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*Envoy to the Terror*

恐怖活动特使

Melanie R. Miller

梅勒妮·r·米勒

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
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## CHAPTER FIVE

## 第五章

### *Agent for Washington,* 华盛顿特工, *Provocateur for France* 法国的挑衅者

ON JANUARY 21, 1790, “A very fine Day, of that Kind of Weather which is distinguished in America by the Name of the second Summer,” Morris received three letters from George Washington, dated October 13, 1789.<sup>1</sup> One was personal, and demonstrated that the new president took the same cautious view of the French Revolution as Morris; indeed, he could have been quoting Morris when he wrote:

在1790年1月21日，“一个非常晴朗的日子，这种天气在美国以第二个夏天的名字而闻名，”莫里斯收到了乔治·华盛顿的三封信，日期是1789年10月13日。<sup>1</sup>其中一封是私人信件，表明新总统对法国大革命的看法与莫里斯一样谨慎；事实上，他写信时可以引用莫里斯的话：

*The revolution which has been effected in France is of so wonderful a nature, that the mind can hardly realize the fact. If it ends as our last accounts to the first of August predict, that nation will be the most powerful and happy in Europe; but I fear, though it has gone triumphantly thorough the first paroxysm, it is not the last it has to encounter before matters are finally settled.*<sup>2</sup>

在法国发生的革命是如此奇妙，以至于人们很难意识到这个事实。如果它像我们最近对8月1日的报道所预测的那样结束的话，那么这个国家将成为欧洲最强大、最幸福的国家

Whether this letter demonstrates, as Jefferson was to angrily assert, that Morris had “poisoned” Washington with his “forebodings,” or that Morris and Washington had similar assessments of the same set of facts, Morris wrote back with characteristic humor:

无论这封信是否像杰弗逊愤怒地断言的那样，证明莫里斯用他的“预言”“毒害”了华盛顿，或者莫里斯和华盛顿对同一组事实有着类似的

评估，莫里斯都以其特有的幽默回复道：

*Your Sentiments on the Revolution effecting here I believe to be perfectly just because they perfectly accord with my own, and that is you know the only Standard which Heaven has given us by which to judge.*<sup>3</sup>

你对革命的感情在这里产生了影响，我相信这正是因为它们完全符合我自己的感情，也就是说，你知道上天给我们的唯一标准，可以用来判断

*The other two letters from Washington were official, and destined Morris to be forever associated with the British and Spanish showdown halfway around the world, at Nootka Sound off Vancouver.*

另外两封来自华盛顿的信是官方的，注定莫里斯将永远与英国和西班牙在温哥华附近的努特卡海峡的世界大战联系在一起。

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"Sir," the President wrote stiffly in the first official letter, dropping the "Dear" in the salutation that he had used in his personal missive,

"先生，" 总统在第一封官方信件中生硬地写道，在他的私人信件中使用的称呼中去掉了"亲爱的"，

*It being important to both countries, that the treaty of peace between Great Britain and the United States should be observed and performed with perfect and mutual good faith, and that a treaty of commerce should be concluded by them, on principles of reciprocal advantage to both, I wish to be ascertained of the sentiments and intentions of the Court of London on these interesting subjects.*<sup>4</sup>

对两国都很重要的是，大不列颠和美利坚合众国之间的和平条约应当本着完全和相互的诚意予以遵守和达成，而且双方应当根据对双方都有利的原则缔结一项对等条约，我希望了解伦敦法院对这些有意义的问题的看法和意图

Washington wished the inquiries to be made "informally, by a private agent." On the understanding that he would soon be in London, Washington directed Morris on the "authority and credit of this letter" to talk with the British ministers.

华盛顿希望调查是"非正式的，由一个私人代理人。"在了解到他不久将到达伦敦的情况下，华盛顿指示莫里斯以"这封信的权威和信誉"与英国大臣们进行会谈。

This letter was to be shown to the British government, so Washington wrote another with more detailed instructions, directing Morris to point out that the adoption of the Constitution had made compensation to British creditors assured and obviated British objections to yielding the northwest posts, both aspects of the peace treaty that were Washington's first order of concern. He also asked Morris to ascertain British intentions regarding compensation for slaves freed by the British troops. Turning to the possibility of a treaty of commerce, he gave Morris what leverage he could by pointing out that Congress was inclined to pass legislation discriminating against British commerce, and asked him to determine what general terms the British would consider in a treaty. "[T]he privilege of carrying our productions in our vessels to their islands, and of bringing in return the productions of those islands to our own ports and markets is regarded here as of the highest importance," Washington told him. Finally, Washington gave him discretion to indicate that Britain's failure to send a minister at a time when America had one posted to London "did not make an agreeable impression on this country," and Morris should

*"request to know what would be their future conduct on similar occasions." Washington ended by emphasizing that the effort should "receive every advantage, which abilities, address, and delicacy can promise and afford."*

这封信将被展示给英国政府，所以华盛顿写了另一封更详细的指示，指示莫里斯指出，宪法的通过已经使英国债权人得到了保证，并消除了英国对让出西北哨所的反对意见，这两个方面的和平条约是华盛顿的首要关注。他还要求莫里斯弄清英国对英国军队解放的奴隶进行补偿的意图。在谈到商业条约的可能性时，他指出国会倾向于通过反对英国商业犯罪的立法，并要求他确定英国在条约中会考虑哪些一般性条款，这给了莫里斯可以利用的筹码。华盛顿告诉他：“将我们的产品用船运往他们的岛屿，并将这些岛屿的产品运回我们自己的港口和市场，在这里被认为是最重要的。”。最后，华盛顿给了他自由裁量权，让他指出英国在美国向伦敦派遣部长的时候没有派遣部长“并没有给这个国家留下令人愉快的印象”，而莫里斯应该“要求知道在类似的情况下，他们未来的行为会是什么样的”华盛顿最后强调，这项努力应该“得到所有的优势，这些优势是能力、地址和细致可以承诺和负担的。”

*While Morris' s mission to London in 1790 might appear at first to have been an irrelevant, if entertaining, sideshow of his experience in France, this is not the case. Any effort by the new American republic to accommodate itself to Britain inevitably raised concerns about the consequences for its relationship with France, and as such it was a highly charged issue in the United States. Crosscurrents of purpose on the other side of the*

尽管莫里斯 1790 年赴伦敦的任务起初可能看起来与他在法国的经历毫不相干，尽管只是娱乐性的小插曲，但事实并非如此。这个新成立的美洲共和国试图与英国建立联系的任何努力，都不可避免地会引发对其与法国关系后果的担忧，因此，这在美国是一个高度敏感的问题。另一方面的目的是相反的

Atlantic were swirling about Morris, in ways of which he was in large part unconscious. Morris fulfilled Washington's instructions with "fidelity,"<sup>5</sup> but in so doing, he displeased his old friend, Alexander Hamilton; or more accurately, the British response to Morris's approach was not what Hamilton wanted to hear, and he readily sacrificed Morris's reputation to his single-minded pursuit of a rapprochement with England.

大西洋对莫里斯纠缠不休，莫里斯在很大程度上是无意识的。莫里斯忠实地履行了华盛顿的指示，但是这样做，他惹恼了他的老朋友，亚历山大·汉密尔顿，或者更准确地说，英国对莫里斯的做法的反应并不是汉密尔顿想听到的，他很乐意牺牲莫里斯的声誉来一心一意地追求与英国的和解。

The story is replete with bizarre ironies: while Morris was busy trying to bring Britain to the table to discuss an amicable resolution of long-term disputes, he was also secretly trying to convince the French to go to war with Britain to save themselves from anarchy and at the same time to give Britain a shove toward dealing with the United States. While the mission gave Morris the right in the eyes of many to nomination as a minister to a European country, it also resulted in Washington's conviction that he could not be chosen as minister to England (as Washington had originally intended) but must instead go to France.<sup>6</sup> This conviction was due to what Julian Boyd calls "libel on an honorable public servant" —Morris—committed by Hamilton.<sup>7</sup> While Hamilton recommended Morris for the London mission, his own ill-conceived and improper secret conversations in New York with a British agent prejudiced Morris's chances of success from the outset. When Hamilton's actions kept events in England from unfolding as he had hoped, he was also Morris's keenest detractor, and his secret and false aspersions damaged Morris in the short and in the long term—his fabrications about Morris's doings in London are still cited as fact by some historians. Hamilton's deceptions also constituted an indefensible effort to manipulate America's foreign policy. Thus, examination of the episode provides painful insight into the character of Hamilton at the same time it removes a stain on Morris's reputation.

这个故事充满了奇怪的讽刺：当莫里斯忙着把英国拉到谈判桌前，讨论一个友好解决长期分歧的方案时，他也在暗地里试图说服法国与英国开战，以免陷入无政府状态，同时给英国一个与美国打交道的机会。虽然在许多人眼中，这项任命使莫里斯有权被提名为一个欧洲国家的部长，但这也导致华盛顿坚信，他不能被选为英国的部长（正如华盛顿最初所打算的那样），而必须去法国。<sup>6</sup> 这项判决是由于朱利安·博伊德(Julian Boyd)所说的“诽谤一个可敬的公务员”——莫里斯的承诺。<sup>7</sup> 汉密尔顿向莫里斯推荐了这项伦敦任务，但他自己在纽约与英国代理商进行的构思拙劣、不恰当的秘密谈话从一开始就影响了莫里斯的成功机会。汉密尔顿

的行为使得英格兰的事件不能如他所希望的那样发展，他也是莫里斯最激烈的批评者，他的秘密和虚假诽谤在短期和长期内损害了莫里斯——他对莫里斯在伦敦所作所为的揭露仍然被一些他的会友引为事实。汉密尔顿的欺骗也构成了操纵美国外交政策的一种站不住脚的企图。因此，审视这段插曲有助于深入了解汉密尔顿的性格，同时也消除了莫里斯名誉上的污点。

*Even without Hamilton's allegations, Morris has been criticized for his approach to negotiation with the British. "[H]owever talented in business or brilliant in repartee Gouverneur Morris might be, his gifts did not include a mastery of the arts of diplomacy," Julian Boyd wrote. Boyd's study of this first test of the new republic remains the most thorough to date, and made this comment in the context of an unflattering comparison with Jefferson, whose diplomatic style he described as "respectful in approach" and "conciliatory in manner." Alexander DeConde agreed, charging that Morris' s conduct in London showed his "ineptitude as a diplomat."*<sup>8</sup> Yet it is difficult to concur with these harsh judgments when one reads the blow-by-blow accounts of Morris' s encounters with the urbane and highly intelligent but unabashedly arrogant Duke of Leeds and William Pitt. Instead, the perception these long-ago verbal duels inspire is that these two giants were over-

即使没有汉密尔顿的指控，莫里斯也因为与英国谈判的方式而受到批评。朱利安·博伊德写道：“不管莫里斯在商业上多么有天赋，在巧妙的应答上多么出色，他的天赋并不包括对外交艺术的精通。”。博伊德对这个新共和国的第一次考验的研究，仍然是迄今为止最全面的，他是在与杰斐逊进行直截了当的比较大的背景下做出这番评论的。他形容杰斐逊的外交风格是“恭敬有礼”和“目空一切”亚历山大·德科德对此表示同意，并指责莫里斯在伦敦的行为显示了他“作为一名外交官的无能”然而，当人们看到莫里斯详细记述了他与彬彬有礼、高智商但不加掩饰的傲慢的利兹公爵(Duke of Leeds)和威廉·皮特(William Pitt)的遭遇时，很难同意这些苛刻的判断。相反，这些很久以前的口头决斗所带来的启示是，这两个巨人已经过时了



*matched by an American of great quick-wittedness and skill with words, who refused to be submissive in the face of their well-justified condescension. They expected to be approached hat in hand and instead they got the scintillating and confounding Gouverneur Morris.*

与他相匹配的是一个美国人，他机智敏捷，言辞娴熟，拒绝在他们理所当然的高谈阔论面前屈服。他们以为会有人恭恭敬敬地接近他们，结果却得到了才华横溢、令人困惑的莫里斯。

*Boyd describes Morris as "more concerned to impress a superior with detailed accounts of ripostes and rebuttals than in reaching an accommodation." Jefferson, on the other hand, endorsed Morris' s statements to the British, praised his performance, and agreed with his conclusions. So did Washington. When Morris advised them the British were not going to make any concessions, it was a simple fact that had nothing to do with Morris and everything to do with Britain' s geopolitical interests (which Morris discerned) and assurances the British ministry was receiving through the back door from Hamilton (which Morris knew nothing of). Indeed, it was Morris' s pessimistic but accurate reports to Washington that led the British to send a minister to America. Since Boyd notes that there was nothing else to be gained at the time from the British, it is puzzling that he nonetheless consigns Morris to the purgatory of being remembered as a mediocre diplomat. It is a realm from which Morris deserves to be redeemed; his gifts and his nationalism never shone more brilliantly than in the offices of Whitehall in the spring of 1790. Perhaps the most telling rebuttal of those who believe Morris offended the British is the fact that four years later, after Morris had left France, he and Lord Grenville (by this time foreign secretary) became friendly and established a regular correspondence.<sup>9</sup>*

博伊德形容莫里斯“更关心用反驳和反驳的详细叙述给上级留下深刻印象，而不是达到折衷处。”另一方面，杰弗逊赞同莫里斯对英国的声明，称赞他的表现，并同意他的结论。华盛顿也是如此。当莫里斯告诉他们英国不会做出任何让步时，一个简单的事实与莫里斯毫无关系，而是与英国的地缘政治利益(莫里斯对此不以为然)和英国外交部通过后门从汉密尔顿那里得到的保证(莫里斯对此一无所知)有关。事实上，正是莫里斯向华盛顿提交的悲观但准确的报告导致英国向美国派遣了一位部长。博伊德指出，当时从英国人那里什么也得不到，但令人费解的是，他仍然让莫里斯承受着作为一个平庸的外交家而被人们所怀念的折磨。这是一个莫里斯应该得到救赎的领域；他的天赋和他的民族主义从未像1790年春天在白厅的办公室那样光芒四射。对于那些认为莫里斯得罪了

英国人的人，最有力的反驳可能是，四年后，在莫里斯离开法国之后，他和格伦维尔勋爵(此时的外交大臣)变得友好起来，并建立了定期通信

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*The story begins with a sly twist: a significant instigator of Morris' s mission was, of all people, Thomas Paine. During the late 1780s, Paine had cultivated contacts in Parliament, including Edmund Burke. In February 1789, Paine, who had been regularly corresponding with Jefferson in Paris, wrote Jefferson that the British ministers were talking with creditors about assuming their American prewar debts, and that the time was ripe to "show that the British Acts since the Peace militate against the payment [by America]." This information, forwarded by Jefferson to John Jay, was part of the genesis of the president' s decision in October 1789 to send Morris to London.<sup>10</sup>*

故事以一个狡猾的转折开始:在所有人中，莫里斯的使命的一个重要推动者是托马斯·潘恩。在 18 世纪 80 年代晚期，潘恩在议会中有包括埃德蒙·伯克在内的人物接触。1789 年 2 月，潘恩定期在巴黎与杰斐逊通信，他写信给杰斐逊说，英国大臣们正在与债权人讨论如何偿还美国战前的债务，现在时机已经成熟，可以“表明自和平时以来英国的行为不利于(美国)偿还债务” 这些信息是由杰斐逊转发给约翰·杰伊的，也是总统在 1789 年 10 月决定派莫里斯去伦敦的部分原因

*Motivation was also provided by warnings received by Hamilton and other members of the "British interest" in America that Madison' s efforts to pass "discriminatory" shipping laws against Britain would, if achieved, result in British retaliation.<sup>11</sup> Boyd also suggests that Hamilton wanted to launch the mission before Jefferson arrived, for he believed that Jefferson had a*

汉密尔顿和其他在美国的“英国利益”成员收到的警告也提供了动机，他们警告说，麦迪逊试图通过针对英国的“歧视性”航运法的努力，如果成功的话，将会招致英国的报复。<sup>11</sup> 博伊德还暗示汉密尔顿想在杰斐逊到来之前发动这次任务，因为他相信杰斐逊有

"womanish" attachment to France and resentment against Britain.<sup>12</sup> However, when Washington met with his cabinet in the first week of October, the future secretary of state was still sitting in Cowes on the Isle of Wight, impatiently waiting for his ship to leave for America. He would not learn of his nomination until his arrival, would not send Washington his reluctant acceptance until December 15, and did not come to Philadelphia until January. Paine's letter intimated that the time was ripe to bring the treaty matters to closure. There was concern in the United States that the longer the northwestern forts remained in British hands the more difficult it would be to obtain them. Consulting Jefferson's expertise would, they knew, have entailed a considerable delay—in the end, it was over three months. Jefferson might have opposed closer ties with Britain, but certainly he would have favored an effort to get the British to comply with the peace treaty.

然而，当华盛顿在10月的第一个星期会见他的内阁成员时，这位未来的国务卿仍然坐在怀特岛的考斯上，焦急地等待着他的船开往美国。他直到到达费城才得知自己获得提名，直到12月15日才向华盛顿表示勉强接受提名，直到1月才来到费城。潘恩在信中暗示，结束条约问题的时机已经成熟。美国担心，西北要塞在英国手中的时间越长，获得它们的难度就越大。他们知道，咨询杰斐逊的专业知识会造成相当长的延误——到最后，延误会超过三个月。杰斐逊可能反对与英国建立更紧密的关系，但他肯定会赞成努力让英国遵守和平条约。

Jay supported the mission, and with unintentional irony recommended Edward Bancroft, whose secret life as a British agent while employed as Franklin's secretary in Paris was never known to his good American friends. Hamilton favored Morris. The sticking point was Madison, who wanted to wait for Jefferson. He opposed the mission, and was concerned that sending Morris would be "a commitment for his appt as Minister if one should be sent to that Court, or wanted at Versailles in place of Mr. Jefferson." (Washington noted in his diary that he agreed with this point; clearly it did not trouble him.) Madison also argued that Morris might color his reports based on whichever capital he hoped for as a post.<sup>13</sup>

杰伊支持这项任务，并无意中讽刺性地推荐了爱德华·班克罗夫特，他在巴黎担任富兰克林秘书期间的英国特工秘密生活从未被他的好美国朋友所知。汉密尔顿喜欢莫里斯。问题的症结在于麦迪逊，他想等杰斐逊。他反对这项任务，并担心派遣莫里斯将是“他担任部长的承诺，如果一个人被派往该法院，或者被通缉在凡尔赛代替杰斐逊先生。”（华盛顿在日记中写道，他同意这一点；显然这没有困扰他。）麦迪逊还认为，莫里斯可能会根据他希望得到的资金来为他的报告涂色

Morris received the letters from Washington on January 21, 1790, and replied

the next day, telling Washington he would leave for London "as soon as I possibly can" for he was planning a trip to Amsterdam to try and retrieve his debt proposal, discussed earlier. However, he did not depart Paris until February 17: he was uneasy about a long separation from Adèle (an uneasiness that proved well-justified) and was trying to get her pregnant. A typical diary entry for the period was that of February 12: "I lend [Monsieur Flahaut] my Carriage to go to the King's Couché and then do all that it is necessary to perpetuate his noble Family." He did not succeed. He would not see Adèle again for nearly eight months.

莫里斯在1790年1月21日收到了来自华盛顿的信，并在第二天回信，告诉华盛顿他将“尽快”前往伦敦，因为他正计划去阿姆斯特丹取回先前讨论过的债务提议。然而，他直到2月17日才离开巴黎：他对长时间与阿德勒分离感到不安（这种不安被证明是正当的），并试图得到她的怀孕。这一时期典型的日记记录是在2月12日：“我把我的马车借给弗拉豪特先生，让他到国王的沙发上去，然后尽一切必要的努力使他的贵族家庭得以延续。”他没有成功。他有近八个月的时间不能再见阿德勒了。

Before he left Paris, Morris visited Montmorin and told him "in the most perfect Confidence the Commission with which I am charged in Part." It is unclear whether Morris meant the part relating to the commercial treaty or to the peace treaty, for he explained to the foreign minister that America's treaty interest was for "a free Commerce with the british Islands" but that Morris "prefer[red] much a close Connection with France." Morris hoped the news would galvanize France into further concessions in the French

在他离开巴黎之前，莫里斯拜访了蒙特莫林，并告诉他“非常确信我所负责的委员会”目前还不清楚莫里斯的意思是商业条约还是和平条约，因为他向外交部长解释说，美国的条约利益是“与英属群岛自由贸易”，但莫里斯“更愿意与法国建立紧密联系”莫里斯希望这个消息能促使法国在法国作出进一步的让步

West Indies, but Montmorin responded that France was not in a position to take action, having "no fixed Plan nor Principle and at present no Chief. I tell him that they ought to go to War."<sup>14</sup>

但蒙特莫林回应说，法国无法采取行动，因为“没有固定的计划或原则，目前也没有酋长。我告诉他，他们应该去打仗。”图 14

Morris arrived in London on March 27, and waited on the Duke of Leeds two days later at Whitehall. The foreign secretary, who had already heard of Morris' s mission, seemed receptive to Washington' s letter; but when they began to discuss the peace treaty, Morris was disappointed to find that Leeds "could go no farther than general professions and assurances." Leeds assured Morris that the delay in appointing a British minister was due to their inability to find "a man every way equal to the task." Morris' s reply that "this country could not want men well qualified for every office" was ignored, and "as it was not worth while to discuss the winds and the weather," he suggested that Leeds review the new American Constitution to see how far the United States had already fulfilled its treaty obligations. Leeds agreed to be back in touch speedily. What Morris did not know was that Leeds would deliberately put him off in order to pursue a scheme of encouraging disaffection of Vermont and Kentucky and other North American settlements from the United States by offering them treaties of commerce and friendship.<sup>15</sup>

莫里斯于3月27日抵达伦敦，两天后在白厅等候利兹公爵。外交大臣已经听说了莫里斯的任务，似乎接受了华盛顿的信；但当他们开始讨论和平条约时，莫里斯失望地发现利兹“仅仅是一般的专业和保证”利兹向莫里斯保证，之所以推迟任命一名英国小型司机，是因为他们无法找到“完全能胜任这项任务的人”莫里斯回答说，“这个国家不希望任何职位都有合格的人才”，但他的回答被忽略了。“因为不值得讨论风和天气，”他建议利兹市审查新的《美国宪法》，看看美国已经在多大程度上履行了它的条约义务。利兹同意迅速恢复联系。莫里斯不知道的是，利兹故意拖延他，以便通过向佛蒙特州、肯塔基州和其他北美定居点提供商业和友谊条约，鼓励他们对美国不满

The day before, Morris had visited his old friend, the chevalier de La Luzerne, formerly the French minister to America during the American Revolution and now French ambassador to Britain.<sup>16</sup> As he told Washington in a letter of April 7, Morris informed La Luzerne "in Confidence that you had directed me to call for a Performance of the Treaty. He told me at once that

they would not give up the posts.” (The Americans did not know that even as the peace treaty was proclaimed in 1784, the governor of Canada had been secretly instructed to retain possession of the posts.)

前一天，莫里斯拜访了他的老朋友，拉卢泽恩骑士，美国革命期间的前法国驻美国部长，现在是法国驻英国大使。<sup>16</sup>正如他在4月7日的一封信中告诉华盛顿的，莫里斯告诉拉卢泽恩“信心满满地说，你指示我要求履行条约。他立刻告诉我，他们不会放弃这些职位。”（美国人不知道，即使在1784年和平条约宣布时，加拿大总督已被秘密指示保留这些职位。）

While Boyd acknowledges that “Morris was not enjoined to secrecy,” he calls Morris’ s discussion with La Luzerne an effort to gain “credit on flimsy grounds,” and that to “reveal in the strictest confidence what he knew could not be kept secret was only an effort to enhance the value of a gesture toward an ally.”<sup>17</sup> Yet the goodwill value of this move seems substantial, regardless of whether La Luzerne would have learned it by other means. Morris thereby made it clear that the approach to the British was not intended as hostile to French-American relations, something the French would in future years have good reason to suspect; and, as he told Robert later, “[Y]ou will recollect that if ever we quarrel on that Subject it may be proper to ask the Interference of France.”<sup>18</sup> It also gave him the benefit of Luzerne’ s considerable knowledge of the British.

虽然博伊德承认“莫里斯没有被要求保密”，但他称莫里斯与拉鲁泽恩的谈话是为了“在站不住脚的理由上获得信任”，而且“严格保密地披露他知道不能保密的事情，只是为了提高一个对盟友的姿态的价值”<sup>17</sup>然而，无论卢塞恩是否通过其他方式学到了这一点，这一举动的善意价值似乎是巨大的。莫里斯因此明确表示，对英国的态度并非有意敌视法美关系，法国在未来有充分的理由怀疑这一点；而且，正如他后来告诉罗伯特的那样，“你会记得，如果我们在这个问题上争吵，也许应该请求法国的干涉。”<sup>18</sup>这也使他受益于卢泽恩对英国的相当多的了解。

Morris heard nothing from Leeds for nearly a month. The minister later said he had thought Morris had gone to Amsterdam, a lame excuse Morris did not believe. He wrote a follow-up letter on April 29 and received a noncommittal note dated the twenty-eighth (he was sure Leeds had deliberately predated the letter). As Morris wrote to Washington, enclosing the correspondence, "It seems pretty clear that they wish to evade a commercial Treaty, but not peremptorily to reject it; and, therefore, I have construed into Rejection his Graces abstruse Language leaving him the Option to give it a different Interpretation." He also believed they would "keep the Posts and withhold Payment for the Negroes. If so," he told Washington, "they will color their Breach of Faith by the best Pretexts in their Power . . . Perhaps there never was a Moment in which this Country felt herself greater, and consequently it is the most unfavorable Moment to obtain advantageous Terms from her in any bargain." <sup>19</sup>

莫里斯近一个月没有收到利兹的任何消息。部长后来说他以为莫里斯去了阿姆斯特丹，莫里斯不相信这是一个站不住脚的借口。他在4月29日写了一封后续的信，收到了一封日期为28日的不确定的信(他确信利兹在信的日期之前已经提前了)。正如莫里斯在给华盛顿的信中所写的那样，“很明显，他们希望规避一项商业条约，但并不坚决反对它；因此，我已经拒绝了他深奥的语言，让他选择给它一个不同的解释。”他还认为他们会“保留这些职位，不给黑人付款”。他告诉华盛顿，“如果是这样的话，他们就会用他们力所能及的最好的借口来掩饰他们的背信弃义……也许这个国家从来没有感到自己更伟大的时刻，因此，这是最不利的时刻，在任何交易中从她那里获得有利的条件。”图19

A week after his first meeting with Leeds, Morris was a guest at the home of Hamilton's sister-in-law Angelica Church and her husband John Church. Morris liked the Churches, and would visit them often during his stays in London. Charles Fox, the leader of the opposition party, was also present. Morris took the opportunity to sound him out on British policy toward America, and wrote up the conversation in a letter to Washington. Fox confirmed what Morris had already observed, that the pro-mercantilist elements were gaining ground in the government, and that in other respects there was no particular policy toward America and they would "in all probability be governed by events." This was the only time Morris talked with Fox, although he went to watch him at Westminster. "Mr. Fox has not the needful Self Possession to make a great Speaker," he noted in disappointment. "His Mind appears like a clouded Sun, and this I believe results from the Life he leads." <sup>20</sup>

在与利兹第一次见面一周后，莫里斯来到汉密尔顿的嫂子安吉莉卡·丘奇和她的丈夫约翰·丘奇的家中做客。莫里斯喜欢这些教堂，在伦敦逗留期间

经常去拜访它们。反对党领袖查尔斯·福克斯也出席了会议。莫里斯利用这个机会试探了一下他对英国对美政策的看法，并在给华盛顿的一封信中写下了这段对话。福克斯电视台对莫里斯已经观察到的情况进行了反驳，认为亲重商主义因素在政府中越来越受欢迎，而且在其他方面，政府并没有特别针对美国的政策，他们“很可能会受到各种事件的影响”这是莫里斯唯一一次与福克斯交谈，尽管他去威斯敏斯特看福克斯。“福克斯先生没有必要的冷静来成为一个伟大的演说家，”他失望地指出。“他的思想就像一个乌云密布的太阳，我相信这是他过的生活的结果。”图 20



*In early May, there was a sharp change in the situation. On May 5, Morris learned that the ministry had demanded satisfaction for the Spanish capture of several British ships in Nootka Sound off Vancouver a year earlier.<sup>21</sup> Morris had actually learned of the incident in January, but had not been concerned, which may explain why he did not mention it to Washington at that time. As he later put it to Leeds:*

五月初，形势发生了急剧变化。5月5日，莫里斯得知外交部要求满足西班牙对几艘英国船只在 *Nootka Sound off Vancouver* 停留一年的要求——莫里斯实际上是在1月份得知这一事件的，但并不担心，这也许可以解释为什么他当时没有向华盛顿提及此事。正如他后来对利兹说的：

*[A]t first I did suppose it might excite some Altercation between the two Nations, but recollecting that no british Subject could be in those Seas without the express Permission of the India Company, and pre-*  
首先，我确实认为这会引起两个国家之间的争论，但是记住，没有印度公司的明确许可，任何英国臣民都不能进入那些海域



suming from the whole View of the Transaction that these Ad-venturers had not that Permission, I concluded that no Notice would be taken of the Matter, because that Spain might have sent them all to England in Irons as having been taken in the direct Violation of a british Act of Parliament, and in such Case, my Lord, I don' t see how you could have done otherwise than have thanked the King of Spain for so kind and brotherly a Proceedure. He assents to this unwarily.<sup>22</sup>

从整个交易的观点来看，这些广告投资者没有得到许可，我得出结论，不会对此事发出通知，因为西班牙可能会把他们全部送到艾恩斯，因为他们直接违反了英国议会法案，在这种情况下，法官大人，除了感谢西班牙国王如此友好和兄弟般的程序，我看不出你还有什么别的办法。他不谨慎地同意这一点

Justified or not, the British decided to use the incident as a pretext for challenging Spanish claims to the Pacific seaboard. "If Spain submits," Morris wrote to Washington, "she may as well give up her American Dominions."<sup>23</sup>

The situation immediately gave the United States new leverage, for the British were concerned that the United States would support France and, via the Bourbon Family Compact, Spain. It also caused the first incidents of what would become a profoundly divisive matter between Britain and its former colonies: impressment of American sailors by the British. Morris noted that a "hot Press" had begun as soon as news of Britain' s ultimatum broke, and he soon received requests from Thomas Paine and a friend of Jefferson, John Brown Cutting, to complain to the ministry

不管合理与否，英国决定利用这一事件作为借口，威胁西班牙对太平洋沿岸的主权主张。“如果西班牙屈服，”莫里斯在给华盛顿的信中写道，“她可能也会放弃美国的领土。”<sup>23</sup>这种情况立即给了美国新的筹码，因为英国担心美国会支持法国，并通过波旁家族契约支持西班牙。这也导致了英国和它的前殖民地之间的第一次事件：英国对美国水手的印象。这件事后来引起了深刻的分歧。莫里斯指出，英国发出最后通牒的消息一传出，“热媒体”就开始了。他很快就收到了托马斯·潘恩和杰斐逊的朋友约翰·布朗·卡丁向牧师提出的投诉请求

about Americans caught up in the sweep.<sup>24</sup>

关于在这次大清洗中被抓获的美国人

Morris was uncomfortable with these requests, which were outside of his instructions, but agreed, and on May 20, he sat down once more with Leeds; the next day, Prime Minister William Pitt joined them. The contest of wits that transpired, described by Morris in a letter to Washington, bears recounting.<sup>25</sup>

莫里斯对这些要求感到不舒服，虽然这些要求超出了他的指示，但他还是同意了。5月20日，他再次与利兹联系；第二天，首相威廉·皮特加入了他们。莫里斯在给华盛顿的一封信中描述了所发生的智力较量，这一点值得一提

*Morris found the British far more tractable, although they could not then or later agree on an approach to the impressment issue. Leeds had other matters on his mind, however, and the discussion moved to the possibility of a commercial treaty, a carrot the British were now willing to dangle. They told Morris that he had mistaken their previous disinterest in such a treaty. Morris, whose instructions regarding the peace treaty were paramount, "answered coolly" that "[i]t appeared idle to form a new Treaty untill the Parties should be thoroughly satisfied with that already existing." When Pitt replied that the "Delay of Compliance on our Part had rendered that compliance less effectual," Morris agreed that "Delay is always a Kind of Breach," and proceeded to discuss the complaints on both sides for compensation. "As to the Compensation for Negroes taken away," he told Pitt, "it is too trifling an Object for you to dispute, so that Nothing remains but the Posts; I suppose, therefore, that you wish to retain these Posts." "Why, perhaps we may," Pitt answered, and Morris rejoined*

莫里斯发现英国人要温顺得多，尽管他们当时或后来在处理预支问题上无法达成一致。然而，利兹心里还有别的事情，于是讨论转移到了是否有可能签订一项商业条约上，这是英国人现在愿意尝试的一种胡萝卜。他们告诉莫里斯，他误解了他们以前对这样一个条约不感兴趣。莫里斯对和平条约的指示至关重要，他“冷静地回答”说，“在缔约方对现有条约完全满意之前，缔结一项新条约似乎毫无意义。”当Pitt回答说“我们方面的延迟遵守使得遵守变得不那么有效”时，Morris同意“延迟总是一种违约行为”，并接着讨论了双方关于赔偿的申诉。“至于对被剥夺的黑人的补偿，”他对皮特说，“这件事对你来说太微不足道了，所以除了邮局以外，你什么也没有留下，我想，因此，你希望保留这些邮局。”“为什么，也许我们可以，”皮特回答，莫里斯接着说

*They are not worth the Keeping, for it must cost you a great Deal of Money, and produce no Benefit. The only Reason you can have to desire them is to secure the Fur Trade, and that will Centre in this Country, let who will carry it on in America.*

它们不值得留着，因为它们必须花费你大量的金钱，而且没有任何好处。唯一的原因你可以要求他们是为了确保毛皮贸易，这将在这个国家的中心，让谁将在美国进行它。

*He then laid out why it was considered essential in America to obtain the posts, to "preserve this Boundary, if you wish to live in Amity with us," and because, he told Pitt bluntly, "our national Honor is interested. You hold them with the avowed Intention of forcing us to comply with such Conditions as you may impose." Pitt retorted that "our Honor is concerned in your Delay." Morris replied promptly:*

然后他解释了为什么在美国获得这些职位是必不可少的，“如果你想和我们一起生活在阿米蒂，就要保留这个疆界”，因为，他坦率地告诉皮特，“我们的国家荣誉感感兴趣。你公开宣称要强迫我们遵守你可能强加的条件。”皮特回答说：“我们的荣誉受到了您的耽搁。”莫里斯立即回答：

*No, Sir, your natural and proper Course was to comply fully on your Part, and if then we had refused a Compliance, you might rightfully have issued Letters of Marque and Reprisal to such of your Subjects as were injured by our Refusal. But the Conduct you have pursued naturally excites Resentment in every American Bosom. We do not think it worth while to go to War with you for these Posts; but we know our Rights, and will avail ourselves of them when Time and Circumstances may suit.*

不，先生，你的正当理由是你必须完全服从，如果我们拒绝服从，你就有权向那些因我们的拒绝而受到伤害的人发出海盗与报复性逮捕证。但是你所追求的行为激起了每一个美国人心中的怨恨。我们认为不值得为了这些岗位与你们开战，但是我们知道我们的权利，当时机成熟时，我们会利用这些权利。

*Pitt then asked if the United States would appoint a minister if the British did. Morris agreed with Washington's and Jefferson's view that Britain, having ignored America's previous minister to London, should appoint one before America would reciprocate. He responded cautiously that "I could almost promise that we should, but was not authorized to give any positive*

Assurance.”<sup>26</sup> When Pitt suggested that Morris should advise Washington of Britain’s disposition “to cultivate a Connection &c.” Morris told him frankly that while Washington’s letter was evidence of such an American disposition, he had received nothing concrete in return. He added that America’s willingness to have “a good Understanding” with Britain was also demonstrated “by the Decision of a Majority of the House of Representatives against laying extraordinary Restrictions on british Vessels in our Ports,” a reference to Congress’s rejection of Madison’s discriminatory tonnage clauses in the tariff and tonnage acts of the summer of 1789. Pitt replied that

皮特接着问，如果英国任命了部长，美国是否会任命一位部长。莫里斯同意华盛顿和杰斐逊的观点，即英国无视美国前任驻伦敦大臣，应该在美国作出回应之前任命一位大臣。他谨慎地回答说：“我几乎可以保证我们应该这样做，但没有授权给予任何积极的保证。”当皮特建议莫里斯建议华盛顿“培养关系”时，莫里斯坦率地告诉他，虽然华盛顿的信是这种美国性格的证据，但他没有得到任何具体的回报。他补充说，美国愿意与英国达成“良好的谅解”，这也体现在“众议院多数议员反对在我们港口对英国船只施加特别限制的决定”上，这里指的是国会在1789年夏天的关税和吨位法案中否决了麦迪逊的歧视性吨位条款。皮特回答道

*instead of Restrictions we ought to give them particular Privileges in Return for those which we enjoy here. I assured him that I knew of none, except that of being imprest, a Privilege which of all others we least wished to partake of.*

我们应该给予他们特殊的特权，以换取我们在这里享有的特权，而不是限制。我向他保证说，除了给他留下深刻印象，这是我们最不愿意享有的特权之外，我一无所知。

*The Duke of Leeds observed, in the same Stile of Jocularly, that we were at least treated in that Respect as the most favored Nation, seeing that we were treated like themselves. But Mr. Pitt said seriously, that they had certainly evidenced Good Will towards us, by what they had done respecting our Commerce. I replied therefore with like Seriousness that their Regulations had been dictated by a View to their own Interest; and therefore as we felt no Favor, we owed no Obligation.*

利兹公爵在同样的滑稽戏台上观察到，我们至少在这方面被当作最惠国对待，因为我们被当作他们自己对待。但是皮特先生认真地说，他们对我们的尊重无疑证明了他们对我们的好意。因此，我以同样严肃的态度回答说，他们的规章制度是出于他们自身利益的考虑而制定的；因此，由于我们感到没有恩惠，我们没有义务。

*The above exchanges are an excellent example of what Julian Boyd has dismissed as Morris' s "fundamentally antagonistic" and "posturing diplomacy." 27 From Washington and Jefferson' s responses, it is evident that these two seasoned statesmen thought otherwise. Certainly it is in stark contrast with the submissive—and as events proved, self-defeating—tack taken by Hamilton. Morris understood the British: his strategy was deliberate. As he explained later to Robert:*

上述交流是朱利安·博伊德(Julian Boyd)斥之为莫里斯“根本对立”和“故作姿态的外交手腕”的一个极好例子<sup>27</sup>从华盛顿和杰斐逊的回答来看，很明显，这两位经验丰富的政治家并不这么认为。当然，这与顺从的态度形成了鲜明的对比——事实证明，汉密尔顿采取的是自我挫败的策略。莫里斯了解英国人，他的战略是欣赏。正如他后来向罗伯特解释的：

*If you mean to make a good Treaty with Britain support your Pretensions with Spirit and they will respect you for it. You must give them visible Reasons because they will have to justify their Conduct: and it will not do to say to a House of Commons the American Minister was such a charming fellow that we could not resist him. I rather think that it would be at least as good ground to say the American Legislature would have greatly injured our Navigation and Commerce if we had not by this Treaty have induced them to repeal their Laws, and there was Reason also to apprehend that the United States would connect themselves still more intimately with France who for the Sake of such Connection would doubtless support them in their Claims as soon as the State of her domestic Affairs*

would permit her to look abroad.<sup>28</sup>

如果你打算与英国缔结一项好的条约，那么请用“精神”来支持你的自命不凡，他们会因此而尊敬你。你必须给他们明显的理由，因为他们必须证明他们的行为是正当的：而且，对一个英国下议院说美国部长是一个如此迷人的家伙，我们无法抗拒他是不行的。我更愿意认为，如果我们没有通过这项条约来促使美国国会废除他们的法律，那么至少有充分的理由说明，如果我们没有通过这项条约来促使他们废除他们的法律，那么美国就会极大地损害我们的航海和商业

Thomas Paine agreed, writing Short, “I know the Character of this Country so well that nothing but carrying a high-hand can manage them.” Unfortunately, Hamilton and others of the “British interest” in America had already signaled American “acquiescence” to the British warning of retaliation<sup>29</sup> against any shipping restrictions.

托马斯·潘恩表示同意，他写道：“我非常了解这个国家的性格，只有高压手段才能控制它。”不幸的是，汉密尔顿和其他“英国利益”在美国已经暗示美国“默许”英国对任何航运限制进行报复的警告

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...

The drumbeat for war continued, and Morris hoped that the British would decide to fulfill the peace treaty. In mid-June, he heard that Lord Grenville 战争的鼓声还在继续，莫里斯希望英国能决定履行和平条约。六月中旬，他听说格伦维尔勋爵

was considering giving up the northwestern posts, and entering a commercial treaty, but the weeks passed with no word.<sup>30</sup>

正在考虑放弃西北部的职位，加入商业协议，但几周过去了，没有任何消息

In the meantime, the president and secretary of state were disappointed but not surprised by the results of Morris' s first discussions. On July 7, Washington wrote to Morris expressing "entire approbation" of his conduct in the March and April meetings.<sup>31</sup> Hamilton, however, was not pleased. Morris' s appraisal of British intentions was quite right, but this was not news that Hamilton, whose vision of American interests was predicated on close ties to Britain, wanted to hear.

与此同时，总统和国务卿对莫里斯第一次谈判的结果感到失望，但并不感到意外。7月7日，华盛顿写信给莫里斯，表示“完全赞同”他在3月和4月的会议上所说的话。然而，汉密尔顿并不高兴。莫里斯对英国意图的评价是相当正确的，但这不是汉密尔顿想听到的新闻，汉密尔顿对美国利益的看法是建立在与英国的密切关系之上的。

He was not ready to relinquish his hopes, even though Morris' s description of the British position was reinforced by Major George Beckwith (aide-de-camp of Lord Dorchester, governor of Canada) in July 1790, after the war crisis had begun but before Morris' s accounts of his second round of discussions had arrived. Dorchester, prompted by the same concerns that impelled Pitt and Leeds to change their tune to Morris, had sent Beckwith to New York to scout out American reaction to the situation, and to try to nullify any reports by Morris of British indifference to the American approach.<sup>32</sup> At the same time, he was to promise nothing, and simply express the hope that war with Spain would not affect America' s "good disposition" to establish "connections" —commercial connections that Hamilton had proposed without Washington' s knowledge.<sup>33</sup> Hamilton apparently thought he could promote these connections by convincing Washington that the British were more receptive than Morris had reported.

尽管1790年7月，在战争危机开始之后，但在莫里斯对第二轮谈判的叙述到来之前，加拿大总督多切斯特勋爵的副官乔治·贝克维斯少校(Major George Beckwith)加强了莫里斯对英国立场的描述，但他还没有准备放弃自己的希望。多切斯特政府出于同样的考虑，促使皮特和利兹改变了对莫里斯的态度，派贝克维斯前往纽约，调查美国对实地迁移的反应，并试图推翻莫里斯关于英国对美国方式漠不关心的任何报道。与此同时，他不承诺任何东西，只是表示希望与西班牙的战争不会影响美国建立“关系”的“良好性格”——汉密尔顿在华盛顿不知情的情况下提出的商业合约。

*He did this by revealing Beckwith' s existence, but at the same time mis-representing his message. Specifically, he told Washington and Jefferson that Beckwith had said the British were interested in a commercial treaty and a possible military alliance, although Beckwith' s instructions made it clear that they were interested in neither. The falsehood regarding the alliance was, as Boyd points out, "a far graver matter" than the commercial treaty.*

他透露了贝克维斯的存在，但同时也错误地表达了他的信息。特别是，他告诉华盛顿和杰斐逊，贝克维斯说英国对商业条约和可能的军事联盟感兴趣，尽管贝克维斯的指示明确表示他们对这两者都不感兴趣。正如博伊德所指出的那样，关于联盟的谎言比商业条约“严重得多”。

*Hamilton presented this version of his meeting to Washington on July 8, 1790. His report of Beckwith' s comments did not attack Morris personally, other than to claim that Beckwith had reported discomfort with Morris' s lack of regular credentials, something Leeds had not in fact objected to.*<sup>34</sup>

1790年7月8日，汉密尔顿向华盛顿提交了这个版本的会议记录。他关于贝克维斯言论的报告并没有攻击莫里斯个人，只是声称贝克维斯对莫里斯缺乏常规资质感到不安，而利兹事实上并没有反对这一点

*Washington was angered by what he heard, noting with unerring precision in his diary that it "was simply and no other than this;*

华盛顿被他所听到的激怒了，在他的日记中准确无误地记录了这件事，“仅仅是这样而已；

*We [Great Britain] did not incline to give any satisfactory answer to*  
我们[大不列颠]不打算给出任何令人满意的答复

*Mr. Morris, who was officially commissioned to ascertain our inten-*  
莫里斯先生，他受正式委托查明我们的收入情况



tions with respect to the evacuation of the Western Posts within the territory of the United States and other matters into which he was empowered to enquire until by this unauthenticated mode we can discover whether you will enter into an alliance with us and make Common cause against Spain. In that case we will enter into a Commercial Treaty with you and promise perhaps to fulfil what they already stand engaged to perform.<sup>35</sup>

关于撤离美国境内的西部哨所和他有权调查的其他事项，直到以这种未经证实的方式，我们才能知道你们是否会与我们结盟，共同起诉西班牙。在这种情况下，我们将与你们缔结一项商业条约，并可能承诺履行他们已经承诺履行的义务

*He instructed Hamilton to treat Beckwith cautiously, and not to commit "by any assurances whatever, the Government of the U. States," a line of conduct Hamilton had already transgressed and now directly disobeyed.*

他指示汉密尔顿谨慎对待贝克维斯，不要做出“任何美国政府的保证”，汉密尔顿已经违反了这一行为准则，现在直接违背了这一准则。

*Morris' s reports of his lively debate with Pitt and Leeds arrived in New York a month later. On August 12, Jefferson sent him further instructions regarding the neutral position to be taken should war break out, and approved his handling of the question of the exchange of ministers.<sup>36</sup> Hamilton, however, was evidently alarmed by Morris' s tone, which he must have considered insufficiently humble. In late September, with no sign of progress, he decided to undermine Morris by fabricating British displeasure with the American representative, thereby undercutting American dignity and betraying his long friendship with Morris. Hamilton' s derogation went in two directions: he attempted to plant in Beckwith, who had heard nothing negative about Morris from his government, a belief in Morris' s indiscretion and offensive behavior. He did the same to Washington by repeating the same slanders as having originated with the British government.*

莫里斯关于他与皮特和利兹激烈辩论的报道一个月后抵达纽约。8月12日，杰斐逊进一步指示他，如果战争爆发，应采取什么中立立场，并批准他处理部长们交换意见的问题。9月下旬，在毫无进展的情况下，他决定破坏莫里斯，制造英国人对美国代表的不满，从而损害了美国人的尊严，背叛了他与莫里斯的长期友谊。汉密尔顿的贬损有两个方向：他试图在贝克维斯身上植入一种信仰，即相信莫里斯的轻率和冒犯行为，而贝克维斯从政府那里并没有听到任何关于莫里斯的负面消息。他对华

盛顿也做了同样的事情，重复起源于英国政府的同样的诽谤。

*His first move was to meet with Beckwith. It is important to note that prior to this time Beckwith had made no complaints regarding Morris. The unsuspecting major fell easy prey to Hamilton's suggestions, however, and this is not surprising for Hamilton had told him that American policy was far more conciliatory toward the British than it really was. Nonetheless, the Machiavellian skill with which Hamilton insinuated a negative view of Morris into Beckwith's mind is remarkable. According to Beckwith, Hamilton told him that "23" [Beckwith's code for Morris] was a "man of capacity, but apt at particular times to give himself up too much to the impressions of his own mind," and he did not approve of Morris's conduct in his talks with Pitt.*

他的第一个行动是会见贝克维斯。必须指出的是，在此之前，贝克维斯没有对莫里斯提出任何投诉。然而，这位毫无戒心的少校很容易被汉密尔顿的建议所迷惑，这并不奇怪，因为汉密尔顿曾告诉他，美国的政策对英国比实际上要温和得多。尽管如此，汉密尔顿在贝克维斯的思想中暗示了对莫里斯的负面看法，这种马基雅维利式的技巧是非常引人注目的。据贝克维斯说，汉密尔顿告诉他，“23”（贝克维斯对莫里斯的称呼）是一个“有能力的人，但在特定的时候会过于沉迷于自己的想法”，他不赞成莫里斯在与皮特谈话时的行为。

*[I]f 23. has cultivated intimacy with the Ministers of any other power in Europe, or has caused suspicion on that ground with respect to*

*[i]23.与欧洲任何其他势力的部长们建立了亲密关系，或者在这方面引起了怀疑*

France, or elsewhere, he has had no authority, for so doing . . . he was very intimate with Monsr. de La Luzerne the Ambassador of France now in London, when he was Minster in this country, possibly from that circumstance he may have been more frequently there, than prudence ought to have dictated, and the knowledge of this circumstance may have produced a greater reserve on the part of Your administration; these ideas strike me, although I have no grounds to go upon.<sup>37</sup>

法国,或者其他地方,他没有权力这样做.....他和 Monsr 非常亲密。现在的法国驻伦敦大使德拉卢泽恩,当他在这个国家担任部长时,可能由于这种情况,他去那里的次数比应有的规定还要多,而且对这种情况的了解可能使你的行政部门更加谨慎;这些想法使我感到震惊,尽管我没有理由继续说下去

Thus, it was Hamilton who originated the allegation that Morris had been hobnobbing with Fox (based on the single conversation described by Morris' s letter of May 2)<sup>38</sup> and with La Luzerne, and that this was a good reason for the British to reject him. The British government had said nothing of the kind; but Beckwith was willing to adopt Hamilton' s views.<sup>39</sup>

因此,汉密尔顿提出指控,说莫里斯与福克斯公司有亲密接触(根据莫里斯5月2日的信中所描述的单一对话),还有与拉卢泽恩公司的对话,这是英国拒绝他的一个很好的理由。英国政府此前没有说过这种话,但贝克维斯愿意采纳汉密尔顿的观点

At the end of the conversation Beckwith, who had swallowed the bait, returned to the subject. He had, he told Hamilton, always made it "a point to preserve the strictest silence with respect to (23)." However, he continued, he had heard Morris' s name mentioned more than once "by his relations and their acquaintances" who indicated that Morris "is greatly liked in London, that he is frequently with the French Ambassador Monsieur de La Luzerne, and with Mr. Fox, who has expressed himself to be greatly pleased with his character and company." Hamilton promptly affirmed Beckwith' s tacit complaint: "Yes, it is so reported; I believe it in some measure to be true . . . I do not question this gentleman' s sincerity in following up those objects committed to his charge," Hamilton continued with feigned candor, "but to deal frankly with you, I have some doubts of his prudence . . . in other respects he is a man of great genius, liable however to be occasionally influenced by his fancy, which at times outruns his discretion." Beckwith eagerly agreed:

谈话结束时,贝克维斯上钩了,又回到了话题上。他告诉汉密尔顿,他总是坚持“对(23)保持最严格的沉默”然而,他坚持认为,他不止一次听到莫里斯的名字被”他的关系和他们的熟人”提到,莫里斯”在伦敦

很受欢迎，他经常和法国大使德拉卢泽恩先生在一起，和福克斯先生在一起，福克斯先生表示对他的性格和公司非常满意汉密尔顿立即肯定了贝克维斯的心照不宣的抱怨：“是的，报道是这样说的；我相信在某种程度上这是真的……我并不怀疑这位先生在追踪那些交付给他的物品时的诚意，”汉密尔顿假装坦率地继续说道，“但是坦白地说，我怀疑他的谨慎……在其他方面，他是一个伟大的天才，怎么可能偶尔会受到他的幻想的影响，这有时候超出了他的判断力。”贝克维斯急切地表示同意：

*[Beckwith] Mr. Fox is a very able man, very generally respected . . . but professing every possible respect for Mr. Fox, and for Monsieur de La Luzerne likewise, it is for Your consideration, how far a gentleman in 23. [sic] situation ought to form intimacies with persons in public political situations, excepting they are in administration.*

福克斯先生是一个非常能干的人，受人尊敬……但是他对福克斯先生尽可能地表示尊敬，对德拉卢塞恩先生也是如此，请您考虑一下，一个 23 岁的绅士到底能走多远。[原文如此]局势应该与处于公共政治局势中的人产生亲密关系，除非他们正在执政。

*[Hamilton] I am quite of Your opinion, and this amongst other causes led me to remark, that it is greatly desirable, that this negotiation should be transferred to our seat of Government.*

[汉密尔顿]我完全同意你的意见，除了其他原因之外，我还想说，把这项谈判转移到我们的政府所在地是非常可取的。

*Thus, in a few sentences, Hamilton did his best to destroy Morris' s efficacy as an agent, giving his opinion (but speaking in the putative position*

因此，在几句话中，汉密尔顿尽力破坏莫里斯作为一个代理人的有效性，给出他的意见(但在假定的立场上讲话

as unofficial government spokesman) that Morris' s reports could not be relied on, that his conduct was embarrassing, and that the British would be justified in refusing to deal with him.

作为非官方的政府发言人)，莫里斯的报告不可信，他的行为令人尴尬，英国人拒绝与他打交道是合理的。

Just how successfully Hamilton made Beckwith believe the criticisms of Morris were his own is revealed in the notes of a conversation between the two men five months later. In early 1791, Washington, relying on Morris' s letters, had advised Congress that the British were unwilling to cooperate in completing the peace treaty terms, and requested steps to decrease American dependency on foreign vessels for shipping.<sup>40</sup> With the possibility of American discriminatory legislation, and of war—this time with France—once more in the air, the British were disconcerted and again sent Beckwith to Hamilton. Unconsciously parroting Hamilton' s remarks of the preceding September, Beckwith told him:

汉密尔顿如何成功地让贝克维斯相信对莫里斯的批评是他自己的，这一点从五个月后两人的谈话记录中可见一斑。1791年初，华盛顿根据莫里斯的信件，向国会建议英国不愿合作完成和平条约的条款，并要求采取措施，减少美国对外国船只的依赖。由于美国可能采取歧视性立法，并可能与法国发生战争，英国人感到不安，再次将贝克威斯送到汉密尔顿。贝克维斯不自觉地重复了汉密尔顿在去年9月发表的言论，并告诉

I have in former conversations had the honor of declaring my sentiments with respect to Mr. Morris . . . I believe him to be a man of genius, of knowledge and of discernment, but like other men of strong faculties, I suspect him liable to be led away by his vivacity, to form tenacious opinions and to act upon them; I assume it is a fact, that the information laid before your Legislature, is founded on Mr. Morris' s communications.<sup>41</sup>

在以前的谈话中，我有幸宣布了我对莫里斯先生的看法.....我相信他是一个有才华、有知识、有洞察力的人，但是和其他有才能的人一样，我怀疑他很容易被他的活泼所引导，形成固执的意见，并据此采取行动;我想，摆在你们议会面前的资料是以莫里斯先生的来文为根据的，这是一个事实

Yet Hamilton' s and Beckwith' s joint assault on Morris seems to have done nothing to mar his reputation with the British government, even though the ministers received copies of these comments. The ministers, of course, knew the

truth of the matter: that Morris had not been spending time with Fox, that his friendship with La Luzerne was irrelevant to their strategy, that Morris was actually a hard-headed negotiator who met them point for point, and, most important, that Morris' s reports of British policy were accurate. Morris himself, unaware that Hamilton had originated the notion that the British were justified in refusing to deal with him, later dismissed the idea with the scorn it deserved:

然而，汉密尔顿和贝克维斯对莫里斯的联合攻击似乎并没有损害他在英国政府中的声誉，尽管部长们收到了这些评论的副本。当然，部长们知道事情的真相：莫里斯没有花时间和福克斯在一起，他和拉鲁泽恩的友谊与他们的策略无关，莫里斯实际上是一个头脑冷静的谈判者，他们进行了直接的会谈，最重要的是，莫里斯关于英国政治的报道是准确的。莫里斯本人并不知道汉密尔顿提出了英国有理由拒绝与他打交道的观点，后来他以应得的轻蔑驳斥了这个观点：

*I will suppose it to be a very good Reason to be given to America for not conferring a favor on her that the Man sent to ask it was disagreeable, no matter from what Cause, but I trust that they will never avow to the british Nation a Disposition to make Sacrifice of their Interest to please a pleasant Fellow. It will remain therefore for them to justify the Refusal of an advantageous Connection because not presented in an agreeable Manner.*

我认为这是一个很好的理由，因为美国没有给她一个恩惠，所以派来问这个问题的人是不可能的，不管是出于什么原因，但是我相信他们永远不会向英国民族承认他们有意牺牲自己的利益来取悦一个讨人喜欢的家伙。因此，对他们来说，拒绝一个有利的连接仍然是合理的，因为它没有以一种协商的方式呈现。

He also pinpointed the British motives for backtracking and deciding to send a minister:

他还明确指出了英国退缩的动机，并决定派遣一名部长：

[T]hey have therefore in fear of french Influence sent you a Minister.  
And they will make a Treaty with us as soon as the People are ripe for it  
and the mercantile Interest feel the Necessity. All the Rest is mere  
Palaver.<sup>42</sup>

[t]因此，他们害怕法国的影响，派了一位部长给你。一旦人民的条件成熟，商业利益感到必要，他们就会与我们签订条约。其余的都是废话

• • •  
•••

Hamilton's attack on Morris was far more successful in America than in Britain. As noted before, it was a two-pronged strategy, to reassure the British that the American government was more manageable than Morris made it appear, and to convince Washington that Morris was alienating the British and providing unreliable intelligence. Hamilton achieved the second aim with a September 30, 1790, memorandum to Washington that grossly misrepresented what had been said at his meeting with Beckwith.

汉密尔顿对莫里斯的攻击在美国要比在英国成功得多。如前所述，这是一个双管齐下的策略，一方面向英国人保证，美国政府比莫里斯表面上看起来更易于管理，另一方面让华盛顿相信，莫里斯疏远了英国人，提供了不可靠的情报。汉密尔顿在1790年9月30日向华盛顿提交了一份备忘录，严重歪曲了他与贝克维斯会晤时所说的话，从而实现了第二个目标。

Were it not so unscrupulous a piece of defamation, it would be humorous to note the touches that Hamilton added to give an air of veracity. "I had lately a visit from a certain Gentleman," he began carefully, "the sole object of which was to make some observations of a delicate nature, concerning another Gentleman" —that is, Morris. Doubtless, said Hamilton, these comments were intended to be passed on to Washington. Beckwith's manner, Hamilton added with a flourish, was "somewhat embarrassed," thereby betraying "rather more than he seemed to intend to discover." According to Hamilton, Beckwith had indicated that "in different companies where he had happened to be, in this City (a circumstance by the way very unlikely)" —Hamilton here professed a skepticism for Beckwith's account

with a jaw-dropping irony that must have struck him as he wrote— Beckwith “had heard it mentioned” that Morris “was upon terms of very great intimacy with the representative of a certain Court at the one where he was employed and with the head of the party opposed to the Minister.” Beckwith had suggested that if the British were unreceptive to Morris, it might be due to “such an intimacy,” —although, Hamilton had Beckwith hasten to add, “he had no intimation however” that Morris was in fact guilty of these associations. If he were, Beckwith supposedly continued, “you will readily imagine that it cannot be calculated to inspire confidence or facilitate free communication.”

如果不是这样肆无忌惮地诽谤的话，注意到汉密尔顿为了给人一种诚实的印象而添加的一些动作就是幽默的。“最近有一位先生来拜访我，”他小心翼翼地开头说，“他的唯一目的就是对于一个敏感的人进行一些观察，监视另一位先生，也就是莫里斯。汉密尔顿说，毫无疑问，这些评论意在传递给华盛顿。汉密尔顿夸张地补充说，贝克维斯的态度“有点尴尬”，因此背叛了“似乎比他打算发现的更多”据汉密尔顿说，贝克维斯曾表示，“在他碰巧所在的不同公司里，在这个城市(这种情况不太可能发生)”——汉密尔顿在这里公开表示怀疑贝克维斯的说法，其中带有令人瞠目结舌的讽刺意味，这一定让他感到震惊——贝克维斯“听说”莫里斯“与他受雇的某个法庭的代表以及与反对部长的政党领袖有着非常密切的关系”贝克维斯曾表示，如果英国人不接受莫里斯，那可能是因为“这种亲密关系”——尽管汉密尔顿让贝克维斯赶紧补充说，“但他并没有暗示”莫里斯实际上对这些关系感到内疚。如果他是，贝克维斯继续写道，“你会很容易想象，这不是为了激发信心或促进自由交流。”

Here Hamilton pulled out the dramatic stops and had Beckwith say with grave dignity:

在这里，汉密尔顿打破了戏剧性的停顿，贝克维斯庄严地说道：



*Man, after all, is but man; and though the Minister has a great mind, and is as little likely as most men to entertain illiberal distrusts or jealousies; yet there is no saying what might be the effect of such conduct upon him.*

毕竟，人只不过是人而已；虽然这位部长有一颗伟大的心，而且和大多数人一样，不大可能接受那些不自由的怀疑主义者或嫉妒者，但是谁也说不清这种行为会对他产生什么影响。

*Hamilton then described his own supposedly loyal response. "I have never heard a syllable Sir, about the matter you mention," he said stoutly, although, he allowed, it was "very possible that an intimacy with both the persons you mention may exist" because La Luzerne was Morris' s friend. As to Fox, Morris would have liked his*

然后，汉密尔顿描述了他自己所谓的忠诚回应。“先生，关于你提到的这件事，我一个字也没听到，”他坚定地说，尽管他承认，“很有可能和你提到的两个人都有亲密关系”，因为拉·卢泽恩是莫里斯的朋友。至于福克斯，莫里斯会喜欢他的

*patronage of American affairs, which is understood to have been uniformly the part of that Gentleman, and in some degree, from a similarity of dispositions and characters; both brilliant men, men of wit and genius; both fond of the pleasures of society.*<sup>43</sup>

对美国事务的支持，据说完全是那位绅士的功劳，而且在某种程度上是由于他的性情和性格的简单化；他们都是才华横溢的人，都是机智聪明的人，都是天才，都喜欢社交的乐趣

*The best that can be said of this letter is that Hamilton had Beckwith admit that his comments were "conjecture" as indeed they were— Hamilton' s conjecture.*

关于这封信，我们能说的最好的情况是，汉密尔顿让贝克维斯承认，他的评论实际上是“猜想”——汉密尔顿的猜想。

*Although Washington remained loyal to Morris, he was shaken by Hamilton' s memorandum; it formed the core of his admonitory letter to Morris in January 1792, accompanying the news of his appointment as minister to France, and later predisposed him to believe French complaints about Morris. Jefferson may have believed the allegations (though Madison suspected Beckwith was behind them) but apparently was unconcerned.*<sup>44</sup> Yet through some means—from

Hamilton directly, or from Jefferson to Madison, Hamilton' s allegations gained currency in New York (and, in yet another remarkable twist of the story, were reported back to London.)<sup>45</sup> The irascible Senator Maclay wrote in his journal of "the disappointment attending Gouverneur Morris' s management" of the negotiation,<sup>46</sup> and when Morris' s nomination to France came before the Senate in December 1791, Hamilton' s fabrications were a major grounds of objection, as articulated by Aaron Burr:

尽管华盛顿依然忠于莫里斯，汉密尔顿的备忘录还是让他感到震惊；这是他在 1792 年 1 月写给莫里斯的警告信的核心内容，附带着他被任命为法国部长的消息，后来他倾向于相信法国对莫里斯的抱怨。杰斐逊可能相信这些指控（尽管麦迪逊怀疑贝克维斯是幕后主使），但显然对此并不关心。<sup>44</sup> 然而，通过某种方式（从汉密尔顿直接，或从杰斐逊到麦迪逊），汉密尔顿的指控在纽约得到了广泛传播（而且，这个故事的另一个引人注目的转折点，被传回了伦敦<sup>45</sup> 脾气暴躁的参议员麦克雷在他的日记中写道，莫里斯对谈判的“管理令人失望”，<sup>46</sup> 1791 年 12 月莫里斯被提名到法国参议院时，汉密尔顿的捏造是反对的主要理由，亚伦·伯尔阐明了这一点：

*I merely state a fact. It has been asserted and without any injunction of secrecy, that Mr. Morris conducted himself so offensively in his intercourse with the Eng. Ministers, that they were offended*

我只是陈述一个事实。莫里斯先生在与英国人交往时表现得如此咄咄逼人，这是有人断言的，而且没有任何异议。大臣们，他们被冒犯了

*& refused, after an abrupt breaking up of an interview, to renew it.*<sup>47</sup>

在一次突然中断的采访后，拒绝重新开始采访

It is yet another fine piece of irony, therefore, that Morris credited Hamilton with the success of his nomination, and thanked him for his "exertions." Hamilton made no effort to correct the impression.<sup>48</sup>

因此，莫里斯又一次讽刺地称赞汉密尔顿获得提名的成功，并感谢他的“努力”汉密尔顿没有努力去改正这种印象



Having described Morris' s dealings with the British ministers through the spring of 1790 (he did not speak with Leeds again until September), it is time to turn to Morris' s own "shadow diplomacy" by which he encouraged France to go to war against Britain.

在描述了莫里斯在 1790 年春与英国大臣们的交往之后(他直到 9 月才再次与利兹联系)，现在是时候转向莫里斯自己的“影子外交”了，他通过这种外交手段鼓励法国对英国发动战争。

While Morris freely criticized the French situation to his English acquaintances, he saw that they were "weak enough to imagine from hence that I am attached to England." He was not: he wanted the United States to cultivate ties with France, not England, but worried that France was heading toward disaster. His motive for pushing Montmorin and Lafayette came from a long-held belief in "that great friend to sovereign authority, a foreign war."<sup>49</sup> He also had an eye on the possible commercial opportunities that would result for American shippers from such a war.<sup>50</sup>

尽管莫里斯毫无顾忌地用英文批评法国的局势，但他看到法国人“软弱得足以想象我依附于英国”他并非如此:他希望美国与法国而不是英国发展关系，但担心法国正走向灾难。他推动蒙特莫林和拉法耶特的动机来自一个长期坚持的信念，“那个伟大的朋友对主权当局，一个外国战争。”他还考虑到这样一场战争可能给美国托运人带来的商机

Yet Morris' s conduct cannot be assessed out of the context of his assignment from Washington. Morris' s activities put his own effectiveness as an agent and the bona fides of his government at considerable risk. Of course, British bona fides were also at risk, given their secret activities in Vermont and Kentucky, but that does not justify Morris' s actions.

然而，莫里斯的行为不能脱离华盛顿的指派来评估。莫里斯的活动使他自己作为代理人的效率和政府的诚意面临相当大的风险。当然，由于他们在佛蒙特州和肯塔基州的秘密活动，英国的诚信也处于危险之中，但这并不能证明莫里斯的行为是正当的。

Morris told Washington candidly in his letter of January 22 that he had advised Montmorin that "I saw no Means of establishing Peace at Home, but

by making War abroad.”<sup>51</sup> When the Nootka controversy arose, he promptly wrote Lafayette and Ternant that he thought England might attack France.<sup>52</sup> In early May he ran into Lafayette’s aide-de camp, Boinville, who was keeping an eye on the duc d’Orléans in London. Morris described a proposed war plan to Boinville, who returned later with instructions to “con-cert” with Morris, an indication that Lafayette, despite their increasing estrangement,<sup>53</sup> was very interested in what Morris had to say.

莫里斯在1月22日的信中坦率地告诉华盛顿，他已经通知蒙特莫林，“我看不到在国内建立和平的办法，只能在国外发动战争。”当努特卡事件引起争议时，他立即写信给拉斐特和特南特，说他认为英国可能会攻击法国。5月初，他偶然遇到拉斐特的副官博因维尔，博因维尔正在伦敦密切注视着奥尔兰公爵。莫里斯向博因维尔描述了一个提出的战争计划，博因维尔后来回来，指示他与莫里斯进行“合作”。这表明，尽管拉法叶特和莫里斯日益疏远，但他对莫里斯的话非常感兴趣

Morris’s plan called for France to honor the Compact. The French would readily turn on the British, he suggested, for “[t]here is no word perhaps in the dictionary, which will take the place of Aristocrat so readily as *Anglais*.” He was quite detailed, with suggestions for the number of marksmen, recruiting Irish regiments, and recommending that Spain send a force to Newfoundland.<sup>54</sup> He also went to see the Spanish ambassador and suggested “some Means of annoying the Commerce of this Country, should a War take Place,” and wrote to Carmichael in Madrid about British weak-

莫里斯的计划要求法国履行《契约》。他认为，法国人很快就会把矛头指向英国人，因为“字典里没有一个单词可以像英国人那样轻易地取代贵族。”他还去见了西班牙大使，建议说“如果战争爆发，可以用一些手段来骚扰这个国家的商业”，并写信给马德里的卡迈克尔，指责英国的软弱

nesses.<sup>55</sup> He did not tell Carmichael of his mission for Washington, however, and Carmichael later complained bitterly to Jefferson that Morris' s negotiations with the British had destroyed America' s chance of using the war crisis to obtain concessions from Spain (in particular, navigation of the Mississippi). Carmichael also complained that the Spanish knew of Morris' s assignment and assumed Carmichael (who did not) was double-dealing with them, which led him to end his correspondence with Morris.<sup>56</sup>

卡迈克尔后来向杰斐逊强烈抱怨说，莫里斯与英国人的谈判破坏了美国利用战争危机获得西班牙让步的机会(特别是密西西比河的航行)。卡迈克尔还抱怨说，西班牙人知道莫里斯的任务，并认为卡迈克尔(谁不)是与他们两面派，这导致他结束了与莫里斯的通信

Montmorin determined that France must honor the Family Compact, but the move to put the French navy into readiness required funding through the National Assembly. This precipitated a debate over the locus of control of foreign policy, and the Assembly voted to shift a large part of the control to itself, thwarting Montmorin' s pledge and further weakening the executive.

蒙特莫林决定，法国必须遵守家庭契约，但采取行动，使法国海军进入准备，需要通过国民议会的资金。这引发了一场关于外交政策控制点的辩论，议会投票决定将大部分控制权转移到自己手中，这违背了蒙特莫林的承诺，进一步削弱了行政权。

As the cold and blustery London summer wore on, the crisis lost its immediacy, and Morris grew convinced that France' s delay would cause Spain to cave in. He wrote to Washington that he had "little Doubt but that the Ministry here would have agreed to comply with the Treaty of Peace, had they found themselves engaged in a War. . . . and I presume, that in Proportion as the Clouds shall disperse, they will be less tractable."<sup>57</sup>

随着寒冷而狂风肆虐的伦敦夏天慢慢过去，危机失去了紧迫性，莫里斯越来越相信法国的延迟会导致西班牙屈服。他写信给华盛顿说，“毫无疑问，如果他们发现自己卷入了一场战争，这里的外交部会同意遵守和平条约……。我想，随着云层逐渐消散，它们就会变得不那么容易收缩了。”<sup>57</sup>

He began to make plans to depart London, but fell ill. On July 7, he noted in his diary that his servant Martin had "contracted a Disease which will I fear incapacitate him for my Service for some Time." Always the amateur physician, he added, "We shall see, however, what Mercurials will do." Most likely, they made the poor man worse. In any event, it must have been contagious. On July 17, Morris found himself listless, and spent the morning amusing himself with drawing, "being (from what Cause I know not) indisposed to Business," a clear indication that something was significantly wrong,

although the details that might permit identifying the problem are hidden under the black lines of Ann Morris' s inhibited pen.<sup>58</sup> The next day he realized he was falling ill. He did not leave his rooms again until September 2, spending most of the time close to the fire in a "State of absolute Rest." Morris did not tell Washington of his ill-ness; he told Robert only that he had been "sick for some days."<sup>59</sup>

他开始计划离开伦敦，但是生病了。7月7日，他在日记中写道，他的仆人马丁“染上了一种疾病，我担心他将在一段时间内无法为我服务”他补充说，作为一个业余医生，“但是，我们会看到水星人会做什么。”最有可能的是，他们让这个可怜的人变得更糟。无论如何，它肯定是有传染性的。7月17日，莫里斯发现自己无精打采，整个上午都在画画，“因为(我不知道是什么原因)对生意不感兴趣”，这清楚地表明出了严重的问题，尽管可以查明问题的细节隐藏在安·莫里斯笔下的黑线之下。第二天，他意识到自己生病了。直到9月2日，他再也没有离开过自己的房间，大部分时间都呆在靠近火堆的地方，处于一种“绝对休息的状态”莫里斯没有把他的病情告诉华盛顿;他只告诉罗伯特他已经“病了几天”<sup>59</sup>

He had received no word from Leeds after their meeting on May 21, and he was anxious to leave, but he thought the news that France was arming might again motivate the British to negotiate. On September 10, recovered at last, he wrote Leeds that he had remained in hopes of hearing something, but would soon depart. He pointed out that he had requested a memorandum detailing the compensation they considered required by the peace treaty, but "[m]onths having elapsed in Silence, your Grace will, I hope, pardon me for observing that the pointed Avowal of a Determination to with-

5月21日与利兹会面后，他没有收到利兹的任何消息，他急于离开，但他认为法国正在武装的消息可能会再次促使英国进行谈判。9月10日，他终于恢复了健康，他写信给利兹说，他还希望能听到些什么，但很快就会离开。他指出，他曾要求一份备忘录，详细说明他们认为和平条约所要求的赔偿，但是”在沉默中过去了几个月，我希望大人能够同意我的看法，因为我看到了《宣誓书》中所指出的——

hold Performance unless upon certain Conditions the Communication of which is withheld, might be construed into unconditional Refusal." Morris added significantly, "Your personal Integrity and Honor, my Lord, the acknowledged Justice of his Majesty, and the Pride of british Faith, prohibit me from harboring that Idea. But it may perhaps be entertained by my Countrymen." Leeds responded with a brief and vague answer, which Morris construed to mean that the British council had not yet reached a decision. He told Washington:

持有履行，除非在某些条件下，通知被扣留，可能被解释为无条件拒绝”莫里斯明确地补充说：“法官大人，您个人的正直和荣誉，陛下公认的正义，以及英国信仰的骄傲，禁止我怀有这种想法。但我的同胞们或许会对此感兴趣。”利兹回答得简短而含糊，莫里斯认为这意味着英国文化协会还没有做出决定。他告诉华盛顿：

*These men do not yet know America. Perhaps America does not yet know herself. They believe british Credit is essential to our Commerce. Useful it certainly is at present, but let our public Credit be well established and supported, and in a very few years our con-mercial Resources will astonish the World. We are yet but in the seed-ing Time of national Prosperity, and it will be well not to mortgage the Crop before it is gathered.*<sup>60</sup>

这些人还不了解美国。也许美国还不了解自己。他们认为英国信用对我们的贸易至关重要。它当然是有用的，目前，但让我们的公共信用建立和支持，并在短短几年内，我们的商业资源将惊人的世界。我们还处在国家繁荣的播种时期，在收获之前最好不要抵押庄稼

*They met again on September 15. The minister was clearly uncomfortable with the little he was permitted to say, but he did assure Morris that the British would send a minister soon. Morris pointed out that if war should come, the United States could "give the West India Islands to whom we please, without engaging in the War ourselves." Leeds agreed that this was true. Morris then criticized the mercantilist system as damaging to both countries, particularly if America should pass a comparable navigation act, for it would mean "they could not bring us a Yard of Cloth which contained spanish Wool, and so of other Things. I thought I could perceive that Considerations like these had already given them some Alarm." Morris saw that nothing had changed, however. He told Washington that the "ministers will not treat with us at present, unless they could see their Way to an offen-sive and defensive Alliance, which we shall be in no Hurry to contract."*<sup>61</sup>

他们在9月15日再次见面。这位部长显然无法接受自己被允许说的这么少，但他向莫里斯保证，英国很快就会派一位部长来。莫里斯指出，如果战争来临，美国可以“把西印度群岛给我们喜欢的人，而不必亲自参战。”利兹同意这是事实。莫里斯随后批评重商主义体系对两国都有损害，特别是如果美国通过类似的航海法案，因为这意味着“他们不能给我们带来一码布料，其中含有西班牙羊毛和其他东西。”。我想我可以感觉到，这样的考虑已经给他们敲响了警钟。”然而，莫里斯看到一切都没有改变。他告诉华盛顿，“部长们目前不会和我们谈判，除非他们能够找到一条通向一个正面的、防御性的联盟的道路，我们不会急于缩小这个联盟。”<sup>61</sup>

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*Morris thought this would be the last communication he would have with the British, but he was again presented with pleas regarding impressment of American sailors, and reluctantly wrote once more to Leeds. His letter received no response. According to Boyd, it deserved none: though he admits it had "grace and force," he calls it "bellicose" and another illustration of Morris' s deficiencies as a diplomat.<sup>62</sup> Assessment of this severe criticism requires a review of the letter.*

莫里斯认为这将是他与英国人的最后一次通信，但他再次收到美国水手的恳求，并不情愿地再次写信给利兹。他的信没有得到任何回复。根据博伊德的说法，这封信根本不值一提:虽然他承认这封信“优雅而有力”，但他称之为“好战”，并指出莫里斯作为一名外交官的缺陷。



Morris addressed the fact that American captains were not only having their American sailors seized but also British sailors contracted to them. "On the first Point," he told Leeds dryly, "I am obliged to mention, my Lord, that interrupting Vessels in their Voyages and taking away those who navigate them may have disagreeable Consequences, & by reminding your Grace of that Sentiment which was excited by the Conduct of a spanish Frigate in Nootka Sound I render I am sure all Comments unnecessary." On the second point, he continued,

莫里斯谈到了这样一个事实，即美国船长不仅被扣押了美国船员，而且还被扣押了英国船员。“关于第一点，”他冷淡地告诉利兹，“我不得不提到，我的主人，打断航行中的船只，带走那些航行中的船只，可能会有不愉快的后果，通过提醒你的恩典，这种感情是由一艘西班牙护卫舰在努特卡湾的行为激起的，我确信所有的评论都是不必要的。”关于第二点，他继续说道，

*I must take the Liberty to observe that the very Circumstance of being on board an american Ship ought to raise a Presumption of Citizen-ship, but when that is strengthened by the Oaths of the Men taken in America, Proof should be required to overturn, not to corroborate it. But, my Lord, it must be impossible to obtain the Evidence required, in many Cases, unless the Master will hazard a Deposition to Facts not in his Knowledge.*

我必须冒昧地指出，在一艘美国船上的情况本身就应该引起一种公民船的推定，但是当在美国的人的誓言加强了这种推定时，应该要求证据来推翻，而不是证实它。但是，法官大人，在许多情况下，要获得所需的证据是不可能的，除非主人冒险对他知识中没有的事实作证。

Morris noted the conflict between British common law, which provided that native citizenship was indefeasible, and the approach made necessary by the American Revolution:

莫里斯指出了英国普通法和美国独立战争所必需的方法之间的冲突，前者规定土著公民身份是不可取的：

*Another Circumstance of most delicate Nature is the insisting that none but Persons born in America shall be privileged from the Impress. I humbly*

*conceive my Lord that previous to the Year 1775 those born in America were equally Subjects of his Majesty with those born in England, and many of them I believe still continue so. By the Treaty of Peace the Sovereign of this Country relinquished all Rights over those then in America who chose to take the Benefit of it; and if the Compact can be set aside in the Case of a Mariner I fear that many others will no longer rely upon it.*

另一个最微妙的情況是，堅持只有在美國出生的人才能從留下深刻印象中获得特權。我謙卑地認為，在 1775 年以前，在美國出生的人和英國出生的人一樣都是國王陛下的臣民，我相信他們中的許多人現在仍然是這樣。根據《和平條約》，這個國家的君主放棄了對當時在美洲選擇從中受益的人的一切權利；如果《契約》可以在一個水手的情況下被擱置一邊，我擔心許多其他國家將不再依賴它。

*Morris then turned to the third point, asking Leeds whether it was*  
然後莫里斯轉向第三點，問利茲是不是

*consistent to claim british Seamen who have contracted to serve in american Vessels and yet withhold american Seamen who have contracted to serve in british Vessels. Pardon me for adding that this would justify a Practice which I hope may never take Place, of manning the Privateers of your Enemies with the Seamen of America.*

符合對英國海員的索賠，他們簽約在美國船上服役，卻拒絕簽約在英國船上服役的美國海員。請原諒我補充一句，這將證明我希望永遠不會發生的一種做法是正確的，那就是把你們敵人的私掠船和美國海員一起派遣

Morris' s refusal to be submissive on a matter so close to national honor— a matter that was a source of increasing American anger into the next century and a major factor in propelling the two countries into the War of 1812—seems to have alarmed Boyd, who, like Morris, concluded that Jefferson' s failure to respond to his report of this discussion indicated disapproval. This is debatable.<sup>63</sup> If Jefferson had wanted Morris to stay out of such matters he had an opportunity and indeed an obligation to say so in his letter of August 12. This letter was in reply to Morris' s account of his May 29 meeting with Leeds, a meeting precipitated by impressment complaints.

莫里斯拒绝在一个如此接近国家荣誉的问题上采取顺从态度，这似乎让博伊德感到震惊，他和莫里斯一样，得出结论认为，杰斐逊未能对他的讨论报告作出回应，表明他不赞成这种做法。这个问题使美国人的愤怒情绪升级到下一次冲突，也是推动两国卷入1812年战争的主要因素。如果杰斐逊想让莫里斯置身事外，他有机会也有义务在8月12日的信中这样说。这封信是对莫里斯5月29日与利兹会面的叙述的回复，那次会面是由于投诉引起的。

Yet Jefferson did not object, and it seems unlikely that Jefferson himself would have ignored the captains' importunities. Certainly the situation made Morris very uncomfortable but "I could not be an indifferent Witness to the Injuries sustained by my Fellow Citizens," he wrote Washington. He realized he would be "[l]iable to Censure for Neglect, and to the Imputation of hunting employment, but feeling alike guiltless of the one, and incapable of the other," he had chosen to act. He had previously made it clear to the ministry that he was not authorized by the American government to negotiate on its behalf on the subject.<sup>64</sup>

然而，杰斐逊并没有反对，而且似乎杰斐逊自己也不太可能无视船长的请求。当然，这种情况让莫里斯感到非常不舒服，但是“我不能对我的同胞们所受的伤害无动于衷地作证，”他写信给华盛顿。他意识到自己“可以因为疏忽大意和打工的无耻行为而受到谴责，但是却觉得这一个没有罪恶感，另一个没有能力，”于是他决定采取行动。他显然地向教育部明确表示，美国政府没有授权他代表教育部就这个问题进行谈判。

Morris' s letter to Leeds, which reads rather like a brief, reflects Morris' s legal training. It is difficult to understand how a submissive tone would have been preferable. Boyd describes Morris' s references to the Nootka crisis as "remarkably blunt," presumably because it raised the specter that America could demand satisfaction on these equally (indeed more) justified grounds. He also views Morris' s implication that Britain was thereby violating

the peace treaty as improper. Yet Morris had cut right to the heart of the matter and discerned its deeply troubling ramifications. Three years later, Thomas Pinckney would struggle with impressment complaints, and ask Morris' s advice. Morris responded that the best Pinckney would get from the British would be "more polite Profession than solid Satisfaction" despite the clear violation of American rights and sovereignty.<sup>65</sup>

莫里斯写给利兹大学的信读起来颇像一份摘要，反映了莫里斯受过的法律训练。很难理解为什么一个顺从的音调会是更好的。博伊德将莫里斯提到的努特卡危机描述为“非常直白”，大概是因为这引发了一个幽灵，即美国可以要求在这些同等(实际上更多)公正的基础上得到满足。他还认为，莫里斯关于英国因此违反和平条约的暗示是不恰当的。然而，莫里斯切中了问题的要害，洞悉了其深刻的麻烦后果。三年后，托马斯·平克尼(Thomas Pinckney)在处理关于强制征聘的投诉时遇到了困难，于是向莫里斯征求意见。莫里斯回应说，尽管平克尼明显侵犯了美国的权利和主权，但他能从英国人那里得到的最好的东西应该是“更有礼貌的职业而不是实实在在的满足”

Rather than maintaining a justifiable "dignified silence," as Boyd suggests, it appears more likely that Leeds did not answer because there was really nothing he could say. Morris' s points were unanswerable. Britain should have tried to work out a satisfactory procedure to protect American citizens, but Britain had the strength to ignore American complaints and she deliberately chose to do so for reasons she considered paramount. Morris, by putting the issue on its correct footing, did the most that America could hope for in its still infantile naval state, for his letter made

利兹没有像博伊德所说的那样保持合理的“有尊严的沉默”，而更有可能的是他没有回答，因为他真的无话可说。莫里斯的观点是无法回答的。英国本应努力制定一个令人满意的程序来保护美国公民，但英国有力量无视美国的抱怨，而她故意选择这样做，是出于她认为至高无上的原因。莫里斯将这个问题置于正确的立足点上，尽了美国在其尚处于婴儿期的海军状态下所能期望的最大努力

it impossible for the British to pretend to justify what was simply an exercise—and an abuse—of sheer power.

对英国人来说，不可能假装为这种仅仅是一种刺激——和纯粹的权力滥用——辩护。

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After receiving Morris' s letters of July, August, and September 1790, Jefferson and Washington agreed that "further applications would tend to delay, rather than advance our object," and in mid-December instructed him to make no more efforts. The following February, Washington' s report to Congress, with extracts of Morris' s letters, demolished the hopes of the "British interest" for a commercial treaty, and Madison' s discriminatory navigation bill was abruptly brought back to life.<sup>66</sup> The bill, which would have mirrored the British navigation laws, prohibiting British ships from carrying anything other than British products to America and from carrying American goods anywhere other than to Britain and its possessions, was approved and sent to the House, where it remained to be taken up at the next session. Jefferson' s hopes for its passage were buttressed that summer by receipt of an internal British report indicating a firm mercantilist policy and utter disinterest in a commercial treaty. Morris' s observations were thereby confirmed, and again, the effect of the report on the "British interest" was "devastating."<sup>67</sup>

在收到莫里斯 1790 年 7 月、8 月和 9 月的信件后，杰斐逊和华盛顿同意，“进一步的申请往往会推迟，而不是推进我们的目标”，并在 12 月中旬指示他不要再做更多的努力。第二年 2 月，华盛顿向国会提交的报告中摘录了莫里斯的信件，粉碎了“英国利益”对商业条约的希望，麦迪逊的描述性航海法案突然恢复了生命力。<sup>66</sup> 这项法案反映了英国的航海法，禁止英国船只向美国运输除英国产品以外的任何东西，也禁止将美国货物运往英国以外的任何地方，它获得了批准，并被送到众议院，在下次会议上继续讨论。那年夏天，杰斐逊收到一份英国内部报告，指出英国采取了坚定的“小康”政策，对商业条约完全不感兴趣，这支持了他通过该条约的希望。莫里斯的喝彩声也因此得到了证实，而且这份报告对“英国利益”的影响也是“毁灭性的”<sup>67</sup>

Morris did not receive their instructions until March 1791. In the mean-time, in December 1790, on a business trip to London, he made a follow-up visit to Whitehall, simply "to let them know that I am alive." Just as he had

anticipated, now that Spain and Britain had reached an accord, the British had nothing more to say to the United States. The brief opportunity for rapprochement had expired, and the story would appear to have been over; but it was not. The ironic effect of Washington's release of Morris's pessimistic reports was that the British now had good reason to fear American commercial retaliation, and in the late spring of 1791 decided it was time, at last, to send a minister. Though British and American relations would continue to be problematic, this was a major diplomatic breakthrough.<sup>68</sup>

莫里斯直到 1791 年 3 月才收到他们的指示。同时,在 1790 年 12 月,在伦敦的一次商务旅行中,他对白厅进行了一次后续访问,仅仅是“让他们知道我还活着。”正如他预料的那样,既然西班牙和英国已经达成协议,英国对美国就没有什么好说的了。说唱的短暂机会已经过去了,故事似乎已经结束了,但事实并非如此。华盛顿公布莫里斯的悲观报告的讽刺效果是,英国人现在有充分的理由担心美国的商业报复,并在 1791 年春末决定,是时候派遣一名部长。虽然英国和美国的关系仍然存在问题,但这是一个重大的外交突破

*In the meantime, Hamilton refused to give up. In late December 1790, he sent William Stephens Smith, son-in-law of John Adams and a would-be diplomat, on another secret attempt to court the British and counteract Morris's reports.<sup>69</sup> Smith's entrée to the ministry was through British financiers allied with the American "British interest." (The British interest included Robert Morris. Robert, who read Gouverneur's reports from London with Washington's permission, and knew of Hamilton's allega-*

与此同时,汉密尔顿拒绝放弃。1790 年 12 月下旬,他派约翰·亚当斯的女婿、潜在的外交官威廉·史蒂芬斯·史密斯再次秘密试图讨好英国人,抵消莫里斯的报告。史密斯通过与美国“英国利益”结盟的英国金融家进入外交部(英国的兴趣包括罗伯特·莫里斯。罗伯特在华盛顿的许可下读了高维尼尔从伦敦发来的报告,知道汉密尔顿的寓言

tions, may have hoped to repair the damage he mistakenly believed Morris had done. Robert had ties with the British financier Patrick Colqhoun, who helped Smith.)<sup>70</sup> At the meetings, Smith falsely implied that he was there on Washington's behalf, and made what Boyd calls "the British side of the argument" to the unimpressed ministers, who were cordial but gave him only the assurance that a minister would be sent. This decision had already been made, but Smith believed he was responsible, and returned to America filled with misplaced confidence that he would receive the reciprocal American appointment to Britain. He reported to Hamilton and then to Washington who, in a reply drafted by Jefferson, "crushed" Smith, noting he had told them nothing that Morris hadn't already communicated. Boyd calls Washington's reply a "re-affirmation of confidence" in Morris, an affirmation made explicit by Jefferson in a very warm letter to Morris of August 1791:

他可能希望修复他错误地认为莫里斯造成的损害。罗伯特与帮助过史密斯的英国金融家帕特里克·科尔亨(Patrick Colqhoun)关系密切在会议上，史密斯错误地暗示他是代表华盛顿出席会议的，并向那些不为所动的部长们表达了博伊德所说的“英国方面的观点”，这些部长们热情友好，但只向他保证会派一位部长出席会议。这个决定已经做出，但是史密斯相信他是负责任的，带着错误的信心回到美国，他相信他会接受美国对英国的再次任命。他先向汉密尔顿报告，然后向华盛顿报告。在杰斐逊起草的回信中，华盛顿“压制”了史密斯，因为他没有告诉他们任何莫里斯没有交流过的事情。博伊德称华盛顿的回复是对莫里斯“信心的再次肯定”，杰斐逊在1791年8月写给莫里斯的一封信非常热情的信中明确表示：

*Some new indications of the ideas with which the British cabinet are coming into treaty confirm your opinions, which I knew to be right, but the Anglomany of some would not permit them to accede to. Adieu my dear Sir*  
*Your affectionate humble servant.*<sup>71</sup>

关于英国内阁即将达成协议的一些想法的一些新迹象证实了你的观点，我知道你的观点是正确的，但是英国的某些人不允许他们同意。再见，我亲爱的先生，您那深情的、谦卑的仆人

*Jefferson did not use the word "affectionate" often or lightly; it appears only in letter closings to people for whom he felt genuine regard.*

杰斐逊并不经常或轻易地使用“深情”这个词，它只出现在他感到真诚关心的人们的信件中。

*Morris was also a dupe of Hamilton' s fabricated allegations, for when they were repeated to him by Robert, he believed that the British had indeed complained, to his disgust. He heaped scorn on their supposed objections, and came near to putting his finger on the truth when he commented that "[c]ertainly Nothing but their Confidence in that English Party [the "British interest" ] which Lord Hawkesbury mentions as existing in our Councils and which I flatter myself does not exist, would ever have permitted a Complaint so idle."* 72

莫里斯也被汉密尔顿捏造的指控欺骗了，因为当罗伯特向他重复这些指控时，他认为英国人确实抱怨了，这让他感到厌恶。对他们所谓的反对意见嗤之以鼻，并且几乎指出了事实的真相——他断言：“除了他们对英国政党(霍克斯伯里勋爵提到的“英国利益”)的信任以外，任何东西都不会允许一个如此无聊的投诉存在于我们的议会中，而且我自我吹捧说，这种利益并不存在。” 72

*Yet he was stung by the attacks, all the more so when he received Washington' s admonishing letter of January 28, 1792, accompanying news of his appointment to France. The letter assured Morris that Wash-ington' s nomination had been made "with all my heart." However, "I wish I could add, that the advice & consent flowed from a similar source— Candour forbids it—and friendship requires that I should assign the causes." Morris had been charged, Washington told him,*

然而，这些攻击刺痛了他，尤其是当他收到华盛顿 1792 年 1 月 28 日的警告信，信中还附有他被任命去法国的消息时。这封信向莫里斯保证，华盛顿的提名是“全心全意”的然而，“我希望我能补充一点，那就是建议和同意也来自类似的来源——坦率不允许这样做——而友谊要求我找出原因。” 华盛顿告诉他，莫里斯已经被起诉，



*with levity, and imprudence of conversation and conduct.—It was urged that your habit of expression, indicated a hauteur disgusting to those who happen to differ from you in sentiment. . . .—That in England you indiscreetly communicated the purport of your Mission, in the first instance to the Minister of France at that Court; who, availing himself in the same moment of the occasion, gave it the appearance of a Movement through his Court.—This, and other circumstances of a similar Nature, joined to a closer intercourse with the opposition Members, occasioned distrust, & gave displeasure to the Ministry; which was the cause, it is said, of that reserve which you experienced in negotiating the business which had been entrusted to you.*<sup>73</sup>

轻率，轻率的谈话和行为。——人们强烈要求你的表达习惯表明那些恰好在感情上与你不同的人所厌恶的傲慢态度。...在英格兰，你轻率地把你的使命的意图告诉了那个法院的法国大臣，而那个法国大臣在那个场合利用了这个机会，通过他的法院给了它一个运动的形象。——这种情况，以及其他类似的情况，加上与反对党议员的密切交往，引起了不信任，并使内阁感到不快；据说，这就是你在谈判委托给你的事务时所经历的那种保留的原因。<sup>73</sup>

*Washington then placed his own gloss on these charges:*

然后，华盛顿对这些指责作出了自己的解释：

*That the promptitude with wch. your brilliant, & lively imagination is displayed, allow too little time for deliberation and correction; and is the primary cause of those sallies which too often offend, and of that ridicule of characters which begets enmity not easy to be forgotten, but which might easily be avoided if it was under the control of more caution and prudence.*

那个敏捷的反应。你才华横溢、生动活泼的想象力得到了展示，留给你的时间太少了，没有多少时间去深思熟虑和纠正；这就是那些经常冒犯别人的文章的主要原因，也是那些嘲笑那些引起敌意的人物的主要原因，这些人物不容易被忘记，但是如果在更加谨慎和谨慎的控制之下，。

*It is notable that Washington asked Jefferson's help with this very personal letter, and Jefferson "freely used the liberty he gave him in softening some expressions lest they should be too much felt by Mr. Morris."*<sup>74</sup>

值得注意的是，华盛顿在这封私人信件中向杰斐逊寻求帮助，杰斐逊“自由地使用了他给予他的自由，以免莫里斯先生过于敏感”<sup>74</sup>

Morris' s first response was to immediately sit down and write to the president and promise "that Circumspection of Conduct which has hith-erto I acknowlege form' d no Part of my Character." The charges rankled, however, and a few days later he wrote another letter (one that Boyd calls "brilliant" ) and specifically denied "Intimacy with the opposition." Morris had seen "none of them except Mr. Fox, and him but twice in my life, and one of those times at a ball." As for "Hauteur," he told Washington,

莫里斯的第一反应是立即坐下来写信给总统，承诺“谨慎的行为，我承认这不是我的性格的一部分。”然而，这些指控激怒了他，几天后，他又写了一封信(博伊德称之为“杰出的”)，明确否认“与反对派有亲密关系”莫里斯“除了福克斯先生以外，他们谁也没见过，我这辈子只见过他两次，其中一次是在舞会上。”至于“豪特乌尔”，他告诉华盛顿，

I believe the Complaint to be in one sense founded. You know Sir that it was not necessary to insist that they should actually appoint a Minister before we did. Time however has shewn that in this Instance at least I judged rightly. If I would have listen' d to Overtures derogatory to the Honor and Interest of my Country I should have been held very highly. And the mortal Sin was that I did not listen to such Overtures.

我认为这种抱怨在某种意义上是有根据的。你知道，主席先生，没有必要坚持他们应该在我们之前任命一位部长。然而，时间已经证明，在这种情况下，至少我判断正确。如果我愿意听那些贬损我国荣誉和利益的提议，我应该得到很高的评价。不可饶恕的大罪就是我没有听从这些提议

Morris also defended himself regarding the discussion with La Luzerne (who had since died), telling Washington that he seriously doubted La

莫里斯还为自己与 LaLuzerne(谁已经去世)的讨论辩护，告诉华盛顿，他严重怀疑 La

Luzerne had revealed what Morris told him, because he was "very apprehensive lest in the derang' d State of french Affairs [w]e should call on his Court to support our application." As such, "it was clearly his Interest to appear unacquainted with the Demand and as to a Treaty of Commerce he knew not one Syllable on the Subject." (If Morris had told Montmorin, La Luzerne' s superior, about the proposed treaty of commerce before leaving Paris, he was on thin ground with this assertion.)

卢泽恩透露了莫里斯告诉他的事情，因为他“非常害怕在法国这个荒唐的国家，我们应该请求他的法庭支持我们的申请。”因此，“显然他对这项要求不熟悉，对于一项商业条约他一个字也不知道，这是他的兴趣。”（如果莫里斯在离开巴黎之前告诉卢塞恩的上司蒙特莫林关于拟议中的贸易条约，他的这种说法是站不住脚的。）

Morris recognized a fatal inconsistency in the charges, though he could not know the reason was that the British had not actually made the charges:

莫里斯意识到这些指控中有一个致命的矛盾，尽管他不知道原因是英国人实际上并没有提出这些指控：

You will recollect Sir that the Duke of Leeds offered to make his Communications to you thro me when I last saw him which I declin' d. At that Moment therefore their Reserve had not proceeded from the Causes now assign' d.

你一定记得，先生，当我最后一次见到利兹公爵时，我告诉过你，利兹公爵曾经表示要向你通风报信。因此，在那一刻，他们的储备并不是来自于现在分配给他们的事业。

Morris then put the matter behind him, but the damage to his reputation caused by Hamilton was done and it was permanent. Yet there is an argument to be made that Morris did deserve criticism for his concurrent efforts to urge France and Spain into war. This was particularly troubling since his superiors in the United States, though informed of his views, were uninformed of his efforts in pursuit of those views. Madison, who apparently feared Morris would prove pro-British, might have approved, but whether Washington or Jefferson would have done so is debatable. If the British had known what he was doing (despite their own secret activi-ties), they might well have refused to deal with him and (if they thought he acted with his government' s approval) with the United States. Yet the issue never seems to have crossed Morris' s mind. We cannot know whether, given a protected channel, Morris would have told

*Washington what he was up to. Lafayette regularly corresponded with Washington and Jefferson, and Morris must have realized that they might find out through the marquis.*

然后莫里斯把这件事抛诸脑后，但汉密尔顿对他的名誉造成的损害是永久性的。然而，有一种观点认为，莫里斯确实应该受到批评，因为他同时努力敦促法国和西班牙开战。这尤其令人不安，因为他在美国的上司虽然知道他的观点，却不知道他为追求这些观点所作的努力。麦迪逊显然担心莫里斯会证明自己是亲英派，他可能会同意，但华盛顿或杰斐逊是否会这么做还有待商榷。如果英国人知道他在做什么(尽管他们有自己的秘密活动)，他们很可能会拒绝与他打交道(如果他们认为他的行为得到了政府的批准)与美国打交道。然而，莫里斯似乎从未考虑过这个问题。我们不知道，如果有一个受保护的频道，莫里斯是否会告诉华盛顿他在做什么。拉法耶经常与华盛顿和杰斐逊通信，莫里斯一定意识到他们可能通过侯爵发现这件事。

*Morris' s good intentions are evident, but the rights of it are not as easy to discern. Since he was never called to account, we do not know how he would have justified himself. It is a striking example of Morris' s ability to compartmentalize his multifaceted sense of duty, something he was to do again when, as American minister to France, he worked actively in the inner royal councils to try to save the king.*

莫里斯的善意是显而易见的，但其权利却不那么容易辨别。既然他从来没有被追究过责任，我们不知道他如何为自己辩护。这是一个突出的例子，说明莫里斯有能力区分他多方面的责任感，当他作为美国驻法国大臣，积极参与内部皇家委员会的工作，试图拯救国王时，他再次这样做了。