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INFO-F-409 - LEARNING DYNAMICS

Assignment One

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1 The Hawk-Dove game

The Hawk-Dove game was first formulated by John Maynard Smith and Georg Prince in 1973 [1]. The aim of the game is to gain a better understanding of conflicts in the animal kingdom. It consists of two players {Player One, Player Two} who have each two actions {Hawk, Dove}. The resulting payoff matrix can be seen in Table 1 where:

- V = fitness value of winning resources in fight
- D = fitness costs of injury
- T = fitness costs of wasting time

and we assume that $V, D, T \geq 0$.

Table 1: Hawk-Dove Payoff Matrix

		Player Two	
		Hawk	Dove
Player One	Hawk	$(V-D)/2$	0
	Dove	0	$V/2-T$

In a mixed strategy game, we consider each player performing his action with a certain probability p , which results in the following payoff matrix displayed in Table 2.

Table 2: Hawk-Dove Probability Payoff Matrix

		Player Two	
		$P(\text{Hawk}) = q$	$P(\text{Dove}) = 1-q$
Player One	$P(\text{Hawk}) = p$	$(V-D)/2$	0
	$P(\text{Dove}) = 1-p$	0	$V/2-T$

2 Which social dilemma?

Player A is confronted with one of three social dilemma's - the corresponding payoff matrix is shown in tables 3, 4 and 5. The player has to decide whether to cooperate (C) or to defect (D) without knowing which game he is actually facing. Each dilemma has the same probability 1/3 of being played. Opponent B knows the game.

Table 3: Prisoners dilemma

	C	D
C	2, 2	0, 5
D	5, 0	1, 1

Table 4: Stag-Hunt game

	C	D
C	5, 5	0, 2
D	0, 2	1, 1

Table 5: Snowdrift game

	C	D
C	2, 2	1, 5
D	5, 1	0, 0

with this information we can calculate the expected payoff for player A for every possible strategy of Player B - Table 6.

Table 6: Expected payoff for Player A

		Player B							
		(C,C,C)	(C,C,D)	(C,D,C)	(C,D,D)	(D,C,C)	(D,C,D)	(D,D,C)	(D,D,D)
Player A	C	9/3	8/3	4/3	3/3	7/3	6/3	2/3	1/3
	D	12/3	7/3	11/3	6/3	8/3	3/3	7/3	2/3

From this table we can select the best response for Player A for each strategy of Player B - cells marked red in Table 7.

Table 7: Best responses for Player A

		Player B							
		(C,C,C)	(C,C,D)	(C,D,C)	(C,D,D)	(D,C,C)	(D,C,D)	(D,D,C)	(D,D,D)
Player A	C	9/3	8/3	4/3	3/3	7/3	6/3	2/3	1/3
	D	12/3	7/3	11/3	6/3	8/3	3/3	7/3	2/3

Now we have to determine the best responses of Player B against Player A of the three different strategies - marked by green cells in Tables 8, 9 and 10.

Table 8: Prisoners dilemma

	C	D
C	2	5
D	0	1

Table 9: Stag-Hunt game

	C	D
C	5	2
D	0	1

Table 10: Snowdrift game


	C	D
C	2	5
D	1	0

The pure strategy Nash Equilibria can now be determined by matching these results. We find two Nash Equilibria at $\{C, (D, C, D)\}$ and $\{D, (D, D, C)\}$.

3 Sequential truel

This scenario considers three persons A,B and C, each of whom has a gun with a single bullet. If alive, each person may shoot at any surviving person. The order in which the scenario is played out is A, then B and then C. The probability that player i hits their target is denoted by p_i where $0 \leq p_i \leq 1$. Every player wishes to optimize her probability of survival. For this exercise we further assume that a player has to target another living player and is not allowed to miss a shoot consciously. The resulting diagram of this game is shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Sequential truel diagram



The Diagram shows all possible actions of all players with all possible outcomes. The lowest level leaf indicates which player is still alive and with which probability - $[0,0,1]$ indicates Player A and B being dead while Player C is alive with a probability of $p_a \times p_c$.

References

- [1] J. Maynard Smith and G. R. Price. The logic of animal conflict. *Nature*, 246(5427):15–18, 1973.