


Bill's goods	Utility to Bill	Utility to Jack	Jack's goods	Ut to Bill	Ut to Jack ①
book	2	4	pen	10	1
whip	2	2	toy	4	1
ball	2	1	knife	6	2
bat	2	2	hat	2	2
box	4	1			


{ pen, knife } → (16, 13) ●
 BILL ~~Box~~ Jack


→ (12, 6) ●

No trade :



or



LOTTERIES

$$d = (d_1, d_2) = \text{dis}$$

$d = \text{disagreement point}$
(or, status quo)

$$a = \begin{pmatrix} a_1 \\ a_2 \end{pmatrix}, \quad \lambda = \begin{pmatrix} \lambda_1 \\ \lambda_2 \end{pmatrix}$$

a_i real number λ_i positive

DEFⁿ ① $a + \lambda x = \begin{pmatrix} a_1 + \lambda_1 x_1 \\ a_2 + \lambda_2 x_2 \end{pmatrix}$ for $\begin{pmatrix} x_1 \\ x_2 \end{pmatrix} \in \mathbb{R}^2$

② For any set $S \subset \mathbb{R}^2$,
 $a + \lambda S = \{a + \lambda x : x \in S\}$

a_i = change of origin } measuring utility of i
 λ_i = change of scale } utility scale of i

Take two lotteries

p	$1-p$
10	7
q	$1-q$
11	5

$p10 + (1-p)7$

$q11 + (1-q)5$

Replace these numbers 10, 7, 11, 5
 by $a_i + \lambda_i 10$, $a_i + \lambda_i 7$, etc.

⇒ LOTTERIES RANKED THE SAME WAY

$$\begin{matrix} \$ & x_1 & \dots & x_n \\ \text{prob} & p_1 & & p_n \end{matrix} \} L$$

$$\begin{matrix} y_1 & \dots & y_n \\ q_1 & & q_k \end{matrix} \} \tilde{L}$$

$$L \succ \tilde{L} \text{ if}$$

$\sum_{i=1}^n p_i x_i$

➤

$\sum_{j=1}^k q_j y_j$

Exp L
Exp \tilde{L}

invariant
under
~~does not~~ change of scale


~~\tilde{x}_i~~

$$\begin{aligned} x_i &\rightarrow \tilde{x}_i = -5 + 7x_i \\ y_j &\rightarrow \tilde{y}_j = -5 + 7y_j \end{aligned}$$

$$\sum p_i \tilde{x}_i \rightarrow \sum q_j \tilde{y}_j$$

$$\succ \Leftrightarrow \succ$$

BARGAINING PROBLEM. (4)



Assume

$\exists x \in S$
such that
 $x_1 > d_1$
 $x_2 > d_2$

$$x = \begin{pmatrix} x_1 \\ x_2 \end{pmatrix}$$

AXIOMS ON ϕ

(5)

$$\phi(d, s)$$

$$\phi(\underbrace{a + \lambda d, a + \lambda s})$$

$$(d, s) \sim (a + \lambda d, a + \lambda s)$$

So SAME SOLⁿ.

AXI $\phi(a + \lambda d, a + \lambda s) = a + \lambda \phi(d, s)$


SCALE INVARIANCE

(

(6)

DEFⁿ S is symmetric if

$$\begin{pmatrix} x_1 \\ x_2 \end{pmatrix} \in S \Rightarrow \begin{pmatrix} x_2 \\ x_1 \end{pmatrix} \in S$$



AXII If $d_1 = d_2$ and S is symmetric
then $\varphi_1(d, S) = \varphi_2(d, S)$

SYMMETRY


PARETO - OPTIMALITY

AX III

$\nexists x = \begin{pmatrix} x_1 \\ x_2 \end{pmatrix} \in S$ such that

$x_1 > \varphi_1(d, S)$
 $x_2 > \varphi_2(d, S)$

PARETO - OPTIMALITY





IIA



Proof

Restrict to

9



maximizes
 $x_1 x_2$

for $x = \begin{pmatrix} x_1 \\ x_2 \end{pmatrix} \in \Delta$

$$\text{Max } x(10-x)$$


$$\text{Max}_{0 \leq x \leq 1} x(10-x)$$

$$\text{So } \frac{d}{dx} [x(10-x)]$$


$$= (10-x) + x \cdot -1 = 0$$

$$\Rightarrow x = 5.$$

(10)



Scale of u_2
has changed
 $\lambda = 2$





Again x_1, x_2 is maximized
at $(5, 10)$


Max x_1, x_2 SAME AS
 $x \in \triangle$

Max $x_1, 2x_2$
 $x \in \triangle$

$= \text{Max } x_1, x_2$



So must have



More generally,

$$\lambda = \begin{pmatrix} \lambda_1 \\ \lambda_2 \end{pmatrix}$$

(A)

if $\max x_1, x_2$ is achieved at $x^* = \begin{pmatrix} x_1^* \\ x_2^* \end{pmatrix}$
① $\begin{pmatrix} x_1 \\ x_2 \end{pmatrix} \in S$

THEN $\max y_1, y_2$ is achieved at $y^* = \lambda x^*$
② $\begin{pmatrix} y_1 \\ y_2 \end{pmatrix} \in \lambda S$
 $= \begin{pmatrix} \lambda_1 x_1^* \\ \lambda_2 x_2^* \end{pmatrix}$

Proof

$$\begin{aligned} y_1 y_2 &= \lambda_1 x_1 \lambda_2 x_2 \\ &= (\lambda_1 \lambda_2) x_1 x_2 \end{aligned}$$

So ~~solve~~ solve ② by

~~Max~~ $\max y_1, y_2$
 $\begin{pmatrix} y_1 \\ y_2 \end{pmatrix} \in \lambda S$



\sim $\max (\lambda_1 \lambda_2) x_1 x_2$
 $\begin{pmatrix} x_1 \\ x_2 \end{pmatrix} \in S$

\rightarrow

General solⁿ is.

$$x = \begin{pmatrix} x_1 \\ x_2 \end{pmatrix}, \quad \text{B}$$

$$\text{Max } (x_1 - d_1)(x_2 - d_2)$$
$$\{x \in S : x \geq d\}$$



©

