TPM-Based Attestation of IoT Devices

Cyber-Security Event Singapore, March 10

Prof. Andreas Steffen
Institute for Networked Solutions
HSR University of Applied Sciences Rapperswil andreas.steffen@hsr.ch







Where the heck is Rapperswil?





HSR - Hochschule für Technik Rapperswil



- University of Applied Sciences with about 1500 students
- Faculty of Information Technology (300-400 students)
- Bachelor Course (3 years), Master Course (+1.5 years)



strongSwan – the OpenSource VPN Solution



FHO Fachhochschule Ostschweiz



Windows Active Directory Server

Linux FreeRadius Server

Corporate Network

High-Availability strongSwan VPN Gateway

strong



Internet

Windows 7/8/10 Agile VPN Client





strongSwan Linux Client

Andreas Steffen, 10.03.2017, HSR_Singapore.pptx 4

Connection <u>n</u>ame: HSR

Connect <u>a</u>utomatically

VPN IPv4 Settings

Gateway

Authentication: EAP

Client

strongswan.hsr.ch

QuoVadis Root CA 2.crt

asteffen

Request an inner IP address
 Enforce UDP encapsulation


Use IP compression

Free Download from Google Play Store


CHF 29.90



FHO Fachhochschule Ostschweiz



6. NCP VPN Client



October 16, 2016: 21'816 installations

United States	5,434	24.91%
China	2,640	12.10%
Germany	2,043	9.36%
■ United Kingdom	1,333	6.11%
□ ■ Canada	858	3.93%
□ ■ Russia	735	3.37%
☐ France	722	3.31%
□ Netherlands	477	2.19%
Australia	465	2.13%
☐ I Japan	445	2.04%
Others	6,664	30.55%

TPM-Based Attestation of IoT Devices

Cyber-Security Event Singapore, March 10

Attestation of IoT Devices based on Trusted Network Connect (TNC)











The Energy Grid



FHO Fachhochschule Ostschweiz

Network devices and SCADA components controlling the energy grid are extremely vulnerable to cyber attacks!

It is important to be able to detect malware embedding itself into IoT firmware.





RSA 2015 Security Conference San Francisco












Cisco 1120 Connected Grid Router with strongSwan running on Linux Guest OS

Trusted Network Connect (TNC) Architecture





Layered TNC Protocol Stack



TNC Measurement Data

```
[IMV] operating system name is 'Android' from vendor Google
[IMV] operating system version is '4.2.1'
[IMV] device ID is cf5e4cbcc6e6a2db
```

IF-M Measurement Protocol

PA-TNC (RFC 5792)

```
[TNC] handling PB-PA message type 'IETF/Operating System' 0x000000/0x00000001

[IMV] IMV 1 "OS" received message for Connection ID 1 from IMC 1

[TNC] processing PA-TNC message with ID 0xec41ce1d

[TNC] processing PA-TNC attribute type 'IETF/Product Information' 0x000000/0x00000002

[TNC] processing PA-TNC attribute type 'IETF/String Version' 0x000000/0x00000004

[TNC] processing PA-TNC attribute type 'ITA-HSR/Device ID' 0x00902a/0x00000008
```

IF-TNCCS TNC Client-Server Protocol

PB-TNC (RFC 5793)

```
[TNC] received TNCCS batch (160 bytes) for Connection ID 1
[TNC] PB-TNC state transition from 'Init' to 'Server Working'
[TNC] processing PB-TNC CDATA batch
[TNC] processing PB-Language-Preference message (31 bytes)
[TNC] processing PB-PA message (121 bytes)
[TNC] setting language preference to 'en'
```

IF-T Transport Protocol

PT-EAP (RFC 7171)

```
[NET] received packet: from 152.96.15.29[50871] to 77.56.144.51[4500] (320 bytes)
[ENC] parsed IKE_AUTH request 8 [ EAP/RES/TTLS ]
[IKE] received tunneled EAP-TTLS AVP [EAP/RES/PT]
```

Demo: Mutually Trusted Video Phones



FHO Fachhochschule Ostschweiz



CeBIT 2016 Hannover:

Raspberry Pi 2 IoT Platform Raspian OS (Debian 8) Intel TSS 2.0 Stack Infineon HW TPM 2.0








Mutual Attestation of IoT Devices





^{*} IMA: Integrity Measurement Architecture

File Version Management using SWID Tags



- ISO/IEC 19770-2:2015 Software Asset Management Part 2: Software Identification Tag
- NISTIR 8060 Guidelines for the Creation of Interoperable SWID Tags

```
<SoftwareIdentity xmlns="http://standards.iso.org/iso/19770/-2/2015/schema.xsd"</pre>
  name="libssl1.0.0" tagId="Ubuntu_16.04-x86_64-libssl1.0.0-1.0.2g-1ubuntu4.6"
  version="1.0.2g-1ubuntu4.6" versionScheme="alphanumeric">
  <Entity name="strongSwan Project" regid="strongswan.org" role="tagCreator"/>
  <Payload>
    <Directory name="/lib/x86 64-linux-gnu" >
      <File name="libcrypto.so.1.0.0" size="2361856"</pre>
         SHA256: hash="879a98c17952cd00d20cf42e83b1c54b4187f48dccb06cc8cc80ac2505a4db56"/>
      <File name="libssl.so.1.0.0" size="42834"</pre>
         SHA256: hash="b46a5c50ee77d7fe59fdb0eb1bae18a724c0e7962b5f228e2d901d6bff93be26"/>
    </Directory>
    <Directory name ="/usr/lib/x86 64-linux-gnu/openssl-1.0.0/engines">
      <File name="libatalla.so" size= "15488"</pre>
         SHA256: hash=" 3e3a07ac750d335555230c1b438c844f7983044a4efcf2c2564670d98549ca9c"/>
    </Directory>
    <Directory name ="/usr/share/doc/libssl1.0.0">
      <File name="copyright" size= "6547"</pre>
         SHA256: hash="df574956b215bcdb0fb9e1b7b1562c9f172f1b5243d03b2f5bab5ecc68300ac5"/>
    </Directory>
  </Payload>
</SoftwareIdentity>
```

Conclusion



- A Trusted Platform Module (TPM) allows the reliable detection of any unauthorized change in the BIOS and operating system of an IoT device, solving the lying endpoint problem.
- Attestation measurements are digitally signed by the TPM thus asserting the trustworthiness.
- Additionally a TPM offers a secure and trustworthy hardware identity derived from a unique Endorsement Seed permanently programmed into the TPM during the manufacturing or provisioning process.
- Modern Intel and ARM processors offer a built-in firmware TPM based on Intel Platform Trust Technology (PTT) and ARM TrustZone, respectively.
- The strongSwan open source project offers a full implementation of the Trusted Network Connect (TNC) Internet standards, allowing the remote or mutual attestation of IoT devices.



Thank you for your attention!

Questions?

www.strongswan.org/tnc/

