since in a double-blind study the researcher does not know whether a subject is receiving the drug/therapy under test or an inert control substance, and so has no relevant expectations to convey to the subject.

Laudan is of course correct that double-blind experiments are methodologically preferable to single-blind experiments. But it is not the fact that double-blind experimentation is more instrumentally efficacious than single-blind experimentation in achieving our goal (of finding out whether the drug/therapy really works) that justifies Q. If it were, then a change in goal could render Q *un*justified. Imagine that we know everything we now know about single- and double-blind methodology, the placebo effect, and so on, except that: (1) subject's expectations have a real but very small effect on experimental results, and (2) the cost of double-blind experimentation greatly exceeds the cost of single-blind experimentation, so that a dogged insistence on double-blind methodology would predictively have the effect of failing to establish (by way of single-blind methodology) the efficacy of large numbers of experimental drugs/therapies. Imagine, that is, that the research community has a choice: (a) utilize double-blind experimental procedures, which control for a real but very small error resulting from the transmission of researcher expectations to subjects, at the cost of significantly restricting the number of drugs/therapies which can be tested; or (b) utilize single-blind procedures, which fail to control for real but small placebo errors, but which also allow for the testing of a much larger number of drugs/therapies. If the research community faced this choice, some members of the community might well reject Q for an alternative rule:

> *R:* If one wants to learn, to an acceptable degree of approximation, whether a drug or therapy is genuinely effective, and one wants to learn this of the largest number of drugs/therapies one can, prefer single-blind to double-blind experiments.

If the research community was genuinely divided about the goals of its research as those goals are articulated in Q and R, then it would divide on the methodological question at issue here. Some would argue that Q is the methodological rule which should govern the community's research, since that rule is instrumentally efficacious with respect to the aims of research articulated by Q; others would argue that R is the rule which the community should embrace, because that rule is instrumentally efficacious with respect to the aims of research articulated by R. *Ex Hypothesi,* both Q and R are instrumentally justified methodological rules, on Laudan's account of methodological rules as 'instrumentalities' which are justified by empirical considerations showing that the rules efficaciously relate methodological means and cognitive ends.

My point in constructing this example is not to show that Laudan's naturalizing of methodology has problems when confronted with methodological rules which are instrumentally efficacious with respect to alternative, incompatible aims. Laudan's treatment of axiology will be considered below.