


Brute Force Attack

Problem Statement:

Conduct a comprehensive security assessment and response for a CentOS VM under brute force attack, focusing on log analysis, user verification, and implementation of enhanced security measures to mitigate future threats.

Task 1: Download Authentication Logs: Access and download authentication logs from the provided URL. These logs contain critical evidence of brute force attacks, including access attempts and usernames.

Step 1: I access from the kali Linux machine the portal of “Simplilearn” and download the needed secure zip file. Step 2: I open the “Terminal” then write (CD \download path), (unzip “folder”).



Task 2: Analyze the Logs for Usernames: Use log analysis tools or scripts to extract all usernames attempted during the attack, identifying the extent and specific entry points targeted.

Step 1: looking at contents of log files

```
labuser@kali: ~/Downloads/securelogs_1726306142274
File Actions Edit View Help
$ cat secure-20240804
Jul 28 07:02:46 honeypot-vicesolutions-sevayan sshd[6810]: Failed password for root from 221.122.88.121 port 59086 ssh2
Jul 28 07:02:46 honeypot-vicesolutions-sevayan sshd[6810]: Connection closed by 221.122.88.121 port 59086 [preauth]
Jul 28 07:02:49 honeypot-vicesolutions-sevayan sshd[6846]: pam_unix(sshd:auth): authentication failure; logname= uid=0 euid=0 tty=ssh ruser= rhost=221.122.88.121 user=root
Jul 28 07:02:50 honeypot-vicesolutions-sevayan sshd[6846]: Failed password for root from 221.122.88.121 port 33114 ssh2
Jul 28 07:02:51 honeypot-vicesolutions-sevayan sshd[6846]: Connection closed by 221.122.88.121 port 33114 [preauth]
Jul 28 07:02:54 honeypot-vicesolutions-sevayan sshd[6855]: pam_unix(sshd:auth): authentication failure; logname= uid=0 euid=0 tty=ssh ruser= rhost=221.122.88.121 user=root
Jul 28 07:02:56 honeypot-vicesolutions-sevayan sshd[6855]: Failed password for root from 221.122.88.121 port 35120 ssh2
Jul 28 07:02:56 honeypot-vicesolutions-sevayan sshd[6855]: Connection closed by 221.122.88.121 port 35120 [preauth]
Jul 28 07:02:58 honeypot-vicesolutions-sevayan sshd[6861]: pam_unix(sshd:auth): authentication failure; logname= uid=0 euid=0 tty=ssh ruser= rhost=221.122.88.121 user=root
Jul 28 07:03:00 honeypot-vicesolutions-sevayan sshd[6861]: Failed password for root from 221.122.88.121 port 37522 ssh2
Jul 28 07:03:01 honeypot-vicesolutions-sevayan sshd[6861]: Connection closed by 221.122.88.121 port 37522 [preauth]
Jul 28 07:03:03 honeypot-vicesolutions-sevayan sshd[6867]: pam_unix(sshd:auth): authentication failure; logname= uid=0 euid=0 tty=ssh ruser= rhost=221.122.88.121 user=root
Jul 28 07:03:06 honeypot-vicesolutions-sevayan sshd[6867]: Failed password for root from 221.122.88.121 port 39724 ssh2
Jul 28 07:03:06 honeypot-vicesolutions-sevayan sshd[6867]: Connection closed by 221.122.88.121 port 39724 [preauth]
Jul 28 07:03:08 honeypot-vicesolutions-sevayan sshd[6873]: pam_unix(sshd:auth): authentication failure; logname= uid=0 euid=0 tty=ssh ruser= rhost=221.122.88.121 user=root
Jul 28 07:03:10 honeypot-vicesolutions-sevayan sshd[6873]: Failed password for root from 221.122.88.121 port 41954 ssh2
Jul 28 07:03:11 honeypot-vicesolutions-sevayan sshd[6873]: Connection closed by 221.122.88.121 port 41954 [preauth]
Jul 28 07:03:13 honeypot-vicesolutions-sevayan sshd[6881]: pam_unix(sshd:auth): authentication failure; logname= uid=0 euid=0 tty=ssh ruser= rhost=221.122.88.121 user=root
Jul 28 07:03:15 honeypot-vicesolutions-sevayan sshd[6881]: Failed password for root from 221.122.88.121 port 44178 ssh2
Jul 28 07:03:16 honeypot-vicesolutions-sevayan sshd[6881]: Connection closed by 221.122.88.121 port 44178 [preauth]
```

Step 2: getting usernames from secure logs and storing it to file named 'username.log'


```

(labuser@kali)-[~/Downloads/securelogs_1726306142274 (3) (1) (3)]
└─$ ls -la
total 13644
drwxrwxr-x 3 labuser labuser 4096 Aug 10 11:15 .
drwxr-xr-x 7 labuser labuser 4096 Aug 10 10:35 ..
-rw-rw-r-- 1 labuser labuser 1024 Aug 10 11:09 .secure.swp
drwxrwxr-x 2 labuser labuser 4096 Aug 10 10:35 __MACOSX
-rw-r--r-- 1 labuser labuser 3731304 Sep 14 2024 secure
-rw-r--r-- 1 labuser labuser 10092544 Sep 14 2024 secure-20240804
-rw-rw-r-- 1 labuser labuser 130076 Aug 10 11:15 usernames.log
(labuser@kali)-[~/Downloads/securelogs_1726306142274 (3) (1) (3)]
└─$

```

Step 4: extracting the invalid usernames form secure logs and storing it into invalidUsers.txt file

```

(labuser@kali)-[~/Downloads/securelogs_1726306142274 (3) (1) (3)]
└─$ cat secure* | grep ssh | grep user | grep Invalid | cut -d " " -f 8 | sort -u >> invalidUsers.txt

(labuser@kali)-[~/Downloads/securelogs_1726306142274 (3) (1) (3)]
└─$ ls -la
total 13652
drwxrwxr-x 3 labuser labuser 4096 Aug 10 11:28 .
drwxr-xr-x 7 labuser labuser 4096 Aug 10 10:35 ..
-rw-rw-r-- 1 labuser labuser 1024 Aug 10 11:09 .secure.swp
drwxrwxr-x 2 labuser labuser 4096 Aug 10 10:35 __MACOSX
-rw-rw-r-- 1 labuser labuser 5361 Aug 10 11:28 invalidUsers.txt
-rw-r--r-- 1 labuser labuser 3731304 Sep 14 2024 secure
-rw-r--r-- 1 labuser labuser 10092544 Sep 14 2024 secure-20240804
-rw-rw-r-- 1 labuser labuser 130076 Aug 10 11:15 usernames.log
(labuser@kali)-[~/Downloads/securelogs_1726306142274 (3) (1) (3)]
└─$

```

Step 5: Counting the invalid users in invalidUsers.txt

```

(labuser@kali)-[~/Downloads/securelogs_1726306142274]
└─$ cat invalidUsers.txt | wc -l
802

```

- There is total 802 invalid users

Task 3: Cross-Reference Usernames with Company Records: Cross-reference extracted usernames with the internal user database to check if any correspond to actual user accounts, indicating potential insider threats.

Step 1: Creating script named 'users_match.sh' to check if any of the invalid users are present in /etc/passwd where all the valid users are listed

```
GNU nano 8.0 users_match.sh
#!/bin/bash
while IFS= read -r username;
do
    if grep -q "^$username:" /etc/passwd;
    then echo "$username exists in validUsers.txt"
    fi done < invalidUsers.txt
```

Step 2: setting 'user_match.sh' execution permission and executing the script

```
(labuser@kali)-[~/Downloads/securelogs_1726306142274 (3) (1) (3)]
$ sudo chmod +x users_match.sh

(labuser@kali)-[~/Downloads/securelogs_1726306142274 (3) (1) (3)]
$ cat users_match.sh
#!/bin/bash
while IFS= read -r username;
do
    if grep -q "^$username:" /etc/passwd;
    then echo "$username exists in validUsers.txt"
    fi done < invalidUsers.txt

(labuser@kali)-[~/Downloads/securelogs_1726306142274 (3) (1) (3)]
$ ./users_match.sh
backup exists in validUsers.txt
news exists in validUsers.txt
proxy exists in validUsers.txt
sys exists in validUsers.txt
uucp exists in validUsers.txt
www-data exists in validUsers.txt

(labuser@kali)-[~/Downloads/securelogs_1726306142274 (3) (1) (3)]
$
```


- As we can see that only few of the users listed in 'invalidUsers.txt' have matched with users listed in /etc/passwd and rest of the usernames are in 'invalidUsers.txt' are invalid.
- So we can conclude that a Brute force attack was carried.

Task 4: Implement Security Enhancements: Based on findings, enhance security by enforcing stricter password policies, implementing multifactor authentication, and possibly changing SSH ports.

Step 1: Disabling Root login by using 'PermitRootLogin no' in /etc/ssh/sshd_config and then restarting the ssh service.

- sudo nano /etc/ssh/sshd_config
 - PermitRootLogin no

- `sudo systemctl restart ssh`



```
labuser@kali: ~
File Actions Edit View Help
GNU nano 8.0 /etc/ssh/sshd_config

# Ciphers and keying
#RekeyLimit default none

# Logging
#SyslogFacility AUTH
#LogLevel INFO


# Authentication:

#LoginGraceTime 2m
PermitRootLogin no
#StrictModes yes
#MaxAuthTries 6
#MaxSessions 10

#PubkeyAuthentication yes

# Expect .ssh/authorized_keys2 to be disregarded by default in future.
#AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys .ssh/authorized_keys2

#AuthorizedPrincipalsFile none
```



```
(labuser@kali)-[~]
$ sudo nano /etc/ssh/sshd_config

(labuser@kali)-[~]
$ sudo systemctl restart ssh

(labuser@kali)-[~]
$
```

Step 2: Enforcing stronger password policy in `/etc/security/pwquality.conf`

- setting up password policy of setting:
 - minimum total password length = 16
 - Require atleast 1 digit
 - Require atleast 1 uppercase letter
 - Require atleast 1 special character
 - Require at least 1 lowercase letter

```
labuser@kali: ~  
File Actions Edit View Help  
GNU nano 8.0 /etc/security/pwquality.conf *  
minlen = 16  
#  
# The maximum credit for having digits in the new password. If less than 0  
# it is the minimum number of digits in the new password.  
dcredit = -1  
#  
# The maximum credit for having uppercase characters in the new password.  
# If less than 0 it is the minimum number of uppercase characters in the new  
# password.  
ucredit = -1  
#  
# The maximum credit for having lowercase characters in the new password.  
# If less than 0 it is the minimum number of lowercase characters in the new  
# password.  
lcredit = -1  
#  
# The maximum credit for having other characters in the new password.  
# If less than 0 it is the minimum number of other characters in the new  
# password.  
ocredit = -1  
lcredit = -1  
# The minimum number of required classes of characters for the new  
# password (digits, uppercase, lowercase, others).
```

Step 3: Implementing multifactor authentication:

- installing google authenticator
 - `sudo apt install libpam-google-authenticator`
- Run: `google-authenticator`
 - This will generate a QR code, on scanning it will get Google Authenticator app on your phone

```

(user1@kali)-[~]
$ sudo apt install libpam-google-authenticator
Installing:
  libpam-google-authenticator

Summary:
  Upgrading: 0, Installing: 1, Removing: 0, Not Upgrading: 459
  Download size: 44.5 kB
  Space needed: 134 kB / 18.0 GB available

Get:1 http://kali.download/kali kali-rolling/main amd64 libpam-google-authenticator amd64 20191231-2.1 [44.5 kB]
Fetched 44.5 kB in 6s (7,227 B/s)
Selecting previously unselected package libpam-google-authenticator.
(Reading database ... 412166 files and directories currently installed.)
Preparing to unpack .../libpam-google-authenticator_20191231-2.1_amd64.deb ...
Unpacking libpam-google-authenticator (20191231-2.1) ...
Setting up libpam-google-authenticator (20191231-2.1) ...
Processing triggers for kali-menu (2025.2.7) ...
Processing triggers for man-db (2.13.1-1) ...

(user1@kali)-[~]
$ auth required pam_google_authenticator.so
Command 'auth' not found, did you mean:
  command 'oauth' from deb ruby-oauth
  command 'iauth' from deb ircd-irc2
  command 'xauth' from deb xauth
Try: sudo apt install <deb name>

(user1@kali)-[~]
$ google-authenticator

Do you want authentication tokens to be time-based (y/n) y
Warning: pasting the following URL into your browser exposes the OTP secret to Google:
https://www.kali.org/docs/...


```



Scanning the above QR code will open an google authenticator app on mobile, and adds current user account to app. and prompts a 6 digit OTP valid for 30 secs, which is used for login.

Step 4: enable PAM in /etc/pam.d/ssh

- auth required pam_google_authenticator.so
- Doing this when a user logs in via SSH, after entering their password, the system will also require a valid TOTP code from the user's Google Authenticator app.
- placement: above @include common-auth



Step 5: Edit /etc/ssh/sshd_config file with 'ChallengeResponseAuthentication yes'

- It allows SSH to ask user for OTP. Without this, SSH won't ask for the Google Authenticator code at all, even if PAM is configured.

```
File Actions Edit View Help
GNU nano 8.4 /etc/ssh/sshd_config
#IgnoreUserKnownHosts no
# Don't read the user's ~/.rhosts and ~/.shosts files
#IgnoreRhosts yes

# To disable tunneled clear text passwords, change to "no" here!
#PasswordAuthentication yes
#PermitEmptyPasswords no
ChallengeResponseAuthentication yes

# Change to "yes" to enable keyboard-interactive authentication. Depending on
# the system's configuration, this may involve passwords, challenge-response,
# one-time passwords or some combination of these and other methods.
```

- Restart ssh service:
 - sudo systemctl restart ssh

Step 6: Changing the ssh port from 22 (default) to 2222, in sshd_config file and then restarting the service

- sudo nano /etc/ssh/sshd_config
- sudo systemctl restart ssh

```
labuser@kali: ~
File Actions Edit View Help
GNU nano 8.0 /etc/ssh/sshd_config
# sshd_config(5) for more information.

# This sshd was compiled with PATH=/usr/local/bin:/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/games

# The strategy used for options in the default sshd_config shipped with
# OpenSSH is to specify options with their default value where
# possible, but leave them commented. Uncommented options override the
# default value.

Include /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/*.conf

Port 2222
#AddressFamily any
#ListenAddress 0.0.0.0
#ListenAddress ::

#HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
#HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key
#HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key

# Ciphers and keying
#RekeyLimit default none

[ Wrote 122 lines ]
^G Help      ^O Write Out  ^F Where Is   ^K Cut        ^T Execute    ^C Location
^X Exit      ^R Read File  ^\ Replace    ^U Paste      ^J Justify    ^_ Go To Line
```

```
(labuser@kali)-[~]
$ sudo nano /etc/ssh/sshd_config

(labuser@kali)-[~]
$ sudo systemctl restart ssh

(labuser@kali)-[~]
$
```

Task 5: Continuous Monitoring and Reporting: Set up continuous monitoring to detect unusual access patterns and generate regular reports to inform the security team of any new threats.

Step 1:

- For continuous monitoring we could install 'auditd' tool
 - `sudo apt install auditd`
 - `sudo systemctl enable --now auditd`
- can check for failed logins using:
 - `ausearch -m USER_LOGIN --success no`

```
(user1@kali)-[~]
$ sudo apt install auditd
[sudo] password for user1:
auditd is already the newest version (1:4.0.2-2+b2).
Summary:
  Upgrading: 0, Installing: 0, Removing: 0, Not Upgrading: 459

(user1@kali)-[~]
$ sudo systemctl enable --now auditd
Synchronizing state of auditd.service with SysV service script with /usr/lib/systemd/systemd-sysv-install.
Executing: /usr/lib/systemd/systemd-sysv-install enable auditd

(user1@kali)-[~]
$ sudo systemctl status auditd
● auditd.service - Security Audit Logging Service
   Loaded: loaded (/usr/lib/systemd/system/auditd.service; enabled; preset: disabled)
   Active: active (running) since Mon 2025-08-11 13:41:21 IST; 1min 43s ago
 Invocation: 51858a934c5e440b26c1c657dbd57ae
    Docs: man:auditd(8)
          https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-documentation
 Main PID: 650 (auditd)
   Tasks: 2 (limit: 4501)
  Memory: 924K (peak: 1.9M)
     CPU: 40ms
    CGroup: /system.slice/auditd.service
            └─650 /usr/sbin/auditd

Aug 11 13:41:21 kali systemd[1]: Starting auditd.service - Security Audit Logging Service...
Aug 11 13:41:21 kali auditd[650]: No plugins found, not dispatching events
Aug 11 13:41:21 kali auditd[650]: Init complete, auditd 4.0.2 listening for events (startup state enable)
Aug 11 13:41:21 kali systemd[1]: Started auditd.service - Security Audit Logging Service.

(user1@kali)-[~]
$ ausearch -m USER_LOGIN --success no
Error opening config file (Permission denied)
NOTE - using built-in end_of_event_timeout: 2
NOTE - using built-in logs: /var/log/audit/audit.log
<no matches>

(user1@kali)-[~]
$ sudo ausearch -m USER_LOGIN --success no
<no matches>
```

Here, 'ausearch -m USER_LOGIN --success no' searches audit logs on a Linux system using the audit framework, filters only USER_LOGIN events (login attempts) and shows only events where the login was unsuccessful (--success no).