

we have such marks. For instance, they may think that our evidence consists in discernible aspects of our experience. If these philosophers dispense with a notion of knowledge entirely, their view is essentially a notational variant of Probabilist Scepticism, with “evidence” in lieu of “knowledge”. Most often, they endorse a looser standard for knowledge; their view is a variant of Internalist Infallibilism. Note that the contemporary rise of the notion of evidence is partly due to the Bayesian tradition. If, as I suspect, the tradition has roots in Classical Infallibilism, it is not surprising that its notion of evidence has a Classical Infallibilist flavour.<sup>125</sup>

## 6 Conclusion

The New Story is simple but surprisingly powerful. It makes sense of a range of features of the history of epistemology. Historical views are hard to place on the contemporary map and conversely because the latter reject the former’s conception of knowledge. Scepticism was influential in the past, but not now, because past views lead to it and contemporary ones do not. Past philosophers did not discuss the definition of knowledge because they did not disagree about it. Idealism was predominant for a couple of centuries because it was a desperate attempt to rescue Dogmatism within the bounds of Classical Infallibilism. It disappeared almost entirely afterwards because it had lost its purpose. The Gettier problem appeared in the mid-twentieth century because views clearly subject to it did not exist before. Contemporary epistemology divides into Externalism and Internalism because they are the two main ways of giving up the traditional view. Contemporary epistemology has two central notions, justification and knowledge, because each is felt to capture one side of the traditional view: discernibility and truth-entailment. Internalist notions of evidence gained popularity in the contemporary period because they offered a new home for Classical Infallibilist intuitions. Needless to say, no remotely comparable explanatory success can be adduced for the Legend.

Epistemologists may draw a few lessons from the New Story. First: *we are all Infallibilists now*.<sup>126</sup> Post-Gettier and Classical views alike put a substantial truth-entailing condition on knowledge. What sets contemporary views apart is not to require that the condition should be *discernible*.<sup>127</sup> If it were, there

<sup>125</sup>See in particular Jeffrey (1965; 1992), whose epistemological project is to strip the Bayesian conception of evidence of its infallibilist roots.

<sup>126</sup>See Sturgeon (1993).

<sup>127</sup>Contrast with Cohen (1988) and Reed (2002a) who characterize “fallibilism” as the view that some beliefs with non-truth-entailing evidence (Cohen) or with non-knowledge-entailing justification (Reed) constitute knowledge. They suggest that “infallibilism” has sceptical implications, but that is so only if evidence and justification are constrained in certain ways. If one’s evidence is everything one knows, and if the only justification for believing *p* is that you know that *p*, “in-