

# BIP 324


## Improving P2P Network Privacy

Presentation by

stratospher  
bitcoin core contributor

# Basic terms

node




# Basic terms


Decentralised  
development

<https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin>

# development process



# P2P Network




version

ping

getaddr

# 1. Self-revealing




## Network Message

Io.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
2...	6.8418...	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	56	15934 → 51428 [ACK] Seq=1 ACK=25 Win=408256 Len=0
2...	6.8418...	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	56	15934 → 51428 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=139 Win=408128 Len=0
2...	6.8422...	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	HTTP/JSON	267	HTTP/1.1 200 OK , JavaScript Object Notation (appli
2...	6.8423...	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	56	51395 → 20929 [ACK] Seq=10932 Ack=17705 Win=390592
2...	6.8439...	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	Bitcoin	191	version
2...	6.8439...	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	56	51428 → 15934 [ACK] Seq=139 Ack=136 Win=408128 Len=0
2...	6.8448...	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	Bitcoin	80	[unknown command]
2...	6.8448...	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	56	51428 → 15934 [ACK] Seq=139 Ack=160 Win=408128 Len=0
-----						
► Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 127.0.0.1, Dst: 127.0.0.1						
► Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 15934, Dst Port: 51428						
▼ Bitcoin protocol						
Packet magic: 0xfbfb5da						
Command name: version						
Payload Length: 111						
Payload checksum: 0xd3e82c4a						
▼ Version message						
Protocol version: 70016						
Node services: 0x0000000000000009						
Node timestamp: Nov 3, 2022 16:38:05.000						
Address as receiving node						
Address of emitting node						
Random nonce: 0x76a7de884dc921f7						
▼ User agent						
Count: 25						
String value: /python-p2p-tester:0.0.3/						
Block start height: 4294967295						
Relay flag: 1						
-----						
0000 02 00 00 00 45 00 00 bb 00 00 40 00 40 06 00 00						
0010 7f 00 00 01 7f 00 00 01 3e 3e c8 e4 f0 b6 0b 55						
0020 26 8f 45 88 80 18 18 e9 fe af 00 00 01 01 08 0a						
0030 2d cb 91 fe 2d cb 91 fd fa bf b5 da 76 65 72 73						
0040 69 6f 6e 00 00 00 00 00 6f 00 00 00 d3 e8 2c 4a						
0050 80 11 01 00 09 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 15 a1 63 63						
0060 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00						
0070 00 00 00 00 00 00 ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00						
0080 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00						
0090 ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f7 21 c9 4d 88 de a7 76						
00a0 19 2f 70 79 74 68 6f 6e 2d 70 32 70 2d 74 65 73						
00b0 74 65 72 3a 30 2e 30 2e 33 2f ff ff ff ff 01						

## 2. Unencrypted

Global observers can detect source/timing of new transactions/blocks



### 3. Unauthenticated

- Identity: “Does Bob know the packet is from Alice?”

✗



*source: Real-World Cryptography by David Wong*

### 3. Unauthenticated

- Encryption scheme used by packets:




“Bob has no idea who the packet is from”  
“packet hasn’t been tampered with”



# BIP 324


**new bitcoin P2P protocol with opportunistic encryption,  
mild bandwidth reduction and upgradeability**

Before BIP 324



- Plaintext bytes
- Version handshake first

After BIP 324



- Pseudorandom bytes
- Initial v2 handshake first

# Why not just use tor?

**Network DDoS →**

v3 Onion Services

We are experiencing a network-wide DDoS attempt impacting the performance of the Tor network, which includes both onion services and non-onion services traffic. We are currently investigating potential mitigations.

1. A solution which works everywhere
2. Tor has high latency
3. Cheaper network partition attacks

# Goals

**Confidentiality against passive attacks**

**Observability of active attacks**

**Pseudorandom bytestream**

**Shapable bytestream**

# Goals

**Forward secrecy**


**Upgradability**

**Compatibility**


**Low overhead**

# [recap]: Cryptography

Encryption




Decryption




*Initiator and Responder need same keys*

# [recap]: Version handshake




*Initiator and Responder need keys before version handshake*

# [recap]: Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman(ECDH)



*Establishes a shared secret over an insecure channel*

# [recap]: Elligator swift



Elliptic curve point




*1010100110011*

Uniform byte string

# Design

## Naive approach - 1




**Initiator**  
**privkey=x**  
**pubkey=X**

**Responder**  
**privkey=y**  
**pubkey=Y**

*Warning ! : detectable pattern (not used)*


# Design

## Naive approach - 2



*Warning ! : detectable pattern (not used)*

# Design




*The responder does not wait for all 64 bytes to be received.  
It responds back with its 64 bytes when 1st mismatch occurs.*

# Design

3 phases



# Packet Encryption Cipher



- *authenticated encryption scheme*
- *pseudorandom bytestream*

# Get involved 😊

## Run a v2 node



```
$ git clone https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin.git  
  
$ ./autogen.sh  
$ ./configure  
$ make -j 4  
  
$ bitcoind -v2transport=1  
$ bitcoin-cli addnode "insert ip address" "add" true
```

Get involved 😊

Run a v2 node

```
$ bitcoin-cli getpeerinfo
[
    {
        "addr": "ip address",
        # ...
        "servicesnames": [
            "WITNESS",
            "NETWORK_LIMITED",
            "P2P_V2"
        ],
        # ...
        # ...
        "connection_type": "manual",
        "transport_protocol_type": "v2",
        "session_id": "psst.. it's a secret"
    },
    # ...
]
```

# Summary

- Bitcoin transport protocol is self-revealing, unencrypted and unauthenticated
- BIP 324 proposes a new v2 transport protocol with opportunistic encryption
  - Initial v2 handshake
  - Packets are encrypted now



**Thank you!**