomena such as perception or imagination (Pasnau, 2013, 990). But more importantly, they were interested in setting out an epistemic ideal: the best knowledge-like state humans could aspire to (Pasnau, 2013, 994). Aristotle and Descartes are offered as illustration: Aristotle's *epistēmē* and Descartes's *scientia* are ideals for human theoretical achievement, not accounts of ordinary knowledge (Pasnau, 2013, 990–6, 1000–11). Ideal-theoretic epistemology emphasizes a scale of distance from the ideal and the question of which grade is suitable for what purposes, rather than the putative threshold between knowledge and non-knowledge and the question whether we cross it. The idea is illustrated by grades of certainty in medieval epistemology (Pasnau, 2010a, 36; 2013, 1014–15).

Pasnau's central insight seems to me correct: many historical philosophers are better understood as laying out an ideal for systematic theoretical inquiry. Indeed, that is essential secure the New Story's claim that philosophers took knowledge to require *nothing more* than discernible marks of truth—for Descartes's *scientia,* for instance, does require more than a discernible mark of truth. However, Pasnau's picture seems to me partial in three ways. First, it omits *intense debates over whether we know*. What Stoics and Sceptics mainly argued about was not what the epistemic ideal was or whether it was reachable but whether we *knew* anything.[91] Indeed, Pasnau (2013, 1015) points out that

[89]Supplement Classical Infallibilism with *opinion*, defined as belief that lacks a discernible mark of truth. "Opinion" and knowledge are species of "belief" in Classical Infallibilism just as "belief" and knowledge are species of "assent" in Antognazza's view of the traditional conception.

[90]See sec. 5 below on the Crude Causal theory. Now dreams and the like are cases of assent in the absence of fact. So the *metaphysical* possibility of dreams would establish the metaphysical possibility of assent without knowing. But that is something that Dogmatists happily grant. The *epistemic* possibility of dreams would show that it is *epistemically possible* that we do not know. If epistemic possibility entails lack of knowledge then we do not know *whether we know*. So Crude Causal theorists would at most take dreams and the like to undermine *second-order* knowledge. Even then, they may quickly dispell the worry by applying their theory at higher order. Dreams and the like do nothing to show that no assent *that one knows* is caused by the corresponding fact.

[91]Examples could be multiplied. When late medieval authors debated over "whether, when I clearly see Socrates running, I know that he is running or I merely opine this" (Buridan, *Sum-*