


Diffie-Hellman

Secret Key Establishment

Assume: DLP is hard in cyclic group G

with generator g



Protocol:

- ① A chooses $a \in_{\mathbb{R}} [1, \dots, |G|]$ & computes g^a . If \mathbb{Z}_p^* , $a \in_{\mathbb{R}} [1, \dots, p-1]$, $g^a \bmod p$
- ② B chooses $b \in_{\mathbb{R}} [1, \dots, |G|]$ & computes g^b .
- ③ Exchange g^a & g^b
- ④ $K_A = (g^b)^a$
 $K_B = (g^a)^b$ } equal

Correctness ☒

Security: Eavesdropper cannot get a & b from g^a & g^b since DLP is hard. DLP being hard is a necessary but maybe sufficient assumption since Eve might get g^{ab} without finding a & b .

Necessary + Sufficient: DDH Assumption

(Intuitively, given g & g^b , g^{ab} is hard to get)

\nexists PPTM A , $|P(A(g^a, g^b, r) = 1) - P(A(g^a, g^b, g^{ab}) = 1)|$
 $\leq \text{negl}(\log |G|)$ _{random}

CDH Assumption: No efficient way to get g^{ab} from g^a & g^b

CDK - Computational Diffie Hellman Assumption

DDH - Decisional " " "

Integer factorization

Computational $\xrightarrow{\text{efficient path}}$ Decisional
Calculate factors Are there factors

Instead $\{ \langle N, \lambda, u \rangle \mid \exists d \mid N, 1 \leq d \leq u \}$


$\text{Gen}(1^n) : \langle S_k, P_k \rangle$

$\text{Enc}_{P_k}(m) = c$

$\text{Dec}_{S_k}(c) = m$

There cannot be a perfectly secure public key cryptography system.

$\langle \text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec} \rangle$ is CPA secure if



No need Enc server

Since public key is available

\nexists PPTM A ,

$\Pr[A(P_k, c) = b] \leq 1/2 + \text{negl}(n)$

RSA is deterministic, so internet uses

Padded RSA, but RSK-OAEP is provably

CPA secure.

E1 - Gamal Public Key Encryption:

Let Cyclic group G on which DLP is hard

$P_k = \langle G, g, q = |G|, g^a \rangle$

$\text{Enc}_{P_k}(m) = \langle g^b, g^{ab} \cdot m \rangle$ $\cdot \langle u, v \rangle$

$b \in_{\mathbb{R}} G$

$\text{Dec}_{S_k}(m) = \frac{v}{u^{S_k}}$
 $S_k = \langle a \rangle$

$\gcd(a, p) = \lambda a + \mu p = 1$
 $\lambda \times \text{mod } p = a^{-1}$