Table 1: Pooled ERGM results with log odds, standard errors and p-values predicting conflict ties between armed groups

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Edges	$-7.787\ (0.605)^{***}$	$-8.375\ (0.631)^{***}$	$-8.364\ (0.617)^{***}$
Covariates			
Cooperation network	$0.916\ (0.355)^{**}$		$0.790\ (0.349)^{*}$
Shared identity		$0.430\ (0.131)^{**}$	$0.404\ (0.131)^{**}$
Controls			
Foreign sponsorship	$-0.099\ (0.227)$	$-0.122\ (0.228)$	$-0.111\ (0.230)$
Coalition group	$-1.537\ (0.365)^{***}$	$-1.302\ (0.350)^{***}$	$-1.449\ (0.364)^{***}$
Territorial control	$0.352\ (0.272)$	$0.527\ (0.273)$	$0.492\ (0.271)$
Years active	$0.294\ (0.052)^{***}$	$0.280\ (0.052)^{***}$	$0.278\ (0.051)^{***}$
Geographic spread	$0.104\ (0.018)^{***}$	$0.109\ (0.018)^{***}$	$0.109\ (0.017)^{***}$
Power projection	$0.005\ (0.001)^{***}$	$0.004\ (0.001)^{***}$	$0.005\ (0.001)^{***}$
Endogenous dependencies			
Isolates	$-11.480\ (0.245)^{***}$	$-11.021\ (0.251)^{***}$	$-10.768\ (0.245)^{***}$
GW Degree (0.2)	$-9.738\ (0.118)^{***}$	$-9.188\ (0.118)^{***}$	$-8.920\ (0.117)^{***}$
GWESP (0)	$0.789\ (0.225)^{***}$	$0.659\ (0.230)^{**}$	$0.645\ (0.226)^{**}$
AIC	1186.449	1182.199	1179.579
BIC	1272.084	1267.835	1273.000
Log Likelihood	-582.224	-580.100	-577.790

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$