

them. It is ironic that it is Laudan who in the work we are considering ignores this epistemic sense of rationality, for in his earlier book he made it central:

At its core, rationality ... consists in doing (or believing) things because we have good reasons for doing so ... if we are going to determine whether a given action or belief is (or was) rational, we must ask whether there are (or were) sound reasons for it (Laudan, 1977, p. 123).<sup>7</sup>

If rationality is a function of good reasons, then instrumentalism cannot be the whole story about rationality, unless the only sort of good reason there can be is an instrumental reason. But we have no reason to think that instrumental reasons are the only sort of reasons there are. Indeed, on Laudan's own instrumentalist view he needs a non-instrumental species of reasons to establish instrumental efficacy:

... inquiry exemplifies the general notion of practical reason and practical action. The conduct of a given inquiry will be *rational* just insofar as we have *grounds* to believe that that inquiry process will be likely to realize our ends ... (Laudan, 1988, p. 349, second emphasis added).

What will such 'grounds' be like? They will not themselves be 'instrumentalities'; rather, they will be *evidence* — evidence that the inquiry process in question is indeed likely to allow us to realize our ends. Consider our earlier methodological rule concerning double-blind experimentation. What counts as grounds for thinking that inquiry conducted according to that rule will help us to realize our end (of establishing that tested drugs/therapies are (not) genuinely effective)? Grounds for this claim are constituted simply by empirical evidence that double-blind experimentation in fact eliminates a sort of experimental error not eliminated by other procedures of inquiry. The grounds in question are nothing but evidence that a proposition relating ends and means is true; that the sought-after relation indeed obtains. Thus to establish the instrumental efficacy of a methodological rule, we need, on Laudan's own account, non-instrumental evidence which provides good reason for thinking that an instrumental relation in fact holds between (acting in accordance with) that rule and some end of inquiry. Thus even on Laudan's own account it is not the case that the only sort of good reasons there are are instrumental ones, or that instrumental rationality is the only sort of rationality science or purposive action can have. In seeing this we see that we have good reason to

<sup>7</sup>As Laudan notes in the text surrounding this passage, the thesis that rationality involves good reasons is not itself a theory of rationality (although it is a constraint which such theories must satisfy); one must provide an account of the constitution of good reasons. Laudan tried to do this in his (1977); he has since repudiated that account, and in the work under discussion here offers an alternative account. I have been arguing that this new account fails; the irony here consists in the fact that Laudan's new account fails to recognize as a constraint on the theory of rationality that, as the cited passage states, such a theory must involve good reasons. If Laudan's earlier theory failed, at least it recognized this constraint. Thanks to Harold I. Brown for challenging correspondence concerning this point.