Dear Delegates,

Welcome to the Disarmament and International Security Committee! My name is Maryam Shokry, and I am thrilled to serve as your chair for the UGA's 27th Model UN Conference, General Assembly 1 Disarmament and International Security Council. I am from Marietta, Georgia, and I am a Senior in the Terry College of Business and School of Public and International Affairs, pursuing degrees in Economics and International Affairs, with a concentration in Security and a minor in Statistics. Outside of my academic work, I intern at the Western Circuit Public Defender's Office, and last summer I studied and volunteered abroad in Stellenbosch, South Africa. In the little free time I have, I enjoy spending time with my friends, cooking, and watching Law and Order.

My name is Kartik Khanna and I will be your co-chair! I was born and raised in the South and graduated from Northview High School in Johns Creek, GA in 2017. At Northview, I was Secretary-General of my high school MUN team and competed at conferences ranging from UGAMUNC to BMUN (UC Berkeley) to NHSMUN! At UGA, I am currently a sophomore studying Finance and hope to work in investment banking or venture capital after graduation. In addition to UGA Model UN, I am involved with the Apollo Society (a Terry College of Business finance organization), the Corsair Society, and our Student Managed Investment Fund, and am a budding photographer! In my free time, you can most likely catch me cheering on the Dawgs or binge-watching Netflix!

As a delegate in our committee, we expect that you will compete to the best of your ability and prepare adequately. With this said, we also would like to address that this committee will at times discuss politically sensitive topics. Thus, we expect that you will compete with the highest level of professionalism and debate responsibly. Additionally, as delegates of your country we expect that the scope of your position papers and your proposed strategies in debate are in line with the views of your country. Delegates should consider the history, politics, culture, and the demographics of the country which they represent. Even if you do not personally agree with these views, the work of DISEC is meant to put forth resolutions for each country and address problems facing the international community, therefore it is imperative that each country is represented in their true form. Furthermore, I would like to emphasize that every country is vital in voicing their opinion during debate, in drafting resolutions, and in cooperating with other nations to bring solutions to the table.

At the beginning of this committee we will review parliamentary procedure and the expectations, however, my co-chair and I urge you to review the UGAMUNC rules and procedure on our website. Please contact me with any questions you might have at my email provided below. Finally, please submit your completed position papers to me and CC Kartik by 11:59 PM February 1st, as we want you to be prepared well before the conference.

Best of Luck,
Maryam Shokry and Kartik Khanna
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Contents

1 Background

The United Nations General Assembly was established as one of the main governing bodies of the UN with the original UN charter from 1945.[1] The General Assembly and other UN bodies were given the power to create subsidiary organs as needed, and thus were born the six main committees of the UN, the first of which originally focused more on political and security issues, but in the 70's became what it is today, when the committee was recommended by the General Assembly to, "devote itself primarily to problems of peace, security and disarmament."[2] Today, the First Committee on Disarmament and International Security provides a space for states to discuss their various positions on disarmament related matters and work as a team to create compromises or enact resolutions that create tools to better understand and approach disarmament and international security-related issues.[3] The committee creates the opportunity for states to build consensus on issues and tries to create a paradigm shift in which states no longer ensure "security" for themselves through the size of their arsenals, but rather, negotiate cooperative security arrangements that lower spending on weapons, reduce arms production, trade, and stockpiles, along with increasing global security.[4]

More recently, the committee's work and goals on disarmament have included a review conference on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, a Review Conference of the Programme of Action to combat illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons, along with resolutions that established a nuclear-weapon-free-zone in Africa, along with resolutions that created similar zones in Central Asia and the southern hemisphere.[5] The body has also been responsible for the immediate resumption of negotiations on a treaty that bans the production of fissile (nuclear) materials for military purposes, along with demanding that international legal instruments be established to guarantee security for non-nuclear states.[6]

On the powers of the committee, DISEC works closely with the United Nations Disarmament Commission, and the Geneva-based Conference of Disarmament.[7] The committee in its modern forms seeks out solutions on challenges and threats to global peace in the international community and seeks solutions to problems in the international security regime.[8]

The reality of the modern debate in DISEC is often static discussion caused by states' limited knowledge of other state's perspective, leading to a committee whose members have become entrenched in their own positions and opposition to resolutions that would otherwise demonstrate consensus on disarmament-related issues.[9]

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[1]Charter of the United Nations, 1945, Art. 7

[2]"United Nations, Main Body, Main Organs, General Assembly." United Nations.

http://www.un.org/en/ga/about/ropga/anx4.shtml#a.

[3]First Committee of the UN General Assembly. http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/disarmament-fora/unga.

[4]Ibid.

[5]"FEATURE: The UN General Assembly's First Committee - Disarmament and International Security Issues | UN News." United Nations. https://news.un.org/en/story/2012/12/429112-feature-un-general-assemblys-first-committee-disarmament-and-international.

[6]Ibid.

[7]"United Nations, Main Body, Main Organs, General Assembly." United Nations. Accessed October 26, 2018. http://www.un.org/en/ga/first/.

[8]Ibid.

[9]First Committee of the UN General Assembly. Accessed October 26, 2018. http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/disarmament-fora/unga.

2 Topic A: Autonomous Weapons Systems

2.1 Introduction

There have been a few fundamental shifts in the landscape of warfare. The first was the development of gunpowder, which was followed by the eventual development of nuclear weapons. Both technologies shifted the nature of warfare. Arguably, the next warfare revolution will be Lethal Autonomous Weapons (AWS), which have the ability to kill without immediate human control. Controversy on this topic has arisen in recent years from many countries and researchers. Many robotics and even tech firms have publicly stated that these weapons must be banned, and even the UN Secretary General has pushed for a full autonomous weapons ban. With the persistence of advancement in technology and the perpetual drive for security, this issue will likely continue to be considered in the UN discourse. Questions have arisen on how to develop regulation within this technological space. It is the job of the Disarmament and International Security Committee to decide how nations will approach this ethical and political issue, as well as debate an international legal solution to the future of Autonomous Weapons Systems.

2.2 History

Two opposing viewpoints underlie this debate. One side argues that autonomous weapons are less susceptible to human-error and communication technology issues. Additionally, since these weapons are more precise, they will reduce collateral damage, making war potentially more humane. However, the other side points to serious flaws in these assumptions. One issue is that the weapon can be programmed to search for particular characteristics such as age or ethnicity which could result in disproportionate selective targeting. Such implications result in a widespread worry over a new arms race and overall global instability.

Currently, it is common to hear about the use of semi-autonomous technology in war. Technology such as aircraft autopilot and missile defense systems have not raised much controversy because of their non-lethal components.[10] Artificial intelligence (AI) in defense is very much a current issue, as this is new technology and it is uncertain the direction it will take. It is also a gradual process for this technology to develop. We have seen many components of weapons incrementally replaced by autonomous technology, but this is accelerating rapidly. There is an estimation that by 2025 global military spending will invest up to $18 Billion in AWS and AI weapons systems.[11] A significant portion of this spending is coming from the biggest militaries in the world including the United States, China, and Russia.[12] However, not only is there a concern about a global arms race, but also the proliferation of these weapons outside of state governments. As with other new technologies when development happens, costs decrease which allows for greater production. This is exemplified by a similar development with drone technology. With diminishing costs, drones have been acquired by smaller militaries, and non-state actors. For instance, groups such as ISIS and Boko Haram have used weaponized drones in recent years, despite not having near the military budget or capabilities as many countries. This issue translates to the many worries researchers and international organizations have regarding the proliferation of Lethal Autonomous Weapons.

With fully autonomous weapons peace might be disrupted on a more significant level than with nuclear weapons or drones. This partly comes from the nature of the technology. The appeal of AWS is primarily its precision, deadly impact, and the attacker oftentimes being unidentifiable because of their distance from the weapon. This results in the possibility for greater discriminatory practices and military overstep. These characteristics of AWS make the need for public accountability even important.

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[10] "Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems." futureoflife.org. Future of Life Institute, August 12, 2020. https://futureoflife.org/lethal-autonomous-weapons-systems/?cn-reloaded=1.

[11] Haner, J. and Garcia, D. (2019), The Artificial Intelligence Arms Race: Trends and World Leaders in Autonomous Weapons Development. Glob Policy, 10: 331-337. doi:10.1111/1758-5899.12713

[12] Ibid.

2.3 Past UN Action

The United Nations has played a significant role in hosting discussions on developing weapons technologies. The area of Autonomous Weapons was raised starting in 2012 at human rights forums through the UN. There are a few past UN treaties which have the ability to guide the development and debate on AWS. The first is the 1949 Geneva conventions, which fundamentally outline humanitarian priorities for wartime. The main provision presented as international law is the protection of civilian persons from war, and the humane treatment of medical personnel, prisoners of war, and other people during wartime.[13] Another aspect of this treaty is that it outlines anti-discrimination provisions during wartime. Each of these are applicable to the AWS debate as some main concerns of the use of this technology may go against the generally accepted international principals previously negotiated within the UN.

Furthermore, the more recent and more applicable convention is the *Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects* (CCW).[14] This document was negotiated under UN oversight in 1979-1980 and has as recently as 2018 been set by the UN as an applicable forum for the debate on Autonomous Weapons. As it pertains to AWS, this treaty sets the groundwork for "excessively injurious or indiscriminate" conventional weapons to be regulated by international law. Original protocols within this convention included restriction on land mines, blinding laser weapons, and incendiary weapons.[15] Some of these provisions have been added in the years since it was first negotiated. The convention has been continuously held as an international forum, where debate regarding Autonomous Weapons Systems began between 2014 and 2016. However, these have not been focused on regulation or prohibition, but rather on the implications of the technology. More substantive groups were developed in 2017 and 2018 to engage multinational technology experts, governmental experts, human rights NGOs, and various think tanks such as the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.[16]

Within the CCW platform, the UN has outlined a number of principles for the international development of autonomous weapons. These include accountability for use of force, as with many other weapons, weapons reviews, and the development of cybersecurity and proliferation safeguards.[17] Additionally, the UN has indicated that these weapons are largely being created by the private industry rather than governmental institutions. Therefore, there is a need for multinational forums and experts to cooperate with all stakeholders and involve the private industry sector in the development of international policies on AWS.

2.4 International Development

Capabilities in Autonomous Weapons Systems are a combination of private industry and state led development. However, it is global militaries that are ultimately the consumers of AWS technology. According to defense spending numbers as of 2019, the five largest competitors for these systems are the United States, China, Russia, South Korea, and the European Union as a combined GDP entity.[18] It is clear that these countries align with historic global military competition, such as in the Cold war period, and they also have the largest global military budgets. These facts are the primary cause for the concern of a global arms race arising out of AWS development. However, it is the hope of the United Nations that international norms and treaties such as the CCW will be a regulatory factor as AWS continues to be developed.

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[13] "Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949." un.org. United Nations, n.d. https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.33_GC-IV-EN.pdf.

[14] "Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons – UNODA." un.org. United Nations, December 2014. https://www.un.org/disarmament/publications/more/ccw/.

[15] Ibid.

[16] Ibid.

[17] Gill, Amandeep Singh. "The Role of the United Nations in Addressing Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems." un.org. United Nations. Accessed October 31, 2020. https://www.un.org/en/un-chronicle/role-united-nations-addressing-emerging-technologies-area-lethal-autonomous-weapons.

[18] Stauffer, Brian. "Stopping Killer Robots." hrw.org. Human Rights Watch, August 10, 2020. https://www.hrw.org/report/2020/08/10/stopping-killer-robots/country-positions-banning-fully-autonomous-weapons-and.

As discussed earlier, AI and AWS technology comes with a high development cost, however, this is changing as production expands and becomes less costly. Furthermore, as it currently stands, most countries with established or developing capacity in AWS are parties to the CCW. This is a crucial element of the ability for international forums and regulation to proceed with those involved in technology development. Additional countries with these capabilities include EU countries such as France and Germany, Israel, Canada, and Japan.[19] Smaller countries which are allied with larger militaries also have the potential for access to these emerging technologies. These countries, typically defined as having a smaller GDP, also have a vested interest in this debate as global warfare and asymmetric power rising from powerful technology will potentially impact their sovereignty and security.

In addition to development within individual countries, the private industry for AWS is multinational. As previously mentioned, states have an interest in working alongside industry stakeholders to maintain an accountability in the international community. Some private firms maintain that autonomous weapons are superior to traditional weapons because they are not reliant on sometimes unpredictable human control. Furthermore, since the weapons are more targeted, casualties should be reduced as the weapon could eliminate an individual or building without collateral damage. Stigma in the international community by those who fear this technology and so called "killer robots" may have an adverse effect. This fear might cause the private industry to retract from the public eye and continue their research in secrecy.[20] As many international institutions and states value public oversight and cooperation, this could be a detrimental development within the autonomous weapons technology space.

As Autonomous Weapons Systems continue to develop, it is in the interest of the Disarmament and International Security Council to be at the forefront of this debate. Many controversies still remain on the table, such as whether or not this technology should even be allowed to be developed. This committee will engage in debate regarding the potential prohibition and regulation of this area in weapons technology. Furthermore, debate will surround the boundaries for permissible use of force, and how sovereignty should be considered with respect to Autonomous Weapons Systems.

2.5 Vocabulary

1. Autonomous: Something that has the ability to operate without outside control or having the right to self-government.[21]

2. Non-State Actor: An organization, company or individual which has the ability to wield with political and social power but is not directly part of the government.[22]

3. CCW: This is the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. It regulates weapons that cause excessive injury or have indiscriminate effects.[23]

4. GDP: The comprehensive value of goods and services produced within a country's borders.[24]

2.6 Questions to Consider

1. How should the international community respond to calls for both oversight or the overall banning of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems? Particularly consider incentives, costs, and impact.

2. What are both positive and negative impacts of the development of AWS?

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[19] Ibid.

[20] Ibid.

[21] "Autonomous." Merriam-Webster. Merriam-Webster. Accessed October 31, 2020. https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/autonomous.

[22] "Non-State Actors." escr-net.org. ESCR. Accessed October 31, 2020. https://www.escr-net.org/resources/non-state-actors.

[23] Ibid

[24] "Gross Domestic Product." Gross Domestic Product | U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). Accessed October 31, 2020. https://www.bea.gov/data/gdp/gross-domestic-product.

3. What levels of regulation of AWS should be considered, and what are the costs and incentives for regulation/deregulation?

4. What are proposed solutions to the proliferation of AWS to non-state actors?

5. How will the UN incorporate and address industry stakeholders who are leading the technological development of AWS?

2.7 Further Reading

1. *Group of Governmental Experts of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects* http://undocs.org/ccw/gge.1/2017/WP.1

2. *So Just What Is a Killer Robot?: Detailing the Ongoing Debate around Defining Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems* https://www.whs.mil/News/News-Display/Article/2210967/so-just-what-is-a-killer-robot-detailing-the-ongoing-debate-around-defining-let/

3. *Autonomous Weapons Systems and the Laws of War,* https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-03/features/autonomous-weapons-systems-laws-war

3 Topic B: Military Tensions and Tensions in the South China Sea

3.1 Introduction

Since the early 1950s, China began a campaign to expand its territory and influence worldwide, from issuing debt in the form of "foreign aid" to default-prone developing countries to funding foreign infrastructure projects "free of cost". However, nowhere has this campaign been more apparent than in the South China Sea, a strait between the Indochinese Peninsula in the North, and Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brunei in the South. While the majority of this strait is considered international waters by the UN and other bodies, China claims over 90% of the strait is Chinese territory — and often backs up any claims with subsequent military defensive and offensive measures. NGOs estimate that China's illegitimate South China Sea presence vastly expands the country's implied regional power and increases military operational ranges by up to 1,000 kilometers.[25] However, China is not the only country to pursue aggressive territorial actions, as countries such as Taiwan, Philippines, Japan, and Malaysia lay their own respective regional claims for similar reasons. One must note, however, that the reasons for these territorial disputes are both strategic and nationalistic, especially when noting the lasting effects of Japan's defeat in WWII and subsequent Cold War geopolitical events. In the current day, the consequences of militarizing supposed "no-man's land" islands and China's land reclamation efforts in the Strait prove concerning, both geo-politically and economically (noting the $3.37T USD in trade passing through the strait yearly and the massive energy reserves the strait holds).

3.2 History

The South China Sea has been a volatile region throughout history, partly due to tense intra-regional relationships, especially between Japan and China. Regional volatility first started after Qing China's defeat in the First Sino-Japanese War, which enabled Japan's expansion into the strait, and then again after Japan's defeat in WWII and the subsequent territorial "tug-of-war". However, in historical times, territorial claims were never a high priority for any regional power, with most action tempered by other, more pressing conflicts requiring attention. The crisis truly gained momentum in the early-2010s, with more-aggressive territorial actions and increased conflicts.[26]

Many stakeholders base their regional claims through partisan, unverifiable anecdotes claiming national presence on the Strait's islands since antiquity, citing archaeological evidence pointing towards fishing activity or shelter construction on islands in question. China's Communist Party, for instance, actively subsidizes archeological digs in the region, hoping to substantiate its claims. Post-WWII, Chiang Kai-shek's China laid claims to islands in question, seeing a lapse in Japanese regional authority and low repercussions. However, after Mao Zedong defeated and exiled Kai-shek and his followers to Taiwan, the Strait's islands were abandoned and laid unbothered, especially noting other, more pressing matters operating in parallel — the Vietnam War. This period of relative calm was interrupted in 1955, when both China and Taiwan laid claims to S. China Sea islands, with a Philippine citizen claiming the whole of Spratly Island for himself. However, this "Scramble for the South China Sea" truly gained momentum in the 1970s when oil was potentially discovered in the region, keeping in mind the geopolitical repercussions of the 1973 OPEC oil crisis. In this time period, the Philippines first occupied the Strait's territory, with China following soon after with a seaborne invasion of several islands. For instance, in the **Battle of the Paracel Islands**, China won several islands from South Vietnam, but killed several Vietnamese soldiers in the process.[27] However, even this sequence of events soon calmed until 1988, when China invaded the Spratly Islands, thus spurring another round of territorial occupations by many regional parties.

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[25] "South China Sea Dispute: China's Pursuit of Resources 'Unlawful', Says US - BBC News." Accessed 30 October 2020. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-53397673.

[26] "South China Sea." Accessed 30 October 2020. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/issues/south-china-sea.

[27] "Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea." Global Conflict Tracker. Accessed 30 October 2020. https://cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/territorial-disputes-south-china-sea.

3.3   UN and International Response

In 2002, peace seemed more-and-more realistic as ASEAN & China signed the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, which detailed a framework to eventually develop a Code of Conduct for the strait. Through this declaration, all signatories agreed to "exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability including, among others, refraining from action of inhabiting on the presently uninhabited islands, reefs, shoals, cays, and other features and to handle their differences in a constructive manner". This declaration was largely successful in tempering regional conflict for about 5 years, with all parties refraining from claiming additional features.[28] However, the Declaration showed signs of tension, with signatories "testing the waters", so to speak, through demarches and notes verbales which aimed to both outline additional potential claims and voice discontent. Famously, Malaysia & Vietnam's joint submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf outlined these aforementioned claims. China's "nine-dash line", which drew a line encompassing most of the strait and all of its land features while engaging in "strategic ambiguity" and refusing to explain what the line signifies, illustrates the indirect ways parties began to flex their muscles.

However, the current problem in the region can be traced to increasing aggression and the region's newly reaffirmed strategic importance. As previously mentioned, over \$3.3T USD passes through the strait yearly and 11 billion barrels of oil are present in the region. Keeping this in mind, in 2012, China took control of Philippines' Scarborough Shoal under false pretenses. After a two-month long standoff, both China and Philippines agreed to relinquish the shoal's control, but only the Philippines honored the accord. Later, the Philippines asked the UNCLOS (UN Convention on the Law of the Sea) to arbitrate. However, China refuses to participate in the arbitration, arguing that maritime disputes cannot be solved before territorial ones (territorial disputes fall outside the UNCLOS charter) In 2014, a Chinese state-owned oil company moved an oil rig into Vietnam-claimed territorial waters until violent confrontation between Vietnam and China forced the company to withdraw its rig one month ahead of schedule. Moreover, recent Chinese land reclamation projects aiming to unilaterally cement the country's regional presence have exponentially escalated tensions, with even the United States sending its military to the region to "preserve the strait's international status".[12]

While this problem seems regional, the strait is a vital shipping route for international commerce, with 30% of global maritime oil trade passing through the region.[13] Moreover, increasing military presence threatens regional stability and sets dangerous territorial presence for the rest of the international community. Noting parties' disregard for international treaties and the UN's historical ineffectiveness when arbitrating this situation, successful solutions must effectively hold all regional parties accountable while protecting global interests.

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[28] "U.S. Position on Maritime Claims in the South China Sea." United States Department of State. Accessed 30 October 2020. https://www.state.gov/u-s-position-on-maritime-claims-in-the-south-china-sea/.

4 Topic C: Privatization of War and Private Military Security Companies

4.1 Introduction

Traditionally held beliefs have dictated that providing security for a state is ultimately the responsibility of that state government. This stems both from the perspective that to maintain power and sovereignty a state needs to provide itself security, as well as that it has a responsibility to provide security for its citizens. These ideals are being challenged with the expansion of Private Military Security Companies (PMSC). These companies have both been engaged in the development of weapons, but also in providing tactical military support and personnel for hire. Consequently, these multinational corporations lead a security industry outside of the control of state governments, and often provide support for multiple states at the same time.[29]

Many concerns have been raised regarding the operation of these security companies including the potential for the violation of human rights. Since they are not accountable to the public interest, but rather their customers and stakeholders the incentive structure for these companies differs greatly from that of a state military. Although some argue this is an adverse effect, others argue that PSMCs promote innovation in the security space and provide state governments the ability to defend their civilians without sacrificing as many of their state military personnel. These two points allow for political gains in many state governments, and innovation is regarded as a general social benefit. It is the job of the Disarmament and International Security Committee to decide how nations will approach regulation in this space, as well as debate implications of these Private Security Companies in the international realm.

4.2 History

For profit militaries, or historically known as mercenaries have been around for ages. However, as economic systems shifted, so did the industry of private militaries. Rather than a group of soldiers for hire, today's for-profit military industry is made up of many multinational corporations. Beyond the economic models used for this industry the shape of the demand for military power changed internationally.

The last significant international conflicts were World War II and followed by the Cold War a few decades later. After the devastation from the new weapons developed during this time period was clear, there was a diminished need for soldiers globally.[30] This led to the decline in the sizes of the standing armies of the historically largest militaries. Additionally, the structure of war has consistently shifted, but even more so after the Cold War. Conflicts we see now are more regional and fought more commonly as proxy wars, rather than major superpowers directly fighting each other. These factors led to the expansion of the demand and market of private military contractors. Rather than internally producing military "goods", it became more efficient to outsource this production, of both weapons and security forces. After these general dynamics in warfare, the most notable shift in the use of military contractors globally was their use in Iraq and Afghanistan by the United States starting in 2009. In fact, during this conflict period military contractors began to outnumber the total U.S. forces without lowering the overall number of troops stationed in the Middle East operating for the U.S. A similar dynamic has historically been taking place in Latin American also at the direction of the United States Government. Furthermore, some of the U.S. based private firms are simultaneously selling weapons to other militaries or providing training services, such as with countries like Australia or the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). This dynamic undoubtedly leads to debate on the international security implications of this industry.

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[29] "UN Expert Group Cites Need for Global Instrument Regulating Private Security Companies | | UN News." news.un.org. United Nations, November 4, 2013. https://news.un.org/en/story/2013/11/454582-un-expert-group-cites-need-global-instrument-regulating-private-security.

[30] Singh, Ana. "Soldiers of Fortune: the Rise of Private Military Companies and Their Consequences on America's Wars." Berkeley Political Review, October 25, 2017. https://bpr.berkeley.edu/2017/10/25/soldiers-of-fortune-the-rise-of-private-military-companies-and-their-consequences-on-americas-wars/.

Many other States and regions have adopted the use of PMSC. Another example is the expansion in the last decade of PMSCs operating in the Indian Ocean and the Horn of Africa to protect merchants against piracy.[31] This region has many smaller insurgency groups which fund themselves partially through piracy. As mentioned earlier, since global standing armies have become smaller, regional governments in this area have had to outsource their economic security interests to PMSCs. One report claims that Singapore has arguably the most sophisticated private navy as their economy relies heavily on overseas trade. Although the largest militaries are often thought of as at the forefront of military spending and development, each country has a vested interest in overall global security. With the rise of PMSCs, even the smallest state could both benefit or be severely harmed by the expansion of these companies. The last few decades have provided evidence of the scale of operations of PMSCs, and their presence within each continent.

4.3 Past UN Action/International Involvement

Ironically, the United Nations itself utilizes private militaries, deploying these security forces in both human-itarian and peacekeeping missions. With the rising use of private militaries by the UN (especially in the last decade), many are concerned about the inherent transparency and accountability gaps that rise as a result. For instance, throughout the 2010's, the UNHCR's Mercenary Working Group evaluated the increasing risk of human rights violations (and lack of accountability) from the deployment of privatized military forces.[32]

However, on the other hand, independent analysts observe how private military forces do not serve on front-line missions, rather providing middle-and-background operations, which significantly reduces risk of over-privatization of UN missions. Moreover, the command structure of many private military forces (PMF) is not agile enough to enable rapid deployment at scale, which reduces the possibility of PMFs replacing current, member-state provided forces.[33] Just as international member-states, the UN has embraced private security forces to bolster UN deployments & secure UN sites worldwide, especially the Middle East.[34] Thus, any solution generated in committee **must** tackle the accountability gaps present in worldwide PMF deployment while bridging the gap that PMFs currently fill.

4.4 Vocabulary

1. PMSC: This the abbreviation for a private military security company. These are corporations whose services are hired by governments to act in a military capacity.

2. Outsourcing: Hiring services outside of your internal company or organization to provide goods and services that have previously been produced within the organization.[35]

4.5 Questions to Consider

1. How should the international community respond to calls for oversight of Private Military Contractors? Particularly consider incentive structures and costs.

2. What are both positive and negative impacts of PMSCs?

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[31]Brown, James. "Pirates and Privateers: Managing the Indian Ocean's Private Security Boom." globalpol-icy.org. Global Policy Forum, September 12, 2012. https://www.globalpolicy.org/nations-a-states/private-military-a-security-companies/51915-pirates-and-privateers-managing-the-indian-oceans-private-security-boom.html?itemid=id.

[32]Royal Norwegian Naval Academy, and Åse Gilje Østensen. UN Use of Private Military and Security Companies. November 2011.

[33]Lynch, Colum. "U.N. Embraces Private Military Contractors." Foreign Policy. Accessed 30 October 2020. https://foreignpolicy.com/2010/01/17/u-n-embraces-private-military-contractors/.

[34]"Use of Private Military and Security Companies by the United Nations." PeaceWomen, 3 February 2015. https://www.peacewomen.org/e-news/article/use-private-military-and-security-companies-united-nations.

[35]Twin, Alexandra. "Why Companies Use Outsourcing." Investopedia. Investopedia, September 16, 2020. https://www.investopedia.com/terms/o/outsourcing.asp.

3. What levels of regulation should be considered, and what are the costs and incentives for regulation/deregulation?

4. How will the UN incorporate and address industry stakeholders who are leading the development of PMSCs?

4.6 Further Reading

1. *30 Most Powerful Private Security Companies in the World* https://www.securitydegreehub.com/most-powerful-private-security-companies-in-the-world/

2. *Private Military and Security Companies in Somalia Need Regulation, Says UN Expert Group* https://www.globalpolicy.org/nations-a-states/private-military-a-security-companies/50192-countries-in-which-pmscs-operate.html

3. *Use of military contractors shrouds true costs of war. Washington wants it that way, study says.* https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2020/06/30/military-contractor-study/