Experiment-8

Full Web Application Penetration Test

Objective

To identify, exploit, and document web application vulnerabilities in the OWASP Juice Shop using OWASP ZAP.

Prerequisites

- Environment Setup:
- Install OWASP Juice Shop: Follow the official installation guide.
- Install OWASP ZAP: Download from OWASP ZAP website.
- Install supporting tools:
- Browser with OWASP ZAP plugin or proxy settings configured.
- Burp Suite (optional for additional validation).

2. System Requirements:

- o A system with Docker installed (for running Juice Shop).
- o Sufficient permissions to configure network settings for proxy.
- o At least 8GB RAM and 20GB storage recommended.

Step 1: Cloning the Juice Shop Repository

Heading:

Setting Up the Vulnerable Web Application **Brief Explanation**:

The first screenshot shows the GitHub repository of OWASP Juice Shop, an intentionally vulnerable web application used for security training. The subsequent screenshots document the process of cloning this repository to a local machine using the git clone command. This step is crucial as it downloads the application's source code, allowing for local deployment and testing.

Lab Observation:

- The repository contains multiple branches and tags, indicating various versions and fixes.
- The cloning process completes successfully, downloading approximately 246 MB of data.

Step 2: Installing Dependencies

Heading:

Resolving Dependencies for Juice

Shop **Brief Explanation**:

After cloning, the npm install command is executed to install the necessary dependencies for Juice Shop. The output shows numerous deprecated packages and security warnings, highlighting outdated or vulnerable components. This is intentional, as Juice Shop is designed to demonstrate security flaws.

Lab Observation:

 Multiple deprecated packages (e.g., inflight, fstream) are flagged, some with critical security issues.

 The warnings suggest the application includes outdated dependencies for educational purposes.

Step 3: Deploying Juice Shop via Docker

```
roote prajmatsuj-[/nome/prajwatsb/juice-snop]
docker run -d -p 3000:3000 bkimminich/juice-shop
Unable to find image 'bkimminich/juice-shop:latest' locally
latest: Pulling from bkimminich/juice-shop
3d78e577de35: Pull complete
bfb59b82a9b6: Pull complete
4eff9a62d888: Pull complete
a62778643d56: Pull complete
7c12895b777b: Pull complete
3214acf345c0: Pull complete
5664b15f108b: Pull complete
0bab15eea81d: Pull complete
4aa0ea1413d3: Pull complete
da7816fa955e: Pull complete
9aee425378d2: Pull complete
d00c3209d929: Pull complete
221438ca359c: Pull complete
ab0f6cad3051: Pull complete
6f971e93c4e2: Pull complete
c83c31ce41af: Pull complete
0cb5c07f8edd: Pull complete
3137de975d0a: Pull complete
b78a86c4c4b5: Pull complete
] 68.03MB/97.55MB
916a4ab8bcd7: Download complete
bc0e9837a40c: Pull complete
916a4ab8bcd7: Pull complete
Digest: sha256:db5bacffb67d4baba08df1d7cf79aa57402eddfe526da37cdf0620a4131e82ca
Status: Downloaded newer image for bkimminich/juice-shop:latest
a1990c28b9534afd4e1d68accf3fb3cf44c4b3e38f4037557eda4d65780c0a72
```


```
Processing triggers for kali-menu (2025.2.3) ...

(root@prajwalsb)-[/home/prajwalsb/juice-shop]

| sudo systemctl enable docker --now

Synchronizing state of docker.service with SysV service script with /usr/lib/systemd/systemd-sysv-install.

Executing: /usr/lib/systemd/systemd-sysv-install enable docker
```



Heading: Containerized Deployment for Easy Access


Brief Explanation:

Instead of running Juice Shop locally, Docker is used to deploy it as a container. The command docker run -d -p 3000:3000 bkimminich/juice-shop pulls the pre-built image and starts the application on port 3000. This method simplifies setup and ensures consistency.

Lab Observation:

- The Docker image is downloaded successfully, and the container starts without errors.
- Accessing http://localhost:3000 confirms the application is running, displaying a mock ecommerce interface.

Step 4: Installing and Configuring ZAP Proxy



```
(root@ prajwalsb)-[/home/prajwalsb/Downloads]
# chmod +x ZAP_2_16_1_unix.sh

(root@ prajwalsb)-[/home/prajwalsb/Downloads]
ZAP_2_16_1_unix.sh

(root@ prajwalsb)-[/home/prajwalsb/Downloads]
# []
```

```
(root@prajwalsk)-[/home/prajwalsb/Downloads]

# /opt/zaproxy/zap.sh
Found Java version 21.0.7
Available memory: 4652 MB
Using JVM args: -Xmx1163m

1131 [main] INFO org.parosproxy.paros.Constant - Copying default configuration to /root/.ZAP/config.xml

1444 [main] INFO org.parosproxy.paros.Constant - Creating directory /root/.ZAP/dirbuster

1458 [main] INFO org.parosproxy.paros.Constant - Creating directory /root/.ZAP/dirbuster

1458 [main] INFO org.parosproxy.paros.Constant - Creating directory /root/.ZAP/fuzzers

1458 [main] INFO org.parosproxy.paros.Constant - Creating directory /root/.ZAP/fuzzers


1458 [main] INFO org.parosproxy.paros.Constant - Creating directory /root/.ZAP/plugin

1655 [main] WARN org.zaproxy.zap.ZapBootstrap - ZAP is being run using the root user - this is NOT recommended!

1740 [main] INFO org.zaproxy.zap.GuiBootstrap - ZAP 2.16.1 started 18/05/2025, 19:50:14 with home: /root/.ZAP/ cores:

1 maxMemory: 1 GB

1869 [AWT-EventQueue-0] WARN org.zaproxy.zap.GuiBootstrap - Failed to set awt app class name: Unable to make field pr ivate static java.lang.String sun.awt.X11.XToolkit.awtAppClassName accessible: module java.desktop does not "opens sun.awt.X11" to unnamed module @2f490758
```




Heading: Preparing the Penetration Testing Tool **Brief Explanation:**

OWASP ZAP (Zed Attack Proxy) is downloaded and installed to perform security testing on Juice Shop. The installer is executed, and ZAP is configured to proxy traffic through 127.0.0.1:8888. This setup allows ZAP to intercept and analyze HTTP/HTTPS requests.

Lab Observation:

- ZAP 2.16.1 is installed on a Linux system.
- Proxy settings are configured manually to ensure traffic routing through ZAP.

Step 5: Initiating an Automated Scan



Launching a Vulnerability Scan

Brief Explanation:

ZAP's "Automated Scan" feature is used to test Juice Shop. The target URL (http://localhost:3000) is entered, and the scan begins, spidering the application to identify vulnerabilities. The progress is monitored in real-time.

Lab Observation:

- The scan discovers multiple URLs and nodes, though some are flagged as "Out of Scope" (e.g., external links).
- Initial results show low-severity alerts, but further analysis may reveal more critical issues.

Step 6: Manual Exploration Setup




Observation:

- OWASP ZAP is configured to intercept traffic from http://localhost:3000.
- The HUD (Heads Up Display) is enabled for real-time feedback.
- Firefox is used as the browser configured with ZAP as a proxy.

Purpose:

 Initial setup to enable interception and monitoring of all interactions with the vulnerable Juice Shop application.

Step 7: Product Listing Page




- Displays product cards like Apple Juice, Banana Juice, and more.
- Includes a cookie tracking consent message.
- Shows the application's default UI without any attacks.

Purpose:

 To establish a baseline of normal application behavior before testing vulnerabilities.

Step 8: Search Functionality Test



- Searching for the keyword "admin" returns no visible results.
- Suggests possible hidden functionality or protection of admin features.

Purpose:

 Basic functionality test, possibly leading to enumeration attempts or privilege escalation testing.

Step 9: WebSocket Traffic Analysis




Observation:

- ZAP logs WebSocket messages with TEXT opcodes and timestamps.
- One message references a path like /images/admin.

Purpose:

 Inspect real-time communication for hidden endpoints or sensitive data being exchanged via WebSockets.

Step 10: XSS Payload Delivery




- JavaScript payload <script>alert('XSS')</script> is sent via WebSocket message.
- The message uses a TEXT opcode, indicating usersupplied input is being transmitted.

Purpose:

 Attempt to execute a stored or reflected XSS attack by injecting scripts into vulnerable input fields.

Step 11: Successful XSS Execution




 A popup alert box displays "XSS", confirming the JavaScript payload was executed.

Purpose:

 Verify the XSS vulnerability and prove that script injection is possible, completing the related security challenge.

Step 12: SQL Injection Attack




Observation:

- SQL Injection payload 'OR '1'='1' -- is injected into the login form's email field.
- The password field is filled with irrelevant data to bypass checks.

Purpose:

• Exploit authentication logic flaw to bypass login restrictions and gain unauthorized access.

Step 13: Successful Admin Login




Observation:

- Application displays a message indicating that the "Login Admin" challenge was completed.
- Product listing page is visible post-login.

Purpose:

 Confirm that the SQL injection was successful and admin-level access was achieved.

Step 14: Initial Login Request



Request:

POST /rest/user/login HTTP/1.1

Host: localhost:3000

Content-Type: application/json

Payload:

["email":"tgt","] // malformed JSON

Observation:

- This malformed request is likely a test input to observe how the login endpoint handles broken JSON syntax.
- The application may log an error or return a 400 Bad Request, depending on its backend validation logic.

Purpose:

 To test the robustness of the backend login handler against invalid inputs, and potentially trigger verbose errors or identify parsing vulnerabilities.

Step 15: Successful Admin Login Response

Response:

HTTP/1.1 200 OK

{"user":{"id":1,"email":"admin@juice-sh.op","profileImage":"defaultAdmin.png"}}

Observation:

- This response confirms a successful login for the admin user.
- Response headers include security-related configurations:


o X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN o X-Content-Type-Options:


nosniff o Content- Security-Policy (possibly present)

Purpose:

 This step confirms that admin credentials were accepted and a session was successfully established.

Step 16: Fuzzing Setup





Configuration:

· Wordlist: admin, password, anything

• Threads: 8

• Delay: 0ms

• Strategy: **Depth First**

Target: POST /rest/user/login


Observation:

- ZAP or another fuzzing tool is configured to test multiple login payloads using a basic wordlist.
- Fast threading and depth-first logic prioritize exploring deep inputs quickly.

Purpose:

 To brute-force or test login credentials and analyze how the server responds to different user/password combinations.

Step 17: Fuzzing Execution and Output



Results:

- Base Request: 401 Unauthorized (expected for invalid credentials).
- Fuzzed Results:
 - Some requests return 500 Internal Server Error, possibly due to malformed inputs or unhandled exceptions.
 - \circ $\,$ No response with 200 OK, indicating that no login succeeded during fuzzing.

Purpose:

- To check if any known or common credentials can bypass authentication.
- Errors (500) might hint at poor input sanitization or exploitable bugs.

Vulnerability Findings Table

| Vulnerability | Description | Affected Endpoint | Severity | Proof of Exploit | Recommendation |
|-------------------------------|---|--|----------|--|---|
| Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) | Reflected XSS in search input field | /search?q= <payload ></payload | High | Images in Steps 10 and 11 | Implement strict input validation and output encoding |
| SQL Injection | Login form is susceptible to SQL injection | /login | Critical | Images in Steps 12,13,1 4 and 15 | Use parameterized queries to prevent SQL injection |
| Broken Authentication | Weak password policy allows brute-force attacks | /login | High | Images in Steps 16 and 17 | Enforce strong password policies and implement rate limiting |

Impact Analysis and Mitigation

1. Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)

Impact:

- Allows attackers to inject malicious JavaScript into input fields (e.g., comment box, search bar).
- Enables session hijacking, phishing, redirection to malicious websites, and UI defacement.
- Compromises confidentiality and integrity of user sessions.

Mitigation:

- Perform strict input validation and sanitization on all user-supplied data.
- Use context-aware output encoding (e.g., HTML, JavaScript, URL).
- Implement browser security headers like **Content Security Policy (CSP)** to limit script execution.

2. SQL Injection (SQLi)

Impact:

- Lets attackers manipulate SQL queries to bypass authentication or retrieve unauthorized data.
- Can result in full compromise of the backend database.
- High risk when affecting login pages, search inputs, or forms interacting with the DB.

Mitigation:

- Use parameterized queries (prepared statements).
- Apply rigorous input validation and sanitization mechanisms.
- Ensure the database user has the **least-privilege** required for the application's function.

3. Broken Authentication

Impact:

- Weak password policies and lack of brute-force protection enable unauthorized login attempts.
- Can lead to full account takeover (including admin access).
- Increases risk of sensitive data leakage and system compromise.

Mitigation:

- Enforce strong password rules (minimum length, complexity, and expiration).
- Implement CAPTCHA, account lockout, and rate limiting.
- Enable Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA).
- Monitor login attempts and generate alerts for suspicious behavior.

4. Insecure Direct Object References (IDOR)

Impact:

- Users may access other users' data or perform unauthorized actions by tampering with URL parameters.
- Results in exposure of private or business-sensitive information.

Mitigation:

- Always validate user access permissions on the server side.
- Avoid exposing sequential or predictable object identifiers.

| • Us | e indirect object re | ferences like III | (I IDs or access | tokens with pro | mer validation | |
|---------|--------------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------------|------------------|----------------|--|
| • Osi | . maneet object re | referees fixe ov | OIDS OF access | tokens with pro | per vanuation. | |
| Result: | | | | | | |
| | AP detected multiprences. Findings w | | | SS, SQLi, and in | nsecure direct | |
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