The Allocation of Teaching Talent and Human Capital Accumulation

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Introduction

- Public education in U.S. has gone through major (positive) changes since end of WW II:
 - Annual real expenditures per student:
 \$2,100 (1950s) to \$12,000 (2010s)
 - Student-teacher ratio: 27 (1955) to 16 (2010s)
- Evolution of educational outcomes doesn't compare favorably with countries at similar income level (e.g. PISA assessments)
- ► Potential explanations include:
 - o U.S. education underfunded by international comparison
 - Role of (powerful) teachers' unions

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 - Occupational choice
 - Local funding for public education (e.g. property taxes)



Research Questions

➤ To what extent do changes in career opportunities in other occupations affect selection of workers into teaching careers?

- To what extent are static efficiency gains associated with improved career opportunities in non-teaching occupations muted or amplified by dynamic effects?
 - ⇒ human capital accumulation channel

What We Do

- Highlight stylized facts
- Develop a novel theory of occupational choice and human capital formation:
 - o non-linear wages ⇒ comparative and absolute advantage
 - o intergenerational dynamics of human capital accumulation
- Combine three longitudinal surveys:
 - Project TALENT, NLSY79, NLSY97

Majority of (Public) School Teachers is Female

% Female	Time Period
61.1	early 70s
77.7	1986-1993
77.1	2009-2013
75	2003-4
	61.1 77.7 77.1


Educational Barriers / Labor Market Discrimination

- ► Females face low barriers / discrimination in teaching
- Barriers / discrimination in non-teaching occupations falling over time

Occupational Choice

- ▶ Share of women in teaching: 4.6% in 1970 to 6.7% in 2010
- ▶ Share of men in teaching: 2.9% in 1970 to 2.1% in 2010
- ► Sharp rise in female labor force participation rate
- Slight decline in male labor force participation rate

Ability Distribution of Females by Occupation



Overview

- OLG
- ▶ Non-linear version of occupational choice model
- ► Educational barriers / labor market discrimination (as in Hsieh et al., 2019)

Endowments, Preferences

- lacktriangle Each period, a measure M of agents is born and lives for two periods: "young" and "old"
- ightharpoonup G groups of individuals
- With occupation-specific abilities from $F_a(\vec{a})$
- ▶ log preferences over consumption and leisure:

$$\mu \ln C_g' + \ln \left(1 - s_{i,g}\right)$$

Technologies

- "Young" make occupation-specific time and goods investments
- "Old" work as teachers or production workers

Human capital production (teaching) depends on teacher's $h_{T,\hat{g}}$, class size $N(h_{T,\hat{g}})$, own ability a_i , time $s_{i,g}$ and goods $e_{i,g}$ investments:

$$h_{i,g}'(a_i) = \left(h_{T,\hat{g}}\right)^{\beta} a_i^{\alpha}(s_{i,g})^{\phi} (e_{i,g})^{\eta} \left(N(h_{T,\hat{g}})\right)^{-\sigma}$$
 where $\widetilde{H}_T = \sum_{\hat{g}=1}^G \int_0^{\infty} \left(h_{T,\hat{g}}\left(a\right)\right)^{\frac{\beta}{\sigma}} f_{T,\hat{g}}(a) da$

Final output production depends on adult worker's human capital $h_{O,g}$ and exogenous productivity A_O :

$$y_g = A_O h_{O,g}$$

Values

$$V_g(a_T, a_O, \widetilde{H}_T) = \max_{\{s_{O,g}, s_{T,g}, e_{O,g}, e_{T,g}\}} \left\{ V_{O,g}(a_O, \widetilde{H}_T), V_{T,g}(a_T, \widetilde{H}_T) \right\}$$

where

$$V_{O,g}(a_{O}, \widetilde{H}_{T}) = \ln\left(1 - s_{O,g}\left(a_{O}, \widetilde{H}_{T}\right)\right)$$

$$+ \mu \ln\left[h'_{O,g}A'_{O}(1 - t')(1 - \tau_{O,g}^{\omega'})\right]$$

$$- e_{O,g}(a_{O}, \widetilde{H}_{T})(1 + \tau_{O,g}^{e})\right],$$

$$V_{T,g}(a_{T}, \widetilde{H}_{T}) = \ln\left(1 - s_{T,g}\left(a_{T}, \widetilde{H}_{T}\right)\right)$$

$$+ \mu \ln\left[\omega'(h'_{T,g}, \widetilde{H}'_{T})(1 - t')(1 - \tau_{T,g}^{\omega'})\right]$$

$$- e_{T,g}(a_{T}, \widetilde{H}_{T})(1 + \tau_{T,g}^{e'})\right]$$

Constraints, Laws of Motion

$$t \left[\sum_{g=1}^{G} \int_{0}^{\infty} \omega_{T} (h_{T,g}(a)) f_{T,g}(a) da + \sum_{g=1}^{G} \int_{0}^{\infty} \omega_{O} (h_{O,g}(a)) f_{O,g}(a) da \right]$$

$$= \sum_{g=1}^{G} \int_{0}^{\infty} \omega_{T} (h_{T,g}(a)) f_{T,g}(a) da$$

$$f_{T,g}(a) = \int_{0}^{\bar{a}_{g}^{-1}(a)} f(a,b) db$$

$$f_{O,g}(b) = \int_{0}^{\bar{a}_{g}(b)} f(a,b) da$$

$$H'_{O} = \sum_{g=1}^{G} \int_{0}^{\infty} \left(\frac{2\widetilde{H}_{T}}{M}\right)^{\sigma} a^{\alpha} s_{O,g} \left(a, \widetilde{H}_{T}\right)^{\phi} e_{O,g}(a, \widetilde{H}_{T})^{\eta} f_{O,g}(a) da$$

$$\widetilde{H}'_{T} = \sum_{g=1}^{G} \int_{0}^{\infty} \left(\left(\frac{2\widetilde{H}_{T}}{M}\right)^{\sigma} a^{\alpha} s_{T,g} \left(a, \widetilde{H}_{T}\right)^{\phi} e_{T,g}(a, \widetilde{H}_{T})^{\eta}\right)^{\frac{\beta}{\sigma}} f_{T,g}(a) da$$

Occupational Threshold

$$a_{T,g}^*(a_O) = \bar{a}_g(a_O, \widetilde{H}_T)$$

such that

$$V_{O,g}(a_O,\widetilde{H}_T)=V_{T,g}\left(a_{T,g}^*(a_O),\widetilde{H}_T
ight)$$
 , for all $a_O\in(0,\infty)$

- Assignment of students to teachers is random
 ⇒ distribution of students' skill identical across classrooms
- ▶ Teachers with different $h_{T,q}$ vary with respect to class *size*
- $lackbox{}\omega(\cdot,\cdot)$ is proportional to the *number of students* in a teacher's class:

$$\omega(h_{T,g}, \widetilde{H}_T) = \lambda N(h^T, \widetilde{H}^T)$$

$$= \frac{H'^O A'^O}{\frac{M}{2} \sum_{g=1}^G \int_0^\infty f_{O,g}(a) da} \cdot \underbrace{\frac{\sum_{g=1}^M \frac{1}{H^T}}{\sum_{g=1}^M \int_0^\infty f_{O,g}(a) da}}_{\text{total output (next period)}} \cdot \underbrace{\frac{\sum_{g=1}^M \int_0^\infty f_{O,g}(a) da}{\sum_{g=1}^G \int_0^\infty f_{O,g}(a) da}}_{\text{fraction of prospective}} \cdot \underbrace{\frac{(h_{T,g})^{\frac{\beta}{\sigma}}}{\widetilde{H}_T}}_{\text{fraction of students taught}}$$

production workers in class

Equilibrium

Given occupational choices of today's "old" and aggregate human capital \widetilde{H}_T and H_O , the equilibrium consists of individual choices of "young" $\{e_{T,g},s_{T,g},e_{O,g},s_{O,g}\}$, the occupational choice boundary $a_{T,g}^*(a_O)$, the corresponding densities $f_{T,g}$ and $f_{O,g}$, and occupation- and group-specific wage profiles $\{\omega_{T,g},\omega_{O,g}\}$ such that:

- 1. Individuals solve their problem Time Investment Goods Investment
- 2. Aggregate human capital follows the laws of motion Laws of Motion
- 3. Government budget constraint is satisfied

Occupational Choice Boundary...

 \ldots does not depend on aggregate state $\widetilde{H^T}$

$$\begin{split} &\frac{a_{O}^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\eta}}}{\overline{a}_{T}(a_{O})^{\frac{\alpha\beta}{\sigma-\eta\beta}}} \cdot \frac{\tau_{O,g}^{\frac{1}{1-\eta}}}{\tau_{T,g}^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-\eta\beta}}} \cdot \frac{1-\eta}{1-\frac{\beta\eta}{\sigma}} \cdot \frac{1+\tau_{O,g}^{e}}{1+\tau_{T,g}^{e}} \cdot \left(\frac{1-s_{O,g}}{1-s_{T,g}}\right)^{\frac{1}{\mu}} \cdot \frac{s_{O,g}^{\frac{\phi}{1-\eta}}}{s_{T,g}^{\frac{\phi\beta}{\sigma-\eta\beta}}} \\ &= \frac{\sum_{g=1}^{G} \tau_{O,g}^{\frac{\eta}{1-\eta}} \cdot s_{O,g}^{\frac{\phi}{\sigma}} \cdot \int_{0}^{\infty} a^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\eta}} f_{O,g}(a) da}{\sum_{g=1}^{G} \tau_{T,g}^{\frac{\eta\beta}{\sigma-\eta\beta}} \cdot s_{T,g}^{\frac{\phi\beta}{\sigma-\eta\beta}} \cdot \int_{0}^{\infty} a^{\frac{\alpha\beta}{\sigma-\eta\beta}} f_{T,g}(a) da \cdot \sum_{g=1}^{G} \int_{0}^{\infty} f_{O,g}(a) da} \end{split}$$

Data

- Micro-data on abilities and occupational choice:
 - 1. Project TALENT (1960-1975):
 - representative 5% sample of high school population in 1960
 - ▶ follow-up surveys at 1, 5, and 11-year post graduation
 - 2. NLSY 79
 - 3. NLSY 97
- Math, Verbal, and Social abilities
- ▶ Occupational choice 11 years after (likely) high school graduation in all surveys (~ age 29)

Occupation-specific Abilities

- Ability rank from NLSY 79 and NLSY 97: Math, Verbal, and Social (Guvenen et al, 2020)
- "Crosswalk" from composite math and verbal scores in Project TALENT to AFQT equivalents (Air Force, 1990)
- Social composite in Project TALENT (Deming, 2017)
- Skill requirements by occupation from O*NET: Math, Verbal, and Social (Guvenen et al, 2020)
- Occupation-specific ability:

$$\bar{a} = \frac{a_m + a_v + a_s}{b_m + b_v + b_s} + \sum_{i = \{m, v, s\}} \frac{a_i}{b_i} \left| \frac{a_i}{a_v + a_m + a_s} - \frac{b_i}{b_v + b_m + b_s} \right|$$

Calibration

Assumptions and Normalization

Parameter	Definition	Determination	Value
$ au_{i,men}^w$	Labor market barriers for men	Assumption	0
$ au_{i,men}^e$	Human capital barriers for men	Assumption	0
$ au_{T,g}^w$	Labor market barriers for all groups	Assumption	0
$ au_{T,g}^{e}$	Human capital barriers for all groups	Assumption	0
$\tau_{i,a}^{e}$	Human capital barriers for other groups	Normalization	0
$ au_{i,g}^{e^{r/3}} \ A_T$	Teachers productivity	Normalization	1
μ_a	Mean ability distribution	Normalization	0
σ_a	St.dev. ability distribution	Normalization	1

Calibration

Baseline Parameters

Param.	Definition	Determination
α	Ability elasticity of human capital	Wage dispersion
η	Goods elasticity of human capital	Aggregate education spending share
ϕ	Time elasticity of human capital	Mincerian return to education for other
A_i	Occupation-specific productivity	Labor market shares for men
$ au_{i,g}^w$	Labor market barriers for other groups	Group gap in labor market shares by occupation

Calibration

Benchmark Calibration

Parameter	Definition	Empirical Targets
β	Teacher elasticity of human capital	Skill composition by occupation and group
σ	Class size elasticity of human capital	Normalization to 1
	Trade-off between consumption and	Schooling of teachers relative
μ	time spent accumulating human capital	to schooling of others
λ_m	Scale for male labor market barriers	Share of teachers among men
λ_f	Scale for other group labor market barriers	Share of teachers among other group

Summing up

Results

- Develop a novel theory of occupational choice and human capital formation:
 - o non-linear wages ⇒ comparative and absolute advantage
 - o intergenerational dynamics of human capital accumulation

Ongoing and Future Work

- Calibrate reduction in discrimination & barriers:
 - o static gains (as in Hsieh et al., 2019) vs.
 - dynamic effects (human capital accumulation)
- Multiple locations differentiated by amenities and/or local tax rates (implicit school segregation by income)

Optimal Time Investment

$$s_{T,g} = \frac{\mu\phi}{\mu\phi + \frac{\beta}{\sigma} - \eta}$$
$$s_{O,g} = \frac{\mu\phi}{\mu\phi + 1 - \eta}$$

Optimal Goods Investment

$$\begin{split} e_{T,g} &= \frac{\beta}{\sigma} \cdot \eta^{\frac{1}{1-\eta}} \cdot \left(\frac{2\tilde{H}_T}{M}\right)^{\frac{\sigma}{1-\eta}} \\ &\times \frac{\sum_{g=1}^G A_O'^{\frac{1}{1-\eta}} \cdot \tau_{O,g}^{\frac{\eta}{1-\eta}} \cdot s_{O,g}^{\frac{\phi}{1-\eta}} \cdot \int_0^\infty a^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\eta}} f_{O,g}(a) da}{\sum_{g=1}^G f_{O,g}(a) da} \\ &\times \frac{\tau_{T,g}^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-\eta\beta}} \cdot s_{T,g}^{\frac{\phi\beta}{\sigma-\eta\beta}} \cdot a_T^{\frac{\alpha\beta}{\sigma-\eta\beta}}}{\sum_{g=1}^G \tau_{T,g}^{\frac{\eta\beta}{\sigma-\eta\beta}} \cdot s_{T,g}^{\frac{\phi\beta}{\sigma-\eta\beta}} \cdot \int_0^\infty a^{\frac{\alpha\beta}{\sigma-\eta\beta}} f_{T,g}(a) da} \\ e_{O,g} &= \left(\tau_{O,g} \cdot \eta \cdot \left(\frac{2\tilde{H}_T}{M}\right)^{\sigma} \cdot A_O'^{\eta} \cdot s_{O,g}^{\phi} \cdot a_O^{\alpha}\right)^{\frac{1}{1-\eta}} \end{split}$$

Aggregate Laws of Motion

$$\begin{split} \widetilde{H}_{T}' &= \left[\left(\frac{\beta}{\sigma} \right)^{\eta} \cdot \eta^{\frac{1}{1-\eta}} \cdot \left(\frac{2\widetilde{H}_{T}}{M} \right)^{\frac{\sigma}{1-\eta}} \right. \\ &\times \left(\frac{\sum_{i=2}^{I} \sum_{g=1}^{G} A_{i}'^{\frac{1}{1-\eta}} \cdot \tau_{i,g}^{\frac{\eta}{1-\eta}} \cdot s_{i,g}^{\frac{\phi}{1-\eta}} \cdot \int_{0}^{\infty} a^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\eta}} f_{i,g}(a) da}{\sum_{i=2}^{I} \sum_{g=1}^{G} f_{i,g}(a) da} \right)^{\eta} \\ &\times \left(\sum_{g=1}^{G} \tau_{T,g}^{\frac{\eta\beta}{\sigma-\eta\beta}} \cdot s_{T,g}^{\frac{\phi\beta}{\sigma-\eta\beta}} \cdot \int_{0}^{\infty} a^{\frac{\alpha\beta}{\sigma-\eta\beta}} f^{g,T}(a) da \right)^{\frac{\sigma-\eta\beta}{\beta}} \right]^{\frac{\beta}{\sigma}} \\ H_{O}' &= \sum_{g=1}^{G} \left(\tau_{O,g}^{\eta} \cdot \eta^{\eta} \cdot \left(\frac{2\widetilde{H}_{T}}{M} \right)^{\frac{\sigma}{1-\eta}} \cdot A_{O}'^{\eta} \cdot s_{T,g}^{\phi} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\eta}} \cdot \int_{0}^{\infty} a^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\eta}} f_{O,g}(a) da \end{split}$$

Teacher's Wage Profile

$$\omega = \eta^{\frac{\eta}{1-\eta}} \cdot \left(\frac{2\widetilde{H}_T}{M}\right)^{\frac{\sigma}{1-\eta}} \cdot \frac{\sum_{g=1}^G A_O'^{\frac{1}{1-\eta}} \cdot \tau_{O,g}^{\frac{\eta}{1-\eta}} \cdot s_{O,g}^{\frac{\phi}{1-\eta}} \cdot \int_0^\infty a^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\eta}} f_{O,g}(a) da}{\sum_{g=1}^G f_{O,g}(a) da}$$

$$\times \frac{\tau_{T,g}^{\frac{\eta\beta}{\sigma-\eta\beta}} \cdot s_{T,g}^{\frac{\phi\beta}{\sigma-\eta\beta}} \cdot a_T^{\frac{\alpha\beta}{\sigma-\eta\beta}}}{\sum_{g=1}^G \tau_{T,g}^{\frac{\eta\beta}{\sigma-\eta\beta}} \cdot s_{T,g}^{\frac{\phi\beta}{\sigma-\eta\beta}} \cdot \int_0^\infty a^{\frac{\alpha\beta}{\sigma-\eta\beta}} f^{g,T}(a) da}$$

Some Parameter Restrictions

- $\blacktriangleright \ \beta < 1 \eta$ to guarantee existence of stable $\widetilde{H^T} = \widetilde{H^T}' > 0$
- $\blacktriangleright \ \frac{\sigma}{\beta} > \eta \text{ and } \mu\phi > 0 \text{ for } s^{T*} \in (0,1)$
- $\blacktriangleright \ 1 > \eta \ \text{and} \ \mu \phi > 0 \ \text{for} \ s^{O*} \in (0,1)$