1

[MN 24:14.1–14.2](https://suttacentral.net/XXX/en/sujato" \l "YYY) M I 145

2

Sunyo 2021

3

For example Ñāṇananda 2016 p.71: “What the Arahants have done is to bring consciousness to such a state where it gets no footing on name-and-form. In other words, it is the state of unestablished consciousness (appatiṭṭhita viññaṇa).”

4

For example Harvey 1995 p.202, Ṭhānissaro 2008a p.118, Pasanno p.155, Cintita p.179

5

See Bodhi 2000 p.840 “The five aggregates are so called because they each unite under one label a multiplicity of phenomena that share the same defining characteristic.”

6

[SN 22.82:6.1–6.7](https://suttacentral.net/XXX/en/sujato" \l "YYY), [MN 109:8.1–8.7](https://suttacentral.net/XXX/en/sujato" \l "YYY) M III 17

7

For example [SN 22.59:10.1](https://suttacentral.net/XXX/en/sujato" \l "YYY)

8

As Ṭhānissaro 2018 p.6

9

[MN 49:25.1](https://suttacentral.net/XXX/en/sujato" \l "YYY) M I 330. For a discussion see Sunyo 2021

10

See [SN 22.56:13.1–14.2](https://suttacentral.net/XXX/en/sujato" \l "YYY), where in context of the five aggregates, the aggregate of consciousness is also defined as that of the six senses.

11

[SN 12.2:12.1–12.4](https://suttacentral.net/XXX/en/sujato" \l "YYY), [SN 12.27:3.9](https://suttacentral.net/XXX/en/sujato" \l "YYY), [SN 12.28:3.9](https://suttacentral.net/XXX/en/sujato" \l "YYY), [SN 12.33:9.9](https://suttacentral.net/XXX/en/sujato" \l "YYY)

12

[SN 56.28](https://suttacentral.net/XXX/en/sujato" \l "YYY) explains: “They are called ‘noble one’s truths’ (ariya-sacca), because in this world […] the Truth­finder (tathāgata) is the noble one (ariya).” Norman 1997 p.16 wrote: “My own feeling is that it is very likely that ‘the truth of the noble one (the Buddha)’ is the correct translation.” See also Norman 2008 and Harvey 2009

13

Tatra tatra, ‘in various realms’. [MN 2:8.8](https://suttacentral.net/XXX/en/sujato" \l "YYY) and [MN 38:5.11](https://suttacentral.net/XXX/en/sujato" \l "YYY) use tatra tatra (more literally ‘in various places’) explicitly for rebirth in different realms. That this is also the intended meaning in the second truth is indicated by it being about the craving that leads to a next life. [Sujato 2023](https://suttacentral.net/XXX/en/sujato" \l "YYY) translates “in various different realms”.

14

[SN 56.13:3.1–3.4](https://suttacentral.net/XXX/en/sujato" \l "YYY)

15

See also Piyadassi p.5, Bodhi 1984 p.5 n.2, Bodhi 2015 p.19

16

[AN 3.61:15.1–15.14](https://suttacentral.net/XXX/en/sujato" \l "YYY)

17

Paṭiccasamuppādaṁ, ‘the dependent arising of things’. By this I mean the actual principles existing in nature, rather than the Buddha’s teachings on these principles, which I call ‘Dependent Arising’.

The term is sometimes translated as ‘dependent co-arising’, but the prefix saṁ- in samuppāda is simply a redundancy for the following prefix up- (=ud-). As PED says under saṁ-: “very often merely pleonastic, esp. in comb[inatio]n with other prefixes.” Therefore, under samuppajjati it simply has, “to arise, to be produced”. No other dictionary suggests ‘co-arising’ either. To give some examples of the word samuppāda in a daily-life context: [SN 3.25:2.14](https://suttacentral.net/XXX/en/sujato" \l "YYY) mentions the arising (samuppanne) of a great peril, namely a mountain that crushes everything; [AN 8.54:6.1, 6.7, 7.1, 7.7](https://suttacentral.net/XXX/en/sujato" \l "YYY) mentions wealth that has arisen (samuppannānaṁ); [Kp 8:1.3](https://suttacentral.net/XXX/en/sujato" \l "YYYhttps://suttacentral.net/XXX/en/sujato%23YYY) mentions the arising (samuppanne) of a need to use stored up wealth; [Thag 1.30:1.3](https://suttacentral.net/XXX/en/sujato" \l "YYY) mentions the arising (samuppanno) of sickness; and [Iti 43:3.1](https://suttacentral.net/XXX/en/sujato" \l "YYY) uses ‘arisen’ (samuppannaṁ) as a synonym for ‘born’ (jātaṁ) and ‘came to be’ (bhūtaṁ). We do not speak of a co-arising of sickness or wealth, nor does there seem to be a good justification, certainly not on a linguistic basis, to speak of a co-arising of death, for instance. Samupajjati is simply a synonym for upajjati, including in the context of Dependent Arising. There is also no such thing as “saṁ-nirodha” (“co-cessation”) but only nirodha (cessation), which indicates “co-” is not intended in samuppāda either. See also Jones 2021 p.234: “When translating the expression paṭicca-samuppāda in the Pāli Canon, it therefore seems inappropriate to use words like ‘co-arising’ or ‘co-production’.” Schmithausen 1997 n.73 similarly concluded: “It is not probable that the prefix saṁ- was, from the outset, intended to convey such a heavy meaning.”

18

[MN 28:28.5–28.9](https://suttacentral.net/XXX/en/sujato" \l "YYY) M I 191

19

[SN 22.5:2.1–4.10](https://suttacentral.net/XXX/en/sujato" \l "YYY)

20

[SN 22.30](https://suttacentral.net/XXX/en/sujato" \l "YYY)

21

As glossed by PED, CPD, CPED, DOP, DPD. I translate it as ‘production’ primarily to illustrate the simile of the painter, which uses the same word for producing a painting. See also note 166

22

For example Bodhi 2012, [AN 10.65](https://suttacentral.net/XXX/en/sujato" \l "YYY)

23

[Ud 8.9:5.1–5.4](https://suttacentral.net/XXX/en/sujato" \l "YYY)

24

For the meaning of ‘fuel’ see for example [SN 44.9:6.5–6.6](https://suttacentral.net/XXX/en/sujato" \l "YYY): “When a being laid down their body and is not yet reborn in another body, I say craving is their fuel (upādāna), because craving is what fuels them at that time.” For the meaning of ‘taking up’ see for example [MN 75:24.6–24.8](https://suttacentral.net/XXX/en/sujato" \l "YYY) M I 512: “I have long been tricked, cheated, and deceived by this mind. For what I have been taking up was just form, sensation, perception, will, and consciousness. And dependent on that taking up (upādāna) of mine, there was existence.”

25

For the ten powers and four reasons to be self-confident see [MN 12:9.1–27.1](https://suttacentral.net/XXX/en/sujato" \l "YYY) M I 69

26

[SN 12.21](https://suttacentral.net/XXX/en/sujato" \l "YYY)

27

Imasmiṁ sati idaṁ hoti, ‘There will be this (idaṁ hoti), only if there is that (imasmiṁ sati)’. The clause imasmiṁ sati forms a locative absolute. There have been discussions whether this implies that the factors of Dependent Arising happen simultaneously or whether it allows for a separation in time (e.g. Brahmavamso 2002). But this misses the fact that the locative absolute, although it can have temporal connotations, can also form a conditional. Wijesekera 1993 §184 states: “the temporal notion is not the only idea expressed by the loc[ative] absolute. […] It may also signify a condition that exists or should exist for the fulfilment of the main action, which may be rendered by such expressions as ‘if, on condition, provided that’ etc.” See also Duroiselle §603 iii: “Sati, the locative singular of santo […] may also often be translated by ‘if, such being the case’.” This conditional meaning applies here. The clause imasmiṁ sati describes a general principle of dependency without any temporal implications.

By “a condition that exists or should exist” Wijesekera means the locative absolute can denote either a sufficient or a necessary condition. A necessary condition can be indicated with ‘provided that’, as Wijesekera suggests, but also with ‘only if’, as I have done. It is a subtle difference, but I think imasmiṁ sati idaṁ hoti should not be translated as “there will be this if there is that” (omitting ‘only’), because this forms a sufficient condition, and sufficiency does not apply to all the links—yet this statement is individually applied to all links, as in §11.

To give a general example first, “there will be rain if there are clouds” would mean it always rains whenever there are clouds. Clouds are sufficient for rain. However, “there will be rain only if there are clouds”, just means it cannot rain without clouds. Clouds are necessary for rain. In the context of Dependent Arising “there will be craving if there are sensations” would mean there will be craving whenever there are sensations. Sensations would be sufficient for craving. This is incorrect, because enlightened beings still experience sensations yet don’t have craving, and even when you’re not enlightened, you can experience sensations without craving, like in deep meditation. However, the translation “there will be craving only if there are sensations” instead means sensations are just a necessary condition for craving. Likewise, birth is not a sufficient condition for old age, since beings can die young. So there will be old age only if there is birth, not if there is birth. Or, if in §83 we were to translate the mutual dependency between consciousness and the immaterial aspects and body as “there will be the immaterial aspects and body if there is consciousness [and] there will be consciousness if there are the immaterial aspects and body”, we would technically say that the two factors keep each other in existence, since there are two statements of sufficiency. However, “there will the immaterial aspects and body only if there is consciousness [and] there will be consciousness only if there are the immaterial aspects and body” leaves room for ignorance and wilful actions to also be required. This mutual dependency is of course exactly what the simile of the bundles of reeds portrays (§95). The idea is that one bundle can stand only if the other stands; not that if one stands, the other also stands automatically.

Furthermore, if the links in Dependent Arising were translated as sufficient conditions (that is, using ‘if’ instead of ‘only if’) technically there could also be other sufficient conditions that lead to the same results. For example, wilful actions could then logically have been the result of something other than ignorance—knowledge, let’s say. For it would then be possible to say: “There will be wilful actions if there is ignorance, and there will be wilful actions if there is knowledge.” With ‘only if’ this does not work (as it shouldn’t): “There will be wilful actions only if there is ignorance, and there will be wilful actions only if there is knowledge.” The two statements conflict, because they are necessary conditions with opposing requirements. The whole point of the sequence of dependent arising is that all links are necessary conditions. Otherwise suffering could technically have been brought about through something other than ignorance.

The underlying issue is, this difference between ‘if’ and ‘only if’ does not exist in Pāli. The locative absolute can be translated as either, depending on the context. However, the context of Dependent Arising demands the latter. It demands necessary conditions. See also Jayatilleke p.449 on this phrase: “B does not occur unless A is present and occurs *only* when A is present.” (emphasis added)

28

See also Shulman p.299

29

More literally, ‘dependency (paccayatā) on something (idap)’. The term idappaccayatā is sometimes translated as ‘causality’, which may work too. However, to many people ‘to cause’ means “to actively produce as a result” (Wiktionary.com s.v. ‘cause’)—think of billiard balls bouncing against one another—and in context of Dependent Arising this kind of causality does not always apply. Birth does not actively produce death, for example. It is heart attacks and car crashes that do so, arguably. Neither do sensations actively produce craving: it is ignorance that does. Also, consciousness and nāmarūpa, which are mutually dependent, do not cause one another in an active way. They just rely on one another, as the simile of the reeds at §95 illustrates, both being in a sense “actively produced” by wilful actions. Jones 2022 p.135 agreed: “To understand them as a causal sequence, whereby ignorance is the cause of the inherited conditioning factors (saṅkhārā), feeling (vedanā) is the cause of craving, birth is the cause of ageing and death, and so on, leads to obscurity and contradiction. But to understand each of these conditionally-arisen phenomena as necessary and sometimes sufficient conditions for the arising of the next in the sequence allows for interpretations that are truer to the teachings.”

In everyday contexts the words paṭicca and paccaya also do not indicate what we normally call ‘causes’. It is said that the body depends on (paṭicca) food, and will die without it. ([SN 46.2:1.2](https://suttacentral.net/XXX/en/sujato" \l "YYYhttps://suttacentral.net/XXX/en/sujato%23YYY)) Food is not the cause of the body: it is just one condition necessary for its continuance. In context of Dependent Arising itself, the Longer Discourse on the Ending of Craving mentions that fire depends on (paṭicca) fuel. (§102) Fuel by itself does not really cause fire either. As to paccaya, a noble disciple is said to be ‘not dependent on others’ (aparappaccaya). These and other everyday uses of the words also indicate that Dependent Arising is about dependencies, not causalities, at least not in the way the word ‘cause’ is sometimes understood.

The word nidāna is sometimes also translated as ‘cause’, particularly in the title of the Mahānidāna Sutta, then called ‘The Great Discourse on Causality’. But a common translation for the word itself is ‘source’, which I think is more accurate. See for example Sujato 2023 at [AN 3.34](https://suttacentral.net/XXX/en/sujato" \l "YYY), Nidāna Sutta, titled ‘Sources’. As another example, discourses stemming from Sāvatthi are called Sāvatthi-nidānaṁ. In this light, the Mahānidāna Sutta should be called something like ‘The Great Discourse on the Sources [of things]’, although that definitely doesn’t sound as good. Schmithausen 2000 calls it the Great Discourse on the Underlying Factors (*Großen Lehrrede von den zugrundeliegenden Factoren*). In this book I just refer to the discourse by its Pāli name.

All that said, ‘causality’ is not wrong per se. There are various ways to define the term, some of which do not differ much from dependency, if at all. Pragmatically the difference between the two may have limited relevance as well, because whether we say death depends on birth or death is caused by birth, the fundamental problem remains the same. Many of the links are also causal no matter how we interpret it. I also use the word ‘cause’ in the main text, although in the translations I stuck to ‘condition’ for hetu and ‘requirement’ for paccaya. The words have a range of meaning that does not match a single English word, so these translations are not applicable throughout the canon, but they do work in the present context.

30

See also Brahmavamso 2002

31

DN 15:1.8 D II 55

32

SN 12.10

33

SN 12.23:4.3–4.5

34

See Collins p.109

35

wikipedia logo Wikipedia s.v. ‘presentism’.

36

Norman 1997 p.21

37

For traditional interpretations see for example Wayman 1971

38

Vism 523. See also Nyanatiloka p.7

39

For example Frauwallner 1953/1973 p.156 & 167, Bernhard p.56, Wayman 1971 p.186, Collins p.108, Vetter 1988 p.46, Vetter 1994, Mejor p.123, Schmithausen 2000 p.45, Jurewicz p.177, Ronkin n.43 p.238, Shulman p.89 n.71, Gombrich 2009 p.138

40

Vetter 1988 p.46

41

Bernhard p.56, translation mine

42

MĀ 97, T 14, and T 52. As also observed by Vetter 1994

43

DĀ 13

44

SN 12.43

45

Arguing for a late construction of the twelvefold sequence are for example Vetter 1994 and Bucknell. On the other hand, Frauwallner 1953/1973 p.156, although he suggests two separate sequences were later joined together, believes it was the Buddha who did so. Wayman 1971 p.185 is also of this opinion.

46

See Bernhard

47

Vism 525

48

See also Ronkin n.43 p.238

49

See for example SN 15 on transmigration having no discernable beginning. For the synonymity see for example AN 3.66:11.1–13.1 : “‘Salha, is there delusion?’—‘Yes, venerable sir.’—‘That is what I mean by ignorance.’”

50

Snp 3.12:12.1–13.4

51

Iti 14

52

The meaning of ‘craving as a spouse’ is explained in SN 35.63 : like the mendicant wanderers should be solitary, without a spouse, they should dwell free from craving.

53

Iti 15

54

Avijjānīvaraṇānaṁ sattānaṁ taṇhāsaṁyojanānaṁ sandhāvataṁ saṁsarataṁ, more literally ‘the transmigration and roaming around of beings who are obstructed by ignorance and chained by craving’, for in example §33, SN 15.1, SN 15.2, SN 15.3, SN 15.4, SN 15.5, SN 15.6, SN 15.7, SN 15.8, SN 15.9, SN 15.10, SN 15.11, SN 15.12, SN 15.13, SN 15.14, SN 15.15, SN 15.16, SN 15.17, SN 15.18, SN 15.19, SN 15.20, and SN 56.33

55

§24; §108

56

DN 33:1.9.5 D III 212. See also SN 45.159:2.7, AN 4.254:3.2, MN 149:11.6 M III 289

57

AN 4.50:9.1–12.4

58

The four knots are explained in DN 33:1.11.169–1.11.170 as longing, ill will, attachment to precepts and observances, and dogmatism.

59

Thag 10.5:5.1–10.4

60

For example §62, Dhp 337, Dhp 338

61

§26, §79. See also SN 12.11, which first goes through the ignorance sequence in reverse order, from sensations back to ignorance, but then through the whole twelvefold sequence in forward order, from ignorance down to old age and death.

62

AN 10.62:1.1–2.3

63

For example in SN 15.1–SN 15.20

64

SN 7.18:5.1–5.4

65

See for example SN 12.24:4.1: “The Buddha said suffering arises dependently. Dependent on what? Dependent on sense impressions.” Or Snp 3.12:21.3: “Whatever suffering there may be, all comes to be dependent on sense impression.”

66

Bodhi 2000 p.520

67

As e.g. Ñāṇavīra p.19, Ñāṇananda 2015 p.56, Brasington p.67, Jones 2009 p.244. See Bodhi 1998 p.172 for a further response to such ideas.

68

For example Harvey 2013 p.71, Jones 2011 p.73, Amaro p.44

69

MN 141:11.1–11.3 M III 249 and MN 9:24-26.2–24-26.9 M I 50. Also in the Mahā­sati­paṭ­ṭhā­na Sutta, DN 22:18.3–18.5 D II 305

70

SN 12.2:3.1–4.3. Similar at SN 12.27:2.1–3.1, SN 12.28:2.1–3.1, SN 12.33:3.1–4.2, 9.1

71

For the translation of the discourse title see note 29

72

DN 15:4.1–4.4 D II 57

73

See Dhammika 2022 p.58

74

DN 14:2.18.2–2.18.3 D II 26. Also at SN 12.4. The other Buddhas have the same reflections at SN 12.5, SN 12.6, SN 12.7, SN 12.8, SN 12.9, SN 12.10

75

The dual explanation of bhava is found e.g. at Vism 571. In contrast, Vism 414 explains ‘birth’ as the continuity of the khandhas in a single existence (ekabhava) ending with death, where bhava doesn’t include karma. See also Bodhi 2000 n.4 at SN 12.2.

76

Shulman n.18. One of the earliest scholars to equate bhava to existence in English scholarship was Thomas 1933/1953 p.61: “It is this grasping after the things (upādāna) [which results in] passing into a new existence (bhava).”

77

Schmithausen 2000 p.52

78

Bodhi 2012 n.503 at AN 3.76 (§71). See also Rhys Davids p.53, referring to the same text: “Bhava [here] is meant to convey the more special concrete sense both of a particular span of life and of a particular world or mode of existence wherein that span is lived.”

79

SN 12.2:5.1–5.4, SN 12.27:3.2, SN 12.28:3.2, SN 12.33:9.2

80

Arv 5

81

MĀ 97, similar at T 14

82

AN 4.131:3.1

83

See Somaratne p.142 and note 479

84

MMK 26.8, using the Sanskrit form skandha instead.

85

Thag 2.1:1.1–1.4

86

MN 127:9.1–9.11 M III 147

87

Kp 6:9.1–9.4, Snp 2.1:9.1–9.4

88

Iti 44:5.5–5.6

89

See Sunyo 2022

90

SN 12.64

91

See also Langer p.5 (translation mine): “Before the quoted extract [of the If There is Desire Discourse] there is a passage on […] the four nutriments. These same four nutriments are also mentioned in other passages, where it is stated that they […] are the cause for the rebirth of the being which is to be reborn (saṁbhāvesīnaṁ).”

92

AN 8.11:10.2–10.7

93

MN 43:16.2–16.3 M I 294

94

I deliberately avoided using the arrow symbol (as in A →‍ B) for it is used in logical notation to indicate A is a sufficient condition for B, which isn’t what is meant. I use the symbol › merely to indicate the order in which the terms occur in the discourse.

95

Bodhi 2000 p.48

96

DN 28:5.3–5.6 D III 102; Thag 16.4:22.3; Thig 15.1:37.4, 39.3–39.4

97

See also Langer (translation mine): “Okkanti [an alternative spelling of avakkanti] is a synonym for birth (jāti).” DOP, DPD, PED, and CPD all attest this. In unrelated contexts the word can mean more literally ‘entering’.

98

AN 3.61:13.4–13.6

99

MN 38:26.1–30.16 M I 266

100

See e.g Langer p.12, Sujato 2008 p.7

101

EĀ 21.3

102

Anālayo 2010 p.254, n.243. See further Anālayo 2008

103

MN 93:18.62–18.63 M II 157

104

MĀ 151, translation Anālayo 2022(a)

105

Wijesekera 1994 p.175

106

MN 38:16.9–16.10 M I 260

107

Vetter 1988 p.48. See also Kalupahana 1976 p.32

108

As also argued by Harvey 1995 p.263 n.5

109

Bodhi 2000 p.518

110

§77. See also ‘Remembering Past Lives’ in Brahmavamso 2006 Chapter 13.

111

Frauwallner 1953/1973 p.163

112

Reat p.15. Reat’s specific conclusions about nāmarūpa I disagree with, though.

113

Olalde 2014 p.40 (translation mine): “As a substantive bahubbīhi [compound] it means ‘that which has a name and form’.” Bahubbīhi compounds are fundamentally adjectives, but like all adjectives in Pāli, they can be adopted as nouns (substantives), see Warder 2010 p.62

114

See Hamilton

115

See for example SN 12.2:11.4–11.5 where rūpa is explained as: “The four elements and the form derived from the four elements: that is what’s called rūpa.”

116

SN 1.76:3.1; SN 22.95:11.1–11.4

117

MN 28:26.2 M I 190

118

JU 3.20.8, see also Olalde 2015 p.10

119

SN 12.2:11.2–11.3, SN 12.27:3.8, SN 12.28:3.8, SN 12.33:9.8

120

In the current age this translation is more pragmatic than ‘name’. Other possible translations are ‘mind’ and ‘mentality’, agreeing with the commentaries that nāma is purely mental (cetasika). But in my view, sensations, perceptions, and sense impressions exist for all six senses, not just the mind. However, compare SN 1.61, SN 1.62, where nāma and citta appear to be used synonymously.

121

RV 10.169; RV 7.103

122

See also Olalde 2015 p.21

123

BU 1.4.7, translation Olivelle

124

TB 3.12.7, see also Frauwallner 1953/1973 p.163

125

Atharvaveda 10.2.12 and 12.5.6, see also Olalde 2014 p.12

126

Olalde 2015 p.8

127

Gonda p.7

128

Werner p.28

129

BU 3.2.12

130

Frazer

131

Jurewicz p.89

132

BU 6.4.21, translation Olivelle

133

Jurewicz p.90

134

Frauwallner 1953/1973 p.164

135

Hamilton p.127

136

Olalde 2014 p.156

137

See Wayman 1997 p.507

138

T1548.28.689a20, translation Patton “If it recognizes, designates, and makes names, then this is called name.” See also Bodhi 2000 p.48

139

See Olalde 2015 p.2, referring to certain views: “They understand ‘name’ as ‘designation’ and neglect the fact that it also (or may I say actually) means ‘proper name;’ in this manner they understand name as ‘naming’ and assume that it always encompasses conceptualisation.”

140

See also Bodhi 1984 p.25: “It [i.e. consciousness] also depends on the mental body [i.e. immaterial aspects], as there can be no cognition of an object without the more specialized functions performed by contact, sensation, perception, volition, attention, and the rest.”

141

See for example §101, §99, §35

142

For example Ds 2.3.3.

143

Gombrich 2009 p.136

144

For example SĀ 298. For a further discussion see Choong p.163

145

Vb 6:9.4

146

MN-A 1.221: ‘Vedanā’ti vedanākkhandho. ‘Saññā’ti saññākkhandho. ‘Cetanā phasso manasikāro’ti saṅkhārakkhandho veditabbo, “‘Sensation’ is the aggregate of sensation. ‘Perception’ is the aggregate of perception. ‘Intention, sense impression, and attention’ should be understood as the aggregate of saṅkhāra.

147

T1548.28.689a20; Frauwallner 1995 p.108; EĀ 49.5, EĀ 46.8

148

Pṭs 1.183

149

SN 12.2:11.4–11.5, SN 12.27:3.8, SN 12.28:3.8, SN 12.33:9.8

150

See also Bodhi 2000 n.81 at SN 22.56:3.2, and Hamilton p.6

151

For example MN 109:16.12 M III 17

152

MN 28:17.1–17.3 M I 185. See also:

MN 62:8.1–12.9 M I 422 and

MN 140:14.1–18.9 M III 240

153

Rather than the standard translation ‘the eye’ I translate cakkhu as ‘the sense of sight’, and likewise for the other senses. Olivelle p.22 notes on the Upaniṣads: “In dealing with sight and hearing, and to some extent also in the case of the other faculties, these documents clearly distinguish the power or the act of seeing and hearing from the respective external organs, the eyes and the ears. Indeed, they consistently use different Sanskrit terms for the two—cakṣus and śrotra for sight and hearing, and akṣan and karṇa for eye and ear, respectively.” I think this distinction is to some extent also present in the Pāli suttas, with the respective terms being cakkhu and sota, and akkhi and kaṇṇa. Hamilton p.18 similarly states: “One might suggest that what is referred to [in the Pāli suttas] by the terms cakkhu, sota, ghāna and so on is not primarily the sense organs eye, ear, nose, etc., but that the terms are to be interpreted figuratively as the faculties of vision, hearing, smell and so on.”

154

MN 137:4.1–5.5 M III 261. See also:

DN 33:2.2.4–2.2.7 D III 243 and

MN 148:4.1–5.6 M III 280

155

SN 12.2:10.1–10.3. Also at SN 12.27:3.7, SN 12.28:3.7, SN 12.33:9.7

156

See also Frauwallner 1953/1973 p.158: “By [saḷāyatana in Dependent Arising] are meant the six inner spheres, i.e., the six sense organs.” Also Hamilton p.16: “In the Saḷāyatana Vagga of the Saṁyutta Nikāya, the six senses are defined as being ajjhattaṁ, personal or internal, and the six corresponding objects are defined as being bāhiraṁ, external, thus giving two ‘sets’ of six āyatanas. In the Nidāna Saṁyutta, however, which is concerned with explaining paṭiccasamuppāda, only the personal āyatanas [i.e. the sense ‘organs’] are referred to by the term āyatana.”

157

DN 2:83.3 D I 76,

DN 10:2.21.3 D I 208,

MN 23:4.1 M I 143,

MN 74:9.1 M I 499,

MN 77:29.2 M II 17

158

DN 22:6.3 D II 294, MN 10:12.3 M I 58

159

Hamilton p.104

160

Olalde 2014 p.114 (translation mine): “But first I would like to recall that nāmarūpa in the Vedic texts and Upaniṣads can refer to both an individual, i.e. a person, as well as [things in] the entire world, with its application to individuals being actually older.”

161

Olivelle p.47

162

SN 12.64:4.1–5.8

163

See Hecker p.53 and the commentary, translated by Bodhi 2000 n.173 at SN 12.64

164

§84

165

For example Ñāṇananda 2015 p.120, Cintita p.61

166

Abhinibbattento abhinibbatteti, ‘when [they] produce a next life, they produce’. The word abhinibbatteti has a strong connection with rebirth. For example see AN 10.65:2.2, “being reborn (abhinibbatti) is painful”, or the definition of birth in §20, which includes abhinibbatti. To capture this meaning, which is surely implied given the context of transmigration, I translate it here as ‘they produce a next life’, following the example of Sujato 2023

167

SN 22.100

168

SN 22.99:2.9

169

Bodhi 2000 n.206 at SN 22.100

170

See also Piyadassi p.6 , Bodhi 1984 p.5, Nyanatiloka p.13

171

MN 98:13.1–13.8 M II 123

172

For example §49 and §62

173

SN 22.56:10.1–10.4

174

AN 6.63:33.3–33.5. MN 136:2.13–2.14, 6.10–6.12 M III 207, AN 10.217, AN 10.218 and AN 10.219 also speak of intentional deeds (sañcetanika kamma).

175

SN 12.2:13.1–13.4, SN 12.27:4.1–4.4, SN 12.28:4.1–4.4, SN 12.33:9.10–9.13

176

AN 4.237:2.1–3.2, AN 4.238:1.2–2.2

177

AN 3.146

178

See for example AN 1.43 & AN 1.44, where “end up in heaven as if carried up there” follows “if a person dies”.

179

AN 2.17:2.1–2.8

180

MN 57:8.1–9.10 M I 389, similar at AN 4.233:2.1–3.6. Compare also AN 4.234, AN 4.235, AN 4.236, AN 4.237, AN 4.238, AN 4.240, AN 3.8

181

AN 3.23

182

MN 44:13.2–13.3 M I 301, similar at SN 41.6:1.3–1.5

183

For similar arguments see Bodhi 1998 p.57, contra e.g. Ñāṇavīra p.16, Ñāṇananda 2015 p.125, Ṭhānissaro 2008b p.3 . Bodhi also argues: “In analyzing the teaching of paṭiccasamuppāda, the texts use the two terms cittasaṅkhārā and manosaṅkhārā as though they were interchangeable.” Sanskrit parallels to SN 12.2 indeed use manaḥsaṁskāra instead of cittasaṅkhāra (SF 165, SF 238).

184

SN 12.2:13.1–13.4, SN 12.27:4.1–4.4, SN 12.28:4.1–4.4, SN 12.33:9.10–9.13

185

AN 3.146:2.1–2.4

186

AN 10.221:2.1–2.4

187

MN 41:7.1 M I 287, idem at MN 42. See also AN 10.176:24.1–24.3, AN 10.220:8.1–8.3

188

§55

189

MN 120

190

See also Vetter 1988 p.50: “Saṅkhārā as a condition of ‘perception’ [viññāṇa] which is conceived as the first moment of a new existence must belong to a period before this moment. We can think of actual emotions in the former life preparing the constituent perception for a future existence and of dispositions maintained or strengthened by these emotions which, after death, cause perception to seek a new place for reincarnation. Both aspects might have been meant, but they are not clearly distinguished.”

191

See for example AN 2.18

192

See for example SN 2.23:12.5, which equates deeds of merit (katānaṁ puññānaṁ) to wholesome deeds (katānaṁ kusalānaṁ); or AN 3.9, which says moral physical, verbal, and mental conduct results in merit.

193

There seems to be a play on words here, because it could also be rendered, “traveling on to (upaga) the fruits of meritorious and bad acts”, which implies rebirth.

194

SN 3.22:4.1–4.6

195

For example AN 1.314, AN 1.315, SN 12.25, AN 4.171

196

MN 82:42.35–42.46 M II 73, Thag 16.4:16.1–18.4

197

See for example Gombrich 1980 p.50

198

In Jain context āsava/āsrava refers to the inflow of physical karmic particles, which in the Jain texts is compared to water flowing into a pond. (Malvania p.47, 83) The Buddha used the same terminology, possibly having adopted it directly from the Jains. For him āsavas are not physical particles but states of mind that defile (saṅkilesikā), that lead to rebirth—see MN 36:47.1–47.7 M I 250.

199

More literally it says the pain-producing āsavas (lit. ‘inflowings’) flow into (assaveyyuṁ) that person.

200

AN 4.195

201

See Gombrich 2009 p.56: “The Buddha converts a Jain by making play with two words, āsava and samārambha.”

202

SN 35.146:1.3–1.7

203

SN 12.37

204

Sujato 2023 at SN 12.37: “It’s old deeds, and should be seen as produced by choices and intentions, as something to be felt.”

205

For example Dhp 278

206

See also Piyadassi p.6

207

Contextually this refers to the aggregate of saṅkhāra, which I usually translate as ‘will’, but to show the connections with Dependent Arising I translated it here as ‘wilful actions’.

208

Saṅkhata, quite literally ‘put (khata) together (saṁ)’, means ‘fabricated’, ‘constructed’, ‘created’, and so forth. In daily speech it is used for a raft that is properly assembled and for a well-made meal (Snp 1.2:4.1; AN 4.57:3.1). The noun saṅkhāra is used for medicine that is prepared (Kd6). In none of these contexts does the common translation ‘conditioned’ work, and neither is it intended in deeper philosophical contexts such as Dependent Arising. For example, in Dhp 154 vi-saṅkhata describes taking apart a house—with the prefix vi- indicating the opposite of putting together—where the house is symbolic for lives in saṁsāra. The point is that lives are created by craving and karma, not merely conditioned by it.

209

SN 22.79:5.1–5.5

210

See Bodhi 2000 n.110 at SN 22.79, Hamilton p.4

211

Thig 16.1:25.1–25.4. See also PED under sankhata: “‘created’, brought about as effect of actions in former births”.

212

SN 22.21

213

SN 56.42, cf. SN 56.43, SN 56.46

214

SN 12.2:14.1–14.3, SN 12.27:4.5–5.1, SN 12.28:4.5–5.1, SN 12.33:10.1–11.2

215

Patiṭṭhā viññaṇassa, ‘a support for the planting of consciousness’. Bodhi 2000 n.112 at SN 12.38 explains: “‘a support for the establishing of consciousness’ renders patiṭṭhā viññaṇassa. I find that ‘established’ works consistently better as a rendering for the participle patiṭṭhita, but ‘support’ for the noun patiṭṭhā, so to bridge the participle and the noun in the present passage (and at SN 22.53, SN 22.54) I have coined this compound expression.” I followed this example, although with ‘planting’ instead of ‘establishing’.

216

SN 12.38:1.2–1.6

217

AN 4.184:5.1–5.8; MN 129:5.1–5.9 M III 165

218

MN 120

219

See also Bodhi 2000 p.522

220

See for example AN 7.11

221

Langer p.30 says the three discourses on intention (SN 12.38, SN 12.39, SN 12.40) “limit themselves […] to descriptions of rebirth” (translation mine). Likewise, although I believe he misunderstands appatiṭṭhita viññāṇa to be a state of mind, Ñāṇananda 2016 p.97 states: “The point at issue [in the First Discourse on Intention] is the question as to how consciousness gets a footing—how consciousness gets established at the moment of death. In fact, it is an attempt to show us the connection between two lives.” See also Anālayo 2018 p.28

222

See also Langer p.32 (translation mine): “In [SN 12.38, SN 12.39, SN 12.40] viruḷhi [means] ‘a new growth’, like a part taken from the mother plant grows again somewhere else. With that, viruḷhi marks the beginning of a new existence.”

223

SĀ 359, translation mine. Compare SĀ 360 in Choong p.170

224

SN 12.39

225

SĀ 360: 入名色故, 有未來世生. Choong p.170 translates: “Because of the entry [i.e. conception] of name-and-material form, there are, in the future, birth, ageing-sickness-and-death […]”

226

See note 192. The translation ‘demerit’ for apuñña is perhaps a bit artificial, having connotations with demerit points on a driver’s license, but it keeps consistency with ‘merit’ (puñña). I tried various other translations for puñña, but overall ‘merit’ just seems to work best.

227

SN 12.51:9.1–9.3

228

AN 6.63:30.2

229

See DPD under upaga: “passing on to (used of consciousness’s linking at death with a new existence)”. See also Bodhi 1998 p.161

230

§108; §77

231

MN 106:3.12, 4.7, 5.10, 6.12, 7.5, 8.5, 9.12 M II 262

232

See also Langer p.28

233

DN 15:33.0–34.10 D II 69. Also at AN 7.44

234

See also Bodhi 2003 p.30

235

SN 12.63:3.7–3.8

236

For example §118, §119

237

See Nyanaponika 1981 for a translation of the commentary to this sutta. Also see Bodhi 2000 n.166 at SN 12.63

238

For example SN 56.11:4.4–4.5

239

MN 12:37.1–37.11 M I 74

240

See for example §17

241

See also AN 7.74:8.1–8.2, Snp 3.8:7.1–7.4

242

Ādicca (‘Sun’) was a name for the clan of the Buddha, possibly a honorific. See Snp 3.1:19.1–19.2 and DPPN under ‘Ādicca’.

243

Thag 6.8

244

Hamilton p.98

245

SN 56.35

246

Thig 16.1:26.1–26.4

247

Hecker p.50

248

Nyanaponika 1981 p.9. See also PED s.v. viññāṇa: “As one of the four āhāras viññāṇa is considered as the material, food or cause, through which comes rebirth. As such it is likened to seed in the field of action (kamma), and as entering (a body) at rebirth the phrase viññāṇassa avakkanti is used.”

249

SN 12.12:2.11

250

Bodhi 2000 n.24 at SN 12.12

251

Bodhi 2000 n.25 at SN 12.12: “The conjunction bhūte sati [‘when the being is born’] is unusual and the redundancy can only be avoided if the past participle bhūte is here understood to function as a noun denoting the being that has come to be.”

252

AN 3.61:9.3, 13.4–13.6

253

MN 140:8.1–8.6 M III 239. See also Wynne p.31: “There are also a number of lists in which ‘space’ and/or ‘consciousness’ are added to this basic set of four elements […] in most places they occur in teachings where they form the objects of a detailed contemplation of the human person.”

254

MN 62:12.1–12.9 M I 423

255

See Hamilton p.5 and Bodhi 2000 n.339 at SN 18.9: “To the four primary elements of the form aggregate the suttas sometimes add the space element.”

256

SN 46.2:1.2

257

For example SN 4.18:4.3–4.4

258

SN 22.22:6.1–7.4

259

AN 10.27:10.5, Kp 4:1.2

260

TU 2.2.1, translation Purohit

261

Lopez

262

Kp 7:6.3–13.4

263

Norman 1991 p.194

264

Snp 3.12:38.1–38.4

265

See for example Nyanaponika 1981

266

AN 3.76

267

AN 3.92:1.3–1.4. See also DN 23:31.3, 31.10 D II 353

268

This translation fits other contexts of the word too. Patiṭṭhita is used for a cow planting down her feet—see AN 9.35:1.4, 3.4. In English we also say “to plant an arrow”, and patiṭṭhita is also used for planting arrows in a target—see DN 3:1.23.17–1.23.20 D I 97 and SN 20.6:1.4, 2.1. English also uses ‘plant’ as a synonym for ‘establish’, like in “to plant a religion in a country”.

269

MN 45:4.7 M I 307. See also AN 3.34:5.1–5.3, which says seeds that are put underground will “develop, sprout, and mature” when rained upon.

270

Mil 3.6.9

271

Vism 602 and 688

272

SN 5.9:4.1–6.4

273

Kp 6:15.1–15.4, Snp 2.1:15.1–15.4

274

See Bodhi 2017 p.523

275

Santipada, ‘place of peace’. In contexts such as this, pada is commonly translated as ‘state’. But related to the English ‘pedal’, it literally means ‘foot’ or ‘step’ and by extent can mean ‘path’ (where one walks) or ‘place’ (where one stands). For example, janapada, ‘country’, is literally ‘people’s place’. Monier-Williams lists ‘a plot of ground’ as one meaning of the Sanskrit pada, and refers to padajñā in RV 1.62.2, which seems to refer to knowing (jñā) the places (pada) where to find cattle. I am not aware of any instance in the Nikāyas where pada unambiguously means ‘state’, so, following Norman 1997 p.13, I translate ‘the sorrowless place’, ‘the peaceful place’, and so on.

I take pada to be a metaphor for the end of the eightfold path, not as a description of what that end exactly is. Just like we do not go to a literal island, literal refuge, literal other shore (mentioned in this very verse), and so on, we do not go to a literal pada. The fact that pada in this context virtually always occurs in verse, always qualified by psychologically positive adjectives, also leans towards it being an emotionally evocative term rather than an ontological one.

276

Snp 1.12:2.1–4.4

277

I follow the Burmese edition, which mentions two situations: unbroken seeds with earth and water and unbroken seeds without earth and water. The PTS edition mentions three situations: unbroken seeds without water and earth, broken seeds with water and earth, and unbroken seeds with water and earth. This seems incorrect, for at no point can consciousness (the seed) be broken while desire (the water) still remains. The Chinese parallel at SĀ 39 mentions three situations too, but all with unbroken seeds: unbroken seeds with earth but no water, unbroken seeds with water but no earth, and unbroken seeds with both water and earth. This makes more sense contextually, for the point of the sutta is that the continuance of consciousness requires both desire (water) and the other aggregates (earth).

278

As an exception I have adopted the reading of the Chinese parallel. The Pāli adds consciousness to the aggregates here, though it does not do so in the previous statements. The Chinese mentions only the other four aggregates, which matches the four things that support consciousness. Also favoring the Chinese is that the addition of consciousness in order to complete the five aggregates would have been a more natural mistake or purposeful edit than its omission. Since there is a peyalla (…) here, it may have been repeated once too many times by the reciter, accidentally adding the aggregate of consciousness. The addition of consciousness also does not add much pragmatic value, since sensation, perception, and consciousness are intrinsically connected (§99), so any desire for consciousness will be accompanied by a desire for sensation and perception.

279

I follow tadappatiṭṭhitaṁ viññāṇaṁ avirūḷhaṁ anabhisaṅkhārañ-ca vimuttaṁ, instead of alternative manuscripts which have anabhisaṅkhacca. Both anabhisaṅkhāraṁ (not willing) and vimuttaṁ (liberated) could be taken as adjectives of viññāṇaṁ. However:

Consciousness as one of the khandhas is just aware of things, it does not do things nor stop doing things at enlightenment, so ‘not willing’ would likely not be said of it.

The before is about how consciousness comes to cease when “its foundation is destroyed”, not about liberating it.

Although viññāṇa can be a near synonym for the mind (citta), the two words are still used in different senses, and elsewhere in the Nikāyas it is always either the mind or the person that is said to be liberated, never viññāṇa.

SN 22.45 & SN 22.46 share their closing paragraph with this sutta, and there it is unmistakably the mind that is liberated.

For these reasons I think the mind is intended in this sutta as well. I take ca (and) to indicate there to be two separate sentences: Tadappatiṭṭhitaṁ viññāṇaṁ avirūḷhaṁ. Anabhisaṅkhārañ-ca vimuttaṁ. Seeing the first part as a full sentence is supported by SN 12.38:3.3, SN 12.38:3.3 & SN 12.40:3.3, where tadappatiṭṭhite viññāṇe avirūḷhe is an absolute, hence a separately functioning clause; and seeing the second as a separate sentence makes it match the other two-word sentences that follow. The translation thus becomes: “Not planted, consciousness will not sprout. And not creating, ‘it’ is liberated.” The ‘it’ refers to the mind, like in the common phrase vimuttasmiṁ ‘vimuttam’iti ñāṇaṁ hoti, “when liberated, there is the knowledge ‘it [the mind] is liberated’.” Previous translators similarly separated viññāṇaṁ from vimuttaṁ in the Seeds Discourse (see note 504). Nyanaponika 1990 has “ist man befreit”, meaning “one is liberated”. But vimuttaṁ being neuter, ‘the mind’ is preferable over ‘one’, which would require the masculine.

The Chinese parallel at SĀ 39 also supports the separation of consciousness and liberation, as it disjoints the two with a set of phrases not found in the Pāli. Anālayo 2014 translated: “The basis being abandoned, that consciousness is not established anywhere and does not grow further and increase. Because of not growing, there is no creating of formations. Not creating formations, one is steady. Being steady, one is contented. Being contented, one is released.” So again the Chinese, as in note 277 and note 278, seems more on point than the Pāli.

280

SN 22.54

281

For example AN 3.58:5.1–6.4

282

AN 6.10:7.3

283

SN 44.9:6.4

284

Gati, ‘departing’, is usually translated as ‘going’ (with agati as ‘coming’). But it being a euphemism for dying in this context, I prefer ‘departing’, which in English is also a euphemism for death. I translate āgati accordingly as ‘arriving’.

285

Thag 16.9:26.1–26.4; DN 8:3.6 D I 162; Thig 6.1:4.1–4.4

286

See also Harvey 1995 p.97f

287

AN 3.34:5.3. See also SN 45.150:1.1, SN 55.25:10.2, AN 6.62:7.8

288

Rūpupayaṁ viññāṇaṁ tiṭṭhamānaṁ tiṭṭheyya, ‘consciousness would continue to exist if it is attracted to form’. Bodhi 2000 translates: “Consciousness, while standing, might stand engaged with form.” Ṭhānissaro 2008a p.27 has: “Should consciousness, when standing, stand attached to form […]” Under tiṭṭhati DOP glosses the literal ‘stands’ but also ‘continues to exist’. The latter is meant here, not ‘stand’, which is too literal. Choong p.50 more accurately translates ‘may persist’. See also Hamilton p.97: “This term [ṭhiti] itself implies continuity: being ‘stationed’ means that [consciousness] ‘persists’.” Harvey 1995 p.97 also renders this term as ‘maintenance’.

Although viññāṇaṁ tiṭṭhamānaṁ tiṭṭheyya literally is ‘existing consciousness would continue’, a present participle followed by a finite form of the same verb is a form of emphasis. For example, cittaṁ bahulaṁ gacchamānaṁ gaccheyya, literally ‘the straying mind may often stray’, simply means the mind may often stray. (SN 35.117:1.2) So I excluded the present participle tiṭṭhamānaṁ, like other translators have done in this example case and similar instances, and instead emphasize the verb with ‘continue to exist’. Further, rūpupayaṁ is a bahubbīhi compound, so the sentence literally says, “existing consciousness which has an attraction to form will continue”. Like Choong I therefore also think it is incorrect to treat rūpa as an object of tiṭṭheyya, as in “stand engaged with form” of other translators.

289

SN 35.235:1.4–1.7

290

On one-seeders see for example AN 3.87. Other suttas on seeds and rebirth are AN 3.34, AN 3.77, AN 6.62

291

SN 12.57. Compare also SN 12.55, SN 12.56 and SN 12.60

292

See also Sunyo 2017

293

AN 1.314:1.4

294

Saṁyojaniyesu, bhikkhave, dhammesu assādānupassino viharato, ‘for those who live focusing on the gratification of things that can chain them’. Bodhi 2000 translates the phrase here as “when one dwells contemplating gratification in things that can fetter”, but in his later translation of the Aṅguttara Nikāya he translates -anupassino viharato as “for one who dwells contemplating”. (Bodhi 2012, AN 5.30) Assādānupassino viharato is a genitive absolute of “whom it concerns” (cf. Wijesekera 1993 §159), so is best translated with “for those who”, like Olalde 2014 p.84, “für denjenigen”. The point is that for those who live dwelling on these things, there will be rebirth, but for those who do not, there won’t be. There are no temporal implications of “when” here.

295

SN 12.58

296

SN 12.59

297

SN 22.3:4.1–4.9

298

See also Wijesekera 1994 p.106

299

SN 12.65:1.2–3.8. See also DN 14:2.19.1–2.19.5 D II 33

300

DN 15:2.15–2.18, 21.1–22.6 D II 63

301

See note 435 and note 436

302

MĀ 97, translation Anālayo 2020(a), emphasis added

303

DĀ 13, translation Patton

304

Contra Ñāṇananda 2015 p.65, p.36. PED states that translating itthatta as ‘thusness’ is incorrect. The word instead refers to existence, literally ‘a state (-tta) here (ittha)’. See for example AN 2.36:2.4, 3.5, 4.7: so tato cuto […] āgantā itthattaṁ, “passing on from there […] he comes to ‘life here’”.

305

For example, in DN 24:2.17.5 D III 29 itthatta refers to a state of existence in the realm of Brahmā. See also Bodhi 2015 p.168

306

See Bodhi 1984 p.29

307

DN 14:2.19.1–2.19.5 D II 33

308

DĀ 13

309

Vetter 1994 p.151

310

DN 15:32.11 D II 68

311

As argued by Olalde 2014 p.102

312

Brahmavamso 2006 p.221

313

Bodhi 1984 p.30

314

Cnd 5

315

For example Ñāṇananda 2015 p.33: “What is meant by the Buddha’s statement is that name-and-form together with consciousness is the rallying point for all concepts of birth, decay, death and rebirth. All pathways for verbal expression, terminology and designation converge on name-and-form together with consciousness. The range of wisdom extends only up to the relationship between these two. And it is between these two that there is a whirling round so that one may point out a this-ness.”

316

See also Sujato 2023 note at DN 15:22.6: “Any state of being ultimately depends on the codependency of name and form with consciousness. Within this key relationship is the extent not only of language, but also of wisdom, and the secret to the undoing of transmigration itself. One of the many profound implications of this is that there is no such thing as a state of pure consciousness independent of concepts.”

317

DN 14:2.18.40–2.18.43 D II 32,

DN 15:22.1–22.2 D II 63 (§84),

SN 12.65:2.14–2.16 (§83),

SN 12.67:4.2–4.3 (§95),

SN 22.57:14.5,

SN 22.82:7.10

318

Viññāṇañca hi, Ānanda, nāmarūpe patiṭṭhaṁ na labhissatha. For patiṭṭhaṁ as ‘support to be planted’ see note 215. See also Sujato 2023 note at DN 15:22.2: “Just as name and form—the organic, sensual, and sense-making body—cannot grow without consciousness, so too consciousness must acquire a landing or grounding place to be ‘planted’ in name and form.” Interestingly, JU 3.20.8 also mentions “my name, my body (śarīra), my support (pratiṣṭhā)”.

319

Hamilton p.129

320

Bodhi 1984 p.25

321

Langer p.25, translation mine

322

DN 10:2.22.1 D I 209. Similar at DN 2:84.1 D I 76, MN 77:29.9 M II 17

323

DN 14:1.21.2 D II 14, MN 123:12.3 M III 121;

MN 79:11.1 M II 33, MN 80:4.1 M II 41

324

SN 12.65:6.3–6.7, SN 12.67:7.12–7.16, DN 14:2.21.3 D II 35

325

For example Falk p.40, Hamilton p.123, Gombrich 2009 p.120, Olalde 2014 p.38ff.

326

Sujato 2012 Section 3.2 - Insight 2.3: Im­perm­anence of the Mind

327

Falk p.40

328

See for example Flood p.274: “The Brahmanical tradition was not a monolithic entity.” Or Bausch 2015 p.1: “There was never a unitary Vedic tradition against which Buddhism reacted. Vedic religiosity was a dynamic aggregate, alive with regional variation.” See also Olivelle pp.8–11. In DN 13 different brahmin traditions are said to teach different paths to Brahma(n).

329

MuṇU 3.2.8, translation Olivelle

330

PrU 6.5, translation Olivelle

331

CU 6.10, translation Olivelle

332

See also Olalde 2014 p.39 (translation mine): “[On the basis of CU 6.10 (§89)] it seems most likely to me that nāmarūpa in MuṇU 3.2.8 and PrU 6.5 (§87 and §88) refers specifically to a person, who until the depicted point in time existed as an individual with his (proper) name and visible form.” See also Olalde 2015 p.14

333

SN 45.91, SN 45.92-95,

SN 45.96,

SN 45.97, SN 45.98-102,

SN 45.103, SN 45.104-108,

SN 45.109, SN 45.110-114,

SN 45.115, SN 45.116-120,

SN 45.121, SN 45.122-126,

SN 45.127, SN 45.128-132,

SN 45.133, SN 45.134-138

334

MN 22:25.5–25.6 M I 138. See also Wijesekera 1994 p.261

335

SN 1.50:6.1–6.4

336

Bausch 2018 p.39

337

Snp 5.2:5.1–6.6

338

Sunyo 2021

339

See Hinüber p.28f

340

DN 11:85.18–85.27 D I 223

341

See for example Hamilton p.12

342

Gombrich 1980 p.45

343

BU 2.4.12, anantam apāraṁ vijñāna-ghana eva; BU 3.8.8, asthūlam anaṇv ahrasvam adīrgham.

344

BU 3.7.3–7, translation Olivelle: “This self of yours who is present within but is different from the earth, whom the earth does not know, […] who is present within but is different from the waters […] the fire […] the wind, whom the wind does not know, […] he is the inner controller, the immortal.”

345

TU 2.8, translation Olivelle: “For when a man finds within that invisible (nadṛśya), incorporeal, indistinct, and supportless essence, the fearless state on which to rest, then he becomes free from fear.” The word has the same verbal root as anidassana of the Kevaddha Sutta

346

CU 3.13.7–14.2, translation Olivelle. See also ‘inner light’ in §94

347

See Sunyo 2021

348

See also Jayatilleke §42: “There is no reason to believe that Yājñavalkya’s theories are based on any kind of mystical experience.”

349

Werner p.26

350

BU 4.4.19

351

Gombrich 1980 p.45

352

For example Ñāṇananda 2016 p.27: “There is a consciousness that is freed from name and form.” Also Oldenberg p.87, who says the “Brahmanic thinking […] is also basically valid for the Buddhistic”, both resulting in “the blissful merging with infinity” when name and form are abandoned.

353

As argued for example by Ñāṇananda 2015 p.60: “In some discourses, like the Mahānidāna Sutta, there is a discussion about a descent of consciousness into a mother’s womb. […] The point […] is that the constant interrelation that exists between consciousness and name-and-form is present even during one’s life in the mother’s womb.” Also see Cintita p.227

354

For example MN 60:5.1–8.8 M I 401, MN 76:7.1–7.10 M I 515, MN 110:11.1–11.4 M III 22, SN 24.5, AN 10.216:5.9

355

§126, DN 1:2.13.4 D I 21

356

SN 22.7:2.5

357

MN 111:6.1 M III 25, as noted by Anālayo 2017 p.120

358

For example at SĀ 284, as pointed out by Choong p.174

359

SN 47.42

360

Anālayo 2018 p.27

361

Body with consciousness (saviññāṇaka kāya):

MN 109:13.1,13.7 M III 18,

MN 112:11.3,20.4 M III 32,

SN 18.21:1.3,1.9,

SN 22.71:1.3,1.9,

SN 22.72:1.3,1.12,

SN 22.82:11.1,11.7,

SN 22.91:1.3,2.7,

SN 22.92:1.3,2.6,

SN 22.124:1.3,2.6,

SN 22.125:1.3,2.6,

AN 3.32:2.1,2.3,4.3,

AN 3.33:2.2,3.1,

AN 7.49:14.3,15.1,16.1;

cf. SN 35.234.

Consciousness bound to the body:

DN 10:2.21.4 D I 209 (§85),

DN 2:83.4 D I 76,

MN 77:29.9–29.11 M II 17.

Consciousness leaves the body:

MN 43:24.2 M I 296

362

Consciousness transmigrates: MN 38:2.2 M I 256. Consciousness passes on and gets reborn: §76, §118. Consciousness travels on: §55. Conceived: §84, see also §81

363

PED under viññāṇa

364

For example Frauwallner 1953/1973 p.162, Hamilton p.101, Langer p.9, Vetter 1988 p.49, Wijesekera 1994 p.111

365

Kalupahana 1975 p.119

366

As argued by Hamilton p.85

367

Gombrich 2009 p.60

368

Vetter 1988 p.36 notes: “The word ‘consciousness’ which is often employed here, is rather inconvenient when one has to interpret viññāṇa as a link in the twelvefold chain of dependent origination, where it seems to point to the first moment of life in the mother’s womb.” Rhys Davids p.55 comments upon her translation of AN 3.76 (§71) that ‘consciousness’ is not an adequate translation in this context: “I have rendered by ‘man [surviving]’ the word viññāṇa, literally ‘awareness’, and rightly so rendered it. [Here] viññāṇa clearly means the man who has survived death.”

369

Schmithausen 2000 p.57, translation mine

370

Frauwallner 1953/1973 p.162, emphasis added

371

Hamilton p.101

372

See for example §8, §137, §114, Thag 1.90

373

See also Brahmavamso 2002

374

For example Vism 546

375

Wijesekera 1994 p.111

376

BU 4.3.7, translation Olivelle

377

MN 38:5.11 M I 256. Compare MN 2:8.8 M I 8: “It is this self of mine who speaks, who feels, who in various realms experiences the results of good and bad deeds.”

378

See also Vetter 1988 p.48–50. For similar explanations see Bodhi 1984 p.24, Wijesekera 1994 p.168–172, Shults p.110

379

DN 28:7.13 D III 105. See also Anālayo 2008 p.97

380

See also Hamilton p.97

381

§126

382

For example Buddhadāsa p.14, Reinhard p.9

383

See also Harvey 1995 p.98

384

PED s.v. viññāṇa, emphasis added.

385

Olalde 2014 p.156. See also p.73ff.

386

SN 12.67:3.7–7.16

387

DPPN

388

See also AN 3.61

389

‘Idaṁ saccan’ti maññati, ‘imagining they know the truth’. This is a typical example of Pāli using quotation in a more abstract sense than English. The quoted words are not literal thoughts, and therefore do not have to be translated as a literal quote. Idaṁ is a pronoun without explicit referent, meaning it does not refer to any specific noun, including nāmarūpa (contra e.g. Ñāṇananda 2015 p.132). See the prose preceding these verses in the discourse, where idaṁ also does not refer to anything specific: “What the world […] considers to be the truth (‘idaṁ saccan’ti upanijjhāyitaṁ), the noble ones […] understand to be false. […] What the world […] considers to be false (‘idaṁ musā’ti upanijjhāyitaṁ), the noble ones […] understand to be the truth.” There is no mention of nāmarūpa at this point. Furthermore, if idaṁ were to refer to nāmarūpa here, then the noble ones also understand it to be true. This does not fit Ñāṇananda’s ideas, who took nāmarūpa to be an intrinsically deluded cognition, “a product of imagination”. Instead, these are more general statements about what is taken to be true and false, not referring to anything specific.

The same idea applies to the common phrase idam’eva saccaṁ, for example in sassato loko, idam’eva saccaṁ, ‘the world is eternal, just this is the truth’— e.g. DN 9:25.3 D I 187. Idaṁ is neuter, while loko is masculine, so the former does not refer to the latter. Put differently, ‘the world’ is not considered to be ‘the truth’: it is the entire statement ‘the world is eternal’ which is taken as truth. Likewise, in the discourse at hand, nāmarūpa is not the thing that is considered to be the truth. It is its selfhood which is mistakenly taken as truth, as the commentary also notes, not nāmarūpa itself. The world imagining (maññati) things to be true refers back to the earlier line on them imagining nāmarūpa to have a self (atta-māniṁ). It also corresponds with the next line: “for whatever they imagine it is [i.e. a self], it is different from that [i.e. without a self].” (See also the passage quoted at note 422: “The Buddha has said to not identify with the attainment of the first jhāna. For whatever you imagine it is, it is different from that.”)

390

Snp 3.12:51.1–53.4

391

The verb niviṭṭha has two meanings. It literally means settling down in some physical place like a campground, but it can also figuratively mean being used to something, similar to English ‘habituate’. In this case it can mean being reborn “in” or being attached to nāmarūpa. ‘Resorting to’ is an attempt to cover both meanings. The commentary only comments on the figurative meaning, but Venerable Ṭhānissaro translated the line as ‘making an abode in name & form’, which given the preceding prose seems well-justified. The following two verses refer to rebirth and its ending as well.

392

Iti 41

393

There is a pun here, which I tried to show in translation. The cutting of the tangle (jaṭā) also refers to the hair of Bhāradvāja Tangled-Hair (jaṭā-bhāradvāja), which was dreadlocked in the style of brahmin renunciants.

394

SN 7.6. Similar at SN 1.23

395

§146

396

SĀ 1187, 諸識永滅

397

SĀ2 100, 心意盡滅

398

See also Bodhi 2000 p.48: “Consciousness can operate only in dependence on a physical body (rūpa) and in conjunction with its constellation of concomitants (nāma); conversely, only when consciousness is present can a compound of material elements function as a sentient body and the mental concomitants participate in cognition.”

399

Langer p.27, translation mine

400

See also Karunadasa p.33: “It is on the reciprocal interplay between consciousness and mentality-materiality that the whole saṁsāric process of birth and death revolves. In this sense their mutual dependence constitutes the irreducible ground of saṁsāric experience.”

401

For example Harvey 1995 p.143, Pasanno p.133, Cintita p.166

402

Sujato 2011a

403

Bodhi 2020 p.25. See also Warder 2010 p.5

404

See Bodhi 2000 n.114 at SN 22.79: “Usually in the suttas viññaṇa is presented simply as the basic awareness of an object through one of the sense bases, i.e., as bare ‘consciousness of’ rather than as a discriminative capacity.” See also Hamilton p.53, 92

405

Ñāṇamoli 1956 n.48 p.606. See also Gombrich 1980 p.43

406

Schmithausen 2000 p.74, translation mine, emphasis in the original

407

Brahmavamso 1994, which uses the simile with reference to feelings instead of consciousness, but the idea is the same.

408

See also Bodhi 1998 p.168: “We might instead hold that the vedanā link should be understood as the result of past kamma only in the more general sense that the capacity for experiencing feeling is a consequence of obtaining a sentient organism through the force of past kamma. […] That is, it is past kamma, accompanied by ignorance and craving, that brought into being the present sentient organism equipped with its six sense bases through which feeling is experienced.”

409

MN 43:9.1–9.9 M I 293

410

MN 148:8.1–8.11 M III 281

411

See Hamilton p.89

412

MN 28:27.1 M I 190

413

MN 38:8.1–8.21 M I 260. SN 12.62, SN 36.10, and SN 48.39 contain a similar simile which compares sense impression to fire sticks.

414

See for example SN 12.52:2.3: “With that nutriment, that fuel, that bonfire would burn for a very long time.”

415

MN 28:17.1 M I 188

416

On the same passage see also Gombrich 2009 p.120

417

MN 146:8.25–9.19 M III 273

418

SN 35.92:1.3–1.5

419

SN 35.93

420

See DN 1:3.21.1–3.26.2 D I 36

421

SN 35.84

422

MN 113:21.7–21.8 M III 42

423

See also Brahmavamso 2006 ‘The Nature of Citta’

424

SN 36.6:2.1. See also SN 36.4

425

SN 12.19

426

Savijñānakaḥ kāyo (SF 161) and 識身 (SĀ 294). See Choong p.185

427

See note 361

428

DOP under nimitta

429

Bodhi 2012 at AN 3.32, AN 3.33 and AN 7.49. Here I regard nāmarūpa as a bahubbīhi-like compound used as a noun; see note 113

430

Schmithausen 2000 p.66 n.103, translation mine

431

Gonda p.8

432

Bodhi 2000 n.48 at SN 12.19

433

Hamilton p.127–135

434

Falk p.56 n.1

435

For example Reat, Bucknell p.324, Anālayo 2018 p.25

436

For example Ñāṇananda 1974/2007 p.31, Cintita p.152, Amaro p.116. The first two both quote the Discourse on the Foolish and Wise in support, but only the part on the fools, omitting the statement on the wise also experiencing nāmarūpa.

437

See for example §137, Thag 1.90

438

See also Hamilton p.135

439

§83, §84

440

§84, §23, §54, §80

441

See also Hamilton p.132 and Olalde 2014 p.103

442

Schmithausen 2000 pp.69–74, translation mine

443

See note 152

444

See for example Bodhi 2000 n.182 at SN 2.26: “The world with which the Buddha’s teaching is principally concerned is ‘the world of experience’, and even the objective world is of interest only to the extent that it serves as the necessary external condition for experience.”

445

Olalde 2014 p.69, “äußerst unklar”; Vetter 1994 p.147, “wenig Sinn”. Schmithausen 2000 p.58 also calls it “difficult” (schwieriger).

446

Bodhi 1984 p.20

447

See Bodhi 1984 p.107

448

See also note 139

449

DN 15:20.1–20.10 D II 63

450

Bodhi 1984 p.21

451

MN 43:21.1–21.6 M I 295, SN 48.42

452

For example Warder 1970 p.108, Vetter 1994 p.148, Olalde 2014 p.110, Schmithausen 2000 p.58

453

Bodhi 1984 p.20

454

Snp 5.7:6.4. See also DOP s.v. nāmakāya: ‘the group of non-material aspects (of an individual)’.

455

DĀ 13 at 61b02, translation Patton

456

Hamilton p.134

457

See Olalde 2014 p.114ff

458

See also Olalde 2014 p.103 (translation mine): “Authors who interpret the interdependency between nāmarūpa and viññāṇa in the sense of a dependency of cognition and its objects […] base their argumentation mainly on that part of the Mahānidāna Sutta which does not actually explain this relationship, but instead that between nāmarūpa and contact (phassa).”

459

DĀ 13 at 61b3, MĀ 97 at 579c7, T 14 at 243b8; T 52

460

Vetter 1994 p.147

461

T 52, see also table 3

462

Snp 4.11:11.1–11.4

463

SN 35.23

464

See also Kalupahana 1976 p.158: “There is no transcendent reality or Being or ‘self’ that is given as the object of such direct perception.”

465

SN 35.92

466

See also The Book of the Six Sense Fields in Sujato 2019: “the idea of the ‘all’ […] suggests that the scope of the six senses includes all that is experienced”. Contra e.g. Ṭhānissaro 2008a p.119

467

Mā h’evaṁ, literally ‘not so’, in some discourses simply means ‘no’ (e.g. SN 12.17:3.1–4.10), while in others it means ‘don’t say so’. I think both are implied here, but with this translation I follow the commentary.

468

Natthaññaṁ kiñci (na atthi aññaṁ kiñci) ‘does something else no longer exists’ was translated by Bodhi 2012 as ‘is there nothing else’. In most other cases na kiñci can be translated as ‘nothing’ without affecting the meaning, but in this context the more literal translation ‘no longer something’ is required. The mistake is more apparent in Bodhi’s translation of the third statement, atthi ca natthi ca aññaṁ kiñci, as ‘is there both something else and nothing else’. The phrase ‘something/nothing else’ occurs twice in the translation, while the Pāli has aññaṁ kiñci only once. The verb phrases atthi and natthi therefore both apply to the same aññaṁ kiñci (‘something else’). They both assume there to be something else beyond the six senses; neither assumes there is nothing beyond them. The assumption that there is nothing beyond the six senses would also effectively state that the six senses are all there is, so it would be inappropriate for Sāriputta to say it elaborates (or proliferates) beyond them, as he does later in the discourse.

469

AN 4.173

470

SN 35.232:10.1–10.24

471

SN 48.53:7.1–7.4

472

For example Ṭhānissaro 2008b p.6, Amaro p.25, Anālayo 2021 p.104

473

SN 12.40

474

SN 12.38, SN 12.39, SN 12.40, at §53, §54, and §115

475

SĀ 359, SĀ 360, SĀ 361

476

Choong p.172

477

MN 144:11.3–11.9 M III 266, SN 35.87:11.3–11.9, Ud 8.4:3.1–3.7

478

For example at SN-A 2.372 (on SN 35.87). In discussing Ud 1.10, Anālayo 2023 Chapter I.4 instead thinks ‘here’ (idha) and ‘beyond’ (huraṁ) refer to the senses and their objects, with ‘in between the two’ being “their interaction”, but this is not supported by other texts. §116 clearly talks about rebirth, for example, and §134 uses the same terminology with reference to physical places. PED and CPD accordingly gloss under huraṁ, “another world”.

479

See Harvey 1995 p.98, Somaratne p.150, Sujato 2008 p.7, Dhammika 2015 p.20 , Anālayo 2018 p.32

480

Bodhi 2000 n.53 at SN 35.87:11.8

481

Snp 3.12:45.1–45.4

482

SN 22.53

483

Anabhisaṅkhāraṁ, ‘not wilfully creating’. I base ‘wilfully’ on aceta­yato anabhi­saṅkha­roto of DN 9:17.7, ‘not intending, not willing’. Similar instances of these synonyms are found in MN 140:22.10, SN 12.51:9.5, and AN 11.16:4.4. This refers to the saṅkhāras of Dependent Arising. Their creative aspect is also implied, hence alternative translations like ‘non-generating’ are also possible. I incorporated both aspects using ‘wilfully creating’.

484

SN 22.45:1.15–1.20

485

SN 12.51:13.1–23.2

486

Kalupahana 1976 p.52. See also Vélez de Cea p.136

487

See also AN 3.34 where a man burns the seeds, although here they represent karma instead of consciousness.

488

Patiṭṭhita (‘plant down’) may also be translated as ‘landing’ in this passage, but for consistency I translated it as ‘planting’ everywhere, including here.

489

SN 12.64:8.1–9.8

490

SN 12.39:3.1–3.5

491

SN 12.1:3.1–3.12

492

Anālayo 2023 Chapter I.10

493

Bodhi 2000 n.174 at SN 12.64

494

SN 12.38:3.1–3.5

495

Hecker p.53

496

Anālayo 2023 Chapter I.10 states that the First Discourse on Intention and other discourses in both Pāli and Chinese “confirm that the notion of an unestablished consciousness expresses an arahant’s successful gaining of freedom from the prospect of future rebirth. At times, the same expression serves to describe the actual passing away of an arahant.” Appatiṭṭhita viññāṇa, he concludes, means “consciousness will not become established in another birth”.

497

Langer p.35, translation mine, referring to Harvey 1995 p.202

498

See also AN 8.70:14.3

499

SĀ 377

500

MN 21:14.1–14.10 M I 128

501

For example Bodhi 2000 n.174 at SN 12.64: “I think it would be wrong to interpret the sutta as saying that after his parinibbāna the arahant’s consciousness persists in some mode that can only be described as unestablished. The present passage is clearly speaking of the arahant’s consciousness while he is alive.” (emphasis in the original)

502

Langer p.34, translation mine

503

Langer p.34, translation mine

504

Instead of “consciousness is liberated” Nyanaponika 1990 has “ist man befreit” (one is liberated), Alfan “si è liberi” (one is liberated), and Baron “sólo liberación” (there is just liberation). See also note 279

505

SN 22.9

506

SN 22.94

507

The three terms are citta, mano, and viññāṇa. Normally I translate both citta and mano as ‘mind’, but here I was forced to translate one differently, and I chose ‘sentience’.

508

SN 12.61

509

Ko nu kho phusati, more literally, “who touches?”

510

SN 12.12:3.1–4.10

511

For example Ñāṇavīra p.84, Cintita p.31

512

SN 35.80

513

For example Ñāṇavīra p.89, Cintita p.130, Amaro p.37

514

Anālayo 2021 p.109

515

§105, §106

516

See also Anālayo 2021 p.109: “The relationship between the senses and their objects, which represent the basic duality of ordinary experience in the early discourses, remains the same after the attainment of full awakening”.

517

SN 22.95:6.1–6.2

518

For example Ñāṇananda 2015 p.218: “The magical illusion created by consciousness […]”, further detailed in Ñāṇananda 1974/2007

519

MN 72:20.1–20.20 M I 487

520

See also Kalupahana 1976 p.84. Contra e.g. Johansson p.61

521

SN 4.23

522

See Snp 3.2

523

SĀ 1265, translation by Anālayo 2015 p.243, parallel to SN 22.87

524

EĀ 26.10. Also translated by Anālayo 2015 p.253

525

See also Anālayo 2018 p.27: “The parallel versions agree in referring to what could have been reborn as his ‘consciousness’.”

526

See also Anālayo 2015 p.247

527

Snp 3.5; Thag 2.48; MN 120:37.8 M III 103

528

MN 98:11.101–11.104 M II 122; Snp 3.9:56.1–56.4; Dhp 420

529

Snp 3.12:18.1–20.4

530

SĀ2 30, also translated by Bingenheimer p.141

531

Thomas 1935 argues the first part of the compound tathāgata is likely tatha (‘truth’), not tathā (‘thus’). PED includes for tathāgata “he who has won through to the truth” and DPD “arrived at the truth”.

532

MN 22:36.1–37.6 M I 140

533

‘Diṭṭhevāhaṁ, bhikkhave, dhamme tathāgataṁ ananuvijjo’ti vadāmi, ‘even while alive there is no truth­finder to be found, I tell you’. The most literal meaning of ananuvijja is ‘not found’, but the verb vijjati, as DPD and Gombrich 2009 p.139 say, can also mean ‘exists’. To “not find” a truth­finder therefore means the truth­finder doesn’t actually exist. I use the expression ‘there is no … to be found’ to include both meanings of the verb. For a similar idea see AN 5.167:9.8–9.10: “If I know that there is no such quality in me, I tell him: ‘It doesn’t exist; this quality isn’t found in me.’”

534

Ñāṇamoli 1995 n.266 at MN 22:36.4. See also Bodhi 1984 p.49: “The bhikkhu knows that ‘Tathāgata’ is just a convenient term for referring to a conglomerate process of impermanent, empty phenomena which are suffering in the deepest sense.”

535

See for example Nyanaponika 1959 p.12, Warder 1970 p.123, Ñāṇananda 1971 p.116, Kalupahana 1976 p.84, Collins p.132, Mahasi p.121, Bodhi 1984 p.49, Anālayo 2021 p.107, Anālayo 2022 p.1412

536

Bodhi 1984 p.49

537

SN 1.34, SN 4.16

538

For example Harvey 1995 p.230, Pasanno p.170, Ṭhānissaro 2008a p.121ff

539

SN 45.150

540

SN 1.20:25.1–25.6

541

See also Bodhi 2000 n.38 at SN 1.20:25.1: “[These lines] seem to be describing the arahant after his parinibbāna.” Olalde 2014 p.119 (translation mine): “That the person in question cannot be found anywhere (seemingly after his death) refers to the fact he reached final nibbāna.”

542

Snp 2.12:14.1–14.5. Also at Thag 21.1:67.1–67.5

543

For example SN 4.1:2.1 and SN 6.2:7.1

544

MĀ 62, translation Anālayo 2013, brackets in the original

545

SN 5.10. See also SN 12.15

546

SN 22.85:5.6–14.1

547

For example SN 1.49, SN 3.17, SN 12.41, AN 2.1, AN 3.34, AN 3.69, Iti 23, Iti 28-29, Iti 41, Iti 44, Snp 1.7, etc.

548

SN 22.86:12.1–13.2

549

See also Siderits Section 4.1. Compare SN 44.7

550

See AN 7.54:4.1–4.6

551

MN 143

552

DN 28:7.13 D III 105

553

MN 106:10.10, 12.6 M II 265

554

Iti 44

555

Saññāvedayitanirodha, ‘the cessation of awareness and what is experienced’, more well-known as ‘the cessation of perception and feeling’. In this state there is the complete cessation of both awareness (saññā) and the object that is experienced (vedayita). Saññā has a range of meanings, and one of these is awareness or consciousness in general (PED, DPD). Vedayita is a past participle meaning ‘felt’ or ‘experienced’ (CPED, PED, DPD). While commonly translated as ‘feeling’ in saññāvedayitanirodha, it refers not to the act of feeling but to that which is felt or experienced.

556

SN 12.51:12.1–24.3

557

Ud 8.1

558

See also Norman 1996

559

Bodhi 2020, 6. The Unconditioned: The Goal, Introduction and Bodhi 1979

560

For example Johansson p.51ff

561

DN 31:8.2 D III 183

562

PED and DPD

563

AN 5.26

564

MN 102:10.1–10.7 M II 233

565

Veditabbe here means ‘should be understood’, as Bodhi 2000 and Sujato 2023, not ‘should be experienced’ as Anālayo 2023 Chapter II.3. The cessation of the six senses includes the cessation of all feelings/experiences (vedanā) and therefore is not something that is experienced. It can, however, be understood. The commentary also understands veditabbe as jānitabba, ‘to be understood’. This use of veditabba is common in the discourses.

566

SN 35.117

567

The relative adverb yattha can mean both ‘where’ and ‘when’.

568

Ud 8.1

569

Brahmāli p.55

570

DOP and PED

571

Iti 51

572

Snp 5.10:2.1–2.5

573

SN 12.68, AN 10.7

574

Contra e.g. Ñāṇananda 2015 p.376. For the Buddha experiencing the formless states see for example SN 6.15

575

MN 59:16.1–16.6 M I 400, SN 36.19:16.1–16.6, compare with

AN 9.34; MN 111:20.1-20.6 M III 28

576

See Wynne p.100

577

See Tan: “Appatiṭṭhitaṃ means ‘without […] support for consciousness.’ Hence, there is neither sensing nor knowing.”

578

Snp 5.5

579

Nicholas Rescher (tr.), Al-Fārābī’s Short Commentary on Aristotle’s Prior Analytics, p.49

580

§7

581

§53, §54, §115

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§76, §78, §118

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