Oblivious Transfer (07)	Active / Byzantine Adversary - Adv. un sun
_	whatever code it wants.
Receiver Server A Co, 1n - i]	Seni Hencot Adversary:
index:	f(x, 3) = xA⊕ 28
a) Can receive obtain ACi3 without	91 k Alica Bolt
nevealing i to the server whilst server	2 = x, x2 7m = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = =
does not reveal A [j], it to the	
receiver.	it introveded to Bob, it introvedes
Perfect solutions don't exist, server can nee	to 14:44 with supput is revealed
i boilt at trace and is Cigh wince	A fives no at vardom
OT Protocol:	9 R= 7, 1 f (2, 2)
Step #1: Receiver sends a random array	RE C TOT (R.w)
REO,1,n-1) where RCID is encrypted	All possible) & ACID= NA @ f (22, i)
why servers public key. Others are	უ
not encrypted (where iR cjJ,j≠i)	
Step #2: Server decrypto the entire array	
RED to obtain Sco, 1 n-17.	
Step #3: Server sends ZCJ =ACJOBJC]	
to receiver	
Step #4: Receiver obtains ACID= ZCIDO RCID	
But, if receiver enoughts more indices, they	
can get more extrino of A.	
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(Pansive Adversary) Semi-Honest Adversary Model	
Adv. runs case delegated to-them too otherwise they can do whatever they want	
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