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The contributions and impact of Professor William H. Riker*

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Abstract. This paper demonstrates the significant and extensive impact of W.H. Riker's works on the study of political science and public choice. We provide a citation analysis, peer reviews, and commentaries from former colleagues and students. The citation analysis shows that Riker's work has been cited more than 3700 times by over 2000 different scholars in more than 500 different journals. Peers, former colleagues and students highly respected him as a scholar and a person. Riker's most significant intellectual contributions include using game theory to analyze political behavior and incorporating rational interest theory as a basis for the scientific study of politics.

1. Introduction

The 40th anniversary of *The Theory of Political Coalitions* provides an excellent opportunity to join several other scholars (Amadae and Bueno de Mesquita, 1999; Bueno de Mesquita and Shepsle, 2001; Mackie, 2001; McLean, 2002; Aldrich, 2002) who have recently reflected, generally positively and with great admiration, on the life and scholarship of William H. Riker.¹

Riker's accomplishments were many, and his scientific approach to the study of political science was truly pioneering, helping to establish an entirely new approach to understanding individual and institutional behavior in politics. His scholarship and his institution building at the University of Rochester provided much of the foundation for what is now known as the "Rochester School" (Amadae and Bueno de Mesquita, 1999). He was a founding member and early president of the Public Choice Society, helping to establish a cross-disciplinary dialogue on rational choice theory. Through all this and particularly through his influence on several generations of top-flight scholars, Riker has left an indelible personal and professional mark on the field and on those who knew him.

* We wish to thank John Boyd for his invaluable help in securing the data needed for this paper. John Aldrich, Iain McLean, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Ken Shepsle, Gordon Tullock and Bernie Grofman read versions of the paper and provided support and encouragement throughout the process.

Riker (1962) described himself as belonging to a group that has been “eager to create specifically political theories of behavior to serve as a base for a future political science.” In what follows, we focus on the importance of Riker’s work in positive political theory and on how his personal style and professional contributions served this goal. In Section 2, we perform a citation analysis of Riker’s most important books and articles. In Section 3, we establish his personal and scholarly connections to the economic analysis of political behavior, a joint sub-field of economics and political science that has come to be known as public choice. In Section 4, we review his most influential works, and provide peer discussions and assessments of his methodologies, his philosophical approach, and the nature and impact of his scholarship. In Section 5, using information gathered from correspondence with former students, co-workers and friends, we provide personal insights into a life that combined the highest levels of scholarship with great personal warmth, deep human compassion, and a level of humility not always found in people who accomplish great things. Section 6 summarizes what we have done here and provides a few concluding remarks.

2. Citation analysis

Citation analysis, while not without its limitations (Quandt, 1976), is a widely used method of ranking journals and academic departments and of evaluating the contributions of highly influential scholars to a particular discipline.² Citation counts presented here focus on the work of William H. Riker and clearly demonstrate that his impact on political science and public choice has been profound.

With over 600 citations, *The Theory of Political Coalitions* is Riker’s most influential work to date but, as Table 1 demonstrates, he was responsible for many other important contributions in political theory.³ Five of his books and four of his articles have been cited more than 100 times and most of his important papers were published in the top journals in political science, including *American Political Science Review*, *Comparative Politics*, and *Public Choice*.

From the beginnings of his professional working life in the mid nineteen fifties until his death in 1992, Riker had a strong desire to understand the fundamental processes at work in politics and to impart this understanding to other scholars. This desire resulted in a body of work that forms the bedrock of the rational interest school of political theory. Several books and papers within that body of work have been so widely read and influential that they deserve to be called “classic” (Durden and Millsaps, 1986). According to

Table 1. Citations to the works of William H. Riker, from 1972 through 2001

Year published	Article or book name	Total citations	Citations per year
1955	The senate and American federalism. <i>American Political Science Review</i> 49: 452–459.	24	<1
1958	The paradox of voting and congressional rules for voting on amendments. <i>American Political Science Review</i> 52: 349–366.	59	1.5
1961	Voting and the summation of preferences. <i>American Political Science Review</i> 55: 900–911.	59	1.5
1962	<i>The theory of political coalitions</i> . New Haven: Yale University Press	664	17.5
1964	<i>Federalism: Origin, operation and maintenance</i> . Boston: Little, Brown.	219	6.0
1965	Arrow's theorem and some examples of the paradox of voting. <i>Mathematical applications in political science</i> , I, John M. Church, Edition (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press), 41–60.	16	< 1
1965	A new proof of the size principle. <i>Mathematical applications in political science</i> , II, Joseph L. Bernd, Editor (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press), 167–174.	15	<1
1967	Bargaining in three person games. <i>American Political Science Review</i> 61: 342–356.	37	1.0
1968	A theory of the calculus of voting. <i>American Political Science Review</i> 62: 25–42.	372	11.3
1969	Six books in search of a subject: Or does federalism exist and does it matter. <i>Comparative Politics</i> 2: 135–146.	14	<1
1970	Rational behavior in politics, with William Zavonia. <i>American Political Science Review</i> 64: 48–60.	24	1.0
1972	Models of coalition formation in voting bodies, with Steven J. Brams. <i>Mathematical application in political science</i> , J.F. Herndon and J.L. Bernd (Charlottesville, VA: University Press of Virginia) 79–111.	11	<1
1973	The paradox of vote trading, with Steven Brams. <i>American Political Science Review</i> 67: 1235–1247.	10	<1
1973	<i>Introduction to positive political theory</i> , with Peter Ordeshook. New York: Prentice-Hall.	569	21.0
1974	The nature of trust. <i>Perspectives on social power</i> . James Tadeshi, Editor. Chicago: Aldine.	12	<1
1974	Federalism: A bibliographic survey. Nelson Polsby and Fred Greenstein, Editors. <i>A handbook of political science</i> , (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley), 93–172.	16	<1

Table 1. Continued.

Year published	Article or book name	Total citations	Citations per year
1976	The number of political parties. <i>Comparative Politics</i> , October: 93–106.	30	1.3
1977	The future of a science of politics. <i>American Behavioral Scientist</i> 21: 11–38.	13	<1
1977	Politics, economics and real estate markets: Municipal zoning under scrutiny, with Steven Maser and Richard Rosette. <i>State and Local Government Review</i> 9: 7–22.	39	1.7
1980	Implications from the disequilibrium of majority rule for the study of institutions. <i>American Political Science Review</i> 74: 432–446.	199	10.0
1982,88	<i>Liberalism against populism: A confrontation between the theory of democracy and the theory of social choice</i> . San Francisco: W.H. Freeman and Company, and Chicago: Waveland Press.	502	27.9
1982	The two-party system and Duverger's law. <i>American Political Science Review</i> 76: 753–766.	141	7.8
1982	A political theory of regulation with some observations on railway abandonments, with Richard Barke. <i>Public Choice</i> 39: 73–106.	13	<1
1982	An assessment of the merits of selective nuclear proliferation, with Bruce Bueno de Mesquita. <i>Journal of Conflict Resolution</i> 26: 283–306.	30	1.9
1983	Political theory and the art of heresthetics. <i>Political science: The state of the discipline</i> , Ada W. Finifter, Editor. (Washington: American Political Science Association), 47–67.	201	11.2
1985	Farquarson and Fenno: Sophisticated voting and home style, with Arthur Denzau and Kenneth Shepsle. <i>American Political Science Review</i> 79: 1117–1134.	47	3.1
1986	<i>The art of political manipulation</i> . New Haven: Yale University Press.	170	12.2
1987	Asymmetric information and the coherence of legislation, with David Austen-Smith. <i>American Political Science Review</i> 81: 897–918.	36	2.7
1987	<i>The development of American federalism</i> . Boston: Kluwer.	18	1.4
1987	The lessons of 1787. <i>Public Choice</i> 55: 5–34.	10	<1

Table 1. Continued.

Year published	Article or book name	Total citations	Citations per year
1988	Constitutional regulation of legislative choice. <i>Virginia Law Review</i> 74: 373–401.	52	4.3
1989	The strategy of ratification. <i>The Federalist Papers and the New Institutionalism</i> . (New York: Agathon Press), 220–256.	14	1.3
1990	Political science and rational choice. <i>Perspectives on positive political economy</i> , James Alt and Kenneth Shepsle, Editors. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.	13	1.3

the criteria developed in Durden and Ellis (1993), “A Theory of the Calculus of Voting” (1968), *Introduction to Positive Political Theory* (1973), and *Liberalism Against Populism* (1982a) are all classics. *The Theory of Political Coalitions* (1962) qualifies for status as a “super classic” (Durden and Ellis, 1993). Riker’s highly cited works include *Federalism: Origin, Operation, and Maintenance* (1964), “Implications form the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions” (1980), “The Two-Party System and Duverger’s Law” (1982b), “Political Theory and the Art of Heresthetics” (1983), and *The Art of Political Manipulation* (1986).

The breadth and depth of Riker’s scholarly impact are summarized in Tables 2 and 3. Table 2 shows total citations and lists those journals that have cited his work four or more times. Over 3700 citations have appeared in more than 400 journals. In excess of 100 citations have appeared in five journals which, one could argue, form the essential core of scholarship in political science: *American Journal of Political Science*, *American Political Science Review*, *Journal of Politics*, *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, and *Public Choice*. Table 3 lists over 200 authors citing Riker’s work five or more times. Twenty-one authors cite him at least twenty times and over 1800 more scholars authored or coauthored papers that cited his work at least once.

3. The public choice connection

Riker was trained in political science, but many of his most important contributions are consistent with the sub-field in economics that has come to be called public choice. “Public Choice deals with the intersection between eco-

Table 2. Journals citing Riker publications four or more times (1972–2001)

Journal name	Total citations
Accounting Review	4
Academy of Management Review	6
American Behavioral Scientist	24
American Economic Review	13
American Journal of Political Science	191
American Political Science Review	272
American Politics Quarterly	29
American Sociological Review	12
Annals of The American Academy of Political and Social Science	6
Annual Review of Political Science	36
Annual Review of Sociology	6
Archives Européennes de Sociologie	4
Australian Journal of Political Science	17
Behavioral Science	39
British Journal of Political Science	88
Cahiers Vilfredo Pareto	6
California Law Review	9
Canadian Journal of Economics	6
Canadian Journal of Political Science	42
Cato Journal	18
Columbia Law Review	20
Comparative Political Studies	77
Comparative Politics	30
Conflict Management and Peace Science	9
Congress & The Presidency – A Journal of Capital Studies	4
Cornell Law Review	17
Critical Review	8
Dados – Revista De Ciencias Sociais	15
Daedalus, 1981	8
Desarrollo Economico – Revista De Ciencias Sociales	8
Duke Law Journal	14
Econometrica	5
Economic Inquiry	5
Economics and Philosophy	4
Educational Administration Quarterly	7
Electoral Studies	42
Environmental and Planning A	8

Table 2. Continued

Journal name	Total citations
Environment and Planning C – Government and Policy	14
Ethics	14
European Economic Review	4
European Journal of Operational Research	4
European Journal of Political Research	56
European Journal of Social Psychology	4
Fordham Law Review	7
Games and Economic Behavior	7
George Washington Law Review	4
Georgetown Law Journal	14
Governance – An International Journal of Policy and Administration	10
Government and Opposition	4
Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy	8
Harvard Law Review	11
History of Political Economy	13
Indiana Law Journal	7
International Interactions	10
International Organization	24
International Political Science Review	18
International Social Science Journal	8
International Studies Quarterly	35
Iowa Law Review	7
Issues & Studies	10
Journal of Accounting Research	4
Journal of Common Market Studies	5
Journal of Commonwealth & Comparative Politics	7
Journal of Conflict Resolution	59
Journal of Economic History	6
Journal of Economic Literature	18
Journal of Economic Theory	12
Journal of Health Politics Policy and Law	6
Journal of Humanistic Psychology	4
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics – Zeitschrift für die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft	14
Journal of Labor Research	7
Journal of Law & Economics	8
Journal of Law Economics & Organization	10

Table 2. Continued

Journal name	Total citations
Journal of Mathematical Sociology	18
Journal of Peace Research	13
Journal of Policy Analysis and Management	5
Journal of Political Economy	12
Journal of Politics	128
Journal of Public Economics	11
Journal of Theoretical Politics	57
Kölner Zeitschrift Für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie	11
Kyklos	18
Law & Society Review	7
Law and Contemporary Problems	4
Legislative Studies Quarterly	148
Management Science	8
Mathematical Social Sciences	15
Michigan Law Review	15
Monograph Series in World Affairs University of Denver	6
New York University Law Review	13
Northwestern University Law Review	9
Orbis – A Journal of World Affairs	4
Österreichische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft	12
Parliamentary Affairs	6
Party Politics	10
Policy and Politics	5
Policy Sciences	12
Policy Studies Journal	14
Political Behavior	8
Political Geography Quarterly	5
Political Psychology	20
Political Research Quarterly	23
Political Science	10
Political Science Quarterly	6
Political Studies	41
Political Theory	9
Politics & Society	18
Politische Vierteljahresschrift	17
Polity	23

Table 2. Continued

Journal name	Total citations
Post-Soviet Affairs	5
Political Science & Politics	29
Psychological Bulletin	6
Psychological Review	5
Public Administration Review	21
Public Choice	304
Public Finance Quarterly	7
Public Finance-Finances Publiques	4
Public Opinion Quarterly	6
Publius – The Journal of Federalism	67
Quality & Quantity	13
Quarterly Journal of Economics	6
Rationality and Society	13
Review of Economic Studies	4
Review of Politics	7
Revue Française de Science Politique	4
Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica	9
Sage Professional Paper in International Studies Series	13
Scandinavian Political Studies	15
Social Choice and Welfare	43
Social Forces	9
Social Philosophy & Policy	12
Social Research	5
Social Science Computer Review	4
Social Science History	6
Social Science Information	8
Social Science Journal	12
Social Science Quarterly	15
Sociological Inquiry	4
Southern California Law Review	8
Stanford Law Review	11
Studies in American Political Development	7
Studies in Comparative International Development	5
Teaching Political Science	12
Texas Law Review	18
Theory and Decision	33
Theory and Society	5

Table 2. Continued

Journal name	Total citations
Tidsskrift for Samfunnsforskning	11
Ucla Law Review	7
University of Chicago Law Review	10
University of Illinois Law Review	4
University of Pennsylvania Law Review	20
Urban Affairs Quarterly	7
Urban Affairs Review	4
Urban Lawyer	4
Vanderbilt Law Review	15
Virginia Law Review	28
Western Political Quarterly	35
Yale Law Journal	61
Zeitschrift für Soziologie	15
Sub-total	3299
All other Journals (304 in number)	488
Total	3787

nomics and political science,” (quoting from the definition of public choice, inside back cover, *Public Choice*), and much of Riker’s work deals with understanding and illuminating this “intersection.”

Public choice theory generally begins with the assumption that political behavior and political processes can be scientifically analyzed using the rational choice model. (As we shall discuss later, Riker considered the contemporary approach too narrowly focused.) The early works of Downs (1957), Black (1948), Buchanan and Tullock (1962), Olson (1965), Niskanen (1971) and others are based on the assumption that political actions are similar to those observed in private exchanges in that they proceed from a conscious or unconscious calculation of costs and benefits. Voters, legislators, and bureaucrats all respond in predictable ways to the incentives present in a democratic representative system. Given this, Riker and his like-minded contemporaries proposed that politics be analyzed as a *science* of human behavior, which was at that time a rather dramatic departure from the prevailing approach.⁴ Among the more fundamental contributions of Riker and his co-

Table 3. List of authors who cited Riker's work at least five times

Author	Citations	Author	Citations
Abramson, P.R.	8	Fiorina, M.P.	21
Aldrich, J.H.	21	Fishburn, P.C.	21
Almond, G.A.	6	Franklin, M.N.	5
Amadae, S.M.	10	Freundreis, J.P.	6
Anderson, C.J.	5	Frey, B.S.	12
Aranson, P.H.	30	Frickey, P.P.	7
Arcelus, F.	5	Friedman, B.	6
Astorino-Courtois, A.	7	Friend K.E.	5
Austen-Smith, D.	25	Frohlich, N.	5
Ball, T.	5	Gardner, J.A.	5
Banks, J.S.	8	Gehrlein, W.V.	8
Baron, D.P.	12	Gellhorn, E.	6
Barry, B.	7	Gillette, C.P.	6
Baungartner, F.R.	9	Glazer, A.	5
Bawn, K.	6	Gleiber, D.W.	6
Blais, A.	10	Goodin, R.E.	7
Bowler, S.	7	Grofman, B.	64
Bowman V.I.	9	Hall, M.G.	7
Boyes, W.J.		7 Hamm, K.E.	5
Brace, P.	9	Hasen, R. L.	5
Brady, H.E.	8	Hathaway, O.A.	5
Brams, S.J.	18	Hinckley, B.	5
Browne W.P.	15	Hinich, M.	10
Brunk G.G.	6	Holcombe, R.G.	7
Buckley, J.J.	5	Hovenkamp, H.	5
Budge, I.	6	Hsieh, J.F.S.	5
Burstein P.	10	Issacharoff, S.	8
Cain, B.E.	6	Jackman, R.W.	5
Calvert, R.L.	8	Jackman, S.	5
Cass, R.A.	7	James, P.	7
Chamberlin, J.R.	17	Jenkins, J.A.	5
Cioffirevilla, C.	9	Johnston, R.	6
Clark, T.N.	6	Jones, M.P.	5
Cloutier, E.	5	Jones, B.D.	8
Cohen, J.L.	13	Kahan, J.P.	10
Collie, M.P.	19	Kanazawa, S.	5
Colomer, J.M.	15	Kim, H.M.	6
Conybeare, J.A.C.	5	Kirchgassner, G.	5
Cook, W.D.	6	Kitschelt, H.	6

Table 3. Continued

Author	Citations	Author	Citations
Coombs, J.H.	10	Koehler, D.H.	9
Coughlin, P.	5	Koford, K.J.	7
Cox, G.W.	15	Kollman, K.	11
Crain, W.M.	6	Komorita, S.S.	5
Cross, F.B.	7	Kramer, L.D.	11
De Mesquita, B.B.	27	Krehbiel, K.	22
Demaio, G.	10	Kress, M.	5
Denzau, A.T.	8	Kushner, H.W.	11
Devins, N.	5	Laing, J.D.	8
Dobell, W.M.	9	Lau, R.R.	9
Doron, G.	6	Uver, M.	18
Douglas, J.	5	Lee, M.H.	7
Druckman, J.N.	5	Levesque, T.	5
Dryzek, J.S.	10	Levmore, S.	8
Dutter, L.E.	7	Lichbach, M.	6
Eavey, C.L.	5	Lijphart, A.	7
Elster, J.	5	Lusztig, M.	5
Eskridge, W.N.	11	Machover, M.	5
Esser, H.	6	Mackuen, M.B.	7
Eulau, H.	6	Maoz, Z.	10
Farber, D.A.	9	Maser, S.M.	5
Feddersen, T.I.	7	Mayer, L.S.	5
Feld, S.L.	29	McGinnis, M.D.	6
Felsenthal, D.S.	12	Mckelvey, R.D.	17
Ferejohn, J.A.	16	Mclean I.S.	23
Merrill, S.	12	Scheiber, H.N.	5
Miller, N.R.	20	Schinnar, A.P.	11
Miller, G.	12	Schneider, M.	8
Mitchell, W.C.	23	Schofield, N.	53
Mitra S.K.	7	Schwartz, T.	14
Moe, T.M.	13	Seliger, M.	5
Morrison, R.J.	6	Sened, I.	11
Morrow, J.D.	8	Shepsle, K.A.	40
Morton, R.B.	5	Simon, H.A.	6
Mueller, D.C.	19	Siverson, R.M.	5
Mueller, J.	5	Smith, R.M.	7
Muller, W.C.	8	Smith, R.A.	5
Munger, M.C.	9	Southwell, P.L.	5
Murnighan, J.K.	6	Stearns, M.L.	20

Table 3. Continued

Author	Citations	Author	Citations
Myerson, R.B.	10	Steiner, J.	6
Nagel, J.H.	7	Stepan, A.	12
Neto, O.A.	8	Strom, K.	16
Niemi, R.G.	8	Sunstein, C.R.	6
Niou, E.M.S.	17	Taagepera, R.	6
Nurmi, H.	23	Talbert, J.C.	9
Opp, K.D.	19	Teske, P.	8
Ordeshook, P.C.	46	Timpone, R.J.	5
Owen, G.	8	Tollison, R.D.	5
Palfrey, T.R.	8	Tsebelis, G.	10
Panning, W.H.	44	Uhlaner, C.J.	11
Paris, D.C.	6	Urken, A.B.	9
Pildes, R.H.	8	Uslaner, E.M.	6
Plott, C.R.	6	Vanroozendaal, P.	6
Pollak, R.A.	5	Verba, S.	5
Radcliff, B.	6	Weale, A.	8
Rapoport, A.	25	Weimer, D.L.	8
Rasch, B.E.	10	Weingast, B.R.	24
Reed, S.R.	7	Williams, J.T.	6
Riker, W.H.	69	Wilson, R.	8
Robinson, G.O.	8	Winer, M.D.	8
Rogers, J.G.	5	Wright, S.G.	6
Rohde, D.W.	9	Wright, J.R.	5
Rosenthal, H.	17	Wuffle, A.	5
Rubin, E.L.	8	Young, R.A.	5
Sager, T.	6	Young, O.R.	5
Santos, F.	5	Zartman, J.W.	5
Scaff, L.A.	5	Sub total	2161
Scharpf, F.W.	9	Others (1889 authors, 1626 cites)	
		Total	3787

authors is the expansion upon the rational choice theme with emphasis on game theory as the vehicle through which political choices can be understood and analyzed. It is important to note that Riker was among those who argued that public choice theory might become too narrow, and that it should employ a broader approach, one which fuses the better elements of economics and traditional political theory. His thoughts in that regard are presented in “The

Place of Political Science in Public Choice,” published in 1988 in *Public Choice*, which is a must read for anyone studying the interplay between economics and politics (whether one agrees with the author or not). In this paper, Riker suggests that much of the contemporary work in public choice has focused on the momentary exchange process as applied to politics, with the role of institutions subordinate or missing altogether: but exchanges take place in a much larger *institutional* context, and they have implications beyond the moment. For example, politicians and political parties are not just concerned with the voting (exchange) process for a current election cycle, but with the maintenance of power and influence over time. Riker proposes that, if the institutional context for political choices (over time) is not considered, then the sub-field of public choice is not needed at all or at best becomes greatly reduced in importance. He argues, with considerable conviction and compelling insight, that public choice analysis must be significantly different from standard economic analysis, and that the primacy of institutional study in political science provides the underpinnings for this necessary difference.

In his own words (Riker, 1988: 252):

Public choice is a combination of economics and political science for the practical study of public issues. Economics, which especially concerns events near to the ideal type of harmonious cooperation, emphasizes models of equilibria of tastes in which institutions are not crucially important. Political science, which concerns events near to the ideal type of exploitive cooperation, emphasizes, on the other hand, models of equilibria induced by institutions. This combination allows us to study both tastes and structures – both of which are important for understanding the real world of public decision.

Riker’s belief that politics and economics can and should be analyzed cooperatively is emphasized by his enthusiastic participation in the early life of the Public Choice Society. He regularly attended meetings and was placed “in charge” of the proceedings early on. In response to an e-mail inquiry Gordon Tullock had this to say:

I agree that Riker was an outstanding scholar and a well liked and respected man. I presume you have access to his correspondence so I will not try to duplicate that, but there’s one item which might not be anywhere in the files. At that year’s meeting site in the Blue Ridge mountains, when Riker was speaking, my next-door neighbor in the audience and I decided that he should be made chairman, As you know, the public choice society has little in the way of formality. When he finished his speech, I simply announced that he was chairman (authors: the equivalent of president of the society). He showed signs of surprise but made no objection and con-

tinued in that role for some time. He organized a well-financed meeting in New York (the next year) and, of course, continued his scholarly work.

Reference to Riker's work in articles that were published in *Public Choice* provides additional evidence of his influence. In excess of 300 citations appear there, more than in any other single journal, even the *American Journal of Political Science* (191 citations) and the *American Political Science Review* (272 citations). Further, a substantial number of first rate scholars who were influenced by Riker's thought (some of them former students and colleagues) have contributed regularly to *Public Choice* since the journal first began publication. Among these are political scientists Bernie Grofman (recent president of the Public Choice Society), John Aldrich, Peter Ordeshook, Ken Shepsle (co-editor of *Public Choice*, 1975–1980), David Austen-Smith, Barry Weingast and sociologist Scott Feld, among a great many others.

4. The profession on Riker

4.1. *Amadae and Bueno de Mesquita*

Evidence of the positive light in which Riker is viewed by other scholars is found in Amadae and Bueno de Mesquita's excellent article "The Rochester School: The Origins of Positive Political Theory" (1999). This paper provides insights on Riker's influences and early attempts at establishing a scientific approach to political science. Amadae and Bueno de Mesquita also describe Riker's institution building at the University of Rochester and the impact the Rochester School has had on political science.

Amadae and Bueno de Mesquita provide a thorough account of Riker's "theoretical synthesis." Frustrated with the case-study approach, Riker began looking for a new scientific foundation for the study of political science. The works of Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), Black (1948), Arrow (1963 [1951]), and Downs (1957) all "contributed to the brew of ideas that Riker fermented to produce positive political theory" (Amadae and Bueno de Mesquita, 1999: 273). Evidence that this "brew" produced a solid foundation for Riker's goal of taking political science in a new direction is seen in papers he wrote as early as the 1950s. These articles incorporated mathematically based (rational choice) behavioral theory, and some subjected theoretically determined relationships to empirical testing. However, as Amadae and Bueno de Mesquita note, at this point Riker was still groping in the dark for the light source that would illuminate positive politics, and his earliest works "did not yet put together the pieces that would later characterize positive political theory" (Amadae and Bueno de Mesquita, 1999: 275).

Table 4. Riker's publications

1951	<p>The National Labor Relations Board Field Examiner. University of Alabama Press.</p> <p>The firing of Pat Jackson. Published for the Interuniversity Case Program by the University of Alabama Press.</p> <p><i>The veterans' gas ration</i>. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press.</p>
1952	<p>The senate and American federalism. <i>American Political Science Review</i> 49: 452–459.</p>
1953	<p><i>Democracy in the United States</i>. New York: Macmillan.</p>
1954	<p>Sidney George Fisher and separation of powers during the Civil War. <i>Journal of the History of Ideas</i> 15: 397–412.</p>
1955	<p>The senate and American federalism. <i>American Political Science Review</i> 49: 452–459.</p>
1957	<p>Events and situations. <i>Journal of Philosophy</i> 54: 57–70.</p> <p>Dutch and American federalism. <i>Journal of the History of Ideas</i> 18: 276–290.</p> <p><i>Soldiers of the States</i>. Washington: Public Affairs Press.</p> <p>Disharmony in federal government, with Ronald Schaps. <i>Behavioral Science</i> 2: 276–290.</p>
1958	<p>The paradox of voting and congressional rules for voting on amendments. <i>American Political Science Review</i> 52: 349–366.</p> <p>Causes and events. <i>Journal of Philosophy</i> 56: 281–292.</p>
1959	<p><i>The study of local politics</i>. New York: Random House.</p> <p>A method for determining the significance of roll call in voting bodies. <i>Legislative behavior</i>, John Walke and H. Eulau, Editors. 337–383.</p> <p>A test of the adequacy of the power index. <i>Behavioral Science</i> 4: 120–131.</p>
1961	<p>Voting and the summation of preferences. <i>American Political Science Review</i> 55: 900–911.</p>
1962	<p>The federal bureaucracy. <i>American government: Structure problems policies</i>, Peter Odegard and Hans Baerwald, Editors. Evanston, Illinois – Elmsford, New York: Row, Peterson and Company.</p> <p>The stability of coalitions on roll calls in the House of Representatives, with Donal Niemi. <i>American Political Science Review</i> 56: 58–65.</p> <p><i>The theory of political coalitions</i>. New Haven: Yale University Press.</p>
1964	<p>Anonymity and rationality in the essential three-person game, with Richard G. Niemi. <i>Human Relations</i> 17: 121–141.</p> <p><i>Federalism: Origin, operation and maintenance</i>. Boston: Little, Brown.</p> <p>Some ambiguities in the notion of power. <i>American Political Science Review</i> 58: 341–349.</p>
1965	<p><i>Democracy in the United States</i>, 2nd edition. Revised. New York: Macmillan.</p> <p>Theory and science in the study of politics: A review. <i>Journal of Conflict Resolution</i> 9: 275–279.</p>

Table 4. Continued

	<p>Arrow's theorem and some examples of the paradox of voting. <i>Mathematical Applications in Political Science</i>, I, John M. Church, Editor. (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press), 41–60.</p> <p>A new proof of the size principle. <i>Mathematical applications in political science</i>, II, Joseph L. Bernd, Editor. (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press), 167–174.</p>
1967	Bargaining in three person games. <i>American Political Science Review</i> 61: 342–356.
1968	<p>Experimental verification of two theories about three-person games. <i>Mathematical applications in political science</i>, III, Joseph L. Bernd, Editor. (Charlottesville, VA: University Press of Virginia), 52–66.</p> <p>A theory of the calculus of voting. <i>American Political Science Review</i> 62: 25–42.</p>
	Weighted voting: A mathematical analysis for instrumental judgments, with L.S. Shapley. <i>Nomos X: Representation</i> , Roland Pennock and John Chapman, Editors. (New York: Atherton Press), 199–216.
1969	<p>Six books in search of a subject: Or does federalism exist and does it matter. <i>Comparative Politics</i> 2: 135–146.</p> <p>Presidential action in congressional nominations, with William Bast. <i>The Presidency</i>, Aaron Wildavsky, Editor. (Boston: Little Brown), 250–267.</p>
1970	Rational behavior in politics, with William Zavanon. <i>American Political Science Review</i> 64: 48–60.
1971	<p>Comment on Butterworth. <i>American Political Science Review</i> 65: 745–750.</p> <p>An experimental examination of formal and informal rules in a three-person game. <i>Social choice</i>, Bernhardt Lieberman, Editor. (New York: Gordon and Breach), 115–140.</p>
	Public safety as a public good. <i>Is law dead?</i> , Eugene V. Rostow, Editor. (New York: Simon and Schuster), 360–385.
1972	<p>Three-person coalitions in three-person games. <i>Mathematical applications in political science</i>, VI, J.F. Herndon and J.L. Bernd, Editors. (Charlottesville, VA: University Press of Virginia), 125–142.</p> <p>Models of coalition formation in voting bodies, with Steven J. Brams. <i>Mathematical applications in political science</i>, VI, J.F. Herndon and J.L. Bernd, Editors. (Charlottesville, VA: University Press of Virginia), 79–111.</p>
	Trust as an alternative to coercion. <i>Nomos XII: Coercion</i> , Roland Pennock, Editor. (New York: Atherton Press), 198–212.
1973	<p>Micropolitics and macroeconomics: Discussion. <i>American Economic Review</i> 63: 178–179.</p> <p>The paradox of vote trading, with Steven Brams. <i>American Political Science Review</i> 67: 1235–1247.</p> <p><i>Introduction to positive theory</i>, with Peter Ordeshook. New York: Prentice-Hall.</p>

Table 4. Continued

1974	<p>The nature of trust. <i>Perspectives on social power</i>, James Tadeshi, Editor. Chicago: Aldine.</p> <p>Federalism: A bibliographic survey. <i>A handbook of political science</i>, Nelson Polsby and Fred Greenstein, Editors. (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley), 93–172.</p>
1975	<p><i>The ideology of a time to choose, no time to confuse</i>. (San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies), 15–156.</p>
1976	<p>The choice of voting systems, with Richard Niemi. <i>Scientific American</i> 234: 21–27.</p> <p>The politics of economics. <i>The faltering US economy</i>, Robert Blattberg, Editor. (New York: New York University Press), 11–68.</p> <p>Comments on Ostrom. <i>Public Choice</i> Fall 1976: 13–15.</p> <p>The number of political parties. <i>Comparative Politics</i>, October: 93–106.</p>
1977	<p>Politics, economics and real estate markets: Municipal zoning under scrutiny, with Steven Maser and Richard Rosette. <i>State and local government review</i>, January 1977: 7–22.</p> <p>The effects of zoning and externalities on the price of land in Monroe, County, New York, with Steven Maser and Richard Rosett. <i>Journal of Law and Economics</i> 20: 11–132.</p> <p>The future of a science of politics. <i>American Behavioral Scientist</i> 2: 11–38.</p>
1978	<p>A confrontation between the theory of democracy and the theory of social choice. <i>The frontiers of human knowledge</i>. Uppsala: University of Uppsala.</p>
1979	<p>Is a ‘new and superior process’ really superior? <i>Journal of Political Economy</i> 87: 875–890.</p>
1980	<p>Implications from the disequilibrium of majority rule for the study of institutions. <i>American Political Science Review</i> 74: 432–446.</p> <p>Political trust as rational choice. <i>Politics as rational action</i>, Leif Lewin and Evert Vedun, Editors. (Dordrecht: D. Reidel), 1–24.</p>
1981	<p>Why Wollheim’s Paradox is not a paradox of democracy. <i>Toward a science of politics: Papers in honor of Duncan Black</i>, Gordon Tullock, Editor. (Blacksburg: Center for the Study of Public Choice), 107–126.</p> <p>A confrontation between the theory of social choice and the theory of democracy. <i>Social justice</i>, Ralph L. Braham, Editor. (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff), 95–120.</p>
1982,88	<p><i>Liberalism against populism: A confrontation between the theory of democracy and the theory of social choice</i>. San Francisco: W.H. Freeman and Company, and Chicago: Waveland Press.</p>
1982	<p>A political theory of regulation with some observations on railway abandonments, with Richard Barke. <i>Public Choice</i> 39: 73–106.</p> <p>The two-party system and Duverger’s law. <i>American Political Science Review</i> 76: 753–766.</p>

Table 4. Continued

1983	An assessment of the merits of selective nuclear proliferation, with Bruno Bueno de Mesquita. <i>Journal of Conflict Resolution</i> 26: 283–306.
	Democracy and representation: A reconciliation of <i>Ball v. James</i> and <i>Reynolds v. Sims</i> . <i>Supreme Court of Economic Review: 1980 term 1</i> : 39–68.
1984	Political theory and the art of heresthetics. <i>Political science: The state of the discipline</i> , Ada W. Finifter, Editor. (Washington: American Political Science Association), 47–67.
	The heresthetics of constitution making: The Presidency in 1787, with Comments on determinism and rational choice. <i>American Political Science Review</i> 78: 1–16.
1985	Electoral systems and constitutional restraints. <i>Choosing an electoral system</i> , Arend Lijphart and Bernard Grofhard, Editors. (New York: Praeger), 1: 103–112.
	Farquarson and Fenno: Sophisticated voting and home style, with Arthur Denzau and Kenneth Shepsle. <i>American Political Science Review</i> 79: 1117–1134.
1986	<i>The art of political manipulation</i> . New Haven: Yale University Press.
1987	Birth of a nation. <i>Reason</i> 18: 41–44.
1987	<i>The development of American federalism</i> . Boston: Kluwer.
	Asymmetric information and the coherence of legislation, with David Austen-Smith. <i>American Political Science Review</i> 81: 897–918.
1988	The lessons of 1787. <i>Public Choice</i> 55: 5–34.
	The place of political science in public choice. <i>Public Choice</i> 57: 247–257.
1989	Constitutional regulation of legislative choice. <i>Virginia Law Review</i> 74: 373–401.
	The strategy of ratification. <i>The Federalist Paper and the new institutionalism</i> . (New York: Agathon Press), 220–256.
1990	Plurality and runoff systems and numbers of candidates, with Stephen G. Wright. <i>Public Choice</i> 60: 155–175.
	Civil rights and property rights. <i>Liberty, property, and the future of constitutional development</i> , Ellen Frankel Paul and Howard Dickman, Editors. (Albany: State University of New York Press), 49–64.
1991	Political science and rational choice. <i>Perspectives on positive political economy</i> , James Alt and Kenneth Shepsle, Editors. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
	A theory of the origin of property rights, with Itai Sened. <i>American Journal of Political Science</i> 35: 951–969.
1992	Why negative campaigning is rational. <i>Studies in American Political Development</i> 5: 224–300.
	The justification of bicameralism. <i>International Political Science Review</i> 13: 101–116.

Table 4. Continued

	Applications of political theory in the study of politics: Introduction. <i>International Political Science Review</i> 13: 5–6.
1993	<i>Agenda formation</i> . Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
1996	<i>The strategy of rhetoric: Campaigning for the American Constitution</i> . Yale University Press.

The puzzle pieces finally fit in 1962, when Riker formalized his views on the nature and substance of positive political theory in *The Theory of Political Coalitions*. Riker (1962) stated that the purpose of this book was “to construct . . . a theory of coalitions,” providing an example “of the fact that it is or may be possible for political science to . . . join economics and psychology in the creation of genuine sciences of human behavior.” His pioneering use of game theory to explain political interactions insured *The Theory of Political Coalitions*’ place in the rational choice canon (over 600 citations), and “Riker not only exhorted the discipline to become more scientific but also showed how to do it.” (Amadae and Bueno de Mesquita, 1999: 277)

Throughout the 1960s and early 1970s, Riker devoted much of his time and energies to an institution-building effort that resulted in the development of what is still an excellent political science department at the University of Rochester. He transformed the graduate program by creating a new curriculum, one that features a comprehensive formal approach, marrying a rational interest-based model of political behavior with appropriate empirical analysis. He recruited new faculty and students, and as the program grew, so did its relative prestige among political science departments. According to Aldrich (2002), the department’s ranking went from unranked in the early 1960s to a top ten program by the 1970s. Early graduates received appointments at many prestigious institutions and went on to play a crucial role in transforming the study of politics. Near the end of this period of growth and consolidation, Riker, with Peter Ordeshook, now of Cal Tech, published *An Introduction to Positive Political Theory* (1972). This book answered the need for a text that could introduce and explain the rational choice approach to the study of political science. The work has been used not only as a teaching tool in many institutions, but also, over the years, as the basis for a great deal of scholarly production (to date, almost 600 citations).

During the next two decades, Riker explored the nature of democracy, structure induced equilibria, manipulation of political agendas, and “heresthetics.”⁵ No matter what the subject of debate, positive political theory formed the fundamental core of his explorations. Examples include: Riker’s (1982a) use of Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem to examine democratic theory;

Riker's (1980) setting political institutions in a positive political context; and Riker's (1986) examination of political strategy and strategic manipulation of the political environment.⁶

Besides their analysis of his scholarship and their assessment of its impact, Amadae and Bueno de Mesquita (1999: 292) also demonstrate that not everyone subscribes totally to Riker's view of how the study of politics should be conducted, in particular, his grounding of political behavior in the rational interest model. Specifically, first, "scholars disagree as to whether positive political theory's theoretical findings and empirical evidence provide meaningful insight into political phenomena." Second, "scholars disagree over the definition and legitimate practice of social science." Third, there is "fundamental disagreement as to whether the 'rational actor' model of human behavior is sufficient." Such considerations are the inevitable result of the substantial changes in political thought that are inherent within Riker's work and teaching, and they are certainly worthy of serious debate and analysis. However, in Riker's defense and in our opinion, posers of the first consideration need to explain exactly why plausible, empirically substantiated, rational interest political behavior models that are based on conscious or unconscious cost-benefit comparisons do not provide meaningful insights. With respect to the third consideration, and to some extent the second, our reading of Riker's work, (in particular, "The Place of Political Science in Public Choice," published in 1988 in *Public Choice*) suggests that he would agree. He seems to have viewed "rational actor" behavioral analysis as an element that could be completely understood only within an existing (but dynamic) set of institutions. He came, "Not to destroy Caesar but to praise him," to provide missing pieces to an incomplete puzzle. In the final analysis, whether eliciting praise or provoking disagreement and criticism, Riker's work is a testament to the "impact that a single person can have on an entire field."

4.2. Dennis Mueller

Mueller (1976) surveys the public choice literature and provides an interesting review of Riker's *Theory of Political Coalitions* (1962). Riker's model assumes that politics is a zero sum game where the gain to any individual or group is offset by the loss to some other individual or group. The result is that all single and multiparty systems converge to two coalitions of equal size. The applicability of the theory depends on whether one looks at collective choice "as a process for revealing preferences for public goods" or views politics as a "dynamic process of redefining issues and coalitions" (Mueller, 1976: 410). In the public goods case, according to Riker, since gains and losses equalize, the zero sum assumption implies that there are no net benefits to political actors. With a dynamic process, "majority rule may convert posit-

ive sum prisoners' dilemma games into zero sum games" (Mueller, 1976: 410). Therefore, in the dynamic setting Riker's analysis is more general and applicable to other issues and models.

4.3. *Bueno de Mesquita and Shepsle*

Bueno de Mesquita and Shepsle's (2001) biographical memorial of William Riker provides additional insights on Riker's efforts to establish a positive political theory and his later work on heresthetics. In *The Theory of Political Coalitions* (1962), Riker introduces the concept of minimal winning coalitions. Maximizing votes is uncertain and costly, since politicians must sacrifice the votes and support (i.e., campaign contributions) of opposing individuals and groups when they work for the interests of other individuals and groups. Rational politicians, then, will aim for just enough votes to win and no more. As the first political scientist to use game theory to explain political interactions, Riker's theory "drew a fundamental distinction between collective outcomes in economics and in politics" (Bueno de Mesquita and Shepsle, 2001: 10). The strategic interaction between players in political arenas results in "collective outcomes in politics (as) the product of conscious strategic processes," as compared to the individual exchange process hypothesized in the strictly economic model (Bueno de Mesquita and Shepsle, 2001: 10).

Bueno de Mesquita and Shepsle regard *Liberalism Against Populism* (1982a) as Riker's most seminal work. In this book, Riker proposes that the advantage of the democratic process is not that it necessarily provides the best public policy, but rather, that it provides measures "to throw the rascals out," if they stray from majority interests. What may politicians do to avoid being thrown out? To answer this question, Riker (1984) began to develop his ideas on heresthetics. In *The Art of Political Manipulation* (1986) he built a theory of how politicians strategically use their positions on various issues to maximize the probability of election or reelection. In the posthumously published *The Strategy of Rhetoric* (1996), Riker did not assume an exogenously given institutional structure within which politicians must operate: rather, he "drew attention to the significance of the proactive role of politicians in structuring the environment in which preferences are coordinated into a collective outcome" (Bueno de Mesquita and Shepsle, 2001: 15). Consistent with the parameters of strategic games, then, politicians will practice the science of heresthetics, which is manipulation of the political environment to accommodate their ultimate goals, survival and the accumulation and retention of political control and power.

4.4. *Scott Paine*

Paine (1989) examines the process by which dimensions can be set or changed, modifying Riker's model as it is outlined in *The Art of Political Manipulation* (1986). According to Riker, there are three types of heresthetical devices: strategic voting, agenda control, and manipulation of dimension. Riker draws a distinction between manipulation of dimension and persuasion, or rhetoric. Through rhetoric, a politician attempts to change an individual's beliefs; manipulation of dimension is the device used to convert beliefs into choices that produce outcomes that are desirable from the politician's point of view. Heresthetical maneuvers and manipulations do not involve persuasion (rhetoric). Manipulation of dimensions occurs before a collective decision is made and affects how one thinks about a decision. Paine gives the example of a news article attempting to influence the New York legislature's vote on raising the minimum drinking age. One of Riker's examples is Lincoln's question to Stephen Douglas on the slavery issue in the 1858 senatorial campaign in Illinois. According to Riker, once the manipulation is introduced it takes on a life of its own, increasing the chance of winning. Paine disagrees, stating that it is not manipulation but persuasion. It is changing someone's mind, not "forcing the victim into a decision with which he or she is inclined to disagree but nonetheless is trapped" (Paine, 1989: 48).

4.5. *Iain McLean*

McLean (2002) reviews Riker's later works, including *Liberalism Against Populism* (1982), *The Art of Political Manipulation* (1986) and *The Strategy of Rhetoric* (1996). Whether Riker's analysis is right or wrong, McLean believes the books to be interesting and worth reading. McLean describes Riker as "more interesting when he is wrong than most of us are when we are right."

McLean recounts Riker's invention of heresthetical in *Liberalism Against Populism* and *The Art of Political Manipulation*. In *Liberalism Against Populism*, Riker explains two normative theories: liberalism (elections as a referendum on incumbent office holders) and populism (elections as a choice among competing platforms) (Aldrich, 2002: 7). Here, he extends Arrow's theorem, showing that strategic voting is ineradicable and that the conditions for equilibrium are highly restrictive. In *Liberalism Against Populism* Riker employs the storytelling technique to explain and illustrate how politicians manipulate the dimensions of a given issue space. In *The Art of Political Manipulation*, he again uses stories to draw attention to the process of political manipulation. McLean asserts that Riker's work in these two books is ambitious and touches on "issues that are central to U.S. history and politics."

Riker returns to the topic of Federalism in *The Strategy of Rhetoric*. McLean (2002: 11) summarizes Riker's research question in this book as, "how on earth was a [U.S.] Constitution ratified?" McLean credits Riker for taking on such an important, yet largely neglected, issue. While some societies were successful in developing constitutional government, many others failed in their attempts. Riker concludes that, in this country, Federalist proponents of our Constitution needed both rhetoric and heresthetics to win enough votes for ratification.

McLean describes in detail the three primary criticisms of Riker's work. The first common criticism is based on the normative implications of Riker's model. Riker's work in *Liberalism Against Populism* reveals that democracy does not necessarily reflect the will of the people. Many outcomes are possible and, therefore, the will of the people does not exist. Unfortunately, social choice has yet to provide any one unique solution to the problem of multiple possible outcomes.

A second criticism of Riker's work is that it infers frequent cycling, where political decisions are impossible, but such cycles rarely occur. McLean (2002: 15) asks the question, "If the inference that Riker draws from the chaos theorems is correct, how do we almost never observe cycling in practice?"⁷ Several answers have been provided:

1. Equilibrium is structure-induced (Shepsle and Weingast, 1984, 1995).
2. Riker over interpreted the chaos results (McKelvey, 1976; Schofield, 1995; Saari, 1997).
3. Roll call analysis shows that opportunities for cycling are rare (Poole and Rosenthal, 1997; McLean and Bustani, 1999; Schonhardt-Bailey, 2000; Koford, 1991).
4. Riker picked stories that tended to support his case (Green and Shapiro, 1994; Mackie, 2001; Mackie, 2001).

The third question asked (p. 16) with respect to the validity of Riker's models and conclusions is "are all (or any) of [Riker's supporting] stories true?" For this question, McLean summarizes Mackie's (2001) paper in which he explores the nature of Riker's stories, and whether they are appropriately and objectively used. In this article, Mackie criticizes Riker for praising politicians he approves of and denigrating those he disapproves of. However, McLean disagrees with Mackie's comments and his conclusions, which are that Riker's methods invite skepticism, since all of the heroes in his stories employ heresthetics. In McLean's view, Riker "admires manipulators, whether or not he substantively approves of their aims" (p. 18).

Having described the criticisms of Riker's work, McLean (2002: 18) examines what he thinks Riker got right. Riker "was right to identify the big and surprising questions, and right that they were susceptible to formal analysis." What were the big and surprising outcomes, which followed from the big and surprising questions that Riker identified?

1. The US Constitution was ratified.
2. Both Houses of the U.K. Parliament passed Repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846.
3. Abraham Lincoln won the 1860 election.
4. The New Zealand Labor government dismantled corporatism and removed the privileges of organized labor.

In conclusion, McLean asks, "Does Riker help the analysis of these facts (outcomes)?" Yes, since investigation of the four surprising facts (outcomes) were driven by the Riker research agenda. For McLean, the Riker research program is alive and well, and the way that he poses and analyzes important questions may be applied to the political research of this or any era. McLean does believe, however, that Riker's approach should be broadened, with less attention devoted to the search for evidence of political cycling, and more attention focused on what causes some political outcomes to be unexpected. Summarizing, McLean (2002: 25) sees Riker's work as important because it explores and identifies "surprising outcomes" in politics and because it seeks "to identify the rhetorical and heresthetic devices..." that may be present in the political maneuvering that has led to the observed results. Riker's talent at using game theory and narrative history to explain the behavior of politicians makes him a hard act to follow.

4.6. *William C. Mitchell*

Mitchell (1988) compares the Virginia, Rochester, and Bloomington schools and provides further insights on the related contributions of William Riker. Mitchell views Riker's use of game theory in such works as *The Theory of Political Coalitions* not as rebellious, but as extending and illuminating political discourse. He credits Riker for wisely moving beyond the basic tenants of the 'behavioral' school and looking "outside political science for inspiration and substance" (Mitchell, 1988). Mitchell (1988) notes that Riker "routinely took political science to task for not being scientific" and spent much of his life trying to change this through his own work, through his associations with the Virginia and Bloomington schools and through his founding (with others) of the Rochester school of political inquiry. For example, Riker's work on vote trading provided an opportunity for the Virginia and Rochester schools

to interact, with exploration of the majority rule bias toward inefficiency as one case in point. Nor, according to Mitchell, does Riker's use of abstract models necessarily neglect normative concerns. For example, in support of such Virginia school scholars as James Buchanan, Riker (1980) supports fiscal reform at the constitutional level.

5. Riker's colleagues and former students

In their biographical memoir, Bueno de Mesquita and Shepsle (2001) wrote that Riker was "an astounding human being." To better understand Riker's contributions as a colleague and professor, the authors of the present study corresponded with several of his former colleagues, coauthors and individuals from the Rochester graduate program. Correspondents were asked to comment on Riker's importance as a scholar in political science and public choice and also on the impact he may have had on their personal and professional lives. Most responded enthusiastically, grateful to supply information on a man they admired and respected. The comments presented below are representative. When asked their opinion on Riker's major contributions to the study of political science, the common emphasis in all responses was on the importance of his role in helping to provide a framework for the scientific study of politics. Riker's use of game theory, in formal models of rational choice, is viewed by many as his greatest contribution to the body of work in political analysis. Among the institutions that have been influenced by Riker and the Rochester school (according to Bruce Bueno de Mesquita) are, "every political science department and many economics departments." Kenneth Shepsle, John Aldrich, and Larry Evans responded similarly, noting that Riker's work influenced, and continues to influence, all research and discourse in political science.

We asked Riker's former students and colleagues what he was like as a mentor, colleague, and/or friend, and the responses were overwhelming. Words like generous, kind, devoted, patient, and curious were used repeatedly. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita described him as "phenomenal" and possessing "a penetrating intellect and generosity of spirit." Former students wrote of his strong support and commitment to them, both personally and professionally. For example, John Aldrich wrote that Riker "really worried about and cared for" his students. Larry Evans described Riker as a professor who "went to the mat for his students, really got behind them early in their careers." Kenneth Shepsle kindly wrote, "I admire him for actively becoming a role model for so many young scholars. This is something I would most wish to emulate."

Perhaps the best measure of a person's life is how one is remembered by people who are in a position to truly know. John Wilkerson remembers William Riker as someone who was "larger than life" yet "humble enough to appreciate that the best ideas can come from the least likely places." When asked how Riker will best be remembered, other responses included:

As the father of modern political science . . . and for the graduate students that he inspired (Larry Evans)

A true visionary . . . and an inspiration (Barry Kay)

Kenneth Shepsle wrote that Riker

Will be remembered as a classically trained scholar who transformed himself into a social scientist, arrived at a vision for political science, and implemented it, all along remaining modest personally, emotionally committed to his students, and possessing a sometimes self-deprecating sense of humor.

6. Conclusion

In this work we attempt to shed light on William H. Riker's many contributions to political science and public choice, using citation analysis, peer reviews, and commentaries from former colleagues and students. The citation analysis illustrates that the influence of Riker's scholarship has been broad and deep, profoundly affecting several generations of scholars. His papers and books have been cited over 3700 times in more than 500 different journals and by more than 2000 different scholars. He was one of the founders of the Public Choice Society and early on served as its chairman (president). Riker's work has been cited extensively in *Public Choice*, with more citations in that journal than in any other. While not an exhaustive collection, the reviews of several political scientists provide both positive and critical assessments of Riker's books and articles. The summary of correspondence with his former colleagues and students serves as a tribute to Riker's tireless efforts as a scholar and educator.

Whether one is a fan or a critic of positive political theory, William H. Riker's influence on political science has been and continues to be profound. Perhaps the best summary comes from the authors' correspondence with Riker's friend and colleague Bruce Bueno de Mesquita. When asked how Riker will best be remembered, Bueno de Mesquita wrote the following: "He will be seen, I believe, as the founder of political *SCIENCE* and as one of the most extraordinary educators of our age."

Notes

1. Readers may also enjoy Kenneth Shepsle's 1979 interview with Riker for the American Political Science Association Oral History Project. A transcript of the interview is available from the University of Kentucky Libraries.
2. For examples in economics, see Liebowitz and Palmer (1984), Medoff (1989), Blaug and Sturges (1986), Laband (1986), Hirsch, Austin, Brooks, and Moore (1984), and Durden, Ellis, and Millsaps (1991).
3. Table 1 lists Riker's publications cited ten times or more. Riker's publications after 1990 are too new for citation counts to be useful. Table 4 provides a complete list of all publications.
4. At the time the study of political science was dominated by the case study method,
5. Aldrich (2002) describes Riker's term heresthetics as "manipulation of the strategic context to turn uncertain outcomes in one's favor."
6. Amadae and Bueno de Mesquita (1999) and Aldrich (2002) provide an excellent discussion of these three topics.
7. Tullock (1981) asks a similar question.

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