

LiquidRoyalty Audit Report

By AstraSec Team
December 2, 2025

Scope

- ❖ <https://github.com/stratosphere-network/LiquidRoyaltyContracts.git>
- ❖ Commit id: b8234e5
- ❖ Contracts: BaseVault.sol, JuniorVault.sol, ReserveVault.sol, UnifiedSeniorVault.sol

VN001: Unauthorized Withdrawal in BaseVault::_withdraw()

- ❖ Anyone can withdraw someone else's assets without approval.

```
function _withdraw(
    address caller,
    address receiver,
    address owner,
    uint256 assets,   if (caller != owner) _spendAllowance(...)
    uint256 shares
) internal virtual override {
    // Calculate 1% withdrawal fee
    uint256 withdrawalFee = (assets * MathLib.WITHDRAWAL_FEE) / MathLib.
    uint256 netAssets = assets - withdrawalFee;

    // Iterative approach: Try up to 3 times to free up liquidity
    uint256 maxAttempts = 3;
    uint256 totalFreed = 0;
```

VN002: Lack of Input Validation in depositLP()

```
function depositLP(address lpToken, uint256 amount) external returns (uint256 depo)
    if (lpToken == address(0)) revert ZeroAddress();
    if (amount == 0) revert InvalidAmount();
    if (address(kodiakHook) == address(0)) revert KodiakHookNotSet();

    // Transfer LP from user to hook
    IERC20(lpToken).safeTransferFrom(msg.sender, address(kodiakHook), amount);
```

Issues:

- 1. Deposit faked lpToken, get real lpToken
- 2. If multiple LP tokens are whitelisted, how does kodiakHook know which one to return to the user?

```
emit PendingLPDepositCreated(depositId, msg.sender, lpToken, amount, expiresAt);
```

❖ Affected: JuniorVault/UnifiedSeniorVault

```
function cancelPendingDeposit(uint256 depositId) external {
    PendingLPDeposit storage deposit = _pendingDeposits[depositId];

    if (deposit.depositor == address(0)) revert DepositNotFound();
    if (deposit.depositor != msg.sender) revert NotDepositor();
    if (deposit.status != DepositStatus.PENDING) revert DepositNotPending();

    // Transfer LP back from hook to depositor
    kodiakHook.transferIslandLP(deposit.depositor, deposit.amount);

    // Update status
    deposit.status = DepositStatus.CANCELLED;

    emit PendingLPDepositCancelled(depositId, deposit.depositor);
```

VN003-1: Reentrancy Risk Caused by Breaking CEI Pattern

- ❖ Affected: BaseVault::_withdraw()

```
function _withdraw(...  
) internal virtual override {  
    ...  
    // Burn shares from owner  
    _burn(owner, shares);  
Move here  
    // Transfer net assets to receiver (after 1% fee)  
    _stablecoin.safeTransfer(receiver, netAssets),  
    // Transfer fee to treasury (if treasury is set)  
    if (_treasury != address(0) && withdrawalFee > 0) {  
        _stablecoin.safeTransfer(_treasury, withdrawalFee);  
        emit WithdrawalFeeCharged(owner, withdrawalFee, netAssets);  
    }  
  
    // Track capital outflow: decrease vault value by actual assets withdrawn  
    _vaultValue -= assets;  
}
```

Checks-Effects-Interactions

Reenter withdraw()/redeem() before _vaultValue update to withdraw more assets than intended.

VN003-2: Reentrancy Risk Caused by Breaking CEI Pattern

- ❖ Affected: UnifiedSeniorVault::withdraw()

```
function withdraw(uint256 amount, address receiver, address owner) public virtual {
    ...

    // Burn snrUSD
    _burn(owner, amount);
    Move here
    // Transfer net amount to receiver (after both early penalty and withdrawal)
    _stablecoin.transfer(receiver, netAssets);

    // Transfer withdrawal fee to treasury
    if (_treasury != address(0) && withdrawalFee > 0) {
    }

    // Track capital outflow: decrease vault value by amount after early penalty
    _vaultValue -= amountAfterEarlyPenalty;
}
```

VN003-3: Reentrancy Risk Caused by Breaking CEI Pattern

- ❖ Affected: JuniorVault::depositLP(), UnifiedSeniorVault::depositLP()

```
function depositLP(address lpToken, uint256 amount) external returns (uint256 depositId) {
    ...
    // Transfer LP from user to hook
    IERC20(lpToken).safeTransferFrom(msg.sender, address(kodiakHook), amount);

    // Create pending deposit
    depositId = _nextDepositId++;
    uint256 expiresAt = block.timestamp + DEPOSIT_EXPIRY_TIME;

    _pendingDeposits[depositId] = PendingLPDeposit({
        lpToken: lpToken,
        amount: amount,
        expiresAt: expiresAt
    });

    _userDepositIds[msg.sender].push(depositId);
    emit PendingLPDepositCreated(depositId, msg.sender, lpToken, amount, expiresAt);
}
```

A green arrow points from the text "Move here" to the line `_userDepositIds[msg.sender].push(depositId);`.

VN003-4: Reentrancy Risk Caused by Breaking CEI Pattern

- ❖ Affected: JuniorVault::approveLPDeposit()/rejectLPDeposit()/cancelPendingDeposit()/claimExpiredDeposit(), UnifiedSeniorVault::approveLPDeposit()/rejectLPDeposit()/cancelPendingDeposit()/claimExpiredDeposit()

```
function rejectLPDeposit(uint256 depositId, string calldata reason) external
    PendingLPDeposit storage deposit = _pendingDeposits[depositId];

    if (deposit.depositor == address(0)) revert DepositNotFound();
    if (deposit.status != DepositStatus.PENDING) revert DepositNotPending();
    Move here
    // Transfer LP back from hook to depositor
    kodiakHook.transferIslandLP(deposit.depositor, deposit.amount);

    // Update status
deposit.status = DepositStatus.REJECTED;
```

VN004-1: Potential Sandwich/MEV Attacks in Vault Contracts

- ❖ Affected: BaseVault::updateVaultValue()/setVaultValue()

```
function updateVaultValue(int256 profitBps) public virtual onlyPriceFeedMa
    // Validate reasonable range
    if (profitBps < MIN_PROFIT_BPS || profitBps > MAX_PROFIT_BPS) {
        revert InvalidProfitRange();
    }

    uint256 oldValue = _vaultValue;

    // Apply profit/loss: V new = V old × (1 + profitBps / 10000)
    _vaultValue = MathLib.applyPercentage(oldValue, profitBps);
    _lastUpdateTime = block.timestamp;

    MEV Attack Vector:
    → deposit()/updateVaultValue()/withdraw()

    // HOOK for derived contracts to execute post-update logic
    _afterValueUpdate(oldValue, _vaultValue);
}
```

VN004-2: Potential Sandwich/MEV Attacks in Vault Contracts

❖ Affected: UnifiedSeniorVault::rebase()

```
function rebase(uint256 lpPrice) public virtual onlyAdmin {
    ...
    // Step 5: Update rebase index
    uint256 oldIndex = _rebaseIndex;
    _rebaseIndex = FeeLib.calculateNewRebaseIndex(oldIndex, selection.selectedRate);
    _epoch++;

    MEV Attack Vector:
    → deposit()/rebase()/withdraw() (management + performance)
        selection.feeTokens;

    if (totalFeeTokens > 0) {
        _mint(_treasury, totalFeeTokens);
    }

    _lastRebaseTime = block.timestamp;

    emit Rebase(_epoch, oldIndex, _rebaseIndex, totalSupply());
    emit RebaseExecuted(_epoch, selection.apyTier, oldIndex, _rebaseIndex, selection);
    emit FeesCollected(mgmtFeeTokens, selection.feeTokens); // Now shows both fees
}
```

VN005: Potential Risks Associated with Centralization

- ❖ Owner is privileged to guard/coordinate protocol-wide operations
 - Admin: Manage roles, etc
 - LiquidityManager: Manage funds and LPs
 - PriceFeedManager: Updates vault value, impacting share price and returns
 - ContractUpdater: Updates important contract addresses for upgrades.
 - ...

```
function investInLP(address lp, uint256 amount) external onlyLiquidityManager {
    if (lp == address(0)) revert AdminControlled.ZeroAddress();
    if (amount == 0) revert InvalidAmount();
    if (!_isWhitelistedLP[lp]) revert WhitelistedLPNotFound();

    // Check vault has sufficient stablecoin balance
    uint256 vaultBalance = _stablecoin.balanceOf(address(this));
    if (vaultBalance < amount) revert InsufficientBalance();

    // Transfer stablecoins from vault to LP
    _stablecoin.transfer(lp, amount);
```

```
function addWhitelistedLPToken(address lpToken) external onlyAdmin {
    if (lpToken == address(0)) revert AdminControlled.ZeroAddress();
    if (_isWhitelistedLPToken[lpToken]) revert LPAAlreadyWhitelisted();

    _whitelistedLPTokens.push(lpToken);
    _isWhitelistedLPToken[lpToken] = true;

    emit WhitelistedLPTokenAdded(lpToken);
}
```

N1-1: Proper Use of previewDeposit() in BaseVault::seedVault()

- ❖ Affected: BaseVault::seedVault(), ReserveVault::seedReserveWithToken()

```
function seedVault(...  
) external onlySeeder {  
    ...  
    // Step 1: Transfer LP tokens from seedProvider to vault  
    IERC20(lpToken).safeTransferFrom(seedProvider, address(this), amount);  
    // Step 2: Transfer LP tokens from vault to hook  
    IERC20(lpToken).safeTransfer(address(kodiakHook), amount);  
  
    // Step 3: Calculate value = amount * lpPrice / 1e18  
    // lpPrice is in 18 decimals, representing how much stablecoin per LP token  
    uint256 valueAdded = (amount * lpPrice) / 1e18;  
  
    // Step 4: Mint shares to seedProvider  
    // Get current share price (how many assets per share)  
    uint256 sharePrice = totalSupply() > 0 ? (totalAssets() * 1e18) / totalSupply() : 1e18;  
  
    Step 1: sharesToMint = previewDeposit(valueAdded)  
    Step 2: safeTransferFrom(...)  
    Step 3: _mint(...)  
    Step 4: _vaultValue += valueAdded  
  
    // Calculate shares based on current share price  
    sharesToMint = (valueAdded * 1e18) / sharePrice;  
}  
  
// Mint shares directly (bypass normal deposit flow)  
_mint(seedProvider, sharesToMint);  
  
// Step 5: Update vault value to include new LP value  
_vaultValue += valueAdded;  
_lastUpdateTime = block.timestamp;
```

N1-2: Proper Use of previewDeposit() in JuniorVault::approveLPDeposit()

```
function approveLPDeposit(uint256 depositId, uint256 lpPrice) external onlyLiquidityManager {
    ...
    // Calculate value and shares
    uint256 valueAdded = (deposit.amount * lpPrice) / 1e18;

    // Calculate shares to mint (same logic as seedVault)
    uint255 Step 1: sharesToMint = previewDeposit(valueAdded);
    Step 2: _mint(...);
    if (sh sh Step 3: _vaultValue += valueAdded
    } else {
        sharesToMint = (valueAdded * 1e18) / sharePrice;
    }

    // Mint shares to depositor
    _mint(deposit.depositor, sharesToMint);

    // Update vault value
    _vaultValue += valueAdded;
    _lastUpdateTime = block.timestamp;
```

N2: Revisited Permission Design of BaseVault::seedVault()

- ❖ Affected: BaseVault::seedVault(), ReserveVault::seedReserveWithToken(), UnifiedSeniorVault::seedVault()

```
function seedVault(
    address lpToken,
    uint256 amount,
    address seedProvider,
    uint256 lpPrice
) external onlySeeder {
    // Validation
    if (lpToken == address(0) || seedProvider == address(0)) revert AdminControlled.Z
    if (amount == 0) revert InvalidAmount();

    Excessive permissions that allow transferring assets from
    any authorized user are not allowed.

    // Step 1: Transfer LP tokens from seedProvider to vault
    IERC20(lpToken).safeTransferFrom(seedProvider, address(this), amount);

    // Step 2: Transfer LP tokens from vault to hook
    IERC20(lpToken).safeTransfer(address(kodiakHook), amount);
```

N3: Improved Logic of BaseVault::removeWhitelistedLP()

```
function removeWhitelistedLP(address lp) external onlyAdmin {
    if (lp == address(0)) revert AdminControlled.ZeroAddress();
    if (!_isWhitelistedLP[lp]) revert WhitelistedLPNotFound();

    // Find and remove from array using swap-and-pop
    for (uint256 i = 0; i < _whitelistedLPs.length; i++) {
        if (_whitelistedLPs[i] == lp) {
            _whitelistedLPs[i] = _whitelistedLPs[_whitelistedLPs.length - 1];
            _whitelistedLPs.pop();
            break;
        }
    }
    Directly use _removeWhitelistedLPInternal(lp)
    // Remove from mapping
    _isWhitelistedLP[lp] = false;

    emit WhitelistedLPRemoved(lp);
```

N4: Improved Logic of BaseVault::setMgmtFeeSchedule()

```
/**  
 * @notice Set management fee schedule (time between management fee mints)  
 * @dev Only admin can update the schedule  
 * @param newSchedule New schedule in seconds (e.g., 7 days, 30 days)  
 */  
function setMgmtFeeSchedule(uint256 newSchedule) external onlyLiquidityManager {  
    if (newSchedule == 0) revert InvalidSchedule();  
  
    uint256 oldSchedule = _mgmtFeeSchedule;  
    _mgmtFeeSchedule = newSchedule;  
}  
  
Should set a minimum interval (e.g., 30 days) to prevent  
mintManagementFee() from being called too frequently.
```

N5: Integration of Non-Standard ERC20 Tokens

- ❖ Affected: BaseVault::investInLP()/withdrawLPTokens()/transferToSenior(),
UnifiedSeniorVault::investInLP()/withdrawLPTokens()/deposit()/withdraw()/emergencyWithdraw(),

```
function investInLP(address lp, uint256 amount) external onlyLiquidityManager {
    if (lp == address(0)) revert AdminControlled.ZeroAddress();
    if (amount == 0) revert InvalidAmount();
    if (!_isWhitelistedLP[lp]) revert WhitelistedLPNotFound();

    // Check vault has sufficient stablecoin balance
    uint256 vaultBalance = _stablecoin.balanceOf(address(this));
    if (vaultBalance < amount) revert InsufficientBalance();

    // Transfer stablecoins from vault to LP
    _stablecoin.transfer(lp, amount); transfer() -> safeTransfer()

    emit LPIvestment(lp, amount);
```

N6: Revisited Logic of UnifiedSeniorVault::previewDeposit()

```
function previewDeposit(uint256 assets) public view virtual returns (uint256) {
    return assets; // 1:1 at current index
} MathLib.calculateSharesFromBalance(assets, _rebaseIndex)
```

N7: Improper Rounding Direction in UnifiedSeniorVault::_burn()

```
function _burn(address from, uint256 amount) internal virtual {
    if (from == address(0)) revert InvalidRecipient();
                                            rounding up instead of down
    uint256 sharesToBurn = MathLib.calculateSharesFromBalance(amount, _rebaseIndex);

    if (_shares[from] < sharesToBurn) revert InvalidAmount(); // Use IVault error

    unchecked {
        _shares[from] -= sharesToBurn;
        _totalShares -= sharesToBurn;
    }

    emit Transfer(from, address(0), amount);
}
```

N8: Suggested Slippage Protection in depositLP()

- ❖ Affected: JuniorVault/UnifiedSeniorVault::depositLP()

```
function depositLP(address lpToken, uint256 amount) external returns (uint256 depositId)
    if (lpToken == address(0)) revert AdminControlled.ZeroAddress();
    if (amount == 0) revert InvalidAmount();
    if (address(kodiakHook) == address(0)) revert KodiakHookNotSet();

    // Transfer LP from user to hook
    IERC20(lpToken).safeTransferFrom(msg.sender, address(kodiakHook), amount);

    // Create pending deposit
    depositId = _nextDepositId++;
    uint256 expiresAt = block.timestamp + DEPOSIT_EXPIRY_TIME;

    _pendingDeposits[depositId] = PendingLPDeposit({
        depositor: msg.sender,
        lpToken: lpToken,
        amount: amount,
        timestamp: block.timestamp,
        expiresAt: expiresAt,
        status: DepositStatus.PENDING
    })
```

N9-1: Redundant State/Code Removal

- ❖ Affected: BaseVault::setSeniorVault()/updateSeniorVault()

```
function setSeniorVault(address seniorVault_) external onlyAdmin {
    if (_seniorVault != address(0) && _seniorVault != address(0x1)) {
        revert SeniorVaultAlreadySet();
    }
    if (seniorVault_ == address(0)) revert AdminControlled.ZeroAddress();

    _seniorVault = seniorVault_;
}

Duplicate functions

function updateSeniorVault(address seniorVault_) external onlyAdmin {
    if (seniorVault_ == address(0)) revert AdminControlled.ZeroAddress();

    _seniorVault = seniorVault_;
}
```

N9-2: Redundant State/Code Removal

- ❖ Affected: UnifiedSeniorVault::setJuniorReserve()/updateJuniorReserve()

```
function setJuniorReserve address juniorVault_, address reserveVault_) external onlyAd
    if (address(_juniorVault) != address(0) && address(_juniorVault) != address(0x1))
        revert JuniorReserveAlreadySet();
    }
    if (juniorVault_ == address(0)) revert AdminControlled.ZeroAddress();
    if (reserveVault_ == address(0)) revert AdminControlled.ZeroAddress();

    _juniorVault = IJuniorVault(juniorVault_);
    _reserveVault = IReserveVault(reserveVault_);
}

Duplicate functions

function updateJuniorReserve address juniorVault_, address reserveVault_) external onl
    if (juniorVault_ == address(0)) revert AdminControlled.ZeroAddress();
    if (reserveVault_ == address(0)) revert AdminControlled.ZeroAddress();

    _juniorVault = IJuniorVault(juniorVault_);
    _reserveVault = IReserveVault(reserveVault_);
}
```

N9-3: Redundant State/Code Removal

- ❖ Affected: BaseVault/UnifiedSeniorVault::setKodiakHook()

```
function setKodiakHook(address hook) external onlyAdmin {
    // Remove old hook from whitelist if exists
    if (address(kodiakHook) != address(0)) {
        _stablecoin.forceApprove(address(kodiakHook), 0);
        Redundant, safely remove
        // Remove from whitelist
        if (_isWhitelistedLP[address(kodiakHook)]) {
            _removeWhitelistedLPInternal(address(kodiakHook));
        }
    }
}
```

N9-4: Redundant State/Code Removal

- ❖ Affected: BaseVault::transferToSenior()

```
/*
 * @notice Transfer Stablecoins to Senior vault (fixes asset transfer issue)
 * @dev Called by Senior vault during backstop
 * @param amount Amount of Stablecoins to transfer
 */
function transferToSenior(uint256 amount) external virtual onlySeniorVault {
    if (amount == 0) return;
    _stablecoin.transfer(_seniorVault, amount);
}
```

N9-5: Redundant State/Code Removal

- ❖ Affected: ReserveVault::setKodiakRouter()/kodiakRouter()

```
/**...
function setKodiakRouter(address router) external onlyAdmin {
    if (router == address(0)) revert ZeroAddress();
    _kodiakRouter = router;
    emit KodiakRouterSet(router);
}
Redundant, _kodiakRouter is not used anywhere

/**...
function kodiakRouter() external view returns (address) {
    return _kodiakRouter;
}
```

N10: Revisited Logic of sweepToKodiak()

```
function sweepToKodiak(...  
) external onlyLiquidityManager {  
    if (address(kodiakHook) == address(0)) revert KodiakHookNotSet();  
  
    // Get all idle stablecoin balance  
    uint256 idle = _stablecoin.balanceOf(address(this));  
    if (  
        If there is new deposit before the sweepToKodiak tx in the  
        same block, the minLPTokens might be not accurate  
        ...  
    )  
    uint256 lpAfter = kodiakHook.getIslandLPBalance();  
    uint256 lpReceived = lpAfter - lpBefore;  
    if (lpReceived < minLPTokens) revert SlippageTooHigh();  
  
    emit KodiakDeployment(idle, lpReceived, block.timestamp);  
}
```

Q1: Revisited Cooldown Design in UnifiedSeniorVault

- ❖ Unclear cooldown purpose: should it update on token transfers, deposits, or withdrawals?

```
function canWithdrawWithoutPenalty(address user) public view virtual returns (bool) {
    uint256 cooldownTime = _cooldownStart[user];
    if (cooldownTime == 0) return false; If cooldownTime is 0, will have penalty.
    return (block.timestamp - cooldownTime) >= MathLib.COOLDOWN_PERIOD;
}

function calculateWithdrawalPenalty(...
) public view virtual returns (uint256) Actually, if cooldownTime is 0, no penalty.
{
    uint256 cooldownTime = _cooldownStart[_user];
    if (cooldownTime == 0) {
        return FeeLib.calculateWithdrawalPenalty(amount, 0, block.timestamp);
    }
    return FeeLib.calculateWithdrawalPenalty(amount, cooldownTime, block.timestamp);
}
```

Q2: Revisited Purpose of Burn-Related Functions in BaseVault

```
/** ...
function burn(uint256 amount) public virtual {
    _burn(msg.sender, amount);
}

What's the purpose of burn-related functions? Donation?

/** ...
function burnFrom(address account, uint256 amount) public virtual {
    _spendAllowance(account, msg.sender, amount);
    _burn(account, amount);
}

/** ...
function adminBurn(address account, uint256 amount) public virtual onlyAdmin {
    _burn(account, amount);
}
```

Q3: Revisited Rebase Frequency in UnifiedSeniorVault

- The rebase() function assumes a monthly schedule, but `_minRebaseInterval` is defaulted to 30 seconds and configurable, creating a mismatch between the intended monthly rebase and the actual callable frequency.

```
uint256 internal _minRebaseInterval; // Settable by admin, default 30 seconds

function rebase(uint256 lpPrice) public virtual onlyAdmin {
    if (block.timestamp < _lastRebaseTime + _minRebaseInterval) {
        revert RebaseTooSoon();
    }

    if (lpPrice == 0) revert InvalidAmount();

    uint256 currentSupply = totalSupply();
    if (currentSupply == 0) revert InvalidAmount();

    // Step 1: Calculate management fee tokens to mint (1% annual / 12 months)
    uint256 mgmtFeeTokens = FeeLib.calculateManagementFeeTokens(_vaultValue);

    // Step 2 & 3: Dynamic APY selection (using full vault value, not reduced)
    RebaseLib.APYSelection memory selection = RebaseLib.selectDynamicAPY(
        currentSupply,
        _vaultValue // Use full vault value now!
    );
```

Q4: Revisited `_vaultValue` Initialization in Vault Contracts

- ❖ Under what scenarios is the initial value of `_vaultValue` not zero?

```
function __BaseVault_init(...  
) internal onlyInitializing {  
    if (stablecoin_ == address(0)) revert AdminControlled.ZeroAddress()  
  
    __ERC20_init(vaultName_, vaultSymbol_);  
    __ERC4626_init(IERC20(stablecoin_));  
    __AdminControlled_init();  
  
    _stablecoin = IERC20(stablecoin_);  
    seniorVault = seniorVault; // Can be placeholder initially  
    _vaultValue = initialValue_;  
    _lastUpdateTime = block.timestamp;  
  
    // Initialize management fee minting variables  
    _lastMintTime = block.timestamp;  
    _mgmtFeeSchedule = 30 days; // Default: 30 days
```

Q5: Non-18-Decimal Tokens Would Break the Valuation Math

```
function deposit(uint256 assets, address receiver) public virtual
...
// Transfer stablecoin from user
_stablecoin.transferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), assets);

// Track capital inflow: increase vault value by deposited assets
_vaultValue += assets;

// Mint snrUSD to receiver (1:1 at current index)
_mint(receiver, assets);

emit Deposit(receiver, assets, assets);
```

```
function approveLPDeposit(uint256 depositId, uint256 lpPrice) external
...
// Calculate value added (Senior: 1:1 with USD)
uint256 valueAdded = (pendingDeposit.amount * lpPrice) / 1e18;
uint256 sharesToMint = valueAdded; // Senior mints 1:1

// Mint shares to depositor
_mint(pendingDeposit.depositor, sharesToMint);

// Update vault value
_vaultValue += valueAdded;
_lastUpdateTime = block.timestamp;
```

LiquidRoyalty (Out-of-Scope)

VN001: Improper New Rebase Index Calculation in calculateNewRebaseIndex()

```
function rebase(uint256 lpPrice) public virtual onlyAdmin {
    ...
    // Step 5: Update rebase index
    uint256 oldIndex = _rebaseIndex;
    _rebaseIndex = FeeLib.calculateNewRebaseIndex(oldIndex, selection.selectedRate);
    _epoch++;
}

function calculateNewRebaseIndex(... internal pure returns (uint256 newIndex) {
    // I_new = I_old * (1 + r_selected > 1.02)
    // Multiplier = 1 + (monthlyRate * .02)
    uint256 multiplier = MathLib.PRECISION +
        ((monthlyRate * (MathLib.PRECISION + MathLib.PERF_FEE)) / MathLib.PRECISION);

    return (oldIndex * multiplier) / MathLib.PRECISION;
}
```

newRebaseIndex should exclude
PERF_FEE, otherwise all holders'
balances are incorrectly increased.

VN002: Improper New Rebase Supply Calculation in calculateRebaseSupply()

```
function rebase(uint256 lpPrice) public virtual onlyAdmin {
    ...
    // Step 1: Calculate management fee tokens to mint (1% annual / 12 months)
    uint256 mgmtFeeTokens = FeeLib.calculateManagementFeeTokens(_vaultValue);

    // Step 2 & 3: Dynamic APY selection (using full vault value, not reduced)
    RebaseLib.APYSelection memory selection = RebaseLib.selectDynamicAPY(
        currentSupply,
        vaultValue // Use full vault value now!
    );
```

```
function selectDynamicAPY(
    uint256 currentSupply,
    uint256 netVaultValue
) internal pure returns (APYSelection memory selection) {
    if (currentSupply == 0) revert InvalidSupply();
    if (netVaultValue == 0) revert InvalidVaultValue();

    // Try 13% APY first (greedy maximization)
    (uint256 newSupply13, uint256 userTokens13, uint256 feeTokens13) =
        FeeLib.calculateRebaseSupply(currentSupply, MathLib.MAX_MONTHLY_RATE);
```

```
function calculateRebaseSupply(...)
) internal pure returns (...)
) {
    // S_users = S * r_month
    userTokens = (currentSupply * monthlyRate) / MathLib.PRECISION;

    // S_fee = S users * 0.02
    newSupply = currentSupply + userTokens + feeTokens;
    newSupply should include mgmtFeeTokens
    // S_new = S + S_users + S_fee
    newSupply = currentSupply + userTokens + feeTokens;

    return (newSupply, userTokens, feeTokens);
```

VN003: Lack of Slippage Control in liquidateLPForAmount()

```
function _withdraw(...  
) internal virtual override {  
    ...  
    for (uint256 i = 0; i < maxAttempts; i++) {  
        ...  
        // Call hook to liquidate LP with smart estimation  
        try kodiakHook.liquidateLPForAmount(needed) {  
            ...  
        } catch {  
            ...  
        }  
    }  
}
```

```
function liquidateLPForAmount(uint256 unstake_usd) public onlyVault {  
    ...  
    // Query Island pool directly for actual balances  
    (, uint256 honeyInPool) = island.getUnderlyingBalances();  
    uint256 totalLPSupply = island.totalSupply();  
  
    if (totalLPSupply == 0 || honeyInPool == 0) return;  
    // Ca Lack of slippage control actually get back as stablecoin)  
    // honeyPerLP is in 1e18 precision  
    uint256 honeyPerLP = (honeyInPool * 1e18) / totalLPSupply;  
  
    // Calculate LP needed to get unstake usd worth of HONEY  
    uint256 lpNeeded = (unstake_usd * 1e18) / honeyPerLP;
```

N1: Redundant State/Code Removal

- ❖ Affected: `ConcreteJuniorVault/ConcreteReserveVault/UnifiedConcreteSeniorVault::initializeV2()`
- ❖ No separate `initializeV2()` is needed; perform this setup directly in `initialize()`.

```
function initializeV2(
    address liquidityManager_,
    address priceFeedManager_,
    address contractUpdater_
) external reinitializer(2) {
    _liquidityManager = liquidityManager_;
    _priceFeedManager = priceFeedManager_;
    _contractUpdater = contractUpdater_;
}
```