

# KRILL-BIA Engineering Specification

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Implementation Reference for Stigmergic Consensus + Pentastratic Immunity (MVP Scope)

**Version 0.2 — February 2026 Companion to:** KRILL Bio-Inspired Architecture (Research Paper v1.0)

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## ES-0. Purpose and Scope

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This document bridges the gap between the KRILL-BIA research paper and a working implementation. It specifies:

- Byte-level wire formats for all messages
- State machines with explicit transitions, timeouts, and edge cases
- Concrete algorithms (not descriptions) for each mechanism
- DAG structure and synchronization protocol
- Blockchain integration API
- Error handling for every identified edge case
- Test vectors with expected outputs
- Main event loop and message dispatch (ES-10)
- Distance estimation methods (ES-11)
- Transport layer: BLE mesh, WiFi, LoRa (ES-12)
- Cryptographic initialization and device enrollment (ES-13)
- Flash layout and persistence strategy (ES-14)
- Rate limiting and DoS protection (ES-15)
- LPWAN gateway trust model (ES-16)

**MVP Scope:** Stigmergic Consensus (§3) + Pentastratic Immunity (§4) + Metabolic State (§5) + Quorum Sensing (§7). Morphogenetic Topology, HGT, and Entropic Valuation are specified at interface level only.

**Target Platform:** ESP32 (Nano node) + nRF52840 (Dust node) over BLE mesh + WiFi.

## What is this document? (Plain-Language Summary)

**This is the builder's manual for KRILL.** While the Research Paper explains *why* and *what*, this Engineering Specification explains *how* — down to individual bytes on the wire.

**If you're a developer, here's what you'll find:**

- **Exact data formats** — every message is specified byte-by-byte with offsets, sizes, and encoding
- **State machines** — every component has explicit states, transitions, and timeouts
- **Pseudocode** — copy-paste-ready algorithms in Rust-like syntax
- **Test vectors** — concrete inputs with expected outputs so you can verify your implementation
- **Hardware targets** — ESP32 (Nano node, \$4) and nRF52840 (Dust node, \$2) over BLE mesh + WiFi + LoRa

**MVP = 4 of 9 subsystems:** Stigmergic Consensus + Immune System + Metabolic State + Quorum Sensing. This is enough for a working prototype. The other 5 subsystems have interface stubs.

**Key sections for getting started:**

- **ES-1** — data types and constants (start here)
- **ES-10** — main event loop (how it all fits together)
- **ES-12** — transport layer (BLE/WiFi/LoRa configuration)
- **ES-13** — device enrollment (how a new device joins)
- **ES-9** — test vectors (verify your code)

## ES-1. Core Data Types and Constants

### ES-1.1 Primitive Types

Type	Size	Encoding	Notes
u8	1B	unsigned	
u16	2B	little-endian	
u32	4B	little-endian	
u64	8B	little-endian	
i16	2B	little-endian	signed, for readings
i32	4B	little-endian	signed
f16	2B	IEEE 754 half	for sensor values
f32	4B	IEEE 754 single	
timestamp	4B	u32	seconds since epoch (Unix, wraps 2106)
duration	4B	u32	seconds

hash20	20B	SHA-1 truncated for DAG references (NOT security-critical)	
hash32	32B	BLAKE2s-256	for integrity/identity
sig64	64B	Ed25519	compact signature
pubkey32	32B	Ed25519	public key
device_id	8B	hash32[0..8]	truncated identity hash
reading_t	2B	i16	fixed-point: value × 100 (e.g., 2310 = 23.10°C)
weight_t	1B	u8	0-255 maps to 0.0-1.0 (w = raw/255)
confidence_t	1B	u8	0-255 maps to 0.0-1.0

## ES-1.2 Global Constants

```

PROTOCOL_VERSION      = 0x01
MAGIC_BYTES           = 0x4B 0x42 ("KB" = KRILL-BIA)

// Pheromone decay
LAMBDA_DEFAULT         = 0.00116 // decay rate, T½ = 10 min → λ = ln(2)/600
LAMBDA_LPWAN           = 0.0000013 // T½ ~6.2 days for LoRa (λ_mesh / 900)

// Immune thresholds (σ multiples, stored as u8 × 0.1)
SIGMA_PYREXIA          = 10 // 1.0σ
SIGMA_INFLAMMATION     = 20 // 2.0σ
SIGMA_REJECTION        = 30 // 3.0σ
DRIFT_THRESHOLD        = 50 // 5.0σ (NK audit)

// Quorum sensing
THETA_LOW              = 3 // neighbors for QUORUM mode
THETA_HIGH             = 10 // neighbors for SWARM mode
HYSTERESIS_DELTA       = 2

// Timing
NEONATAL_DURATION      = 1209600 // 14 days in seconds
EPOCH_DURATION         = 60 // 1 epoch = 60 seconds
PRESENCE_INTERVAL      = 10 // seconds between presence pulses
TRACE_INTERVAL_DEFAULT = 5 // seconds between trace deposits
NK_AUDIT_PROBABILITY   = 3 // p = 3/255 ≈ 0.012 per epoch

// Metabolic half-lives (seconds)
T_HALF_EPHEMERAL       = 600 // 10 minutes
T_HALF_OPERATIONAL     = 86400 // 1 day
T_HALF_STRUCTURAL      = 7776000 // 90 days
T_HALF_ARCHIVAL        = 0xFFFFFFFF // infinite (never decays, compresses)

// Limits
MAX_NEIGHBORS          = 32
MAX_DAG_ENTRIES        = 4096 // per local DAG (Nano); 256 (Dust)
MAX_PROFILE_BINS       = 50
PROFILE_SIZE_BYTES     = 500 // per monitored device
REJECTION_RATE_LIMIT   = 51 // max 20% = 51/255 of cluster per epoch

```

## ES-1.3 Quantity Type Enumeration

```

enum QuantityType : u8 {
    TEMPERATURE      = 0x01,
    HUMIDITY          = 0x02,
    PRESSURE          = 0x03,
    LIGHT             = 0x04,
    ACCELERATION      = 0x05,

```

```

    CO2                = 0x06,
    SOIL_MOISTURE       = 0x07,
    VIBRATION           = 0x08,
    VOLTAGE             = 0x09,
    CURRENT             = 0x0A,
    SOUND_LEVEL         = 0x0B,
    PM25               = 0x0C,
    WATER_FLOW          = 0x0D,
    // 0x0E-0x7F: reserved for future physical quantities
    BINARY_DOOR         = 0x80,    // discrete: open/close
    BINARY_MOTION       = 0x81,    // discrete: detected/not
    BINARY_BUTTON       = 0x82,    // discrete: pressed/not
    // 0x83-0xFE: reserved for future discrete types
    CUSTOM              = 0xFF     // user-defined
}

```

## ES-1.4 Physical Bounds Table (compiled into firmware)

```

struct PhysicalBounds {
    quantity:      QuantityType,
    absolute_min:   i16,      // reading_t: × 100
    absolute_max:   i16,      // reading_t: × 100
    max_spatial_grad: u16,    // × 100 per meter
    max_temporal_rate: u16,    // × 100 per second
    typical_sigma:  u16,      // × 100, manufacturer uncertainty
}

// Compiled table (Stratum 0 innate rules):
BOUNDS_TABLE[] = {
    // qty          abs_min    abs_max    spat_grad    temp_rate
    sigma
    { TEMPERATURE, -27315,    100000,    500,        83,        50
    },
    //              -273.15°C   1000.00°C   5.00°C/m     0.83°C/s
    0.50°C
    { HUMIDITY,    0,        10000,    1000,        83,        200
    },
    //              0.00%       100.00%    10.00%/m     0.83%/s
    2.00%
    { PRESSURE,    30000,    110000,    1,          0,        10
    },
    //              300.00hPa   1100.00hPa 0.01hPa/m    ~0
    0.10hPa
    { CO2,         0,        500000,    10000,       83,
    3000},
    //              0ppm       5000.00ppm 100.00/m     0.83/s
    30.00ppm
    { LIGHT,       0,        10000000,   -1,         -1,        -1
    },
    //              (highly variable – innate only checks absolute
    bounds)
    { SOUND_LEVEL, 0,        19400,    2000,        4000,     150
    },
    //              0.00dBA    194.00dBA 20.00/m     40.00/s
    1.50dBA
    { PM25,        0,        100000,    5000,        16667,
    1000},
    //              0µg/m³     1000.00   50.00/m     166.67/s
    10.00
    }
}

// -1 = check disabled for that dimension (use only absolute bounds)

```

## ES-2. Wire Formats

All messages share a common header. Multi-byte values are little-endian.  
All messages are signed.

### ES-2.1 Message Header (12 bytes)

Offset	Size	Field	Description
0	2	magic	0x4B42 ("KB")
2	1	version	PROTOCOL_VERSION (0x01)
3	1	msg_type	MessageType enum
4	8	sender_id	device_id of sender

Total: 12 bytes

### ES-2.2 Message Types

```
enum MessageType : u8 {
    // Stigmergic Consensus
    TRACE_DEPOSIT      = 0x01,    // sensor reading + pheromone trace
    CONSISTENCY_ALERT  = 0x02,    // physical consistency violation
    detected

    // Quorum Sensing
    PRESENCE_PULSE     = 0x10,    // minimal heartbeat
    MODE_ANNOUNCE      = 0x11,    // current operating mode

    // Immune System
    PYREXIA_NOTICE     = 0x20,    // 1-2σ deviation noticed
    INFLAMMATION_QUERY = 0x21,    // 2-3σ, requesting neighbor
    confirmation
    INFLAMMATION_REPLY = 0x22,    // neighbor's response to query
    REJECTION_NOTICE   = 0x23,    // >3σ, device isolated
    NK_AUDIT_REQUEST   = 0x24,    // random audit challenge
    NK_AUDIT_RESPONSE  = 0x25,    // audit result
    VACCINE             = 0x26,    // attack signature propagation
    PROFILE_SYNC        = 0x27,    // behavioral profile exchange between
    neighbors

    // Metabolic State
    HEARTBEAT          = 0x30,    // proof of life (refreshes STRUCTURAL
    state)
    DEATH_CERTIFICATE  = 0x31,    // device apoptosis announcement
    DATA_RETRACTION   = 0x32,    // data apoptosis

    // HGT (future)
    MODULE_ADVERTISE   = 0x40,
    MODULE_REQUEST     = 0x41,
    MODULE_TRANSFER    = 0x42,
    MODULE_FITNESS     = 0x43,

    // Clock sync
    TIME_SYNC_REQUEST  = 0x50,
    TIME_SYNC_RESPONSE = 0x51,
}
```

## ES-2.3 TRACE\_DEPOSIT (primary message — most frequent)

Offset	Size	Field	Description
0	12	header	msg_type = 0x01
12	4	timestamp	u32, seconds since epoch
16	1	quantity_type	QuantityType enum
17	2	reading	i16, fixed-point × 100
19	1	confidence	u8, 0-255 → 0.0-1.0
20	1	weight	u8, immunological weight
21	1	seq_num	u8, wrapping sequence number (monotonic counter)
22	4	prev_hash	hash20[0..4], link to previous own trace (DAG parent)
24	64	signature	Ed25519(sender_privkey, bytes[0..26])
Total: 90 bytes			

### Dust node compressed variant (for LPWAN):

Offset	Size	Field	Description
0	2	sender_id_short	device_id[0..2] (disambiguated by gateway)
2	2	reading	i16, fixed-point × 100
4	2	timestamp_delta	u16, seconds since last trace
6	1	confidence	u8
7	1	checksum	CRC-8 of bytes[0..7]
Total: 8 bytes (fits LoRa SF12 payload)			

## ES-2.4 PRESENCE\_PULSE (quorum sensing)

Offset	Size	Field	Description
0	12	header	msg_type = 0x10
12	1	mode	current mode: 0=SOLO, 1=QUORUM, 2=SWARM
13	1	neighbor_count	u8, observed neighbor count
14	64	signature	Ed25519
Total: 78 bytes			

## ES-2.5 CONSISTENCY\_ALERT

Offset	Size	Field	Description
0	12	header	msg_type = 0x02
12	8	suspect_id	device_id of suspect device
20	2	suspect_reading	i16
22	2	expected_max	i16, max permissible reading given physics
24	2	expected_min	i16, min permissible reading given physics
26	1	severity	0=PYREXIA, 1=INFLAMMATION, 2=REJECTION
27	64	signature	Ed25519
Total: 91 bytes			

## ES-2.6 INFLAMMATION\_QUERY

Offset	Size	Field	Description
0	12	header	msg_type = 0x21
12	8	suspect_id	device_id under investigation
20	1	quantity_type	QuantityType
21	2	suspect_reading	i16
23	2	reporter_reading	i16, sender's own recent reading
25	4	timestamp	when anomaly observed
29	64	signature	Ed25519
Total: 93 bytes			

## ES-2.7 INFLAMMATION\_REPLY

Offset	Size	Field	Description
0	12	header	msg_type = 0x22
12	8	suspect_id	device_id under investigation
20	1	verdict	0=CONFIRM_ANOMALY, 1=DENY_ANOMALY, 2=ABSTAIN
21	2	own_reading	i16, responder's own reading of same quantity
23	1	own_confidence	u8
24	64	signature	Ed25519
Total: 88 bytes			

## ES-2.8 VACCINE

Offset	Size	Field	Description
0	12	header	msg_type = 0x26
12	4	origin_timestamp	when attack was first detected
16	8	origin_cluster	cluster identifier (hash of founding device set)
24	1	attack_type	enum: 0=VALUE_SPIKE, 1=SLOW_DRIFT, 2=PATTERN_CHANGE, 3=FLOOD, 4=IMPERSONATION
25	1	hops_from_origin	u8, incremented at each relay (TTL = 10 - hops)
26	20	attack_signature	condensed feature vector of the attack: [quantity_type(1), deviation_mean(2), deviation_std(2), temporal_pattern(4), affected_dims_bitfield(2), reserved(9)]
46	1	vaccine_strength	u8, decays: strength = initial × e <sup>{-hops/d<sub>o</sub>}</sup>
47	64	signature	Ed25519 of originating node (NOT relaying node)
Total: 111 bytes			

## ES-2.9 DEATH\_CERTIFICATE

Offset	Size	Field	Description
0	12	header	msg_type = 0x31
12	1	reason	0=SELF_COMPROMISE, 1=PUF_ANOMALY, 2=BOOT_FAIL, 3=OPERATOR_COMMAND, 4=ENERGY_DEPLETED
13	4	timestamp	time of death
17	32	old_pubkey_hash	hash of public key being invalidated
49	64	signature	signed with OLD key (proof of voluntary death)
Total: 113 bytes			

## ES-2.10 HEARTBEAT (proof of life)


Offset	Size	Field	Description
0	12	header	msg_type = 0x30
12	4	timestamp	current time
16	4	uptime	seconds since last boot
20	1	battery_level	u8, 0-255 (0xFF = mains powered)
21	1	mode	current quorum mode
22	2	dag_tip_hash	hash20[0..2] of latest DAG entry
24	64	signature	Ed25519
Total: 88 bytes			

## ES-2.11 PROFILE\_SYNC (behavioral profile exchange)


Offset	Size	Field	Description
0	12	header	msg_type = 0x27
12	8	subject_id	device being profiled
20	2	profile_version	u16, incremented on update
22	1	component_id	which profile component: 0=VALUES, 1=TEMPORAL, 2=COMM, 3=ENERGY, 4=CORRELATION
23	1	bin_count	number of histogram bins ( $\leq 50$ )
24	N	bins	bin_count $\times$ 2 bytes (u16 counts)
24+N	64	signature	Ed25519
Total: 88 + N bytes (max 188 bytes for 50 bins)			

## ES-3. State Machines

### ES-3.1 Node Lifecycle State Machine







### State definitions:

```

struct NodeState {
    state:          enum { OFFLINE, BOOTING, NEONATAL, NORMAL,
                          PYREXIA, INFLAMMATION, REJECTION,
                          QUARANTINE, APOPTOTIC },
    entered_at:     timestamp,      // when entered current state

    // Neonatal tracking

```

```

    neonatal_start:    timestamp,
    profile_frozen:    bool,           // true after neonatal ends

    // Immune tracking
    deviation_history: RingBuffer<f16, 64>, // last 64 deviation values
    consecutive_pyrexia: u16,           // epochs in PYREXIA
    inflammation_query_id: u32,         // active query, or 0
    inflammation_replies: [InflammationReply; MAX_NEIGHBORS],
    inflammation_reply_count: u8,

    // Quarantine
    quarantine_reason: u8,
    remediation_attempts: u8,           // max 3

    // Metabolic
    last_heartbeat:    timestamp,
    immunological_weight: weight_t,     // current w(i,t)
}

```

### Transition rules (pseudocode):

```

fn transition(state: &mut NodeState, event: Event) {
    match (state.state, event) {
        // BOOTING
        (BOOTING, PUF_OK) ⇒ state.state = NEONATAL;
                           state.neonatal_start = now();
                           state.immunological_weight = 77; //
0.3 × 255
        (BOOTING, PUF_FAIL) ⇒ state.state = APOPTOTIC;
                           broadcast(DEATH_CERTIFICATE,
PUF_ANOMALY);

        // NEONATAL → NORMAL
        (NEONATAL, TIMER_EXPIRED) ⇒ if now() - state.neonatal_start ≥
NEONATAL_DURATION
N {
                                state.state = NORMAL;
                                state.profile_frozen = true;
                                state.immunological_weight = 204;
// 0.8 × 255
                                freeze_self_signature();
                                }

        // NORMAL → PYREXIA
        (NORMAL, DEVIATION(d)) ⇒ if d ≥ SIGMA_PYREXIA && d <
SIGMA_INFLAMMATION {
                                state.state = PYREXIA;
                                state.entered_at = now();
                                state.consecutive_pyrexia = 0;
                                increase_monitoring_frequency(2);
                                }

        // NORMAL → INFLAMMATION (skip PYREXIA for sudden large deviation)
        (NORMAL, DEVIATION(d)) ⇒ if d ≥ SIGMA_INFLAMMATION && d <
SIGMA_REJECTION {
                                state.state = INFLAMMATION;
                                broadcast_inflammation_query();
                                }

        // NORMAL → REJECTION (extreme deviation)
        (NORMAL, DEVIATION(d)) ⇒ if d ≥ SIGMA_REJECTION {
                                // Don't auto-reject: always query

```

```

neighbors first

state.state = INFLAMMATION;
broadcast_inflammation_query();
}

// PYREXIA → NORMAL (recovery)
(PYREXIA, DEVIATION(d)) ⇒ if d < SIGMA_PYREXIA {
    state.state = NORMAL;
    restore_monitoring_frequency();
}

// PYREXIA → INFLAMMATION (escalation)
(PYREXIA, DEVIATION(d)) ⇒ if d ≥ SIGMA_INFLAMMATION {
    state.state = INFLAMMATION;
    broadcast_inflammation_query();
}

// PYREXIA timeout: auto-escalate after 6 hours
(PYREXIA, TIMER_EXPIRED) ⇒ if now() - state.entered_at > 21600 {
    state.state = INFLAMMATION;
    broadcast_inflammation_query();
}

// INFLAMMATION: collect replies
(INFLAMMATION, REPLY(r)) ⇒ {

state.inflammation_replies[state.inflammation_reply_count] = r;
state.inflammation_reply_count +=
1;

    evaluate_inflammation();
}

// INFLAMMATION timeout: decide with partial replies after 5
minutes
(INFLAMMATION, TIMER_EXPIRED) ⇒ if now() - state.entered_at > 300
{
    evaluate_inflammation();
}

// REJECTION → QUARANTINE after 72 hours
(REJECTION, TIMER_EXPIRED) ⇒ if now() - state.entered_at > 259200
{
    state.state = QUARANTINE;
    state.remediation_attempts = 0;
}

// QUARANTINE: attempt remediation
(QUARANTINE, REMEDIATE_OK) ⇒ state.state = NEONATAL; // restart
lifecycle
state.neonatal_start = now();
state.immunological_weight = 77;

(QUARANTINE, REMEDIATE_FAIL) ⇒ {
    state.remediation_attempts += 1;
    if state.remediation_attempts ≥
3 {
        state.state = APOPTOTIC;
        broadcast(DEATH_CERTIFICATE,
SELF_COMPROMISE);
    }
}

// Heartbeat miss: any state → APOPTOTIC

```

```

        (_, HEARTBEAT_TIMEOUT) ⇒ if now() - state.last_heartbeat >
T_HALF_STRUCTURAL
    {
        state.state = APOPTOTIC;
    }

    _ ⇒ {} // no transition
}


fn evaluate_inflammation() {
    let total = state.inflammation_reply_count;
    if total == 0 { return; } // wait for at least one reply

    let confirm_count = count(replies where verdict == CONFIRM_ANOMALY);
    let deny_count = count(replies where verdict == DENY_ANOMALY);

    if deny_count > total / 2 {
        // Neighbors deny the change → suspect is anomalous
        if latest_deviation ≥ SIGMA_REJECTION {
            state.state = REJECTION;
            state.immunological_weight = 0;
            isolate_from_consensus();
        } else {
            // Moderate anomaly, neighbors disagree
            state.state = PYREXIA; // downgrade, watch more
        }
    } else if confirm_count > total / 2 {
        // Neighbors confirm the change → environment shifted
        update_profile(latest_readings);
        state.state = NORMAL;
    } else {
        // Inconclusive → stay in INFLAMMATION, wait for more replies
        // Auto-resolve after 5 min timeout with best available data
    }
}

```

## ES-3.2 Quorum Sensing State Machine



Transitions (with hysteresis on UPWARD transitions, simple threshold on DOWNWARD):

SOLO → QUORUM:	neighbor_count ≥ THETA_LOW + HYSTERESIS_DELTA	(≥ 5)
QUORUM → SOLO:	neighbor_count < THETA_LOW	(< 3)
QUORUM → SWARM:	neighbor_count ≥ THETA_HIGH + HYSTERESIS_DELTA	(≥ 12)
SWARM → QUORUM:	neighbor_count < THETA_HIGH - HYSTERESIS_DELTA	(< 8)

```

struct QuorumState {
    mode:          enum { SOLO, QUORUM, SWARM },
    neighbor_count: u8,           // smoothed over 3 epochs (EMA)
    neighbor_table: [NeighborEntry; MAX_NEIGHBORS],
    last_mode_change: timestamp,
    min_transition_interval: u32, // 120 seconds (prevent
                                oscillation)
}

```

```

struct NeighborEntry {
    device_id:    device_id,
    last_seen:    timestamp,
    rssi:         i8,           // signal strength (for distance
est.)
    mode:         u8,           // neighbor's reported mode
    weight:       weight_t,     // neighbor's immunological weight
    alive:        bool,         // false if last_seen > 3 *
PRESENCE_INTERVAL
}

fn update_quorum(qs: &mut QuorumState) {
    // Prune dead neighbors
    for n in qs.neighbor_table {
        if now() - n.last_seen > 3 * PRESENCE_INTERVAL {
            n.alive = false;
        }
    }

    let alive_count = count(qs.neighbor_table where alive == true);

    // EMA smoothing (α = 0.3)
    qs.neighbor_count = (0.3 * alive_count + 0.7 * qs.neighbor_count) as
u8;

    // Rate limit transitions
    if now() - qs.last_mode_change < qs.min_transition_interval { return; }

    match qs.mode {
        SOLO => {
            if qs.neighbor_count ≥ THETA_LOW + HYSTERESIS_DELTA {
                qs.mode = QUORUM;
                qs.last_mode_change = now();
            }
        }
        QUORUM => {
            if qs.neighbor_count < THETA_LOW {
                qs.mode = SOLO;
                qs.last_mode_change = now();
            } else if qs.neighbor_count ≥ THETA_HIGH + HYSTERESIS_DELTA {
                qs.mode = SWARM;
                qs.last_mode_change = now();
            }
        }
        SWARM => {
            if qs.neighbor_count < THETA_HIGH - HYSTERESIS_DELTA {
                qs.mode = QUORUM;
                qs.last_mode_change = now();
            }
        }
    }
}

```

### ES-3.3 HGT Module Lifecycle (interface only — MVP deferred)

```

UNKNOWN → ADVERTISED → REQUESTED → TRANSFERRING → SANDBOX → PRODUCTION
                                             |
                                             ↳ REJECTED
(rollback)
                                             ↳ REVOKED (key
compromise)

```

---

## ES-4. Algorithms

---

### ES-4.1 Physical Consistency Check

```
fn check_physical_consistency(  
  my_reading: i16,      // reading_t × 100  
  their_reading: i16,   // reading_t × 100  
  quantity: QuantityType,  
  distance_cm: u32,     // estimated distance in centimeters  
  time_delta_ms: u32,   // time difference in milliseconds  
) → ConsistencyResult {  
  
  let bounds = BOUNDS_TABLE.get(quantity);  
  if bounds.is_none() {  
    return ConsistencyResult::UNKNOWN; // no bounds for this quantity  
  }  
  let b = bounds.unwrap();  
  
  // Step 1: Innate check (Stratum 0)  
  if my_reading < b.absolute_min || my_reading > b.absolute_max {  
    return ConsistencyResult::REJECT_INNATE;  
  }  
  
  // Step 2: Compute maximum permissible difference  
  let distance_m = distance_cm as f32 / 100.0;  
  let time_delta_s = time_delta_ms as f32 / 1000.0;  
  
  let epsilon_spatial = if b.max_spatial_grad < 0 {  
    i16::MAX // disabled, skip spatial check  
  } else {  
    (b.max_spatial_grad as f32 * distance_m) as i16  
  };  
  
  let epsilon_temporal = if b.max_temporal_rate < 0 {  
    i16::MAX  
  } else {  
    (b.max_temporal_rate as f32 * time_delta_s) as i16  
  };  
  
  let sigma_sum = 2 * b.typical_sigma; //  $\sigma_i + \sigma_j$  (assume same sensor  
type)  
  
  let max_diff = epsilon_spatial  
    .saturating_add(epsilon_temporal)  
    .saturating_add(sigma_sum as i16);  
  
  // Step 3: Compare  
  let actual_diff = (my_reading - their_reading).abs();  
  
  if actual_diff ≤ max_diff {  
    ConsistencyResult::CONSISTENT  
  } else {  
    let deviation_sigma = (actual_diff - max_diff) as f32  
      / (b.typical_sigma as f32);  
    if deviation_sigma < 1.0 {  
      ConsistencyResult::CONSISTENT // within noise  
    } else if deviation_sigma < 2.0 {  
      ConsistencyResult::PYREXIA(deviation_sigma)  
    } else if deviation_sigma < 3.0 {
```

```

        ConsistencyResult::INFLAMMATION(deviation_sigma)
    } else {
        ConsistencyResult::REJECTION(deviation_sigma)
    }
}

enum ConsistencyResult {
    CONSISTENT,
    REJECT_INNATE,           // Stratum 0: physically impossible
    PYREXIA(f32),           // 1-2σ: elevated, watch
    INFLAMMATION(f32),       // 2-3σ: significant, query neighbors
    REJECTION(f32),          // >3σ: extreme, isolate after confirmation
    UNKNOWN,                 // no bounds available
}

```

## ES-4.2 Behavioral Fingerprint (Stratum 1)

Profile construction (run on Nano node for each monitored Dust node):

```

struct BehavioralProfile {
    subject_id:      device_id,

    // Component 0: Value distribution (histogram)
    value_hist:      [u16; MAX_PROFILE_BINS], // 50 bins
    value_min:       i16,                      // histogram range min
    value_max:       i16,                      // histogram range max
    value_count:     u32,                      // total readings
    ingested
    value_mean:      f32,                      // running mean
    value_var:       f32,                      // running variance
    (Welford's)

    // Component 1: Temporal pattern
    hourly_activity: [u16; 24], // readings per hour-of-day bucket
    avg_interval_ms:  u32,       // mean inter-reading interval
    interval_var_ms:  u32,       // variance of intervals

    // Component 2: Communication pattern
    unique_neighbors: u8,        // distinct neighbors contacted per
day
    msg_rate_per_epoch: f16,     // messages per epoch (smoothed)

    // Component 3: Energy signature
    battery_trend:     i8,        // -128..+127: mV/day change
    active_energy_ratio: f16,     // energy during active vs sleep

    // Component 4: Cross-correlation with neighbors
    correlation_scores: [f16; MAX_NEIGHBORS], // Pearson corr with each
neighbor

    // Metadata
    profile_version:  u16,
    last_updated:     timestamp,
    is_frozen:        bool,      // true = self-signature (immutable)
}

// Total size: ~500 bytes (as specified in architecture doc)

```

Anomaly detection algorithm (Mahalanobis-inspired, dimension-reduced):

```

fn compute_deviation(
    profile: &BehavioralProfile,
    new_reading: &TraceDeposit,
    recent_readings: &RingBuffer<TraceDeposit, 32>,
) → f32 {
    // Deviation score: weighted sum of per-dimension z-scores

    let mut total_deviation = 0.0_f32;
    let mut total_weight = 0.0_f32;

    // Dimension 0: Value deviation (weight: 0.4)
    let z_value = if profile.value_var > 0.0 {
        ((new_reading.reading as f32 / 100.0) - profile.value_mean).abs()
        / profile.value_var.sqrt()
    } else {
        0.0
    };
    total_deviation += 0.4 * z_value;
    total_weight += 0.4;

    // Dimension 1: Timing deviation (weight: 0.2)
    if let Some(prev) = recent_readings.last() {
        let interval_ms = (new_reading.timestamp - prev.timestamp) * 1000;
        let z_timing = if profile.interval_var_ms > 0 {
            (interval_ms as f32 - profile.avg_interval_ms as f32).abs()
            / (profile.interval_var_ms as f32).sqrt()
        } else {
            0.0
        };
        total_deviation += 0.2 * z_timing;
        total_weight += 0.2;
    }

    // Dimension 2: Neighbor correlation deviation (weight: 0.3)
    // Compare reading against expected value from correlated neighbors
    let expected_from_neighbors = compute_neighbor_expectation(
        profile, recent_readings
    );
    if let Some(expected) = expected_from_neighbors {
        let z_corr = (new_reading.reading as f32 / 100.0 - expected).abs()
            / (profile.value_var.sqrt() + 0.01); // avoid div/0
        total_deviation += 0.3 * z_corr;
        total_weight += 0.3;
    }

    // Dimension 3: Communication pattern deviation (weight: 0.1)
    // (computed per epoch, not per reading – skip here, add at epoch
    boundary)

    // Normalize
    if total_weight > 0.0 {
        total_deviation / total_weight
    } else {
        0.0
    }
}

fn compute_neighbor_expectation(
    profile: &BehavioralProfile,
    recent_readings: &RingBuffer<TraceDeposit, 32>,
) → Option<f32> {
    // Weighted average of neighbor readings, weighted by historical
    correlation
    let mut weighted_sum = 0.0_f32;

```



```

let mut weight_sum = 0.0_f32;

for (i, neighbor) in neighbor_table.iter().enumerate() {
    if !neighbor.alive { continue; }
    let corr = profile.correlation_scores[i] as f32;
    if corr.abs() < 0.1 { continue; } // ignore uncorrelated neighbors

    if let Some(their_reading) = get_latest_reading(neighbor.device_id)
{
        weighted_sum += corr * (their_reading as f32 / 100.0);
        weight_sum += corr.abs();
    }
}

if weight_sum > 0.5 { // need sufficient correlated data
    Some(weighted_sum / weight_sum)
} else {
    None
}
}

```

### Profile update (Welford's online algorithm):

```

fn update_profile(profile: &mut BehavioralProfile, reading: &TraceDeposit)
{
    if profile.is_frozen { return; } // self-signature: never update

    let value = reading.reading as f32 / 100.0;

    // Welford's online mean + variance
    profile.value_count += 1;
    let n = profile.value_count as f32;
    let delta = value - profile.value_mean;
    profile.value_mean += delta / n;
    let delta2 = value - profile.value_mean;
    profile.value_var += (delta * delta2 - profile.value_var) / n;
    // Note: for running profile (not frozen), use EMA instead for
    adaptivity:
    // profile.value_mean = 0.99 * profile.value_mean + 0.01 * value;
    // profile.value_var = 0.99 * profile.value_var + 0.01 * (value -
    profile.value_mean)^2;

    // Update histogram
    let bin_width = (profile.value_max - profile.value_min) as f32
        / MAX_PROFILE_BINS as f32;
    let bin_idx = ((reading.reading - profile.value_min) as f32 /
    bin_width) as usize;
    let bin_idx = bin_idx.clamp(0, MAX_PROFILE_BINS - 1);
    profile.value_hist[bin_idx] =
    profile.value_hist[bin_idx].saturating_add(1);

    // Update temporal pattern
    let hour = (reading.timestamp % 86400) / 3600;
    profile.hourly_activity[hour as usize] += 1;

    profile.last_updated = reading.timestamp;
    profile.profile_version += 1;
}

```

## ES-4.3 NK Random Audit (Stratum 4)

```
fn maybe_run_nk_audit(
  device_id: device_id,
  self_signature: &BehavioralProfile,    // frozen at end of neonatal
  current_profile: &BehavioralProfile,    // mutable, current
  epoch_rng: u8,                          // random byte from RNG
) → Option<NkAuditResult> {

  // Probability check: p_audit ≈ 0.012
  if epoch_rng > NK_AUDIT_PROBABILITY { return None; }

  // Compare current profile against immutable self-signature
  let drift = compute_profile_drift(self_signature, current_profile);

  if drift > DRIFT_THRESHOLD as f32 / 10.0 {
    Some(NkAuditResult::DRIFT_DETECTED {
      device_id,
      drift_sigma: drift,
      dimensions: identify_drifted_dimensions(self_signature,
current_profile),
    })
  } else {
    Some(NkAuditResult::PASS)
  }
}

fn compute_profile_drift(
  baseline: &BehavioralProfile,
  current: &BehavioralProfile,
) → f32 {
  // L2 distance across all dimensions, normalized by baseline variance

  let mut drift_sq = 0.0_f32;

  // Value distribution drift
  let mean_drift = (current.value_mean - baseline.value_mean).abs()
    / (baseline.value_var.sqrt() + 0.01);
  drift_sq += mean_drift * mean_drift;

  // Variance drift (has the noise profile changed?)
  let var_ratio = if baseline.value_var > 0.01 {
    current.value_var / baseline.value_var
  } else {
    1.0
  };
  let var_drift = (var_ratio - 1.0).abs() * 2.0; // scaled: 50% change =
10
  drift_sq += var_drift * var_drift;

  // Timing drift
  let timing_drift = if baseline.avg_interval_ms > 0 {
    ((current.avg_interval_ms as f32 - baseline.avg_interval_ms as
f32).abs())
    / (baseline.interval_var_ms as f32).sqrt().max(1.0)
  } else {
    0.0
  };
  drift_sq += timing_drift * timing_drift;

  // Communication pattern drift
  let comm_drift = (current.unique_neighbors as f32 -
baseline.unique_neighbors as f32).abs()
    / 3.0;
```

```

    drift_sq += comm_drift * comm_drift;

    drift_sq.sqrt() // total multi-dimensional drift in  $\sigma$  units
}

fn identify_drifted_dimensions(
    baseline: &BehavioralProfile,
    current: &BehavioralProfile,
) → u8 {
    // Bitfield: bit 0 = value, bit 1 = timing, bit 2 = comm, bit 3 =
    energy
    let mut dims = 0u8;

    let mean_drift = (current.value_mean - baseline.value_mean).abs()
        / (baseline.value_var.sqrt() + 0.01);
    if mean_drift > 2.0 { dims |= 0x01; }

    let timing_drift = (current.avg_interval_ms as f32 -
        baseline.avg_interval_ms as f32).abs()
        / (baseline.interval_var_ms as f32).sqrt().max(1.0);
    if timing_drift > 2.0 { dims |= 0x02; }

    let comm_drift = (current.unique_neighbors as f32 -
        baseline.unique_neighbors as f32).abs()
        / 3.0;
    if comm_drift > 2.0 { dims |= 0x04; }

    dims
}

```

#### ES-4.4 Entropic Data Valuation (interface only — runs on Full nodes)

```

fn compute_data_value(
    reading: &TraceDeposit,
    local_readings: &[TraceDeposit],    // recent readings from neighbors
    health: weight_t,                    // immunological weight of sender
) → f32 {
    // Approximate  $I(r; \text{World} \mid \text{Network\_State})$  using local entropy
    reduction

    let prior_entropy = estimate_entropy(local_readings);

    // Add new reading to set, recompute entropy
    let mut augmented = local_readings.to_vec();
    augmented.push(*reading);
    let posterior_entropy = estimate_entropy(&augmented);

    let information_gain = (prior_entropy - posterior_entropy).max(0.0);
    let health_f = health as f32 / 255.0;

    information_gain * health_f
}

fn estimate_entropy(readings: &[TraceDeposit]) → f32 {
    // Histogram-based entropy estimation
    // Bin width = typical_sigma for the quantity type
    if readings.is_empty() { return 0.0; }

    let n = readings.len() as f32;
    let bounds = BOUNDS_TABLE.get(readings[0].quantity_type);
    let bin_width = bounds.map(|b| b.typical_sigma).unwrap_or(100) as f32;

```

```

// Build histogram
let mut bins: HashMap<i16, u32> = HashMap::new();
for r in readings {
    let bin = r.reading / bin_width as i16;
    *bins.entry(bin).or_insert(0) += 1;
}

// Shannon entropy
let mut h = 0.0_f32;
for &count in bins.values() {
    let p = count as f32 / n;
    if p > 0.0 {
        h -= p * p.log2();
    }
}
h
}

```

## ES-4.5 Pheromone Field Computation

```

struct PheromoneField {
    entries: [PheromoneEntry; MAX_DAG_ENTRIES],
    count: u16,
    lambda: f32, // decay rate (LAMBDA_DEFAULT or LAMBDA_LPWAN)
}

struct PheromoneEntry {
    device_id: device_id,
    reading: i16,
    timestamp: timestamp,
    weight: weight_t,
    quantity: QuantityType,
    seq: u8,
}

fn query_field(
    field: &PheromoneField,
    quantity: QuantityType,
    now: timestamp,
) → FieldQuery {
    let mut weighted_sum = 0.0_f32;
    let mut weight_sum = 0.0_f32;
    let mut count = 0u16;
    let mut min = i16::MAX;
    let mut max = i16::MIN;

    for entry in field.entries[..field.count as usize].iter() {
        if entry.quantity != quantity { continue; }

        let age = (now - entry.timestamp) as f32;
        let decay = (-field.lambda * age).exp(); //  $e^{-\lambda(t-t_i)}$ 

        if decay < 0.03 { continue; } // below 3% = effectively dead

        let w = (entry.weight as f32 / 255.0) * decay;
        weighted_sum += w * (entry.reading as f32);
        weight_sum += w;
        count += 1;
        min = min.min(entry.reading);
        max = max.max(entry.reading);
    }
}

```

```

FieldQuery {
    consensus_value: if weight_sum > 0.0 {
        Some((weighted_sum / weight_sum) as i16)
    } else {
        None
    },
    active_traces: count,
    range: (min, max),
    total_weight: weight_sum,
}

}

fn deposit_trace(
    field: &mut PheromoneField,
    trace: &TraceDeposit,
) {
    // Garbage collect: remove entries with decay < 3%
    let now = trace.timestamp;
    let mut write_idx = 0;
    for read_idx in 0..field.count as usize {
        let age = (now - field.entries[read_idx].timestamp) as f32;
        let decay = (-field.lambda * age).exp();
        if decay ≥ 0.03 {
            field.entries[write_idx] = field.entries[read_idx];
            write_idx += 1;
        }
    }
    field.count = write_idx as u16;

    // Add new entry
    if (field.count as usize) < MAX_DAG_ENTRIES {
        field.entries[field.count as usize] = PheromoneEntry {
            device_id: trace.sender_id,
            reading: trace.reading,
            timestamp: trace.timestamp,
            weight: trace.weight,
            quantity: trace.quantity_type,
            seq: trace.seq_num,
        };
        field.count += 1;
    } else {
        // Evict oldest entry
        let mut oldest_idx = 0;
        let mut oldest_time = u32::MAX;
        for i in 0..field.count as usize {
            if field.entries[i].timestamp < oldest_time {
                oldest_time = field.entries[i].timestamp;
                oldest_idx = i;
            }
        }
        field.entries[oldest_idx] = PheromoneEntry {
            device_id: trace.sender_id,
            reading: trace.reading,
            timestamp: trace.timestamp,
            weight: trace.weight,
            quantity: trace.quantity_type,
            seq: trace.seq_num,
        };
    }
}
}

```

## ES-4.6 Morphogenetic Signals (interface only — runs on Nano+)

```
struct MorphogeneticState {
    activator:    f16,    // A: local "more connectivity needed" signal
    inhibitor:    f16,    // I: local "capacity saturated" signal

    // Parameters (from governance or self-tuning)
    d_a:          f16,    // activator diffusion rate (SLOW)
    d_i:          f16,    // inhibitor diffusion rate (FAST, d_i > d_a)
    margin:       f16,    // decision margin
}

fn update_morphogenetic(
    state: &mut MorphogeneticState,
    packet_drop_rate: f16,    // local metric
    latency_ratio: f16,      // current / threshold
    energy_reserve: f16,     // 0.0-1.0
    neighbor_A: &[f16],     // activator from neighbors
    neighbor_I: &[f16],     // inhibitor from neighbors
    dt: f32,                // time step
) {
    // Reaction terms
    let f_a = packet_drop_rate + (latency_ratio - 1.0).max(0.0); // need
    drives activator
    let f_i = (1.0 - energy_reserve) + bandwidth_saturation();    // cost
    drives inhibitor

    // Diffusion: discrete Laplacian on neighbor graph
    let laplacian_A = neighbor_A.iter().map(|a| *a as f32).sum::<f32>() /
neighbor_A.len(
) as f32
        - state.activator as f32;
    let laplacian_I = neighbor_I.iter().map(|i| *i as f32).sum::<f32>() /
neighbor_I.len(
) as f32
        - state.inhibitor as f32;

    // Euler step for reaction-diffusion
    let new_A = state.activator as f32
        + dt * (state.d_a as f32 * laplacian_A + f_a as f32);
    let new_I = state.inhibitor as f32
        + dt * (state.d_i as f32 * laplacian_I + f_i as f32);

    // Clamp to [0, 1]
    state.activator = new_A.clamp(0.0, 1.0) as f16;
    state.inhibitor = new_I.clamp(0.0, 1.0) as f16;
}

fn morphogenetic_decision(state: &MorphogeneticState) → TopologyAction {
    let diff = state.activator as f32 - state.inhibitor as f32;
    if diff > state.margin as f32 {
        TopologyAction::EXPAND // increase range/frequency/relay
    } else if diff < -(state.margin as f32) {
        TopologyAction::CONTRACT // decrease range/frequency/relay
    } else {
        TopologyAction::HOLD
    }
}
```

## ES-5. DAG Structure and Synchronization

### ES-5.1 Local DAG Structure

Each node maintains a local DAG. The DAG is **not shared globally** — it is a local data structure representing the pheromone field.

```
struct LocalDAG {
    entries:    [DAGEntry; MAX_DAG_ENTRIES],
    count:      u16,
    tip_hash:   hash20,           // hash of latest entry
    my_last_seq: u8,              // my latest sequence number
}

struct DAGEntry {
    hash:        hash20,           // SHA-1(entry contents)
    parent_hash: hash20,           // previous entry by SAME device
    device_id:   device_id,
    timestamp:   timestamp,
    quantity:    QuantityType,
    reading:     i16,
    confidence:  confidence_t,
    weight:      weight_t,
    seq:         u8,
}

// Size per entry: 20 + 20 + 8 + 4 + 1 + 2 + 1 + 1 + 1 = 58 bytes
// Dust (256 entries): 256 × 58 = ~14.5 KB (stored in flash, not RAM)
// Nano (4096 entries): 4096 × 58 = ~232 KB (stored in flash)
```

### ES-5.2 DAG Operations

```
fn dag_append(dag: &mut LocalDAG, trace: &TraceDeposit) → hash20 {
    let parent = dag_find_latest_by_device(dag, trace.sender_id);

    let entry = DAGEntry {
        hash:        sha1_truncated(&serialize(trace, parent)),
        parent_hash: parent.map(|p| p.hash).unwrap_or([0u8; 20]),
        device_id:   trace.sender_id,
        timestamp:   trace.timestamp,
        quantity:    trace.quantity_type,
        reading:     trace.reading,
        confidence:  trace.confidence,
        weight:      trace.weight,
        seq:         trace.seq_num,
    };

    // Insert (with GC if full)
    if dag.count as usize ≥ MAX_DAG_ENTRIES {
        dag_gc(dag, trace.timestamp);
    }

    dag.entries[dag.count as usize] = entry;
    dag.count += 1;
    dag.tip_hash = entry.hash;

    entry.hash
}

fn dag_gc(dag: &mut LocalDAG, now: timestamp) {
    // Remove entries older than 5 × T%_EPHEMERAL (effectively dead)
```

```

let cutoff = now.saturating_sub(5 * T_HALF_EPHEMERAL);

let mut write = 0usize;
for read in 0..dag.count as usize {
    if dag.entries[read].timestamp ≥ cutoff {
        dag.entries[write] = dag.entries[read];
        write += 1;
    }
}
dag.count = write as u16;

// If still full after time-based GC, evict lowest-weight entries
if dag.count as usize ≥ MAX_DAG_ENTRIES {
    // Sort by weight × recency, keep top 75%
    dag.entries[..dag.count as usize].sort_by(|a, b| {
        let score_a = (a.weight as u32) * (a.timestamp - cutoff);
        let score_b = (b.weight as u32) * (b.timestamp - cutoff);
        score_b.cmp(&score_a)
    });
    dag.count = (dag.count as f32 * 0.75) as u16;
}
}

```

## ES-5.3 DAG Synchronization on Reconnect

When a node reconnects after being offline:

```

fn dag_sync(my_dag: &mut LocalDAG, neighbor: &Connection) {
    // Step 1: Exchange tip hashes
    send(neighbor, TimeSyncRequest { my_tip: my_dag.tip_hash });
    let their_tip = receive(neighbor); // TimeSyncResponse

    // Step 2: If tips match, no sync needed
    if my_dag.tip_hash == their_tip { return; }

    // Step 3: Find divergence point
    // Send my last N entry hashes (N = 32 for efficiency)
    let my_recent: Vec<hash20> = my_dag.entries[..]
        .iter().rev().take(32).map(|e| e.hash).collect();
    send(neighbor, my_recent);

    // Step 4: Neighbor responds with entries I'm missing
    let missing_entries: Vec<DAGEntry> = receive(neighbor);

    // Step 5: Validate and insert
    for entry in missing_entries {
        // Verify hash integrity
        if sha1_truncated(&serialize_entry(&entry)) ≠ entry.hash {
            continue; // corrupted, skip
        }
        // Check if we already have it
        if dag_contains(my_dag, entry.hash) {
            continue;
        }
        // Insert (bypasses normal trace processing — these are historical)
        dag_insert_historical(my_dag, entry);
    }
}

```



## ES-5.4 Dust Node DAG (Minimal)

Dust nodes maintain a **micro-DAG**: only their own traces + most recent trace from each neighbor.

```
struct DustDAG {
    my_traces:      RingBuffer<DAGEntry, 64>,    // last 64 own traces
    neighbor_latest: [DAGEntry; MAX_NEIGHBORS],  // 1 per neighbor
    neighbor_count:  u8,
}
// RAM: 64 × 58 + 32 × 58 = ~5.6 KB (stored in flash on 32KB device)
// Active RAM: ~200 bytes (current trace + working memory)
```

## ES-6. Blockchain Integration API

### ES-6.1 Nano → Full Node Interface

Nano nodes batch traces and submit to Full nodes for on-chain settlement.

```
struct TraceBatch {
    batch_id:      u32,
    nano_id:       device_id,    // submitting Nano node
    epoch_start:   timestamp,
    epoch_end:     timestamp,
    trace_count:   u16,
    traces:        [BatchedTrace; 256], // max 256 per batch
    aggregate:     BatchAggregate,
    signature:     sig64,        // Nano's signature over batch
}

struct BatchedTrace {
    device_id:     device_id,
    quantity:      QuantityType,
    reading_mean:  i16,          // mean of readings this epoch
    reading_count: u8,           // how many readings
    confidence:    confidence_t, // weighted average confidence
    anomaly_flags: u8,           // bitfield: 0=none, 1=pyrexia,
                                // 2=inflam, 4=reject
}
// Size per trace: 8 + 1 + 2 + 1 + 1 + 1 = 14 bytes
// Batch of 256: 256 × 14 + overhead = ~3.7 KB

struct BatchAggregate {
    total_devices:  u16,
    healthy_devices: u16,        // weight > 0.5
    anomalies_detected: u16,
    rejections:     u8,
    field_entropy:  f16,        // pheromone field entropy
}
```

### ES-6.2 On-Chain vs Off-Chain

```
ON-CHAIN (via Full node BFT consensus):
- BatchAggregate (summary statistics)
```

- Device identity events: registration, death certificates, key rotations
- PLANKTON settlement: rewards per device per epoch
- Governance parameter changes
- Module hashes (HGT audit trail)

OFF-CHAIN (local DAGs, never on-chain):

- Individual sensor readings (traces)
- Behavioral profiles
- Pheromone field state
- Immune system state (anomaly history, inflammation queries)
- Raw presence pulses

SETTLEMENT (per epoch):

- Nano submits TraceBatch to Full node
- Full node validates: batch signature OK, device\_ids are registered, anomaly\_flags are consistent with known immune state
- Full node computes PLANKTON rewards:
  - for each trace in batch:
    - if anomaly\_flags == 0:
      - reward = base\_reward × data\_value(trace)
    - else:
      - reward = 0 (anomalous data not rewarded)
  - Full node submits settlement TX to blockchain:
    - $PLANKTON\_net(nano) = \sum rewards - bandwidth\_cost(batch)$

## ES-6.3 PLANKTON Settlement Formula

```
fn compute_plankton_settlement(
    batch: &TraceBatch,
    plankton_staked: u64,           // Nano's staked PLANKTON
    bandwidth_cost_per_byte: u64,   // current network rate
) → i64 {
    let bandwidth_cost = batch.byte_size() as u64 *
    bandwidth_cost_per_byte;

    let mut total_reward: u64 = 0;
    for trace in &batch.traces {
        if trace.anomaly_flags == 0 {
            let value = compute_data_value_simple(trace);
            total_reward += value;
        }
    }

    // Net = staked - cost + rewards
    plankton_staked as i64 - bandwidth_cost as i64 + total_reward as i64
}
```

## ES-7. Error Handling and Edge Cases

### ES-7.1 Nano Node Crash (Dust nodes lose supervisor)

SCENARIO: Nano node monitoring 100 Dust nodes crashes.

DETECTION: Dust nodes stop receiving presence pulses from Nano.  
After 3 × PRESENCE\_INTERVAL (30s): Nano marked as dead in neighbor table.

IMMEDIATE EFFECT:

- Dust nodes lose Strata 1-2 protection (behavioral fingerprint, adaptive immunity)
- Dust nodes retain Stratum 0 (innate) – hardcoded, no external dependency
- Profiles stored on crashed Nano are temporarily unavailable

#### RECOVERY PROTOCOL:

1. Quorum sensing detects reduced neighbor count → may transition SWARM → QUORUM
2. Other Nano nodes in range detect orphaned Dust nodes (Dust nodes sending traces but no Nano acknowledging)
3. Nearest healthy Nano node adopts orphaned Dust nodes:
  - Begins building new profiles (enters partial neonatal for these devices)
  - Uses cross-reference with other Nano nodes that may have partial profiles
4. If crashed Nano recovers: profile data restored from flash → immediate resumption
5. If crashed Nano is permanently lost: profiles rebuild over neonatal period (14 days)

#### PROFILE REDUNDANCY:

Each device's profile is stored by MULTIPLE Nano nodes (all Nano nodes in range).

Typical redundancy: 2-4 copies. Single Nano failure ≠ profile loss.

#### Profile adoption protocol:

Nano\_new sends PROFILE\_SYNC request to other Nano nodes for orphaned device\_ids.

Receiving Nano responds with profile data.

Nano\_new merges profiles (weighted average, preferring higher-version profiles).

## ES-7.2 Neonatal Period During Network Partition

SCENARIO: Device in neonatal period gets partitioned from network.

PROBLEM: Neonatal timer continues, but no neighbors are building profile.

#### HANDLING:

- Neonatal timer PAUSES when quorum mode = SOLO (no neighbors).
- Timer resumes when at least THETA\_LOW neighbors are detected.
- Remaining neonatal duration stored in persistent state:
 
$$\text{neonatal\_remaining} = \text{NEONATAL\_DURATION} - \text{time\_with\_neighbors}$$
- Device stays in neonatal (w = 0.3) until total observed-by-neighbors time reaches NEONATAL\_DURATION.

Edge case: device is partitioned for 6 months, then reconnects.

- Neonatal timer has barely advanced.
- Device starts fresh neonatal from near-zero progress.
- This is CORRECT: the network has no basis to trust this device yet.

## ES-7.3 PUF Degradation (Aging Silicon)

SCENARIO: PUF response shifts over years due to silicon aging.

#### DETECTION:

- Every boot, device extracts PUF response and derives key.
- Fuzzy extractor tolerates up to 15% bit error rate.

- If raw PUF bit error rate exceeds 12% (approaching limit):  
→ WARNING flag set internally.
- If bit error rate exceeds 15% (fuzzy extractor fails):  
→ PUF extraction fails → BOOTING → PUF\_FAIL → APOPTOTIC.  
→ Device issues death certificate, reboots with new PUF enrollment.

#### MONITORING:

- PUF bit error rate logged each boot:  
$$\text{puf\_ber} = \frac{\text{hamming\_distance}(\text{raw\_response}, \text{enrolled\_reference})}{\text{total\_bits}}$$
- Trend tracking: if BER increases by >1% per year, operator warned.
- Proactive re-enrollment: operator can trigger PUF re-enrollment before failure.  
New enrollment = new identity = new neonatal period.

COST: PUF re-enrollment requires physical access (to reset helper data in flash).

Cannot be done remotely – this is a feature, not a bug (prevents remote identity theft).

## ES-7.4 Conflicting Profiles from Multiple Neighbors

SCENARIO: Two Nano nodes have different profiles for the same Dust device.

CAUSE: Nanos observed device at different times, from different perspectives.

#### RESOLUTION:

```
fn merge_profiles(
  profile_a: &BehavioralProfile,
  profile_b: &BehavioralProfile,
) → BehavioralProfile {
  // Higher version number = more recent observations
  let (primary, secondary) = if profile_a.profile_version >
profile_b.profile_version {
    (profile_a, profile_b)
  } else {
    (profile_b, profile_a)
  };

  // Weighted merge: 70% primary, 30% secondary
  let mut merged = primary.clone();
  merged.value_mean = 0.7 * primary.value_mean + 0.3 *
secondary.value_mean;
  merged.value_var = 0.7 * primary.value_var + 0.3 *
secondary.value_var
                    + 0.21 * (primary.value_mean -
secondary.value_mean).powi(2);
  // (variance of mixture: Var =  $\sum w_i(\sigma_i^2 + \mu_i^2) - \mu_{\text{mix}}^2$ )

  // Histogram: weighted merge
  for i in 0..MAX_PROFILE_BINS {
    merged.value_hist[i] = (0.7 * primary.value_hist[i] as f32
                          + 0.3 * secondary.value_hist[i] as f32) as
u16;
  }

  merged.profile_version = primary.profile_version + 1;
  merged
}
```

## ES-7.5 HGT Module Late Failure (post-sandbox)

SCENARIO: Module passes 24h sandbox but causes issues after 30 days.

### DETECTION:

- Continuous fitness monitoring (not just sandbox period).
- fitness(M) recomputed every epoch from all devices running M.
- If fitness(M) drops below 0.5 after initial acceptance:
  - MODULE\_DEGRADATION alert

### RESPONSE:

1. Module quarantined: no new installations.
2. Devices running M: prompted to report detailed diagnostics.
3. If fitness(M) drops below 0.3:
  - Automatic rollback on all devices.
  - Module marked as REVOKED in DAG.
4. If fitness(M) recovers above 0.6:
  - Quarantine lifted, monitoring continues.

### TIMELINE:

- Detection: depends on fitness reporting interval (1 epoch = 60s)
- Rollback: automatic, 1 epoch after decision
- Total exposure: up to 30 days of degraded operation
- Mitigation: canary deployment limits exposure to 10% of compatible devices

## ES-7.6 Boundary Environment: Undeclared Boundary During Neonatal

SCENARIO: Two sensors on opposite sides of a wall, deployed simultaneously. Neither knows about the boundary. Both in neonatal period.

### WHAT HAPPENS:

1. During neonatal, both sensors build profiles independently.
2. Both are marked  $w = 0.3$  (neonatal weight).
3. After neonatal, they begin cross-checking.
4. FIRST CROSS-CHECK: Huge difference detected (e.g., 25°C).
5. Both trigger INFLAMMATION.
6. Neighbors are queried. If other neighbors exist on EACH SIDE:
  - Each side's neighbors CONFIRM their local reading.
  - Result: BOUNDARY PROFILE created automatically.
7. If no other neighbors (just these two):
  - Inconclusive. Both remain in INFLAMMATION.
  - Timeout: after 5 min, both downgraded to PYREXIA (watch).
  - Over subsequent days, the consistent difference is learned.
  - Boundary profile emerges from repeated observation.

LEARNING TIME: 3-7 days of consistent boundary observations before boundary profile confidence exceeds 0.8.

## ES-8. Test Vectors

### ES-8.1 Physical Consistency Check

#### TEST VECTOR 1: Normal reading

##### Input:

```
my_reading = 2310      (23.10°C)
their_reading = 2340   (23.40°C)
quantity = TEMPERATURE
distance_cm = 200      (2 meters)
time_delta_ms = 5000   (5 seconds)
```

##### Computation:

```
epsilon_spatial = 500 × 2.0 = 1000 (reading_t units, i.e., 10.00°C
max gradient over 2m)
epsilon_temporal = 83 × 5.0 = 415 (reading_t units, i.e., 4.15°C max
change over 5s)
sigma_sum = 2 × 50 = 100
max_diff = 1000 + 415 + 100 = 1515
actual_diff = |2310 - 2340| = 30
30 ≤ 1515 → CONSISTENT ✓
```

#### TEST VECTOR 2: Fire event

##### Input:

```
my_reading = 2310      (23.10°C)
their_reading = 8500    (85.00°C)
quantity = TEMPERATURE
distance_cm = 100       (1 meter)
time_delta_ms = 2000    (2 seconds)
```

##### Computation:

```
epsilon_spatial = 500 × 1.0 = 500
epsilon_temporal = 83 × 2.0 = 166
sigma_sum = 100
max_diff = 500 + 166 + 100 = 766
actual_diff = |2310 - 8500| = 6190
excess = 6190 - 766 = 5424
deviation_sigma = 5424 / 50 = 108.48σ
→ REJECTION(108.48) ✓
(Note: neighbor confirmation will determine if this is a real fire
or a compromised sensor)
```

#### TEST VECTOR 3: Slight anomaly

##### Input:

```
my_reading = 2310      (23.10°C)
their_reading = 2480    (24.80°C)
quantity = TEMPERATURE
distance_cm = 50        (0.5 meters)
time_delta_ms = 1000    (1 second)
```

##### Computation:

```
epsilon_spatial = 500 × 0.5 = 250
epsilon_temporal = 83 × 1.0 = 83
sigma_sum = 100
max_diff = 250 + 83 + 100 = 433
actual_diff = |2310 - 2480| = 170
170 ≤ 433 → CONSISTENT ✓
(Even 1.7°C difference at 0.5m is physically normal)
```

#### TEST VECTOR 4: Boundary case (PYREXIA)

##### Input:

```
my_reading = 2310      (23.10°C)
```

```

their_reading = 2620      (26.20°C)
quantity = TEMPERATURE
distance_cm = 30          (0.3 meters, very close)
time_delta_ms = 500       (0.5 seconds)

Computation:
    epsilon_spatial = 500 × 0.3 = 150
    epsilon_temporal = 83 × 0.5 = 42 (truncated from 41.5)
    sigma_sum = 100
    max_diff = 150 + 42 + 100 = 292
    actual_diff = |2310 - 2620| = 310
    excess = 310 - 292 = 18
    deviation_sigma = 18 / 50 = 0.36σ
    0.36 < 1.0 → CONSISTENT ✓
    (Just barely within noise)

```

#### TEST VECTOR 5: CO<sub>2</sub> anomaly

```

Input:
    my_reading = 42000      (420.00 ppm)
    their_reading = 89000   (890.00 ppm)
    quantity = CO2
    distance_cm = 300       (3 meters)
    time_delta_ms = 10000   (10 seconds)

```

```

Computation:
    epsilon_spatial = 10000 × 3.0 = 30000
    epsilon_temporal = 83 × 10.0 = 830
    sigma_sum = 2 × 3000 = 6000
    max_diff = 30000 + 830 + 6000 = 36830
    actual_diff = |42000 - 89000| = 47000
    excess = 47000 - 36830 = 10170
    deviation_sigma = 10170 / 3000 = 3.39σ
    → REJECTION(3.39) – triggers INFLAMMATION query

```

## ES-8.2 Behavioral Fingerprint Deviation

#### TEST VECTOR 6: Normal device

```

Profile:
    value_mean = 23.10
    value_var = 0.25 (σ = 0.50)
    avg_interval_ms = 5000
    interval_var_ms = 250000 (σ = 500)
    correlation with neighbor A = 0.92
    neighbor A latest reading = 23.30

```

New reading: 23.40°C at interval 4800ms

```

z_value = |23.40 - 23.10| / 0.50 = 0.60
z_timing = |4800 - 5000| / 500 = 0.40
expected_from_neighbors = 0.92 × 23.30 / 0.92 = 23.30
z_corr = |23.40 - 23.30| / 0.50 = 0.20

```

```

total_deviation = (0.4 × 0.60 + 0.2 × 0.40 + 0.3 × 0.20) / 0.9
                 = (0.24 + 0.08 + 0.06) / 0.9
                 = 0.42σ → NORMAL ✓

```

#### TEST VECTOR 7: Compromised device (value manipulation)

Profile: same as above

New reading: 25.60°C at interval 5100ms

Neighbor A latest: 23.20°C (environment hasn't changed)

```

z_value = |25.60 - 23.10| / 0.50 = 5.00

```

```

z_timing = |5100 - 5000| / 500 = 0.20
z_corr = |25.60 - 23.20| / 0.50 = 4.80

total_deviation = (0.4 × 5.00 + 0.2 × 0.20 + 0.3 × 4.80) / 0.9
                = (2.00 + 0.04 + 1.44) / 0.9
                = 3.87σ → REJECTION ✓

TEST VECTOR 8: Environmental change (HVAC turned on)
Profile: same as above

New reading: 25.60°C at interval 5100ms
Neighbor A latest: 25.40°C (neighbor ALSO shifted)

z_value = |25.60 - 23.10| / 0.50 = 5.00
z_timing = |5100 - 5000| / 500 = 0.20
z_corr = |25.60 - 25.40| / 0.50 = 0.40

total_deviation = (0.4 × 5.00 + 0.2 × 0.20 + 0.3 × 0.40) / 0.9
                = (2.00 + 0.04 + 0.12) / 0.9
                = 2.40σ → INFLAMMATION ✓

Inflammation query: neighbors confirm shift → PROFILE UPDATE → NORMAL
(This correctly distinguishes real environmental change from attack)

```

## ES-8.3 Pheromone Field Query

```

TEST VECTOR 9: Healthy field
Field entries (all TEMPERATURE):
  Device A: reading=2310, weight=204(0.80), age=10s
  Device B: reading=2340, weight=204(0.80), age=15s
  Device C: reading=2290, weight=255(1.00), age=5s
  Device D: reading=2320, weight=77(0.30), age=8s (neonatal)

λ = 0.00116

Decay factors:
  A: e(-0.00116 × 10) = 0.9885
  B: e(-0.00116 × 15) = 0.9827
  C: e(-0.00116 × 5) = 0.9942
  D: e(-0.00116 × 8) = 0.9908

Weights (w × decay):
  A: 0.80 × 0.9885 = 0.7908
  B: 0.80 × 0.9827 = 0.7862
  C: 1.00 × 0.9942 = 0.9942
  D: 0.30 × 0.9908 = 0.2972

Weighted sum = 0.7908×2310 + 0.7862×2340 + 0.9942×2290 + 0.2972×2320
              = 1826.7 + 1839.7 + 2276.7 + 689.5
              = 6632.6

Weight sum = 0.7908 + 0.7862 + 0.9942 + 0.2972 = 2.8684

Consensus value = 6632.6 / 2.8684 = 2312 (23.12°C)
Active traces = 4
Range = (2290, 2340)

Note: neonatal device D has LOW influence (0.2972 vs avg ~0.86)
This is correct: untested devices contribute less to consensus.

TEST VECTOR 10: Decayed field (old traces)
Same entries but all 30 minutes old:

Decay at 1800s: e(-0.00116 × 1800) = e(-2.088) = 0.1238

```



```

Weights:
  A:  $0.80 \times 0.1238 = 0.0990$ 
  B:  $0.80 \times 0.1238 = 0.0990$ 
  C:  $1.00 \times 0.1238 = 0.1238$ 
  D:  $0.30 \times 0.1238 = 0.0371$ 

Total weight = 0.3589 (very low – field is stale)
Consensus value still computable but LOW CONFIDENCE.

After 50 minutes (3000s): decay =  $e^{(-3.48)} = 0.031$ 
→ Below 0.03 threshold → entries garbage-collected.

```

## ES-8.4 NK Audit Drift Detection

```

TEST VECTOR 11: Slow drift attack (0.1σ per day, 100 days)
Self-signature (frozen):
  value_mean = 23.10
  value_var = 0.25 (σ = 0.50)
  avg_interval_ms = 5000
  interval_var_ms = 250000
  unique_neighbors = 8

Current profile (after 100 days of 0.1σ/day drift):
  value_mean = 28.10 (drifted +5.00°C = +10.0σ)
  value_var = 0.30 (slightly widened)
  avg_interval_ms = 5200
  interval_var_ms = 280000
  unique_neighbors = 7

Drift computation:
  mean_drift =  $|28.10 - 23.10| / 0.50 = 10.00\sigma$ 
  var_drift =  $|0.30/0.25 - 1.0| \times 2.0 = 0.40\sigma$ 
  timing_drift =  $|5200 - 5000| / 500 = 0.40\sigma$ 
  comm_drift =  $|7 - 8| / 3.0 = 0.33\sigma$ 

  total_drift =  $\sqrt{(10^2 + 0.4^2 + 0.4^2 + 0.33^2)} = \sqrt{(100 + 0.16 + 0.16 + 0.11)}$ 
               =  $\sqrt{100.43} = 10.02\sigma$ 

  DRIFT_THRESHOLD = 5.0σ
  10.02 > 5.0 → DRIFT_DETECTED ✓
  drifted_dimensions = 0x01 (value dimension only, > 2σ)

Detection timing:
  p_audit = 0.012 per epoch (60s)
  Expected detection:  $1/0.012 \approx 83$  epochs  $\approx 83$  minutes
  At 1 audit/day: detection after ~83 days
  But with p_audit per EPOCH (not per day): detection within hours.

```

## ES-8.5 Quorum Sensing Transitions

```

TEST VECTOR 12: Startup sequence (SOLO→QUORUM requires EMA ≥ 5,
QUORUM→SWARM ≥ 12)
t=0:    neighbor_count=0, mode=SOLO
t=10:   1 neighbor detected, count=0.3×1+0.7×0=0.30, SOLO (< 5)
t=20:   3 neighbors, count=0.3×3+0.7×0.30=1.11, SOLO
t=30:   5 neighbors, count=0.3×5+0.7×1.11=2.28, SOLO
t=40:   7 neighbors, count=0.3×7+0.7×2.28=3.70, SOLO (< 5)
t=50:   10 neighbors, count=0.3×10+0.7×3.70=5.59, QUORUM (≥ 5) ✓
t=60:   12 neighbors, count=0.3×12+0.7×5.59=7.51, QUORUM (< 12)

```

```
t=70: 15 neighbors, count=0.3×15+0.7×7.51=9.76, QUORUM (< 12)
t=80: 18 neighbors, count=0.3×18+0.7×9.76=12.23, SWARM (≥ 12) ✓
```

Transition back:

```
t=90: 10 neighbors, count=0.3×10+0.7×12.23=11.56, SWARM (≥ 8)
t=100: 5 neighbors, count=0.3×5+0.7×11.56=9.59, SWARM (≥ 8)
t=110: 3 neighbors, count=0.3×3+0.7×9.59=7.61, QUORUM (< 8) ✓
t=120: 1 neighbor, count=0.3×1+0.7×7.61=5.63, QUORUM (≥ 3)
t=130: 0 neighbors, count=0.3×0+0.7×5.63=3.94, QUORUM (≥ 3)
t=140: 0 neighbors, count=0.3×0+0.7×3.94=2.76, SOLO (< 3) ✓
```

Note: EMA smoothing prevents rapid oscillation. Hysteresis on SOLO→QUORUM (threshold 5 vs 3) means you need sustained neighbor presence to enter QUORUM.

## ES-8.6 Wire Format Serialization

TEST VECTOR 13: TRACE\_DEPOSIT serialization

Input:

```
sender_id = 0xA1B2C3D4E5F60718
timestamp = 1707800000 (2024-02-13 ~07:33 UTC)
quantity = TEMPERATURE (0x01)
reading = 2310 (23.10°C)
confidence = 204 (0.80)
weight = 204 (0.80)
seq_num = 42
prev_hash = 0xABCD1234 (4 bytes)
```

Serialized (hex), before signature:

```
4B 42 // magic
// version
// msg_type = TRACE_DEPOSIT
18 07 F6 E5 D4 C3 B2 A1 // sender_id (little-endian)
80 6C C7 65 // timestamp (1707800000 LE)
// quantity = TEMPERATURE
06 09 // reading = 2310 (LE: 0x0906)
CC // confidence = 204
CC // weight = 204
2A // seq_num = 42
34 12 CD AB // prev_hash[0..4] (little-endian)
[64 bytes signature]
```

Total: 90 bytes ✓

## ES-9. Implementation Priorities (MVP Roadmap)

PHASE 1 – Minimum Viable Stigmergy (standalone, no blockchain):

- ✦ Wire format serialization/deserialization
- ✦ TRACE\_DEPOSIT + PRESENCE\_PULSE messages
- ✦ Physical consistency check (ES-4.1)
- ✦ Local DAG (ES-5.1, ES-5.2)
- ✦ Pheromone field (ES-4.5)
- ✦ Quorum sensing state machine (ES-3.2)
- ✦ Innate immunity (Stratum 0) – compiled bounds table

Target: 2 ESP32s + BLE mesh, temperature sensors

Validation: Test vectors ES-8.1, ES-8.3, ES-8.5, ES-8.6

#### PHASE 2 – Pentastratic Immunity:

- ✦ Behavioral profile construction (ES-4.2)
- ✦ Anomaly detection (ES-4.2 compute\_deviation)
- ✦ Node lifecycle state machine (ES-3.1)
- ✦ INFLAMMATION\_QUERY/REPLY protocol
- ✦ NK random audit (ES-4.3)
- ✦ Neonatal period management

Target: 10+ ESP32s, simulated attacks

Validation: Test vectors ES-8.2, ES-8.4

#### PHASE 3 – Metabolic State + Blockchain Integration:

- ✦ State decay (half-life computation per state type)
- ✦ Apoptosis protocols (device, state, data)
- ✦ TraceBatch assembly and submission (ES-6.1)
- ✦ PLANKTON settlement (ES-6.3)

Target: Integration with KRILL blockchain testnet

#### PHASE 4 – Advanced Mechanisms:

- ✦ Morphogenetic topology (ES-4.6)
- ✦ HGT protocol (ES-3.3)
- ✦ Entropic data valuation (ES-4.4)
- ✦ Vaccine propagation
- ✦ Boundary learning

Target: 100+ node testbed

## ES-10. Main Loop and Event Dispatch

Every BIA node runs a single cooperative event loop. There are no threads — all work is done in time-sliced tasks within a single loop iteration. This section defines exactly what happens each iteration and at what intervals.

### ES-10.1 Timer Configuration

```
// All intervals in milliseconds
TIMER_SENSOR_READ      = 5000      // read sensor every 5s
(TRACE_INTERVAL_DEFAULT × 1000)
TIMER_PRESENCE_PULSE    = 10000     // broadcast presence every 10s
TIMER_EPOCH_TICK        = 60000     // epoch boundary every 60s
TIMER_DAG_GC            = 300000    // garbage collect DAG every 5 min
TIMER_FLASH_FLUSH       = 60000     // persist critical state every 60s
TIMER_QUORUM_UPDATE     = 10000     // update quorum state every 10s
TIMER_HEARTBEAT         = 30000     // send heartbeat every 30s (metabolic
proof-of-life)
TIMER_PYREXIA_CHECK     = 21600000  // 6h pyrexia timeout check
TIMER_INFLAMMATION_TO   = 300000    // 5 min inflammation timeout
```

### ES-10.2 Main Loop (Nano Node)

```
fn main() {
  // — Phase 0: Hardware Init —
  init_hardware();           // GPIO, SPI, I2C, BLE radio, WiFi
  let puf_result = extract_puf(); // see ES-13
  if puf_result.is_err() {
    broadcast(DEATH_CERTIFICATE, PUF_ANOMALY);
    enter_deep_sleep_forever();
  }
}
```

```

    }
    let (privkey, pubkey, device_id) =
derive_identity(puf_result.unwrap());

    // — Phase 1: Restore State from Flash —
    let mut state = load_state_from_flash(); // see ES-14
    if state.is_none() {
        // First boot: fresh state
        state = Some(NodeState::new_neonatal(device_id, now()));
    }
    let mut state = state.unwrap();
    let mut quorum =
load_quorum_from_flash().unwrap_or(QuorumState::new());
    let mut dag = load_dag_from_flash().unwrap_or(LocalDAG::new());
    let mut field = PheromoneField::new(LAMBDA_DEFAULT);
    let mut profiles: HashMap<device_id, BehavioralProfile> =
load_profiles_from_flash();

    // — Phase 2: Transport Init —
    let transport = init_transport(&device_id, &pubkey); // see ES-12
    transport.start_advertising();
    transport.start_scanning();

    // — Phase 3: Clock Sync —
    if quorum.neighbor_count > 0 {
        request_time_sync(&transport);
    }

    // — Phase 4: Main Event Loop —
    let mut last_sensor_read = 0u32;
    let mut last_presence = 0u32;
    let mut last_epoch = 0u32;
    let mut last_dag_gc = 0u32;
    let mut last_flash_flush = 0u32;
    let mut last_quorum_update = 0u32;
    let mut last_heartbeat = 0u32;

    loop {
        let now_ms = millis(); // hardware monotonic clock
        let now_s = now_ms / 1000;

        // — 4a: Process incoming messages (non-blocking) —
        while let Some(msg) = transport.recv_nonblocking() {
            if !rate_limiter.check(msg.sender_id, msg.msg_type) { // ES-15
                continue; // rate limited, drop
            }
            if !verify_signature(&msg) {
                continue; // invalid signature, drop
            }
            dispatch_message(&mut state, &mut quorum, &mut dag, &mut field,
                &mut profiles, &msg, &transport);
        }

        // — 4b: Sensor read + trace deposit —
        if now_ms - last_sensor_read ≥ TIMER_SENSOR_READ {
            last_sensor_read = now_ms;

            let reading = read_sensor();
            if reading.is_ok() {
                let reading = reading.unwrap();

                // Innate check on own reading (Stratum 0)
                let self_check = check_absolute_bounds(reading,
sensor_quantity);

```

```

        if self_check == REJECT_INNATE {
            // Own sensor is broken - enter PYREXIA for self
            transition(&mut state, DEVIATION(3.0));
        } else {
            // Build and broadcast trace
            let trace = build_trace_deposit(
                &device_id, reading, sensor_quantity,
                state.immunological_weight, &mut dag, &privkey
            );
            transport.broadcast(&trace);
            deposit_trace(&mut field, &trace);
            dag_append(&mut dag, &trace);
        }
    }

    // — 4c: Presence pulse —
    if now_ms - last_presence ≥ TIMER_PRESENCE_PULSE {
        last_presence = now_ms;
        let pulse = build_presence_pulse(&device_id, &quorum,
&privkey);
        transport.broadcast(&pulse);
    }

    // — 4d: Quorum update —
    if now_ms - last_quorum_update ≥ TIMER_QUORUM_UPDATE {
        last_quorum_update = now_ms;
        update_quorum(&mut quorum);

        // Adjust lambda based on mode
        field.lambda = match quorum.mode {
            SOLO    ⇒ LAMBDA_DEFAULT * 2.0,    // faster decay when
alone
            QUORUM  ⇒ LAMBDA_DEFAULT,
            SWARM   ⇒ LAMBDA_DEFAULT * 0.5,    // slower decay in dense
network
        };
    }

    // — 4e: Epoch boundary processing —
    if now_ms - last_epoch ≥ TIMER_EPOCH_TICK {
        last_epoch = now_ms;
        epoch_tick(&mut state, &mut quorum, &mut dag, &mut field,
            &mut profiles, &transport, &privkey);
    }

    // — 4f: DAG garbage collection —
    if now_ms - last_dag_gc ≥ TIMER_DAG_GC {
        last_dag_gc = now_ms;
        dag_gc(&mut dag, now_s);
    }

    // — 4g: Heartbeat —
    if now_ms - last_heartbeat ≥ TIMER_HEARTBEAT {
        last_heartbeat = now_ms;
        let hb = build_heartbeat(&device_id, now_s, &dag, &quorum,
&privkey
);
        transport.broadcast(&hb);
        state.last_heartbeat = now_s;
    }

    // — 4h: Persist to flash —
    if now_ms - last_flash_flush ≥ TIMER_FLASH_FLUSH {

```

```

        last_flash_flush = now_ms;
        flush_to_flash(&state, &quorum, &dag, &profiles); // ES-14
    }

    // — 4i: State timeout checks —
    check_state_timeouts(&mut state, now_s, &transport, &privkey);

    // — 4j: Sleep until next event —
    // Calculate next wake time
    let next_event = [
        last_sensor_read + TIMER_SENSOR_READ,
        last_presence + TIMER_PRESENCE_PULSE,
        last_epoch + TIMER_EPOCH_TICK,
        last_quorum_update + TIMER_QUORUM_UPDATE,
    ].iter().min().unwrap() - now_ms;

    if next_event > 10 && transport.recv_queue_empty() {
        light_sleep(next_event.min(100)); // max 100ms sleep, wake on
radio interrupt
    }
}
}
}

```

### ES-10.3 Message Dispatch

```

fn dispatch_message(
    state: &mut NodeState,
    quorum: &mut QuorumState,
    dag: &mut LocalDAG,
    field: &mut PheromoneField,
    profiles: &mut HashMap<device_id, BehavioralProfile>,
    msg: &Message,
    transport: &Transport,
) {
    match msg.msg_type {
        TRACE_DEPOSIT => {
            // 1. Record in DAG
            dag_append(dag, &msg.as_trace());

            // 2. Deposit in pheromone field
            deposit_trace(field, &msg.as_trace());

            // 3. Physical consistency check against own latest reading
            if let Some(my_latest) = get_my_latest_reading(dag) {
                let distance = estimate_distance(msg.sender_id, quorum);
                // ES-11
                let result = check_physical_consistency(
                    my_latest.reading, msg.as_trace().reading,
                    msg.as_trace().quantity_type,
                    distance, (now() - my_latest.timestamp) * 1000
                );
                handle_consistency_result(state, result, msg.sender_id,
transport);
            }

            // 4. Behavioral profile update (if not in neonatal)
            if state.profile_frozen {
                let profile = profiles.entry(msg.sender_id)
                    .or_insert(BehavioralProfile::new(msg.sender_id));
                let deviation = compute_deviation(profile, &msg.as_trace(),
                    &get_recent_readings(dag, msg.sender_id));

                // Feed deviation into state machine
            }
        }
    }
}

```

```

        transition(state, DEVIATION(deviation));

        // Update profile (only if not anomalous)
        if deviation < SIGMA_INFLAMMATION as f32 / 10.0 {
            update_profile(profile, &msg.as_trace());
        }
    }

    PRESENCE_PULSE ⇒ {
        // Update neighbor table
        let entry = &mut quorum.neighbor_table;
        upsert_neighbor(entry, msg.sender_id, msg.as_pulse().mode,
            transport.last_rssi(), now());
    }

    INFLAMMATION_QUERY ⇒ {
        // Am I a neighbor of the suspect?
        let query = msg.as_inflammation_query();
        if let Some(my_reading) = get_my_latest_for_quantity(dag,
query.quantity_type) {
            let verdict = evaluate_inflammation_locally(
                my_reading, query.suspect_reading, query.quantity_type
            );
            let reply = build_inflammation_reply(
                &device_id, query.suspect_id, verdict,
                my_reading, &privkey
            );
            transport.send_to(msg.sender_id, &reply);
        }
    }

    INFLAMMATION_REPLY ⇒ {
        transition(state, REPLY(msg.as_inflammation_reply()));
    }

    VACCINE ⇒ {
        let vaccine = msg.as_vaccine();
        if vaccine.hops_from_origin < 10 { // TTL check
            // Apply vaccine to local immune state
            apply_vaccine(profiles, &vaccine);
            // Relay with incremented hop count
            let relayed = vaccine.with_incremented_hops();
            transport.broadcast(&relayed);
        }
    }

    DEATH_CERTIFICATE ⇒ {
        let cert = msg.as_death_cert();
        // Remove device from neighbor table
        remove_neighbor(&mut quorum.neighbor_table, cert.sender_id);
        // Mark all traces from this device as untrusted
        invalidate_traces(dag, field, cert.sender_id);
        // Remove profile
        profiles.remove(&cert.sender_id);
    }

    HEARTBEAT ⇒ {
        upsert_neighbor(&mut quorum.neighbor_table, msg.sender_id,
            msg.as_heartbeat().mode, transport.last_rssi(),
now());
    }

    PROFILE_SYNC ⇒ {

```

```

        let sync = msg.as_profile_sync();
        if let Some(local_profile) = profiles.get(&sync.subject_id) {
            if sync.profile_version > local_profile.profile_version {
                // Merge: remote is newer
                let merged = merge_profiles(local_profile,
&sync.to_profile());
                profiles.insert(sync.subject_id, merged);
            }
        } else {
            // New device we haven't profiled yet - adopt
            profiles.insert(sync.subject_id, sync.to_profile());
        }
    }

    _ => {} // unknown message type, ignore
}
}

```

## ES-10.4 Epoch Tick

```

fn epoch_tick(
    state: &mut NodeState,
    quorum: &mut QuorumState,
    dag: &mut LocalDAG,
    field: &mut PheromoneField,
    profiles: &mut HashMap<device_id, BehavioralProfile>,
    transport: &Transport,
    privkey: &[u8; 32],
) {
    // 1. Update communication pattern in profiles
    for (did, profile) in profiles.iter_mut() {
        let msg_count = count_messages_this_epoch(dag, *did);
        // EMA update
        profile.msg_rate_per_epoch = 0.9 * profile.msg_rate_per_epoch
            + 0.1 * msg_count as f16;
    }

    // 2. NK Random Audit (Stratum 4)
    let rng_byte = hardware_rng_byte();
    for (did, profile) in profiles.iter() {
        if let Some(self_sig) = get_self_signature(did) {
            if let Some(result) = maybe_run_nk_audit(*did, self_sig,
profile, rng_byte) {
                match result {
                    NkAuditResult::DRIFT_DETECTED { device_id, drift_sigma,
dimensions } =>
                {
                    // Broadcast alert
                    let alert = build_consistency_alert(
                        device_id, 0, 0, 0, REJECTION as u8, privkey
                    );
                    transport.broadcast(&alert);
                    // Local action
                    transition(state, DEVIATION(drift_sigma));
                }
                NkAuditResult::PASS => {} // all good
            }
        }
    }

    // 3. Neonatal timer check
    if state.state == NEONATAL {

```



```

        if quorum.mode ≠ SOLO {
            // Only count time when we have neighbors observing us
            let elapsed = now() - state.neonatal_start;
            if elapsed ≥ NEONATAL_DURATION {
                transition(state, TIMER_EXPIRED);
            }
        }
    }

    // 4. Batch assembly for blockchain (if Full node connection available)
    if quorum.mode == SWARM || quorum.mode == QUORUM {
        if let Some(batch) = assemble_trace_batch(dag, field, profiles) {
            submit_to_full_node(batch, transport);
        }
    }

    // 5. Profile sync with neighbors (every 10th epoch = 10 min)
    static mut epoch_counter: u32 = 0;
    epoch_counter += 1;
    if epoch_counter % 10 == 0 {
        for (did, profile) in profiles.iter() {
            let sync_msg = build_profile_sync(did, profile, privkey);
            transport.broadcast(&sync_msg);
        }
    }
}

```

## ES-10.5 State Timeout Check

```

fn check_state_timeouts(
    state: &mut NodeState,
    now_s: u32,
    transport: &Transport,
    privkey: &[u8; 32],
) {
    match state.state {
        PYREXIA => {
            // Auto-escalate after 6 hours
            if now_s - state.entered_at > 21600 {
                transition(state, TIMER_EXPIRED);
            }
        }
        INFLAMMATION => {
            // Decide with partial replies after 5 minutes
            if now_s - state.entered_at > 300 {
                evaluate_inflammation();
            }
        }
        REJECTION => {
            // Move to QUARANTINE after 72 hours
            if now_s - state.entered_at > 259200 {
                transition(state, TIMER_EXPIRED);
            }
        }
        QUARANTINE => {
            // Attempt auto-remediation every 24 hours
            if now_s - state.entered_at > 86400 *
(state.remediation_attempts as u32 + 1) {
                let result = attempt_remediation(state);
                transition(state, result);
            }
        }
        _ => {

```

```

        // Check heartbeat timeout (any state)
        if now_s - state.last_heartbeat > T_HALF_STRUCTURAL {
            state.state = APOPTOTIC;
            let cert = build_death_certificate(ENERGY_DEPLETED,
privkey);
            transport.broadcast(&cert);
        }
    }
}
}

```

## ES-10.6 Dust Node Main Loop (Simplified)

```

fn main_dust() {
    // Dust nodes have NO behavioral profiling, NO NK audit, NO
inflammation queries.
    // They only: read sensor, deposit trace, listen for alerts.

    init_hardware_lpwan();
    let (privkey, pubkey, device_id) = derive_identity_dust();
    let transport = init_lpwan_transport();

    loop {
        // 1. Read sensor
        let reading = read_sensor();

        // 2. Innate check (Stratum 0 only)
        if check_absolute_bounds(reading, sensor_quantity) == REJECT_INNATE
{
            enter_deep_sleep(60); // sensor broken, retry in 60s
            continue;
        }

        // 3. Build compressed trace (8 bytes for LPWAN)
        let trace = build_compressed_trace(
            device_id, reading, &mut seq_counter
        );
        transport.send(&trace);

        // 4. Check for incoming alerts/vaccines (rare)
        if let Some(msg) = transport.recv_with_timeout(500) {
            match msg.msg_type {
                VACCINE => apply_vaccine_dust(&msg);
                REJECTION_NOTICE => {
                    if msg.suspect_id == device_id {
                        enter_quarantine_dust();
                    }
                }
                _ => {}
            }
        }

        // 5. Deep sleep until next reading
        enter_deep_sleep(TRACE_INTERVAL_DEFAULT * 1000);
    }
}

```

## ES-11. Distance Estimation

### ES-11.1 Problem Statement

`check_physical_consistency()` requires `distance_cm` between two devices. In a wireless mesh network, exact distance is rarely known. This section specifies how distance is estimated.

### ES-11.2 Estimation Methods (ordered by preference)

```
enum DistanceMethod : u8 {
    STATIC_CONFIG = 0,    // operator-provided during deployment
    RSSI_MODEL     = 1,    // radio signal strength model
    ROUND_TRIP_TIME = 2,   // BLE connection interval timing
    UNKNOWN        = 3,    // fallback: assume MAX_REASONABLE_DISTANCE
}
```

### ES-11.3 Method 0: Static Configuration (preferred for fixed deployments)

```
DEPLOYMENT MANIFEST (loaded into flash at provisioning time):

struct DeploymentEntry {
    device_id:    device_id,
    position_cm:  [i32; 3],    // (x, y, z) in centimeters, relative
                           to deployment origin
    floor:        u8,          // floor number (for multi-story
                           buildings)
    zone:         u16,         // logical zone identifier
}

fn static_distance(a: device_id, b: device_id, manifest: &
[DeploymentEntry]) → Option<l
t;u32> {
    let pos_a = manifest.iter().find(|e| e.device_id == a)?.position_cm;
    let pos_b = manifest.iter().find(|e| e.device_id == b)?.position_cm;

    let dx = (pos_a[0] - pos_b[0]) as f32;
    let dy = (pos_a[1] - pos_b[1]) as f32;
    let dz = (pos_a[2] - pos_b[2]) as f32;

    Some((dx*dx + dy*dy + dz*dz).sqrt() as u32) // distance in cm
}

STORAGE COST: 21 bytes per device. For 100-device deployment = 2.1 KB.
Fits in Nano flash easily. Dust nodes store only their own position.
```

### ES-11.4 Method 1: RSSI-Based Model (for ad-hoc deployments)

```
// Log-distance path loss model:
//   RSSI = RSSI_ref - 10 × n × log10(d / d_ref)
// Where:
//   RSSI_ref = RSSI at reference distance d_ref (1 meter)
//   n = path loss exponent (environment-dependent)
//   d = estimated distance
```

```

// Calibration constants (stored in flash, adjustable per-deployment):
RSSI_REF_1M          = -59          // dBm at 1 meter (BLE typical,
measured during calibration
)
PATH_LOSS_EXPONENT_INDOOR = 2.7      // typical indoor (2.0 = free space,
3.5 = heavy walls)
PATH_LOSS_EXPONENT_OUTDOOR = 2.2     // typical outdoor
RSSI_FLOOR           = -95          // below this, signal is noise

fn rssi_to_distance_cm(rssi: i8, environment: Environment) → u32 {
    if rssi ≥ RSSI_REF_1M {
        return 100; // closer than 1m, clamp to 1m (RSSI model unreliable
close-up)
    }
    if rssi ≤ RSSI_FLOOR {
        return MAX_REASONABLE_DISTANCE; // too weak to estimate
    }

    let n = match environment {
        INDOOR  ⇒ PATH_LOSS_EXPONENT_INDOOR,
        OUTDOOR ⇒ PATH_LOSS_EXPONENT_OUTDOOR,
    };

    //  $d = d_{ref} \times 10^{((RSSI_{ref} - RSSI) / (10 \times n))}$ 
    let exponent = (RSSI_REF_1M as f32 - rssi as f32) / (10.0 * n);
    let distance_m = 10.0_f32.powf(exponent);

    (distance_m * 100.0) as u32 // convert to centimeters
}

// ACCURACY: ±50% indoors (walls, reflections cause multipath fading)
// MITIGATION: Use median of last 8 RSSI readings to smooth fluctuations

struct RSSITracker {
    history: RingBuffer<i8, 8>,
}

fn smoothed_rssi(tracker: &RSSITracker) → i8 {
    let mut sorted = tracker.history.as_slice().to_vec();
    sorted.sort();
    sorted[sorted.len() / 2] // median (more robust than mean against
outliers)
}

MAX_REASONABLE_DISTANCE = 3000      // 30 meters (cm). Used when estimation
fails.

```

## ES-11.5 Method 2: Round-Trip Time (BLE only, high accuracy)

```

// BLE connection events have precise timing. Round-trip can estimate
distance.
// Speed of light: ~3.3 ns/meter. BLE clock resolution: ~1 μs = ~300m.
// NOT practical for sub-meter accuracy over BLE.
// RESERVED for future UWB (Ultra-Wideband) support where RTT gives ±10cm
accuracy.
// For now: UNUSED. Placeholder for UWB-enabled hardware.

```

## ES-11.6 Composite Distance Estimation

```

fn estimate_distance(
    their_id: device_id,

```

```

    quorum: &QuorumState,
) → u32 {
    // Priority 1: Static config
    if let Some(d) = static_distance(my_id(), their_id,
&DEPLOYMENT_MANIFEST) {
        return d;
    }

    // Priority 2: RSSI model
    if let Some(neighbor) = find_neighbor(quorum, their_id) {
        if neighbor.rssi > RSSI_FLOOR {
            let tracker = get_rssi_tracker(their_id);
            return rssi_to_distance_cm(smoothed_rssi(tracker),
CURRENT_ENVIRONMENT);
        }
    }

    // Priority 3: Unknown – use conservative default
    // Using MAX_REASONABLE_DISTANCE (30m) makes consistency checks
LENIENT.
    // This is intentional: we'd rather miss an anomaly than false-alarm
when
    // distance is unknown. The behavioral fingerprint (Stratum 1) will
catch
    // attacks that spatial consistency misses.
    MAX_REASONABLE_DISTANCE
}

// IMPORTANT: distance estimation quality affects ONLY spatial gradient
checks.
// Temporal gradient checks and behavioral profiling are distance-
independent.
// Even with ±50% RSSI error, the system remains secure because:
// 1. Temporal checks catch rapid changes regardless of distance
// 2. Behavioral fingerprint catches sustained deviations
// 3. Neighbor correlation catches isolated anomalies
// 4. NK audit catches slow drift
// Distance is a "nice to have" for spatial gradient – not a single point
of failure.

```

---

## ES-12. Transport Layer

---

### ES-12.1 Transport Abstraction

```

// All BIA code talks to a Transport trait. Concrete implementations are
per-hardware.
// This allows the same BIA logic to run on BLE mesh, WiFi, LoRa, or
simulation.

trait Transport {
    fn broadcast(&self, msg: &[u8]); // send to all
neighbors
    fn send_to(&self, target: device_id, msg: &[u8]); // send to specific
device
    fn recv_nonblocking(&self) → Option<Message>; // poll for
incoming messa
ge
    fn recv_with_timeout(&self, ms: u32) → Option<Message>;

```

```

    fn last_rssi(&self) → i8;                                // RSSI of last
received message
    fn start_advertising(&self);
    fn start_scanning(&self);
    fn recv_queue_empty(&self) → bool;
}

```

## ES-12.2 BLE Mesh Implementation (Primary for Nano+Dust)

### BLUETOOTH CONFIGURATION:

Specification: Bluetooth Mesh (Mesh Profile 1.0.1)

Model: Vendor-specific model (Company ID: to be assigned)

Service UUID: 0xKB01 (placeholder, real UUID = 128-bit)

Advertising:

- Type: Connectable + Scannable Undirected (ADV\_IND)
- Interval: 100ms (during active phase), 1000ms (during sleep phase)
- TX Power: 0 dBm (default), adjustable -20 to +8 dBm per morphogenetic signal

Scanning:

- Window: 30ms
- Interval: 60ms (50% duty cycle during active)
- Active scan: Yes (to get scan response data)

### Connection:

Not used for data exchange (connectionless mesh)  
 BLE Mesh uses advertising-based bearer

### MTU:

Advertising PDU payload: 31 bytes (legacy) / 255 bytes (extended advertising)

For extended advertising (BT 5.0+): 255 bytes → all messages fit in 1 PDU

For legacy advertising: messages > 31 bytes need SEGMENTATION

### SEGMENTATION (legacy BLE only):

Header: [segment\_index: u8, total\_segments: u8, msg\_id: u16] = 4 bytes overhead

Payload per segment: 31 - 4 = 27 bytes

TRACE\_DEPOSIT (90B):  $\text{ceil}(90/27) = 4$  segments → 4 × advertising events

PRESENCE\_PULSE (78B):  $\text{ceil}(78/27) = 3$  segments

### Reassembly:

Receiver maintains reassembly buffer per (sender\_id, msg\_id) pair.  
 Timeout: 500ms. If not all segments received → discard.  
 Max concurrent reassemblies: 8 (per neighbor).

NOTE: With BT 5.0 extended advertising (255B), segmentation is unnecessary.

Phase 1 MVP SHOULD target BT 5.0 devices to avoid segmentation complexity.

### RELAY:

BLE Mesh relay is ENABLED on Nano nodes.

Nano nodes relay messages for Dust nodes that can't reach each other directly.

Relay TTL: 3 hops (adjustable via governance).

Relay cache: last 32 message hashes to prevent relay loops.

### NETWORK KEY:

All BIA devices in a deployment share a Network Key (NetKey).  
NetKey is provisioned during device enrollment (ES-13).  
NetKey provides network-layer encryption (AES-CCM).  
Application-layer integrity: Ed25519 signatures (per ES-2).

NOTE: NetKey prevents non-BIA devices from injecting messages into the mesh,  
but does NOT prevent compromised BIA devices from sending invalid data.  
That's what the immune system is for.

### ES-12.3 WiFi Implementation (Nano-to-Full, Nano-to-Nano long range)

#### WIFI CONFIGURATION:

Protocol: ESP-NOW (connectionless, peer-to-peer over WiFi PHY)  
Channel: Auto-negotiated, follows BLE mesh channel  
Encryption: CCMP (WPA2-equivalent, built into ESP-NOW)  
Max payload: 250 bytes (ESP-NOW limit) → all messages fit

#### Peer management:

Max ESP-NOW peers: 20 (ESP32 hardware limit)  
Peers = Nano nodes in range (discovered via BLE mesh)  
Fallback: standard WiFi + UDP multicast if ESP-NOW peer limit reached

#### UDP Multicast (fallback):

Address: 239.75.66.73 (0xEF.0x4B.0x42.0x49 = "KBIA" in ASCII offsets)  
Port: 47201  
TTL: 1 (link-local only)  
No ACK, no retransmit (same as BLE mesh — at-most-once delivery)

#### NANO → FULL NODE (batch submission):

Protocol: TCP over WiFi  
Port: 47202  
TLS: Required (TLS 1.3, server authenticates with Ed25519 cert)  
Message format: Length-prefixed (4-byte LE length + TraceBatch payload)  
Keepalive: 30s TCP keepalive  
Reconnect: Exponential backoff 1s → 2s → 4s → ... → 300s max

### ES-12.4 LoRa/LPWAN Implementation (Dust nodes)

#### LORA CONFIGURATION:

Frequency: Region-dependent (EU868: 868 MHz, US915: 915 MHz)  
Spreading Factor: SF12 (max range, min data rate)  
Bandwidth: 125 kHz  
Coding Rate: 4/5  
Max payload: 51 bytes (SF12, EU868) → compressed trace (8B) fits easily  
Duty cycle: 1% (EU regulation) → max 1 message per ~7 seconds at SF12

#### MESSAGE FLOW (Dust → Gateway → Nano):

1. Dust node wakes from deep sleep
2. Reads sensor
3. Builds compressed trace (8 bytes, ES-2.3)
4. Transmits via LoRa
5. Gateway (co-located with Nano or standalone) receives

```

6. Gateway wraps compressed trace into full TRACE_DEPOSIT:
   - Expands sender_id_short (2B) to full device_id (8B) from
registration table
   - Adds gateway-provided timestamp (if Dust has no RTC)
   - Signs with GATEWAY'S key (not Dust's – Dust has no Ed25519)
   - Sets confidence field to reflect gateway vouching (see ES-16)
7. Gateway injects into BLE/WiFi mesh as normal TRACE_DEPOSIT
8. Nano processes like any other trace (but with gateway trust
discount)

DOWNLINK (rare):
  - Gateway → Dust: VACCINE messages (condensed to 8 bytes)
  - Gateway → Dust: REJECTION_NOTICE (4 bytes: header + device_id_short)
  - Max 1 downlink per 10 uplinks (duty cycle budget)

```

## ES-12.5 Multicast vs Unicast Rules

```

MESSAGE DELIVERY MODE:
BROADCAST (BLE mesh advertising, ESP-NOW broadcast, UDP multicast):
  TRACE_DEPOSIT           - all neighbors need it for consensus
  PRESENCE_PULSE          - discovery protocol
  HEARTBEAT               - proof of life
  MODE_ANNOUNCE           - quorum state advertisement
  VACCINE                 - epidemic propagation
  DEATH_CERTIFICATE       - network-wide invalidation
  CONSISTENCY_ALERT       - network awareness

UNICAST (BLE mesh unicast, ESP-NOW peer, TCP):
  INFLAMMATION_QUERY      - sent to specific neighbors of suspect
  INFLAMMATION_REPLY      - reply to specific querier
  NK_AUDIT_REQUEST        - challenge to specific device
  NK_AUDIT_RESPONSE       - response to challenger
  PROFILE_SYNC            - targeted exchange between Nano nodes
  TIME_SYNC_REQUEST       - request to nearest clock source
  TIME_SYNC_RESPONSE      - response to requester
  MODULE_* (HGT)          - targeted module exchange
  TraceBatch              - Nano → specific Full node (TCP)

```

## ES-13. Cryptographic Initialization and Device Enrollment

### ES-13.1 PUF-Based Key Derivation

```

BOOT SEQUENCE (cryptographic):

1. SRAM PUF EXTRACTION:
  - Power on ESP32
  - Read uninitialized SRAM (first 4KB, before any write)
  - SRAM cells settle to device-specific pattern based on manufacturing
variation
  - Raw PUF response: 4096 bytes = 32768 bits

2. FUZZY EXTRACTION (BCH-based):
  - Fuzzy extractor parameters:
    n = 32768 (PUF response length in bits)

```



```

k = 256 (extracted key length in bits)
t = 5120 (error correction capacity = 15.6% BER tolerance)

- ENROLLMENT (first boot only):
  a. Read raw PUF response R
  b. Generate random 256-bit seed S
  c. Encode S using BCH(32768, 256, 5120) → codeword C
  d. Compute helper data:  $W = R \oplus C$ 
  e. Store W in flash (public – knowing W without R reveals nothing about S)
  f. Derive key pair from S

- RECONSTRUCTION (every subsequent boot):
  a. Read raw PUF response R' (noisy version of R)
  b. Load helper data W from flash
  c. Compute  $C' = R' \oplus W$  (noisy codeword)
  d. BCH decode  $C' \rightarrow C$  (corrects up to  $t=5120$  bit errors)
  e. Recover  $S = \text{BCH\_message}(C)$ 
  f. Derive same key pair from S

- BIT ERROR RATE MONITORING:
  ber = hamming_distance(R', R_enrolled) / 32768
  Store ber_history[8] in flash (last 8 boots).
  If ber > 0.12 (approaching 0.156 limit): set PUF_DEGRADATION_WARNING flag.
  If ber > 0.156: BCH decode fails → PUF_FAIL → APOPTOTIC.

3. KEY DERIVATION (from seed S):
  - signing_privkey = HKDF-SHA256(S, salt="krill-bia-sign", info="ed25519-v1", len=32)
  - signing_pubkey  = Ed25519_pubkey(signing_privkey)
  - device_id       = BLAKE2s(signing_pubkey)[0..8] // truncated to 8 bytes
  - network_auth_key = HKDF-SHA256(S, salt="krill-bia-net", info="mesh-auth-v1", len=16)
    // Used for BLE mesh network authentication during provisioning

STORAGE:
  - Flash (persistent):
    helper_data_W: 4096 bytes (PUF helper data)
    ber_history: 8 bytes
    enrolled_flag: 1 byte (0x00 = first boot, 0xFF = enrolled)
  - RAM (derived each boot):
    signing_privkey: 32 bytes (NEVER written to flash)
    signing_pubkey: 32 bytes
    device_id: 8 bytes
    network_auth_key: 16 bytes

```

## ES-13.2 Device Enrollment Protocol

ENROLLMENT FLOW (new device joining network):

### 1. PROVISIONER ROLE:

- Any Nano node in NORMAL state with weight  $\geq 0.8$  can act as provisioner.
- Provisioner must be connected to  $\geq 3$  other Nano nodes (QUORUM or SWARM).
- In Phase 1 MVP: enrollment requires physical button press on provisioner (prevents remote enrollment of rogue devices).

### 2. PROTOCOL:

NEW DEVICE (Neonatal)	PROVISIONER (Nano)
Boots, extracts PUF, derives keys	
Enters NEONATAL state	
Broadcasts ENROLLMENT_REQUEST:	
{ device_id, pubkey, capabilities,	
sensor_types[], hw_version }	→ Receives request
	→ Operator presses ENROLL button
	(or: auto-accept if deployment
manifest	includes this device_id)
	→ Validates: device_id not already
registered	
	→ Generates ENROLLMENT_RESPONSE:
	{ provisioner_id,
network_key_encrypted,	time_sync, deployment_zone,
	initial_neighbor_list[] }
	←
Receives response	
Decrypts network_key using	
Diffie-Hellman(my_privkey, provisioner_pubkey)	
Sets system clock from time_sync	
Stores network_key in RAM	
Enters BLE mesh with network_key	
Begins NEONATAL period	

3. ENROLLMENT MESSAGE (new wire format):

MessageType ENROLLMENT\_REQUEST = 0x60  
 MessageType ENROLLMENT\_RESPONSE = 0x61

ENROLLMENT_REQUEST:			
Offset	Size	Field	Description
12		header	msg_type = 0x60
32		pubkey	Ed25519 public key
1		capability_flags	bit 0=BLE, 1=WiFi, 2=LoRa, 3=UWB
1		sensor_count	number of sensors
N		sensor_types	N × QuantityType (1 byte each)
46+N	2	hw_version	hardware revision
48+N	64	signature	Ed25519(self-signed, proves key ownership)

ENROLLMENT_RESPONSE:			
Offset	Size	Field	Description
12		header	msg_type = 0x61
8		target_device_id	who this response is for
32		provisioner_pubkey	for DH key exchange
32		network_key_enc	NetKey encrypted with DH shared secret
4		time_sync	current timestamp
2		deployment_zone	zone assignment
64		signature	Ed25519(provisioner key)

4. KEY ROTATION:

- Normal operation: keys are NEVER rotated (PUF-derived, stable).
- If PUF degrades: device issues DEATH\_CERTIFICATE with old key, undergoes physical re-enrollment with new PUF extraction → new identity.
- If network key is compromised: provisioner broadcasts KEY\_ROTATION

```
message
  with new NetKey encrypted to each device's pubkey individually.
  Deadline: 24 hours. Devices that don't rotate are excluded from mesh.
```

## ES-13.3 Dust Node Enrollment (Simplified)

Dust nodes CANNOT run Ed25519 (insufficient compute/RAM on nRF52832 class).

### DUST ENROLLMENT:

1. Dust node has factory-provisioned 128-bit symmetric key (AES-128).
2. During deployment, operator registers (dust\_id, symmetric\_key) in gateway.
3. Gateway maintains lookup table: dust\_id\_short (2B) → { device\_id (8B), aes\_key (16B) }.
4. Dust traces are authenticated via CRC-8 (ES-2.3) – NOT cryptographically signed.
5. Gateway verifies CRC, wraps in full TRACE\_DEPOSIT, signs with gateway's Ed25519 key.
6. Trust chain: Dust → symmetric auth → Gateway → Ed25519 → Network.

LIMITATION: If gateway is compromised, all Dust traces through that gateway are suspect.

Mitigation: Multiple gateways per zone, cross-validation between gateway-submitted traces.

### STORAGE (Gateway):

Per Dust device: 2 + 8 + 16 = 26 bytes.

For 1000 Dust devices: 26 KB. Fits easily in Nano flash.

## ES-14. Flash Layout and Persistence

### ES-14.1 Flash Partitioning (ESP32 — 4MB Flash)

#### PARTITION TABLE:

Offset	Size	Name	Content
0x000000	0x008000	nvs	Non-Volatile Storage (ESP-IDF NVS)
0x008000	0x001000	phy_init	WiFi/BLE calibration data
0x009000	0x001000	otadata	OTA partition tracking
0x010000	0x180000	app0	Firmware image A (1.5 MB)
0x190000	0x180000	app1	Firmware image B (OTA, 1.5 MB)
0x310000	0x001000	krill_meta	BIA metadata (enrolled flag, PUF helper, etc.)
0x311000	0x040000	krill_dag	DAG storage (256 KB)
0x351000	0x020000	krill_profiles	Behavioral profiles (128 KB)
0x371000	0x004000	krill_state	Node state + quorum state (16 KB)
0x375000	0x001000	krill_deploy	Deployment manifest (4 KB)
0x376000	0x08A000	krill_reserve	Reserved for future (552 KB)
Total:	0x400000	(4 MB)	

## ES-14.2 krill\_meta Partition Layout

Offset	Size	Field	Description
0x000	1	enrolled_flag	0x00=first boot, 0xFF=enrolled
0x001	1	protocol_version	PROTOCOL_VERSION at time of enrollment
0x002	2	hw_version	hardware revision
0x004	4096	puf_helper_data_W	fuzzy extractor helper data
0x1004	8	ber_history	last 8 boot BER values (u8 each, ×255 = percentage)
0x100C	32	pubkey_cache	cached public key (for verification, not security)
0x102C	8	device_id_cache	cached device_id
0x1034	4	enrollment_timestamp	when device was enrolled
0x1038	2	deployment_zone	assigned zone
0x103A	16	network_key_enc	encrypted NetKey (decrypted at boot via PUF)
0x104A	4	boot_count	total boot counter
0x104E	4	last_boot_timestamp	when device last booted
0x1052	1	puf_warning_flag	0x00=OK, 0x01=BER>12% warning
0x1053	1	reserved	
Total: ~4180 bytes (fits in 4KB partition with margin)			

## ES-14.3 State Persistence Strategy

WHAT IS PERSISTED (and when):

1. CRITICAL STATE (persisted every `TIMER_FLASH_FLUSH = 60s`):
  - `NodeState.state`, `entered_at`, `neonatal_start`
  - `NodeState.immunological_weight`
  - `NodeState.last_heartbeat`
  - `NodeState.remediation_attempts`
  - `QuorumState.mode`, `last_mode_change`
2. DAG (persisted incrementally):
  - Each new DAG entry is appended to `krill_dag` partition
  - DAG GC rewrites the partition (compaction)
  - Format: sequential `DAGEntry` structs (58 bytes each)
  - Header: [`entry_count`: u16, `tip_hash`: hash20, `checksum`: u32]
  - Max entries:  $256\text{KB} / 58\text{B} = \sim 4413$  entries (capped at `MAX_DAG_ENTRIES = 4096`)
3. PROFILES (persisted every 10th epoch = 10 min):
  - Serialized `HashMap<device_id, BehavioralProfile>`
  - Format: [`profile_count`: u16, then sequential (`device_id`, `BehavioralProfile`) pairs]
  - Max profiles:  $128\text{KB} / 500\text{B} = \sim 256$  profiles
4. NEIGHBOR TABLE (NOT persisted – rebuilt from presence pulses):
  - Neighbors are transient; rebuilding from scratch takes ~30 seconds
  - Not worth flash wear for data that changes every 10 seconds

FLASH WEAR MANAGEMENT:

- ESP32 flash endurance: ~100,000 write cycles per sector (4KB)
- At 1 write/minute to `krill_state`:  $100,000 \text{ min} = \sim 69 \text{ days}$  per sector
- MITIGATION: Use NVS library (wear-leveling built-in) for state partition
- DAG partition: wear-leveled via rotating write pointer + compaction
- Profiles: written every 10 min →  $100,000 \times 10 \text{ min} = \sim 694 \text{ days} = \sim 1.9 \text{ years}$

- For 5-year lifetime: implement sector rotation (3 sectors minimum)

BOOT SEQUENCE (state restoration):

1. Read krill\_meta: verify enrolled\_flag, increment boot\_count
2. Extract PUF, derive keys
3. Read krill\_state: restore NodeState and QuorumState
4. Read krill\_dag: restore LocalDAG, rebuild PheromoneField from DAG entries
5. Read krill\_profiles: restore behavioral profiles
6. If any partition has invalid checksum: start with empty state for that component  
(DAG and profiles will rebuild naturally; state defaults to NEONATAL)
7. Resume main loop

## ES-14.4 Dust Node Flash Layout (nRF52 — 256KB Flash)

PARTITION TABLE (nRF52832, 256KB flash):

Offset	Size	Name	Content
0x000000	0x01C000	softdevice	BLE softdevice (112 KB)
0x01C000	0x01C000	application	Firmware (112 KB)
0x038000	0x001000	dust_meta	Enrolled flag, symmetric key, device_id (4 KB)
0x039000	0x003800	dust_dag	Micro-DAG (14 KB, ~240 entries)
0x03C800	0x001000	dust_state	Minimal state (4 KB)
0x03D800	0x002800	dust_reserve	Reserved (10 KB)
Total:	0x040000	(256 KB)	

Active RAM usage: ~2 KB (current trace, working buffers, radio stack)

## ES-15. Rate Limiting and DoS Protection

### ES-15.1 Rate Limiter Design

```
// Per-device, per-message-type token bucket rate limiter.
// Prevents flood attacks from compromised devices.

struct RateLimiter {
    buckets: HashMap<(device_id, MessageType), TokenBucket>,
}

struct TokenBucket {
    tokens:      u16,          // current token count
    max_tokens:  u16,          // bucket capacity
    refill_rate: u16,          // tokens per epoch (60s)
    last_refill: timestamp,
}

// Rate limits per message type (tokens per epoch):
RATE_LIMITS = {
    TRACE_DEPOSIT: 15,        // max 15 traces/min (normal: 12 at 5s interval)
    PRESENCE_PULSE: 8,        // max 8 pulses/min (normal: 6 at 10s interval)
    CONSISTENCY_ALERT: 5,     // max 5 alerts/min
    INFLAMMATION_QUERY: 3,    // max 3 queries/min (expensive operation)
```

```

    INFLAMMATION_REPLY: 10,      // max 10 replies/min (responding to
multiple queries)
    VACCINE: 2,                  // max 2 vaccines/min (epidemic propagation
is slow)
    HEARTBEAT: 4,                // max 4 heartbeats/min (normal: 2 at 30s
interval)
    DEATH_CERTIFICATE: 1,        // max 1 death cert/min (should be very
rare)
    PROFILE_SYNC: 2,             // max 2 syncs/min
    ENROLLMENT_REQUEST: 1,       // max 1 enrollment/min per device
    // All others: 5,            // default
}

fn check_rate_limit(
    limiter: &mut RateLimiter,
    sender: device_id,
    msg_type: MessageType,
    now: timestamp,
) → bool {
    let key = (sender, msg_type);
    let bucket = limiter.buckets.entry(key).or_insert_with(|| {
        let limit = RATE_LIMITS.get(&msg_type).unwrap_or(&5);
        TokenBucket {
            tokens: *limit,
            max_tokens: *limit,
            refill_rate: *limit,
            last_refill: now,
        }
    });

    // Refill tokens
    let elapsed_epochs = (now - bucket.last_refill) / EPOCH_DURATION;
    if elapsed_epochs > 0 {
        bucket.tokens = (bucket.tokens + bucket.refill_rate *
elapsed_epochs as u16)
            .min(bucket.max_tokens);
        bucket.last_refill = now;
    }

    // Consume token
    if bucket.tokens > 0 {
        bucket.tokens -= 1;
        true // allowed
    } else {
        false // rate limited – drop message
    }
}

```

## ES-15.2 Duplicate Detection

```

// Sequence number tracking prevents replay attacks and duplicate
processing.

struct DuplicateDetector {
    seen: HashMap<device_id, SeqTracker>,
}

struct SeqTracker {
    last_seq: u8,
    seen_bitmap: u32, // bitmap of last 32 sequence numbers
}

fn is_duplicate(

```

```

    detector: &mut DuplicateDetector,
    sender: device_id,
    seq_num: u8,
) → bool {
    let tracker = detector.seen.entry(sender).or_insert(SeqTracker {
        last_seq: seq_num.wrapping_sub(1),
        seen_bitmap: 0,
    });

    let delta = seq_num.wrapping_sub(tracker.last_seq);

    if delta == 0 {
        return true; // exact duplicate
    }

    if delta ≤ 32 {
        // Recent message – check bitmap
        let bit = 1u32 << (delta - 1);
        if tracker.seen_bitmap & bit ≠ 0 {
            return true; // already seen
        }
        tracker.seen_bitmap |= bit;
        return false;
    }

    if delta > 32 && delta < 224 {
        // Far ahead – accept, reset tracker (missed messages in between)
        tracker.last_seq = seq_num;
        tracker.seen_bitmap = 0;
        return false;
    }

    // delta ≥ 224: likely a wrapped-around old message, reject
    true
}

```

### ES-15.3 Flood Detection and Temporary Blacklist

```

struct FloodDetector {
    counters:      HashMap<device_id, FloodCounter>,
    blacklist:     HashMap<device_id, timestamp>, // blacklisted until
timestamp
}

struct FloodCounter {
    total_this_epoch: u16,
    rejected_this_epoch: u16, // rate-limited messages count
}

FLOOD_THRESHOLD      = 50 // if >50 messages rejected in 1 epoch
→ blacklist
BLACKLIST_DURATION   = 300 // 5 minutes

fn check_flood(
    detector: &mut FloodDetector,
    sender: device_id,
    was_rate_limited: bool,
    now: timestamp,
) → bool {
    // Check blacklist
    if let Some(&until) = detector.blacklist.get(&sender) {
        if now < until {
            return false; // still blacklisted, drop silently
        }
    }
}

```

```

    }
    detector.blacklist.remove(&sender);
}

let counter = detector.counters.entry(sender).or_insert(FloodCounter {
    total_this_epoch: 0,
    rejected_this_epoch: 0,
});

counter.total_this_epoch += 1;
if was_rate_limited {
    counter.rejected_this_epoch += 1;
}

if counter.rejected_this_epoch > FLOOD_THRESHOLD {
    // Blacklist this device
    detector.blacklist.insert(sender, now + BLACKLIST_DURATION);
    // Optionally: broadcast CONSISTENCY_ALERT about flooding device
    return false;
}

true
}

// Reset counters at epoch boundary:
fn reset_flood_counters(detector: &mut FloodDetector) {
    detector.counters.clear();
}

```

## ES-15.4 BLE Mesh Layer Protection

MESH-LEVEL PROTECTIONS (in addition to application-level rate limiting):

1. NETWORK LAYER ENCRYPTION:
  - BLE Mesh encrypts all messages with NetKey (AES-128-CCM)
  - Devices without NetKey cannot inject messages
  - Protects against external (non-BIA) attackers
2. RELAY CACHE:
  - Each Nano node maintains a relay cache of last 32 message hashes
  - Prevents relay amplification attacks (same message relayed in circles)
  - Hash: BLAKE2s(msg[0..header\_size + 8])[0..4] = 4-byte truncated hash
3. TTL ENFORCEMENT:
  - All relayed messages have TTL decremented
  - Messages with TTL=0 are NOT relayed
  - Default TTL: 3 (covers ~3 hops / ~30m BLE range / ~90m effective range)
  - Vaccine messages: TTL=10 (wider propagation needed)
4. ADVERTISING RATE LIMIT:
  - BLE specification limits advertising to minimum 20ms interval
  - Hardware enforced – cannot be bypassed by compromised firmware
  - At 100ms advertising interval: max 10 advertisements/second per device
  - This is a natural hardware-level DoS ceiling



## ES-16. LPWAN Gateway Trust Model

### ES-16.1 Problem Statement

Dust nodes communicate via LPWAN (LoRa) through a gateway. The gateway wraps unsigned 8-byte compressed traces into signed 90-byte TRACE\_DEPOSITS. This creates a trust dependency on the gateway. If a gateway is compromised, it can forge traces for any Dust device it manages.

### ES-16.2 Trust Architecture

TRUST LEVELS (reflected in confidence field):

confidence\_t values for gateway-vouched traces:

```
DIRECT_SIGNED      = 255    // device signed with own Ed25519 key (Nano nodes)
GATEWAY_VOUCHERED_OK = 180    // gateway vouches, ≥2 gateways agree
GATEWAY_VOUCHERED_1 = 128    // single gateway vouching (default for LPWAN)
GATEWAY_UNVERIFIED  = 64     // gateway vouches but CRC check failed / timing anomaly
GATEWAY_SUSPECT     = 0      // gateway under investigation
```

IMPACT ON BIA MECHANISMS:

- Pheromone field: confidence is multiplied into weight, so gateway-vouched traces have 50-70% influence of directly-signed traces.
- Behavioral profile: gateway-vouched traces update profile normally, but anomaly thresholds are relaxed by 20% (to account for gateway timing jitter).
- NK audit: drift threshold raised by  $1.0\sigma$  for Dust devices ( $\text{DRIFT\_THRESHOLD} = 6.0\sigma$  instead of  $5.0\sigma$ ) because Dust profiles are noisier.

### ES-16.3 Gateway Verification Protocol

CROSS-GATEWAY VALIDATION:

If a Dust device is in range of multiple gateways (ideal deployment):

```
Gateway A receives compressed trace from Dust device D
Gateway B receives same compressed trace from Dust device D
```

Both gateways independently produce TRACE\_DEPOSITS:

```
trace_A = { sender=D, reading=X, timestamp=T_a, sig=sig_A }
trace_B = { sender=D, reading=X, timestamp=T_b, sig=sig_B }
```

Nano node receives both:

```
if trace_A.reading == trace_B.reading:
    confidence = GATEWAY_VOUCHERED_OK (180)    // corroborated by 2 gateways
else:
    // Gateways disagree – one may be compromised
    confidence = GATEWAY_UNVERIFIED (64)
    trigger INFLAMMATION for both gateways
```

GATEWAY HEALTH MONITORING (run on Nano nodes):

```
struct GatewayProfile {
    gateway_id:      device_id,
    dust_devices:     [device_id; 256],    // Dust devices this gateway
serves
    dust_count:      u16,
    traces_received:  u32,                  // total traces received via
this gateway
    anomalies_flagged: u16,                  // traces that triggered immune
response
    anomaly_rate:     f16,                  // anomalies / total (EMA
smoothed)
    last_cross_validated: timestamp,        // when another gateway last
corroborated
}

fn evaluate_gateway_trust(
    gw: &mut GatewayProfile,
    trace_was_anomalous: bool,
) → confidence_t {
    gw.traces_received += 1;
    if trace_was_anomalous {
        gw.anomalies_flagged += 1;
    }

    // EMA anomaly rate
    let instant_rate = if trace_was_anomalous { 1.0 } else { 0.0 };
    gw.anomaly_rate = 0.99 * gw.anomaly_rate + 0.01 * instant_rate;

    if gw.anomaly_rate > 0.20 {
        // >20% anomaly rate from this gateway – suspect
        GATEWAY_SUSPECT // 0: effectively removes all Dust traces via this
gateway
    } else if gw.anomaly_rate > 0.05 {
        GATEWAY_UNVERIFIED // 64: reduced trust
    } else if now() - gw.last_cross_validated < 3600 {
        GATEWAY_VOUCHED_OK // 180: recently corroborated by another
gateway
    } else {
        GATEWAY_VOUCHED_1 // 128: normal single-gateway trust
    }
}
```

## ES-16.4 Gateway Registration

GATEWAY ENROLLMENT:

Gateways are Nano-class devices with LoRa radio in addition to BLE/WiFi. They enroll like any Nano node (ES-13.2) plus:

1. Operator registers gateway with its Dust device table:  
for each Dust device:  
    register\_dust(dust\_id\_short, dust\_device\_id, dust\_aes\_key)
2. Gateway advertises GATEWAY\_CAPABILITY in MODE\_ANNOUNCE:  
    capabilities\_flags bit 4 = LPWAN\_GATEWAY
3. Other Nano nodes recognize gateway and create GatewayProfile.
4. Gateway periodically broadcasts GATEWAY\_STATUS:  
    { gateway\_id, dust\_device\_count, uptime, anomaly\_rate\_self\_report }  
    (This is informational – Nano nodes compute their own anomaly rate.)

```
DUST_ID_SHORT COLLISION HANDLING:
  sender_id_short is 2 bytes = 65536 possible values.
  For deployments < 1000 Dust devices: collision probability < 1%.
  If collision detected (same id_short, different traces):
    Gateway disambiguates by LoRa device address (DevAddr in LoRaWAN) or
    timing pattern (each Dust device has slightly different crystal
    frequency,
    creating a natural "timing fingerprint" at ±5ppm resolution).
```

---

*This engineering specification is a companion to the KRILL-BIA research paper (v1.0, February 2026). It provides the implementation-level detail needed to build a working prototype. Where the research paper says "what" and "why," this document says "how" and "exactly how many bytes."*

*Version 0.2 — Updated with: main loop (ES-10), distance estimation (ES-11), transport layer (ES-12), crypto init (ES-13), flash layout (ES-14), rate limiting (ES-15), LPWAN gateway trust (ES-16). Fixed: prev\_hash 2B→4B, quorum hysteresis consistency, test vector comments.*

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## Supporting This Work

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This engineering specification — and the KRILL project as a whole — is open and freely available. If you implement this protocol, use it in a product, or build research on top of it, please consider supporting further development:

**Ethereum / ERC-20 / Base / Arbitrum / Polygon:**

```
0x0BC290355c0B16B5B247701B7BC9AB2E1e61ffa7
```

**What your support enables:**

- Reference firmware for ESP32 (Nano) and nRF52840 (Dust)
- Hardware test lab with 50+ device mesh for validation
- Formal TLA+ model of consensus and NK audit protocols
- Bounty program for community-discovered spec bugs

Code contributions are equally welcome — see the project repository for open issues and contribution guidelines.

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This document is released for public review and implementation.