

flourished in recent times.¹⁰⁸

A putative role of knowledge is to justify belief.¹⁰⁹ Externalist views are criticised for failing to secure it.¹¹⁰ The suggestion is that justified belief requires some discernible indication of truth. *Internalist Infallibilism* takes knowledge to require both a discernible indication and a mark of truth. On pains of collapsing into Classical Infallibilism, the same property cannot play both roles. But a straightforwardly conjunctive account is likely to face a *secondary* Gettier problem: when it is a coincidence that one's belief bears both a discernible indication and a mark of truth, one does not know.¹¹¹ On better versions of the view the mark of truth, while not discernible itself, *entails* that one's belief bears a discernible indication of truth. Undefeated Justification accounts illustrate the idea. One these accounts knowledge requires a "justification", which is taken to be a discernible indication of truth, and in addition that one's "justification" is "undefeated", where the justification's being "undefeated" is not discernible but ensures that a belief is true.¹¹² Thus undefeated justification is a mark of truth that entails a discernible indication of truth without being discernible itself. In the wake of the Gettier problem several Internalist Infallibilist accounts appeared.¹¹³

As defined, Externalist and Internalist Infallibilisms are not exclusive. If believing is discernible, for instance, and if it counts as a sufficient "indication of truth", then the two are coextensive. To specify a divide one needs a notion of indication of truth. Internalists with respect to that notion are those who take it to be discernible and entailed by knowing. Strict Externalists are those who deny that it is required or that it is discernible. Since there is no uncontroversial notion of indication of truth, there is no uncontroversial way of drawing the divide.¹¹⁴

¹⁰⁸Malcolm (1952, 181) distinguished a "strong" and "weak" sense of "know". Interestingly, he upholds Classical Infallibilist standards for the strong sense (see notably Malcolm, 1952, 183–6). See also Stine (1976), Lewis (1979, 1996), Unger (1986), Cohen (1988, 1999), Williams (1991), DeRose (1992a, 2009), Hawthorne (2004), Stanley (2005), Fantl and McGrath (2009).

¹⁰⁹In the Hellenistic debate it was assumed that knowledge, and only knowledge, would justify assent. The Probabilist Sceptical idea that something less could justify belief (and not merely guide action) was apparently not introduced before Philo. See sec. 4.5. Lasonen-Aarnio (2010) argues against the idea that knowledge makes belief *reasonable*, but leaves open whether a belief can be both justified and unreasonable.

¹¹⁰BonJour (1980), Lehrer (1990, 162–163).

¹¹¹The argument in Williamson (2000, 3.2) may be adapted, substituting a candidate discernible condition for the internal one.

¹¹²See Howard-Snyder et al. (2003, 306) for the claim that most defeasibility conditions entail truth.

¹¹³Lehrer (1965); Chisholm (1966); Sosa (1969); Klein (1971); Harman (1973); Pollock (1986, appendix), and most of the 'fourth-clause' accounts discussed in Shope (1983). Goldman (1976) and Lewis (1996) defend accounts according to which (roughly) one knows provided one's *experience* entails truth over a range of situations relevantly like one's current situation. Even though these accounts are not usually classified as "internalist", they fall into the Internalist Infallibilist camp if they take experience be discernible.

¹¹⁴Primitivists hold that knowledge is not definable. Since knowing is truth-entailing, they are