

Review: PRG + 2 relaxations \rightarrow Security against
 Existence of
 eavesdropper ; PRG \Leftrightarrow One way fn ; Discrete
 logarithm Problem (DLP)

$y = f(x) = g^x \bmod p$ DLP: Find x

Reduction to MSB DLP: $DLP \leq_p MSB-DLP$

Find MSB of x

If efficient algo for MSB-DLP exists, then
 efficient algo for DLP exists. (MSB of
 x is the hardest bit to find, but it is one of
 the hardcore predicates for DLP)

Theorem: LSB-DLP has a polynomial
 time soln.

Proof: Given g, p & $g^x \bmod p$, $LSB(x)$

(i.e. even or odd is solvable in polynomial
 time. (Shows need for hardcore predicate))

Fermat's Little Theorem

If p is prime, $\forall a \in [1, \dots, p-1]$,
 $a^{p-1} \bmod p = 1$ (a & p are coprime)

Proof: $a \in [1, \dots, p-1]$
 $\in [1, \dots, p-1]$

Let $i \neq j$, and $ia = ja \pmod{p}$

$\Rightarrow p$ divides $ia - ja$ $p \mid ia - ja$

$\Rightarrow p \mid (i-j)a$ but $i-j$ & $a \in [1, \dots, p-1]$

$\Rightarrow a, 2a, 3a, 4a, \dots, (p-1)a \bmod p$

are distinct & is a permutation of

$1, 2, 3, \dots, p-1$

Product of $a, 2a, 3a, \dots, (p-1)a \bmod p = a^{p-1} (p-1)!$
 $(1, 2, 3, \dots, p-1 \bmod p = (p-1)!)$

$\Rightarrow a^{p-1} \bmod p = 1$

$$g^{p-1} \bmod p = 1$$

If $x^2 \equiv 1 \pmod{p}$, then $p \mid x^2 - 1$

$$\Rightarrow p \mid (x+1)(x-1)$$

either $x+1 = 0 \bmod p$

$$x-1 = 0 \bmod p$$

x is 1 or $p-1$

$$\Rightarrow g^{\frac{p-1}{2}} \bmod p = p-1$$

(since g is generator & g^{p-1} is already
 1)

If $y = g^x \bmod p$,

$$y^{\frac{p-1}{2}} \bmod p = g^{\frac{x(p-1)}{2}} \bmod p$$

$$= (p-1)^x \bmod p$$

$$= \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } x \text{ is even} \\ -1 & \text{if } x \text{ is odd} \end{cases}$$

Given y , calculate $y^{\frac{p-1}{2}}$ & conclude
 if x is even or odd in $O(\log(\frac{p-1}{2}))$ time

Can we use this to solve DLP in polynomial time?

Let $y = g^x \bmod p$.

Find l s.t. $l(x) = l$

\Rightarrow If $l = 0$:

$$y \leftarrow \sqrt{y} = g^{\frac{x}{2}} \bmod p$$


else, $l = 1$:

$$y \leftarrow \sqrt{yg^{-1}} \quad (\text{same as } \sqrt{y-1})$$

Then:

$G(k) \oplus m$ is not CPA secure.

Proof:



$$P[b = b'] \leq \frac{1}{2} + \text{negl}(n)$$

Then: No deterministic encryption scheme is CPA secure.

Use encryption server to get ciphertext of m_0 & m_1 , as c_0 & c_1 . Compare $c = \text{Enc}_k(m_b)$ with c_0 & c_1 to decide b' with probability 1.

→ CPA security needs probabilistic encryption.

Probabilistic Encryption

Choose a random nonce (number used once)

$$c = \langle r \in_{\mathcal{R}} \{0,1\}^n, \text{Enc}_k(r) \oplus m \rangle$$

$$\text{Enc}_k : \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\}^n$$

$$y = g^x \text{ mod } p$$

$$\sqrt{y} \begin{cases} g^{x/2} \text{ mod } p & \text{ans 1} \\ g^{\frac{x+p-1}{2}} \text{ mod } p & \text{ans 2} = -\text{ans 1} \end{cases}$$

The positive root is the one we need to use & to decide which is the +ve root, we need to know $\text{MSB}(\frac{p-1}{2})$ or $(\frac{p-1}{2})$.

Thus, DLP cannot be solved using only LSB-DLP.

PRG:

$$G(k) = \sigma_1, \sigma_2, \sigma_3, \dots$$

$$\sigma_i = h(f^i(k))$$

$$\text{Ex: } f(x) = g^x \text{ mod } p$$

$G(k)$ (The PRG) has to be as fast as the fast insecure channel if PRG is run online to use full bandwidth of the fast insecure channel