

Syllabus

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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

JTISTHEMAN4 v. UNITED STATES

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

No. 25–3. Decided March 24, 2025

Jtistheman4 was convicted and sentenced in the District Court for the District of Columbia on many counts of various federal offenses. A component of the sentencing order imposed on the petitioner is that he is barred from offices of “profit or trust” under the United States and under inferior jurisdictions. Seemingly, no authority for this component of the sentencing was invoked. Petitioner contends that the order to bar him from certain offices is unconstitutional and unlawful.

Held: (a) Absent a constitutional authority, the power of disqualification to the offices of inferior jurisdictions is reserved to them under the Tenth Amendment and not the United States. Pp. 1–2.

(b) The District Court acted *ultra vires* in imposing disqualification from federal office by going beyond section 3501 of the Federal Criminal Code. Pp. 1–3.

Reversed in part

FEELINGS, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 25–3

JTISTHEMAN4 v. UNITED STATES

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

[March 24, 2025]

JUSTICE FEELINGS delivered the opinion of the court.

Jtistheman4 was convicted and sentenced in the District Court for the District of Columbia on many counts of various federal offenses. A component of the sentencing order imposed on the petitioner is that he is barred from offices of “profit or trust” under the United States and under inferior jurisdictions. Seemingly, no authority for this component of the sentencing was invoked. Petitioner contends that the order to bar him from certain offices is unconstitutional and unlawful.

Because the Constitution does not explicitly empower the United States to issue disqualifications from the offices of inferior jurisdictions, except under the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, and because the provisions of section 3501 of the Federal Criminal Code were not followed, we reverse.

I

To say that the arguments presented by the parties before the court are well formed would be to utter a falsity worthy of death hanging in the public square. In fact, not a single coherent argument based in fact or law has been brought forth before this Court during the entire course of these proceedings. Despite this, the Court will proceed

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anyway in a valiant attempt to cobble together what is meant by the parties and provide some kind of guiding precedent that will provide any semblance of direction to the District Court on what is otherwise a genuinely complicated issue regarding disqualification from offices.

Let us start first with the fact that the petitioner's entire argument relies on the holding of the real-life counterpart to this Court in *Trump v. Anderson*, 601 U. S. 100 (2024). It is, of course, well set in law that "States have no power under the Constitution to enforce Section 3 [of the 14th Amendment] with respect to federal offices," *Id.* at 110. That is not a matter of law which is in dispute before the Court now. The petitioner, either willingly or negligently, neglects to recognize that the **United States** District Court does not derive its decision-making power from a fucking State. Instead, its power is derived from the Constitution of the United States. There will be no savior for the respondent, either, for failing to catch these deficiencies and also in failing to make one (1) correct legal citation throughout the entire brief. During this most holy month of Ramadan, may Allah save us all from the lack of wit exhibited by the litigants before this Court.

II

It is most troubling that the District Court invokes no authority by which the order was imposed, but that is perhaps a matter to be handled outside of this opinion. In considering the component of the sentencing order at issue here, it must be broken down into its base parts. There is first the matter of the disqualification of the petitioner with respect to 'municipal offices,' which is construed as the offices of an inferior jurisdiction—the District of Columbia. With respect to this disqualification, nothing can be more perfectly clear that absent some constitutional authority, the power of disqualification to the offices of inferior jurisdictions is "reserved to the inferior jurisdiction" by the Tenth Amendment, not empowered to the United States.

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Secondly, the order also includes disqualification from federal offices. There are provisions of law, specifically section 3501 of the Federal Criminal Code, which provide for the disqualification of persons from federal offices. However, this disqualification may only appear as part of the sentencing order when a defendant is convicted of certain offenses. Seeing as the defendant-petitioner in this matter was not convicted of those offenses, the District Court acted *ultra vires* in imposing any such restriction anyways.

* * *

Having found that both parts of the component are unlawful, we need go no further. The component of the sentencing order which provides for disqualifications from office is reversed, without any effect to the remainder of the order.

It is so ordered.