

Dynamic Online Pricing with Incomplete Information Using Multi-Armed Bandit Experiments

Kanishka Misra^{*}

Eric M. Schwartz[†]

Jacob Abernethy[§]

February, 2018

Abstract

Pricing managers at online retailers face a unique challenge. They must decide on real-time prices for a large number of products with incomplete demand information. The manager runs price experiments to learn about each product's demand curve and the profit-maximizing price. Balanced field price experiments, in practice can create high opportunity costs since a large number of customers are presented with sub-optimal prices. In this paper, we propose an alternative dynamic price experimentation policy. The proposed approach extends multi-armed bandit (MAB) algorithms, from statistical machine learning, to include microeconomic choice theory. Our automated pricing policy solves this MAB problem using a scalable distribution-free algorithm. We prove analytically that our method is asymptotically optimal for any weakly downward sloping demand curve. In a series of Monte Carlo simulations, we show that the proposed approach perform favorably compared to balanced field experiments and standard methods in dynamic pricing from computer science. In a calibrated simulation based on an existing pricing field experiment, we find that our algorithm can increase profits by 43% profits during the month of testing and 4% annually.

^{*}Rady School of Management, University of California, San Diego. Contact: kamisra@ucsd.edu

[†]Ross School of Business, University of Michigan. Contact: ericmsch@umich.edu

[‡]The first two authors are listed alphabetically

[§]School of Computing, Georgia Tech University. Contact: prof@gatech.edu

1 Introduction

1.1 Overview

Consider the pricing decision for a manager at an online retailer. There are two features of this setting that make it different from brick-and-mortar retail settings. First, online sellers can vary prices nearly continuously and often randomize those changes for learning purposes [White House, 2015]. This differs from a traditional retail setting where retailers face high costs, known as menu costs, to change prices limiting the number price changes [Anderson et al., 2015]. Second, large online retailers sell a large number of products, for example amazon.com sells hundreds of millions of products with tens of thousands of new products per day¹. At the time of pricing, the manager is unlikely to have complete information about each product's demand curve. In these markets, a manager must consider an automated pricing policy [Baker et al., 2014] to set real-time retail prices with incomplete demand information.

Consider how a firm typically tests prices when faced with incomplete demand information. For example, a firm is deciding among a set of 10 prices ($p \in \{\$0.10, \$0.20, \dots, \$0.90, \$1.00\}$), however does not have information about demand at each price. The firm may experiment the prices, one at a time, observe demand and profits at each level, and then select the price that leads to highest profits. This approach is intuitive, often implemented in industry, and is a benchmark in the academic operations research literature Besbes and Zeevi [2009]. This form of price experimentation is best described as “learn then earn.” In our example, the firm runs a *balanced experiment* where the same number of consumers are shown each of the 10 prices. The experiment estimates the mean (with measurement error) demand ($D(p = \$0.10), \dots, D(p = \$1.00)$) and profit at each price ($\pi(p = \$0.10), \dots, \pi(p = \$1.00)$). The manager can then select the price with the highest profits.

In this paper, we build on the dynamic price experimentation literature. Instead of considering two distinct phases of learning and earning, this literature frames the problem as a dynamic optimization problem with the goal of maximizing *earning while learning*. The objective of continuous price experimentation is to maximize long-run profits, where the firm wants to minimize the opportunity costs of experimentation. The pricing algorithm sequentially sets prices to balance currently earning profits and learning about demand for future profits. The key difference here is that the firm observes real-time purchase decisions and incorporates

¹For example, industry reports suggest Amazon.com sells about 500 million products <https://www.scrapehero.com/many-products-amazon-sell-january-2018/> [last accessed 2/11/2018].

this additional information for future pricing decisions. Therefore, to select the price for the t th round of the experiment, the firm will use profit estimates from the first $t - 1$ rounds.

Multi-armed bandit (MAB) methods provide algorithms for adaptive experimentation. The MAB problem is a fundamental dynamic optimization problem in reinforcement learning [Sutton and Barto, 1998]. The problem has a long history in statistics and operations research, and recently in marketing (Gittins et al. [2011], and see Schwartz et al. [2017] for an overview of MAB in the marketing literature). The algorithm is faced with a set of possible decisions, called ‘arms’ (in our application, arms represent different prices). Each arm has stable but unknown reward distribution (in our application, profit). In this setup, the algorithm selects arms sequentially in real-time with the goal of optimizing cumulative reward.

We illustrate the difference between a MAB experiment and a balanced experiment for the example above. In the computer science literature, Auer [2002] propose the UCB1, an optimal non-parametric bandit algorithm that continuously balances learning and earning over time (we will build on this algorithm in our paper and it described in detail in section 2). For our illustration, we assume a demand curve (here, $D(p) = 3 \cdot (1 - p)$, with the profit maximizing price at \$0.5) and run both algorithms over 1,000 experimental periods. In any period, the manager gets a noisy signal of the true profit with variance of 0.3. The results are shown in Figure 1. In Panel A, we show the prices played (by round and a histogram across all rounds) in each method. In a balanced experiment, by definition, each price is played an equal number of times. The bandit experiment, on the other hand learn the profit maximizing price and is charges that price more often.

As a result (Figure 1, Panel B) the bandit algorithm earns more profit than the balanced experiment (95% vs. 66%). Moreover the bandit continuously increases the profit achieved with experiments, while the balanced experiment is by definition constant over time. A second important difference is the precision of the learning. Figure 1, Panel B (right side) also illustrates that the confidence intervals for the balanced experiment are the same for all prices. However, the bandit experiment results in smaller confidence intervals for prices around the optimal price and much larger ones for prices that are suboptimal. In terms of profit learning, a balanced experiment focuses on *learning everywhere*, while the bandit focuses on *relevant learning*. Relevant learning [Aghion et al., 1991] refers to learning true profit for the most profit relevant price points. We use this example to illustrate the value of relevant learning and the value gained from MAB algorithms to optimize experiments, as we will use this MAB framework throughout the paper.

[Figure 1 about here.]

Our proposed solution extends common MAB algorithms to include choice theory from microeconomics. We account for the two key features of the online retail pricing problem setting: wide variety of products and real-time changes for those millions of products. To ensure our model can be used for a wide variety of products, we make minimal assumptions about the underlying demand curve for a particular product. Instead of assuming each product's demand curve to come from the same family of distributions, we opt for an approach that is driven by economic theory and flexible. By limiting parametric assumptions, our algorithm will be more robust to any arbitrary unknown downward-sloping demand system. While traditional robust optimization solutions come with a relatively large computational cost (e.g., Berger [1985] write "minimax principle can be devilishly hard to implement" page 309), our algorithm can be estimated in real-time.

Our algorithm builds on the Upper Confidence Bound (UCB) algorithm in the non-parametric MAB literature [Auer et al., 2002]. The family of UCB algorithms work as follows. In each time period, the algorithm assigns each arm a so-called UCB value: the sum of expected reward and an exploration bonus. That exploration bonus is the potential value from experimentation. Then the algorithm plays the arm with the highest UCB value. The algorithm observes a noisy reward and updates these values for each arm. The UCB algorithm is guaranteed to be the "best" non-parametric algorithm for any bounded payoff function in terms of achieving the theoretically optimal error rate in a finite-time setting [Lai, 1987].

We extend this MAB algorithm to incorporate partially identified demand learning. In the typical UCB algorithm, when a particular price is charged (an arm is played), the firm's observations are limited to profits (reward) from that price (arm). We extend this to allow learning across prices (arms) based on economics. Formally, we assume that a consumer's choice structure is such that individual demand curves are weakly downward sloping. With this additional yet minimal assumption, when a consumer is exposed to any price, the manager can *partially identify* the consumer's underlying preference across different potential prices. For example, if a consumer purchases a good at \$3, the manager can infer she would have purchased at any price below \$3. And if a consumer does not purchase a good at \$3, the manager can infer she would not have purchased at any price above \$3.

We consider a setting where each consumer makes a single purchase decision, so we rely on cross-sectional identification to estimate aggregate demand. We assume the firm observes consumer characteristics and can use this to observed heterogeneity for segmentation. In practice these segments may be based on many variables, including demographics and behavior. Due to the abundance of data, online retailers can

have a large number of segments. For example, Google analytics and Facebook analytics offer over 1,000 segments to advertising brands.² We estimate the within-segment variation in customer valuations and allow the heterogeneity across segments to be fully non-parametric – that is, information about preferences in each segment are independent.

Since we impose minimal assumptions about the shape or structure of the demand model, our algorithm is quite robust to distributional assumptions about heterogeneity, and context [Handel et al., 2013], and therefore, it can be credibly applied for a variety of products. We will show that this includes situations where demand and profit functions are discontinuous or multi-modal. It even allows for special price effects (e.g., contextual factors). This robustness to the structure of the demand model is important as our pricing model can be used to estimate prices for a variety of products.

Finally, the other key feature of online retail is pricing in real-time at large scale. We ensure our algorithm can run in real-time for millions of products. Since our proposed algorithm has minimal estimation requirements, it plays prices at speeds orders of magnitude faster than current solutions. In a two-period version of a pricing problem, the full solution in Handel and Misra [2015] plays first period prices for one product in about 15 hours of computation time. Our proposed method can calculate about 2 million prices per minute, and can be used for real-time online pricing.

We consider a monopolist’s pricing, which is consistent with much of the literature on price experimentation, for example, the literature on MAB [Kleinberg and Leighton, 2014], pricing under ambiguity [Besbes and Zeevi, 2009, Bergemann and Schlag, 2011], field experiments [Dubé and Misra, 2017]. Our algorithm is therefore most relevant for products with limited competition³. This includes products with a monopolist seller and products with limited distribution early or late in their life-cycles. The algorithm is also relevant when faced with a stable or predictable competitor. A stable competitor will not respond to real-time price changes. A predictable competitor, for example may use an automated real-time price matching algorithm. With “non strategic” competition (see Hviid and Shaffer [1999] for a review of price matching), the product’s demand curve is stable over time. We note that our algorithm and theoretical results are not guaranteed for products with strategic competition.

Our main results show the following. (1) We analytically prove our proposed algorithm’s performance

²We note that in practice such segmentation is used by advertisers using data from Facebook <https://www.facebook.com/help/analytics/1568220886796899/> or Google analytics <https://support.google.com/analytics/answer/3123951?hl=en>. Accessed March 2016.

³Recent industry reports suggest that Amazon.com carries 14 times more products than the second largest online retailer Walmart.com www.scrapehero.com/amazon-vs-walmart-products-sold-in-april-2017/.

using a novel analysis technique for MAB algorithms. Here we show that for any weakly downward-sloping demand curve, our algorithm is guaranteed to asymptotically optimal (Section 3). (2) In a series of Monte Carlo simulation experiment across a range of settings, we outperform a set of benchmarks. We find our algorithm achieves a higher mean profit and a lower variance across simulation settings. We document the limiting condition (no observable heterogeneity) under which our proposed algorithm matches current machine learning methods (Section 4).

(3) We conduct a simulation experiment based on a randomized pricing experiment in Dubé and Misra [2017], run with ZipRecruiter.com. Approximately 8,000 consumers were shown one of ten prices between 19 and 399. We use those experimental results as a basis for simulating demand curves. We find that our algorithm achieves 43% higher profits during the month of testing and about 4% higher annual profits (Section 5).

1.2 Contributions

With the emergence of big data, we see an increase in machine learning applications in marketing [Chintagunta et al., 2016]. But a natural critique is machine learning algorithms' absence of economic theory. This work illustrates how we can bridge this gap. We propose a novel combination of economic theory with machine learning. To marketing and economics, we adapt scalable reinforcement learning methods to address dynamic optimization problems. We propose a fast dynamic pricing algorithm rooted in economic theory.

To machine learning, we introduce distribution-free theory of demand to improve existing algorithms theoretically and empirically. Typically, the models of active learning in computer science often rely on stylized demand models since they are amenable to formal analysis. But they may lack the economic theory, which, as we find, can improve the optimal pricing algorithms.

1.3 Related Literature

1.3.1 Literature on Pricing

Our paper adds to a large literature on pricing and learning demand in marketing, economics, and operations research. Much of the current literature makes strong assumptions about the information the firm has about demand of each product. In marketing and operations, for instance, the literature often assumes that firms make product pricing decisions based on knowing the demand curve [Oren et al., 1982, Rao and

Bass, 1985, Wernerfelt, 1986, Smith, 1986, Bayus, 1992, Rajan et al., 1992, Acquisti and Varian, 2005, Nair, 2007, Akcay et al., 2010, Jiang et al., 2011]. These methods assume that the firm has access to perfect information about the demand curve and consider the optimal dynamic pricing given this information. We argue that it is infeasible for large online retailers to know the demand curve for millions of products.

A second related literature assumes that firms know demand only up to a parameter [Rothschild, 1974, Lodish, 1980, Aghion et al., 1991, Braden and Oren, 1994, Kalyanam, 1996, Biyalogorsky and Gerstner, 2004, Bergemann and Valimaki, 1996, Aviv and Pazcal, 2002, Hitsch, 2006, Desai et al., 2010, Bonatti, 2011, Biyalogorsky and Koenigsberg, 2014]. The modeling approach in these papers assumes that the manager knows the structure of demand and just learns the parameters. This could be a two-period model [Biyalogorsky and Koenigsberg, 2014] or an infinite-time model [Aghion et al., 1991]. In the infinite-time model, Aghion et al. [1991] consider a very general model where the manager knows the structure of demand up to a parameter (θ), the firm sets prices and observes market outcomes. In subsequent periods the firm updates the posterior belief distributions for the parameters, and then the firm sets prices. They show that under this structure learning can be “inadequate” in cases where the profit function is multi-modal or discontinuous. Inadequate learning is defined as when the agent never acquires adequate knowledge (i.e., asymptotically, adequate with probability zero). Adequate knowledge is defined when the agent knows enough about the true profit function to achieve ex-post optimal profits. Aghion et al. [1991] concludes: “even when learning goes on forever, it does not result in adequate knowledge” (pg. 642).

We argue that it is important for a robust pricing policy to incorporate all possible demand curves. Therefore, we make weaker assumptions than assuming a demand model in order to derive optimal prices. Economically, by making only weak assumptions about the demand curve, we sacrifice precision for credibility [Manski, 2005]. This is consistent with saying that it is not feasible for a firm to have both precise and credible demand information about every single product, so we have to make a trade-off between precision and credibility.

Our non-parametric method builds on the robust pricing literature [Bergemann and Schlag, 2008, 2011, Handel et al., 2013]. The robust dynamic pricing literature provides a solution for two-periods pricing [Handel and Misra, 2015]. Here the authors consider a brick-and-mortar retail setting, where the retailer must keep a fixed price for the entire time period. We differ from these papers by building a solution based on the MAB literature in computer science. The advantage of our model is that it allows for continuous learning and real-time changes to suggested prices. The key simplifying assumption here is that we do not

account for endogenous demand curve learning. Specifically, when estimating the value of experimenting at price (say p_1), we only consider the value of learning about demand at that price ($D(p = p_1)$). However, we do not consider the value of learning about the demand curve at other prices ($D(p \neq p_1)$). We believe endogenous demand curve learning is more relevant in settings with infrequent price changes.

The current work also contributes to theoretical work in operations research, namely dynamic pricing and revenue management. The area of revenue management has a large literature that considers dynamic pricing (see Elmaghraby and Keskinocak [2003], den Boer [2015] for a reviews of the literature). Our work falls into a category known as dynamic pricing without inventory constraints, where dynamics are due to incomplete information and learning. Within this literature our paper fits with the less studied and more recent stream of non-parametric work. Non-parametric approaches (Besbes and Zeevi [2009]), consider pricing policies in an incomplete information setting. Here the authors consider algorithms that minimize the maximum ex-post statistical regret from not charging the optimal static price. The proposed algorithm divides the sales horizon into an “exploration” phase during which the demand function is learned and an “exploitation” phase during which the estimated optimal price is used. The firm has to ex-ante set the length of experimentation stage, therefore this algorithm corresponds to a balanced field experiment. In more recent additions to this literature, Wang and Hu [2014] and Lei et al. [2014] improve the convergence results, yet the algorithms proposed in these papers also consider distinct phases for exploration then exploitation, or as we refer to it, “learning *then* earning.” Instead, in our paper, we consider the learning and earning phases simultaneously, accounting for the potential value from learning at each point in time. This is consistent with the broader MAB literature from machine learning.

1.3.2 Literature on Multi-Armed Bandits

We consider the problem of pricing using MAB methods, which are not typically used for pricing, but do stretch across computer science, statistics, operations research, and marketing. The MAB problem is the quintessential problem of the fields of active learning, referring to the sequential decision-making process, and reinforcement learning in the computer science literature (for an overview, see Sutton and Barto [1998]).

A large part of this literature provides theoretical analysis and mathematical guarantees of algorithms. The algorithms are policies to adaptively select the arms to achieve the best profits. The objective function for these algorithms is to minimize the statistical regret. *Statistical regret* “is the loss due to the fact that the globally optimal policy is not followed all the times” [Auer et al., 2002]. That is the difference between

the achieved profits and the ex-post optimal profits, if the decision maker knew the true average profits for each arm. Algorithms are compared based on the bounds on regret. This bound represents the worst case performance: the maximum possible regret for any possible distribution of the true rewards across the arms.

These UCB policies provide the backbone of a stream of MAB solutions in reinforcement learning coming from statistical machine learning [Agrawal, 1955, Auer et al., 2002]. Lai and Robbins [1985] first obtained these “nearly optimal index rules in the finite-horizon case” where the indices can be interpreted as “upper confidence bounds for the expected rewards,” hence UCB (Brezzi and Lai [2002], pp. 88-89). While these index rules do not provide the exactly optimal solution to the optimization problem with discounted infinite sum of expected rewards, these rules are asymptotically optimal for arbitrarily large finite-time horizons, T . As $T \rightarrow \infty$, the UCB-based index rule achieves optimal performance with respect to maximizing the expected sum of rewards through T periods “from both the Bayesian and frequentist viewpoints for moderate and small values of $[T]$ ” (Brezzi and Lai [2002], pp. 88-89).⁴

Asymptotic theory links the finite-horizon undiscounted case and the infinite-horizon discounted multi-armed bandit problem [Brezzi and Lai, 2002]. Depending on the discount factor, $disc$, the UCB directly approximates the Gittins index [Lai, 1987]. When setting $T = (1 - disc)^{-1}$, as $disc \rightarrow 1$, then the UCB in Lai [1987] (pg. 1113) is not only asymptotically optimal for the finite-horizon undiscounted problem, but also for the infinite-horizon undiscounted problem from Gittins. The link is strengthened as Brezzi and Lai [2002] derive an Approximate Gittins Index, with a structure exactly the same as that of the UCB, the sum of expected reward and an exploration bonus.

We add to this literature by allowing (partially identified) demand curve learning across the potential prices. Formally, we assume that each consumers choice structure satisfies the weak axiom of revealed preference (WARP) (see proposition 3.D.3 in Mas-Colell et al. [1995], and discussed in the next section). While in the UCB models the prices would typically be considered independent arms, adding an economic assumption allows us to use information about demand at a price (say p_1) to make an inference about demand at other prices ($p \neq p_1$).

The learning-and-earning problem for pricing relates to a broader class of problems, optimizing marketing experiments or so-called A/B testing. The emerging framework is using MAB methods to optimally

⁴We note that if the decision maker is willing to make stronger parametric assumptions about the demand curve, alternative streams of MAB algorithms based on parametric models are more appropriate. One such algorithm is the earliest Bayesian formulation of the MAB problem, which led to Thompson Sampling Thompson [1933]. A more prominent formulation with Bayesian learning led to the Gittins index [Gittins, 1989] and Whittle index [Whittle, 1980].

balance earning while learning. These approaches most commonly appear in online advertising or website design [Hauser et al., 2009, Urban et al., 2013, Schwartz et al., 2017]. We argue that pricing is different from other marketing decisions in two key ways. First, economic theory gives strong predictions that individual indirect utility functions are non-increasing in prices, but this is not true for other marketing decision variables. Without particular parametric assumptions, learning about one ad creative or website design does not inform predictions of others in predictable ways. Second, unlike advertising, the randomization of prices is imperfect. Retailers do not commonly offer the same product to different consumers at a given point in time.⁵ Therefore, price changes can happen only across time and not across consumers.

2 Dynamic Multi-Period Monopoly Pricing

2.1 Model setup and maintained assumptions

In this section, we state our main assumptions in our analysis. We first discuss our assumptions on the demand side and then our assumptions on the supply side.

We assume there are a large set of potential consumers with unit demand for each product. For each consumer we assume the following:

1. she has stable preferences,
2. she has a stable budget over time,
3. she faces a stable outside option, and
4. her choice structure satisfies the weak axiom of reveal preference (WARP).

We note that the first three of these assumptions, while typically unstated, are assumed in any field experiment; these assure that the results of the field experiment can be used to understand demand after the experiment. With these assumptions, we represent the consumer's preference as v_i . In any purchase occasion, when facing a price p , her indirect utility can be written as $u_i = v_i - p$, and she will purchase the good if and only if $u_i \geq 0$, that is, $v_i \geq p$. The assumption of stable preference guarantees that v_i does not change over time. This rules out learning [Erdem and Keane, 1996], stockpiling [Hendel and Nevo,

⁵Amazon.com has run price experiments in 2000 and due to consumer feedback release a statement say "random testing was a mistake, and we regret it because it created uncertainty and complexity for our customers, and our job is to simplify shopping for customers. That is why, more than two weeks ago, in response to customer feedback, we changed our policy to protect customers" <http://cnfn.cnn.com/2000/09/28/technology/amazon/>.

2006], network externalities [Nair et al., 2004], reference price effect [Kalyanaram and Winer, 1995, Winer, 1986] and strategic consumers [Nair, 2007]. Unlike much of the prior work on dynamic prices (e.g., Nair [2007]), in our paper firms change prices for learning the demand curve as opposed to inter-temporal price discrimination.

Our next set of assumptions consider the heterogeneity across consumers. We assume that the manager has access to demand relevant descriptive variables for each consumer, these could include observable variables, such as demographics and behavioral patterns, or model-based criteria. As an example, in their application Dubé and Misra [2017] consider geography, company type, and job benefits as relevant demand shifters in their pricing for Ziprecruiter.com. We assume heterogeneity among consumers can be separated as observable (by descriptive variables Z) and unobservable heterogeneity. Formally $v_i = f(Z_i) + \nu_i$.

To allow for any functional form of the $f(Z_i)$, we will consider the firm assigns consumers in to segments S . Where each $s \in S$ represents a combination of the descriptor variables Z_i . We define the aggregate proportion of consumers in each segment, ψ_s . We note that the online retailers have the ability to use a large number of segments, for example Google and Facebook offer over different 1,000 segments to its advertisers (see Footnote 2).

With this formulation we can add a fixed effect for each segment, or formally for a consumer i in segment s , we have $v_i = v_s + \nu_i$, where v_s represent the midpoint of range of consumer valuations within segment s and ν_i represents the unobserved heterogeneity. Rather than assume a function form for ν_i we assume they can be bounded by δ (or $\nu_i \in [-\delta, \delta]$) ⁶. Handel et al. [2013] show that this formulation sacrifices precision for creditability, in the sense that it is robust to violations to standard distributional and independence assumptions. With this assumption, the preference of all consumers in a segment are within δ of the segment midpoint, v_s . Taken together,

$$v_i \in [v_s - \delta, v_s + \delta] \forall i \in s. \quad (1)$$

These demand assumptions are quite general. Within each segment, we allow for any distribution of preferences within this range; therefore, we note that v_s is not assumed to be the mean or the median of the segment valuations. Across segments, we allow for fully non-parametric heterogeneity across segments. This assumption allows cross-sectional learning of consumer preferences.

⁶This is an assumption about the data generating process and not the information that firm has. In our empirical application, we assume that δ is not known to the firm and will be estimated from observed choice data

We will estimate v_s and δ in our empirical algorithm. Our estimate of δ can be interpreted as a measure of the “quality of segmentation”. If the firm’s ex-ante segmentation does not group consumers with similar preferences, then the estimate of δ will be large. But if the firm’s ex-ante segmentation does group consumers with similar preference, then δ will be small.

On the supply side, we assume that the firm is a monopolist who sets online prices to maximize profits for a constant marginal cost product. The main deviation we make from the standard pricing literature (e.g., Oren et al. [1982], Rao and Bass [1985]) is that we assume the firm does not know consumer valuations. We assume that the only information available to the firm at the time of initial pricing is that consumer valuations are between $[v_L, v_H]$. The interpretation here is that if the product is sold for v_L (can be zero) all consumers will purchase for sure, and if the product is sold for v_H , no consumers will buy. Consistent with the robust pricing literature [Bergemann and Schlag, 2008, 2011, Besbes and Zeevi, 2009, Handel et al., 2013, Wang and Hu, 2014, Handel and Misra, 2015, Lei et al., 2014] we assume within this range the firm does not know the distribution of consumer preferences across or within segments. Our motivation for this assumption is that it is infeasible for the manager to have credible priors for millions of products.

We assume that the firm does not price discriminate across consumers. Formally, the firm observes a consumer’s identity and segment membership; however, we assume the firm does not use this information to price discriminate. If we had full information, there exists an optimal static price that a monopolist would charge. However, due to the lack of information the monopolist must experiment with prices. We assume that the firm can change prices quickly. White House [2015] reports that Amazon.com can change prices within 15 minutes. In our model, we will assume that prices can change after every N consumers who visit the product.⁷

2.2 Overview of multi-armed bandit pricing

We begin by formulating the pricing problem as a dynamic optimization problem. We assume there exist a finite set of K prices that the firm can choose from $p \in \{p_1, \dots, p_K\}$. For any price, p , the firm faces an unknown true demand $D(p)$. We assume a constant marginal cost (set to zero for ease of exposition). Given this setup the true profit is given by $\pi(p) = pD(p)$.

While the true profit function $\pi(p)$ is unknown, the firm observes realizations of profits for each price p_k . Suppose by time t , the firm has charged p_k a total of n_{kt} times. Let $\pi_{k,1}, \pi_{k,2}, \dots, \pi_{k,n_{kt}}$ be realizations

⁷Websites <http://camelcamelcamel.com> and <https://thetracktor.com> we can track price changes.

of profit per consumer from every time that price p_k has been charged. We assume that these are drawn from an unknown probability distribution with a mean at the true profit $\pi(p_k)$. We refer to the sample mean at time t as $\bar{\pi}_{kt} = \frac{\sum_{\tau=1}^{n_{kt}} \pi_{k\tau}}{n_{kt}}$. By definition, we must have $\sum_{k=1}^K n_{kt} = t$.

A pricing *policy or algorithm*, Ψ , selects prices based on the history of past prices and earned profits. Mathematically this can be described as, $p_t = \Psi(\{p_\tau, \pi_\tau | \tau = 1, \dots, t-1\})$. The policy maps data from all previous experiments onto price.

To evaluate a policy's performance, the literature considers statistical *regret*.⁸ The key criterion to evaluate policies is minimizing maximum regret (i.e., minimax regret). Regret for a policy is defined as the expected profit loss due to not always playing the unknown ex-post optimal profit-maximizing fixed price [Lai and Robbins, 1985]. The notion of regret is standard in the computer science and decision theory literature [Lai and Robbins, 1985, Auer, 2002, Berger, 1985]. This was first proposed by Wald [1950] and has been axiomatized in the economic literature [Milnor, 1954, Stoye, 2011]. This criterion has been used to study pricing in economics [Bergemann and Schlag, 2008, 2011, Handel et al., 2013] and marketing [Handel and Misra, 2015]. The economic interpretation of regret is the “forgone profits” due to price experimentation.

Formally, we represent regret as the distance to the optimal profits. We define the ex-post profit maximizing price to be p^* for all t yielding an expected profit $\mu^* = \mathbb{E}[\pi(p)] = p^* D(p^*)$ each time period. The regret of a policy Ψ through time t is

$$\text{Regret}(\Psi, \{\pi(p_k)\}, t) = \mathbb{E} \left[\sum_{\tau=1}^t \pi^* - \pi_\tau \right] = \sum_{\tau=1}^t (\pi^* - \pi_{p_\tau}) = \pi^* t - \sum_{k=1}^K \pi(p_k) \mathbb{E}[n_{kt}] \quad (2)$$

where π_t is profit realized in time period t , and regret is stated in terms of true profits, $\{\pi(p_k)\} = \{\pi_1, \dots, \pi_K\}$.

However, when considering the analysis of regret, we do not observe true profits, $\{\pi_1, \dots, \pi_K\}$, and therefore, also do not know π^* . The analysis instead considers all possible realizations of profit since the distribution of profits is not known before running the algorithm. Next we consider the possible realization that generates the “worst case” or maximum regret for a given policy Ψ . The economic interpretation of this is to consider a feasible demand curve ($D(p)$) that results in the maximum regret given a pricing policy. The

⁸We note regret is appropriate because of the active learning setting. We need an “ex-ante” criteria to evaluate a pricing policy. By “ex-ante” we mean, the objective function must be one that can be calculated without knowing the true demand curve. Specifically we cannot consider a criteria such as total expected profits, as this cannot be used to evaluate a policy *before* the probability of outcomes are realized.

algorithm with the best *minimax regret* is one that can minimize the maximum regret.

In the MAB literature, according to the minimax regret criterion, the optimal solution for this non-parametric problem is a policy involving an index rule scoring each action with its UCB of expected rewards [Agrawal, 1955, Auer, 2002, Lai and Robbins, 1985, Lai, 1987]. This policy is proven to be the asymptotically best possible performance in terms of achieving the lowest maximum regret.

The structure of the index assigned to each action in the UCB algorithm is the sum of expected reward and an exploration bonus. For instance, in the focal algorithm in Auer [2002], UCB1, the index for action k at time T is based on only the sample mean reward of the arm and an exportation bonus. In our notation this translates to

$$\text{UCB1}_{kt} = \bar{\pi}_{kt} + \sqrt{\frac{2 \log t}{n_{kt}}}. \quad (3)$$

Then the arm with the highest UCB value is selected to be played in the next round.

The amount by which UCB exceeds the expected reward is called the *exploration bonus*, representing the value of information. The exploration bonus, $\sqrt{\frac{2 \log t}{n_{kt}}}$, can be expressed more generally with a parameter $\alpha > 0$ as $\sqrt{\frac{\alpha \log t}{n_{kt}}}$. The particular structure inside the UCB1 exploration bonus follows from the proof of the algorithm's optimality. The proof in Auer [2002] leads to setting $\alpha = 2$ to obtain its bound on regret for UCB1. But we will discuss the details of UCB in greater detail in Section 3 and derive an alternative value of α informed by economic theory and the pricing setting.

To prove that it is asymptotically optimal, exploration bonus, which quantifies the value of information, is defined to ensure that cumulative regret grows slowly at logarithmic rate in time, with arbitrarily high probability. Cumulative regret is the difference between the cumulative reward and the optimal cumulative reward, and we refer to ex-post profits. We illustrate this in our proof, using deviation bounds (concentration inequalities), for our algorithm later in the theoretical analysis (Section 3.1 and Appendix A1).

The UCB framework, spawning multiple versions since Auer [2002], has become a standard approach in the MAB literature in machine learning, but those UCB versions have had limited application, for instance, first appearing in marketing in Schwartz et al. [2017]. Even starting in Auer [2002] itself, new versions emerge. The authors note that the UCB1 algorithm only considers the number of times each action is played and does not account for the variance in outcomes from the trial of each arm. They provide an additional algorithm called UCB-Tuned, which they report better performance, however without analytical

regret bounds. For this algorithm they define,

$$\begin{aligned} V_{kt} &= \left(\frac{1}{n_{kt}} \sum_{\tau=1}^{n_{kt}} \pi_{k\tau}^2 \right) - \bar{\pi}_{kt}^2 + \sqrt{\frac{2 \log t}{n_{kt}}} \\ \text{UCB-Tuned}_{kt} &= \bar{\pi}_{kt} + \sqrt{\frac{\log t}{n_{kt}} \min \left(\frac{1}{4}, V_{kt} \right)} \end{aligned} \quad (4)$$

An assumption in non-parametric multi-armed bandit algorithms, including the UCB algorithms, is that the profit outcomes in any two actions are uncorrelated. That is, the realized profits when action k is played does not inform us of the possible profits with another action j is played. In many marketing applications, this is a valid assumption depending on the design of the experiment, such as, website design [Hauser et al., 2009]. In other marketing applications with correlated actions, parametric assumptions are required to capture those correlations, as shown in online advertising [Schwartz et al., 2017].

Pricing is different. But it typically enters into a parametric demand model. In our application to pricing, however, we can add non-parametric demand learning [Handel et al., 2013] to MAB algorithms. We will prove the regret convergence rates with adding demand learning for the UCB1 algorithm and will then adapt the UCB-Tuned algorithm to account for variance in observed profits. In the next section we discuss how we can add non-parametric demand learning and then will discuss an updated model.

We note that while we account for demand learning, our model is different to the dynamic minimax regret problem discussed in Handel and Misra [2015]. In our model we account for the fact that observed outcomes of a prior price experiment can impact expected demand for all other price points. However we do not consider endogenous learning when considering the exploration bonus for current price experiments. We note that we consider a very different context to Handel and Misra [2015] who consider a context where all consumers are exposed to every price experiment. Instead we consider online prices that can change rapidly and only a few consumers are exposed to prices. The benefit of not including endogenous learning is analytical tractability, and therefore we have a 10-order-of-magnitude improvement in speed.

2.3 Learning the demand curve from price experiments

In this section we will discuss how we the researcher can learn preferences across different price experiments. In this section our key parameter of interest is the demand for each product at each price level, or

$D(p_k) \forall k \in [1, K]$. This section is based on the demand side assumptions we make in section 2.1. The implication of these assumptions is that if a consumer is willing to purchase a product at a price p_1 , she will be willing to purchase the product for a price $p_k < p_1$. Similarly, if the consumer does not purchase the product at p_2 , she will not be willing to purchase the product for any price $p_k > p_2$.⁹ Formally we can define a set of possible consumer preferences as $\Theta \equiv \{\theta_1, \dots, \theta_K\}$, where θ_k refers to a preference that satisfies: (a) $\theta_k - p_k > 0$ and (b) $\theta_k - p_{k+1} < 0$. Here, θ_k represents a preference under which the highest amount the consumer will purchase this good for is p_k .

If we consider products that are purchased repeatedly, we can use this information to identify bounds for each consumer's valuations. Consider an example where we observe the following price experiments for a consumer i . She purchases at \$3, does not purchase at \$8, purchases at \$2 and does not purchase at \$6. We can say that the true preference for this consumer (v_i) must be between \$3 and \$6. We can then aggregate this non-parametrically across all consumers to identify the set to all feasible demand curves (see Handel et al. [2013] Section 2 for details).

Requiring many repeat-purchase data for each customer may be overly restrictive or not suited for most products. In particular, we believe the assumption of stable preferences is likely to be violated when a consumer is exposed to multiple prices for the same product [Kalyanaram and Winer, 1995]. Instead, we focus on cross-sectional learning across consumers.

2.3.1 Learning segment-level demand with partial identification

The firm has data on $n_{s,t}$ price experiments for segment s through time t . In each experiment a consumer i in segment s is exposed to a price p_k and makes a purchase decision. In this section we will first describe how one can estimate v_s (segment valuations) and δ (intra-segment heterogeneity) from observed price experiments.

For any price p_k we can define the set of valuations (defined as $H[D(p_k)_{s,t}]$) that is consistent with that price as follows: (a) $D(p_k)_{s,t} = 0$ is consistent with consumers being of types $\{\theta_1, \dots, \theta_{p_k-1}\}$, or types where consumers will not purchase at price p_k ; (b) $D(p_k)_{s,t} = 1$ is consistent with consumers being of types $\{\theta_k, \dots, \theta_{p_K}\}$, or types where consumers will purchase for sure at price p_k ; (c) $D(p_k)_{s,t} \in (0, 1)$ is consistent with a mixture of consumer types $\{\theta_1 \dots \theta_{p_k-1}\}$ and $\{\theta_k, \dots, \theta_{p_K}\}$, or types where some consumers will purchase and other consumers will not purchase.

⁹In the treatment choice literature [Manski, 2005], this corresponds to monotone treatment response

For any segment s , we can define p_s^{min} as the highest price where all consumer in segment s purchase. Mathematically, we set $p_{s,t}^{min} \equiv \max\{p_k | D(p_k)_{s,t} = 1\}$. And similarly, we define p_s^{max} as the lowest price where no consumer from segment s purchased, so $p_{s,t}^{max} \equiv \min\{p_k | D(p_k)_{s,t} = 0\}$.

To illustrate our estimation of p_s^{min} and p_s^{max} , consider the following example. Suppose we have data for a segment, $s = A$, with the following observations:

- At a price \$1, 100% of consumers purchased
- At a price \$2, 50% of consumers purchased
- At a price \$3, 0% of consumers purchased
- At a price \$4, 0% of consumers purchased
- At a price \$5, 0% of consumers purchased

Given these data, we would define $p_A^{min} = \$1$ and $p_A^{max} = \$3$ since we know for sure that all consumers purchase at prices lower than \$1 and that no consumers will purchase at prices higher than \$3. (We will refer to this segment again in the next section.)

We know that given the information so far $\forall i \in s, v_{i,s} \in [p_{s,t}^{min}, p_{s,t}^{max}]$. We can define an estimated mid-point of the segment valuations (v_s) and the segment level $\delta_{s,t}$ as

$$\hat{v}_{s,t} = \frac{p_{s,t}^{max} + p_{s,t}^{min}}{2}$$

$$\hat{\delta}_{s,t} = \frac{p_{s,t}^{max} - p_{s,t}^{min}}{2}$$

The interpretation of $\delta_{s,t}$ here is that it is the smallest δ that can rationalize the observed decisions for consumers in segment s after t observed price experiments. We note that this estimate will be consistent, that is in the limit as $t \rightarrow \infty$ (and there is enough price variation, we identify the true δ (call this δ^* for each segment. Formally, we have $\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} P(\hat{\delta}_{st} = \delta^*) = 1$. However these will be biased for any finite t , $\delta_{s,t}$ will be biased downwards. In order to correct for this bias we use the assumption that $\delta_s = \delta$, that is all segments have the same δ . Our methodology to estimate the small sample bias follows Handel et al. [2013].

In any time period t , consider the set $\{\hat{\delta}_{1t}, \dots, \hat{\delta}_{St}\}$. We then estimate the maximum of that set,

$$\hat{\delta}_t = \max\{\hat{\delta}_{st}, s \in S\}.$$

This will be also be biased downwards relative to δ^* . Again, $\hat{\delta}_t$ would be consistent for δ^* , we follow the econometric literature on estimating boundaries to correct for this bias in our estimator (see Karunamuni and Alberts [2005] for a review). Denote the bias as γ . Our estimator is similar to that used in Handel et al. [2013], which is an adaption of the Hall and Park [2002] estimator.¹⁰ Define $f(\cdot)$ as the empirical distribution of $\hat{\delta}_{st}$ (controlling for segment size) across S for fixed t . Formally $f(x) = \sum_{s \in S} \psi_s \mathbf{1}(\hat{\delta}_{st} = x)$. Note incorporating ψ_s in our estimate for f allows us to account for the fact that different segments are of different sizes.

Our estimator for γ is:

$$\hat{\gamma}_t = \sum_{\hat{\delta}_{st} \in \Delta_t} (\hat{\delta}_t - \hat{\delta}_{st}) f(\hat{\delta}_{st})$$

This estimator is consistent as $\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \hat{\gamma}_t = 0$, by our assumption of a common δ^* across segments. Handel et al. [2013] show that $\hat{\delta}_t + \hat{\gamma}_t$ provides a reliable and conservative estimate for the true δ^* .

Define $\hat{v}_{s,t}^{\min} = \hat{v}_{s,t} - (\hat{\delta}_t + \hat{\gamma}_t)$ and $\hat{v}_{s,t}^{\max} = \hat{v}_{s,t} + (\hat{\delta}_t + \hat{\gamma}_t)$ to represent the lowest and highest possible consumer valuations within segment s . The key output from this analysis is for each segment of consumers s , we can identify the identified set of consumer preference $H_t[v_{i,s}]$ as follow:

$$H_t[v_{i,s}] = [\hat{v}_{s,t}^{\min}, \hat{v}_{s,t}^{\max}] = [\hat{v}_{s,t} - (\hat{\delta}_t + \hat{\gamma}_t), \hat{v}_{s,t} + (\hat{\delta}_t + \hat{\gamma}_t)] \quad (5)$$

2.3.2 Learning population-level demand with partial identification

Using distribution-free partial identification, aggregated to the population-level, we gain information to narrow the set of possible demand curves. As we accumulate data of demand for different prices, we aim to bound expected demand (and expected profit) more tightly. After gaining new data, we can update the bounds. For each price p_k , the true demand is $D(p_k)$. Without any data we can define the identification region $H[(p_k)]$ as $H[D(p_k)] = [0, 1]$. Here we will use the identified set of valuations within each segment to estimate the bounds on aggregate demand and profits.

The aggregate demand at a price p_k is the number of consumers in each segment that have valuations $v_{i,s} \geq p_k$. Define $F_s(\cdot)$ to be the true cumulative density of all valuation with a segment s . Then, we can

¹⁰Formally Hall and Park [2002] boundary estimator considers a setup where the econometrician observes N draws from a continuous univariate distribution F with a unknown and finite upper boundary. The Handel et al. [2013] estimator is a discrete analog to these methods, since the distribution of $\hat{\delta}_{st}$ is discrete.

rewrite aggregate demand as,

$$D(p_k) = \sum_{s \in S} \psi_s (1 - F_s(p_k))$$

where ψ_s is the (known) proportion of consumers in segment s .

However, we do not observe $F_s(p_k)$. Therefore we can consider bounds of this distribution. From our estimation in the previous section, we know that $F_s(p_k) = 0$ if p_k is less than the lower bound of valuations for segment s , $\hat{v}_{s,t}^{\min}$. Similarly $F_s(p_k) = 1$ if p_k is greater than the upper bound of valuations for segment s , $\hat{v}_{s,t}^{\max}$. Therefore, we can define the identified region for demand at price p_k as

$$H[D(p_k)|t] = [\sum_{s \in S} \psi_s \mathbf{1}(\hat{v}_{s,t}^{\min} \geq p_k), \sum_{s \in S} \psi_s \mathbf{1}(\hat{v}_{s,t}^{\max} \geq p_k)]. \quad (6)$$

This aggregation is best described in an example illustrated in Figure 2. Suppose we have two segments, A and B, of equal sizes. For segment A, we have identified preferences to be between [\$1, \$3], as described in the previous section. For segment B, suppose we have identified preference to be between [\$2, \$4]. We can identify the feasible demand sets as follows:

- $H[D(p \leq \$1)] = [1, 1]$ (point identified), as consumers in segments A and B will purchase for sure.
- $H[D(p \in (\$1, \$2])] = [0.5, 1]$, as consumers in segment A may or may not purchase and consumers in segment B will purchase for sure.
- $H[D(p \in (\$2, \$3])] = [0, 1]$, as consumers in segment A and segment B may or may not purchase.
- $H[D(p \in (\$3, \$4))] = [0, 0.5]$, as consumers in segment A will not purchase and consumers in segment B may or may not purchase.
- $H[D(p > \$4)] = [0, 0]$ (point identified), as consumers in segments A and B will not purchase.

[Figure 2 about here.]

Using the identified demand bounds, we define profit bounds for each price as, $H[\pi(p_k)|t] = p_k H[D(p_k)|t]$. This gives us the lower and upper bound of true profit after t observations, which we define as $LB(\pi(p_k), t)$

and $UB(\pi(p_k), t)$. In summary, we have

$$\begin{aligned} H[\pi(p_k)|t] &= [LB(\pi(p_k), t), UB(\pi(p_k), t)] \\ LB(\pi(p_k), t) &= p_k \sum_{s \in S} \psi_s \mathbf{1}(\hat{v}_{s,t}^{\min} \geq p_k) \\ UB(\pi(p_k), t) &= p_k \sum_{s \in S} \psi_s \mathbf{1}(\hat{v}_{s,t}^{\max} \geq p_k) \end{aligned} \quad (7)$$

3 Upper confidence bound with learning partially identified demand (UCB-PI)

In this section, we extend the UCB1 algorithm to accommodate profit maximization by incorporating learning demand with partial identification. We define this upper confidence bound bandit algorithm incorporating learning partially identified demand (UCB-PI). The UCB-PI (untuned) index is,

$$\mathbf{UCB-PI-untuned}_{kt} = \begin{cases} \bar{\pi}_{kt} + p_k \sqrt{\frac{2 \log t}{n_{kt}}} & \text{if } UB(\pi(p_k), t) > \max_l (LB(\pi(p_l), t)) \\ 0 & \text{if } UB(\pi(p_k), t) \leq \max_l (LB(\pi(p_l), t)) \end{cases}, \quad (8)$$

where we label this untuned in contrast to its tuned version defined later.

There are two key differences between our proposed algorithm and the UCB1 algorithm described Auer [2002]. First, we assign an action a non-zero value only if the upper bound of potential returns are higher than the highest lower bound across all action. In a partial identification sense, we only consider an action if it is not dominated by another action. From an economic sense, there is no reason to explore an action, if we know an alternative action will lead to higher profits with certainty. Empirically, we will examine how the set of active prices varies over time, eliminating dominated prices and focusing on a set including the true optimal price.

Second, we scale the exploration bonus by price p_k . This is because we know $D(p_k) \in [0, 1]$, and therefore $\pi(p_k) \in [0, p_k]$. But the original UCB1 algorithm was defined where each action's reward had the same potential range, e.g., $[0, 1]$, regardless of action. By restricting demand, we impose a natural upper bound of profit that depends on price.

In following section, we first prove properties of the UCB-PI and show that regret is lower than UCB1. Then, we define a tuned version of the UCB-PI algorithm analogous to the UCB-tuned algorithm in Audibert et al. [2009].

3.1 Theoretical performance

In this section, we provide the key result of the theoretical analysis of our proposed algorithm. First, we derive the exploration bonus in the UCB-PI-untuned algorithm, given by equation 8, and second, we prove performance guarantees for the algorithm. The complete proof is in the Appendix A1. The derived performance guarantee is an upper bound on the regret for our algorithm, which describes performance in the worst case scenario. Economically, this represents the maximum regret over all feasible demand curves for our algorithm.

We give the structure of the theoretical results. In equation 2, we define regret as a function of (a) a feasible demand curve (and therefore, a profit curve), (b) an algorithm (i.e., UCB-PI-untuned), and (c) a time horizon (T). To understand theoretical performance, we can derive the implications of an algorithm across all feasible demand systems. Our main result shows that UCB-PI-untuned algorithm (Equation 8) provides a log-regret upper bound. That is, for any feasible demand model the regret from UCB-PI-untuned increases, at most, on the scale of $\log(T)$ over time. Log-regret bounds are important; the computer science literature shows that these are asymptotically optimal for MAB problems [Agrawal, 1955, Auer, 2002, Lai and Robbins, 1985, Lai, 1987]. Therefore, our proposed UCB-PI-untuned is an asymptotically optimal MAB algorithm.

Mathematically, suppose we consider a set of prices $\{p_k | k = 1, \dots, K\}$ and any feasible demand curve that generates a set of profits $\{\pi(p_k)\}$. Without loss of generality, we label p_1 as the optimal prices for this demand curve, i.e., $p_1 = \operatorname{argmax}_{p_k} \{\pi(p_k)\}$. The regret through time T , in terms of profit, is bounded from above as follows,

$$\text{Regret}(\text{UCB-PI-untuned}, \{\pi(p_k)\}, T) \leq 8 \sum_{k=2}^K \frac{p_i \log(T)}{\pi^* - \pi(p_i)} + O(1). \quad (9)$$

Since all p_k are scaled to be in $[0, 1]$, this regret is guaranteed to be lower than that in the UCB1 algorithm, which is the standard UCB formulation in the computer science literature. We note that our proof is based on an alternative view of the original UCB analysis [Auer et al., 2002]. But our proof differs from the standard proof, even in technique, because we use an argument based on the *potential function*, which we define formally in the proof. This argument using the potential function is a novel application of these tools for the formal analysis of learning algorithms. We choose this technique because we believe it provides a more clear economic intuition for UCB-style algorithms and their proofs.

3.2 UCB-PI Tuned algorithm

We will present a version of our algorithm where we tune the exploration bonus by considering both the variance of the observed outcomes and the size of the bound. This is analogous to the UCB-Tuned algorithm presented in Auer et al. [2002]. The V_{kt} represents an upper bound on the reward variance (as opposed to mean). It is also equal to its empirical variance plus an exploration bonus,

$$V_{kt} = \left(\frac{1}{n_{kt}} \sum_{\tau=1}^{n_{kt}} \pi_{k\tau}^2 \right) - \bar{\pi}_{kt}^2 + \sqrt{\frac{2 \log t}{n_{kt}}}.$$

The upper bound on variance enters the UCB of the mean to control the size of the exploration bonus. We add an additional tuning factor, $2\hat{\delta}$, since it is the size of the range for our partially identified intervals. When δ is large, there is more uncertainty; when it is small, the intervals shrink and so does the exploration bonus.

$$\text{UCB-PI-tuned}_{kt} = \begin{cases} \bar{\pi}_{kt} + 2p_k \hat{\delta} \sqrt{\frac{\log t}{n_{kt}} \min\left(\frac{1}{4}, V_{kt}\right)} & \text{if } UB(\pi(p_k), t) > \max_l(LB(\pi(p_l), t)) \\ 0 & \text{if } UB(\pi(p_k), t) \leq \max_l(LB(\pi(p_l), t)) \end{cases} \quad (10)$$

The final novel aspect of the proposed algorithm is “shutting off” prices that are dominated. Dominated prices have an upper bound that is still worse than at least some other price’s lower bound, $UB(\pi(p_k), t) \leq \max_l(LB(\pi(p_l), t))$.

4 Empirical performance: Simulation study

We test our proposed algorithm in a series of simulation experiments. These show its robust performance across unknown true distributions of consumer valuations. Each simulation has the same structure of the data-generating process. Customers arrive, observe the price, and purchase if and only if their valuation is greater than the price. After the customers decide, the firm observes which customers arrived (in particular the consumer’s segment) and their choices. Then the firm sets the price for the next period.

In our simulation we consider a firm with $K = 100$ potential prices from \$0 to \$1 in 0.01 increments. The firm can change prices after every 10 consumers visit. Each consumer belongs to one of $S = 1,000$ segments. We draw the segment probabilities (true ψ_s) from a simplex on the uniform distribution.

Each segment’s valuation (true v_s) are drawn from a parametric distribution. We consider five (5) possible distribution of valuations. Importantly, this distribution is the data generating process and is unknown

to the researcher, so it is not assumed in the estimation method.

1. Right-skewed beta distribution given by $\text{beta}(2,9)$
2. Symmetric beta distribution given by $\text{beta}(2,2)$
3. Left-skewed beta distribution given by $\text{beta}(9,2)$
4. Bimodal continuous given by $\text{beta}(0.2,0.3)$
5. Discontinuous finite mixture model with each v_s equal to either \$0.2 (with 70% chance) or \$0.9 (30%)

The purpose of these settings is to consider a range of different possible distributions of consumer preferences, leading to range of aggregate demand and profit curves. The first three simulation settings involve unimodal continuous distributions of valuations. The last two have bimodal continuous and bimodal discontinuous distributions leading to bimodal profit functions, Aghion et al. [1991] show that Bayesian learning leads to insufficient learning in these settings. The distribution of the valuations, aggregate demand curve, and the aggregate profit curve for each simulation setting are all shown in Appendix section A2.

Within each segment, consumers' valuations can be $10c$ ($\delta = 0.1$) above or below the segment valuation. Alternatively, the range of within-segment heterogeneity is 20% of the range of across-segment heterogeneity (between 0 and 1).

4.1 Estimating the Demand Model: Comparing untuned algorithms

To show the advantage of adding partial identification to UCB algorithms we run simulations of prices and consumer decisions over 200,000 decision rounds. We note that the computer science literature has noted that tuned algorithms outperform untuned algorithms [Auer, 2002], however feel this is an important comparison to show the relative benefit of adding partial identification.

The results for the first simulation (segment valuations right skewed) are shown in Figure 3. In Panel A we plot the prices charged in each of 200,000 rounds, for UCB1 untuned (left) and UCB-PI untuned (right). We can see the set of prices tested each period by UCB-PI narrows, showing that partial identification allows us to reduce the number of prices experimented. The algorithm narrows to focus only on prices near the true optimal price. This is summarized in Panel B (left) shows the number of times each possible price is charged by UCB and UCB-PI. While UCB's modal price is near the true optimal price, the UCB-PI algorithm concentrates nearly all of its observations on prices at or close to optimal.

The key reason for the differences between the algorithms is partial identification. We illustrate the partially identified bounds of the aggregate demand for UCB-PI in Figure 3, Panel B, right. At each price the shaded areas represent the partially identified bounds for the demand curve after 1, 100, 1,000, and 10,000 rounds (later rounds are shown in darker shades). The true demand (which is the dashed line) is always within the partially identified bounds. Notice that after only one round, we have very wide demand bounds, as we get more data the partially identified bounds get narrower. Further after 10,000 rounds we know that the demand above a price of \$0.7 is point identified at 0. As a result the UCB-PI algorithm no longer experiments with prices above \$0.7 (see Panel A, right chart). In Appendix A3, we explicitly show the prices “turned off” by round. Due to this demand learning, the UCB-PI algorithm results in higher ex-post profits than the UCB algorithm (Panel C). Overall, the UCB-PI attains 90% of ex-post optimal profits, while the UCB1 attains 50% of ex-post optimal profits. We note that we will focus on profits when comparing the tuned algorithms in the next section.

[Figure 3 about here.]

We show this demand learning for the other four simulations in Figure 4. Each panel of this figure represents a simulation. The left column is the histogram of prices charged across 200,000 rounds. Here we see that in each of our simulations the histogram for prices played under UCB-PI (blue) is tighter around the true optimal profit (vertical left line) than the prices played under UCB (gray). Therefore with partial identification the algorithm spends more rounds earning and fewer rounds learning.

Figure 4, (right column) represents demand learning over time. In all of our simulations the demand bounds get narrower around the true demand curve as we get more data. This is the advantage of partial identification: for any data generating process that satisfies the assumptions in section 2.1, we can bound the true demand curve. Most importantly, consider Figure 4, Panel D, where demand is discontinuous. This is a case where Aghion et al. [1991] find that Bayesian learning almost surely leads to insufficient learning. With partial identification we do correctly learn the demand curve, moreover after 10,000 rounds (the darkest shade) the model recovers with certainty that true demand curve must be discontinuous.

[Figure 4 about here.]

4.2 Profit implications of adding PI: Comparison of tuned algorithms

In this section, we will consider the UCB-tuned and the UCB-PI Tuned algorithms. In this section we will run our simulation for 20,000 rounds (as opposed to 200,000 rounds in the previous section) as learning is faster in the tuned algorithms. Figure 5 plots the prices played and profit earned in each of these five (5) simulation settings based on different true demand curves. Each row of this figure corresponds to each simulation setting.

[Figure 5 about here.]

We will first focus on the prices charged. In Panel A of Figure 5, we plot the price played each round for UCB-tuned (left column) and UCB-PI Tuned (middle column) algorithms. Across all simulations we find that adding partial identification results in the algorithm setting prices at the optimal levels more often, with more focused experimentation. This is consistent with our results from the untuned algorithms where we found that partial identification leads to faster learning of demand.

Turning our attention to profit achieved, Figure 5, Panel A (right column) shows UCB-PI's relative profit improvement over UCB over time. We find that the UCB-PI outperforms UCB consistently. The maximum increase in profitability is between 15% and 90% across the different simulations. As the number of rounds goes to infinity, the UCB is guaranteed to achieve optimal profits [Auer, 2002] and therefore the relative benefit is guaranteed to asymptote to zero. However, we find that adding partial identification increases the profits gained in smaller rounds with the maximum benefit achieved in between 1 and 5,000 rounds.

In an absolute sense, the algorithms can be compared to ex-post optimal profit. The ex-post optimal profit is the profit achieved assuming the firm had perfect demand information, and set the optimal price in every period. Figure 5, Panel B, shows the ex-post profits across all five settings. Again we find the UCB-PI Tuned achieves higher profit than the UCB tuned algorithm in each simulation. In particular, the UCB-PI algorithm achieves above 95% of ex-post optimal profit in four (4) of the five (5) settings. The finite mixture setting where learning is difficult [Aghion et al., 1991], the algorithm achieves 89% of ex-post profits.

4.3 Monte Carlo comparisons to alternative algorithms

While we have just illustrated UCB-PI's superior performance over UCB in five settings, the algorithm performance is stochastic, so we now show a large Monte Carlo simulation across algorithms and problem

settings. Here, we consider a broader set of algorithms, we consider the *Learn Then Earn* algorithm, or a balanced field experiment. In these algorithms the researcher has to ex-ante set how long the algorithm should learn (experimental time), and how long the algorithms should use that learning in order to earn. In our simulation experiments, we consider 5 versions of the Learn and then Earn algorithm where learning is set for 0.1%, 1%, 5%, 10% and 25% of experiments. We also include the case where the learning period is 100% because it is exactly a *balanced experiment*, which matches typical research-driven field experiments and A/B or multivariate testing in industry. The performance of a balanced experiment is not optimizing since it only earns the average profit of all its arms.

In all, we consider 10 different algorithms: UCB untuned and tuned, UCB-PI untuned and tuned, Learn Then Earn with six different settings. We test each algorithm across each of our five different simulation settings. We run each algorithm and setting pair for 1,000 independent Monte Carlo (MC) simulations. In each, we run each algorithm for 20,000 rounds, simulating time, with 10 consumers in time period. In all, we simulate 1 billion prices in this Monte Carlo simulation, and it takes only about 5 hours of computation time.

Our key measure of performance is profits as a percentage of optimal, which a summary of ex-post achieved profits for each setting and algorithm appears in Figure 6. In Panel A, we display the distribution of performance for each algorithm across all 5 settings and 1,000 MC simulations. We display the mean and range (in brackets) of profits achieved. The bar charts represent the 100th (full range), 90th, and 75th percentiles of the profits achieved. Looking across all settings, the UCB-PI algorithm stands out, with the average of 96% of ex-post optimal profit, and a narrow range from 91% to 99%. The ex-post optimal profit is the highest across all algorithms and the range is the most narrow across all algorithms.

The Learn Then Earn algorithms, with learning periods between 0.5% and 25%, achieve an average between 89% and 95% of ex-post optimal profits depending on the time to learn. We find that in this setting, the highest mean profit is for the 5% learning period. However a researcher cannot know ex-ante (when setting the learning time) that 5% would be have been best in this setting. Consistent with the empirical bandit literature [Kuleshov and Precup, 2014], we find that heuristic based algorithms (Learn Then Earn) can achieve higher ex-post profits than UCB tuned. We find that when we add economic theory to the UCB algorithm, the UCB-PI Tuned algorithm outperforms the heuristic based algorithms across a wide range of settings.

The outcomes of Learn Then Earn experiments have a large range of ex-post profit outcome. A key

advantage of the theory-based algorithms (such as UCB-PI) is that they have a lower range of outcome, this is consistent with the objective of minimax regret. To show the differences across rounds in Figure 6 panel B, we plot the outcomes across all simulations for the UCB-PI algorithm and the Learn Then Earn 5% (which had the highest ex-post average profit among alternative algorithms) by experimental round (time). This shows that UCB-PI has higher profits particularly in early time periods. The highest average percentage difference between the algorithms is at the end of the Learn Then Earn's learning phase (5%). On average, the UCB-PI achieved 20% higher profits after 5% of experimental rounds. As both algorithms run for longer time period, this mean difference is reduced to 1%. Beyond the mean difference, the UCB-PI has a lower variability across the 1,000 Monte Carlo experiments. This variability is desirable since a researcher could not predictably know ex-ante, for any given setting, when the Learn Then Earn algorithm will perform well. In the Appendix, Section A4, we show the distribution of outcomes after 10,000 rounds for each simulation setting.

[Figure 6 about here.]

5 Empirical performance: Simulation Based on Pricing Field Experiment (Dube and Misra, 2017)

In this section, we conduct a simulation study based on the field experiment in Dubé and Misra [2017] (henceforth, DM). DM conduct a price experiment in collaboration with ZipRecruiter.com, “a large, online recruiting firm,” which is a business-to-business firm. The experiment includes two phases. In phase I, conducted in September 2015, they ran a randomized price experiment where “the experiment randomly assigned each new customer arriving at the website’s paywall to one of ten price buckets ranging from \$19 to \$399, including a control condition of \$99 which was the firm’s regular base price at that time” (DM, pg 2). In phase II of their experiment, they analyzed the demand data from the experiment where they “used the experimental data to estimate (i.e. ‘train’) a demand model” (DM, pg. 3). In phase III of their experiment, they then implemented the best uniform price (DM, Table 4). Using the terminology used in our paper, the pricing policy implemented in DM is Learn Then Earn, where phases I and II in DM are “Learn,” and phase III is “Earn.” In this section, we will consider a simulation to illustrate the benefits of our proposed bandit algorithm over a pricing experiment using distinct Learn and Earn phases. We note that, in this section, we consider only the uniform pricing in DM, but DM consider price discrimination with a targeting model that

is not considered in our algorithm or illustration ¹¹.

Two main features of this setting are consistent with our model. First, consistent with DM we assume that the firm does not have additional information about the demand curve (formally the firm does not have additional ex-ante demand information, e.g. probability distribution over feasible demand curves, outside the experiment). Second, each consumer has to enter detailed characteristics data (e.g., type of job and type of firm). This allows the firm to assign consumers to different segments in our model.

Next, we will first discuss how we simulate datasets based on the DM study. Then, we will compare our proposed method (UCB-PI) for optimizing pricing experiments with the computer science method (UCB-tuned) and a balanced field experiment (Learn Then Earn). We find our approach achieves 43% higher profits in the first month, and even sustains positive gains throughout the year in 80% of simulations.

5.1 Simulation Setup: Data-Generation Using Field Experiment Data

Our simulation is based on Table 5 in DM, which reports the observed demand (“acquisition rates”) based on Phase I of the experiment. We use a simple data-generating process from a demand system consistent with the realized demand in the experiment. DM discusses that in its setting consumers have to reveal 11 different descriptive variables before they are shown a price. Since this is a business-to-business application, the “consumers” are firms paying for the services of ZipRecruiter. These descriptive variables include company descriptors, job posting descriptors, and job benefits (for a complete list, see Table 2 in DM). We assume that the firm can use these variables to create segments of consumers, and we assume there are 1,000 such ex-ante equally sized segments the firm can create, just as we have previously assumed. We simulate the 1,000 segment mean valuations based on the following underlying piecewise-continuous distribution that is consistent with the aggregate demand reported for 10 prices in Table 5 of DM. Of all consumers viewing the lowest price of \$19, 36% of them purchase, so we assume that 64% of segments have valuations drawn from a uniform distribution between \$0 and \$19. At the second lowest price of \$39, 32% of consumer purchase, so we assume that 4% (36% – 32%) of segments have valuations drawn from a uniform distribution between \$19 and \$39, and so on, to the highest price of \$399. ¹²

¹¹ Table 4 in DM shows that profit implications of optimal uniform and targeted pricing are a statistically indistinguishable

¹² We make two further assumptions when simulating true population valuations. First, the acquisition rates in DM are upward sloping between \$59 and \$79. We assume that this is a small sample error, as opposed to the distribution of the population’s preferences. In our simulation we assume 28% of consumers purchase at both \$59 and \$79 (instead of 27% at \$59 and 29% at \$79 in DM table 5). Second, in Table 5 of DM, the acquisition rate is 11% at \$399. At this number, \$399 is the optimal uniform price ($11\% * 399[43.89] > 17\% * 249[42.33]$). This is inconsistent with the population optimal price from the analysis in DM (“We can rule out \$399 as being too high since there is close to a 100% posterior probability that the own-elasticity is well above -1 at that

We now illustrate how our data-generating process is consistent with the data reported in DM. We consider 10,000 independent replications of the observed experiment with 7,870 simulated consumers. For each replication, we draw a set of 1,000 midpoints of segment valuations from the distribution described above. From all of the equally sized segments, we sample 7,870 consumers' segment membership labels. Each consumer's valuation is then a draw from a uniform distribution between $-\delta$ and $+\delta$ that midpoint of the consumer's segment. We set $\delta = \$5$ because we find that this value makes the true optimal price, averaged across replications of the experiment, to be \$281, so we are consistent with DM. We randomize all consumers to the same 10 price points, with 787 consumers drawn for each price. This allows for small sample upward sloping demand curves. Based on the demand curve and assuming zero marginal cost, we calculate the implied profit curve for each replication of the experiment.

The resulting empirical distributions of our simulated demand and profit curves are consistent with the realized demand and profit in DM, as we show in Figure 7, Panel A. For each price, we illustrate the distribution of simulated demand (Panel A, left) includes the realized acquisition rates in DM Table 5 (red dots). The distribution of simulated per-consumer-profits at each price (Panel A, right) shows that the optimal profit levels are achieved at prices \$199 to \$399. For 60% of the experiment replications, the optimal fixed uniform price is \$249. We \$399 is optimal for 15% of small sample experiments (as in DM's raw data). The average optimal uniform price is \$281 (as in DM's phase II calculations). We note importantly, that this implies, in an infinite sample setting, the optimal uniform price – out of the 10 tested prices – would be \$249 for all Monte Carlo draws (as in the implemented uniform price in DM).

[Figure 7 about here.]

5.2 Pricing Policies in Simulation

We now consider the firm's pricing decision, facing the previously described data and under the following assumptions. First, we assume that firm sets prices with the objective to maximize total annual profits. We say annual because in the DM experiment, ZipRecruiter.com had about 8,000 visitors in one month, so we assume 100,000 consumers will visit in a year. Second, the firm only considers a well-defined set of 10 prices to test, the same as in the DM field experiment. And third, at the start of the year, the firm does not know what the optimal price would be.

point" on page 17). We assume this is because of a small sample error and assume demand at \$399 is 10%.

Under these assumptions, we will consider two type of experiment policies: Learn-then-Earn and Bandit experiments. As we have defined, using the Learn-then-Earn policy, the firm runs a balanced field experiment, setting each price uniformly randomly for pre-defined learning phase. Then, in the earn phase, the firm finds the optimal price, and sets that for a remaining time. For example a 10% Learn-then-Earn experiment runs a balanced experiment for 10% of the year, finds the optimal price, and sets that for the remaining 90% of the year. We will consider learning phases of various lengths: 0.5%, 1%, 5%, 7.9% (this represents the DM experiment), 10%, and 25%.

Using the bandit experiment, as opposed to the two distinct phases of the Learn-then-Earn policy, the firm continually balances learning and earning across each time period. We assume that the firm can change prices after every 10 visitors, so there are 10,000 possible price changes (pricing rounds). In addition to our proposed policy, UCB-PI Tuned, we also consider the standard MAB algorithm from computer science, UCB-Tuned, described earlier.

5.3 Results of Simulation Based on Field Experiment

The resulting total annual profits, across different policies and all simulated replications, are shown in Figure 7, Panel B. The UCB-PI policy achieves the highest average profit and has the lowest variability of profits across simulations. To highlight the advantage of adding partial identification to this method, the UCB-PI Tuned increases ex-post optimal profits to 98%. The computer science benchmark, UCB-tuned, does not perform as well and achieves only 81% of ex-post optimal profits. Among the Learn-then-earn policies tested, the highest ex-post profit is achieved by the Learn(7.9%)-Then-Earn, which represents the DM experiment. This corresponds to about one month of balanced experimentation followed by setting the optimal price for the remaining 11 months of the year. However, even with this method, which attains 94% of optimal profits, there is a wide range of ex-post profit achieved, as high as 97% and as low as 83%. The UCB-PI algorithm not only has a higher mean (98%), but it also has a much tighter range across simulations, as high as 99% and only as low as 96%. Looking at profits across the year with 100,000 customers, compared to the Learn(7.9%)-Then-Earn, the UCB-PI does maintain higher profits with a mean difference of about 4%. The range across all simulations is from -1% to 18%, with a positive difference in 88% of simulations.

Beyond looking at the annual profits, we specifically look at profits during the first month. While annual profits combine the learn phase (first month) of the Learn(7.9%)-then-Earn policy and its earning (remaining 11 months), profits in the first month alone show UCB-PI enjoys its best relative performance, 43% higher

profits (Figure 7, Panel B). The UCB-PI quickly achieves 92% of optimal profits during those first 7,870 customer interactions. By contrast, the Learn(7.9%)-Then-Earn policy, achieves 62% of optimal profits. Since it is balanced experiment for the month, the policy just achieves an average of the profit levels for each price tested.

We consider the evolution of prices and profits by over time in both algorithms to better understand how the UCB-PI performs better than the Learn Then Earn algorithm. In Figure 8, Panel A, we plot the evolution of prices by round, where each round refers to 10 customers visiting the website, and prices are shaded based on their true ex-post profit level (i.e., higher profits are shown with less shading). In the Learn Then Earn algorithm, by definition, the first 7,870 consumers are in a balanced field experiment and therefore, are exposed to one of the 10 prices with equal probability (i.e., all prices appear as equally-sized regions). After the end of the learning period (marked by dotted vertical line, Figure 8), the algorithm picks the price with the best profits so far and charges that price for the remaining rounds. Reflecting the underlying data-generating process (Figure 7, Panel A), the algorithm learns the true ex-post optimal price of \$249 in about 60% of simulations.

The UCB-PI algorithm, however, balances learning and earning continuously over all rounds and brings about two important differences in the price paths. First, the UCB-PI tends not to charge low prices with lower profits (regions shaded by dark gray). This is driven by the partial identification (PI) in the algorithm. For example, if the estimated lower bound of demand at \$399 is 5%, then the lower bound of profit at \$399 is higher than the profit at \$19 even with 100% demand. Based on Figure 10, the UCB-PI will “turn off” experimentation at \$19. Second, while Learn Then Earn stops adjusting price after the its experimentation phase, the UCB-PI method continues learning and continuously keeps increasing the percentage of rounds charging the ex-post optimal price of \$249. These trends are also shown in the profits across rounds (Figure 7, Panel B).

[Figure 8 about here.]

6 Conclusion and Future Research

With the emergence of big data, we see an increase in machine learning applications in marketing [Chintagunta et al., 2016]. We study a realistic dynamic pricing problem for an online retailer. The goal is a pricing experimentation policy that can apply to many types products (robust) and run in real-time (fast).

We propose a novel combination of reinforcement learning with microeconomic theory. To marketing and economics, we bring these scalable reinforcement learning methods for the firm's pricing problem. Here we show the benefit of earning while learning over balanced field experiments. To the machine learning literature, we introduce distribution-free theory of demand to improve existing algorithms theoretically and empirically.

We provide strong evidence for the benefit of partial identification of demand in non-parametric bandit problems. We derive theoretically the rate of convergence for our algorithm. This shows that when faced with any weakly downward-sloping demand, our algorithm is guaranteed to converge faster than current algorithms.

Across a range of simulation settings, we show that our proposed algorithm, compared to alternatives, achieves a higher mean profit and a lower variance of outcomes across settings. This suggests that our proposed algorithm can be used for a variety of products and will predictably lead to higher profits. In a calibrated simulation based on a field experiment [Dubé and Misra, 2017], we find that our algorithm achieves 43% higher profits during the month of testing and about 4% higher annual profits.

A limitation of our current work is that we consider a simple demand system, where each consumer has a stable valuation. We note that our demand model assumes that the firm has information about observed heterogeneity. In the limit, if the firm has no information about observed heterogeneity (or $\delta = 1$), our method (UCB-PI) will exactly replicate the computer science method (UCB, formally, a version of UCB with scaling the exploration bonus by prices). We illustrate this in Appendix A5.3.

Further research can consider setting where consumer valuation can change over time. This could be in the form of prior prices creating reference prices or consumers with dynamic preferences. A challenge is that optimal profit will no longer be stationary, moreover will vary based on the experimentation method. Another avenue for further research is to consider demand systems that consider more than one product, this includes both category management and competition. We note that our algorithm and theoretical results are not guaranteed for markets with strategic competition. Additionally further research can consider optimal price discrimination in the form of targeted or personalized pricing.

References

- A. Acquisti and H. R. Varian. Conditioning prices on purchase history. *Marketing Science*, 24(3):pp. 367–381, 2005.
- P. Aghion, P. Bolton, C. Harris, and B. Jullien. Optimal learning by experimentation. *The Review of Economic Studies*, 58(4):621–654, 1991.
- R. Agrawal. Sample Mean Based Index Policies with $O(\log n)$ Regret for the Multi-Armed Bandit Problem. *Advances in Applied Probability*, 27(4):1054–1078, 1995.
- Y. Akcay, H. P. Natarajan, and S. H. Xu. Joint dynamic pricing of multiple perishable products under consumer choice. *Management Science*, 56(8):pp. 1345–1361, 2010.
- E. Anderson, N. Jaimovich, and D. Simester. Price stickiness: Empirical evidence of the menu cost channel. *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 97(4):813–826, 2015.
- J. Y. Audibert, R. Munos, and C. Szepesvári. Exploration-exploitation trade-off using variance estimates in multi-armed bandits. *Theoretical Computer Science*, 410(19):1876–1902, 2009.
- P. Auer. Using Confidence Bounds for Exploitation-Exploration Trade-offs. *Journal of Machine Learning Research*, (3):397–422, 2002.
- P. Auer, N. Cesa-Bianchi, and P. Fischer. Finite-time Analysis of the Multiarmed Bandit Problem. *Machine Learning*, 47:235–256, 2002.
- Y. Aviv and A. Pazcal. Pricing of short lifce-cycle products through active learning. Unpublished Manuscript, Washington University of St. Louis, October 2002.
- W. Baker, D. Kiewell, and G. Winkler. Using big data to make better pricing decisions. *McKinsey and Company*, 2014. URL <http://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/marketing-and-sales/our-insights/using-big-data-to-make-better-pricing-decisions>.
- B. L. Bayus. The dynamic pricing of next generation consumer durables. *Marketing Science*, 11(3):pp. 251–265, 1992.

- D. Bergemann and K. Schlag. Pricing without priors. *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 6 (2-3):560–569, 2008.
- D. Bergemann and K. Schlag. Robust monopoly pricing. *Journal of Economic Theory*, 146(6):2527–2543, 2011.
- D. Bergemann and J. Valimaki. Market experimentation and pricing. Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper 1122, 4 1996.
- J. O. Berger. *Statistical decision theory and Bayesian analysis*. Springer, 1985.
- O. Besbes and A. Zeevi. Dynamic pricing without knowing the demand function: Risk bounds and near-optimal algorithms. *Operations Research*, 57(6):1407–1420, 2009.
- E. Biyalogorsky and E. Gerstner. Contingent pricing to reduce price risks. *Marketing Science*, 23(1):pp. 146–155, 2004.
- E. Biyalogorsky and O. Koenigsberg. The design and introduction of product lines when consumer valuations are uncertain. *Production and Operations Management*, 2014.
- A. Bonatti. Menu pricing and learning. *American Economic Journal: Microeconomics*, 3(3):124–163, 2011.
- D. J. Braden and S. S. Oren. Nonlinear pricing to produce information. *Marketing Science*, 13(3):pp. 310–326, 1994.
- M. Brezzi and T. L. Lai. Optimal Learning and Experimentation in Bandit Problems. *Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control*, 27:87–108, 2002.
- N. Cesa-Bianchi and G. Lugosi. *Prediction, learning, and games*. Cambridge university press, 2006.
- P. Chintagunta, D. M. Hanssens, and J. R. Hauser. Editorial—Marketing Science and Big Data. *Marketing Science*, 35(3):341–342, 2016.
- A. V. den Boer. Dynamic pricing and learning: Historical origins, current research, and new directions. *Surveys in Operations Research and Management Science*, 20:1–18, 2015.
- P. S. Desai, O. Koenigsberg, and D. Purohit. Forward buying by retailers. *Journal of Marketing Research*, 47(1):pp. 90–102, 2010.

- J.-P. Dubé and S. Misra. Scalable price targeting. Working Paper 23775, National Bureau of Economic Research, September 2017. URL <http://www.nber.org/papers/w23775>.
- W. Elmaghraby and P. Keskinocak. Dynamic Pricing in the Presence of Inventory Considerations: Research Overview, Current Practices, and Future Directions. *Management Science*, 49(10):1287–1309, 2003.
- T. Erdem and M. P. Keane. Decision-making under uncertainty: Capturing dynamic brand choice processes in turbulent consumer goods markets. *Marketing Science*, 15(1):pp. 1–20, 1996.
- J. C. Gittins. *Multi-Armed Bandit Allocation Indices*. John Wiley and Sons, Chichester, UK, 1 edition, 1989.
- J. C. Gittins, K. Glazebrook, and R. Weber. *Multi-Armed Bandit Allocation Indices*. John Wiley and Sons, New York, NY, 2 edition, 2011.
- P. Hall and B. U. Park. New methods for Bias correction at endpoints and boundaries. *The Annals of Statistics*, 30(5):1460–1479, 2002.
- B. Handel and K. Misra. Robust new product pricing. *Marketing Science*, 34(6):864–881, 2015.
- B. Handel, K. Misra, and J. Roberts. Robust firm pricing with panel data. *Journal of Econometrics*, 174(2), 2013.
- J. R. Hauser, G. L. Urban, G. Liberali, and M. Braun. Website Morphing. *Marketing Science*, 28(2): 202–223, 2009.
- I. Hendel and A. Nevo. Measuring the implications of sales and consumer inventory behavior. *Econometrica*, 74(6):1637–1673, 2006.
- G. Hitsch. Optimal dynamic product launch and exit under demand uncertainty. *Marketing Science*, 25(1): pp. 25–30, 2006.
- M. Hviid and G. Shaffer. Hassle costs: The achilles’ heel of price-matching guarantees. *Journal of Economics and Management Strategy*, 8(4):489–521, 1999. ISSN 1530-9134. doi: 10.1111/j.1430-9134.1999.00489.x. URL <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1999.00489.x>.
- Y. Jiang, J. Shang, C. F. Kemerer, and Y. Liu. Optimizing e-tailer profits and customer savings: Pricing multistage customized online bundles. *Marketing Science*, 30(4):pp. 737–752, 2011.

- K. Kalyanam. Pricing decisions under demand uncertainty: A bayesian mixture model approach. *Marketing Science*, 15(3):pp. 207–221, 1996.
- G. Kalyanaram and R. S. Winer. Empirical Generalizations from Reference Price Research. *Marketing Science*, 14(3, Part 2 of 2: Special Issue on Empirical Generalizations in Marketing):G161–G169, 1995.
- R. J. Karunamuni and T. Alberts. On boundary correction in kernel density estimation. *Statistical Methodology*, 2(3):191–212, 2005.
- R. Kleinberg and F. T. Leighton. The value of knowing a demand curve: Bounds on regret for on-line posted-price auctions. Akamai Technologies, 2014.
- V. Kuleshov and D. Precup. Algorithms for the multi-armed bandit problem. 2014. URL <https://arxiv.org/abs/1402.6028>.
- T. L. Lai. Adaptive Treatment Allocation and the Multi-Armed Bandit Problem. *Annals of Statistics*, 15(3): 1091–1114, 1987.
- T. L. Lai and H. Robbins. Asymptotically Efficient Adaptive Allocation Rules. *Advances in Applied Mathematics*, 6(1):4–22, 1985.
- Y. Lei, S. Jasin, and A. Sinha. Near-optimal bisection search for nonparametric dynamic pricing with inventory constraint. *Ross School of Business Working Paper No. 1252*, 2014. URL <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2509425>.
- L. M. Lodish. Applied dynamic pricing and production models with specific application to broadcast spot pricing. *Journal of Marketing Research*, 17(2):pp. 203–211, 1980.
- C. Manski. *Social Choice with Partial Knowledge of Treatment Response*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2005.
- A. Mas-Colell, M. Whinston, and J. Green. *Microeconomic Theory*. Oxford University Press, 1995.
- J. Milnor. *Games Against Nature in R.M. Thrall, C.H. Coombs, and R.L. Davis (Eds.) Decision Processes*. Wiley, New York, 1954.
- H. Nair. Intertemporal price discrimination with forward-looking consumers: Application to the us market for console video-games. *Quantitative Marketing and Economics*, 5(3):pp. 239–292, 2007.

- H. Nair, P. Chintagunta, and J.-P. Dube. Empirical Analysis of Indirect Network Effects in the Market for Personal Digital Assistants. *Quantitative Marketing and Economics*, 2(1):23–58, 2004.
- S. S. Oren, S. A. Smith, and R. B. Wilson. Nonlinear pricing in markets with interdependent demand. *Marketing Science*, 1(3):pp. 287–313, 1982.
- A. Rajan, R. Steinberg, and R. Steinberg. Dynamic pricing and ordering decisions by a monopolist. *Management Science*, 38(2):pp. 240–262, 1992.
- R. C. Rao and F. M. Bass. Competition, strategy, and price dynamics: A theoretical and empirical investigation. *Journal of Marketing Research*, 22(3):pp. 283–296, 1985.
- M. Rothschild. A two-armed bandit theory of market pricing. *Journal of Economic Theory*, 9(2):185–202, 1974.
- E. M. Schwartz, E. T. Bradlow, and P. S. Fader. Customer Acquisition via Display Advertisements Using Multi-Armed Bandit Experiments. *Marketing Science*, pages –, 2017.
- S. A. Smith. New product pricing in quality sensitive markets. *Marketing Science*, 5(1):pp. 70–87, 1986.
- J. Stoye. Axioms for minimax regret choice correspondences. *Journal of Economic Theory*, 146(11): 2226–2251, 2011.
- R. S. Sutton and A. G. Barto. *Reinforcement Learning: An Introduction*. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1998.
- W. R. Thompson. On the Likelihood that One Unknown Probability Exceeds Another in View of the Evidence of Two Samples. *Biometrika*, 25(3):285–294, 1933.
- G. L. Urban, G. Liberali, E. MacDonald, R. Bordley, and J. R. Hauser. Morphing Banner Advertising. *Marketing Science*, forthcoming, 2013.
- A. Wald. *Statistical Decision Functions*. Wiley, New York, 1950.
- Z. Wang and M. Hu. Committed Versus Contingent Pricing Under Competition. *Production and Operations Management*, 23(11):1919–1936, 2014.
- B. Wernerfelt. A special case of dynamic pricing policy. *Management Science*, 32(12):pp. 1562–1566, 1986.

C. o. E. A. White House. Big Data and Differential Pricing. February, 2015.
 URL <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2015/02/06/economics-big-data-and-differential-pricing>.

P. Whittle. Multi-armed Bandits and the Gittins Index. *Journal of Royal Statistical Society, Series B*, 42(2): 143–149, 1980.

R. S. Winer. A Reference Price Model of Brand Choice for Frequently Purchased Products. *Journal of Consumer Research*, 13(2):250–256, 1986.

Appendix A1: Theoretical performance of UCB-PI algorithm

We provide theoretical guarantees for the UCB-PI index (Equation 8)¹³. The log-regret bound was first shown by Lai and Robbins [1985] for a particular stylized multi-armed bandit problem. Our proof is based on an alternative view of the original UCB analysis. The proof we present here differs from the standard UCB proof from Auer et al. [2002] because we use an argument based on *potential function*, which we define in the proof. This argument in the proof features a novel application of these tools for formally analysis of algorithms. We use this alternative approach, in part, because it permits a more general description of the exploration bonus.

Problem definition and preliminaries

We use more general notation beyond price and profit to describe actions and rewards. Price p_k played at time t is the action described by \mathcal{A}^t . Let π_k at price k is described a random variable R_i^t of reward for $i \in 1, \dots, K$.

Let Q_i be a distribution on the reward R_i^t , with support on $[0, p_i]$. Then let the rewards $R_i^1, \dots, R_i^T \stackrel{\text{iid}}{\sim} Q_i$, where mean $\mathbb{E}[R_i^t] = \mu_i$. We assume that the largest μ_i is unique and, without loss of generality, assume that the coordinates are permuted in order that μ_1 is the largest ex-post mean reward. Define $\Delta_i := \mu_1 - \mu_i$ for $i = 2, \dots, K$.

The *bandit algorithm* is a procedure that chooses an action \mathcal{A}^t on round t as a function of the set of past observed action/reward pairs, $(\mathcal{A}^1, R_{\mathcal{A}^1}^1), \dots, (\mathcal{A}^{t-1}, R_{\mathcal{A}^{t-1}}^{t-1})$.

¹³In the main text we refer to this as the UCB-PI-untuned, but drop the “untuned” label here for easier reading since the theoretical literature does not focus on the “tuned” algorithms.

On round t , the past data are summarized by the count, $N_i^t := \sum_{\tau=1}^{t-1} \mathbb{I}[\mathcal{A}^\tau = i]$, and the empirical mean estimator, $\hat{\mu}_i^t := \frac{\sum_{\tau=1}^{t-1} \mathbb{I}[\mathcal{A}^\tau = i] R_{\mathcal{A}^\tau}^\tau}{N_i^t}$.

Analysis techniques: concentration inequalities and potential function

Much of the literature and techniques used to analyze finite time multi-armed bandit problems rely on a standard set of tools known as *deviation bounds* or *concentration inequalities*. Deviation bounds are used to reason about tail probabilities of averages of iid random variables and martingales, for instance. Perhaps the most basic deviation bound is Chebyshev's Inequality, which says that for any random variable X with mean μ and variance σ^2 we have $\Pr(|X - \mu| > k\sigma) \leq \frac{1}{k^2}$. More advanced results are based on the *Chernoff bounds*, which provide much sharper guarantees on the decay of the tail probability. For example, the *Hoeffding-Azuma Inequality* [Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi, 2006], which we present below, gives a probability bound on the order of $\exp(-k^2)$, which is much faster than $1/k^2$.

Let us assume we are given a particular deviation bound that provides the following guarantee,

$$\Pr(|\mu_i - \hat{\mu}_i^t| > p_i \epsilon \mid N_i^t \geq N) \leq f(N, \epsilon), \quad (11)$$

where $f(\cdot, \cdot)$ is a function, continuous in $\epsilon > 0$ and monotonically decreasing in both parameters, that controls the probability of a large deviation. While UCB relies specifically on the Hoeffding-Azuma inequality, for now we leave the deviation bound in a generic form.

We define a pair of functions that allow us to convert between values of ϵ and N in order to guarantee that $f(N, \epsilon) \leq \nu$ for a given $\nu > 0$. To this end define

$$\begin{aligned} \Lambda(\epsilon, \nu) &:= \min\{N \geq 1 : f(N, \epsilon/2) \leq \nu\}, \\ \rho(N, \nu) &:= \begin{cases} \inf\{\epsilon : f(N, \epsilon) \leq \nu\} & \text{if } N > 0; \\ 1 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \end{aligned}$$

We omit the ν in the argument to $\Lambda(\cdot), \rho(\cdot)$. Note the property that $\rho(N, \nu) \leq \epsilon/2$ for any $N \geq \Lambda(\epsilon, \nu)$.

Note that $\hat{\delta}$, which plays a role in the lower and upper bounds on reward, does not enter this proof, yet we can conclude the proof applies to our proposed algorithm. Indeed, δ is not known to the researcher and must be estimated. Consider the worst case (in the sense that this will lead to the maximum regret), where

segmentation is useless, then $\delta = 1$. Then the credible intervals for every segment's feasible profit still are the entire possible range. This is the case presented in the proof here. But in practice, $0 \leq \delta \leq 1$, and δ can be smaller than its maximum value, making segmentation useful, and narrowing the partially identified intervals. Therefore, the proposed UCB-PI algorithm does no worse than the performance described here.

Bounds for the UCB-PI algorithm

Recall that the UCB-PI index is defined in Equation 8 by taking the mean estimated reward plus an exploration bonus for each price p_i . The precise form of the exploration bonus derives from the deviation bound, particularly from the form of $\rho(\cdot)$. In other words, for a fixed choice of $\nu > 0$, we can redefine the algorithm as follows:

$$\text{UCB-PI Algorithm:} \quad \text{on round } t \text{ play } \mathcal{A}^t = \arg \max_i \{ \hat{\mu}_i^t + p_i \rho(N_i^t, \nu) \} \quad (12)$$

A central piece of the analysis relies on the following potential function, which depends on the current number of plays of each arm $i = 2, \dots, K$.

$$\Phi(N_2^t, \dots, N_K^t) := 2 \sum_{i=2}^K \sum_{N=0}^{N_i^t-1} p_i \rho(N, \nu)$$

With our notation, the expected regret can be expressed as

$$\mathbb{E} [\text{Regret}_T(\text{UCB})] = \sum_{t=1}^T \mu_1 - \mu_{\mathcal{A}^t}$$

Lemma 1. *The expected regret of UCB is bounded as*

$$\mathbb{E} [\text{Regret}_T(\text{UCB})] \leq \mathbb{E} [\Phi(N_2^{T+1}, \dots, N_K^{T+1})] + O(T\nu)$$

Proof. The additional (statistical) regret suffered on round t of UCB is exactly $\mu_1 - \mu_{\mathcal{A}^t}$. From our deviation

bound (Equation 11), we can consider two inequalities ¹⁴

$$\mu_1 \leq \hat{\mu}_1^t + p_i \rho(N_1^t, \nu) \quad \text{and} \quad \hat{\mu}_{\mathcal{A}^t}^t \leq \mu_{\mathcal{A}^t} + p_{\mathcal{A}^t} \rho(N_{\mathcal{A}^t}^t, \nu).$$

To analyze the two inequalities above, we let ξ^t be the indicator variable that one of the above two inequalities fails to hold. Note we chose $\rho(\cdot)$ so that $\mathbb{P}[\xi^t = 1] \leq 2\nu$.

Since the algorithms choose arm \mathcal{A}^t , we have

$$\hat{\mu}_1^t + p_1 \rho(N_1^t, \nu) \leq \hat{\mu}_{\mathcal{A}^t}^t + p_{\mathcal{A}^t} \rho(N_{\mathcal{A}^t}^t, \nu)$$

If we combine the above two equations, and consider the event that $\xi^t = 0$, then we obtain

$$\mu_1 \leq \hat{\mu}_1^t + p_1 \rho(N_1^t, \nu) \leq \hat{\mu}_{\mathcal{A}^t}^t + p_{\mathcal{A}^t} \rho(N_{\mathcal{A}^t}^t, \nu) \leq \mu_{\mathcal{A}^t} + 2p_{\mathcal{A}^t} \rho(N_{\mathcal{A}^t}^t, \nu).$$

Even in the event that $\xi^t = 1$ we have that $\mu_1 - \mu_{\mathcal{A}^t} \leq 1$. Hence, $\mu_1 - \mu_{\mathcal{A}^t} \leq 2p_{\mathcal{A}^t} \rho(N_{\mathcal{A}^t}^t, \nu) + \xi^t$.

Finally, we observe that the potential function was chosen so that $\Phi(N_2^{t+1}, \dots, N_K^{t+1}) - \Phi(N_2^t, \dots, N_K^t) = 2p_{\mathcal{A}^t} \rho(N_{\mathcal{A}^t}^t, \nu)$. Recalling that $\Phi(0, \dots, 0) = 0$,

$$\mathbb{E}[\text{Regret}_T(\text{UCB})] \leq \mathbb{E} \left[\Phi(N_2^{T+1}, \dots, N_K^{T+1}) + \sum_{t=1}^T \xi^t \right] = \mathbb{E}[\Phi(N_2^{T+1}, \dots, N_K^{T+1})] + 2T\nu.$$

□

The final piece we need to establish is that the number of pulls N_i^t of arm i , for $i = 2, \dots, K$, is unlikely to exceed $\Lambda(\Delta_i, \nu)$.

Lemma 2. For any $T > 0$ we have $\mathbb{E}[\Phi(N_2^{T+1}, \dots, N_K^{T+1})] \leq \Phi(\Lambda(\frac{\Delta_2}{p_2}, \nu), \dots, \Lambda(\frac{\Delta_K}{p_K}, \nu)) + O(T^2\nu)$.

Proof of Lemma 2. To obtain the inequality of the lemma, define for every $t = 1, \dots, T$ and $i = 2, \dots$ the indicator variable ζ_i^t which returns 1 when $\mathcal{A}^t = i$ given that $N_i^t \geq \Lambda(\frac{\Delta_i}{p_i}, \nu)$, and returns 0 otherwise. We can show that $\zeta_i^t = 1$ with probability smaller than 2ν .

Note that if $\mathcal{A}^t = i$ then the upper confidence estimate for i was larger than that of action 1. More precisely, it must be that $\hat{\mu}_i^t + p_i \rho(N_i^t) \geq \hat{\mu}_1^t + p_1 \rho(N_1^t)$. For this to occur, either we had (a) a large

¹⁴Here we can see that if δ were less than its maximum value, the partially identified intervals shrink, and the above probabilities are smaller.

underestimate on μ_1 , that is $\hat{\mu}_1^t + p_1\rho(N_1^t) \leq \mu_1$. Or, (b) we had a large overestimate on μ_i , that is, $\hat{\mu}_i^t + p_i\rho(N_i^t) \geq \mu_1$. It is clear that (a) occurs with probability less than ν by construction of ρ .

To analyze (b), note that $\mu_1 = \mu_i + \Delta_i$, and we are also given that $N_i^t \geq \Lambda(\frac{\Delta_i}{p_i}, \nu)$ which implies that $p_i\rho(N_i^t) \leq \Delta_i/2$.

$$\hat{\mu}_i^t + p_i\rho(N_i^t) \geq \mu_1 \implies \hat{\mu}_i^t \geq \mu_i + p_i\rho(N_i^t)$$

which happens with probability no more than ν . Therefore,

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{E} [\Phi(N_2^{T+1}, \dots, N_K^{T+1})] &\leq \Phi(\Lambda(\frac{\Delta_2}{p_2}, \nu), \dots, \Lambda(\frac{\Delta_K}{p_K}, \nu)) + \mathbb{E} [\sum_{i=2}^K \sum_{t=1}^T \zeta_i^t] \\ &\leq \Phi(\Lambda(\frac{\Delta_2}{p_2}, \nu), \dots, \Lambda(\frac{\Delta_K}{p_K}, \nu)) + 2T^2\nu \end{aligned}$$

□

We are now able to combine the above results for the final bound.

Theorem 3. *If we set $\nu = T^{-2}/2$, the deviation bound is given by*

$$\rho(N, \nu) = \sqrt{\frac{\log(2/\nu)}{2N}}$$

And the expected regret of UCB is bounded as

$$\mathbb{E} [\text{Regret}_T(\text{UCB})] \leq 8 \sum_{i=2}^K \frac{p_i \log(T)}{\Delta_i} + O(1).$$

Proof. A standard deviation bound that holds for *all* distributions supported on $[0, p_i]$ is the Hoeffding-Azuma inequality [Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi, 2006], where the bound is given by $f(N, \epsilon) = 2 \exp(-2N\epsilon^2)$. Utilizing Hoeffding-Azuma we have $\Lambda(\epsilon, \nu) = \left\lceil \frac{2 \log 2/\nu}{\epsilon^2} \right\rceil$ and $\rho(N, \nu) = \sqrt{\frac{\log(2/\nu)}{2N}}$ for $N > 0$. If we utilize

the fact that $\sum_{y=1}^Y \frac{1}{\sqrt{y}} \leq 2\sqrt{Y}$, then we see that

$$\begin{aligned}
\Phi(\Lambda(\frac{\Delta_2}{p_2}, \nu), \dots, \Lambda(\frac{\Delta_K}{p_K}, \nu)) &= 2 \sum_{i=2}^K \sum_{N=1}^{\Lambda(\frac{\Delta_i}{p_i}, \nu)} \rho(N, \nu) \\
&= 2 \sum_{i=2}^K \sum_{N=1}^{\Lambda(\frac{\Delta_i}{p_i}, \nu)} \sqrt{\frac{\log(2/\nu)}{2N}} \\
&\leq 2 \sum_{i=2}^K 2 \sqrt{\frac{\log(2/\nu) \Lambda(\frac{\Delta_i}{p_i}, \nu)}{2}} \\
&= 4 \sum_{i=2}^K \frac{p_i \log(2/\nu)}{\Delta_i}
\end{aligned}$$

Combining the Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, setting $\nu = T^{-2}/2$, we conclude the theorem. \square

Notice in Theorem 3 we set $\rho(N, \nu) = \sqrt{\frac{\log(2/\nu)}{2N}}$. We can now consider this into the UCB algorithm in Equation 12 we get the exploration bonus in our proposed algorithm (see equation 8). The bound for regret for this algorithm is strictly lower than Auer [2002] as all p_i s are scaled to be lower than 1.

Further adding the additional partial identification implies that an arm is played weakly less than $\Lambda(\epsilon, \nu)$ derived by the Hoeffding-Azuma inequality. Consider the proofs for Lemmas 1 and 2, as arms are “turned off”, we get lower deviation bounds. As we discussed above, the number of arms turned off in an empirical application depends on the value of δ . The bounds derived are for δ at its maximum value, where no arms are turned off, and segmentation is not useful. However the empirical performance of our algorithm should improve for any lower values of δ . The theoretical argument holds true as a worst case analysis, that is $\delta = 1$.

Appendix A2: Data generating process for the simulations

[Figure 9 about here.]

Appendix A3: Estimating δ and Active Arms in UCB-PI

In Figure 10, Panel A, we illustrate how UCB-PI drops arms and only keeps certain arms active when they are near the ex-post true optimal prices.

In Panel B, we plot the estimated δ , which represents the heterogeneity of preferences within a segment. In our simulation the true value is $10c$, we show that we do recover this true valuation and consistent with Handel et al. [2013] we find that in early simulation we estimate a value of δ that is biased upward. This implies that our learning is not biased, however is slower than if we knew the true δ . We plot the percentage of arms that are active (right column), the other “turned off” due to partial identification. In our simulation we estimate that about 45% of arms are active, this allows the algorithm to focus the exploration of demand.

[Figure 10 about here.]

Appendix A4: Histogram of UCB-tuned, UCB-PI Tuned and Learn Then Earn (5%) profits by simulation setting

[Figure 11 about here.]

Appendix A5: Model extension and robustness

A5.1. Model Extension: Including sampling error

In our main algorithm proposed in section 2, our main model considers all consumer valuations are with δ of the segment mean, or formally $v_i \in [v_s - \delta, v_s + \delta] \forall i \in s$. In this section we propose a method to further relax this assumption to allow for the fact that in some observations consumers within a segment may have valuations outside this range. As introduced in [Handel et al., 2013], we consider that ϕ percent of consumers have valuations outside this range. As discussed in [Handel et al., 2013], an econometrician cannot identify both δ and ϕ , therefore we consider ϕ must be a model parameter set by the researcher¹⁵.

In our setup, we assume that $\frac{\phi}{2}$ percent of consumer in segment s will not purchase at any price, and $\frac{\phi}{2}$ will purchase at any price p . This is consistent with a data contamination view in the treatment response literature Manski [2005]. With this assumption, we can consider the smallest identified set of valuations for a segment by adjusting our definition of p_s^{min} and p_s^{max} from section 2. In the main document we defined $p_{s,t}^{min} \equiv \max\{p_k | D(p_k)_{s,t} = 1\}$ and $p_{s,t}^{max} \equiv \min\{p_k | D(p_k)_{s,t} = 0\}$. To account for data contamination we change this to consider the lowest and the highest $\frac{\phi}{2}$ of prices that each segment is exposed to as contaminated data. Formally $p_{s,t}^{min} \equiv \max\{p_k | \sum_{p_j \leq p_k} D(p_j)_{s,t} \geq 1 - \frac{\phi}{2}\}$ and $p_{s,t}^{max} \equiv \min\{p_k | \sum_{p_j \geq p_k} D(p_j)_{s,t} \leq \frac{\phi}{2}\}$.

¹⁵ Assuming a value of ϕ lower (higher) than the true data generating will result in a upward (downward) biased estimated δ

To show that the main results of our paper hold, we replicate our main Monte Carlo results (Figure 6, Panel A) with adding an assumption that $\phi = 5\%$, or 5% of the observed data are inconsistent with $v_i \in [v_s - \delta, v_s + \delta] \forall i \in s$. Further we assume that 2.5% of consumers have valuations below $v_s - \delta$ and 2.5% of consumers have valuations above $v_s + \delta$. The results are shown in figure 12. As in our main results (6), we find that UCB-PI has the highest mean profits and the smallest variation across all algorithms.

[Figure 12 about here.]

A5.2. UCB-Tuned with price scaling

There are two differences between our main algorithm (proposed in Section 2) and the standard algorithm in the computer science literature [Auer, 2002]. First, we introduce partial identification to turn-off prices that we learned to be far from optimal. Second, we change the scaling of the exploration bonus to include price. This second change is driven by the fact that our model is derived based on demand learning (see Section 6) as opposed to profit learning. We consider an alternative to the UCB-Tuned, which was UCB1 model with tuning, that considers demand learning: UCB-Tuned(Price Scaled), where the exploration bonus is scaled by price. The formulation is given by,

$$\mathbf{V}_{kt} = \left(\frac{1}{n_{kt}} \sum_{\tau=1}^{n_{kt}} \pi_{k\tau}^2 \right) - \bar{\pi}_{kt}^2 + \sqrt{\frac{2 \log t}{n_{kt}}} \quad (13)$$

$$\text{UCB-Tuned(Price Scaled)}_{kt} = \bar{\pi}_{kt} + p_k \sqrt{\frac{\log t}{n_{kt}}} \min \left(\frac{1}{4}, \mathbf{V}_{kt} \right) \quad (14)$$

We now can understand if our main results of our paper are due to partial identification or scaling of the exploration bonus (we thank the review team of this suggestion). Therefore, we repeat our main Monte Carlo results (Figure 6, Panel A) with adding the UCB-Tuned(Price Scaled) algorithm. The results are shown in Figure 13. Here we notice that UCB-Tuned and UCB-Tuned(Price Scaled) achieve very similar profits. This suggests that the difference in profits achieved between the standard computer science model (UCB) and our proposed model (UCB-PI) are driven by partial identification and not simply by the scaling of the exploration bonus.

[Figure 13 about here.]

A5.3. Implication of the size of unobserved heterogeneity (δ)

In our Monte Carlo simulation in section 4, we set the value of δ to be 0.1. Therefore, unobserved heterogeneity or within segment variation is $2\delta = 0.2$, or represents about 20% of the entire range of possible valuations. Here we consider the implications for the limit conditions with all ($\delta = 1$) or no ($\delta = 0$) unobserved heterogeneity. We re-run all our simulations for each of these models. The results are shown in figures 14 ($\delta = 1$) and 15 ($\delta = 0$).

At the limit condition with no observed heterogeneity ($\delta = 1$), i.e., segmentation is not valuable, the profits from UCB-PI and UCB are similar. Moreover the results from UCB-Tuned & Price Scaling (see Appendix A5.2) are identical to the results from our proposed model UCB-PI-Tuned. This is because if all heterogeneity is unobserved, there is no additional information from demand learning (or partial identification). Recall in our model, we see each consumer only once.


On the other hand in the limit condition with all observed heterogeneity ($\delta = 0$), i.e. segmentation is perfect. The profits from UCB-PI are much larger than those shown in the main paper (panel A in figure 6). The lower bound of profits from our proposed method, is higher than the upper bound of profits from UCB-Tuned.

[Figure 14 about here.]

[Figure 15 about here.]

Figure 1: Balanced field experiment (left) versus multi-armed bandit experiment (right). The bandit experiment is adaptive. This particular algorithm is UCB-Tuned [Auer, 2002].

Panel A. Prices Played. The left hand side plots show the price charged over time and the right hand side chart show the distribution of all prices charged. A Balanced experiment (top) charges all prices equally while the bandit (bottom) leans in real time and charges the truly optimal price (\$0.50) more often.




Panel B. Profits Learning and Earning. The left hand side plots show the profits over time (earning). After 1,000 prices tested, the bandit earns 95% of optimal profits, while the balanced experiment earns only 66% of optimal profits. The right hand side chart shows the mean and 95% confidence intervals of the learned profit at each price. The red dotted line represents the true profit curve. The balanced experiment learns the profit curve with the same precision at all prices, while the bandit learns the true profit with small confidence intervals around the optimal price (\$0.5) and large confidence intervals at sub optimal prices.



Figure 2: Partial identification of valuations by segments and aggregated estimated demand bounds.

Panel A. Identifying segment valuation: Sample segment valuations are partially identified over four rounds of prices. The dashed regions reflect ambiguity within a range of valuations.



Panel B. Aggregate demand bounds: Demand bounds (thick lines around dashed areas) come from aggregating segment-specific identified sets of valuations. Solid colored areas represent prices where a segment would purchase certainly, and dashed regions reflect uncertainty. For instance, when the price is \$1.50, all of Segment B will purchase, but some of Segment A may or may not purchase (hence, feasible demand is between 50% and 100%).






Figure 3: Value from Partial Identification: Comparison of the UCB1 and UCB-PI untuned algorithm for the simulation with true segment valuations from right-skewed distribution, $\text{beta}(2, 9)$ and within-segment heterogeneity set to $\delta = 0.1$.

Panel A: Price charged. Prices by experiment with UCB (left) and UCB-PI (right) to learn the true optimal price (red line). The UCB-PI learns the optimal price sooner and does not experiment with higher prices (compared to UCB).



Panel B: Prices and Demand: The left histogram of prices charged under UCB (gray) and UCB-PI (blue), with truly optimal price (vertical red line). The right figure shows the partially identified demand learning under UCB-PI. The shaded gray regions show the partially identified demand bounds after 1 round (start; lightest), 100 rounds, 1,000 rounds and 10,000 rounds (darkest).



Panel C: Profits Implication of price learning on profits earned by round. The left chart consider profits relative to optimal profits, and the right chart shows the relative performance of the algorithms [Defined as: $(\text{UCB-PI profits} / \text{UCB profits}) - 1$]






Figure 4: Value from Partial Identification: Demand learning for the UCB-PI untuned algorithm. The left histogram of prices charged under UCB (gray) and UCB-PI (blue), with truly optimal price (vertical red line). The right figure shows the partially identified demand learning under UCB-PI. The shaded gray regions show the partially identified demand bounds after 1 round (start; lightest), 100 rounds, 1,000 rounds and 10,000 rounds (darkest). For all settings, the within-segment heterogeneity set to $\delta = 0.1$.


Panel A: Setting: Symmetric



Panel B: Setting: Left-Skewed



Panel C: Setting: Bimodal Continuous



Panel D: Setting: Finite Mixture





Figure 5: Value of Partial Identification for Tuned Algorithms. The UCB Tuned (gray) and UCB-PI Tuned (blue) algorithms differ across five (5) settings, for one simulation each, by prices charged, relative profits, and percentage of ex-post optimal profits.

Panel A: Each row represents a simulation setting. The first (second) column contains the UCB Tuned (UCB-PI Tuned) prices by round. The red line represent the optimal prices. The third column considers the percentage difference in profits.



Panel B: Ex-Post Profits achieved across the five (5) simulation settings





Figure 6: Monte Carlo Experiment: We compare the performance of the UCB, UCB-PI, and Learn Then Earn algorithms across 1,000 MC simulations and 5 settings. We consider the ex-post profits achieved, the average and variability in performance, summarizing the full distributions of outcomes overall (Panel A) and over time by simulation setting (Panel B)

Panel A: Summary across all simulations. Plot considers the ex-post profits achieved by UCB, UCB-PI and Learn Then Earn (balanced experiments) across all 5 simulations and 1,000 Monte Carlo Simulations. The bars represent the range of 100% (light gray; numerical values are shown below the bars), 95% (dark gray) of estimates. The red dots represent the mean profit achieved (numerical values are shown above the bars).



Panel B: Profits over time Plot considers the mean and range of profits achieved by the UCB-PI tuned and the Learn then Earn (5%) algorithms by simulation settings and experimental round (time). The vertical line shows the end of the leaning period. This shows that the UCB-PI achieves the same or higher mean profits than the best performing Learn Then Earn algorithm, and UCB-PI has a smaller range across Monte Carlo simulations.





Figure 7: Simulation based on Dube and Misra (2017): Setup and Results. We describe a data-generating process to recreate data from DM (Panel A). We compare performance of the UCB, UCB-PI, and Learn Then Earn algorithms across 1,000 Monte Carlo experiments (Panel B).

Panel A: Simulation Set up. We consider the simulated demand (left) and profits (right) for 10,000 draws of 7,870 consumers. In each draw, we assume that an independent set of 787 consumers are exposed to each of the 10 prices. Consumers valuations are draw from a uniform distribution between -\$5 and +\$5 of the segment midpoint. The percentage of simulations in which each price is profit-maximizing appears in value above the denisty (right chart).



Panel B: Ex-post profits We consider the ex-post profits achieved by UCB, UCB-PI and Learn Then Earn (balanced experiments) across 1,000 Monte Carlo Simulations. We consider the profit after 100,000 consumers (about 1 year). The bars represent the range of 100% (light gray, and the interval values are shown below the bars), and 95% (dark gray) of the profit estimates. The red dots represent the mean profit (the mean values are shown above the bars).





Figure 8: Simulation based on Dube and Misra (2017): Tracking over time. We compare the prices (panel A) and profits (panel B) of UCB-PI versus Learn Then Earn (7.9%) algorithms over time. The 7.9% reflects the 7,870 customers, corresponding to the one month (or 787 rounds).

Panel A: Distribution of prices. We plot the distribution of prices charged across 1,000 Monte Carlo simulations by UCB-PI tuned (right) and the Learn then Earn (7.9%) (left) algorithms by round (each round represents a price charged to 10 consumers). The prices charged are color coded by optimal ex-post profits (light is high and dark is low). The red line indicates the end of the learning period in the learn then earn algorithm.



Panel B: Profits over time We plot the profits achieved by the UCB-PI tuned and the Learn then Earn (7.9%) algorithms by round (10 consumers). The lines represent the means and the shaded area represents the distribution across 1,000 Monte Carlo Simulations. The left hand side plot shows the percent of ex-post optimal achieved, and the right hand side plot show the relative profits. The vertical line indicates the end of the learning period in the learn then earn algorithm.




Figure 9: True demand for simulation unknown to the researcher. The data-generating process of the five (5) simulations settings differ by true unobserved heterogeneity of valuations (left column), which determine the aggregate true demand curve (middle). The true ex-post profit function (right) is the product of price and demand.





Figure 10: Inside UCB-PI: dropping dominated arms and estimating heterogeneity

Panel A. Active arms. UCB-PI drops arms and keeps certain arms active. Which arms are active at each round? (left) How many arms are active at each round? (right)



Panel B. Within-segment heterogeneity estimates. The estimated delta (δ) at each round approaches the true data-generating process within-segment heterogeneity.




Figure 11: In this figure we plot the histogram of ex-post profits achieved by the UCB-PI Tuned and the Learn Then Earn (5%) algorithms 1,000 Monte Carlo Simulations for each of the 5 simulation settings. The UCB-PI has both a higher mean and a lower variation in profits compared to Learn Then Earn.




Figure 12: Monte Carlo Experiment with 5% error shocks: Comparison of the UCB, UCB-PI, and Learn Then Earn algorithms across 1,000 MC simulations and 5 settings. We consider the ex-post profits achieved.




Figure 13: Monte Carlo Experiment with UCB-Tuned with Price Scaled: Comparison with the UCB, UCB-PI algorithms across 1,000 MC simulations and 5 settings. We consider the ex-post profits achieved.




Figure 14: Monte Carlo Experiment with all unobserved heterogeneity ($\delta = 1$), across 1,000 MC simulations and 5 settings. We consider the ex-post profits achieved.




Figure 15: Monte Carlo Experiment with no unobserved heterogeneity ($\delta = 0$), across 1,000 MC simulations and 5 settings. We consider the ex-post profits achieved.

