


Blockchain & Business Application

Lecture:

Bitcoin as a Platform for General Business Applications

Chapter 9

Bitcoin as a Platform



- So far, Bitcoin as a currency (CC)
 - What other possible applications?
-
- Some already implementable
 - Some needs modifications

- Consider Bitcoin as an ***Append-Only-Log***
- Once data written
 - Tamper-proof
 - Forever available
- Everything in order
 - Hash pointers,
 - Not timestamps
 - miners can lie about timestamps,
 - miners' clocks may not be synchronized,
 - latency on the network.
 - If timestamp too weird (1 hour difference) rejected

- We want to be able to prove that:
We know some value $x @ T$.
- Might not want to *reveal* $x @ T$.
- Instead, we only want to reveal x when we actually make the proof $@T+t$
- However, once proof is OK, we want the evidence to be permanent

Recall committing data

- Instead of publishing x , we can publish $H(x)$
- Later, no y such that $x \neq y$ but $H(x) = H(y)$
- $H(x)$ reveals no info about x .

Applications of timestamping 1


- Suppose we wanted to prove that some invention we filed a patent on was actually in our heads much earlier
- Publish the hash of the design document
- Later anytime, publish the design document
- Anyone can compute $H(d. doc)$ and compare

Applications of timestamping 2

- Suppose Alice hires Bob to perform a programming job;
- Their contract requires Bob to submit his work to Alice by a specific time.
- A&B published the hash of Bob's submitted work signed by both
- If any dispute later, straightfw to check

Attacks on Proof-of-Clairvoyance

- Clairvoyance: Ability of predicting the future!
- Publish a commitment about a future event
- After it occurred, publish your words



- A Twitter account attempted to “prove” 2014 FIFA Men’s World Cup Final was rigged by “predicting” the outcome of the match



- How come? Is it Possible?

- Tweeted all possibilities
- Kept ones ended true
- Deleted all others



Bitcoin

- Secure timestamping system does not tie commitments to any individual's public identity.
- If you don't reveal them, it is easy to publish a large number of commitments
- The ones you never reveal cannot easily be traced back to you.

Anonymity vs. decentralization

How to achieve a secure timestamping in Bitcoin?

Secure timestamping the old-fashioned way



Figure 9.2: A timestamping service (GuardTime) that publishes hashes in a daily newspaper rather than the Bitcoin block chain.

Bitcoin: Unspendable outputs.

- *OP_RETURN* instruction → unspendable output
 - returns immediately with an error
 - so that this script can never be run successfully,
 - the data you include is ignored
- Cost: One transaction fee, 1 penny
- Drawback: Arbitrary data? Child pornography?
- Would you become a miner?
- U.S. Code 2252:
 - “*knowingly* possesses, or *knowingly* accesses with intent to view”

Overlay Currencies

- We *can* write any data we want into Bitcoin
 - Use Bitcoin as an append-only-log
 - Build a new CC *on top of Bitcoin*
 - Without need to develop a consensus mech.
-
- Bitcoin Miners won't validate the data (ignore)
 - Complicated logic required
 - Double spend?

Counterparty

- All of its transactions written on Bitcoin
- In 2014, 1% of Bitcoin transactions carried it
- Counterparty's developers don't need to deal with consensus, etc. → Can develop sophisticated applications, smartcontracts, etc
- Ability to create a new CC without consensus mechanism and new miners? Looks good!
- Drawbacks?

Bitcoins as “Smart Property”

- Use bitcoins to represent sth other than a unit of currency in the Bitcoin system
- Following transaction graph, you can trace ownership of value in the Bitcoin system over time (bad for anonymity)
- No actual “coins” just unspent transactions
- Bitcoins are not fungible (not like gold)
- Histories are different; it “may” matter

Give a *meaning* to history of..

- Paper currency, first?
- Not jokes but some meaning
- Even a db to match s.n. → no need to stamp
- Inherit the anti-counterfeiting of paper money

“Bill #L11180916G hereby grants the holder admission to the Yankees game on Aug 18, 2014”



$SIGN_K(M, \#)$

Figure 9.4: An example of adding useful metadata to ordinary bank notes

Bitcoin

- Colored coins: Color as an extra metadata
- “issuing” transaction, we’ll insert some extra metadata




Figure 9.5: Colored coins. The transaction graph shown illustrates issuance and propagation of color

OppenAssets

- Most popular application using “colors”
- Assets issued using special Pay-to-Script-Hash (P2SH) address
- A transaction to that address adds color
- More than one “color” is OK
- Compatible with Bitcoin (only if color, extra value)
- When using “colored coin”, use a marker
 - To prevent double payment (e.g. ticket)
- Miners don’t check colors, trust a 3rd party

Secure Multi-Party Lotteries in Bitcoin

- Traditional betting
 - Alice and Bob want to bet five dollars.
 - They both agree to the bet in future, and the method
 - Bob will flip a coin in the air
 - while it's rotating Alice calls out "Heads" or "Tails".
 - When the coin lands,
 - both immediately see who won
 - Both know the outcome was random (no influence)
 - Both "trust" that loser is going to pay

Cryptographic coin flipping

- If designed, build various applications
- “Secure multiparty computation”
 - two or more mutually untrusting parties
 - each have some data
 - want to compute a result depends on all data
 - but without revealing the data to each other
- Sealed-bid auction, without a trusted auctioneer

- We might want
 - the result of the *computation* to determine a *monetary* outcome in an irrevocable way.
 - to ensure that the winning bidder in the auction pays the seller;
 - we even want to ensure that the seller's (smart) property being auctioned is automatically transferred to the winning bidder
 - to penalize parties if they deviate from the protocol.

Coin Flipping Online

- Online game
 - Alice, Bob, and Carol
 - All want to select 0,1 or 2 with equal probability
 - They can pick large random numbers x, y, z
 - Compute $(x+y+z) \% 3$
- If each sends number simultaneously, OK.
- If not, problem!
- Solution?

- Commitment

Round 1:

Each party picks a large random string — Alice picks x , Bob picks y , and Carol picks z .

The parties publish $H(x)$, $H(y)$, $H(z)$ respectively.

Each party checks that $H(x)$, $H(y)$, $H(z)$ are all distinct values (otherwise aborts the protocol).

Round 2:

The three parties reveal their values, x , y , and z .

Each party checks that the revealed values agree with the hashes published in Round 1.

The outcome is $(x + y + z) \% 3$.

Figure 9.6: Using hash commitments to implement a fair random number generator.

This protocol can be easily extended to support any number of parties.

- What if Carol gives up declaring z ?
- How to force each to declare in a limited time
 - Called “fairness” in cryptography
- Bitcoin’s “timed commitment” great for this
 - Some technical details

Bitcoin as Public Randomness Source

History

- NBA Draft Lottery
 - 1985 in NY
 - NY Knicks won

Conspiracy theories

- Envelope's corner bent
- Envelope kept in freezer

- U.S. military draft lottery
 - 1969, which young men to join the Army
 - To make it “look fair”




Figure 9.8: Images from the 1969 (Vietnam war) military draft lottery.

- In 1 week, statisticians observed a pattern
- Watched the tapes again and see:
 - Drums rotated exactly even numbers!




Figure 9.9: Statistical bias of the 1969 draft lottery. Day of the year (x-axis) versus lottery number (y-axis).

- Very difficult to prepare a “fair” setup
 - Actually, impossible with classical physics
 - *Determinism!*
 - Just ignore some parameters → pseudorandom
 - We need non-determinism
 - A quantum bit provides perfect random bit!
- Even if “fair”, how to convince the public?

Cryptographic beacon

- If we have a perfect cryptographic beacon
 - Continuously publishing a random string
 - People could trust
 - No need to efforts drums, etc.
 - No need to cryptographic efforts
- We have no perfect (*classical*) beacon yet

NIST Quantum Beacon '2011

- Preparing two entangled photons,
- Measuring photons' states
- Outcome is QM non-deterministic
- Do you **trust** QM
 - Uncertainty, superposition, entanglement?
- Do you **trust** that
 - Men in the lab actually doing it?
 - Not modifying the results after the measurement?

Other ways

- Criteria
 - public observability,
 - security against manipulation,
 - an acceptable level of unpredictability
- Possible methods
 - Tomorrow's temperature?
 - Sunspots?
 - Cosmic background radiation?
 - *All actually based on QM?*



Figure 9.10: NASA image of sunspots.

Drawbacks of natural phenomena

- Slow
 - Temp once a day?
 - Sunspots change slow
- Expertise
 - Public visible but is it really DIY?
- Measurement imprecision
- Requires **trust** to experts

Financial Data

- Stock market prices
- Low-level fluctuations
 - A good level of randomness
 - Difficult to predict
- Drawbacks?

Financial Data

- Drawbacks of low-level fluctuations
 - If you can predict, why not make direct profit
 - You manipulate stock market, need lots of \$ 😊
 - Need to **trust** the people in charge
- In summary, **trust** is needed!

Bitcoin as a Beacon?

- Miners compute lots of hash values
- No one “can” predict the hash of next block




Figure 9.11: Extracting public randomness from the hashes of blocks in the block chain.

Bitcoin as a Beacon?

- Security?
 - You find a block, you know its hash
 - Publish it, or play lottery?
- Timing?
 - Next block, exactly when?
- Pool members discarding the blocks?
- Interesting but unproven way