

# A Projection-based Approach for Memory Leak Detection

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**Abstract**—One of the major software safety issues is memory leak. Moreover, detecting memory leak vulnerabilities is challenging in static analysis. Existing static detection tools find bugs by collecting programs’ information in the process of scanning source code. However, the current detection tools are weak in efficiency and accuracy, especially when the targeted program contains complex branches. This paper proposes a projection-based approach to detect memory leaks in C source code with complex control flows. According to the features of memory allocation and deallocation in C source code, this approach projects the original control flow graph of a program to a simpler one, and it reduces the analysis complexity. Besides, this paper implements a memory-leak detection tool—PML\_Checker, and evaluates the tool by comparing with three open-source static detection tools on both public benchmarks and study test cases. The experimental results show that PML\_Checker reports the most memory leak vulnerabilities among the four existing tools with complex control flows and complex data types, and PML\_Checker obtains higher efficiency and accuracy on public benchmarks.

**Keywords**—memory leak, projection algorithm, static analysis

## I. INTRODUCTION

Memory leak is a major cause of reliability and performance issues in software. Especially in embedded systems, since it causes the long-running applications, which eventually will run out of memory. A system running out of memory may lead to the slowing down of the system caused by frequently swapping in and out, and process creation failure because of no more memory available. Moreover, memory leaks have caused severe consequences in some large applications and services. Therefore, detecting memory leaks is very important and necessary to ensure the quality of software. Although memory leaks do not typically constitute a direct security threat, attackers can exploit them to increase a denial-of-service attacks effectiveness. However, detecting memory leaks is challenging, since the only symptom of memory leaks is the slow increasing of memory consumption. To address this challenge, there are two general techniques in existing works—dynamic testing and static source code analysis [1]. Dynamic testing relies on the coverage of the test cases and requires long-time execution. Comparing to dynamic testing, static source code analysis has the advantage of higher accuracy, because static analysis is usually to find the memory allocation location and the corresponding release point. Therefore, this paper focuses on detecting memory leaks by applying source code analysis.

The relationship between memory allocation and deallocation can describe the root causes of memory leaks. To check this type of errors, there are in general the following two approaches: value-flow-based approach and control-flow-based approach. The basic idea of value-flow-based approach is to capture def-use chains and value flows, by assigning all memory locations represented by both top-level and address-taken pointers. Thence, it is also known as VFG (Value Flow Graph)[2][3]. While the basic idea of control-flow-based approach is to construct a dynamic memory allocation and deallocation model on the CFG (Control Flow Graph). Based on the CFG model, this paper checks whether a block of heap memory space is reclaimed by the program when the lifetime of the program has ended—if a block is not reclaimed, then there is memory leak. Comparing the VFG model with the projection-based CFG model, the latter focuses on all the possible execution paths, analyzes the lifetime of pointers that assigned memory locations. In particular, in order to capture the indirect allocation-deallocation relation and obtain accurate results, this paper takes into account the memory pointers’ lifecycle, i.e., including all the memory operations.

The existing control-flow-based approaches have limitations in efficiency and accuracy when the control flow is getting complex, because the analysis of complex control flow needs to deal with a large number of path branches. We say that the control flow of a program is complex if the allocation and deallocation appear in different control flow branches of a program, and thus memory leaks are more likely to happen. Due to the complexity of the branch conditions’ analysis, complex control flows make memory detection more difficult. In this work, this paper focuses on efficiently and accurately detecting memory leaks in programs with complex control flows.

The main contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows:

- The classification of memory leaks, particularly in source code with complex control flows.
- A projection-based approach to detect potential memory leaks in C program, reducing the false negative rate in the program with complex control flows.
- A detecting tool—PML\_Checker, evaluating the effectiveness and accuracy of the tool on public benchmarks.

## II. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION

The targeted problem in this paper is the dynamic memory leaks—A block of heap memory space is being leaked if the program, or the run-time system does not reclaim its memory when the lifetime of heap memory space has ended. The lifetime of heap memory space is represented in three ways [4]:

- *Referencing*: the lifetime of a block of a heap memory space ends when there are no references to the space (excluding references from abandoned spaces).
- *Reachability*: the lifetime of a heap memory space ends when it is no longer reachable from program variables.
- *Liveness*: the lifetime of a heap memory space ends after the last access to that space.

This paper focuses on the second view—reachability. Reachability is more intuitive in the CFG, and our analysis is based on it. In the reachability view, there is a memory leak if the lifetime of a heap memory space ends while the memory pointer can not reach to that space. Since our approach is based on CFG, detecting memory leaks is essentially analyzing whether the memory pointers have been freed when the lifetime of the corresponding memory spaces end in each branch of the control flow graph. Therefore, the memory detection can be converted into the control flow graph analysis. The analysis includes the correspondence relations between the memory pointers and the lifetime of the corresponding memory spaces. That refers to the reachability of the pointers.

As stated in Section I, when procedure  $P$  has complex control flow branches, the pointers pointing to corresponding memory spaces may be freed in wrong order, and the allocation and deallocation of memory space may appear in different control flow branches. Thus increases the complexity of the control flow graph analysis, because of the complex branch guarding condition analysis.




Figure 1. Description of memory leaks reasons

Fig. 1 displays this generation of complex control flows. A simple control flow graph of procedure  $P$  with memory allocation and deallocation is shown on the left. After adding the control flow branches, a complex control flow graph is shown on the right. Therefore, detection system needs to analyze whether the memory spaces are released in each branch after being allocated. It should be noted that this section

only considers the cases that allocate or release memory spaces of the same pointer, and the case that memory spaces are not fully released does not exist. There are four cases corresponding to the values of the two branches in the complex control flow graph:

- 1)  $B1 = \text{false}$ ,  $B2 = \text{false}$ : Corresponding to path 1-6-7. No memory leaks occur in this case, since there is no memory operations.
- 2)  $B1 = \text{true}$ ,  $B2 = \text{false}$ : Corresponding to path 1-2-3-7. The memory blocks have not been freed after being allocated, which is a typical kind of memory leaks.
- 3)  $B1 = \text{false}$ ,  $B2 = \text{true}$ : Corresponding to path 6-4-5. The unallocated memory blocks are freed.
- 4)  $B1 = \text{true}$ ,  $B2 = \text{true}$ : Corresponding to path 1-2-3-4-5. Whether there is memory leak in this case is uncertain. The result relies on the number of executions of the memory allocation or deallocation related statements. Specifically, if both  $B1$  and  $B2$  are conditional branches, the memory allocation and deallocation will be executed only once, then there are no memory leaks in this structure. If  $B1$  or  $B2$  is a loop node, then the memory allocation or deallocation for the same pointer  $p$  will be executed more than once in the loop. It will lead to a memory leak. E.g., if  $B1$  is a loop node, then multiple memory spaces are allocated, each in a single execution of the loop; but  $B2$  is a conditional node, and thus there is only one deallocation in the branch.

In each branch of the control flow graph, in addition to considering the allocation and deallocation of memory spaces, detection system needs to additionally consider the lifetime of each pointer, as shown in the definition of dynamic memory leaks. To provide some clue, Fig. 2 shows the lifetime of a pointer  $p$  pointing to a heap memory space, using C language as an example. This figure shows the lifetime of a pointer  $p$  from being declared to being freed. The solid arrows represent the correct order. The dotted arrows represent all the cases that may result in the memory leaks on the memory blocks refereed by a single pointer  $p$ . In details, the dotted arrow 5 shows the case that the pointer  $p$  is not initialized before being allocated to memory blocks, arrow 6 illustrates that the pointer  $p$  is not allocated to memory blocks before being accessed, arrow 7 presents that  $p$  is not allocated to memory blocks before being freed.




Figure 2. Lifetime of a pointer  $p$

Note that Fig. 2 only shows the lifetime of one pointer. When considering multiple pointers, the cases that may lead to memory issues are more complicated. So that is another challenge in the memory leak detection.

### III. APPROACH

Our approach performs projection in constructing the detection model, and it simplifies memory leak detection procedure based on the model.

#### A. Projection Algorithm

Projection Subject is the input of the projection process and Projection Target is the output of the projection process. Specifically, Projection Subject ( $G$ ) is the control flow graph of the program to be analyzed.  $G = (N, E)$ , where  $N = \{n_1, n_2, \dots, n_k\}$  denotes the set of nodes, and  $E = \{e_1, e_2, \dots, e_k\}$  denotes the set of edges. In the procedure  $P$ , each statement is a node  $n$ , and there is an edge  $e$  between two statements executed in sequence. Projection Target ( $G^*$ ) is a directed graph that contains all the control flow branch nodes denoted by  $B$ , and all the allocation nodes denoted by  $A$  and deallocation nodes denoted by  $F$  (if exist).  $G^* = (N^*, E^*)$ , where  $N^* = A \cup B \cup F$  ( $A \cup B \cup F \neq \emptyset$ ) denotes the set of nodes, and  $E^*$  denotes the set of edges between nodes, representing the sequential ordering between nodes.

**Definition 1** (Control-Flow-Graph Projection). *Given two directed graphs  $G = (N, E)$  and  $G^* = (N^*, E^*)$ . Let set  $M$  contains all the statement nodes relating to memory management in the procedure  $P$  and the set  $B$  contains all the control flow branch nodes (e.g. if, else, while, for et al.). If  $G$  and  $G^*$  satisfy the following conditions, then we say that  $G^*$  is the projection of  $G$ , denoted as  $G^* \mapsto G$ :*

- $N^* \subseteq N$ ;
- If  $\forall m, n \in N^*, (m \neq n), m \in \Gamma(n)$  ( $\Gamma(n)$  denotes the set of direct successor nodes of  $n$ ), then there must be a connected path  $\mu$  from  $n$  to  $m$  in  $G$ , formally  $\exists \mu = (n, n_1, \dots, n_l, m)$  in  $G$  and  $n_1 \in \Gamma(n) \wedge n_{i+1} \in \Gamma(n_i) \wedge n_n \in \Gamma(m)$  ( $0 \leq i \leq (n-1)$ );
- $\forall n \in B$  in directed graph  $G^*$ , if  $\forall m \in M : m \notin \Gamma(n)$ , then  $\Gamma(n) = \Gamma(n) \cup \{n\}$ .

Fig. 3 shows the CFG ( $G$ ) of a piece of code. In this graph, there are 11 elements forms set  $N$ , that is,  $N = \{S_0, S_1, S_2, S_3, S_4, S_5, S_6, S_7, S_8, S_9, S_{10}\}$ . The memory block is allocated in  $S_1$  ( $S_1 \in A$ ) and freed in  $S_9$  ( $S_9 \in F$ );  $S_3$  is a looping branch node and  $S_6$  is a conditional branch node ( $B = \{S_3, S_6\}$ ); In node  $S_7$ , another pointer points to the memory block ( $S_7 \in A$ ); Others are unrelated to memory operation. Thus the cyclomatic complexity of this graph is 4. Fig. 4 shows the projection graph ( $G^*$ ) of  $G$ . Following the projection definition, we have  $N^* = A \cup B \cup F = \{S_1, S_3, S_6, S_7, S_9\}$ . Similarly, we have the edges from  $S_1$  to  $S_3$ ,  $S_3$  to  $S_6$ ,  $S_6$  to  $S_7$  and  $S_7$  to  $S_9$ . Apart from this,  $S_3$  is a closed node since all its direct successor nodes are not memory related nodes, thus we add a loop to  $S_3$ . There is no loop at  $S_6$ , because the direct successor  $s_7$  is a memory related node.

Algorithm 1 shows the projection algorithm. Given the control flow graph  $G = (N, E)$  of program  $P$  as input. The algorithm returns  $G$ 's projection graph  $G^* = (N^*, E^*)$




Figure 3. The CFG of the program ( $G$ )




Figure 4. The projection graph ( $G^*$ )

as output. Algorithm 1 can be divided into 3 steps. Step1 (line 1 – 2) establishes the min-heap of  $N$  according to the execution order of statements. Step2(line 3 – 9) folds those unrelating to memory management paths. Step3 (line 10 – 12) adjusts the Red Black Tree ( $RBT(N^*)$ ) and the  $Map(N^*)$ , and obtains the final projection graph  $G^*$ . In this algorithm,  $n.ind$  and  $n.outd$  stand for the in-degree and out-degree of node  $n$  respectively;  $a$  means the node  $a$  is in set  $A$ .  $f$  means the node  $f$  is in  $F$ . Lastly, whenever a loop is added to  $G^*$  (even when the loop already exists), both the in-degree and the out-degree of the looping node are increased by one.

Considering the complexity of the projection algorithm, the Red Black Tree is used to store the nodes in set  $N$ . Red Black Tree is a data structure, which is an approximate balanced tree with only two types of nodes: red nodes and black nodes. This type of data structure has the advantage of high search efficiency, due to that it is sequential which can avoid the disorder during the search process.

In the algorithm, the set  $E$  in graph  $G$  (the execution sequence of statements in procedure  $P$ ) is implemented as a set of *Maps*. A *Map* is a data structure stored in the form of key-value pairs. The elements in a *Map* are the ordering relation between a node  $n$  in set  $N$  and its successor nodes (i.e., nodes in  $\Gamma(n)$ ).

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#### Algorithm 1 ControlFlowProjection ( $G$ )

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**Input:** A control flow graph  $G$  for program  $P$ .

**Output:** Projection graph  $G^*$  for the input control flow graph

1. Initialize the Red Black Tree  $RBT(N)$ .
  2. For all  $n$  from  $N$ , add  $n$  and  $\Gamma(n)$  to  $Map(n)$ .
  3. **while**  $RBT$  has next element **do**
  4.   **if**  $n.ind \geq 2 || n.outd \geq 2$  **then**
  5.     **if**  $a \in \Gamma(n) || f \in \Gamma(n)$  **then**
  6.        $\Gamma(n) \leftarrow a || \Gamma(n) \leftarrow f$ .
  7.     **else then**
  8.        $\Gamma(n) \leftarrow (n \cup \Gamma(n) \cap N^*)$ .
  9.   **end while**
  10. Delete all  $n$  that are not in  $N^*$ .
  11.  $RBT(N) \leftarrow RBT(N^*)$ .
  12.  $Map(N) \leftarrow Map(N^*)$ .
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#### B. System Detecting Process

The input data of PML\_Checker is C source code. After lexical analysis and syntax analysis, abstract syntax tree gen-

erates the original control flow graph. System captures the data flow information of each node based on the CFG, and after this process completed, system produces a new control flow graph from the memory allocation point to the release point, or a extended control-flow-graph. PML\_Checker projects the extended control-flow-graph according to the projection algorithm, then traverses the existing projection graph. Finally, the constraint solver solves the path conditions in the graph to determine whether the code exists memory leaks.

#### IV. EVALUATION

In general, this paper investigates the following research questions to evaluate PML\_Checker:

- RQ1: How does our approach perform under the real-world repositories and public benchmarks?
- RQ2: How does our approach perform in terms of effectiveness analysis for complex control flows?
- RQ3: How does our approach perform in terms of effectiveness analysis for complex data types?

##### A. Experimental Setup

In our experiment, there are three state-of-the-art detection tools compared with PML\_Checker<sup>1</sup>: CppCheck<sup>2</sup>, Splint[5] and RL\_Detector [6]. They are all open-source static detection tools, and have a good performance in detecting memory leaks.

This experiment adopts two real-world repositories for evaluation: SPEC CPU 2000<sup>3</sup> and SIR<sup>4</sup>. Specifically, we take 15 programs with 581 thousand lines code from SPEC CPU 2000, and 15 programs with 267.9 thousand lines code from SIR.

However, we can not count the false negatives of the two repositories, because of the large amount of code. In order to count false negatives of PML\_Checker, this experiment also uses artificial small code as test cases: SARD<sup>5</sup> (Software Assurance Reference Dataset) and CC code. SARD is a public benchmark providing test cases. This experiment take 40 memory-related test cases, including 20 bad cases with memory errors and 20 corresponding good cases with no errors. CC code is provided by this paper to verify PML\_Checker from two aspects: complex control flows and complex data types. A complex control flow refers to a control flow graph with more than one control flow branches, which is the focus of this paper. To make the experiment more convincing, this paper considers the complexity of data types. In our experiment, complex data types include data structure like linked list, struct, array and the combination of these data types. CC code presents 10 small programs with different complex control flows, and 10 small programs with different complex data types. Adhering to the principle of single case coverage scenarios minimized<sup>6</sup>, each case only covers one test scenario and includes only one memory leak.

<sup>1</sup>PML\_Checker. [https://github.com/sunxiaohuiczc/PML\\_Checker](https://github.com/sunxiaohuiczc/PML_Checker). 2018.

<sup>2</sup>CppCheck. [trac.cppcheck.net/wiki](http://trac.cppcheck.net/wiki). 2016.

<sup>3</sup>SPEC. <http://www.spec.org/cpu/>. 2007.

<sup>4</sup>SIR. <http://sir.unl.edu/content/sir.php>. 2017.

<sup>5</sup>NIST. <https://samate.nist.gov/SARD/>. 2016.

<sup>6</sup>Test Case Design. <http://ecomputernotes.com/software-engineering/test-case-design>. 2017.

There are six metrics in our experiments for evaluation.

- *TW*: The total number of the reported memory leaks.
- *TL*: The total number of memory leaks contained in a program, and it takes the number of pointers pointing to memory blocks as the measurement standard.
- *NF*: The number of false positives.
- *FP*: The false positive rate, a metric used to measure the accuracy. It can be calculated by the following formula:  

$$FP = \frac{NF}{TW}$$
- *NP*: The false negative rate, a metric used to measure the accuracy. It can be calculated by the following formula:  

$$NP = \frac{TL - NF}{TL}$$
- *RunTime*: The run time of each tool for C program.

##### B. Experimental Results and Discussion

###### 1) Accuracy Analysis:

This section includes two-part experiments: experiment on large amount code (SPEC CPU 2000 and SIR), experiment on small amount code (test cases from SARD).

TABLE I  
TEST RESULTS ON SPEC CPU 2000

Program	Size (Kloc)	CppCheck		Splint		RLDetector		PMLChecker	
		TW	NF	TW	NF	TW	NF	TW	NF
gzip	7.8	1	1	1	1	1	1	3	1
vpr	17.0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	1
gcc	205.8	1	0	46	24	35	0	22	1
mesa	49.7	1	0	9	5	4	2	17	5
art	1.3	1	0	0	0	1	0	3	0
mcf	1.9	0	0	5	2	0	0	1	1
equake	1.5	0	0	0	0	0	0	8	0
crafty	18.9	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ammp	13.3	12	0	22	4	20	0	22	2
parser	10.9	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
perlbnk	58.2	2	1	0	0	4	1	2	0
gap	59.5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
vortex	52.7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
bzip2	4.6	1	0	2	1	0	0	1	0
twolf	19.7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	581	19	2	85	37	65	6	83	11

TABLE II  
TEST RESULTS ON SIR

Program	Size (Kloc)	CppCheck		Splint		RLDetector		PMLChecker	
		TW	NF	TW	NF	TW	NF	TW	NF
bash	59.8	7	1	15	3	3	0	17	2
flex	10.5	1	0	2	1	2	1	2	1
grep	10.1	3	1	0	0	0	0	2	0
gzip	5.7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
make	35.5	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
print	0.7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
print2	0.6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
replace	0.6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
schedule	0.4	0	0	5	2	0	0	2	0
schedule2	0.4	0	0	3	0	0	0	2	1
sed	14.4	4	2	0	0	0	0	3	0
space	6.2	2	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
tcas	0.2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
totinfo	0.6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
vim	122.2	3	0	12	5	8	0	4	1
Total	267.9	21	4	37	11	13	1	34	6

Table I shows the test results on SPEC CPU 2000 and

Table II shows the test results on SIR. Compare PML\_Checker with other three tools, we have the following observations.

In the view of *TW* from Table I and Table II, Splint reports most bugs, and PML\_Checker ranks second, while CppCheck reports the least bugs. However, in the view of *FP*, the *FP* of Splint is highest, and the *FP* of the other three tools are acceptable.

Table III shows the test results on 40 test cases from SARD. Compare PML\_Checker with other three Tools, we have the following observations. First, the *FP* of PML\_Checker is the lowest among the four tools. For the analysis of *FP*, there are no false positives in the results of RL\_Detector, CppCheck and PML\_Checker. While Splint reports a false positive. This experiment fails to compare the *FP* due to the small size of program, but the test results on *NP* reflects the accuracy of PML\_Checker in detecting memory leaks.

TABLE III  
TEST RESULTS ON SARD TEST CASES

Cases	CppCheck (TW)	Splint (TW)	RLDetector (TW)	PMLChecker (TW)
bad	10	4	6	14
good	0	1	0	0

## 2) Efficiency Analysis:

Considering CppCheck, RL\_Detector and PML\_Checker all use symbolic execution, it is necessary to verify whether our approach affects the efficiency. This experiment chooses SPEC CPU 2000 as the test object due to its large amount of code and large number of files, and analyzes the *RunTime* of the three tools. Table IV lists the *RunTime* of CppCheck, RL\_Detector and PML\_Checker. By comparing the *RunTime* of these three tools, we conclude that the performance of RL\_Detector and PML\_Checker is better than CppCheck in *RunTime*, and our approach does not affect the efficiency of PML\_Checker.

TABLE IV  
RUNTIME ON SPEC CPU 2000

Program	Size (Kloc)	RunTime(second)		
		CppCheck	RLDetector	PMLChecker
gzip	7.8	5.3	4.5	3.2
vpr	17.0	10.0	7.5	7.6
gcc	205.8	167.7	48.3	41.0
mesa	49.7	51.0	33.1	34.8
art	1.3	0.3	0.9	0.4
mcf	1.9	1.0	4.0	3.7
equake	1.5	0.2	1.0	0.4
crafty	18.9	27.3	14.2	13.3
ammp	13.3	7.4	10.3	10.0
parser	10.9	4.0	6.7	5.1
perlbnk	58.2	123.2	41.3	39.0
gap	59.5	29.0	20.9	20.0
vortex	52.7	73.2	30.1	26.7
bzip2	4.6	2.0	0.6	1.5
twolf	19.7	11.0	23.7	24.0
Total	581.0	512.6	247.1	230.7

## 3) Effectiveness Analysis of Complex Control Flows:

Table V lists the test results on 10 small programs. Comparing PML\_Checker to other three tools, we have the following observations. First, PML\_Checker covered all the

TABLE V  
TEST RESULTS ON COMPLEX CONTROL FLOWS

Cases	CppCheck	Splint	RLDetector	PMLChecker
branch1	✓	×	✓	✓
branch2	✓	✓	✓	✓
loop1	×	×	✓	✓
loop2	✓	×	✓	✓
chainBranch1	×	×	✓	✓
chainBranch2	×	×	✓	✓
chainLoop1	✓	✓	×	✓
chainLoop2	✓	✓	×	✓
nestingBranch	×	×	✓	✓
nestingLoop	×	×	✓	✓

test cases about complex control flows. Second, regarding the comparison of the approaches. Obviously, our approach has advantage of complex-control-flow detection. The regular match based approach matches the source code with the vulnerabilities in the process of detection. This approach is not sensitive and inflexible to complex control flow. The style and notation based approach improves the software quality by improving the programming style, and discovers the potential bugs of program. However, this kind of analysis is not complete, so it has a high false negative rate. The approach by constructing resources streamlined slices only makes a simple assumption for allocation and deallocation of resources within loop bodies. It reduces the number of loops to 1 and treats the loops the same as branches. Therefore, this approach can not pass the test cases on the chain\_loop structure (chainLoop1 and chainLoop2) in the experiment.

## 4) Effectiveness Analysis of Complex Data Types:

TABLE VI  
TEST RESULTS ON COMPLEX DATA TYPES

Cases	CppCheck	Splint	RLDetector	PMLChecker
array1	✓	×	✓	✓
array2	×	×	×	×
array3	×	×	×	✓
list1	×	×	×	×
list2	×	✓	×	✓
list3	×	✓	×	✓
struct1	×	✓	×	✓
struct2	×	✓	×	✓
arrayStruct1	×	✓	✓	✓
arrayStruct2	✓	✓	✓	✓

Table VI lists the test results on 10 small programs. Comparing our approach with other approaches, we have the following observations. First, the results of Splint and PML\_Checker show a higher effectiveness. Splint has a high effectiveness because it mainly checks the specifications in programs, since it is sensitive to different data types. PML\_Checker shows a high effectiveness, because it simplifies the analysis for complex data types in the process of abstracting the control flows. Second, comparing PML\_Checker to Splint, Splint reports memory leaks on the latter three data types (linked list, struct and array\_struct), except the memory leaks in an array. Due to the programs that are provided in this paper are in small scale and simple data relationships, PML\_Checker shows a little advantage compared with Splint. For the former

approaches, that is CppCheck and RL\_Detector, there is a large space to improve in analyzing the complex data types.

### C. Summary

From the above experimental results, we have the following main findings including advantages and limitations:

- For the accuracy of detection, PML\_Checker shows a lower false negative comparing to other three tools, while it shows a high false positive rate in real-world repositories (SPEC CPU 2000 and SIR). Therefore, in the next step, more detailed data flow analysis are plan to be added into our approach.
- For the complex control flows and complex data types analysis, PML\_Checker is better than the other three tools.
- For the scalability of detection, our experiment needs to expand the range of detection. Specifically, it is possible to detect the large scale benchmarks with millions of code lines, or source code from some open-source software.

## V. RELATED WORK

In recent years, some researchers proposed new static approaches to memory leak detection. [7], [8], [9], [10] detected errors by model checking. [7], [8] proposed Memory State Transition Graph (MSTG) and implemented the tool Melton. MSTG recorded change of memory-object states as path conditions. It made the cases in the same code pattens were easy to detect [9] considered from the perspective of object ownership for memory mangement and modeling it. The ownership-model approach could check potential memory leaks and double deletions in a procedure. However, the above approaches may cause high false positive in large programs. In some sense, according to the leak model in complex control flows, our approach checks memory leaks based on this model. It makes the detection in complex programs simple and intuitive.

Research on the analysis complex programs mainly focus on control flow graphs. To our knowledge, there is currently no investigation of memory leak detection in complex control flow. [11], [12] study control flow graphs. The DMP (diverge-merge processor) in [11] is a processor architecture to predict complex branches dynamically. [12] presents a method to calculate all the worst paths from any node. [13] shows a method to measure the complexity of programs. This paper combines complex control flow with memory leaks in the program, shows a novel detecting method.

There are only a few of papers use the projection method in the program analysis. [14] analyzed the specification and abortion of programs by the projection of functions. While in terms of safety, this paper only takes a conservative analysis, in other words, the output is “uncertain” or “unknown” for some uncertain input, which is relatively fuzzy, so the accuracy of the analysis results need to be improved. In our approach, we redefine the projection of the program control flow graphs, and solve safety problems with a specific algorithm for detecting memory leaks.

## VI. CONCLUSION

In this paper, we focus on memory leak detection with complex control flows. We propose a projection-based approach to increase the accuracy in detecting memory leaks in C source code. We implement a detection tool named PML\_Checker, and evaluate our approach by comparing with three open-source tools on real-world repositories, public benchmarks and CC code. Experimental results show that our approach has lower false negatives than three other approaches, especially in C source code with complex control flows and complex data types. The future direction is to improve our approach in terms of scalability. Specifically, it is possible to improve the detection accuracy by combining with other static methods such as data flow analysis.

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