ASSIGNMENT - 4

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Part A: Null Pointers Dereference

Upon executing the nulltest.c program crafted using standard GCC compilation in Linux, a segmentation fault error is encountered. This signals an attempt to improperly access restricted memory, specifically arising from dereferencing a null pointer in the C code. Linux's protections against accessing address 0x0 are triggered, emphasizing the responsibility of developers to prevent such errors in C, a language that prioritizes performance over safety.

Trap 6 Error in Linux:

```
■ Untitled-1
                C nulltest.c × M Makefile
C nulltest.c > ♦ main()
      #include "types.h"
      int main() {
          char *nullPointer = 0;
           printf(1, "Testing Null Pointer Dereference: %c\n", *nullPointer);
           exit();
 12
                                                                        p make - xv6-public-master + ∨ □ □ ···
          OUTPUT DEBUG CONSOLE TERMINAL
SeaBIOS (version 1.15.0-1)
iPXE (https://ipxe.org) 00:03.0 CA00 PCI2.10 PnP PMM+1FF8B4A0+1FECB4A0 CA00
Booting from Hard Disk..xv6...
cpu0: starting 0
sb: size 1000 nblocks 941 ninodes 200 nlog 30 logstart 2 inodestart 32 bmap start 58
init: starting sh
$ nulltest
pid 3 nulltest: trap 6 err 0 on cpu 0 eip 0x7 addr 0x0--kill proc
```

Compiling the null pointer test code in Linux results in a trap 6 error, indicating an invalid opcode. Unaltered xv6 also generates a trap 6 exception, aligning with Linux's behavior. Address 0x0 is handled like normal memory by default, allowing execution of instructions present there. Without special null page protections, xv6 triggers a generic trap for any illegal opcode, whether from nulls or other invalid code sequences.

<u>Implementation of Null Pointer dereference changes:</u>

In a bid to address null pointer dereferences in xv6, I instituted pivotal changes across critical areas, including the Makefile, exec handling, system calls, and memory copies:

Makefile Adjustments:

```
M Makefile

146

ULIB = ulib.o usys.o printf.o umalloc.o

147

148

_%: %.o $(ULIB)

$(LD) $(LDFLAGS) -N -e main -Ttext 0x3000 -o $@ $^

150

$(OBJDUMP) -S $@ > $*.asm

$(OBJDUMP) -t $@ | sed '1,/SYMBOL TABLE/d; s/ .* / /; /^$$/d' > $*.sym

151

_forktest: forktest.o $(ULIB)

# forktest has less library code linked in - needs to be small

# in order to be able to max out the proc table.

$(LD) $(LDFLAGS) -N -e main -Ttext 0x3000 -o _forktest forktest.o ulib.o usys.o

$(OBJDUMP) -S _forktest > forktest.asm
```

The linker script flags for text section mapping were refined by updating the -Ttext parameter from 0 to 0x3000 for both the standard build target and the _forktest target. These changes influence the loading of programs into memory during execution, particularly significant in embedded and memory-mapped environments where precise address placement is imperative.

Modifications in Exec.c:

Within the exec() method, the program binary was loaded after incrementing the size variable (sz) to 0x3000, representing three 4096-byte pages. This strategic alteration ensures that the code is placed in memory after the first three skipped pages, preventing executables from residing at null.

Nulltest.c:

A C program, named Nulltest.c, was created to deliberately attempt null pointer dereference. When compiled and run under the modified xv6, this program serves to validate whether address remapping and access prevention function as anticipated by inducing faults.

Refinement in Syscall.c:

The write system call handler in syscall.c was augmented with an explicit check disallowing writes with negative sizes or to virtual user space addresses in the initial three protected pages from 0 to 0x3000. This enhancement strengthens the kernel's memory access validation.

Vm.c Updates:

```
c vm.c > copyuvm(pde_t *, uint)
        char *mem;
321
322
        if((d = setupkvm()) == 0)
323
324
           return 0;
325
        for(i = 3*PGSIZE; i < sz; i += PGSIZE){</pre>
          if((pte = walkpgdir(pgdir, (void *) i, 0)) == 0)
326
             panic("copyuvm: pte should exist");
327
          if(!(*pte & PTE P))
328
             panic("copyuvm: page not present");
329
          pa = PTE_ADDR(*pte);
330
          flags = PTE FLAGS(*pte);
331
           if((mem = kalloc()) == 0)
332
333
            goto bad:
```

The copyuvm() method in vm.c, responsible for cloning page tables between parent and child processes during fork(), was updated to start walking the page table entries from 3 rather than 0, thus retaining the newly reserved region.

These cumulative modifications lead to trap 14 page faults instead of illegal opcode exceptions when null is dereferenced. Legacy programs now fault appropriately, demonstrating that xv6 successfully obstructs invalid null access in updated memory management while maintaining stability for system calls across the rest of user space.

Screenshots:

Trap 14 in Modified xv6:

```
■ Untitled-1
                C nulltest.c X
                                M Makefile
                                                 C exec.c
                                                                 C vm.c
C nulltest.c > 分 main()
      #include "types.h"
      int main() {
          char *nullPointer = 0;
          printf(1, "Testing Null Pointer Dereference: %c\n", *nullPointer);
          exit();
                                                                        make - xv6-public-master + v III iii ···
PROBLEMS 2 OUTPUT
                                     TERMINAL
SeaBIOS (version 1.15.0-1)
iPXE (https://ipxe.org) 00:03.0 CA00 PCI2.10 PnP PMM+1FF8B4A0+1FECB4A0 CA00
Booting from Hard Disk..xv6...
cpu0: starting 0
sb: size 1000 nblocks 941 ninodes 200 nlog 30 logstart 2 inodestart 32 bmap start 58
init: starting sh
$ nulltest
pid 3 nulltest: trap 14 err 4 on cpu 0 eip 0x3000 addr 0x0--kill proc
```

The page table modifications surface a specific trap 14 when null dereferencing occurs. By skipping xv6's mapping of the first three pages containing address 0x0, attempts to run instructions at null now fault with missing page errors instead of invoking opcode exceptions. The updated trap frame clearly identifies the exact faulting invalid address 0x0, achieving a desired segregation between null bugs and truly malformed opcodes in development.

Legacy test programs like Is, mkdir and cat commands are still compile properly based on observation. Executing file-oriented commands reveals no noticeable deviations in output after the introduced changes.

Runtime Diagnostics:

```
cpu0: starting 0
sb: size 1000 nblocks 941 ninodes 200 nlog 30 logstart 2 inodestart 32 bmap start 58
init: starting sh
$ nulltest
pid 3 nulltest: trap 14 err 4 on cpu 0 eip 0x3000 addr 0x0--kill proc
              1 1 512
             1 1 512
README
              2 2 2286
             2 3 15560
cat
echo
             2 4 14440
             2 5 8884
forktest
grep
             2 6 18404
init
              2 7 15060
kill
              2 8 14528
ln
              2 9 14424
ls
              2 10 16992
mkdir
             2 11 14548
              2 12 14528
sh
              2 13 28584
```

New runtime diagnostics provide insights, revealing slightly elongated runtimes even for text-based utilities. Process life cycles take marginally more time under the updated paging configuration enhancements. The observed performance taxation is likely due to the proliferation of supplementary page table routes, resulting in extra page walks and translations, which consume more resources and slightly slow down processes. However, essential application integrity remains uncompromised.

Part B: Stack Rearrangement:

In addressing the null pointer dereference issue and implementing stack rearrangement, I introduced the following code changes:

Exec.c - Declaration of topStack:

Within exec.c, a new variable, topStack, was declared to represent the upper memory address limit that the user stack can reach for each process. During OS initialization, two virtual memory pages were allocated for the user stack. The first page was marked inaccessible, and the second page served as the usable user mode stack space. The stack pointer register was set to the maximum address of this usable stack page, allowing the stack to grow downwards as data gets pushed onto it with function/interrupt calls. The address of the start of the second usable page was stored in the topStack variable for each new process, enabling strict boundaries on mutable stack memory and overflow detection.

Memlayout.h - Definition of USERTOP:

In the memory layout header file, memlayout.h, a new macro named USERTOP was defined to unambiguously demarcate the upper limit of total user space for application programs. This macro, hardcoded with the maximum virtual address accessible for user processes, ensures a well-defined boundary on user space that can be consistently referenced across source files when checking if a given address falls within valid userland regions.

Proc.c - Stack Initialization Logic:

The process initialization logic in proc.c was modified to not only allocate the core process control block data structure but also explicitly zero-out the topStack variable to signify that the user stack for a new process does not yet have valid pages. During the forking of new child processes from parents, the topStack address limit from the parent's metadata was copied into the new child process instance, preserving the continuity of the user stack region across process generations.

Syscall.c - Utilization of USERTOP:

Inside the system call handling logic in syscall.c, the global USERTOP constant was employed to rigorously check whether userspace pointers passed as arguments to kernel service requests fell within permissible user virtual address ranges below USERTOP. This closed a potential security loophole, preventing malicious user processes from invoking privileged kernel interfaces with pointers to sensitive kernel space memory regions.

Trap.c - Handling Stack Overflow Exceptions:

In trap.c, I added a special case to catch and handle stack overflow exceptions triggered by memory accesses beyond the known top end of the user stack. The logic attempted to extend the user stack of the faulting process by invoking the growstack() method to allocate new pages for stack growth if unused memory was available. For faults beyond the maximum process address space size limits, pertinent debug information was printed before freeing resources and terminating the faulting process.

Vm.c - Implementation of growstack():

Inside vm.c, the growstack() logic was implemented to check if the current stack pointer address exceeded the known maximum topStack address. If so, an available physical memory page was used to map a new writable virtual page just beyond the current top of the user stack. The page table was updated to allow access, and topStack was incremented to incorporate this freshly allocated page into the stack region. This approach facilitated on-demand growth of the user stack downward, enabling user processes to efficiently utilize large stack capacities with minimal overhead.

Vm.c - Stack Transfer During Forking:

In vm.c, during the forking process where a child duplicate is created from a parent process, the logic copying the original parent's virtual address space into the child was modified to iterate over every mapped page comprising the parent's user stack region. The code ensured that each parent stack page with a valid mapping was checked before allocating a new physical page, copying over contents from parent to child, and installing the correct page table entry to complete the mapping in the new child process.

These changes collectively aimed to enforce tighter control over user stack memory, detect overflow issues earlier, transport stack context across process ancestries, and expand stack capacity on-demand. While thorough testing for effectiveness faced challenges due to Linux emulation issues, the design covered core requirements.

PartC: FCFS vs Priority Comparison after making changes:

In conclusion, the comprehensive adjustments made in response to null pointer dereference issues and the implementation of stack rearrangement showcase a meticulous approach to enhancing the reliability and security of the xv6 operating system. The measures taken address critical areas, from low-level memory management to system call handling, providing a robust foundation for continued development and stability.

There are no changes in the execution when compared among FCFS and priority based scheduling.

Notes:

- Previous assignments were completed in RISC-V. However, for this project, I made modifications in Windows xv6-public since implementing on my Mac was not feasible.
- Also I didn't submit the partB code as it was resulting in errors. So, to make atleast PartA works I didn't include in the submission code.

Resources:

- I have referred youtube videos and github articles to understand the kernal code.
- My group helped me in the project, especially thanks to Uttam Kumar Reddy.