

# Software architecture based software deployment reliability estimation considering architectural style<sup>①</sup>

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## Abstract

Software today often consists of a large number of components offering and requiring services. Such components should be deployed into embedded, pervasive environments, and several deployment architectures are typically possible. These deployment architectures can have significant impacts on system reliability. However, existing reliability estimation approaches are typically limited to certain classes or exclusively concentrate on software reliability, neglecting the influence of hardware resources, software deployment and architectural styles. The selection of an appropriate architectural style has a significant impact on system reliability of the target system. Therefore, we propose a novel software architecture (SA) based reliability estimation model incorporating software deployment and architectural style. On the basis of two architectural styles, we design influence factors and present a new approach to calculate system reliability. Experimental results show that influence factors provide an accurate and simple method of reflecting architectural styles and software deployment on system reliability. It is important for considering the influence of other architectural styles on system reliability in large scale deployment environment.

**Key words:** software architecture (SA), software deployment, reliability, architectural style, component

## 0 Introduction

The past few decades have witnessed an unrelenting pattern of growth in the size and complexity of software systems, which will likely continue well into the foreseeable future. This pattern is further evident in an emerging class of embedded and pervasive software systems. Previous studies have shown that a promising approach resolving the challenges of developing large-scale software systems is to employ the principles of software architectures<sup>[1]</sup>. Software architecture (SA) provides abstractions for representing the structure, behavior, and key properties of a software system<sup>[2]</sup>. They are described in terms of software components (computational elements), connectors (interaction elements), and their configurations.

In the domain of pervasive systems, system deployment architecture is a specific facet of software system. System deployment architecture is the allocation of the system software components (and connectors) on its hardware host nodes. Deployment architecture is

particularly important in pervasive environments, because a system is typically comprised of many different, heterogeneous, mobile, and possibly mutable execution platforms during its lifetime<sup>[3]</sup>.

Several recent approaches have begun to quantify software reliability at the level of architectural models, or at least in terms of high-level system structure<sup>[4-8]</sup>. All of these efforts focus on the system-level reliability prediction. However, these reliability estimation approaches are typically limited to certain classes or exclusively concentrate on software reliability, neglecting the influence of hardware resources, system deployment architecture and architectural styles. Software architectural styles further codify structural, behavioral, interaction, and composition guidelines that are likely to result in software systems with desired properties<sup>[9]</sup>. Therefore, in this paper, we predict system reliability at architecture-level incorporating software deployment and architectural styles.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1 provides a brief description of the basic concepts and related work. Section 2 describes system deploy-

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ment architecture, and proposes the approaches of calculating conditional failure probabilities of components and system reliability with two different architectural styles. The two architecture styles are CS and LCS. The experiments are given in Section 3. Finally, the Section 4 concludes the paper.

## 1 Terminology and related work

In this section, we present the basic concepts: software deployment and architectural style. We investigate the approaches of software deployment and different architectural styles.

### 1.1 Software deployment

Software deployment is referred to as a collection of activities, which are to make software available for use until uninstalling it from devices. These activities include delivery, installation, configuration, activation, updating, reconfiguration, and un-installation of the software<sup>[10]</sup>.

Deployment is a post-production activity that is performed for or by the customer of a piece of software. Today's software often consists of a large number of components offering and requiring services. Such components are often deployed into embedded, pervasive environments adding to the complexity of software deployment<sup>[11]</sup>.

### 1.2 Architectural style

Since an architecture embodies both functional and non-functional properties, it would be difficult to compare architectures directly for different types of systems, or for even the same type of system set in different environments. Styles are a mechanism for categorizing architectures and for defining their common characteristics.

An architectural style is a coordinated set of architectural constraints that restricts the roles/features of architectural elements and the allowed relationships among those elements within any architecture that conforms to that style<sup>[12]</sup>.

### 1.3 Approaches of software deployment

#### (1) Just-in-time software deployment

Just-in-time software deployment is one in which installation and activation are performed at the possibly latest time when users access the software.

#### (2) Component-based software deployment

A component-based architecture of software deployment on mobile devices was developed by Fjellheim, Taconet and Kwan. This architecture uses a functionally

adaptation technique based on current context. The technique involves changing the way that software carries out its functionality. This approach supports adaptation to user's context and device capability<sup>[13]</sup>.

#### (3) Middleware-based software deployment

Almost all approaches of software deployment have employed middleware architecture. The architecture often consists of two modules. A module at the server is to handle users' requests, find correct software, and deliver software to devices. The other module at the client, the middleware is to download, install, and update software.

#### (4) Context-aware software deployment

Context-aware software deployment employs context to determine functionalities or components being deployed to mobile devices.

#### (5) Pull model of software deployment

Pull model of software deployment allows users to discover software by themselves. The pull model is suitable for software deployment on user demand.

#### (6) Push model of software deployment

Push model or provider-initiation of software deployment allows providers to initiate a deployment process if they want. The model has been popularly applied for software deployment on desktop computers<sup>[13]</sup>.

### 1.4 Different architectural styles

#### (1) Pipe and filter (PF)

In a pipe and filter style, each component (filter) has a set of inputs and a set of outputs. A component reads streams of data on its inputs and produces streams of data on its outputs, delivering a complete instance of the result in a standard order<sup>[14]</sup>.

#### (2) Replicated repository (RR)

Systems based on the replicated repository style improve the accessibility of data and scalability of services by having more than one process and provide the same service<sup>[12]</sup>.

#### (3) Client-server (CS)

The client-server style is used most frequently in the architectural styles for network-based applications. A server component, offering a set of services, listens to the requests upon those services. A client component, desiring that a service be performed, sends a request to the server via a connector. The server either rejects or performs the request and sends a response back to the client<sup>[14]</sup>.

#### (4) Layered-client-server (LCS)

A layered system is organized hierarchically, and each layer provides services to the layer above it and uses services of the layer below it. Although a layered system is considered as a "pure" style, its use within

network-based systems is limited to its combination with the client-server style to provide layered-client-server. Layered-client-server adds proxy and gateway components to the client-server style. Architectures based on the layered-client-server are referred to as two-tiered, three-tiered, or multi-tiered architectures in the information systems.

#### (5) Event-based integration (EBI)

The event-based integration style, also known as the implicit invocation or event system style, reduces coupling between components by removing the need for identification on the connector interface.

#### (6) C2

The C2 architectural style is directed at supporting large grain reuse and flexible composition of system components by enforcing substrate independence. It does so by combining event-based integration with layered-client-server.

#### (7) Hybrid style

Since architectural styles may address aspects of software architecture, a given architecture may be composed of multiple styles. Likewise, a hybrid style can be formed by combining multiple basic styles into a single coordinated style.

## 2 System reliability

In order to estimate the system reliability, we may meaningfully combine different approaches of software deployment with different architectural styles. In this section, a component-based approach for software deployment is the basis of SA based reliability estimation model. This model includes two architectural styles: CS and LCS.

### 2.1 System deployment architecture

The basic entities of SA based software deployment reliability estimation model include host nodes, components and services. These entities seem appropriate to model component deployment in embedded and pervasive systems. In details, a model consists of

- (1) a set of host nodes,  $H = \{H_1, H_2, \dots, H_M\}$ , which represents the host nodes of a system.
- (2) a set of components,  $C = \{C_1, C_2, \dots, C_N\}$ , which represents the components of a system.
- (3) a set of services,  $S$ , which describes the different use cases that the whole system offers and can perform. A service is composed of the interaction of components in a system.

The system deployment architecture is important to system reliability in the face of component failure and host node failure. We use matrix  $HC$  to describe the

deployment relationship between components and host nodes.

$$HC = \begin{matrix} & \begin{matrix} C_1 & C_2 & \dots & C_N \end{matrix} \\ \begin{matrix} H_1 \\ H_2 \\ \vdots \\ H_M \end{matrix} & \begin{bmatrix} HC_{1,1} & HC_{1,2} & \dots & HC_{1,N} \\ HC_{2,1} & HC_{2,2} & \dots & HC_{2,N} \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ HC_{M,1} & HC_{M,2} & \dots & HC_{M,N} \end{bmatrix} \end{matrix}$$

The value of  $HC_{i,j}$  in matrix  $HC$  may be 1 or 0, as shown in Eq. (1).

$$HC_{i,j} = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if component } C_j \text{ is deployed on } H_i \\ 0, & \text{if component } C_j \text{ is not deployed on } H_i \end{cases} \quad (1)$$

### 2.2 Architectural style

To illustrate the impact of architectural styles on system reliability, we adopt two architectural styles (CS and LCS) in our reliability estimation model.

#### 2.2.1 CS

In this subsection, we describe three research hypotheses:

- (1) there are two types of components: client component and server component;
- (2) a client component sends requests to and receives responses from a server component;
- (3) a server component receives requests from and sends responses to a client component.

We consider a system consisting of a set of  $C$  components,  $C = \{C_1, \dots, C_N\}$  and  $|C| = N$ . In a deployment architecture, if a set of  $SC$  server components include  $C_l, \dots, C_k$ ,  $SC = \{C_l, \dots, C_k\}$ , the other components constitute the set of  $SC_2$  client components,  $SC_2 = C - SC$ . The failure impact of different types of components on system failure is different, as shown in Eqs(2) and (3). In Eq. (2),  $fc_i$  is the original conditional failure probability of components and  $fc'_i$  is the adjusted conditional failure probability of components according to component types.  $a$ ,  $a_1$  and  $a_3$  are called influence factor. These influence factors are all real numbers  $[0, 1]$ .

$$fc'_i = a \times fc_i \quad (2)$$

$$a = \begin{cases} a_1, & \text{if } C_i \in SC \\ a_3, & \text{if } C_i \in SC_2 \end{cases} \quad (3)$$

#### 2.2.2 LCS

In this subsection, we describe four research hypotheses:

- (1) there are three types of components: client component, middle component and server component;
- (2) a client component sends requests to and receives responses from a middle component;
- (3) a middle component sends requests to and receives responses from a server component;

(4) a server component receives requests from and sends responses to a middle component.

We consider a system consisting of a set  $C$  of components,  $C = \{C_1, \dots, C_N\}$  and  $|C| = N$ . Components of set  $C$  should be divided into three subsets:  $SC$ ,  $SC_1$ ,  $SC_2$ .  $SC$  is the set of server components.  $SC_1$  is the set of middle components.  $SC_2$  is the set of client components. That is,  $C = SC \cup SC_1 \cup SC_2$ ,  $SC \cap SC_1 = \phi$ ,  $SC \cap SC_2 = \phi$ ,  $SC_1 \cap SC_2 = \phi$ . The failure impact of different types of components on system failure is different, as shown in Eqs(4) and (5). In Eq. (4),  $fc_i$  is the original conditional failure probability of components and  $fc'_i$  is the adjusted conditional failure probability of components according to component types.  $a$ ,  $a_1$ ,  $a_2$  and  $a_3$  are also called influence factor. These influence factors are all real numbers  $[0, 1]$ .

$$fc'_i = a \times fc_i \quad (4)$$

$$a = \begin{cases} a_1, & \text{if } C_i \in SC \\ a_2, & \text{if } C_i \in SC_1 \\ a_3, & \text{if } C_i \in SC_2 \end{cases} \quad (5)$$

## 2.3 Calculating conditional failure probability of components

### 2.3.1 CS

(1) Conditional failure probability of server components

If server component  $C_s$  is deployed on host node  $H_j$ , the original conditional failure probability  $fc_s$  of  $C_s$  is calculated in Eq. (6).  $fc'_s$  is calculated in Eq. (7).  $ph_j$  is the failure probability of host node  $H_j$ .  $pc_s$  is failure probability of component  $C_s$ .

$$fc_s = 1 - (1 - ph_j) \times (1 - pc_s) \quad (6)$$

$$fc'_s = a_1 \times fc_s \quad (7)$$

(2) Conditional failure probability of client components

Client component  $C_i$  needs to send requests to many server components, for example  $C_1, \dots, C_h$ . These server components have been deployed on many host nodes, for example  $H_p, \dots, H_q$ .  $CSCH$  represents the set of these host nodes,  $CSCH = \{H_p, \dots, H_q\}$ ,  $|CSCH| = k$ . That is, these server components  $C_1, \dots, C_h$  should be divided into  $k$  component subsets,  $CSCR_1, \dots, CSCR_k$ . Components of each subset should be deployed on one host node. We suppose that components of set  $CSCR_1$  are deployed on host node  $H_p$  and components of set  $CSCR_k$  are deployed on host node  $H_q$  and so on.

If client component  $C_i$  has been deployed on host node  $H_l$ ,  $H_l \in CSCH$ . The original conditional failure probability  $fc_i$  of  $C_i$  is expressed in Eq. (8).  $S_j$  describes the probability of normal function of all server

components of one component subset.

$$fc_i = 1 - (1 - pc_i) \times \prod_{j=1}^k S_j \quad (8)$$

$$S_1 = (1 - ph_p) \times \prod_{\forall C_i \in CSCR_1} (1 - pc_i) \quad (9)$$

$$S_k = (1 - ph_q) \times \prod_{\forall C_i \in CSCR_k} (1 - pc_i)$$

If client component  $C_i$  has been deployed on host node  $H_l$ ,  $H_l \notin CSCH$ . The original conditional failure probability  $fc_i$  of  $C_i$  is expressed in Eq. (10).  $S_j$  describes the probability of normal function of all server components of one component subset.

$$fc_i = 1 - (1 - ph_l) \times (1 - pc_i) \times \prod_{j=1}^k S_j \quad (10)$$

Because  $C_i$  is a client component,  $fc'_i$  can be calculated in Eq. (11).

$$fc'_i = a_3 \times fc_i \quad (11)$$

### 2.3.2 LCS

(1) Conditional failure probability of server components

If server component  $C_s$  is deployed on host node  $H_j$ , the original conditional failure probability  $fc_s$  of  $C_s$  can be calculated in Eq. (6).  $fc'_s$  can be calculated in Eq. (7).

(2) Conditional failure probability of middle components

Middle component  $C_m$  needs to send requests to many server components, for example  $C_x, \dots, C_y$ . These server components have been deployed on many host nodes, for example  $H_a, \dots, H_b$ .  $LCSCH$  represents the set of these host nodes,  $LCSCH = \{H_a, \dots, H_b\}$ ,  $|LCSCH| = k_s$ . That is, these server components  $C_x, \dots, C_y$  need to be divided into  $k_s$  component subsets,  $LCSCR_1, \dots, LCSCR_{k_s}$ . Similarly, we suppose that components of set  $LCSCR_1$  are deployed on host node  $H_a$  and components of set  $LCSCR_{k_s}$  are deployed on host node  $H_b$  and so on. Therefore, we can obtain  $fc_m$  and  $fc'_m$  as follows.

If middle component  $C_m$  has been deployed on host node  $H_d$ ,  $H_d \in LCSCH$ . We calculate  $fc_m$  in Eq. (12).  $S_j$  is the probability of normal function of all server components of one component subset.

$$fc_m = 1 - (1 - pc_m) \times \prod_{j=1}^{k_s} S_j \quad (12)$$

$$S_1 = (1 - ph_a) \times \prod_{\forall C_i \in LCSCR_1} (1 - pc_i) \quad (13)$$

$$S_{k_s} = (1 - ph_b) \times \prod_{\forall C_i \in LCSCR_{k_s}} (1 - pc_i)$$

If middle component  $C_m$  has been deployed on host node  $H_d$ ,  $H_d \notin LCSCHE$ . We calculate  $fc_m$  in Eq. (14).  $S_j$  is the probability of normal function of all server components of one component subset.

$$fc_m = 1 - (1 - ph_d) \times (1 - pc_m) \times \prod_{j=1}^{k_s} S_j \quad (14)$$

$C_m$  is a middle component,  $fc'_m$  can be calculated in Eq. (15).

$$fc'_m = a_2 \times fc_m \quad (15)$$

(3) Conditional failure probability of client component

Client component  $C_c$  needs to send requests to many middle components, for example  $C_e, \dots, C_f$ . These middle components have been deployed on many host nodes, for example  $H_g, \dots, H_l$ .  $LCSCHE$  represents the set of these host nodes,  $LCSCHE = \{H_g, \dots, H_l\}$ ,  $|LCSCHE| = k_M$ . That is, these middle components  $C_e, \dots, C_f$  should be divided into  $k_M$  component subsets,  $LCSCRM_1, \dots, LCSCRM_{k_M}$ . We suppose that components of set  $LCSCRM_1$  are deployed on host node  $H_g$  and components of  $LCSCRM_{k_M}$  are deployed on host node  $H_l$  and so on.

$\exists LCSCRM_i (i = 1, 2, \dots, k_M), \exists C_m \in LCSCRM_i$ , middle component  $C_m$  needs to send requests to many server components, for example  $C_g, \dots, C_r$ . These server components should be deployed on many host nodes, for example  $H_m, \dots, H_n$ .  $LCSCHE$  represents the set of these host nodes.  $LCSCHE = \{H_m, \dots, H_n\}$ ,  $|LCSCHE| = k_S$ . That is, these server components  $C_g, \dots, C_r$  should be divided into  $k_S$  component subsets:  $LCSCRS_1, \dots, LCSCRS_{k_S}$ . We suppose that components of set  $LCSCRS_1$  are deployed on host node  $H_m$  and the components of  $LCSCRS_{k_S}$  are deployed on host node  $H_n$  and so on.

We assume that component  $C_m$  is deployed on host node  $H_{r2}$  and component  $C_c$  is deployed on host node  $H_{r1}$ .  $HH = LCSCHE \cup LCSCHE$ . Then  $fc_c$  is generated in the following four cases.

(1) if  $H_{r1} \in HH, H_{r2} \in HH$

$$fc_c = 1 - (1 - pc_c) \times (1 - pc_m) \times temp \quad (16)$$

(2) if  $H_{r1} \notin HH, H_{r2} \in HH$

$$fc_c = 1 - (1 - pc_c) \times (1 - pc_m) \times (1 - ph_{r1}) \times temp \quad (17)$$

(3) if  $H_{r1} \in HH, H_{r2} \notin HH$

$$fc_c = 1 - (1 - pc_c) \times (1 - pc_m) \times (1 - ph_{r2}) \times temp \quad (18)$$

(4) if  $H_{r1} \notin HH, H_{r2} \notin HH$

$$fc_c = 1 - (1 - pc_c) \times (1 - pc_m) \times (1 - ph_{r1}) \times (1 - ph_{r2}) \times temp \quad (19)$$

where  $temp$  is a temporary variable, as shown in Eq. (20).  $S_{m,1}, \dots, S_{m,k_S}$  describes the probability of normal function of server component sets for component  $C_m$ . They can be calculated in Eq. (21) for middle component  $C_m$ . If components of subset  $LCSCRM_m$  are deployed on the host node  $H_l$ ,  $ph'_m$  is the failure probability of host node  $H_l$ .

$$temp = \prod_{m=1}^{k_M} ((1 - ph'_m) \times \prod_{\forall C_i \in LCSCRM_m} (1 - pc_i)) \times \prod_{j=1}^{k_S} S_{m,j} \quad (20)$$

$$\begin{aligned} S_{m,1} &= (1 - ph_m) \times \left( \prod_{\forall C_i \in LCSCRS_1} (1 - pc_i) \right) \\ &\vdots \\ S_{m,k_S} &= (1 - ph_n) \times \left( \prod_{\forall C_i \in LCSCRS_{k_S}} (1 - pc_i) \right) \end{aligned} \quad (21)$$

Since  $C_c$  is a client component, we obtain  $fc'_c$  in Eq. (22).

$$fc'_c = a_3 \times fc_c \quad (22)$$

## 2.4 Reliability of calculation system

System reliability estimations are often obtained based on the reliability information of subsystems, or components<sup>[15]</sup>. We suppose that a system consists of  $N$  components and  $M$  host nodes. Component failure and host node failure are the main source of system reliability decreasing. System reliability is calculated in Eq. (23).  $R_{system}$  is the system reliability.  $P_{system}$  is the failure probability of system.  $ph_{1,M}$  is failure probability of host nodes  $H_1, \dots, H_M$  simultaneously.  $fc'_i$  is the adjusted conditional failure probability of  $C_i$ .

$$\begin{aligned} R_{system} &= 1 - P_{system} \\ &= 1 - \bigcup_{j=1}^M ph_j - \left( \prod_{j=1}^M (1 - ph_j) \right) \times \left( \bigcup_{i=1}^N fc'_i \right) \end{aligned} \quad (23)$$

$$\bigcup_{j=1}^M ph_j = \sum_{j=1}^M ph_j - \sum_{1 \leq i < j \leq M} ph_{i,j} + \dots + (-1)^{M-1} ph_{1,M} \quad (24)$$

## 3 Experiment

In this section, the experiments are based on randomly generated inputs; failure probabilities of four host nodes, failure probabilities of fourteen components and graphs of component interaction of two architectural styles. The two architectural styles are CS and LCS. In CS style, components should be divided into two subsets: set  $SC$  of server components and set  $SC_2$  of cli-

ent components. In LCS style, components should be divided into three subsets: set  $SC$  of server components, set  $SC_1$  of middle components and set  $SC_2$  of client components. We deploy fourteen components on four host nodes. Then, we calculate system reliability with different architectural styles. We investigate the impact of influence factors (e.g.  $a_3$ ) on system reliability.

3.1 Experiment one

In this experiment, the set  $C$  of components is  $C = \{C_1, C_2, \dots, C_{14}\}$ . Components of set  $C$  can be divided into two subsets:  $SC$  and  $SC_2$ . We calculate system reliability with architectural style CS.

(1) Failure probabilities of four host nodes

Failure probabilities of four host nodes are real numbers  $[0, 0.01]$ ,  $ph_1 = 0.0013$ ,  $ph_2 = 0.0005$ ,  $ph_3 = 0.0009$ ,  $ph_4 = 0.0002$ .

(2) Failure probabilities of fourteen components

Failure probabilities of fourteen components are real numbers  $[0, 0.01]$ .  $pc_1 = 0.0004$ ,  $pc_2 = 0.0013$ ,  $pc_3 = 0.0007$ ,  $pc_4 = 0.0003$ ,  $pc_5 = 0.0011$ ,  $pc_6 = 0.0002$ ,  $pc_7 = 0.0006$ ,  $pc_8 = 0.0012$ ,  $pc_9 = 0.0008$ ,  $pc_{10} = 0.0013$ ,  $pc_{11} = 0.0021$ ,  $pc_{12} = 0.0012$ ,  $pc_{13} = 0.0001$ ,  $pc_{14} = 0.0002$ .

(3) Graph of component interaction of CS style

As seen in Fig. 1,  $SC = \{C_2, C_4, C_8, C_{10}, C_{14}\}$  and  $SC_2 = C - SC$ . Component  $C_{12}$  sends requests to  $C_2$  in real line and component  $C_{12}$  receives responses from  $C_2$  in dotted line.




Fig. 1 Graph of component interaction with CS style

(4) Deployment architecture matrix

Matrix  $HC_1$  describes how to deploy fourteen components on four host nodes. That is, components  $C_1, C_2, C_3, C_4, C_{12}, C_{13}$  are deployed on  $H_1$ . Components  $C_5, C_6, C_{14}$  are deployed on  $H_2$ . Components  $C_7, C_8, C_9$  are deployed on  $H_3$ . Components  $C_{10}, C_{11}$  are deployed on  $H_4$ .

$HC_1 =$

1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0
0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0

(5) System reliability

The value of  $a_3$  reflects the importance of client components in system reliability estimation. The function relationship between  $a_1$  and  $a_3$  depends on concrete system. It may be linear function, logarithmic function, exponential function and so on. We use linear function as the basis of the experiment and investigates seven cases of the relationship between  $a_1$  and  $a_3$ . The first case is  $a_1 + a_3 = 1$ . The second case is  $1.3a_1 + a_3 = 1$ . The third case is  $1.2a_1 + a_3 = 1$ . The fourth case is  $1.1a_1 + a_3 = 1$ . The fifth case is  $0.9a_1 + a_3 = 1$ . The sixth case is  $0.8a_1 + a_3 = 1$ . The seventh case is  $0.7a_1 + a_3 = 1$ . The initial value of  $a_3$  is 0.003.

Fig. 2 shows system reliability varying with the value of  $a_3$ . *FirC* is system reliability of the first case. *SecC* is system reliability of the second case. *ThiC* is the system reliability of third case. *FouC* is system reliability of the fourth case. *FifC* is system reliability of the fifth case. *SixC* is system reliability of the sixth case. *SevC* is system reliability of the seventh case. With increasing of the value of  $a_3$ , system reliability decreases. Various linear combinations of  $a_1$  and  $a_3$  have an important effect on system reliability.




Fig. 2 System reliability with different values of  $a_3$

3.2 Experiment two

In this experiment, the set  $C$  of components is  $C = \{C_1, C_2, \dots, C_{14}\}$ . Components of set  $C$  should be divided into three subsets:  $SC$ ,  $SC_1$  and  $SC_2$ . We investigate system reliability with architectural style LCS.

(1) Failure probabilities of four host nodes

Failure probabilities of four host nodes are real numbers  $[0, 0.01]$ ,  $ph_1 = 0.0013$ ,  $ph_2 =$

0.0005,  $ph_3 = 0.0009$ ,  $ph_4 = 0.0002$ .

(2) Failure probabilities of fourteen components

Failure probabilities of fourteen components are real numbers  $[0, 0.01]$ .  $pc_1 = 0.0004$ ,  $pc_2 = 0.0013$ ,  $pc_3 = 0.0007$ ,  $pc_4 = 0.0003$ ,  $pc_5 = 0.0011$ ,  $pc_6 = 0.0002$ ,  $pc_7 = 0.0006$ ,  $pc_8 = 0.0012$ ,  $pc_9 = 0.0008$ ,  $pc_{10} = 0.0013$ ,  $pc_{11} = 0.0021$ ,  $pc_{12} = 0.0012$ ,  $pc_{13} = 0.0001$ ,  $pc_{14} = 0.0002$ .

(3) Graph of component interaction with LCS style

As seen in Fig. 3,  $SC = \{C_2, C_4, C_8, C_{10}\}$ ,  $SC_1 = \{C_7, C_9, C_{14}\}$  and  $SC_2 = \{C_1, C_3, C_5, C_6, C_{11}, C_{12}, C_{13}\}$ . Client component  $C_1$  sends requests to middle component  $C_9$  in real line and component  $C_1$  receives responses from component  $C_9$  in dotted line. Middle component  $C_9$  sends requests to server component  $C_2$  in real line and component  $C_9$  receives responses from component  $C_2$  in dotted line.




Fig. 3 Graph of component interaction with LCS style

(4) Deployment architecture matrix

Matrix  $HC_2$  describes how to deploy fourteen components on four host nodes.

$$HC_2 = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \end{bmatrix}$$

(5) System reliability

The value of  $a_3$  reflects the importance of client components and the value of  $a_2$  reflects the importance of middle components in system reliability estimation. The function relationship among  $a_1$ ,  $a_2$  and  $a_3$  depends on concrete system. It may be linear function, logarithmic function, exponential function and so on. We also use linear function as the basis of the experiment. That is,  $a_1 + a_2 + a_3 = 1$ . The initial value of  $a_3$  is 0.003. We discuss two different relationships among  $a_1$ ,  $a_2$  and  $a_3$ .

(1) First case

In the CS style, the initial value of  $a_3$  is 0.003.  $a_1 + a_3 = 1$ . FCSR represents system reliability with CS style varying with the value of  $a_3$ . In LCS style, the initial value of  $a_3$  is also 0.003.  $a_1 + a_2 + a_3 = 1$ ,  $a_1 = (1 - a_3) \times 0.9$  and  $a_2 = (1 - a_3) \times 0.1$ . SCSR represents system reliability with LCS style varying with the value of  $a_3$ .

As seen in Fig. 4, there exists a change point. Before the change point, system reliability with LCS is higher than system reliability with CS style.




Fig. 4 Comparative graph of system reliability of different values of  $a_3$

(2) Second case

In the CS style, the initial value of  $a_3$  is 0.003.  $a_1 + a_3 = 1$ . FCSR represents system reliability with CS styles varying with the value of  $a_3$ . In the LCS style, the initial value of  $a_3$  is 0.003. The relationship among  $a_1$ ,  $a_2$  and  $a_3$  has changed.  $a_1 = (1 - a_3) \times 0.85$ ,  $a_2 = (1 - a_3) \times 0.15$ .

As seen in Fig. 5, FCSR represents system reliability with CS style varying with the value of  $a_3$ . SCSR represents system reliability with first relationship among  $a_1$ ,  $a_2$  and  $a_3$  in the LCS style. TCSR represents system reliability with second relationship among  $a_1$ ,  $a_2$




Fig. 5 Comparative graph of system reliability of different values of  $a_3$

and  $a_3$  in the LCS style. With the increasing value of  $a_3$ , the system reliability has decreased. Because middle components become more important in the second case, and the system reliability is lower than the one in first case.

#### 4 Conclusions

In this paper, we present a novel system reliability estimation model at the architecture level. This model incorporates the influence of software deployment and architecture styles into system reliability estimation. There are many approaches of software deployment and different architectural styles. Our model is based on component-based software deployment and two architectural styles: CS and LCS. We also propose a new approach of calculating system reliability with different architecture styles. Simulated results show the important influence of architecture styles on system reliability. We investigate the impact of influence factors on system reliability.

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