CS 5594: BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGIES

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CRYPTOGRAPHIC PRIMITIVES

Bitcoin is a <u>crypto</u>currency

Crypto is a mandatory building block in BTC/BC

<u>Remark</u>: Blockchain is based on <u>distributed system</u> and <u>cryptography</u>

Outline

Hash Functions and Applications

Asymmetric Cryptography

Public Key Primitives

Digital Signatures

Elliptic Curve Cryptography

Hash Functions and Applications

Hash Function

Long message of arbitrary length → Hash → Short message of fixed length

Also known as

- Message digest

- One-way transformation

- One-way function

- Hash

$$|H(m)| \ll |m|$$

$$|H(m)| = \{160, 256, 384, 512\} \text{ (preferred 256 bits)}$$

Random Oracle

```
On input x ∈ {0,1}*
If x not in Book
        Flip coin d times to determine H(x)
        Record (x,H(x)) in Book
Else
        return y where (x,y) ∈ Book
EndIf
```

Impossible to build a Random Oracle in real-world

Idea: Approximate Random Oracle

(Generally) Merkle-Damgard (MD) iteration

Start from a compression function H

$$H: \{0,1\}^{b+n} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^n$$

$|M| = b = 512\text{bits}$

H

$d = H(c, M) = 160 \text{ bits}$

$c = 160 \text{ bits}$

Iterate it

M_1 M_2 M_{L-1} M_L

H H ... H H $d = H(M)$

$\text{IV} = d_0$ d_1 d_2 d_{L-2} d_{L-1} d_L

Create small, fixed size message digests from arbitrary message

Authentication

Digital signatures

Hash-based Message Authentication Codes

Pseudo Random Number Generators

Key Derivation Functions

Blockchains

Performance

Easy to compute $H(m)$

One-Way (OW) property (Pre-Image Resistance)

Given $H(m)$, it is computationally infeasible to find m

$$m \qquad \xrightarrow{\text{easy}} \qquad H(m)$$
$$\xleftarrow[\text{hard}]{\times}$$

(Strong) Collision Resistance (CR)

Computationally infeasible to find m_1, m_2 s.t. $H(m_1) = H(m_2)$

(Weak) Collision Resistance (Target Collision Resistance – TCR)

Given $H(m)$ and m, it is computationally infeasible to find some m' s.t. $H(m') = H(m)$

CR implies TCR

CTR does <u>not</u> imply CR

OW vs. CR

OW does <u>not</u> imply CR

CR does <u>not</u> imply OW

Why do we need 160 or 256 bits in the output of a hash function?

If it is too long?

Unnecessary overhead

If it is too short?

Birthday paradox attack

Loss of strong collision property

Birthday Paradox

A classroom of n students

Probability of at least two students having the same birthday (e.g., Feb 3)

n=1 $\qquad\qquad\qquad 1 - \dfrac{365}{365}$

n=2 $\qquad\qquad\qquad 1 - \dfrac{364}{365}$

n=3 $\qquad\qquad\qquad 1 - \left(\dfrac{364}{365} \times \dfrac{363}{365}\right)$

General n students:

$$1 - \left(\frac{364}{365} \times \frac{363}{365} \dots \frac{365-n-1}{365}\right) = 1 - \frac{365!}{(365-n!)\cdot(365^n)}$$

$$\Pr(\text{no collision}) = \left(1 - \frac{1}{n}\right) \times \left(1 - \frac{2}{n}\right) \times \cdots \times \left(1 - \frac{k-1}{n}\right) \approx e^{-\frac{k^2}{2n}}$$

When x is small $1 - x \approx e^{-x} \Rightarrow \left(1 - \frac{1}{n}\right) \approx e^{-\frac{1}{n}}$

$$\Pr(\text{no collision}) = e^{-1/n} \times e^{-2/n} \times \cdots \times e^{-\frac{k-1}{n}}$$
$$= e^{-((1+2+\cdots+(k-1))/n}$$
$$= e^{-k(k-1)/2n}$$

$$\Pr(\text{no collision}) = e^{-k(k-1)/2n}$$

$$\Pr(\text{at least one collision}) = 1 - e^{-k(k-1)/2n}$$

$$\Rightarrow k = \sqrt{2n \times \ln\left(\frac{1}{1-p}\right)}$$

In general, if there are k possibilities then (on average) $\sqrt{k}$ are required to find a collision

Implication for hash function H of length m

    With a probability of 0.5

    If we hash $2^{m/2}$ random inputs

    Two message will have the same hash output

    Birthday attack

In Conclusion

        Choose at least $m \geq 160$, preferably $m = 256$

Applications should rely only on "specific security properties" of hash functions

> Try to make these properties as "standard" and as weak as possible

Increase the odds of long-term security

When weaknesses are found in hash function, application more likely to survive

Example: MD5 is badly broken, but HMAC-MD5 is barely scratched

Deterministic hashing

Attacker chooses $M, d = H(M)$

Hashing with a random salt

Attacker chooses M, then good guy chooses public salt $s, d = H(s, M)$

Hashing random messages

Given $M, d = H(M')$, where $M' = M \,||\, r$

Hashing with a secret key k

Attacker chooses $M, d = H(k, M)$

Stronger

Weaker

Deterministic hashing

<u>Collision Resistance (CR)</u>

Attacker cannot find M, M' such that $H(M) = H(M')$

Also many other properties

Hard to find fixed-points, near-collisions, M s.t. $H(M)$ has low Hamming weight

Hashing with public salt

Target-Collision-Resistance (TCR)

Attacker chooses M, then given random salt s, cannot find M' s.t. $H(s, M) = H(s, M')$

Enhanced TCR (eTCR)

Attacker chooses M, then given random salt s, cannot find M' and s' s.t. $H(s, M) = H(s', M')$

Hashing Random Message

Second Preimage Resistance

Given random M, attacker cannot find M' such that $H(M) = H(M')$

One-wayness

Given $d = H(M)$ for random M, attacker cannot find some M' such that $H(M') = d$

Extraction

For random s, high-entropy M, the digest $d = H(s, M)$ is close to being uniform

Hashing with a Secret Key

Pseudo-Random Functions

The mapping $M \rightarrow H(k, M)$ for secret key k looks random to an attacker

Universal hashing

$$\forall\ M \neq M', \Pr_k[H(k, M)\ =\ H\ (k, M')] < \epsilon$$

Block-based Encryption as Hash

Encryption block size may be too short (DES=64)

Birthday attack

Extension attacks

A few recently discovered methods can find collisions in a few hours

A few collisions were published in 2004

Many collisions found later for 1024-bit messages

More discoveries afterwards

In 2005, two X.509 certificates with different public keys and the same MD5 hash were constructed

- Based on differential analysis

- 8 hours on a 1.6GHz computer

- Much faster than birthday attack

MD5

- Previous versions (MD2, MD4) have serious weaknesses

- Broken; collisions published in August 2004

- Too weak to be used for critical applications

SHA-1

- Broken, both in theory and practice (with real-attacks)

- Collisions found in 2^{69} hash operations, much less than brute-force of 2^{80} operations (CRYPTO '05)

- http://thehackernews.com/2017/02/sha1-collision-attack.html

Recommended

- SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, …
- BLAKE-256/512 (good for embedded devices)

Authentication

     Digital Signatures

     Hash-based Message Authentication Code (HMAC)

     Authenticated Data Structures

          Hash Chain

          Merkle Tree

Proof of Work

Digital Signatures

Hash-then-sign paradigm

First shorten arbitrary-long message, $d = H(m)$

Then sign the digest, $s = \text{Sign}(d)$

Rely on **collision resistance** property

If $H(M) = H(M')$ then s is a signature for both M and M'

Attacks on MD5, SHA-1 threaten current signatures

MD5 attacks can be used to get bad CA certificate [Stevens et al. 2009]

Attacker works off-line (find *M,M'*)

    Use state-of-the-art cryptanalysis, as much as computation power as it can garter, without being detected !!

Helped by birthday attack (e.g., 2^80 vs. 2^160)

Well-worth the effort

    One collision -> forgery for any signer

Use randomized hashing

To sign M, choose fresh random salt s

Set $d = H(s, M)$, then $s = \text{sign}(s, d)$

Attack scenario (collision game)

Attacker chooses M, ~~M'~~

Signer chooses random salt s

Attacker mut finds M' s.t. $H(s, M) = H(s, M')$

Attack is inherently online

Only rely on **target collision resistance (TCR)**

Same s (since s is explicitly signed)

Not every randomization works

$H(M||s)$ may be subject to collision attacks when H is Merkle-Damgård

Yet this is what Probabilistic Signature Scheme (PSS) does (and it is provable in the ROM model)

Many constructions "in principle"

From any one-way function

Some engineering challenges

Most use long/variable-size randomness → don't preserve Merkle-Damgård

Also, signing salt means changing the underlying signature schemes!

Simple key-prepend/append have problems when used with Message Digest (MD) hash

Tag $\leftarrow H(key \;||\; M)$ subject to **length extension attacks**

HMAC: tag $\leftarrow H(key \;||\; H(key \;||\; M))$

About as fast as key-prepend for a MD hash

Rely only on PRF quality of hash

tag $\leftarrow H(key||M)$ looks random when key is secret

Hash Chain

Used for many network security applications

S/Key

Authenticate data streams

Key derivation in crypto schemes

Forward-security

Commitments

$K_i = H(K_{i+1}), H:$ hash function

Commitment

$$K_0 \xleftarrow{F} K_1 \xleftarrow{F} K_2 \xleftarrow{F} K_3 \xleftarrow{F} K_4 \xleftarrow{F} \xleftarrow{F} K_n = R$$

Given K_i:

Anybody can compute K_j, where $j < i$

It is computationally infeasible to compute K_l, where $l > i$

Any K_l disclosed later can be authenticated by checking if $H^{l-i}(K_i) = K_l$

Disclosing of K_{i+1} or a later value authenticates the owner of the hash chain

$$K_0 \xleftarrow{F} K_1 \xleftarrow{F} K_2 \xleftarrow{F} K_3 \xleftarrow{F} K_4 \xleftarrow{F} \xleftarrow{F} K_n = R$$

Idea: generate a long list of passwords, use each only one time

Attacker gains little/no advantage by eavesdropping on password protocol, or cracking one password

Disadvantages

Storage overhead

Remember a lot of passwords

Alternative: the S/Key protocol

Use one-way (hash) function

Alice selects a password x_0

Alice specifies n, the number of passwords to generate

Alice's generates a sequence of passwords

- $x_1 = H(x)$
- $x_2 = H(x_1)$
- …
- …
- $x_n = H(x_{n-1})$

Alice sends (securely) last value in the sequence: x_n

Key feature: no one knowing x_i can easily find x_{i-j} such that $H(x_{i-j}) = x_i, j \in [i]$

Only Alice possesses that information

Limited number of passwords (by n)

　　Need to periodically regenerate a new chain of passwords

Does not authenticate server!

Do not substitute bad seed password

Just a tool to enhance password-based systems

More general construction than one-way hash chains

Useful for authenticating a sequence of data values $D_0, D_1, \ldots, D_n$

H^* authenticates the entire chain

$H(D_{n-1}\|H_{n-1})$ $H(D_n)$

A binary tree over data values

For authentication purpose

Verifier stores the root as the commitment of the Merkle tree

Example

To authenticate k_2, send $(k_2, m_3, m_{01}, m_{47})$

Check $m_{07} =? h(h(m_{01}||h(f(k_2)||m_3)||m_{47})$

$m_{07} = h(m_{03}, m_{47})$

$m_{03} = h(m_{01}, m_{23})$

$m_{01} = h(m_0, m_1)$

$m_0 = f(k_0)$

Hashing at the leaf level is mandatory to prevent unnecessary disclosure of data values

Authentication of the root is necessary to use the tree

Typically done through a digital signature or pre-distribution

Limitation

All leaf values must be known ahead of time

$m_{07} = h(m_{03}, m_{47})$

$m_{03} = h(m_{01}, m_{23})$

$m_{01} = h(m_0, m_1)$

$m_0 = f(k_0)$

Update an element?

Insert a new element?

Delete an element?

Hash chain of blocks

prev: H( )

trans: H( )

prev: H( )

trans: H( )

prev: H( )

trans: H( )

Hash tree (Merkle tree) of transactions in each block

H( )   H( )

H( )   H( )

H( )   H( )

transaction

transaction

transaction

transaction

Asymmetric Cryptography

Public Key (Asymmetric) Cryptography

Cryptographic operations use different keys

Known as *asymmetric key* cryptography, *public key* cryptography

Key negotiation, digital signatures

Rely on some known mathematical hard problems

     Discrete logarithmic

     Elliptic curve discrete logarithmic

     Large integer factorization

P vs. NP

     A problem is in P if it can be solved in polynomial time

     A problem is in NP if the validity of a proposed solution can be checked in polynomial time

Confidentiality

Authentication

Integrity

<u>Non-repudiation</u>

Algebraic Structures

Public key cryptosystem harnesses certain algebraic properties in finite field

Closure under addition $\qquad a + b \ = \ c \in G$

Associativity of addition $\qquad a + (b + c) \ = \ (a + b) \ + \ c$

Additive identity $\qquad \exists e$ s.t. $a \ + \ e \ = \ e \ + \ a \ = \ a$

Additive inverse $\qquad \exists b$ s.t. $a + b \ = \ e$

Commutativity of addition $\qquad a + b \ = \ b + a$

Closure under multiplication $\qquad a \times b \ = \ c \in G$

Associativity of multiplication $\qquad a \times (b \times c) \ = \ (a \times b) \times c$

Distributive laws $\qquad a \times (b + c) \ = \ a \times b \ + \ a \times c$

Commutativity of multiplication $\qquad a \times b \ = \ b \times a$

Multiplicative identity $\qquad \exists e$ s.t. $a \times e \ = \ e \times a$

No zero divisors $\qquad a \times b = 0 \ \Rightarrow \ a = 0 \vee b = 0$

Multiplicative inverse $\qquad \exists \ b$ s.t. $a \times b \ = \ e$

Most popular public key method

Provide both public key encryption and digital signatures

Operates on **multiplicative group** $(\mathbb{Z}/n\mathbb{Z})^*$

Based on factorization problem

Given $n = p \cdot q$, hard to factorize n in polynomial time

Variable key length (2048 bits or greater)

Variable plaintext block size

Plaintext block size must be smaller than key size

Ciphertext block size is same as key size

Find (using Miller-Rabin) large primes p and q

Let $n = p \cdot q$

      Do not disclose p and q

      $\Phi(n) = ???$

Choose an e that is relatively prime to $\Phi(n)$
$$\gcd(e, \Phi(n)) = 1$$

Public key = (e, n)

Find d as multiplicative inverse of $e \bmod \Phi(n)$
$$e \cdot d = 1 \bmod \Phi(n)$$

Private key = (d, n)

Let RSA public key = (e, n) and RSA private key = (d, n)

Given a plaintext message $m < n$

Encryption

Encryption: $c \leftarrow m^e \bmod n$

Decryption: $m \leftarrow c^d \bmod n$

Signature

Signing: $s \leftarrow m^d \bmod n$

Verification: $m \leftarrow s^e \bmod n$

What if m > n?

Remark: hash-then-sign paradigm

Hashing: $t \leftarrow \text{Hash}(m)$ # |t| = 160 bits $\Longrightarrow t < n$
Signing: $s \leftarrow t^d \bmod n$

RSA Example

- Choose $p = 23, q = 11$
  - Both primes
  - $n = p \cdot q = 253$
  - $\Phi(n) = (p - 1) \cdot (q - 1) = 220$
- Choose $e = \mathbf{39}$
  - Relatively prime to 220
  - Public key = (**39**, 253)

- Find $d = e^{-1} \bmod 220 = \mathbf{79}$
  - $39 \cdot 79 \equiv 1 \bmod 220$
  - Private key = <**79**, 253>

Suppose plaintext $m = \mathbf{80}$

- Encryption
  $c = 80^{39} \bmod 253 = \underline{\quad}$ ($m^e \bmod n$)

- Decryption
  $m = \underline{\quad}^{79} \bmod 253 = \mathbf{80}$ ($c^d \bmod n$)

- Signing
  $c = 80^{39} \bmod 253 = \underline{\quad}$ ($m^e \bmod n$)

- Verification
  $m = \underline{\quad}^{79} \bmod 253 = \mathbf{80}$ ($c^d \bmod n$)

- Choose $p = 23, q = 11$
  - Both primes
  - $n = p \cdot q = 253$
  - $\Phi(n) = (p-1) \cdot (q-1) = 220$
- Choose $e = \mathbf{39}$
  - Relatively prime to 220
  - Public key = ($\mathbf{39}$, 253)
- Find $d = e^{-1} \bmod 220 = \mathbf{79}$
  - $39 \cdot 79 \equiv 1 \bmod 220$
  - Private key = <$\mathbf{79}$, 253>

Suppose plaintext $m = \mathbf{80}$

- Encryption
  $c = 80^{39} \bmod 253 = \mathbf{37}$ ($m^e \bmod n$)

- Decryption
  $m = \mathbf{37}^{79} \bmod 253 = \mathbf{80}$ ($c^d \bmod n$)

- Signing
  $s = 80^{79} \bmod 253 = \mathbf{224}$ ($m^d \bmod n$)

- Verification
  $m = 224^{39} \bmod 253 = \mathbf{80}$ ($s^e \bmod n$)

At present, 1024-bit keys are considered secure, but 2048-bit keys are recommended

Tips for making n hard to be factorized

p and q lengths should be similar (e.g., ~500 bits each if key is 1024 bits)

both $(p-1)$ and $(q-1)$ should contain a "large" prime factor

$\gcd(p-1, q-1)$ should be "small"

d should be larger than $n^{0.25}$

RSA Security

Some attacks on RSA

   Mathematical attacks (factor n, compute d from e) -> extremely difficult

   Brute force

   Probable-message attacks

   Timing attacks

How to prevent attacks?

   Large key

   Random padding (OKCS #1 v1)

   Message blinding

Useful only for digital signing (no encryption or key exchange)

Components

SHA-1 to generate a hash value (some other hash functions also allowed now)

Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) to generate the digital signature from this hash value

Designed to be fast for the signer rather than verifier

Based on discrete log hard problem

Given y_M , hard to find x_M s.t. $y_M = g^{x_M} \bmod p$

Announce public parameters used for signing

Pick p as a prime with >= 1024 bits

$p\ =\ 103$

Pick q as a 160-bit prime such that $q|(p{-}1)$

$q = 17$ (divides 102)

Choose $g \equiv h^{(p-1)/q} \bmod p$,

If $h = 2$, $g = 2^6 \bmod 103 = 64$

where $1 < h < (p-1)$ such that $g > 1$

powers of 64 mod 103 =
64 79 9 61 93 81 34 13 8 100 14 72 76 23 30 66 1

17 values

Note: g is of order q mod p

Key Generation

- Alice generates a long-term private key x_M

  - Random integer $0 < x_M < q$

    $$x_M = 13$$

- Alice generates a long-term public key y_M

  - $y_M = g^{x_M} \bmod p$

    $$y_M = 64^{13} \bmod 103 = 76$$

- Alice randomly picks a private key k such that $0 < k < q$, and generates $k^{-1} \bmod q$

  $$k = 12; \; k^{-1} = 12^{-1} \bmod 17 = 10$$

Signing phase

- Signing message M

  $$H(M) = 75$$

  - Public key $r = (g^k \bmod p) \bmod q$

    $$r = (6412 \bmod 103) \bmod 17 = 4$$

  - Signature $s = \big(k^{-1}(H(M) + x_m \cdot r)\big) \bmod q$

    $$s = \big(10 \cdot (75 + 13 \cdot 4)\big) \bmod 17 = 12$$

- Send (M, r, s)

  $$(M, 4, 12)$$

Verification

- Public parameters: g, p, q, y_M

  $p = 103, q = 17, g = 64, y_M = 76$

- Received from signer: M, r, s

  $M, 4, 12$ $H(M) = 75$

- $w = (s)^{-1} \bmod q$

  $w = 12^{-1} \bmod 17 = 10$

- $u_1 = [H(M)w] \bmod q$

  $u_1 = 75 \cdot 10 \bmod 17 = 2$

- $u_2 = (r * w) \bmod q$

  $u_2 = 4 \cdot 10 \bmod 17 = 6$

- $v = [(g^{u_1} \cdot y_M^{u_2}) \bmod p] \bmod q$

  $v = ((64^2 \cdot 76^6) \bmod 103) \bmod 17 = 4$

1. If $v = r$, then the signature is verified

Given y_M, it is difficult to compute x_M

x_M is the discrete log of y_M to the base g, mod p (i.e., $y_M = g^{x_M} \bmod p$)

Similarly, given r, it is difficult to compute k

Cannot forge a signature without x_M

Signatures are not repeated (used once per message) and cannot be replayed

Slower to verify than RSA, but faster signing than RSA

Key lengths of 2048 bits and greater are also allowed

Elliptic Curve Cryptography

An elliptic curve (EC) consists of all elements $(x, y) \in \mathbb{F}$ satisfying

$$y^2 = x^3 + ax + b$$

$y^2 = x^3 - x + 3$

$y^2 = x^3 + 1$

$y^2 = x^3 - 1$

$y^2 = x^3 - 4x$

Shorter key size than conventional PKCs (DL-based, RSA)

Lower computation overhead

Due to shorter key

Sec level (bits)	RSA/DL-based key size (bits)	ECC key size (bits)
56	512	112
80	1024	160
112	2048	224
128	3072	256
192	7680	384
256	15360	512

- **Point addition:** Let P and Q be two EC points

$$P + Q = R = (x, -y),$$

$$(x, y) = -R := \text{intersection of EC and PQ-line}$$

- **Point negation:** $P + (-P) = O$

  - *O: identity point at infinity (not on the curve)*

- **Point doubling:** $R = P + P = (x', -y'),$

  $$(x', y') = -R := \text{intersection of EC and } \underline{\text{tangent line}} \text{ of P}$$

- **Point multiplication:** achieved via <u>double-and-add</u>

  - Similar to <u>multiply-and-square</u> trick

  - e.g., Q=7P, 7 = $(111)_2$, Q = 0, R=P

    - Q += R & R*=2; Q+=R & R*=2; Q+=R & R*=2

Point addition and point doubling (arithmetic)

$$x_3 = s^2 - x_1 - x_2$$
$$y_3 = s^2 - y_1 - y_2$$

where

$$s = \begin{cases} \dfrac{y_2 - y_1}{x_2 - x_1} & \text{if } P \neq Q \text{ (point addition)} \\ \dfrac{3x_1^2 + a}{2y_1} & \text{if } P = Q \text{ (point doubling)} \end{cases}$$

- <u>Example:</u> Let $\text{EC} = y^2 = x^3 + 2x + 2 \bmod 17, \text{P} = (5,1), \text{Q} = (7,6)$

- Compute $\text{U} = 2P, V = P + Q$

  - $s_u = \dfrac{3x_1^2 + a}{2y_1} = (3 \cdot \underline{} + 2) \cdot (2 \cdot \underline{})^{-1} = \underline{} \cdot \underline{}^{-1} = \underline{} \cdot \underline{} \equiv \underline{} \bmod 17$

  - $s_v = \dfrac{y_2 - y_1}{x_2 - x_1} = (\underline{} - \underline{}) \cdot (\underline{} - \underline{})^{-1} = \underline{} \cdot \underline{}^{-1} = \underline{} \equiv \underline{} \bmod 17$

  - $x_u = s_u^2 - x_p - x_p = \underline{} - 5 - 5 = \underline{} \equiv \underline{} \bmod 17; \ y_u = s_u^2 - y_p - y_p = \underline{} - 1 - 1 = \underline{} \equiv \underline{} \bmod 17$

  - $x_v = s_u^2 - x_p - x_q = \underline{} - 5 - 7 = \underline{} \equiv \underline{} \bmod 17; \ y_u = s_u^2 - y_p - y_q = \underline{} - 1 - 6 = \underline{} \equiv \underline{} \bmod 17$

Points on an elliptic curve and the infinity point O form cyclic subgroups

e.g., $y^2 = x^3 + 2x + 2 \bmod 17$, P $= (5,1)$

2P = (6,3); 3P = 2P+P = (10,6); ...., 18P = (5,16); 19P = O

EC has order |E| = 19 as there are 19 points in its cyclic group

How many points in an arbitrary EC?

Given an elliptic curve E modulo p, the number of points on E is bounded by

$p + 1 - 2\sqrt{p} \le |E| \le p + 1 + 2\sqrt{p}$ (**Hasse Theorem**)

Number of points close to prime p

Rely on <u>EC-discrete logarithmic</u> hard problem

Given $(G, Y) \in$ EC s.t. $Y = k \cdot G$ (Y is G added to itself k times), hard to find k

EC Key size smaller than RSA/DH-based crypto

Attacks on EC groups are weaker than factorizing algorithm or discrete log attacks

Best known attacks

Baby-step, giant step

Pollard-Rho

<u>Number of trials:</u> $O(\sqrt{p})$

Public parameter generation

Pick p as a prime with >= 160 bits

$p\ = 17$

Pick a, b to form an EC

$y^2 = x^3 + 2x^2 + 2x$
(a=2,b=2)

Pick an ECC generator G with order n

$$n{\times}G\ =\ 0$$

G = (5,1), n=19

How to choose G and n?

multiplication of G mod p =
(5,1) (6,3) (10,6) (3,1) (9,16) (16,13) (0,6) (13,7) (7,6) (7,11) (13,10) (0,11) (16,4) (9,1) (3,16) (10,11) (6,14) (5,16) (O)

19 points

(p,a,b,G,n) are public parameters

Key Generation

Alice generates a long-term private key d_A

Random integer $0 < d_A < n$

$d_M = 5$

Alice generates a long-term public key Q_A

$Q_A = d_M \times G \bmod p$

$Q_A = (9,16)$

Signing phase: To sign message M

$z = H(M) = 5$

Select an ephemeral key k from $[1, n-1]$

$k = 3$

Compute an EC point $(x_1, y_1) = k \times G$

$(x_1, y_1) = (10,6)$

Compute $r = x_1 \bmod n$ (choose other k if $r = 0$)

$r = 10$

Compute $s = k^{-1}(z + r \cdot d_A) \bmod n$ (choose other k if $s = 0$)

Signature $\sigma = (r, s)$

$s = 13 \cdot (5 + 10 \cdot 5) \bmod 19 = 12$

Send (M, σ)

$(M, 10, 12)$

Verification

Public parameters: a, b, G, n, Q_A

$a = 2, b = 2, p = 17, n = 19, G = (5,1), Q_A = (9,16)$

Received from signer: M, r, s

$M, 10, 12$ $z = H(M) = 5$

$u_1 = z \cdot s^{-1} \bmod n$

$u_1 = 5 \cdot 12^{-1} \bmod 19 = 2$

$u_2 = r \cdot s^{-1} \bmod n$

$u_1 = 10 \cdot 12^{-1} \bmod 19 = 4$

Compute EC point $(x_1, y_1) = u_1 \times G + u_2 \times Q_A$

$(x_1, y_1) = (6,3) + (5,1) = (10,6)$

If $(x_1, y_1) = O$, invalid signature

$x_1 = 10, r = 10$

If $r \equiv x_1 \bmod n$, valid signature. Invalid otherwise

Curve25519 (Montgomery curve)

$$y^2 = x^3 + 486662x^2 + x$$

$$p = 2^{255} - 19$$

Secp256k1 (used in bitcoin)

$$y^2 = x^3 + 7$$

$$p = 2^{256} - 2^{32} - 2^9 - 2^8 - 2^7 - 2^6 - 2^4 - 1$$

ECC replaces modular arithmetic operations in conventional PKC by operations defined over the elliptic curve

ECC primitives can be easily constructed by making analogous changes to the corresponding conventional PKC

     ECC Encryption from ElGamal Encryption

     ECC-DH Key Exchange from Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange

     ECC-DSA Signature from DSA Signature