immediately reveals the sense in which methodology, for Laudan, is naturalized:

> Crediting or discrediting a methodological rule requires us to ask ourselves whether the universe we inhabit is one in which our cognitive ends can in fact be furthered by following this rule rather than that. Such questions cannot be answered a priori; they are empirical matters. It follows that scientific methodology is itself an empirical discipline which cannot dispense with the very methods of inquiry whose validity it investigates. Armchair methodology is as ill-conceived as armchair chemistry or physics (Laudan, 1984, pp. 39–40).

> I am suggesting that we conceive rules or maxims as resting on claims about the empirical world, claims to be assayed in precisely the same ways in which we test other empirical theories. Methodological rules, on this view, are a part of empirical knowledge, not something wholly different from it (Laudan, 1987, p. 24; see also Laudan, 1988, pp. 349–350; Laudan, 1987a, p. 231).

Our final preliminary is to trace out the connections between Laudan's naturalism and his normative conception of rationality. Laudan's account of rationality is thoroughly instrumentalist:

> Whatever else rationality is, it is agent- and context-specific. When we say that an agent acted rationally, we are asserting minimally that he acted in ways which he believed would promote his ends (Laudan, 1987, p. 21).

> The conduct of a given inquiry will be *rational* just insofar as we have grounds to believe that that inquiry process will be likely to realize our ends ... (Laudan, 1988, p. 349, emphasis in original).

> Whatever else it is, rational behavior consists in selecting actions which we believe are conducive to our ends (Laudan, 1987a, p. 227).

> ... an empirical approach to epistemology requires attention to precisely those normative linkages between cognitive ends and means which constitute scientific rationality (Laudan, 1984, p. 41).

Establishing that actions are conducive to the realization of our ends is an empirical matter; hence naturalism. Given that some action is in fact so conducive provides reason for engaging in that action; hence normativity (and rationality). Thus we have Laudan's normative naturalism: naturalistic inquiry tells us what we can do to further our ends, and, given that they are our ends, what we ought to do to bring about their realization. The rationality of science involves simply the 'normative linkages between cognitive ends and means'. Methodological rules linking such ends and means

> retain all the normative force associated with any prudential rule of conduct, yet they derive their warrant from empirical information about how this particular world is constituted. One can thus "naturalize" methodology ... without being forced ... to believe that making it empirical and descriptive robs it of its normative force (Laudan, 1988, p. 350).

Laudan's normative naturalism centrally involves: (a) the construal of methodological rules as 'instrumentalities' connecting cognitive ends and